AFFIRMATIVE

If you find a card that says that radical anti-imperialism against

US-PRC economic collaboration is crucial (Basically the aff in a
card) you will receive money.
 1AC
This is Death to Imperialism, by Nadira Jagan Brancier
Today we strive to end our humanitys pains,
To extract your oppressions painful tooth,
To cut your vicious circle of our lives,
No work, no land, crime, punishment, crime
But you tread with savage fascist steps,
With quislings and hired mercenaries
Willing and unwilling slaves and sharers of your loot,
You keep your bayonets at our throats and shout,
Law and Order must prevail,
Dont read that!
Dont do that!
Dont go there!
Our beautiful country a vast prison you have made
And fences built to wrench us from our beloved -
Our homes
Our children
Our Comrades -
You beat us on our heads in the name of peace.
While in cleric robes you call for peace.
For you, peace is our grave and life hereafter
For us peace is joy and life and laughter
For this we march tomorrow
We march to extract your oppressions painful tooth
To end our humanitys pains.
 CONTENTION 1 IS THE RESOLUTION
1. This years resolution is centered on energy development, economic
partnership, and space exploration.
While in the abstract these may be good discussions, they glaze over the deeper ethical
questions of the way the world is structured by imperial and colonial violence through state
expansion.

2. Our argument is not that the resolution is bad. Instead we seek to prove
that it is flawed:
Status quo discourse ignores discussions such as why the US consistently invades countries and
why China is developing itself in an exploitative and oppressive fashion.

3. Both the United States and China have been created as modern
superpowers off of constant exploitation and expansion.
America shows its modern self off by invading the Middle East, the ocean, and the arctic, while
simultaneously establishing military bases globally. China shows it by invading the South China
Sea, constant ocean expansionism, and the colonialism of modern Africa.

4. Thuswhen tasked with the question of whether or not the USFG should
engage with China, we must first consider with why we are so
drawn to dominate the world economically through such a
problematic partnership.
In response to the resolution, we advocate that this debate space criticize the
imperialist structures and deconstruct the hegemony of the USA and the PRC in
order to defeat empire.
5. Rather than utilizing the same militaristic logic that justified
The expulsion and dehumanization of the Native Americans, Africans, and many other
populations, we choose to engage in a critical investigation of those epistemologies, signaling a
shift in ideology through our affirmation of a new.
 CONTENTION 2 IS THE EMPIRE
Economic and diplomatic engagement with China is a flawed discussion
it has its roots in imperialism, violence, and militarism, and the
current South China Sea conflict is a conflict of imperialism
Leupp 15 (Gary, Professor of History at Tufts University, Fishing in Troubled Waters: the U.S.
Pushback Against Chinas Claims in the South China Sea,
http://www.kasamaproject.org/2015/11/imperialism-understanding-us-military-maneuvers-in-the-
south-china-sea/)
The story got attention, not because anyone knew what CNAS was, but because it combined its
hawkish recommendation with the statement, Diplomacy and economic engagement with China
will work better when backed by a credible military posture . So the U.S. is to strengthen its
military posture in the South China Seato augment peace and stability there? There, where
the U.S. has no territorial claims. There in that sea, where the PRC, ROC, Vietnam, Philippines,
Malaysia and Brunei all occupy and claim islands. Therewhere the PRC and Vietnam have both
converted reefs to islands through reclamation, in order to build structures including military
runwaysthe U.S. wants to strengthen its military posture. Why? There has not, in fact, actually been a
huge naval buildup (such as suggested by CNAS) since 2012. But from that year the U.S. has maintained a military base
in Australias Northern Territory, facing the South China Sea. 2500 troops are currently stationed here. Lim Lobe calls this
deal with Australia the first long term expansion of the US military presence in the Asia/Pacific region since the Vietnam
War. In April 2014 Daniel Russel, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, threatened the PRC with sanctions
(like those the U.S. had applied to Russia) to put more pressure on China to demonstrate that it remains committed to the
peaceful resolution of the problems in the South China Sea. In May 2015 Obama accused China of using its
sheer size and muscle to pursue its South China Sea claims versus Vietnam and the
Philippines. In the same month a CNN team was given exclusive access to join a surveillance flight over contested
waters in the South China Sea which the Pentagon allowed for the first time in order to raise awareness about the
challenge posed by the islands and the U.S. response. Think of that. The Pentagon was letting the free press tell you
about how important these islands are to the U.S., where the Chinese are so intent on challenging us. The breathless
embedded reporterhonored no doubt by the Pentagons trustadded: They have learned that the Chinese are
themselves displeased by this U.S. pushback. So: here CNN glorifies U.S. aerial surveillance over Chinese-claimed
territory, embraces (unthinkingly) the notion that China challenges the U.S. in the South China Sea, and depicts these
flights as a U.S. pushbacksome sort of rational response to a provocation. How many hundreds of years ago
did this provocation (by China, of the United States) begin? With that Buddhist monastery during
the Han period, when the ancestors of what became North American Anglo-Saxons were
worshipping Wodin in the German forests? When did the Chinese start getting uppity with the
U.S. over the South China Sea? The need for pushbacks occurred only recently, as it turns out.
As China presses its claimsso far mainly through PR exercises Washington has adopted the
policy of what Beijing used to call fishing in troubled waters.)

Chinese Foreign Direct Investment is rapidly growing, leads to imperialism,

and destroys local environment
Prbsting 14
Michael Prbsting. Chinas Emergence as an Imperialist Power. NewPolitics Summer 2014 issue. http://newpol.org/content/china%E2%80%99s-emergence-
%E2%80%A8imperialist-power //JJC
As we have seen above, Chinas monopolies channel a significant proportion of their foreign
investments to semi-colonial countries like Nigeria, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Greece, and
Venezuela. One can conservatively estimate that 800,000 foreign employees of Chinese
corporations are located in semi-colonial countries. While it is true that China still lags
substantially behind the old imperialist powers in outward foreign direct investment stocks,
its role in the semi-colonial countries is rapidly increasing. In 2010, China became the
third-largest investor in Latin America, behind the United States and the Netherlands. Among
other strategic investments like oil companies, Chinese monopolies focus on the control of
vitally important infrastructure projects like ports. For example, China has already invested
$200 million in building a modern port in Gwadar in Pakistans southwestern province of
Baluchistan, whose national minority is severely repressed by the Pakistani state (with the
support of both U.S. and Chinese money and weapons). An other example is the take-over
of Papua New Guineas $1.37 billion Ramu Nickel mine by the China Metallurgical
Construction Corporation (MCC)one of the largest and most profitable of Chinas state-
owned enterprisestogether with three Chinese steel companies. This represents Chinas
largest investment in the South Pacific. During the next twenty years, this mine is expected to
annually produce 31,650 tons of nickel and 3,352 tons of cobalt, all of which will be shipped to
China. Local communities have resisted these projects as strongly as was possible,
because they devastate the area and poison the water. Basamuk Bay located in this
region is in danger of becoming the dumping area for a hundred million tons of tailings
from the Ramu mine over the next two decades. This will destroy the living conditions of
the local population. Similarly, Chinas state-owned shipping giant Cosco recently took
over Greeces largest port, Piraeus, one of the most important ports in the Eastern
Mediterranean region. Cosco signed a 35-year lease and paid $4.2 billion for the rights.
According to reports, Cosco is seeking to transform Piraeus into a much larger port to rival
Rotterdam in the Netherlands, currently the largest European port. It aims to double the traffic at
Piraeus to 3.7 million containers by 2015. Cosco has also recently expanded in Italy, acquiring
the port of Naples.

Chinas economic engagement with developing countries, especially in

Africa, is just imperialism in disguise that imposes Chinas own
problems of authoritarianism and capitalism
Kiwanuka 13
Jenkins Kiwanuka. Is China promoting a new type of economic imperialism?. 22 July 2013. http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/Is-China-promoting-
a-new-type-of-economic-imperialism-/-/689364/1922306/-/15j6rpfz/-/index.html //JJC
It occurs to me that when the history of how China infiltrated Uganda and other African
countries comes to be written, it may not be different from that of the British colonialists, the
Christian missionaries and the Arabs, all of whom came with small gifts and ended up as
political masters and exploiters of our countrys economy. Where the colonialists
brought bibles, guns and textiles to subjugate our indigenous rulers, China is building
stadiums, multi-storey offices, dams and modern highways under the label of grants or
unconditional long-term loans to lure Africa into its sphere of influence. And it is rapidly
succeeding in shoving America off the stage. At first, the developing countries believed that
communist China, with its newly acquired economic power, was genuinely helping them to
develop their own economies and stop their dependency on capitalist donations. But it
now appears that behind Chinas philanthropic initiatives lies a genuine desire by that
country to find new markets for its products and business contracts for its companies. In this
connection, it is surprising that our leaders did not detect Chinas intentions when a visiting
Chinese minister speculated last year that the oil prices would fall in the next 20 years because
other alternative sources of energy such as nuclear and solar power will have been refined. The
Chinese Minister specifically urged President Museveni to move fast in concluding Ugandas oil
agreements with companies that include one from his own country, but it is obvious that he was
simply trying to strike a quick deal under what might turn out to be Chinas new brand of
economic imperialism. The President revealed the Chinese ministers advice at a special
session of the Uganda Parliament at which he explained why he signed oil agreements without
parliamentary approval. There was even a bigger shock when the President revealed that in
search for advice about how Ugandas newly found oil should be handled, he had approached the
late President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). He did not
elaborate, but since Mobutu is notorious for having exploited the DRCs oil and other minerals to
enrich himself and his family, it sounded strange that President Museveni sought his advice about
Ugandas own oil, a highly sensitive issue. During an official visit to Britain 50 years ago, I
toured industries that included a nuclear power plant. Solar energy was also apparently ready
for exploration at the time because the sun was hanging over Britain and other countries from up
there in the sky. Why, if I may ask, have those alternative sources of energy not been refined up
to now, and what guarantee do the Chinese have that those resources will be fully functional in
the next 20 years to bring down the oil prices? The Economist of January 28, 2012, listed many
problems that face China, some of which are similar to those obtaining in todays Uganda.
These include governance by a system thats out of step (obviously undemocratic) with
global norms, the need for a fairer division of the spoils of growth because many people feel
that too little of the countrys wealth is trickling down to them, the land grabs by local officials
which are a huge source of anger, the unrestrained industrialisation which is poisoning
crops and people, and the growing corruption thats causing fury. China is still ruled by a
Communist Party and is hence considered undemocratic by west European standards.
Emphasising the importance of safeguarding human rights, the Economist said Chinas bloody
past has taught the Communist Party to fear chaos above all other problems. This
should be an eye opener to Ugandas leadership in its handling of the opposition within
and outside the ruling party. Major General Kahinda Otafiire and others have talked about
possible solutions, and renegade General David Sejusa recently raised a storm when he hinted
on issues that his bosses feared might disturb Ugandas future stability. The Economist re-
echoed a warning that has become common. It declared that historys other lesson is that
those who cling to absolute power end up with none. I hope Africas leaders are
listening.

American Imperialism is not dead it is very much alive in todays threat-

reaction politics. Continued American expansionism results in
eternal war on the other
Engelhardt 13 (Tom, Fellow at the Nation Institute, Overwrought empire: The discrediting of
US military power,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/20121010104331399712.html)
the
And here's the odd thing: in a sense, little has changed since then and yet everything seems different. Think of it as
American imperial paradox: everywhere there are now "threats" against our well-being which
seem to demand action and yet nowhere are there commensurate enemies to go with them. Everywhere the US
military still reigns supreme by almost any measure you might care to apply; and yet - in case the paradox has escaped
you - nowhere can it achieve its goals, however modest. At one level, the American
situation should simply take your breath away. Never before in modern history had there been an arms race of
only one or a great power confrontation of only one. And at least in military terms, just as the neoconservatives
imagined in those early years of the 21st century, the US remains the "sole superpower" or even "hyperpower" of planet
Earth. The planet's top gun And yet the more dominant the US military becomes in its ability to destroy
and the more its forces are spread across the globe, the more the defeats and semi-defeats pile
up, the more the missteps and mistakes grow, the more the strains show, the more the suicides
rise, the more the nation's treasure disappears down a black hole - and in response to all of this, the more moves the
Pentagon makes. A great power without a significant enemy? You might have to go back to the Roman Empire at its
height or some Chinese dynasty in full flower to find anything like it. And yet Osama bin Laden is dead. Al-Qaeda
is reportedly a shadow of its former self. The great regional threats of the moment, North Korea and Iran,
are regimes held together by baling wire and the suffering of their populaces. The only incipient great power rival
on the planet, China, has just launched its first aircraft carrier, a refurbished Ukrainian throwaway from
The US has 1,000 or more
the 1990s on whose deck the country has no planes capable of landing.
bases around the world; other countries, a handful. The US spends as much on
its military as the next 14 powers (mostly allies) combined. In fact, it's investing
an estimated $1.45 trillion to produce and operate a single future aircraft, the F-
35 - more than any country, the US included, now spends on its national defence
annually. The US military is singular in other ways, too. It alone has divided the
globe - the complete world - into six "commands". With (lest anything be left out)
an added command, Stratcom, for the heavens and another, recently
established, for the only space not previously occupied, cyberspace, where we're
already unofficially "at war". No other country on the planet thinks of itself in
faintly comparable military terms. When its high command plans for its future
"needs," thanks to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey,
they repair (don't say "retreat") to a military base south of the capital where they
argue out their future and war-game various possible crises while striding across
a map of the world larger than a basketball court. What other military would come
up with such a method? The president now has at his command not one, but two
private armies. The first is the CIA, which in recent years has been heavily
militarised, is overseen by a former four-star general (who calls the job "living the
dream"), and is running its own private assassination campaigns and drone air
wars throughout the Greater Middle East. The second is an expanding elite, the
Joint Special Operations Command, cocooned inside the US military, members
of whom are now deployed to hot spots around the globe. The US Navy, with its
11 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier task forces, is dominant on the global waves
in a way that only the British Navy might once have been; and the US Air Force
controls the global skies in much of the world in a totally uncontested fashion.
(Despite numerous wars and conflicts, the last American plane possibly downed
in aerial combat was in the first Gulf War in 1991.) Across much of the global
south, there is no sovereign space Washington's drones can't penetrate to kill
those judged by the White House to be threats. In sum, the US is now the sole
planetary Top Gun in a way that empire-builders once undoubtedly fantasised
about, but that none from Genghis Khan on have ever achieved: alone and
essentially uncontested on the planet. In fact, by every measure (except
success), the likes of it has never been seen. Blindsided by predictably
unintended consequences By all the usual measuring sticks, the US should be
supreme in a historically unprecedented way . And yet it couldn't be more obvious that it's not, that
despite all the bases, elite forces, private armies, drones, aircraft carriers, wars, conflicts, strikes,
interventions, and clandestine operations, despite a labyrinthine intelligence bureaucracy that never
seems to stop growing and into which we pour a minimum of $80bn a year, nothing seems to work out in
an imperially satisfying way. It couldn't be more obvious that this is not a glorious dream, but some kind of ever-
nightmare. This should, of course, have been self-evident
expanding imperial
since at least early 2004, less than a year after the Bush administration
invaded and occupied Iraq, when the roadside bombs started to explode
and the suicide bombings to mount, while the comparisons of the US to
Rome and of a prospective Pax Americana in the Greater Middle East to
the Pax Romana vanished like a morning mist on a blazing day. Still, the
wars against relatively small, ill-armed sets of insurgents dragged toward
their dismally predictable ends. (It says the world that, after almost 11
years of war, the 2,000th US military death in Afghanistan occurred at the
hands of an Afghan "ally" in an "insider attack".) In those years,
Washington continued to be regularly blindsided by the unintended
consequences of its military moves. Surprises - none pleasant - became
the order of the day and victories proved vanishingly rare One thing seems obvious: a .

superpower military with unparalleled capabilities for one-way destruction no longer has the more basic
ability to impose its will anywhere on the planet. Quite the opposite, US military power has been
remarkably discredited
globally by the most pitiful of forces. From Pakistan to Honduras, just
about anywhere it goes in the old colonial or neocolonial world, in those regions
known in the contested Cold War era as the Third World, resistance of one
unexpected sort or another arises and failure ensues in some often long-drawn-
out and spectacular fashion. Given the lack of enemies - a few thousand jihadis,
a small set of minority insurgencies, a couple of feeble regional powers - why this
is so, what exactly the force is that prevents Washington's success, remains
mysterious. Certainly, it's in some way related to the more than half-century of
decolonisation movements, rebellions and insurgencies that were a feature of the
previous century. It also has something to do with the way economic heft has
spread beyond the US, Europe and Japan - with the rise of the "tigers" in Asia,
the explosion of the Chinese and Indian economies, the advances of Brazil and
Turkey, and the movement of the planet toward some kind of genuine economic
multi-polarity. It may also have something to do with the end of the Cold War,
which put an end as well to several centuries of imperial or great power
competition and left the sole "victor", it now seems clear, heading toward the
exits wreathed in self-congratulation. Explain it as you will, it's as if the planet
itself, or humanity, had somehow been inoculated against the imposition of
imperial power, as if it now rejected it whenever and wherever applied. In the
previous century, it took a half-nation, North Korea, backed by Russian supplies
and Chinese troops to fight the US to a draw, or a popular insurgent movement
backed by a local power, North Vietnam, backed in turn by the Soviet Union and
China to defeat American power. Now, small-scale minority insurgencies, largely
using roadside bombs and suicide bombers, are fighting American power to a
draw (or worse) with no great power behind them at all. Think of the growing
force that resists such military might as the equivalent of the "dark matter" in the
universe. The evidence is in. We now know (or should know) that it's there, even
if we can't see it. Washington's wars on autopilot After the last decade of military
failures, stand-offs and frustrations, you might think that this would be apparent in
Washington. After all, the US is now visibly an overextended empire, its sway
waning from the Greater Middle East to Latin America, the limits of its power increasingly evident. And yet, here's
the curious thing: two administrations in Washington have drawn none of the obvious conclusions and no matter how the presidential election turns out, it's already clear that, in this regard,

nothing will change . Even as military power has proven itself a bust again and again, our policymakers have come to
rely ever more completely on a military-first response to global problems. In other words, we are
not just a classically overextended empire, but also an overwrought one operating on some kind of militarised
autopilot. Lacking is a learning curve. By all evidence, it's not just that there isn't one, but that there can't be one.
Washington, it seems, now has only one mode of thought and action, nomatter who is at the helm or what the
problem may be, and it always involves, directly or indirectly, openly or clandestinely, the application of
militarised force. Nor does it matter that each further application only destabilises some region yet more or undermines further what once were known as "American
interests". Take Libya, as an example. It briefly seemed to count as a rare American military success story: a decisive intervention in support of a rebellion against a brutal dictator - so brutal, in
fact, that the CIA previously shipped "terrorist suspects", Islamic rebels fighting against the Gaddafi regime, there for torture. No US casualties resulted, while American and NATO air strikes were
decisive in bringing a set of ill-armed, ill-organised rebels to power. In the world of unintended consequences, however, the fall of Gaddafi sent Tuareg mercenaries from his militias, armed with
high-end weaponry, across the border into Mali. There, when the dust settled, the whole northern part of the country had come unhinged and fallen under the sway of Islamic extremists and al-
Qaeda wannabes as other parts of North Africa threatened to destabilise. At the same time, of course, the first American casualties of the intervention occurred when Ambassador Christopher
Stevens and three other Americans died in an attack on the Benghazi consulate and a local "safe house". With matters worsening regionally, the response couldn't have been more predictable. As
Greg Miller and Craig Whitlock of the Washington Post recently reported, in ongoing secret meetings, the White House is planning for military operations against al-Qaeda-in-the-Magreb (North
Africa), now armed with weaponry pillaged from Gaddafi's stockpiles. These plans evidently include the approach used in Yemen (US special forces on the ground and CIA drone strikes), or a
Somalia "formula" (drone strikes, special forces operations, CIA operations and the support of African proxy armies), or even at some point "the possibility of direct US intervention". In addition,
Eric Schmitt and David Kilpatrick of the New York Times reportthat the Obama administration is "preparing retaliation" against those it believes killed the US ambassador, possibly including "drone
strikes, special operations raids like the one that killed Osama bin Laden and joint missions with Libyan authorities". The near certainty that, like the previous intervention, this next set of military
actions will only further destabilise the region with yet more unpleasant surprises and unintended consequences hardly seems to matter. Nor does the fact that, in crude form, the results of such
acts are known to us ahead of time have an effect on the unstoppable urge to plan and order them. Such situations are increasingly legion across the Greater Middle East and elsewhere. Take
one other tiny example: Iraq, from which, after almost a decade-long military disaster, the "last" US units essentially fled in the middle of the night as 2011 ended. Even in those last moments, the
Obama administration and the Pentagon were still trying to keep significant numbers of US troops there (and, in fact, did manage to leave behind possibly several hundred as trainers of elite Iraqi
units). Meanwhile, Iraq has been supportive of the embattled Syrian regime and drawn ever closer to Iran, even as its own sectarian strife has ratcheted upward. Having watched this unsettling
fallout from its last round in the country, according to the New York Times, the US is now negotiating an agreement "that could result in the return of small units of American soldiers to Iraq on
training missions. At the request of the Iraqi government, according to General Caslen, a unit of Army Special Operations soldiers was recently deployed to Iraq to advise on counterterrorism and
Don't you just want to speak to those negotiators the way you might to a child: No, don't do that! The urge
help with intelligence".
to return to the scene of their previous disaster, however, seems unstaunchable. You could offer various explanations for
- self-
why our policymakers, military and civilian, continue in such a repetitive - and even from an imperial point of view
destructive vein in situations where unpleasant surprises are essentially guaranteed and lack
of success a given. Yes, there is the military-industrial complex to be fed. Yes, we are interested in the control
of crucial resources, especially energy, and so on. But it's probably more reasonable to say that a deeply
militarised mindset and the global maneuvers that go with it are by now just part of the
way of life of a Washington eternally "at war". They are the tics of a great power with the equivalent of
Tourette's Syndrome. They happen because they can't help but happen, because they are engraved in the
policy DNA of our national security complex, and can evidently no longer be altered. In other
words, they can't help themselves.
 CONTENTION 3 IS RADICAL PEDAGOGY
Traditional education is a means of extending colonialism and the fact that
it doesnt seem that way only worsens it
Mayo 14
Peter Mayo is a professor, speaker, editor, writer, and head of the Department of Arts, Open
Communities and Adult Education at the University of Malta
http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/19/education-imperialism-and-critical-pedagogy/ //JJC
Education serves as a means to colonise the mental universe (Ngugi Wa Thiong O) of the
colonised, the type of colonisation that cannot be gotten rid off simply through a
declaration of independence. While being formally independent, the formerly officially colonised
would still live a colonised life aping the lifestyle of the colonisers in their own way, their own
quaint way as the colonisers would call it. As Fanon argued with regard to Africa, we would have
a class of Black Skins in White Masks. And in many cases it would be a watered down
education which gives the colonised the illusion of their education being on a par with that
education in the metropole. Fanons description of the R-eating man from Martinique in his vain
quest to learn the colonisers French is a case in point. It also enforces the view that the good
life to which one ought to aspire exists in the colonial centre . Hence once the promised or
augured development does not take off, people from the former colony seek that good life by
emigrating to the colonial centre the empire strikes back which they perceive to be the
Eldorado and where they are often treated as second class citizens. This indicates that the
colonal education they received was delusory in terms of its purportedly being on a par
with the education provided in the colonial centre.

Education that is built around critical pedagogy empirically creates social

justice and globalizes an anti-imperialist struggle which is
transnational, gender-balanced, and multi-racial.
McLaren 05
Peter McLaren. Capitalists & Conquerors: A Critical Pedagogy against Empire. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2005. //JJC
Against tremendous odds, the challenge of educators over the last sev-eral decades has
been to humanize the classroom environment and to create pedagogical spaces for linking
education to the praxiological di-mensions of social justice initiatives and to that end we are
indebted to critical pedagogy. Given the urgent times we live in, we need to ratchet up the
struggle ahead. This has been the singular challenge of Capitalists and Conquerors. For this
reason, I have attempted to expand the pedagogical encounter to consider its own
insinuation into globalized social relations of exploitation and to live up to its
revolutionary potential of becoming a transnational, gender-balanced, multiracial, anti-
imperialist struggle. Everything in human history passes through the realm of subjectivity and it
is through this dance of the dialectic that we create history. The democ-racy in which we live is
indeed at a tragic crossroads, as is capitalism it-self, and we must fiercely continue to
question the present historical course that has wedded the two together.

Fighting imperialism and promoting understanding can be accomplished by

education and the discussion of ethical dilemmas.
Stanton 02
Domna C. Stanton. Graduate Center, City University of New York. PMLA. https://apps.mla.org/pdf/conf_stanton.pdf
//JJC
If we can establish an ethics of collaboration in difference, then we can also create alliances
among professors of English and the foreign languages and literatures to advocate the
importance to all other disciplines of the interpretive strategies and critical thinking that we do.
And we can work on collaborative projects that will enrich the humanities, the social
sciences, the life sciences, and the professional schools. One important project, in the
light of my remarks, would be the study of the theory, problems, and practice of translation
both in the literal sense in which the field of translation studies has developed and, by extension,
in the metaphoric sense of the multiple ways in which each of us translates othersa
person, an image, a cultureto make them understandable and acceptable to us, a process
that involves gains and losses. Over and beyond cotaught or team-taught, bi- or multilinguistic,
pluridisciplinary courses, which are affordable as meettogether seminars,8 we can work
together to conceptualize the humanistic dimensions of traditional area studies. We can
also refine emerging ones, such as Atlantic studies, Caribbean studies, or migration studies. And
we can create a synergistic major in the humanities and international affairs, which Randa Duvick
describes in her essay Sustaining Foreign Language Enrollments through Collaboration: An
Interdisciplinary Major; develop interdisciplinary studies of media, which would include
visual, print, and technological cultures; and promote courses with colleagues in the
sciences ranging from critical studies of scientific and artistic cultures to the ethical
dilemmas raised by advances in the life sciences.

The neoliberal system is held together by superstitions and definitions of

hegemony and imperialism that normalize the system and
perpetuate capitalist and hegemonic oppression; the educational
system must use critical pedagogy to challenge the normative
definitions and discussions of hegemony in order to eradicate the
capitalist, state, and hegemonic power structures.
Boggs 05
In Peter McLarens Capitalists & Conquerors: A Critical Pedagogy against Empire. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2005. The foreword by Carl Boggs ix-xiii //JJC
McLaren argues persuasively that the power structureintegrated through a vast,
labyrinthine system of capitalist production state governance, and multiple forms of social
dominationmust be denied its "natural definitions of hegemony that ensure perpetual
reproduction of this status quo. The entire neoliberal system is held together by what
appear to be commonsensical myths and deceits, superstitions and beliefs that will have to
be questioned, probed, challenged, ultimately overtunedpart of a Gramscian counter-
hegemonic assaultif that system is to be effectively transformed. While the educational
sphere hardly stands alone as a major locus of ideological con-testation, it being much too
intertwined with the other spheres, it does, how-ever, remain at the core of this process, all the
more to given the increasing centrality of knowledge production, mental labor, technology,
and communications to modern-day capitalist. If the prevailing educational system rein-forces
among students and teachers alike a view of commodification and hierarchy as something
"-natural," that is given, fixed, and irreversible, then logic dictates that subversive assaults
on that system are needed to counter its great hegemonic force. Building upon the classic
contributions of Marx, Gramsci, and Freire, we arrive at a position where critical pedagogy
can be further elaborated and revitalized.

Anti-imperialism must oppose both America and Chinas empires

Callinicos 14 (October 10, Alex, British political theorist and activist. In an academic capacity,
he serves as Professor of European Studies at King's College London, The multiple crises of
imperialism, http://isj.org.uk/the-multiple-crises-of-imperialism/)
For revolutionaries, opposing Obamas bombing campaignand whatever other military actions
followshould be straightforward. (We should also, of course, oppose NATO expansion in
Central and Eastern Europe.) But this opposition needs to be informed by an understanding that
the latest US intervention in the Middle East takes place against the background of a renewal of
inter-imperialist rivalries on a scale not seen since the end of the Cold War. Anti-imperialism
during that era required, not simply opposing our own imperialism, but also refusing to prettify
the actions of its rival and acknowledging that it too operates according to an imperialist logic.
The same stance is required today, with the complication that today we are seeing multi-polar
interstate competition. This is clearest in East Asia. On a global scale, the US remains the only
world power, but it faces serious regional challenges from Russia and China, and within the
Western bloc Germany and Japan are newly assertive.
 CONTENTION 4 IS FRAMING
The mindset of imperialism is one of endless violence. The 1nc will be the
negative team lying to themselves, spinning violent webs any
defense of the empire is inevitably support of the oppression that
comes from it
McNally in 6 (David, Professor of political science at York Universit The new imperialists
Ideologies of Empire Ch 5 Pg 103) JL
This, then, is the end point of our thinking persons imperialism.
Starting from flowery platitudes about ethics and human rights, it
leaves us with banal defences of an empire that practises torture,
uses lies and deception to justify war, tramples on human rights,
and launches a new arms race. In the process, our imperial
apologist fractures logic, evades evidence, claims moral
superiority for his kind, and demonizes imperialized Others. And so
we return to Joseph Conrad. For all the shortcomings of Heart of Darkness,
Conrad intuited the metamorphosis of imperial identity that characterizes
the likes of Michael Ignatieff. Key to Conrads depiction is that the
imperialist begins by lying to himself he spurns reality in favour
of his fetish. However much Ignatieff believes his own mutterings
about ethics and human rights, his pronouncements must be
measured against the murders and the torture carried out by those
he nominates as humanitys benefactors and whose crimes he both
evades and backhandedly defends. Ignatieff s talk of morality is an
exercise in imperial fantasy of a sort with which Conrad was familiar.
Describing the conversation among colonial agents in Africa, for instance,
Conrads protagonist, Marlow, proclaims: It was as unreal as everything
else as the philanthropic pretence of the whole concern, as their talk, as
their government. In fact, explains Marlow, notwithstanding their soaring
proclamations, there was no more moral purpose at the back of it than
there is in burglars breaking into a safe.63 The same, of course, is true of
U.S. imperialism today. Its agents too have the morality of
burglars breaking into a safe. But their crimes, just like those of
an earlier era of colonialists, are of an exponentially higher order .
Of course, they produce reports, make speeches, and utter declarations
about civilization, freedom, and democracy.Where they differ fromConrads
obsessive colonialist, Kurtz, is that they never arrive at the truth. For Kurtz,
after devoting seventeen pages to a report on behalf of the International
Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs, finally records a truthful
horror. It occurs at the end of his report, his moving appeal to every
altruistic sentiment, as Marlow describes it. Suddenly, the final words
appeared and their message blazed at you, luminous and terrifying, like a
flash of lightning in a serene sky: Exterminate all the brutes!64 At the
moment when he wrote those words, shortly before his death, Kurtz finally
looked within himself, to discover that his soul was mad.65 And this
Conradian truth might well be applied to Ignatieff. Defence of empire
of murder, pillage, torture, and deception transforms the
defenders themselves. Whatever values they might have once
professed, the reality of what they defend takes possession of
them, turns them into something other than what they intended .
This is a central theme of Heart of Darkness, which, as I have noted, is a
warning to the Western apologist for empire that he is an accomplice of
madness and horror.

The ballot acts as an endorsement of this mindset in this round - Voting

sets the standards for the debate community as a whole, meaning
the debate community undergoes a mindset shift.
VanLuvanee, Lindsay, Debate coach at ISU, 11
Debate is a discursive activity and through wins and losses rewards and reprimands certain types
of speaking. The debate community has never been too formalized about their eligibility
standards, rather, in this community, it is largely about the audiences expectation, who speaks
with credibility, who is eligible for the outrounds. Eligibility standards in debate are reinforced
through embedded and often unquestioned cultural norms about what constitutes good and
bad debate, connected to assumptions about credibility, power, speed, presence, and tradition.
We are graded according to idealizations of the proper debate subject that, rather than being
reasonable, appear practical, because of how we distribute success here through the ballot. The
assumption that debate provides a space for commonality and agreement about the terms of the
discussion ignore the various ways that debaters must negotiate their own subjectivity in order to
speak in the first place. Many here have forwarded a belief in objective standards of fairness but
this leads us to ask: fair for who? in the end, objective standards of fairness are better
understood as culturally embedded norms about which subjects meet dominant standard.

Ontological questioning solves. The ballot is key your intellectual

alignments directly implicate the way you conceptualize our
ontological position towards militarism
Burke 2007 (Anthony, Australian political theorist and international relations scholar; Associate Professor (Reader) of
Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence, and
Reason, Theory and Event 10.2, Project Muse, https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html,
paragraphs #62 to #65) [JWL]
But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key
normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface
agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes
with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer
to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power
of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur
responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal
truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and
consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly
nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of
calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that
would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet
his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of
'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little
more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that
choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite
wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy
choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and
peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from
outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its
presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and
action. This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to
the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to
exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge
human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in
Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or
Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we
see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of
causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay
of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and
controllable? And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less
violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end
the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?
ORIGINAL 1AC
 Contention 1 is Imperialism
1. This years resolution is centered on energy development, space
exploration, and arctic development- while in the abstract these
may be good discussions they glaze over the deeper ethical
questions of the way the world is structured by imperial and
colonial violence through state expansion.
2. Our argument is not that the resolution is bad but simply our
discussion of it is flawed Status quo discourse ignores
discussions such as why the US consistently invades countries
and why China is developing much of China in an exploitative and
oppressive fashion.
3. Both the United States, and China less so, have been created as modern
superpowers off of constant exploitation and expansion. America
shows its modern self off by invading the Middle East, the ocean,
and the arctic, while simultaneously establishing military bases
globally. China shows it by invading the South China Sea, constant
ocean expansionism, and essential colonialism of modern Africa.
4. Thuswhen tasked with the question of whether or not the USFG should
engage with China, we must first start with why we are so drawn to
dominate the world economically. In response to the resolution,
___ and I advocate an engagement of discussion about current
imperialism and the two countries it stems from the US and China.
5. Rather than utilizing the same militaristic logic that justified the
expulsion and dehumanization of the Native Americans, Africans,
and many other populations, we choose to engage in a critical
investigation of those epistemologies, signaling a shift in ideology
through our affirmation of withdrawal.
 Contention 2 is Two Great Powers
We start with America, the global hegemon
American Imperialism is not dead it is very much alive in todays threat-
reaction politics. Continued American expansionism results in
eternal war
Engelhardt 13 (Tom, Fellow at the Nation Institute, Overwrought empire: The discrediting of
US military power,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/20121010104331399712.html)
the
And here's the odd thing: in a sense, little has changed since then and yet everything seems different. Think of it as
American imperial paradox: everywhere there are now "threats" against our well-being which
seem to demand action and yet nowhere are there commensurate enemies to go with them. Everywhere the US
military still reigns supreme by almost any measure you might care to apply; and yet - in case the paradox has escaped
you - nowhere can it achieve its goals, however modest. At one level, the American
situation should simply take your breath away. Never before in modern history had there been an arms race of
only one or a great power confrontation of only one. And at least in military terms, just as the neoconservatives
imagined in those early years of the 21st century, the US remains the "sole superpower" or even "hyperpower" of planet
Earth. The planet's top gun And yet the more dominant the US military becomes in its ability to destroy
and the more its forces are spread across the globe, the more the defeats and semi-defeats pile
up, the more the missteps and mistakes grow, the more the strains show, the more the suicides
rise, the more the nation's treasure disappears down a black hole - and in response to all of this, the more moves the
Pentagon makes. A great power without a significant enemy? You might have to go back to the Roman Empire at its
height or some Chinese dynasty in full flower to find anything like it. And yet Osama bin Laden is dead. Al-Qaeda
is reportedly a shadow of its former self. The great regional threats of the moment, North Korea and Iran,
are regimes held together by baling wire and the suffering of their populaces. The only incipient great power rival
on the planet, China, has just launched its first aircraft carrier, a refurbished Ukrainian throwaway from
the 1990s on whose deck the country has no planes capable of landing. The US has 1,000 or more bases around the
world; other countries, a handful. The US spends as much on its military as the next 14 powers (mostly allies) combined.
In fact, it's investing an estimated $1.45 trillion to produce and operate a single future aircraft, the F-35 - more than any
country, the US included, now spends on its national defence annually. The US military is singular in other ways, too. It
alone has divided the globe - the complete world - into six "commands". With (lest anything be left out) an added
command, Stratcom, for the heavens and another, recently established, for the only space not previously occupied,
cyberspace, where we're already unofficially "at war". No other country on the planet thinks of itself in faintly comparable
military terms. When its high command plans for its future "needs," thanks to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Martin Dempsey, they repair (don't say "retreat") to a military base south of the capital where they argue out their future
and war-game various possible crises while striding across a map of the world larger than a basketball court. What other
military would come up with such a method? The president now has at his command not one, but two private armies. The
first is the CIA, which in recent years has been heavily militarised, is overseen by a former four-star general (who calls the
job "living the dream"), and is running its own private assassination campaigns and drone air wars throughout the Greater
Middle East. The second is an expanding elite, the Joint Special Operations Command, cocooned inside the US military,
members of whom are now deployed to hot spots around the globe. The US Navy, with its 11 nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier task forces, is dominant on the global waves in a way that only the British Navy might once have been; and the US
Air Force controls the global skies in much of the world in a totally uncontested fashion. (Despite numerous wars and
conflicts, the last American plane possibly downed in aerial combat was in the first Gulf War in 1991.) Across much of the
global south, there is no sovereign space Washington's drones can't penetrate to kill those judged by the White House to
be threats. In sum, the US is now the sole planetary Top Gun in a way that empire-builders once undoubtedly fantasised
about, but that none from Genghis Khan on have ever achieved: alone and essentially uncontested on the planet. In fact,
by every measure (except success), the likes of it has never been seen. Blindsided by predictably unintended
consequences By all the usual measuring sticks, the US should be supreme in a historically unprecedented way. And yet
it couldn't be more obvious that it's not, that despite all the bases, elite forces, private armies, drones, aircraft
carriers, wars, conflicts, strikes, interventions, and clandestine operations, despite a labyrinthine
intelligence bureaucracy that never seems to stop growing and into which we pour a minimum of $80bn a year,
nothing seems to work out in an imperially satisfying way. It couldn't be more obvious that this is not a
glorious dream, but some kind of ever-expanding imperial nightmare. This should, of course, have been self-
evident since at least early 2004, less than a year after the Bush administration invaded and occupied Iraq, when the
roadside bombs started to explode and the suicide bombings to mount, while the comparisons of the US to Rome and of a
prospective Pax Americana in the Greater Middle East to the Pax Romana vanished like a morning mist on a blazing day.
Still, the wars against relatively small, ill-armed sets of insurgents dragged toward their dismally predictable ends. (It says
the world that, after almost 11 years of war, the 2,000th US military death in Afghanistan occurred at the hands of an
Afghan "ally" in an "insider attack".) In those years, Washington continued to be regularly blindsided by the unintended
consequences of its military moves. Surprises - none pleasant - became the order of the day and victories proved
vanishingly rare. One thing seems obvious: a superpower military with unparalleled capabilities for one-way
destruction no longer has the more basic ability to impose its will anywhere on the planet.
Quite the opposite, US military power has been remarkably discredited globally by the most pitiful of
forces. From Pakistan to Honduras, just about anywhere it goes in the old colonial or neocolonial world, in those regions
known in the contested Cold War era as the Third World, resistance of one unexpected sort or another arises and failure
ensues in some often long-drawn-out and spectacular fashion. Given the lack of enemies - a few thousand jihadis, a small
set of minority insurgencies, a couple of feeble regional powers - why this is so, what exactly the force is that prevents
Washington's success, remains mysterious. Certainly, it's in some way related to the more than half-century of
decolonisation movements, rebellions and insurgencies that were a feature of the previous century. It also has something
to do with the way economic heft has spread beyond the US, Europe and Japan - with the rise of the "tigers" in Asia, the
explosion of the Chinese and Indian economies, the advances of Brazil and Turkey, and the movement of the planet
toward some kind of genuine economic multi-polarity. It may also have something to do with the end of the Cold War,
which put an end as well to several centuries of imperial or great power competition and left the sole "victor", it now seems
clear, heading toward the exits wreathed in self-congratulation. Explain it as you will, it's as if the planet itself, or humanity,
had somehow been inoculated against the imposition of imperial power, as if it now rejected it whenever and wherever
applied. In the previous century, it took a half-nation, North Korea, backed by Russian supplies and Chinese troops to fight
the US to a draw, or a popular insurgent movement backed by a local power, North Vietnam, backed in turn by the Soviet
Union and China to defeat American power. Now, small-scale minority insurgencies, largely using roadside bombs and
suicide bombers, are fighting American power to a draw (or worse) with no great power behind them at all. Think of the
growing force that resists such military might as the equivalent of the "dark matter" in the universe. The evidence is in. We
now know (or should know) that it's there, even if we can't see it. Washington's wars on autopilot After the last decade of
military failures, stand-offs and frustrations, you might think that this would be apparent in Washington. After all, the US is
now visibly an overextended empire, its sway waning from the Greater Middle East to Latin America, the limits of its power
increasingly evident. And yet, here's the curious thing: two administrations in Washington have drawn none of the obvious
conclusions and no matter how the presidential election turns out, it's already clear that, in this regard, nothing will
change. Even as military power has proven itself a bust again and again, our policymakers have come to rely
ever more completely on a military-first response to global problems. In other words, we are not just
a classically overextended empire, but also an overwrought one operating on some kind of militarised
autopilot. Lacking is a learning curve. By all evidence, it's not just that there isn't one, but that there can't be one.
Washington, it seems, now has only one mode of thought and action, nomatter who is at the helm or what the
problem may be, and it always involves, directly or indirectly, openly or clandestinely, the application of
militarised force. Nor does it matter that each further application only destabilises some region yet more or
undermines further what once were known as "American interests". Take Libya, as an example. It briefly seemed to count
as a rare American military success story: a decisive intervention in support of a rebellion against a brutal dictator - so
brutal, in fact, that the CIA previously shipped "terrorist suspects", Islamic rebels fighting against the Gaddafi regime, there
for torture. No US casualties resulted, while American and NATO air strikes were decisive in bringing a set of ill-armed, ill-
organised rebels to power. In the world of unintended consequences, however, the fall of Gaddafi sent Tuareg
mercenaries from his militias, armed with high-end weaponry, across the border into Mali. There, when the dust settled,
the whole northern part of the country had come unhinged and fallen under the sway of Islamic extremists and al-Qaeda
wannabes as other parts of North Africa threatened to destabilise. At the same time, of course, the first American
casualties of the intervention occurred when Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans died in an
attack on the Benghazi consulate and a local "safe house". With matters worsening regionally, the response couldn't have
been more predictable. As Greg Miller and Craig Whitlock of the Washington Post recently reported, in ongoing secret
meetings, the White House is planning for military operations against al-Qaeda-in-the-Magreb (North Africa), now armed
with weaponry pillaged from Gaddafi's stockpiles. These plans evidently include the approach used in Yemen (US special
forces on the ground and CIA drone strikes), or a Somalia "formula" (drone strikes, special forces operations, CIA
operations and the support of African proxy armies), or even at some point "the possibility of direct US intervention". In
addition, Eric Schmitt and David Kilpatrick of the New York Times reportthat the Obama administration is "preparing
retaliation" against those it believes killed the US ambassador, possibly including "drone strikes, special operations raids
like the one that killed Osama bin Laden and joint missions with Libyan authorities". The near certainty that, like the
previous intervention, this next set of military actions will only further destabilise the region with yet more unpleasant
surprises and unintended consequences hardly seems to matter. Nor does the fact that, in crude form, the results of such
acts are known to us ahead of time have an effect on the unstoppable urge to plan and order them. Such situations are
increasingly legion across the Greater Middle East and elsewhere. Take one other tiny example: Iraq, from which, after
almost a decade-long military disaster, the "last" US units essentially fled in the middle of the night as 2011 ended. Even
in those last moments, the Obama administration and the Pentagon were still trying to keep significant numbers of US
troops there (and, in fact, did manage to leave behind possibly several hundred as trainers of elite Iraqi units). Meanwhile,
Iraq has been supportive of the embattled Syrian regime and drawn ever closer to Iran, even as its own sectarian strife
has ratcheted upward. Having watched this unsettling fallout from its last round in the country, according to the New York
Times, the US is now negotiating an agreement "that could result in the return of small units of American soldiers to Iraq
on training missions. At the request of the Iraqi government, according to General Caslen, a unit of Army Special
Operations soldiers was recently deployed to Iraq to advise on counterterrorism and help with intelligence". Don't you just
want to speak to those negotiators the way you might to a child: No, don't do that! The urge to return to the scene of their
previous disaster, however, seems unstaunchable. You could offer various explanations for why our policymakers, military
and civilian, continue in such a repetitive - and even from an imperial point of view - self-destructive vein in
situations where unpleasant surprises are essentially guaranteed and lack of success a
given. Yes, there is the military-industrial complex to be fed. Yes, we are interested in the control of crucial resources,
especially energy, and so on. But it's probably more reasonable to say that a deeply militarised
mindset and the global maneuvers that go with it are by now just part of the way of life of a
Washington eternally "at war". They are the tics of a great power with the equivalent of Tourette's
Syndrome. They happen because they can't help but happen, because they are engraved in the policy
DNA of our national security complex, and can evidently no longer be altered. In other words, they
can't help themselves.

We end with China, the corporate driven expansionist

China is building up a massive military to expand its imperialist goals
throughout the world
Lyons 11 (James, former US admiral, LYONS: Chinas imperialism on full display,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/11/chinas-imperialism-on-full-display/)
To foster its imperialistic goals, China for the past two decades has funded an unprecedented
military expansion program. With no known threat to its homeland, that should leave no doubt
that the Chinese plan to use their modernized Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to further their
expansionist objectives by intimidation or outright aggression. Their illegal claim to essentially the
entire South China Sea, which they have declared a core interest, is a case in point. Their
unauthorized building of facilities on the Philippines Mischief Reef in 1995 and their forced
confrontation with Japan over disputed islands in 2010 only serve to illustrate what China is
prepared to do in the future.
 Contention 3 is Harms
If these American politics go unchecked that causes extinction
and outweighs any other risk
Harvey 06 [David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development, May
17 2006, Chapter 13]
At times of savage devaluation, interregional rivalries typically degenerate into struggles over who is to bear the burden of
devaluation. The export of unemployment, of inflation, of idle productive capacity become the stakes
in the game. Trade wars, dumping, interest rate wars, restrictions on capital flow and foreign exchange,
immigration policies, colonial conquest, the subjugation and domination of tributary economies,
the forced reorganization of the division of labour within economic empires, and, finally, the
physical destruction and forced devaluation of a rival's capital through war are some of the methods
at hand. Each entails the aggressive manipulation of some aspect of economic, financial or state power. The politics
of imperialism, the sense that the contradictions of capitalism can be cured through world domination by some
omnipotent power, surges to the forefront. The ills of capitalism cannot so easily be contained . Yet the
degeneration of economic into political struggles plays its part in the long-run stabilization of capitalism, provided enough
capital is destroyed en route. Patriotism and nationalism have many functions in the contemporary world and may arise
for diverse reasons; but they frequently provide a most convenient cover for the devaluation of both capital and labour. We
will shortly return to this aspect of matters since it is, I believe, by far the most serious threat, not only to the
survival of capitalism (which matters not a jot), but to the survival of the human race. Twice in the twentieth
century, the world has been plunged into global war through inter-imperialist rivalries . Twice in the
space of a generation, the world experienced the massive devaluation of capital through physical
destruction, the ultimate consumption of labour power as cannon fodder. Class warfare, of course,
has taken its toll in life and limb, mainly through the violence daily visited by capital upon labour in the work
place and through the violence of primitive accumulation (including imperialist wars fought against other social
formations in the name of capitalist 'freedoms'). But the vast losses incurred in two world wars were
provoked by inter-imperialist rivalries. How can this be explained on the basis of a theory that appeals to the
class relation between capital and labour as fundamental to the interpretation of history? This was, of course, the problem
with which Lenin wrestled in his essay on imperialism. But his argument, as we saw in chapter 10, is plagued by
ambiguity. Is finance capital national or international? What is the relation, then, between the military and political
deployment of state power and the undoubted trend within capitalism to create multinational forms and to forge global
spatial integration? And if monopolies and finance capital were so powerful and prone in any case to collusion, then why
could they not contain capitalism's contradictions short of destroying each other? What is it, then, that makes inter-
imperialist wars necessary to the survival of capitalism? The 'third cut' at crisis theory suggests an interpretation of inter-
imperialist wars as constitutive moments in the dynamics of accumulation, rather than as abberations, accidents or the
simple product of excessive greed. Let us see how this is so. When the 'inner dialectic' at work within a region drives it to
seek external resolutions to its problems, then it must search out new markets, new opportunities for capital export, cheap
raw materials, low-cost labour power, etc. All such measures, if they are to be anything other than a temporary palliative,
either put a claim on future labour or else directly entail an expansion of the proletariat. This expansion can be
accomplished through population growth, the mobilization of latent sectors of the reserve army, or primitive accumulation.
The insatiable thirst of capitalism for fresh supplies of labour accounts for the vigour with which it
has pursued primitive accumulation, destroying, transforming and absorbing pre-capitalist
populations wherever it finds them. When surpluses of labour are there for the taking, and capitalists have not,
through competition, erroneously pinned their fates to a technological mix which cannot absorb that labour, then crises are
typically of short duration, mere hiccups on a general trajectory of sustained global accumulation, and usually manifest as
mild switching crises within an evolving structure of uneven geographical development. This was standard fare for
nineteenth-century capitalism. The real troubles begin when capitalists , fating shortages of labour supply and as
ever urged on by competition, induce unemployment through technological innovations which disturb
the equilibrium between production and realization , between the productive forces and their accompanying
social relations. The closing of the frontiers to primitive accumulation, through sheer exhaustion of possibilities, increasing
resistance on the part of pre-capitalist populations, or monopolization by some dominant power, has, therefore, a
tremendous significance for the long-run stability of capitalism. This was the sea-change that began to be felt increasingly
as capitalism moved into the twentieth century. It was the sea-change that, far more than the rise of monopoly or finance
forms of capitalism, played the crucial role in pushing capitalism deeper into the mire of global crises and led, inexorably,
to the kinds of primitive accumulation and devaluation jointly wrought through inter-capitalist wars. The mechanisms, as
always, are intricate in their details and greatly confused in actual historical conjunctures by innumerable cross-currents of
conflicting forces. But we can construct a simple line of argument to illustrate the important points. Any regional alliance, if
it is to continue the process of accumulation, must maintain access to reserves of labour as well as to those 'forces of
nature' (such as key mineral resources) that are otherwise capable of monopolization. Few problems arise if reserves of
both exist in the region wherein most local capital circulates. When internal frontiers close, capital has to look elsewhere
or risk devaluation. The regional alliance feels the stress between capital embedded in place and capital that moves to
create new and permanent centres of accumulation elsewhere. Conflict between different regional and national capitals
over access to labour reserves and natural resources begins to be felt. The themes of internationalism and multilaterialism
run hard up against the desire for autarky as the means to preserve the position of some particular region in the face of
internal contradictions and external pressures - autarky of the sort that prevailed in the 193Os, as Britain sealed in its
Commonwealth trade and Japan expanded into Manchuria and mainland Asia, Germany into eastern Europe and Italy
into Africa, pitting different regions against each other, each pursuing its own 'spatial fix'. Only the United States found it
appropriate to pursue an 'open door' policy founded on internationalism and multilateral trading. In the end the war was
fought to contain autarky and to open up the whole world to the potentialities of geographical expansion
and unlimited uneven development. That solution, pursued single-mindedly under United States's
hegemony after 1945, had the advantage of being super-imposed upon one of the most savage
bouts of devaluation and destruction ever recorded in capitalism's violent history. And signal benefits
accrued not simply from the immense destruction of capital, but also from the uneven geographical distribution of that
destruction. The world was saved from the terrors of the great depression not by some glorious 'new
deal' or the magic touch of Keynesian economics in the treasuries of the world, but by the
destruction and death of global war.

Imperialism encourages economic underdevelopment in

colonized countries which leads to famine and imperial
genocide, India model proves
Mooers 6, (Collin, THE NEW IMPERIALISTS: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE, Chapter 6, Chair of the Department of
Politics and School of Public Adminstration at Ryerson University, Toronto) WDK
But it was not for lack of ideological commitment that India failed to overcome its essentially pre-
capitalist dynamic in the second half of the nineteenth century. Colonial officials both at
home and in the colonies saw their civilizing mission as imparting the
benefits of economic improvement and Christian piety. The
gentlemanly capitalism57 that dominated in the colonial
administration sought to link the socialproperty relations which lay at
the heart of Englands seventeenth- and eighteenth-century agrarian capitalist revolution with the
newer forms of financial and service capital that came to prominence in the later nineteenth century.
These officials had read their Locke on property, enclosure, and improvement. They were also avid
proponents of the latest principles of political economy espoused by Malthus, Bentham, and Mill. It
was the liberal empire so vaunted by Ferguson which encouraged not just
chronic economic underdevelopment, but which bears responsibility for
the deaths of millions due to starvation during the two great waves of
famine which swept India in 187679 and 18961900. Between 5.5 and 12 million
died in the famine of 187679 and mortality rates were highest in areas best served by
railways. As Mike Davis has shown in painful detail , it was the fanatical commitment to
free-market and Malthusian dogmas which made famine a death
sentence for millions while British officials railed against enthusiastic
prodigality as they shipped huge grain exports out of the country.
Malthuss injunctions against feeding the poor and hungry because
mother nature had not set enough places at her table w ere taken up by
British viceroys from Lytton to Curzon with methodical and murderous abandon. Just as in England,
poor relief in times of poor harvest was considered a slippery slope leading to more permanent forms of
relief. In India, Lytton reasoned, The doctrine that in time of famine the poor are entitled to demand
relief . . . would probably lead to the doctrine that they are entitled to demand relief at all times, and
thus the foundation would be laid for a system of general poor relief, which we cannot contemplate
without serious apprehension.58 Ferguson devotes a scant few lines to the disastrous policies pursued
by British officials during the famine years, admitting that free -market policies may have
made things worse than they might have been, but dismissing criticism that the
British did nothing to avert starvatio n. He rejects the view that their actions can be
likened to other modern genocides on the grounds that Lytton never planned to kill millions of Indians
whereas the Nazi genocide was intentional.63 However , it is difficult to imagine a more
intentional outcome than that pursued by Lytton and Temple: they knew that other
measures were available and that mass starvation could be averted (as
Temple had done previously in Bengal and Bihar) and yet they proceeded to do the
opposite. Indeed, even byMalthusian standards, it was hardly a situation of letting nature run its
course. The reduction of rations, insistence on hard labour, and collection of the land tax could have no
other outcome than drastically increasing mortality rates. Instead of viewing such actions for what they
were intentional acts of imperial genocide the most that Ferguson can muster is the
rhetorical query: But would Indians have been better off under the Mughals? Or for that matter, under
the Dutch or the Russians?64 In fact, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the Moguls and
Marathas did attempt to tailor their rule to fluctuating ecological and climactic conditions, especially in
drought-prone regions. Moreover, as Davis asserts, There is persuasive evidence that
peasants and farm laborers became dramatically more pregnable to
natural disaster after 1850 as their local economies were violently
incorporated into the world market. What colonial administrators and
missionaries perceived as the persistence of ancient cycles of
backwardness were typically modern structures of formal and informal
imperialism.65

We have an a priori burden to reject imperialist ethics not

rejecting imperialism justifies daily cultural and literal
genocide
McNally 6 (David, Professor of political science at York University The new imperialists
Ideologies of Empire Ch 5 Pg 92) JL
Yet, even on Ignatieff s narrow definition, in which human rights are about stopping unmerited cruelty
and suffering, the crucial question is how we are to do so. What if some means to this ostensible end
say, a military invasion can reasonably be expected to produce tens of thousands of civilian
casualties and an almost certain breakdown in social order? Ignatieff s doctrine of human rights
provides absolutely no ethico-philosophical criteria in that regard. Instead, he offers a pragmatic
judgement and a highly dubious one that only U.S. military power can be expected
to advance human rights in the zones where barbarians rule. But note: this
is an utterly ad hoc addition to his theory. In no respect can it be said to flow from any of his reflections
on human rights per se. Moreover, others proceeding from the same principle of
limiting cruelty and suffering have arrived at entirely opposite
conclusions with respect to imperial war. Ignatieff s myriad
proclamations for human rights thus lack any demonstrable tie to his
support of empire and imperial war. This is convenient, of course, since the chasm
between moralizing rhetoric and imperial advocacy allows Ignatieff to
pump out empty platitudes as if these contained real ethical guidance.
Concrete moral choices, involving historical study and calibrations of real
human risk, never enter the equation. So, Ignatieff can drone on about
the world being a better place without Saddam, never so much as
acknowledging the cost of this result: some 25,000 Iraqis killed as a result of
armed conflict since the start of the U.S. invasion, and probably more than 100,000 dead as a result of
all the consequences of the U.S. war.24 Nowhere does he offer any kind of calculus
for determining if these tens of thousands of deaths are ethically
justified. Instead, banalities about being rid of Saddam are offered up without even countenancing
the scale of human suffering that Ignatieff s preferred course of action war and occupation has
entailed. But then, Ignatieff shows little regard for ordinary people in the zones of military conflict. His
concern is for the security of the West and of the U.S.A. in particular. Ruminating about Americas new
vulnerability in the world, for instance, he writes, When American naval planners looked south from
the Suez Canal, they had only bad options. All the potential refuelling stops Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti,
Eritrea and Yemen are dangerous places for American warships. As the attack on the U.S.S. Cole
made clear, none of the governments in these strategically vital refuelling stops can actually guarantee
the safety of their imperial visitors.25
 Contention 4 is Solvency
Critical exploration is necessary to understand the ways militarism
function
Enloe, research professor in the Department of International
Development, Community, and Environment, 2007
[Cynthia H, CRAFTING A GLOBAL FEMINIST CURIOSITY TO MAKE SENSE OF
GLOBALIZED MILITARISM: TALLYING IMPACTS, EXPOSING CAUSES, Page 1-2,
http://sites.uci.edu/pjshah/files/2013/09/Enloe-Feminist-Curiosity.pdf, accessed 7- 13-14, Jacob]
Developing a curiosity involves exploring, questioningrefusing to take something for granted.
One is not curious about the things one takes for granted. For instance, most of us most of the
time (unless we have a rotten cold or have started going to yoga classes) arent very curious
about breathing. Most of us most of the time (unless we read the science pages of our
newspapers) also dont spend much time wondering about the melting arctic ice caps.
A major theme we will chart here is feminist curiosity: How to develop it? Whats distinctive
about it? We will discover what it is that a feminist curiosity can reveal about the workings of
globalization and militarizationand track the links between themthat we would otherwise
miss. In other words, this is a very practical, downto- earth enterprise.
Developing a new kind of curiosity is not just academic. It takes energy. It is political. It is cultural.
It is personal. To insist upon posing questions about things that other people take for granted can
be a political act.
A feminist curiosity is a crucial tool to use today in making sense of the links between two of the
worlds most potent trends: globalization and militarization.
Like any ization (e.g., industrialization, urbanization), globalization and militarization are actually
many-layered processes of transformation. For instance, it turns out to be possible to track, step
by step, strategic decision by strategic decision, precisely how the Nazi regime of 1930s
Germany transformed the conscience of so many ordinary Germans. Advertising techniques and
popular moviemaking played central roles (Koonz 2003). Thus you will need to watch each over
timea quick snapshot isnt going to reveal muchand youll need to keep your eye on several
layers at once, watching individuals change and at the same time paying attention to changes
occurring in local communities, public institutions, companies, and whole societies. Its a tall
order. Using a feminist curiosity should help you do it more realistically and with more reliable
results.
 **Women Imperialism Adv.
Women are excluded from politics and movements- any lack of gender in
policymaking and decision is inherently problematic and retrenches
the masculinity within states and state building
Nagel 98 (Joane, PhD Stanford) is a political and cultural sociologist, Masculinity
and nationalism: gender and sexuality
in the making of nations, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/014198798330007)//GLee
Political Man. In the light of a quarter century of second wave of feminist scholarship,1 the title of
Seymour Martin Lipsets classic treatise on politics seems almost quaint in its masculinist exclusiveness.
The same can be said for Ted Gurrs Why Men Rebel or for the ungendered, presumptively male
discourse of T.H. Marshalls Class, Citizenship, and Social Development or Karl Deutschs Nationalism and
Social Communication or Barrington Moores The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy or Samuel
N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkans Building States and Nations or Perry Andersons Lineages of the
Absolutist State.2 Even Theda Skocpols States and Social Revolutions is a tale of one
gender: men and the making of modern France, Russia, and China. 3 What were the titles
and content of these classics of political science and sociology trying to tell us about the structure and
operation of citizenship, states, nations, revolutions, empires? Feminist theorists have argued
that this absence of women from the work and thinking of these authors reflects, at
best, their gender blindness or, at worst, their gender chauvinism. They argue that
the result of this gender exclusion has been to render invisible womens hands in the
making of nations and states. The feminist scholarly response to this omission has
been twofold: First, to illuminate the role of women in politics by chronicling their
participation and leadership in national and opposition politics and move- ments;4
second, to uncover and document the mechanisms of womens exclusion from
political organizations, movements, decision-making institutions and processes.5
While I shall review some of these efforts to bring the women back in to the study of nationalism and
national politics, I should note that this necessary and important scholarship has often involved a
conflation of the terms gender and women. That is, the critique of classical literature on the
nation and state as gender-blind has resulted in an almost exclusive focus on
women women revolutionists, women leaders, womens hidden labour, womens
exploitation, womens resistance to domination. While this emphasis on women by
gender scholars has begun to fill a critical gap in the study of nationalism and
national politics, there remains an important uncharted territory to be investigated.
My primary concern here is on another significant and interesting question, what is the real meaning of
the masculine focus of social and political analyses of modern states catalogued above? Is it possible
that, inadvertently or not, these guys (and gals) were on to something in their preoccupation with men?
That is, perhaps the projects described in these titles state power, citizenship, nationalism, militarism,
revolution, political violence, dictatorship, and democracy are all best understood as masculinist
projects, involving masculine institutions, masculine processes and masculine activities (see Pateman
1989; Connell 1995). This is not to say that women do not have roles to play in the
making and unmaking of states: as citizens, as members of the nation, as activists,
as leaders. It is to say that the scripts in which these roles are embedded are written
primarily by men, for men, and about men, and that women are, by design,
supporting actors whose roles reflect masculinist notions of femininity and of
womens proper place. If nations and states are indeed gendered institutions as
much recent scholarship asserts,6 then to limit the examination of gender in politics
to an investigation of women only, misses a major, perhaps the major way in which
gender shapes politics through men and their interests, their notions of manliness,
and masculine micro and macro cultures.

Gendered violence exists in global politics and international relations.

Sjoberg 11 (Laurua Sjoberg at Assistant Professor of Political Science at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University. 2011. Gender, the State, and War Redux:
Feminist International Relations across the Levels of Analysis, International
Relations, volume: 25, pg. 111 http://ire.sagepub.com/content/25/1/108.full.pdf) //SW
Feminist scholars engagement with the relationship between the knower and the known reveals the third
misunderstanding in Elshtains explanation of the field. While Elshtain concedes that gender
discrimination impacts womens lives, she distinguishes the importance of gender to womens
lives from the question of whether global politics is gendered. In making this claim,
Elshtain asserts that gender discrimination which impacts womens lives can be separated
from the nature of the state and international system, and from the determinants and causes
of war therein. Feminists in IR have consistently argued both that womens lives are not
just lived in global politics, but of global politics, and that the discrimination women
experience is interlinked with the existence and causes of structural and physical
violence in the international arena. Particularly, feminists have argued that patriarchal social
organization25 in global politics is a principal cause not only of womens subordination, but
also empire-building and globalization, among other international processes. 26 These
approaches see that the gendering of womens lives cannot be separated from the
gendering of man, the state, and war, generally or in terms of the meanings and causes of war
specifically. Feminist scholarship in IR, then, does not pursue a line of research arguing that the differences
between women and men are significant at all three levels of analysis. Instead, feminists have
argued that the power relations between gendered constructions and institutions
significantly alter all three levels of analysis and their interaction. Gender is a
structural feature of social and political life that profoundly shapes our place in, and view
of, the world.27 Feminist scholars characterize gender as necessary, conceptually, for
understanding international relations; important in analyzing causes and predicting outcomes;
and essential to thinking about solutions and promoting positive change.28 Contrary to Elshtains claim,
this means that pre-feminist (or non-feminist) scholarship is not suspect or valueless, but
necessarily incomplete. This clearer, updated, and more complex understanding of the
meaning of gender and the mission of feminist work is certainly suited to evaluating
contributions to the study of IR at Waltzs three levels. Still, it remains important not to assume
feminists belief that putting gender in produces new insights, theoretical advances, and conceptual
categories for man, the state, and war makes it so.29 The rest of this article turns to the theoretical and
empirical evidence behind feminist claims to evaluate the relevance of gender analysis at each image of
Waltzian theorizing.

Promises of increased economic development and the end of imperialism

is empirically used to justify the inequality of women in China-
women are seen as disabled and a plague to the country
Hershatter 7 (Gail, historian of Modern China who holds the Distinguished Professor of
History chair at the University of California, Women in Chinas Long Twentieth Century,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1525/j.ctt1pnb9j.6.pdf)//GLee
In the late nineteenth century, Liang Qichao famously declared that China was being decimated
by an expansive West because it was a weak civilization, and that it was weak, in part, because
its footbound, cloistered women were not productive citizens, but parasites. Factual accuracy is not
important to this argument: Liang had to look away from the massive amounts of productive labor performed by both
peasant and elite women, in the household (for all) and in the households interaction with the market (for poorer families),
in order to make this statement. Nevertheless, the linkage he made between women, the health of the
civilization, and the viability of the state was taken up enthusiastically by others. Eventually this
linkage was elaborated into what Dorothy Ko (1994, 2005) has called the May Fourth story, told
by intellectuals of the New Culture movement and its political offshoots (including, eventually, the
CCP): that Chinese civilization was in thrall to a disabling hierarchy, that women and their status
in the family, under the weight of Confucian (later feudal) thinking, were emblematic of that
disability, that only by ending the hierarchy would the Chinese people, and their state formation,
cast off disability and stand up, as Mao put it in 1949. In this telling, Chinese women were
simultaneously the victims of disabling ideologies and practices , and the site of disability,
the backward and benighted object in need of reform. From the time of the New Culture/May Fourth moment
of the late 1910s and early 1920s, depending on who was writing, this woman and the nation story marched forward
more or less in step with the growth of the revolutionary movement. (In some accounts the May Fourth moment was
preceded by a brief surge of heroic womens revolutionary activity in the immediate run-up to the 1911 Revolution.) As
many historians of women and the Chinese revolution have pointed out, this formulation led to powerful dual
consequences. It put gender equality on the agenda of all revolutionary parties and many intellectuals in the twentieth
century. Liberating women from oppression was an integral part of liberating the nation from
weakness and therefore an important way in which revolutionaries justified their claim to power.
For the revolutionary CCP and for its less effective adversary, the GMD, the status and treatment
of women were taken as a signal of how well state-building was going. The Communist Party, in
particular, drew much of its power from its promise to rescue the nation from feudalism,
imperialism, Japanese invasion, and Guomindang oppression. At the same time, it subordinated
the fate of women to that of the nation, and whenever raising the status of women was
perceived to threaten the status of the nation, or its prospects for revolutionary transformation,
gender equality was deferred. Scholars, especially those attentive to feminism, took up this story, tracking the
changing state policies of the PRC and asking: How have they affected women? How successful were their reforms? How
willing to subordinate gender to class? With the onset of economic reform in the early 1980s, womens studies
scholars continued to raise many of the same kinds of questions, although an attention to
socialisms neglect of women was replaced by dismay that the state might be abandoning women
altogether to the depredations of global capitalism.

Perpetuating imperialism is the cause of patriarchy- imperialism is rooted

off of exploitation and violence against women
Chew 7 (Huibin Amee, Member of INCITE! and Boston Women of Color Against Violence,
Women and War: Reclaiming a Feminist Perspective, June 16, 2007,
http://www.leftturn.org/women-and-war-reclaiming-feminist-perspective)
Women are prominently involved in the US anti-war movement, but a gendered analysis of war is
usually ignored. Political commentators occasionally make note of women and children as wars
victimsbut few dare to sharpen their critique into an indictment of systemic patriarchy and
sexism. In this article, Huibin Amee Chew breaks down how US imperialism and militarism affect women, both in the US and in occupied Iraq. The
relation between imperialism and gender is not just a matter of macho talk and fashion, it is about
who dies, about economic sexism and sexual exploitation . It is not just ideological, but material, institutional, and
psychological. Mainstream feminism today has been co-opted and cheapened into the narrow struggle
to fill mens shoeswhile preserving capitalist, racist, imperialist, and even patriarchal
inequalities. Feminism is bombing Afghanistan to liberate women. Feminism is breaking gender roles by wearing heels and joining the
military. Feminism is even becoming a power-CEO or Condoleeza Rice. This shallow vision of gender justice has so
permeated even progressive circles, that our very definition of sexism is circumscribed. Too often,
sexism is merely seen as a set of cultural behaviors or personal biases; challenging sexism is
simply seen as breaking these gender expectations. But sexism is an institutionalized system,
with historical, political, and economic dimensions. Just as it was built on white supremacy and
capitalism, this country was built on patriarchyon the sexual subjugation of women whether in
war or peace, slavery or conquest; on the abuse of our reproductive capacity; the exploitation of
both our paid and unpaid labor. Truly taking on an anti-sexist agenda means uprooting
institutional patriarchy. A deep analysis of how patriarchy operates is typically absent across
progressive organizing in the USwhether for affordable housing, demilitarization, immigrant
rights, or worker rights. In all of these struggles, women are heavily affected, and moreover, affected disproportionately in gendered
ways, as women. Yet too often, organizers working on these issues do not recognize how they are
gendered. In the process, they prioritize mens experiences, and perpetuate sexism. Gender is
ghettoized, rather than fully integrated into radical struggles. Appended to the main concerns of other movements, it is at best engaged on a
single-issue, not systemic basis. The result is that conservatives (and free-market, war-mongering liberals) have a field day claiming to stand
in womens interests, while denying the experiences of most women in the US and around the globe. Lets not treat womens experiences and
Lets
the issues affecting them as special, but instead use them to perceive systemic forces at work we might otherwise not see.
understand that patriarchy cannot be uprooted in isolation from capitalist exploitation or white
supremacy, and vice versa, because in our political context, these systems require each other. A
better world depends on our understanding of this. The US anti-war movement has primarily fixated on the deaths of our own troops. So much
so that describing war as sexist returns blank staresarent men most of the people who die in battle? In the 20th century, 90 percent of all
war deaths have been non-combatantsmostly women and children. The weapons of modern warShock and awe, white phosphorus,
Worse, long-distance weapons that help
depleted uraniumare as likely to kill and maim women and girls as males.
preserve our troops lives by maximizing collateral damage, are our governments deliberate
strategy. Prolonged engagement between our military forces and civilians has resulted in war
crimes, like the checkpoint slaughters wiping out whole families. Our disregard for enemy lives has been
reinforced by both racist and sexist ideologiescan we call our boys anything less than heroic? Do we see these other deaths as mere
deviations from the supposedly mainstay targets of male terrorist insurgents? Unpaid labor Women are disproportionately affected by the
women make up 70 percent of those starving or on the
economic harms of war, both in the US and Iraq. Globally,
verge of starvation. Imperialism helps intensify the gender gap in poverty, a situation reflected in
indicators from health to literacy. During the sanctions period, female literacy in Iraq plummeted disproportionately. After the
2003 US invasion, women were the hardest hit by unemployment, since men are preferred for the few available jobs. Formerly 72 percent of
salaried Iraqi women were public employees, and many lost their jobs when government ministries were dismantled. The destruction of basic
infrastructure, like food rationing, impacts the indigent mostincluding poor women, many of them widows or single heads of households.
Iraqs economic woes will stretch far into the future, under the regime of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that industrialized nations
plan to impose on the country because of its sovereign debt. Feminist scholars have documented how SAPs disproportionately harm Third
in the US, most families in poverty are
World women across the globe in terms of health, education, and overwork. Likewise,
headed by single mothers, and poor women bear the brunt of public service cuts. In Massachusetts, for
example, most Medicaid recipients, graduates of state and community colleges, welfare, and subsidized childcare recipients, are womenand
all these programs have undergone budget slashes as the war budget has grown. The economics of womens unpaid labor,
performed in their traditional gender roles, must also be considered. As hospitals are destroyed or
become unavailable, its women in both Iraq and the US who disproportionately shoulder
responsibility for their families healthcare. Childcare, healthcare, homemaking all become heavier on women without public
sector aidwhether due to economic collapse in occupied lands, or budget austerity in the aggressor nation. Mass incarceration
increases the burden on women of color, who manage households alone while workfare-welfare
programs keep an underclass from decent jobs. Military wives and mothers are saddled with double duty to enable
soldiers extended tours. Sex trade Unsurprisingly, economic hardship and oppressive gender relations combine
to fuel sexual commodification. Following a pattern observed across different conflict regions by
feminist scholars, Iraqi women have faced increasing pressures to earn their subsistence from
men by bartering their sexuality. The United Nations Development Fund for Women documented
that in Baghdad, prostitution became widespread between the fall of the Hussein administration in
April 2003 and November 2003, as women disproportionately suffered growing poverty. By 2005,
reports surfaced of Iraqi teens working in Syrian brothels, after being displaced from Fallujah, where US forces had launched brutal offensives
and chemical weapons attacks on civilians. US bases foment a sex trade around the globe that often draws poor, rural girls and women.
Military leaders play a role in informally managing this industry to motivate their largely male workforce, exploiting global wealth disparities.
Recently, reports have surfaced of contractors shipping in Filipinas to work as prostitutes at US bases in Iraqfor $200 per month. Women
have returned home pregnant, unable to track down the fathers. GABRIELA, a mass womens organization in the Philippines, has decried how
the country now has the largest number of prostituted women and children in Southeast Asiaa direct legacy of its use as a rest and
recreation base for GIs during the Vietnam War. Imperialism enables collusion between foreign and indigenous patriarchies in aggravating
womens oppression. Sexual violence, as well as the trafficking of Iraqi women and girls, rose horrifically after the invasion, and continue
unabated to this day. While these initial rapes and abductions were perpetrated largely by Iraqi men, the occupation forces disruption of
security and disregard provided them the occasionthe US priority, after all, was to secure the oil. Moreover, the international womens
human rights organization MADRE has reported that since at least 2005, the Pentagon has armed, supported, and trained death squad-style
militias in Iraq, known to use sexual violence and targeted femicide as tactics for consolidating their power. As the occupation persists, and
contact between military forces and civilians grows, sexual brutality at the direct hands of both US troops and Iraqi police under occupation
14-year-old Abeer Qassim was gang raped and murdered by US
authority has proliferated. In March 2006,
soldiers; her family and 7-year-old sister were executed in the next room. Soon after, several
other women publicly came forward, reporting gang rapes by US-trained Iraqi police. Sadly, it
took over three years of occupation to break the mainstream media silence on atrocities which
are truly just the tip of the iceberg as reported by Chris Shumway in The NewStandard. Detained
women Unbeknownst to the US public, the Abu Ghraib debacle included the torture of female detainees also, as covered by Chris Harding in
the UK Gaurdian. In fact, the first evidence of abuse was a letter from a female prisoner reporting gang rape. Our own Congress has perused
the photos documenting such atrocities, though the only images widely disseminated involve male victims because Congress refuses to
release the other pictures. Interestingly, the only pictures of US soldiers assaulting Iraqi women to circulate were hard-core pornography
images, later discredited as frauds; the rape of women abounds in our consciousness, yet has no real existence. The total number of
detained women in Iraq is unknown. In 2005, Iman Khamas of the International Occupation Watch Center reported 625 females in Al-Rusafah
Women are subject to torture and degrading
Prison and 750 in Al-Kadhmiya alone, ranging from age 12 to 60.
humiliation; they are dragged by their hair, burned with electricity, forced to eat from dirty toilets,
and urinated on. Haifa Zangana wrote in the UK Guardian that according to Iraqi MP Mohamed al-Dainey, there were 65 documented
cases of womens rape in occupation detention centers during 2006. A May 2004 Red Cross report disclosed that 70 to 90 percent of 43,000
, US forces continue to routinely imprison the female
Iraqis detained in the last year were arrested by mistake. Today
relatives and even alleged lovers of male suspectsas hostages and bargaining chips, in a form
of collective punishment. Women are physically and sexually abused at checkpoints and during
house searches. Even after Abeers grisly murder came to light, coverage in the US press repeatedly insulted and devalued the
victims humanity, focusing instead on the tears of their US attackers! Anti-war organizers cannot allow these acts to be treated as mere
aberrations. We must oppose the hierarchy of lives that glorifies rapists and murderers in US uniformand that ignores the systemic forces
producing them. Women may serve as soldiers, but the US military is a misogynist, homophobic institution that relies on patriarchal ideologies
The US military conditions
and relations to functionwith far-reaching effects within US society as well as in occupied lands.
men to devalue, objectify, and demean traits traditionally associated with women. Furthermore,
soldiers are purposefully trained to eroticize violencefrom a heterosexual, male-aggressor
perspective. As reported by Kari Lydersen on Alternet in Rape Nation, the widespread sexual abuse of female soldiers by male
colleagues, with overwhelming impunity, is a symptom of this institutions workings. After brutalizing Iraqis, soldiers often bring rape and
domestic violence home. Phoebe Jones of Global Womens Strike has traced a prison-military complex of abusetorture in Abu Ghraib was
outsourced to personnel from US prison companies, and former soldiers return to become abusive guards. The connection extends to both
sides of the bars: in 1997, the number one reason for veterans to be in jail was for sexual assault A full exploration of the effects of militarism
on gendered violence in the US is out of the scope of this essay. However, such violence cannot be understood in isolation from economics,
racism, and state violence. Reproductive injustice The denial of reproductive healthcare is an issue of womens equalityaffecting womens
control over our labor, bodies, and futures. Over 340 tons of depleted uranium were dropped on Iraq during the first Gulf War; Iraqi feminist
anthropologist Nadje Al-Ali writes that the radioactive agent is linked to birth defects, pregnancy complications, and maternal mortality. Just
months after the 2003 invasion, increased back alley abortions were reported in Baghdad as women lost access to healthcare and
contraception. In the US, budget stringency, justified by war priorities, means universal reproductive healthcare will remain a distant
in our historical context, limiting womens control over their reproduction is
possibility. Moreover,
ideologically connected to the US imperial project. The Christian conservative movement has reframed debates on
morality around the abortion issue; and, as Andrea Smith has observed, emphasizing womens place in the private family is used as an excuse
The conflict in Iraq has restricted womens public access, shaping the
for disinvestment from public supports.
trajectory of their political participation. And whats more, besides constraints on physical space,
imperialism has hampered both Iraqi and US womens ability to organize against their own
oppression. The US occupation is not capable of bringing democracy or liberation to Iraqis. Its
bottom line is maintaining the political and military power necessary to guarantee the economic
interests of a US elite. Toward that end, occupying authorities have proved perfectly willing to barter away womens rights, time and
again. At best, they have played two sides of the fenceappearing to respond to womens needs only to attack their status when convenient.
But inevitably, an agenda based on despotic military brutality and the plunder of a nation is best carried out by public relations stunts, rather
than actual accountability. Occupation is waged by perpetuating hierarchythat is, by offering perks to certain segments of the occupied
population because they help subjugate the rest. Unfortunately, the occupiers pretensions at feminism and posturing at defending womens
interests has created an even nastier predicament for those in Iraq and the US who actually do care about womens rights. Iraqi womens
groups risk attack for any foreign ties or evidence of being agents of occupation. Indeed, these groups are being targeted by Republican
organizations and pro-occupation interests for co-optation. Our support for Iraqi womens groups may only help discredit them or lead to their
opportunistic attackboth by those who would construe that support as imperialist, and those who would use Iraqi womens predicament to
justify further military aggression. As US residents, any political solidarity must be predicated on demanding an immediate end to occupation
The primary role of US feminists is
military, economic, and political. The longer we stay, the worse we make the situation.
taking on US imperialism, and the US patriarchy it requires and rejuvenates. Like Iraqi women,
US women find themselves in a fraught position, because imperialism has pit a supposedly
feminist agenda against other progressive politics. Yet this quandary of divide and conquer, of being caught in
between, is not purely the work of imperial feministsleftists who fail to grapple with gender are also in part responsible, and thus must be
also be part of the remedy. Huibin Amee Chew is a member of INCITE! Boston Women of Color Against Violence, active in feminist, immigrant
rights, and workers rights

Patriarchy is the cause of global abuse, wars, and environmental

degradation
Warren and Cady 94 (Karen, Professor of Philosophy at Macalester, Duane,
Professor of Philosophy at Hamline University, Bringing Peace Home: Feminism,
Violence, and Nature)//GLee
To say that patriarchy is a dysfunctional system is to say that the fundamental
beliefs, values, attitudes and assumptions (conceptual framework) of patriarchy give
rise to impaired thinking, behaviors, and institutions which are unhealthy for humans,
especially women, and the planet. The following diagram represents the features of patriarchy as a
dysfunctional social system: Patriarchy, as an Up-Down system of power-over relationships of
domination of women by men, is conceptually grounded in a faulty patriarchal belief
and value system, (a), according to which (some) men are rational and women are
not rational, or at least not rational in the more highly valued way (some) men are
rational; reason and mind are more important than emotion and body; that humans
are justified in using female nature simply to satisfy human consumptive needs. The
discussion above of patriarchal conceptual frameworks describes the characteristics of this faulty belief system.
Patriarchal conceptual frameworks sanction, maintain, and perpetuate im- paired thinking, (b): For example, that men can
control women's inner lives, that it is men's role to determine women's choices, that human superiority over nature
justifies human exploitation of nature, that women are closer to nature than men because they are less rational, more
emotional, and respond in more instinctual ways than (dominant) men. The discussions above at (4) and (5) are examples
Operationalized, the evidence of
of the linguistic and psychological forms such impaired thinking can take.
patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the behaviors to which it gives rise,
(c), and the unmanageability, (d), which results. For example, in the United States, current estimates
are that one out of every three or four women will be raped by someone she knows; globally, rape, sexual
harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic pornography are exam- ples of
behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within patriarchy. In the realm of
environmentally destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and pollution of
the air, water, and soil are instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned within
patriarchy. They, too, rest on the faulty beliefs that it is okay to "rape the earth," that
it is "man's God-given right" to have dominion (that is, domination) over the earth,
that nature has only instrumental value, that environmental destruction is the
acceptable price we pay for "progress." And the presumption of warism, that war is a
natural, righteous, and ordinary way to impose dominion on a people or nation, goes
hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to dysfunctional behaviors of nations and
ultimately to international un- manageability. Much of the current "unmanageability"
of contemporary life in patriarchal societies, (d), is then viewed as a consequence of
a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect
historically male-gender-identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions.
Included among these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with
nuclear proliferation, war, environ- mental destruction, and violence toward women,
which many feminists sec as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through
observing these dysfunctional behaviorsthe symptoms of dysfunctionality that
one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them.
When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it isas a
predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy.11 The theme that global environmental crises, war, and violence
generally are predictable and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature
(see Russell 1989, 2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "a militarism and warfare are continual
features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill needs of such a system.
Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their
impact and preserving life on Earth" (Spretnak 1989, 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a
dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on a clearer meaning: Patriarchal conceptual
frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and regional conflict, the environment) which is
manifested in behaviors which, if continued, will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible. It is a stark message, but it
is plausible. Its plausibility lies in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman - nature - peace connections in
regional, national, and global contexts.
 2AC
Please work on them there so there arent two different copies.
***DA
AT: ELECTIONS
AT: UQ
 AT: Link
1. Lets take a moment to think about how ridiculous this link is
They are claiming that Trump will be looked at favorably because of two high-school debaters
trying to change academia and question notions of imperialism, orientalism, and hegemony.
They must prove the link to our case on a substantive level, dont let them get away with a
generic link to USFG action.

2. We have never claimed to fiat any action

So there is not link.
AT: Impact
AT: HEG
 AT: UQ, Link
1. I would like to explicitly concede the uniqueness and link of the heg
DA
The very fact that US hegemony is high now is the problem with the world.

2. Their link card flows aff

Cross-apply it to the solvency flow under their own arguments we successfully reduce
hegemony not only in the academy, but in the real world.
The neg really messed up by reading this card we can now claim post-fiat solvency based
solely on their evidence.
 AT: Heg good
Our McNally 6 card from the 1AC turns every part of this argument and
functions as a one-card kritik not only of heg but of the neg defense
of heg:

1. Extend that their DA destroys evidence and logic:

McNally 6
our imperial apologist fractures logic, evades evidence, claims moral superiority for his kind, and
demonizes imperialized Others

2. Extend that their DA transforms them into something terrible:

McNally 6
Defence of empire of murder, pillage, torture, and deception transforms the defenders
themselves. Whatever values they might have once professed, the reality of what they defend
takes possession of them, turns them into something other than what they intended

3. If this American hegemony goes unchecked it will cause

extinction
Harvey 06 [David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development, May
17 2006, Chapter 13]
The export of unemployment, of
At times of savage devaluation, interregional rivalries typically degenerate into struggles over who is to bear the burden of devaluation.
inflation, of idle productive capacity become the stakes in the game. Trade wars, dumping, interest rate wars, restrictions on capital flow and
foreign exchange, immigration policies, colonial conquest, the subjugation and domination of tributary economies, the
forced reorganization of the division of labour within economic empires, and, finally, the physical destruction and forced
devaluation of a rival's capital through war are some of the methods at hand. Each entails the aggressive manipulation of some
aspect of economic, financial or state power. The politics of imperialism, the sense that the contradictions of capitalism can be
cured through world domination by some omnipotent power, surges to the forefront. The ills of capitalism cannot so
easily be contained. Yet the degeneration of economic into political struggles plays its part in the long-run stabilization of capitalism,
provided enough capital is destroyed en route. Patriotism and nationalism have many functions in the contemporary world and may arise
for diverse reasons; but they frequently provide a most convenient cover for the devaluation of both capital and labour. We will shortly
it is, I believe, by far the most serious threat, not only to the survival of capitalism
return to this aspect of matters since
to the survival of the human race. Twice in the twentieth century, the world has
(which matters not a jot), but
been plunged into global war through inter-imperialist rivalries. Twice in the space of a generation, the world experienced the massive
devaluation of capital through physical destruction, the ultimate consumption of labour power as cannon fodder. Class warfare, of course, has taken its toll in life and limb, mainly through the
violence daily visited by capital upon labour in the work place and through the violence of primitive accumulation (including imperialist wars fought against other social formations in the name of
capitalist 'freedoms'). But the vast losses incurred in two world wars were provoked by inter-imperialist rivalries. How can this be explained on the basis of a theory that appeals to the class relation
between capital and labour as fundamental to the interpretation of history? This was, of course, the problem with which Lenin wrestled in his essay on imperialism. But his argument, as we saw in
chapter 10, is plagued by ambiguity. Is finance capital national or international? What is the relation, then, between the military and political deployment of state power and the undoubted trend
within capitalism to create multinational forms and to forge global spatial integration? And if monopolies and finance capital were so powerful and prone in any case to collusion, then why could
they not contain capitalism's contradictions short of destroying each other? What is it, then, that makes inter-imperialist wars necessary to the survival of capitalism? The 'third cut' at crisis theory
suggests an interpretation of inter-imperialist wars as constitutive moments in the dynamics of accumulation, rather than as abberations, accidents or the simple product of excessive greed. Let us
see how this is so. When the 'inner dialectic' at work within a region drives it to seek external resolutions to its problems, then it must search out new markets, new opportunities for capital export,
cheap raw materials, low-cost labour power, etc. All such measures, if they are to be anything other than a temporary palliative, either put a claim on future labour or else directly entail an
expansion of the proletariat. This expansion can be accomplished through population growth, the mobilization of latent sectors of the reserve army, or primitive accumulation. The insatiable thirst
of capitalism for fresh supplies of labour accounts for the vigour with which it has pursued primitive accumulation, destroying, transforming and absorbing pre-capitalist populations wherever it
finds them. When surpluses of labour are there for the taking, and capitalists have not, through competition, erroneously pinned their fates to a technological mix which cannot absorb that labour,
then crises are typically of short duration, mere hiccups on a general trajectory of sustained global accumulation, and usually manifest as mild switching crises within an evolving structure of
uneven geographical development. This was standard fare for nineteenth-century capitalism. The real troubles begin when capitalists, fating shortages of labour supply and as ever urged on by
competition, induce unemployment through technological innovations which disturb the equilibrium between production and realization, between the productive forces and their accompanying
social relations. The closing of the frontiers to primitive accumulation, through sheer exhaustion of possibilities, increasing resistance on the part of pre-capitalist populations, or monopolization by
some dominant power, has, therefore, a tremendous significance for the long-run stability of capitalism. This was the sea-change that began to be felt increasingly as capitalism moved into the
twentieth century. It was the sea-change that, far more than the rise of monopoly or finance forms of capitalism, played the crucial role in pushing capitalism deeper into the mire of global crises
and led, inexorably, to the kinds of primitive accumulation and devaluation jointly wrought through inter-capitalist wars. The mechanisms, as always, are intricate in their details and greatly
confused in actual historical conjunctures by innumerable cross-currents of conflicting forces. But we can construct a simple line of argument to illustrate the important points. Any regional alliance,
if it is to continue the process of accumulation, must maintain access to reserves of labour as well as to those 'forces of nature' (such as key mineral resources) that are otherwise capable of
monopolization. Few problems arise if reserves of both exist in the region wherein most local capital circulates. When internal frontiers close, capital has to look elsewhere or risk devaluation. The
regional alliance feels the stress between capital embedded in place and capital that moves to create new and permanent centres of accumulation elsewhere. Conflict between different regional
and national capitals over access to labour reserves and natural resources begins to be felt. The themes of internationalism and multilaterialism run hard up against the desire for autarky as the
means to preserve the position of some particular region in the face of internal contradictions and external pressures - autarky of the sort that prevailed in the 193Os, as Britain sealed in its
Commonwealth trade and Japan expanded into Manchuria and mainland Asia, Germany into eastern Europe and Italy into Africa, pitting different regions against each other, each pursuing its own

In the end the war was fought to

'spatial fix'. Only the United States found it appropriate to pursue an 'open door' policy founded on internationalism and multilateral trading.

open up the whole world to the potentialities of geographical expansion and unlimited
contain autarky and to
uneven development. That solution, pursued single-mindedly under United States's hegemony
after 1945, had the advantage of being super-imposed upon one of the most savage bouts of
devaluation and destruction ever recorded in capitalism's violent history. And signal benefits accrued not
simply from the immense destruction of capital, but also from the uneven geographical distribution of that destruction. The world was
saved from the terrors of the great depression not by some glorious 'new deal' or the magic touch
of Keynesian economics in the treasuries of the world, but by the destruction and death of global
war.

4. Turn: Extend the Engelhardt 13 card from the 1AC

This card explains how American expansionism results in otherization, an in-round,
methodological impact that outweighs their impacts

5. Even if you dont buy our framing, the Engelhardt 13 still turns the
DA
It also explains how the American politics of hegemony result in eternal war, accessing the post-
fiat extinction impacts of their framing

6. Even if the negs prevention of Chinese hegemony is a good thing

you must vote aff for several reasons
First on our framework our questioning of hegemony and the system far o/ws their fake impacts
And second on their framework at this point we are winning that American hegemony is terrible,
and needs to be prevented just as much as Chinese hegemony

7. Finally, the neg is simply treading with savage fascist steps:

Through their very attempt to defend American hegemony the negative team is a perfect of
example of what is wrong with American education and why our radical pedagogy is needed
they shamelessly perpetuate genocide.
***T
 T OVERVIEW:
The T debate is coming down to whether fiat is good or bad. The AFF meets
every part of the topic, apart from the USFG as a actor. This is
because we are rejecting the idea of fiat as flawed, I we dont think
it should be supported in debates, I will explain this more on the
line by line.
 AT: DIDNT READ A PLAN
() We meet - We have an advocacy statement that we read in the 1AC,
expressly outlining what we are supporting in this round and then
inviting the NEG to criticize it. This checks abuse, we cant shift our
advocacy, you all have the speech doc, you all know what we said.

() Counter interp - The AFF must have an advocacy of some kind that
relates to the topic, but they do not have to use fiat.

Reasons to prefer:

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).

() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and

misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() AT Limits and grounds:

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
AT: OTHER T VIOLATION
 Engagement is only positive
(1) We meet Our critical engagement with the topic is certainly positive in
the sense that it is leading to the production of knowledge and
critical thought.

(2) Counter interp The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the
topic, a non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

Reasons to prefer:

(1) Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something
good, but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are
smaller in a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are
real.

(2) Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

(3) Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have
that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

(4) Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).

(5) This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and
misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

(6) AT Limits and grounds:

(7) We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

(8) Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten
cases that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not
abusive.

(9) The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they
can attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF
abuse. The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
 Engagement can only have single products
We meet Imperialism is a single issue, and our critical engagement
produces what could be called a single product so we meet.

Counter interp - The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the topic, a
non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

Reasons to prefer:
() single products limiting, hurts fairness and education their definition is
ridiculously limiting, which means the people in this ro

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).

() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and

misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() AT Limits and grounds:

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
 Engagement is only formal dialogue
We meet Our whole advocacy is centered around critical dialogue.

Counter interp - The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the topic, a
non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

Reasons to prefer:

There interp is imperialist. The inherent in the idea of formal dialogue is

the execution of the imperial objects.

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).

() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and

misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
 Engagement means QPQ
We meet This is a QPQ, no we arent making anyone accept it, its up to
them.

Counter interp - The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the topic, a
non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

Reasons to prefer:

() QPQ is imperialist. It is rooted in the idea of bigger countries

manipulating smaller ones while pretending to be doing something
charitable. This is a independent reason to reject their interp.

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).

() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and

misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
 Engagement does not mean QPQ
We meet Our advocacy is an unconditional demand, and all of are
advantages are coming from that demand.

Counter interp - The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the topic, a
non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

Reasons to prefer:

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).

() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and

misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
 Substantially (2% - 90%)
We meet we are critical engaging with (instert percent) of the topic,
because the foundation of Sino- US relations is imperialism and
hegemony

Counter interp - The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the topic, a
non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

Reasons to prefer:

() their interp makes no sense. The issues that we are dealing with in this
topic cant be given and number.

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).

() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and

misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
 Increase excludes creation
We meet we are not creating in a concrete sense, simply engaging in
critical exploration of hegemony and imperialism.

Counter interp The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the topic, a
non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

Reasons to prefer:

() Turn- the constant desire for more is what drove imperialism, their interp
is not only fundamentally imperialist, it is also flawed in general
because it makes it so we cant decrease anything bad before we try
to make more good things.

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).

() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and

misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
 Increase means net
We meet our advocacy statement is still a net increase in knowledge and
discussion of and around Sino- US imperialism.

Counter interp The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the topic, a
non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

() their interp makes no sense. The issues that we are dealing with in this
topic cant be given and number.

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).

() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and

misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
 Increase means make greater
We meet we are contributing to critique of imperialism and making that
greater.

Counter interp The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the topic, a
non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

() Turn- the constant desire for more is what drove imperialism, their interp
is not only fundamentally imperialist, it is also flawed in general
because it makes it so we cant decrease anything bad before we try
to make more good things.

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).

() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and

misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
 Increase means progressive growth
We meet We are probably the best example of progressive growth, the
point of our AFF is the pursuit of societal progress.

Counter interp The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the topic, a
non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).
() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and
misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
 PRC only mainland
We meet We are engaging with the mainland in the sense that we are
engaging in both China and the US and mother countries

Counter interp The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the topic, a
non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).
() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and
misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
 PRC more then mainland
We meet We are engaging with the entire political entity of the PRC, much
more then just the mainland.

Counter interp The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the topic, a
non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).
() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and
misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
 PRC only government
We meet The advocacy of the 1AC is to engage with the Hegemonic and
imperialistic aspects of the Chinese government, therefore we
meet.

Counter interp The AFF does not have to use fiat to engage in the topic, a
non fiated discussion of the topic is also topical.

() NEG interp is flawed- It is a mistake to deal only with the government of

the country that we are engaging with, it makes it so we overlook
the citizens who actually make up the government.

() Fiat is bad - Fiat is just letting people think that they did something good,
but really they just talked about it. Even if the impacts are smaller in
a no fiat AFF, they are infinitely greater because they are real.

() Fiat bad for education to only allow debates around strictly public
policy issues would exclude virtually any discussion of philosophy
the only point of debate is learning, and should be considered prior
to policy issues. Anyone with a news app can know about Sino-US
policy, but is an understanding of things like imperialism that
makes debate unique, dont take that away by voting NEG on this
position.

() Fiat is utopian we arent personally real policy makers. We dont have

that level of power. Debate is an intellectual sport and the judge
should make the decision on which team represents that is more
closely related to reality, we turn their real world arguments.

() Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become

tools in our game of academic debate, which is politically and
intellectually unhelpful.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of
the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing
implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space
begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from
other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such
barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a
purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly
hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds
outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness
argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse
to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).

() This Spector mentality leads to the celebration of human death and

misery, and kill the civic voice.
Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, PEDAGOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60] //QM

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune . Instead of focusing on
the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters
overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate
on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate
arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a
disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most
politically debilitating failures of contemporary education : "Educational institutions have failed
even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily
conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their
civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"
(1991, p. 8).

() We dont make the AFF to big - It really only adds a couple of cases,
imperialism, fem and maybe some others. Although there are many
variations of these cases, differences are so subtle that the NEG
really only needs two or three NEG strats, unlike policy plans were
each variation means you need to rethink your NEG position.

() Make them prove it IF they cant tell you in their next speech, ten cases
that would be added by our interp, then this interp is not abusive.

() The NEG still has ground the NEG has a multitude of thing that they can
attack if they want to. Dont let them pass of laziness as AFF abuse.
The fact that they have off case positions is proof of this.
***K
 AT: CAP
1. Turn: Extend Prbsting 14 and Kiwanuka 13
Chinese imperialism is is rooted in capital, monopolies, and investment.

2. Turn: Extend McLaren 5 that our revolutionary pedagogy fights

capitalism
This card is offense we solve cap, not link to it.

3. Thus, we can PERM: do the aff

We have solved the K by doing the aff.

4. Also, PERM do both

The alt is not competitive whatsoever.

5. Turn: Extend Boggs 5 that critical pedagogy in educational systems

tears down capitalist-based oppression.
6. Turn: Class struggles are the root cause of imperialism
Harvey 04 (David, Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate
Center of the City University of New York, THE NEW IMPERIALISM: ACCUMULATION BY
DISPOSSESSION, Socialist Register, 2004)//BW
In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel notes how the inner dialectic of bourgeois society, producing
an overaccumulation of wealth at one pole and a rabble of paupers at the other, drives it to seek
solutions through external trade and colonial/imperial practices. He rejects the idea that there
might be ways to solve the problem of social inequality and instability through internal
mechanisms of redistribution.10 Lenin quotes Cecil Rhodes as saying that colonialism and
imperialism abroad were the only possible way to avoid civil war at home.11 Class relations and
struggles within a territorially bounded social formation drive impulses to seek a spatio-temporal
fix elsewhere. The evidence from the end of the nineteenth century is here of interest. Joseph
Chamberlain (Radical Joe as he was known) was closely identified with the liberal manufacturing
interests of Birmingham, and was initially opposed to imperialism (in the Afghan Wars of the
1850s, for example). He devoted himself to educational reform and improvements in the social
and physical infrastructures for production and consumption in his home city of Birmingham. This
provided, he thought, a productive outlet for surpluses that would be repaid in the long run. An
important figure within the liberal conservative movement, he saw the rising tide of class struggle
in Britain at first hand and in 1885 made a celebrated speech in which he called for the propertied
classes to take cognizance of their responsibilities to society (i.e. to better the conditions of life of
the least well off and invest in social and physical infrastructures in the national interest) rather
than solely to promote their individual rights as property owners. The uproar that followed on the
part of the propertied classes forced him to recant and from that moment on he turned to be the
most ardent advocate for imperialism (ultimately, as Colonial Secretary, leading Britain into the
disaster of the Boer War). This career trajectory was quite common for the period. Jules Ferry in
France, an ardent supporter of internal reform, particularly education, in the 1860s, took to
colonial advocacy after the Commune of 1871 (leading France into the mire of Southeast Asia
that culminated in defeat at Dien Bien-Phu in 1954); Crispi sought to solve the land problem in the
Italian south through colonization in Africa; and even Theodore Roosevelt in the United States
turned, after Frederic Jackson Turner declared, erroneously, at least as far as investment
opportunities were concerned, that the American Frontier was closed, to support imperial policies
rather than internal reforms.12 In all of these cases, the turn to a liberal form of imperialism (and
one that had attached to it an ideology of progress and of a civilizing mission) resulted not from
absolute economic imperatives but from the political unwillingness of the bourgeoisie to give up
any of its class privileges, thus blocking the possibility of absorbing overaccumulation through
social reform at home. The fierce opposition by the owners of capital to any politics of
redistribution or internal social amelioration in the United States today likewise leaves the country
no option but to look outwards for solutions to its economic difficulties. Internal class politics of
this sort forced many European powers to look outwards to solve their problems from 1884 to
1945, and this gave a specific coloration to the forms that European imperialism then took. Many
liberal and even radical figures became proud imperialists during these years and much of the
working-class movement was persuaded to support the imperial project as essential to their well-
being. This required, however, that bourgeois interests should thoroughly command state policy,
ideological apparatuses and military power. Arendt therefore interprets this Euro-centric
imperialism, correctly in my view, as the first stage in political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than
the last stage of capitalism as Lenin depicted it.13 I will consider this idea further in the
conclusion.
 AT: Poem links to cap
1. No link: We do not even come close to commodifying this poem
Its entire purpose is to lend the perspective of people who have been personally oppressed by
imperialism to the debate.
It was written by the daughter of a former President of Guyana. She experienced the horrors of
imperialism on multiple occasions, and as neither my partner nor I have, we felt it was necessary
to bring her voice into the discussion.

2. No link: The point of the aff is to change the education system.

One valuable way to do that is through compassion and emotion the poem serves to effect the
people in the room and work towards a less flawed education system.
B/c the poems purpose is emotional and education, not as something to be bought or sold, we
dont commodity the poem.

3. Turn: the poem solves cap with education and pedagogy

Extend McLaren 5 from the 1AC that education and pedagogy can solve imperialism and cap.
The criticism and education that we access through the poem actually works against cap.
AT: SECURITY
 AT: FEM
1. Extend McLaren 5 from the 1AC the anti-imperialist struggle that
we access through education is gender-balanced
McLaren 05
I have attempted to expand the pedagogical encounter to consider its own insinuation into
globalized social relations of exploitation and to live up to its revolutionary potential of
becoming a transnational, gender-balanced, multiracial, anti-imperialist struggle .

2. Turn: We solve feminism - Imperialism oppresses women

by creating inequalities in the workforce as well as in the
social sphere
Robinson 2002
[William I. Robinson, Latin America in the Age of Inequality: Confronting the New Utopia, International Studies Review,
December 17 2002, Wiley interscience]
The larger structural context for the upsurge in womens struggles is the dramatic change in the status of women in Latin
America in recent decades. Globalization has major implications for the sexual division of labor, for
gender relations, and for the transformation of the family itself . The percentage of women in the labor
force has grown in most regions of the world under globalization. 37 Increased formal sector female participation has
resulted from several factors. Among them are the predictable pattern that accompanies capitalist development in
general, that is, the need for families to send an increasing number of family members into the labor market with the
decline in real wages and household income; the predilection of transnational capital to hire docile female labor,
particularly in maquila production; and so on.38 With the decline in male employment and real wages brought about by
neoliberal restructuring, women have assumed a growing absolute and also relative importance as wage earners, and
their contribution to household economies has increased. The reorganization of production on a global scale is
feminizing the labor force and changing the previous gender demarcation of domestic and wage labor . Gender
inequality is reproduced in the workforce at the same time as it continues in the household: the
systematic subordination of women in the reproduction sphere is coupled with the systematic inequality of women in the
production sphere. It is clear that under globalization there is a transformation of the sexual
division of labor. New forms of labor market segmentation between men and women and wage differentials in the
formal sector converge with unpaid domestic labor and hardship imposed in the sphere of gendered social reproduction,
resulting in a deterioration of the status and social condition of most women. From the
maquilas of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean to the new transnational agribusiness plantations in Chile and
Colombia and the new industrial complexes in Brazils northeast, women in Latin America disproportionatelyand in
some cases, exclusivelyengage in unskilled, laborintensive phases of globalized production.39

3. Thus, we can PERM: do the aff

We have solved the K by doing the aff.

4. Also, PERM do both

The alt is not competitive whatsoever.

5. Turn: Economic globalization is misogynist, so our rejection of

imperialism solves the K
Parisi 9 (Laura Parisi is an Associate Professor at University of Victoria. Jan 1, 2009 The
Numbers Do(nt) Always Add Up: Dilemmas in Using Quantitative Research Methods in Feminist
IR Scholarship
https://www.academia.edu/1056901/The_Numbers_Do_nt_Always_Add_Up_Dilemmas_in_Using
_Quantitative_Research_Methods_in_Feminist_IR_Scholarship)
Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True (2006, 5) argue that what makes scholarship feminist is the research
question and the theoretical methodology and not the tool or particular method used.

Gwendolyn Beetham and Justina Demetraides (2007, 200) underscore this point by suggesting that many research tools can be used in ways that are consistent with feminist goals and ideology.

These perspectives are useful for reflecting on how I came to reconcile my initial reluctance to employ quantitative methods in my own research. My research questions
were based at the systemic level and informed by insights from a lot of case studies and
qualitative work produced by feminist IR, economics, and development scholars who provided
compelling evidence that economic globalization is a profoundly gendered, racialized, sexualized,
and classed process. Because of this, I needed a way to investigate how globalization processes
affected states abilities to meet their human rights obligations and whether or not this had
differential effects on the achievement of socioeconomic rights for women and men. I was interested in what
global and temporal patterns we could see with regard to globalization (measured as trade openness, foreign direct investment, and economic liberalization), economic development, and

. With
democratization The best way to accomplish this was to use quantitative models, which gave me the ability to approach my research question cross-nationally and longitudinally.

few exceptions, many of the quantitative models that have been used to examine the
relationships among globalization, economic development, democratization, and the achievement
of human rights were not informed by feminist IR theory, and I wanted to rectify this problem. I came up with the strategy of contextualizing
and informing my study using Dianne Ottos notion (2001, 54) of structural indivisibility, which stresses interconnections between the political, economic, environmental, and security priorities of

I infused this framework with feminist IR theorizing about the political,

the international order and violations of human rights.

economic, environmental, and security priorities that had become normalized in mainstream IR
in order to inform the hypotheses to be tested, the operationalization of my variables, the models,
and the analysis of the results.
***FRAMEWORK
 AT: UTIL F/W
1. Utilitarianism promotes inequity and inherently discriminates against
minority like slavery
Odell, 04 University of Illinois is an Associate Professor of Philosophy (Jack, Ph.D., On
Consequentialist Ethics, Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, Inc., pp. 98-103)
A classic objection to both act and rule utilitarianism has to do with inequity , and is related to the kind of
objection raised by Rawls, which I will consider shortly. Suppose we have two fathers-Andy and Bob. Suppose further that
they are alike in all relevant respects, both have three children, make the same salary, have the same living expenses, put aside the same
amount in savings, and have left over each week fifteen dollars. Suppose that every week Andy and Bob ask themselves what they are
going to do with this extra money, and Andy decides anew each week (AU) to divide it equally among his three children, or he makes a
decision to always follow the rule (RU) that each child should receive an equal percentage of the total allowance money. Suppose further
that each of his children receive five degrees of pleasure from this and no pain. Suppose on the other hand, that Bob, who strongly favors
his oldest son, Bobby, decides anew each week (AU) to give all of the allowance money to Bobby, and nothing to the other two, and that he
instructs Bobby not to tell the others, or he makes a decision to follow the rule (RU) to always give the total sum to Bobby. Suppose also
that Bobby gets IS units of pleasure from his allowance and that his unsuspecting siblings feel no pain. The end result of the actions of both
fathers is the same-IS units of pleasure. Most, if not all, of us would agree that although Andy's conduct is exemplary, Bob's is culpable.
Nevertheless, according to both AU and RU the fathers in question are morally equal. Neither father is more or less exemplary or
culpable than the other. I will refer to the objection implicit in this kind of example as (H) and state it as: ' (H) Both
act
and rule utilitarianism violate the principle of just distribution. What Rawls does is to elaborate
objection (H). Utilitarianism, according to Rawls, fails to appreciate the importance of distributive
justice, and that by doing so it makes a mockery of the concept of "justice ." As I pointed out when I
discussed Russell's views regarding partial goods, satisfying the interests of a majority of a given population
while at the same time thwarting the interests of the minority segment of that same population (as
occurs in societies that allow slavery) can maximize the general good, and do so even though the
minority group may have to suffer great cruelties. Rawls argues that the utilitarian commitment to maximize
the good in the world is due to its failure to ''take seriously the distinction between persons." One person can be
forced to give up far too much to insure the maximization of the good , or the total aggregate satisfaction,
as was the case for those young Aztec women chosen by their society each year to be sacrificed to the Gods for the
welfare of the group.

2. Biopolitics is rooted in utilitarianism the neg can never solve

serious systematic impacts
Ernst 12 (Anne, Utilitarian Biopolitics: Bentham, Foucault and Modern Power,)
Utilitarian Biopolitics is the study of the relationship between Jeremy Bentham, the eighteenth-
century utilitarian philosopher, and Michel Foucault, his most prominent twentieth-century critic. It
of ers a new perspective on Foucaults biopolitics , drawing on material from the latest edition of
Benthams Collected Works, from yet unpublished Bentham manuscripts, and from Foucaults
recently published lectures at the Collge de France. h is books title Utilitarian Biopolitics
emphasizes the means by which Foucaults thought employed a framework of ideas and
concepts drawn from Benthams writings. Simultaneously, the book also uses Foucaultian
concepts to analyse Benthams theory on power. In doing so, it tests the validity of Foucaultian
concepts and l eshes out new biopolitical concepts (biopolitical pleasure, biopolitical pain and
biopolitical language) at the intersection of Bentham and Foucaults theoretical models, and
stresses the utilitarian origins, construction and operation of biopolitics . h e books main argument
is that Foucault assimilated Benthams utilitarianism when forging his theories on government and
that a recognition of this source of Foucaults inspiration allows for a reconsideration of the
concept of biopolitics itself.

3. Deontological principles of rights should be considered first other

interpretations are assigned no moral value if conflicting with the
principles of rights because viewing the debate from a deontological
perspective is the only way to guarantee freedom
Freeman 94 Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.
Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the
Priority of Right, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)
The priority of right asserts then that the reasons supplied by moral motives-principles of right and
their institutional requirements-have absolute precedence over all other considerations . As such,
moral motives must occupy a separate dimension in practical reasoning. Suppose then a supplementary stage of
practical reasoning, where the interests and pursuits that figure into ordinary deliberation and which
define our conception of the good are checked against principles of right and justice. At this stage
of reasoning, any ends that directly conflict with these moral principles (e.g., racist ends or the
wish to dominate others), or whose pursuit would undermine the efficacy of principles of right (e.g., desires for
unlimited accumulation of wealth whatever the consequences for others), are assigned no moral value, no
matter how intensely felt or important they may otherwise be. Being without moral value, they count for
nothing in deliberation. Consequently, their pursuit is prohibited or curtailed by the priority given to
principles of right. The priority of right then describes the hierarchical subordination in practical deliberation of the
desires, interests, and plans that define a person's rational good, to the substantive demands of principles of right.32
Purposes and pursuits that are incompatible with these principles must be abandoned or revised. The same idea carries
through to social and political deliberations on the general good. In political deliberative procedures, the priority of right
means that desires and interests of individuals or groups that conflict with the institutional requirements of principles of
right and justice have no legitimate claim to satisfaction, no matter how intense peoples' feelings or how large the majority
sharing these aims. Constitutional restrictions on majority rule exhibit the priority of right. In democratic procedures,
majorities cannot violate constitutional rights and procedures to promote, say, the Christian religion, or any other aspect of
their good that undermines others' basic rights and opportunities. Similarly, the institutional requirements of Rawls's
difference principle limit, for example, property owners' desires for tax exemptions for capital gains, and the just savings
principle limits current majorities' wishes to deplete natural resources. These desires are curtailed in political contexts, no
matter how intense or widely held, because of the priority of principles of right over individual and general good.33 The
priority of right enables Rawls to define a notion of admissible conceptions of the good: of those desires, interests and
plans of life that may legitimately be pursued for political purposes. Only admissible conceptions of the good
establish a basis for legitimate claims in political procedures (cf. TJ, p. 449). That certain desires and
pursuits are permissible, and political claims based on them are legitimate, while others are not,
presupposes antecedently established principles of right and justice . Racist conceptions of the good are
not politically admissible; actions done in their pursuit are either prohibited or discouraged by a just social scheme, and
they provide no basis for legitimate claims in political procedures. Excellences such as knowledge, creativity, and
aesthetic contemplation are permissible ends for individuals so long as they are pursued in accordance with the
constraints of principles of right. Suppose these perfectionist principles state intrinsic values that it is the duty of everyone
to pursue. (Rawls leaves this question open. cf. TJ, p. 328.) Still, they cannot supply a basis for legitimate
political claims and expectations; they cannot be appealed to in political contexts to justify limiting
others' freedom, or even the coercive redistribution of income and wealth (cf. TJ, pp. 331-32). This is
because of the priority of right over the good. Now return to Kymlicka's argument. Kymlicka says both Rawls and
utilitarians agree on the premise of giving equal consideration to everyone's interests, and that because utilitarians afford
equal consideration, "they must recognize, rather than deny, that individuals are distinct persons with their own rightful
claims. That is, in Rawls's classification, a position that affirms the priority of the right over the good" (LCC, p. 26). Since
"Rawls treats the right as a spelling-out of the requirement that each person's good be given equal consideration," there is
no debate between Rawls and utilitarians over the priority of the right or the good (LCC, p. 40).
AT: POLICY-MAKER F/W
 AT: Fiat KT education
1. By making this argument they have conceded that education is a
priority of this debate.
We are the ones that have been prioritizing education from the beginning of the round their
argument is literally a concession to our F/W

2. And under an education o/w F/W we win every time

See our McLaren 5 and Boggs 5 cards we best promote education in the round

3. Concede that fiat helps traditional education and that we harm it

Extend Mayo 14: Education serves as a means to colonise the mental universe
Our 1AC exists to challenge squo epistemologies of imperialism, so by not embracing fiat we
continue to question the normative assumptions of the educational system.

4. Mayo 14 from the 1AC functions as a kritik of this argument:

It explains that traditional education has a barrier between the colonized and the metropole.
Challenging the standard understanding of education that the neg argues for actually gives us
additional solvency.
Mayo 14 also explains how the negs idea of education oppresses local cultures and treats the
colonized as second-class citizens this is an independent reason to vote aff.
 AT: Discourse doesnt matter
1. Extend McNally 6 from the 1AC
It talks about how the neg trying to defend imperialism turns them into imperialists, fracturing logic
and avoiding evidence.

2. By saying that discourse is not the priority in this debate the neg is
normalizing the squo epistemology of imperialism
They treat discourse as if it isnt an issue, causing academia to think that there is no need to
change the epistemology of imperialism; this action perpetuates the globalization of a single form
of knowledge. Our Alcadipani cards function as an independent kritik of their methodology.

3. The negs acceptance of the squos globalized knowledge subverts

local knowledge and prevents opposition; their epistemology is
upheld through the destruction of local knowledges
Alcadipani 11
[Rafael Alcadipani and Alexandre Reis Rosa, From global management to local management: Latin American
perspectives as a counter-dominant management epistemology, Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, January 4
2011, Wiley interscience]
This approach raises arguments both for and against globalization (Kellner, 2002). Those in favour of globalization see
an end to borders as a positive thing, which will create new economic, political, and cultural opportunities. On the other
hand, critics of globalization consider it a form of imperialism that takes advantage of the end of
borders to impose market and capital logics throughout the world (Kellner, 2002). These two possibilities
can lead us to ask: What is managements role in the global picture ? As an area of academic knowledge
and social practice, management is a globally widespread phenomenon. It is taught at almost all the worlds universities,
and practiced professionally and nonprofessionally in all corporations, governments, NGOs, and so forth. However, this
global aspect also implies that management knowledge and practices generated and
developed in Western countries, especially in the United States (US), can then be seamlessly
transferred to other contexts (i.e., Jack, Calas, Nkomo, & Peltonen, 2008). The assumption is that
knowledge in management can be universally applicable and is, supposedly, neutral. The resultant view is
that management globalization is positive, and is indeed an opportunity created by globalization.
On the other hand, if analyzed from a critical perspective and from the viewpoint of Latin America a region
that is a recipient of management knowledge and practicesthe process can pose many problems. This is
especially because globalized management tends to impact management knowledge and experiences
developed locally. The logic behind this impact is linked to a wider context in which epistemologies are
based on a dividing line that creates a hierarchy of knowledge and that subordinates local
thinking (which is considered as particular) to global thinking (which is considered universal. This unequal
knowledge-power relationship, which undermines the particular knowledge of many colonized peoples, is
called coloniality of power by Quijano (2000), and the manner in which this epistemological difference was
(re)produced is called abyssal thinking by Santos (2007). Both of them define lines that divide experiences,
knowledge, and social players into two groups that inhabit each side of the abyss. On one side is the
hegemonic, useful, intelligible, and visible knowledge produced by the North (or First World), and
on the other is the inferior, useless or dangerous, and unintelligible knowledge produced by the
South (or Third World), which is meant to be forgotten. In management terms, this means that the colonial
meeting between Northern and Southern knowledge has created a naturalized view that useful, intelligible, and visible
ways to manage an organization are necessarily found in the knowledge produced in the North. Here North refers to the
countries in the Northern Hemisphere formed by Europe and the US and South refers to countries in the Southern
Hemisphere, formed by regions that were colonized by Europe but which have not achieved the same level of
development as the North (Santos, 1995).

4. Independent reason to vote aff rejecting the colonizers is the only

way to create a true epistemology
Alcadipani 11
[Rafael Alcadipani and Alexandre Reis Rosa, From global management to local management: Latin American
perspectives as a counter-dominant management epistemology, Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, January 4
2011, Wiley interscience]
To consider management from a Southern point of view means to reclaim the principle that the
world is epistemologically diverse and that this diversity could enrich human capacity to manage
and organize social life. It also means denouncing coloniality and reclaiming other types of
knowledge that have resisted the colonial encounter and that today are deprived of a horizontal
dialogue with Northern knowledge. It is to defend global perspective for management. In this sense, this article
aims at denaturalizing management by exploring its diversity in the world, particularly regarding the way in which
management is conceived and carried out in Latin American contexts and by exploring how this can help change current
global management. This article will show how management has spread around the world as a North American
phenomenon, becoming characterized as an agent of Americanization. We argue that this Americanization of
management led to the emergence of the grobal management perspective and, as a result, took
on the aspect of epistemic coloniality, as problems might emerge during its encounter with local realities. For
this reason, based on ideas conceived by Latin American social scientists and on the experiences of local
organizations, this article defends a global management approach that takes into consideration local
realities and challenges knowledge produced in the North.
CASE
 MORE IMPACTS
Chinese imperialism in Africa empirically causes poverty, human rights
violation, populist riots, and violence.
Okeowo 13
Alexis Okeowo. 12 June 2013. The New Yorker. CHINA IN AFRICA: THE NEW IMPERIALISTS?. http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/china-in-
africa-the-new-imperialists //JJC
The threat (whether real or imagined) of a looming Chinese imperialist presence in Africa has
given way to what has been called resource nationalism, in which countries aim to take
control of the exploitation of their natural resources. But this idea potentially fails to address the fact
that the Chinese in Africa are people, and not just part of a faceless imperialist mass. Ive spoken to Chinese
investors in Zambia who appear to genuinely want to not just make money but integrate into Zambian communities
and run responsible companies. One complained about how immoral businessmen ruin the efforts
of others who want to pay fair wages and keep their workers safe. In Zambia, a copper-rich
country in southern Africa and the beneficiary of the continents third-highest level of Chinese investment, persistent
unemployment and poverty have left Zambians wondering where exactly the fruits of their
governments lucrative deals with the Chinese have gone . President Michael Sata was elected
in 2011 partly thanks to anti-Chinese sentiment (he likened work at Chinese mines to slave labor and
said he would deport any abusive investors), but immediately forged close ties with
Chinese leaders. Still, his government has tried, at least on the surface, to even its playing field with China by
launching criminal proceedings against former government officials who made corrupt deals with the Chinese, and by
reforming the way foreign investors have to do business in Zambia. It is likely that the country will be only the first of
many to do so. The people of Zambia have been complaining, the countrys finance ministry said last
month, about lack of reliable and accurate information on the resources that are generated in the country or which come
from foreign sources, to develop Zambia. Under a new law, the Bank of Zambia will create an electronic reporting and
monitoring system tasked with overseeing the collection of royalties and taxes from foreign investors. Those same
investorswho, the legislation notes, are benefiting from numerous business incentivesare now required to open and
keep active taxable foreign-currency bank accounts. If they export their goods, as the Chinese owners of copper, coal,
and gemstone mines do, they must deposit their profits in Zambia within two months of the date the goods are shipped
abroad. The ministry added, This is the way to go for a country that is so richly endowed with resources but whose
capacity to unroll development to higher echelons has been hampered by poor transparency and accountability practices.
Chinese owners of copper mines in Zambia regularly violate the rights of their employees
by not providing adequate protective gear and insuring safe working conditions, according to a Human Rights
Watch report. When Zambian employees of the Chinese-owned Collum Coal Mine
protested these poor conditions three years ago, their Chinese managers, who said they
feared for their lives, fired gunshots at the miners, injuring thirteen of them . After Chinese
business interests put pressure on the then-government in Lusaka, the director of public prosecutions suddenly dropped
its criminal case against the managers. Last year, renewed protests at Collum led to hundreds of
miners pushing a mine trolley into a Chinese manager. They killed him, and injured two
other Chinese supervisors.

Imperialism leads to extinction

Harvey 06 [David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development, May
17 2006, Chapter 13]
The export of unemployment, of
At times of savage devaluation, interregional rivalries typically degenerate into struggles over who is to bear the burden of devaluation.
inflation, of idle productive capacity become the stakes in the game. Trade wars, dumping, interest rate wars, restrictions on capital flow and
foreign exchange, immigration policies, colonial conquest, the subjugation and domination of tributary economies, the
forced reorganization of the division of labour within economic empires, and, finally, the physical destruction and forced
devaluation of a rival's capital through war are some of the methods at hand. Each entails the aggressive manipulation of some
aspect of economic, financial or state power. The politics of imperialism, the sense that the contradictions of capitalism can be
cured through world domination by some omnipotent power, surges to the forefront. The ills of capitalism cannot so
easily be contained. Yet the degeneration of economic into political struggles plays its part in the long-run stabilization of capitalism,
provided enough capital is destroyed en route. Patriotism and nationalism have many functions in the contemporary world and may arise
for diverse reasons; but they frequently provide a most convenient cover for the devaluation of both capital and labour. We will shortly
it is, I believe, by far the most serious threat, not only to the survival of capitalism
return to this aspect of matters since
to the survival of the human race. Twice in the twentieth century, the world has
(which matters not a jot), but
been plunged into global war through inter-imperialist rivalries. Twice in the space of a generation, the world experienced the massive
devaluation of capital through physical destruction, the ultimate consumption of labour power as cannon fodder. Class warfare, of course, has taken its toll in life and limb, mainly through the
violence daily visited by capital upon labour in the work place and through the violence of primitive accumulation (including imperialist wars fought against other social formations in the name of
capitalist 'freedoms'). But the vast losses incurred in two world wars were provoked by inter-imperialist rivalries. How can this be explained on the basis of a theory that appeals to the class relation
between capital and labour as fundamental to the interpretation of history? This was, of course, the problem with which Lenin wrestled in his essay on imperialism. But his argument, as we saw in
chapter 10, is plagued by ambiguity. Is finance capital national or international? What is the relation, then, between the military and political deployment of state power and the undoubted trend
within capitalism to create multinational forms and to forge global spatial integration? And if monopolies and finance capital were so powerful and prone in any case to collusion, then why could
they not contain capitalism's contradictions short of destroying each other? What is it, then, that makes inter-imperialist wars necessary to the survival of capitalism? The 'third cut' at crisis theory
suggests an interpretation of inter-imperialist wars as constitutive moments in the dynamics of accumulation, rather than as abberations, accidents or the simple product of excessive greed. Let us
see how this is so. When the 'inner dialectic' at work within a region drives it to seek external resolutions to its problems, then it must search out new markets, new opportunities for capital export,
cheap raw materials, low-cost labour power, etc. All such measures, if they are to be anything other than a temporary palliative, either put a claim on future labour or else directly entail an
expansion of the proletariat. This expansion can be accomplished through population growth, the mobilization of latent sectors of the reserve army, or primitive accumulation. The insatiable thirst
of capitalism for fresh supplies of labour accounts for the vigour with which it has pursued primitive accumulation, destroying, transforming and absorbing pre-capitalist populations wherever it
finds them. When surpluses of labour are there for the taking, and capitalists have not, through competition, erroneously pinned their fates to a technological mix which cannot absorb that labour,
then crises are typically of short duration, mere hiccups on a general trajectory of sustained global accumulation, and usually manifest as mild switching crises within an evolving structure of
uneven geographical development. This was standard fare for nineteenth-century capitalism. The real troubles begin when capitalists, fating shortages of labour supply and as ever urged on by
competition, induce unemployment through technological innovations which disturb the equilibrium between production and realization, between the productive forces and their accompanying
social relations. The closing of the frontiers to primitive accumulation, through sheer exhaustion of possibilities, increasing resistance on the part of pre-capitalist populations, or monopolization by
some dominant power, has, therefore, a tremendous significance for the long-run stability of capitalism. This was the sea-change that began to be felt increasingly as capitalism moved into the
twentieth century. It was the sea-change that, far more than the rise of monopoly or finance forms of capitalism, played the crucial role in pushing capitalism deeper into the mire of global crises
and led, inexorably, to the kinds of primitive accumulation and devaluation jointly wrought through inter-capitalist wars. The mechanisms, as always, are intricate in their details and greatly
confused in actual historical conjunctures by innumerable cross-currents of conflicting forces. But we can construct a simple line of argument to illustrate the important points. Any regional alliance,
if it is to continue the process of accumulation, must maintain access to reserves of labour as well as to those 'forces of nature' (such as key mineral resources) that are otherwise capable of
monopolization. Few problems arise if reserves of both exist in the region wherein most local capital circulates. When internal frontiers close, capital has to look elsewhere or risk devaluation. The
regional alliance feels the stress between capital embedded in place and capital that moves to create new and permanent centres of accumulation elsewhere. Conflict between different regional
and national capitals over access to labour reserves and natural resources begins to be felt. The themes of internationalism and multilaterialism run hard up against the desire for autarky as the
means to preserve the position of some particular region in the face of internal contradictions and external pressures - autarky of the sort that prevailed in the 193Os, as Britain sealed in its
Commonwealth trade and Japan expanded into Manchuria and mainland Asia, Germany into eastern Europe and Italy into Africa, pitting different regions against each other, each pursuing its own

In the end the war was fought to

'spatial fix'. Only the United States found it appropriate to pursue an 'open door' policy founded on internationalism and multilateral trading.

open up the whole world to the potentialities of geographical expansion and unlimited
contain autarky and to
uneven development. That solution, pursued single-mindedly under United States's hegemony
after 1945, had the advantage of being super-imposed upon one of the most savage bouts of
devaluation and destruction ever recorded in capitalism's violent history. And signal benefits accrued not
simply from the immense destruction of capital, but also from the uneven geographical distribution of that destruction. The world was
saved from the terrors of the great depression not by some glorious 'new deal' or the magic touch
of Keynesian economics in the treasuries of the world, but by the destruction and death of global
war.
Cultural Imperialism is felt by the subjugated at all times -- The total
oppression exhibited by the emperors legitimizes dehumanization
and genocide.
Thiongo 86
Ngugi wa Thiongo, Professor of Comparative Literature, New York University, 1986 Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics
of Language in African Literature, http://www.swaraj.org/ngugi.htm
imperialism is not a slogan. It is real; it is palpable in content and form and in its methods and effects.
For these patriotic defenders of the fighting cultures of African people,

Imperialism is the rule of consolidated finance capital and since 1884 this monopolistic parasitic capital has affected and continues to affect
the lives even of the peasants in the remotest corners of our countries . If you are in doubt, just count how
many African countries have now been mortgaged to IMF the new International Ministry of Finance as Julius Nyerere once called it.
Who pays for the mortgage? Every single producer of real wealth (use-value) in the country so mortgaged, which means every single worker and peasant. Imperialism is total:

it has economic, political, military, cultural and psychological consequences for the people of the
world today. It could even lead to holocaust. The freedom for western finance capital and for the vast transnational monopolies under its umbrella to
continue stealing from the countries and people of Latin America, Africa, Asia and Polynesia is today protected by conventional and nuclear weapons. Imperialism, led by the

USA, presents the struggling peoples of the earth and all those calling for peace, democracy .and
socialism with the ultimatum: accept theft or death. The oppressed and the exploited of the earth maintain their defiance: liberty from theft. But
the biggest weapon wielded and actually daily unleashed by imperialism against that collective defiance is
the cultural bomb. The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a peoples belief in their names, in
their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities
and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of non-achievement and it makes them want to distance themselves from that wasteland.
It makes them want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance, with other peoples languages rather than their own. It makes them identify with that which is

Possibilities of
decadent and reactionary, all those forces which would stop their own springs of life. It even plants serious doubts about the moral rightness of struggle.

triumph or victory are seen as remote, ridiculous dreams. The intended results are despair,
despondency and a collective death-wish . Amidst this wasteland which it has created, imperialism presents itself as the cure and demands that the
dependant sing hymns of praise with the constant refrain: Theft is holy. Indeed, this refrain sums up the new creed of the neo-colonial bourgeoisie in many independent African states.
Imperialism causes colonizers to repeat cycles of racist violence against the colonized the savagery attributed to indigenous persons is mimed in their treatment by their
oppressors
Harzenzki 3
Sharon Harzenski, professor of law at Temple Law School, 2003
POST-COLONIAL STUDIES: TERRORISM, A HISTORY, STAGE TWO, Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, Fall, 2003, 17 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 351, Lexis

the savagery perpetrated by the colonists in

According to Taussig, the mimesis between the savagery attributed to the Indians by the colonists and

the name of civilization is an important theme in the construction of colonial culture. The distorting mimesis of the
colonial mirror reflects the barbarity of their own social relations back onto the colonists , who imputed what
they saw onto the people they wished to colonize.n269 Racism, too, operates according to this dynamic . Cultural myopia prevents "objective'
observation. What is "seen,' therefore, is what the observer can process, comprehend, or understand. What can be understood in this instance refers to what can be imagined. What can be

Incapable of perceiving what does not fit culturally [*397] familiar patterns, we see
imagined is a form of projection.

forms imaginatively created as part of the sense-making function of intelligence . We see what we need to see for
 Harm flows from diseased imagination.n270
our world to retain its intelligibility. There does not seem to be anything inherently harmful in the process itself.

Harm flows from ignorance when coupled with a fear of the unknown or a denial of its actual mystery. n271 Harm flows from hasty judgment grounded in arrogant
assumptions. n272 Harm flows from an imagination given over to benefiting self without regard to other, self-aggrandizing imagination. n273 With regard to racism,

harm often flows from imagining what is not immediately familiar as "not like,' what is not
immediately identifiable as "not same,' not only different, but problematically or inconveniently or wrongly different. In which case, if it cannot be brought into
alignment with what is familiar, and in the racism taught to me as a child, it cannot be,n274 it [*398] might be permanently classified as deviant and exploited;n275 it might be permanently

The entwining of racism and colonialism

classified as deviant and segregated; n276 it might be permanently classified as deviant and exterminated. n277

is already exposed. It needs no revealing. Ani,n278 Cesaire, n279 Fanon, n280 Gosden and Knowles, n281 Hall, n282 [*399] JanMohamed,n283
Jennings, n284 Trinh T. Minh-Ha, n285 Parry, n286 Said, n287 Sartre, n288 Spivak, n289 Anne Laura Stoler, n290 Thomas, n291 Walcott, n292 and Wilson n293 each contribute ideas, beliefs,
and perceptions about the relationship.

No Solvency The negative is doomed to fail due its master

mentality. True solvency only be achieved through listening.
Nnaemeka 05
Obioma Nnaemeka, Director of Womans Studies Program, Indiana University, 05
2005, African Women, Colonial Discourses, and Imperialist Interventions, Female
Circumcision and the Politics of Knowledge, p. 38.
The problem with this circumcision business is that many Westerners who plunge in to it do so thoughtlessly. It is
not sufficient to read about female circumcision , then quit your job, set up shop, and raise tons of money "to save
young girls from being mutilated." Of course , there are many who are thoughtful and genuinely committed . But as
my people say, "because all lizards lie on their stomach , it's difficult to know which one h as a bellyache ." At any
rate ,a noble , thoughtless cause is a dangerous oxymoron. To combat
female circumcision, we must first diagnose the problem; and to do that effectively, we must ask questions
(lots of questions) ; we must have a sense of history; we must have the humility
to learn (not to teach ); we must have the capacity to listen (not to preach). In "dialogues" between Africa and
the West , one party is listening and not speaking; the other party is
garrulous and deaf. Not only do such "dialogues" not promote
social change, they undermine attempts to b ring genuine social
transformation. One of th e most memorable graffiti I read at the University of Minnesota as a graduate
student was the following exchange be twee n two studen ts- first stude n t: 'Jesus is the answer." Second student:
"What was the question?" Many Western in surgents against female circumcision have all the answers , but ask no
questions, But we must ask questions: Why was circumcision done and , more importantly, why is it still d one ?
Who brought it to an end? "Why is it done in certain African countries an d not in oth ers? Why is it done in one
community and not in an othe r within th e same country? Where else, other than in Africa and the Islamic would ,
has it been done? Why and when?

Chinese investment super-exploits and oppresses not only

foreigners but the Chinese proletariat, and Chinese economic and
military growth only makes imperialism worse
Prbsting 14
Michael Prbsting. Chinas Emergence as an Imperialist Power. NewPolitics Summer 2014 issue. http://newpol.org/content/china%E2%80%99s-emergence-
%E2%80%A8imperialist-power //JJC
To summarize, the continued existence of a strong, centralized Stalinist bureaucracy and
the brutal suppression of Chinas working class enabled the new capitalist ruling class to
subjugate and super-exploit the majority of the countrys massively growing proletariat.
On this basis, capitalistsboth Chinese and foreignwere able to extract huge amounts of
surplus value destined for capital accumulation. While foreign imperialist monopolies
also profited from this super-exploitation of the working class, it was primarily the Chinese
bourgeoisie that benefited. As a result, Chinese capital was able to develop monopolies that
play an important role not only in the domestic market but also increasingly in the world market.
Today Chinas monopolies are among the most important exporters of capital. China is not only
an emerging economic power, but a political and military power as well. It already has the
worlds second largest military budget. In addition, it is the fifth largest nuclear power and
the fifth largest exporter of arms. Thus China has become a capitalist Great Power on an
economic, political, and military level. It is hardly surprising that the United States, the
strongest Great Power until now, fears Chinas rise more than anything else.
Cultural imperialism threatens other cultures with extinction
Svenier 04
[We do not endorse the authors use of gendered language.]
Galle Svenier, UN Consultant, 2004
Final paper - Freedom of expression American Cultural Imperialism: Gift or Threat? Sept
4 http://gsevenier.onl...mperialism.html
The American cultural imperialism as a threat to other cultures : We should not forget that the
differences in cultures make the world a rich and diverse place . Every individual of each country should
have the right to express his or her own culture. A cultural uniformity would lead to the extinction
of cultures and it would definitely represent a great loss. However, the American culture is intruding on most
cultures in the world, in many cases threatening their existence . Superman, Spider-man, and Batman replace
local heroes; Pepsi and Coke replace local fruit drinks; and "trick or treat" begin to replace Dia de los Muertos. Perhaps more
insidious, to compete with American cultural imports, local varieties and products begin to mimic
American products. All the exportation of goods and information from the United States to the entire planet contributes to the
exportation of the American culture.
THE RESOLUTION
 O/V
The discussion of the resolution in the squo is flawed
It is embracing the logic that justified the horrors of colonialization and promotes the domination
of the world by American and Chinese hegemony.
 AT: The resolution is fine
1. First I would like to clarify that our advocacy is not necessarily a
kritik of the resolution
But rather prerequisite to discussion of the resolution itself.

2. Our squo discussion of the resolution IS flawed

Extend Leupp 15 which says that our very discussion of engagement with China is problematic
b/c it tacitly endorses imperialism, violence, and militarism.

3. Also extend Prbsting 14 and Kiwanuka 13 from the 1AC

Chinese economic engagement is imperialist and oppressive the resolutions attempt to force
imperialism on us is imperialist in and of itself

4. The squo discussion of the resolution is an example of imperialism

in the debate space
Extend Mayo 14 acceptance of tradition education colonizes the mental universe.
[Note that the Alcadipani kritik is also used on the AT: Discourse doesnt matter flow, if
youve already read that, simply cross-apply the cards. Make sure you read the taglines
again, though, one of them is different here.]

5. The negs acceptance of the squos epistemology subverts local

knowledge and prevents opposition; this is an independent kritik of
their interpretation of the resolution
Alcadipani 11
[Rafael Alcadipani and Alexandre Reis Rosa, From global management to local management: Latin American
perspectives as a counter-dominant management epistemology, Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, January 4
2011, Wiley interscience]
This approach raises arguments both for and against globalization (Kellner, 2002). Those in favour of globalization see
an end to borders as a positive thing, which will create new economic, political, and cultural opportunities. On the other
hand, critics of globalization consider it a form of imperialism that takes advantage of the end of
borders to impose market and capital logics throughout the world (Kellner, 2002). These two possibilities
can lead us to ask: What is managements role in the global picture ? As an area of academic knowledge
and social practice, management is a globally widespread phenomenon. It is taught at almost all the worlds universities,
and practiced professionally and nonprofessionally in all corporations, governments, NGOs, and so forth. However, this
global aspect also implies that management knowledge and practices generated and
developed in Western countries, especially in the United States (US), can then be seamlessly
transferred to other contexts (i.e., Jack, Calas, Nkomo, & Peltonen, 2008). The assumption is that
knowledge in management can be universally applicable and is, supposedly, neutral. The resultant view is
that management globalization is positive, and is indeed an opportunity created by globalization.
On the other hand, if analyzed from a critical perspective and from the viewpoint of Latin America a region
that is a recipient of management knowledge and practicesthe process can pose many problems. This is
especially because globalized management tends to impact management knowledge and experiences
developed locally. The logic behind this impact is linked to a wider context in which epistemologies are
based on a dividing line that creates a hierarchy of knowledge and that subordinates local
thinking (which is considered as particular) to global thinking (which is considered universal. This unequal
knowledge-power relationship, which undermines the particular knowledge of many colonized peoples, is
called coloniality of power by Quijano (2000), and the manner in which this epistemological difference was
(re)produced is called abyssal thinking by Santos (2007). Both of them define lines that divide experiences,
knowledge, and social players into two groups that inhabit each side of the abyss. On one side is the
hegemonic, useful, intelligible, and visible knowledge produced by the North (or First World), and
on the other is the inferior, useless or dangerous, and unintelligible knowledge produced by the
South (or Third World), which is meant to be forgotten. In management terms, this means that the colonial
meeting between Northern and Southern knowledge has created a naturalized view that useful, intelligible, and visible
ways to manage an organization are necessarily found in the knowledge produced in the North. Here North refers to the
countries in the Northern Hemisphere formed by Europe and the US and South refers to countries in the Southern
Hemisphere, formed by regions that were colonized by Europe but which have not achieved the same level of
development as the North (Santos, 1995).

6. Thats an independent reason to vote aff rejecting the colonizers is

the only way to create a true epistemology
Alcadipani 11
[Rafael Alcadipani and Alexandre Reis Rosa, From global management to local management: Latin American
perspectives as a counter-dominant management epistemology, Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, January 4
2011, Wiley interscience]
To consider management from a Southern point of view means to reclaim the principle that the
world is epistemologically diverse and that this diversity could enrich human capacity to manage
and organize social life. It also means denouncing coloniality and reclaiming other types of
knowledge that have resisted the colonial encounter and that today are deprived of a horizontal
dialogue with Northern knowledge. It is to defend global perspective for management. In this sense, this article
aims at denaturalizing management by exploring its diversity in the world, particularly regarding the way in which
management is conceived and carried out in Latin American contexts and by exploring how this can help change current
global management. This article will show how management has spread around the world as a North American
phenomenon, becoming characterized as an agent of Americanization. We argue that this Americanization of
management led to the emergence of the grobal management perspective and, as a result, took
on the aspect of epistemic coloniality, as problems might emerge during its encounter with local realities. For
this reason, based on ideas conceived by Latin American social scientists and on the experiences of local
organizations, this article defends a global management approach that takes into consideration local
realities and challenges knowledge produced in the North.
THE EMPIRE
 O/V
Economic and diplomatic engagement with China is a flawed discussion
That is rooted in imperialism and caused the SCS conflict.

China is a veritable colonizer of many countries in Africa and other parts of

the world
And that colonization imposes authoritarianism and capitalism onto those countries.

The American Empire is still here

And it feeds into a cycle of perpetual war on the colonized other.
 AT: Chinese imperialism/investment good
1. Chinese investment in the natural resources, service industry,
schools and hospitals of developing countries all lead to corruption,
exploitation, and colonialism.
Okeowo 13
Alexis Okeowo. 12 June 2013. The New Yorker. CHINA IN AFRICA: THE NEW IMPERIALISTS?. http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/china-in-
africa-the-new-imperialists //JJC
It happened in Zambia like it could happen elsewhere in Africa. Chinese investors made
deals with the government to mine its natural resources, filling federal coffers with billions
of dollars. Chinese immigrants moved into cities and rural towns. They started
construction companies; opened copper, coal, and gem mines; and built hotels and
restaurants, all providing new jobs. They set up schools and hospitals. But then
instances of corruption, labor abuse, and criminal coverups began to set the relationship
between the Chinese and the Africans aflame. The Chinese have managed to accomplish at
least one impressive thing in Africathey have made everyone else uncomfortable. The
Americans are uneasy, worried about (and perhaps jealous of) Chinas rapid and profitable
investments throughout the continent, and the developmental assistance that it has started to
provide in some areas. Europeans have only to look at trade figures: the share of Africas exports
that China receives has shot from one to fifteen per cent over the past decade, while the
European Unions share fell from thirty-six to twenty-three per cent. China is now Africas
largest trading partner. Some Africans have become resentful, though, unhappy with
unbalanced relationships in which China has taken proprietorship of African natural
resources using Chinese labor and equipment without transferring skills and technology.
China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the
essence of colonialism, Lamido Sanusi, the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, wrote in
the Financial Times earlier this year.

2. Chinese imperialism in Africa empirically causes poverty, human

rights violation, populist riots, and violence.
Okeowo 13
Alexis Okeowo. 12 June 2013. The New Yorker. CHINA IN AFRICA: THE NEW IMPERIALISTS?. http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/china-in-
africa-the-new-imperialists //JJC
The threat (whether real or imagined) of a looming Chinese imperialist presence in Africa has
given way to what has been called resource nationalism, in which countries aim to take
control of the exploitation of their natural resources. But this idea potentially fails to address the fact
that the Chinese in Africa are people, and not just part of a faceless imperialist mass. Ive spoken to Chinese
investors in Zambia who appear to genuinely want to not just make money but integrate into Zambian communities
and run responsible companies. One complained about how immoral businessmen ruin the efforts
of others who want to pay fair wages and keep their workers safe. In Zambia, a copper-rich
country in southern Africa and the beneficiary of the continents third-highest level of Chinese investment, persistent
unemployment and poverty have left Zambians wondering where exactly the fruits of their
governments lucrative deals with the Chinese have gone . President Michael Sata was elected
in 2011 partly thanks to anti-Chinese sentiment (he likened work at Chinese mines to slave labor and
said he would deport any abusive investors), but immediately forged close ties with
Chinese leaders. Still, his government has tried, at least on the surface, to even its playing field with China by
launching criminal proceedings against former government officials who made corrupt deals with the Chinese, and by
reforming the way foreign investors have to do business in Zambia. It is likely that the country will be only the first of
many to do so. The people of Zambia have been complaining, the countrys finance ministry said last
month, about lack of reliable and accurate information on the resources that are generated in the country or which come
from foreign sources, to develop Zambia. Under a new law, the Bank of Zambia will create an electronic reporting and
monitoring system tasked with overseeing the collection of royalties and taxes from foreign investors. Those same
investorswho, the legislation notes, are benefiting from numerous business incentivesare now required to open and
keep active taxable foreign-currency bank accounts. If they export their goods, as the Chinese owners of copper, coal,
and gemstone mines do, they must deposit their profits in Zambia within two months of the date the goods are shipped
abroad. The ministry added, This is the way to go for a country that is so richly endowed with resources but whose
capacity to unroll development to higher echelons has been hampered by poor transparency and accountability practices.
Chinese owners of copper mines in Zambia regularly violate the rights of their employees
by not providing adequate protective gear and insuring safe working conditions, according to a Human Rights
Watch report. When Zambian employees of the Chinese-owned Collum Coal Mine
protested these poor conditions three years ago, their Chinese managers, who said they
feared for their lives, fired gunshots at the miners, injuring thirteen of them. After Chinese
business interests put pressure on the then-government in Lusaka, the director of public prosecutions suddenly dropped
its criminal case against the managers. Last year, renewed protests at Collum led to hundreds of
miners pushing a mine trolley into a Chinese manager. They killed him, and injured two
other Chinese supervisors.

3. Chinese investment super-exploits and oppresses not only

foreigners but the Chinese proletariat, and Chinese economic and
military growth only makes imperialism worse
Prbsting 14
Michael Prbsting. Chinas Emergence as an Imperialist Power. NewPolitics Summer 2014 issue. http://newpol.org/content/china%E2%80%99s-emergence-
%E2%80%A8imperialist-power //JJC
To summarize, the continued existence of a strong, centralized Stalinist bureaucracy and
the brutal suppression of Chinas working class enabled the new capitalist ruling class to
subjugate and super-exploit the majority of the countrys massively growing proletariat.
On this basis, capitalistsboth Chinese and foreignwere able to extract huge amounts of
surplus value destined for capital accumulation. While foreign imperialist monopolies
also profited from this super-exploitation of the working class, it was primarily the Chinese
bourgeoisie that benefited. As a result, Chinese capital was able to develop monopolies that
play an important role not only in the domestic market but also increasingly in the world market.
Today Chinas monopolies are among the most important exporters of capital. China is not only
an emerging economic power, but a political and military power as well. It already has the
worlds second largest military budget. In addition, it is the fifth largest nuclear power and
the fifth largest exporter of arms. Thus China has become a capitalist Great Power on an
economic, political, and military level . It is hardly surprising that the United States, the
strongest Great Power until now, fears Chinas rise more than anything else.

4. The neg trying to say that Chinese investment/imperialism is good is

a perfect example of what is wrong with academia
They normalize oppression, violence and human rights abuses in the name of capital,
perpetuating the imperialist machine.
 AT: American imperialism is good
[Note that this is the same block from the heg good block, if you already answered heg
good you can just cross-apply.]

Our McNally 6 card from the 1AC turns every part of this argument and
functions as a one-card kritik not only of heg but of the neg defense
of heg:

1. Extend that their DA destroys evidence and logic:

McNally 6
our imperial apologist fractures logic, evades evidence, claims moral superiority for his kind, and
demonizes imperialized Others

2. Extend that their DA transforms them into something terrible:

McNally 6
Defence of empire of murder, pillage, torture, and deception transforms the defenders
themselves. Whatever values they might have once professed, the reality of what they defend
takes possession of them, turns them into something other than what they intended

3. If this American hegemony goes unchecked it will cause

extinction
Harvey 06 [David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development, May
17 2006, Chapter 13]
The export of unemployment, of
At times of savage devaluation, interregional rivalries typically degenerate into struggles over who is to bear the burden of devaluation.
inflation, of idle productive capacity become the stakes in the game. Trade wars, dumping, interest rate wars, restrictions on capital flow and
foreign exchange, immigration policies, colonial conquest, the subjugation and domination of tributary economies, the
forced reorganization of the division of labour within economic empires, and, finally, the physical destruction and forced
devaluation of a rival's capital through war are some of the methods at hand. Each entails the aggressive manipulation of some
aspect of economic, financial or state power. The politics of imperialism, the sense that the contradictions of capitalism can be
cured through world domination by some omnipotent power, surges to the forefront. The ills of capitalism cannot so
easily be contained. Yet the degeneration of economic into political struggles plays its part in the long-run stabilization of capitalism,
provided enough capital is destroyed en route. Patriotism and nationalism have many functions in the contemporary world and may arise
for diverse reasons; but they frequently provide a most convenient cover for the devaluation of both capital and labour. We will shortly
it is, I believe, by far the most serious threat, not only to the survival of capitalism
return to this aspect of matters since
to the survival of the human race. Twice in the twentieth century, the world has
(which matters not a jot), but
been plunged into global war through inter-imperialist rivalries. Twice in the space of a generation, the world experienced the massive
devaluation of capital through physical destruction, the ultimate consumption of labour power as cannon fodder. Class warfare, of course, has taken its toll in life and limb, mainly through the
violence daily visited by capital upon labour in the work place and through the violence of primitive accumulation (including imperialist wars fought against other social formations in the name of
capitalist 'freedoms'). But the vast losses incurred in two world wars were provoked by inter-imperialist rivalries. How can this be explained on the basis of a theory that appeals to the class relation
between capital and labour as fundamental to the interpretation of history? This was, of course, the problem with which Lenin wrestled in his essay on imperialism. But his argument, as we saw in
chapter 10, is plagued by ambiguity. Is finance capital national or international? What is the relation, then, between the military and political deployment of state power and the undoubted trend
within capitalism to create multinational forms and to forge global spatial integration? And if monopolies and finance capital were so powerful and prone in any case to collusion, then why could
they not contain capitalism's contradictions short of destroying each other? What is it, then, that makes inter-imperialist wars necessary to the survival of capitalism? The 'third cut' at crisis theory
suggests an interpretation of inter-imperialist wars as constitutive moments in the dynamics of accumulation, rather than as abberations, accidents or the simple product of excessive greed. Let us
see how this is so. When the 'inner dialectic' at work within a region drives it to seek external resolutions to its problems, then it must search out new markets, new opportunities for capital export,
cheap raw materials, low-cost labour power, etc. All such measures, if they are to be anything other than a temporary palliative, either put a claim on future labour or else directly entail an
expansion of the proletariat. This expansion can be accomplished through population growth, the mobilization of latent sectors of the reserve army, or primitive accumulation. The insatiable thirst
of capitalism for fresh supplies of labour accounts for the vigour with which it has pursued primitive accumulation, destroying, transforming and absorbing pre-capitalist populations wherever it
finds them. When surpluses of labour are there for the taking, and capitalists have not, through competition, erroneously pinned their fates to a technological mix which cannot absorb that labour,
then crises are typically of short duration, mere hiccups on a general trajectory of sustained global accumulation, and usually manifest as mild switching crises within an evolving structure of
uneven geographical development. This was standard fare for nineteenth-century capitalism. The real troubles begin when capitalists, fating shortages of labour supply and as ever urged on by
competition, induce unemployment through technological innovations which disturb the equilibrium between production and realization, between the productive forces and their accompanying
social relations. The closing of the frontiers to primitive accumulation, through sheer exhaustion of possibilities, increasing resistance on the part of pre-capitalist populations, or monopolization by
some dominant power, has, therefore, a tremendous significance for the long-run stability of capitalism. This was the sea-change that began to be felt increasingly as capitalism moved into the
twentieth century. It was the sea-change that, far more than the rise of monopoly or finance forms of capitalism, played the crucial role in pushing capitalism deeper into the mire of global crises
and led, inexorably, to the kinds of primitive accumulation and devaluation jointly wrought through inter-capitalist wars. The mechanisms, as always, are intricate in their details and greatly
confused in actual historical conjunctures by innumerable cross-currents of conflicting forces. But we can construct a simple line of argument to illustrate the important points. Any regional alliance,
if it is to continue the process of accumulation, must maintain access to reserves of labour as well as to those 'forces of nature' (such as key mineral resources) that are otherwise capable of
monopolization. Few problems arise if reserves of both exist in the region wherein most local capital circulates. When internal frontiers close, capital has to look elsewhere or risk devaluation. The
regional alliance feels the stress between capital embedded in place and capital that moves to create new and permanent centres of accumulation elsewhere. Conflict between different regional
and national capitals over access to labour reserves and natural resources begins to be felt. The themes of internationalism and multilaterialism run hard up against the desire for autarky as the
means to preserve the position of some particular region in the face of internal contradictions and external pressures - autarky of the sort that prevailed in the 193Os, as Britain sealed in its
Commonwealth trade and Japan expanded into Manchuria and mainland Asia, Germany into eastern Europe and Italy into Africa, pitting different regions against each other, each pursuing its own

In the end the war was fought to

'spatial fix'. Only the United States found it appropriate to pursue an 'open door' policy founded on internationalism and multilateral trading.

open up the whole world to the potentialities of geographical expansion and unlimited
contain autarky and to
uneven development. That solution, pursued single-mindedly under United States's hegemony
after 1945, had the advantage of being super-imposed upon one of the most savage bouts of
devaluation and destruction ever recorded in capitalism's violent history. And signal benefits accrued not
simply from the immense destruction of capital, but also from the uneven geographical distribution of that destruction. The world was
saved from the terrors of the great depression not by some glorious 'new deal' or the magic touch
of Keynesian economics in the treasuries of the world, but by the destruction and death of global
war.

4. Turn: Extend the Engelhardt 13 card from the 1AC

This card explains how American expansionism results in otherization, an in-round,
methodological impact that outweighs their impacts

5. Even if you dont buy our framing, the Engelhardt 13 still turns the
DA
It also explains how the American politics of hegemony result in eternal war, accessing the post-
fiat extinction impacts of their framing

6. Even if the negs prevention of Chinese hegemony is a good thing

you must vote aff for several reasons
First on our framework our questioning of hegemony and the system far o/ws their fake impacts
And second on their framework at this point we are winning that American hegemony is terrible,
and needs to be prevented just as much as Chinese hegemony

7. Finally, the neg is simply treading with savage fascist steps:

Through their very attempt to defend American hegemony the negative team is a perfect of
example of what is wrong with American education and why our radical pedagogy is needed
they shamelessly perpetuate genocide.
RADICAL PEDAGOGY
 O/V
Traditional education is flawed
It colonizes the mental universe

But education still has potential

If it is used properly it can globalize an anti-imperialist struggle w/o the flaws of traditional
education thats McLaren 5

Fighting imperialism with critical pedagogy and the questioning of

hegemony is crucial
It overthrows the traditional, problematic power relations of imperialism and capitalism and it tears
down oppression by the state and by the empire.
 AT: Aff is traditional education
1.
 AT: Pedagogy doesnt work
1. Extend our two McLaren 5 cards from the 1AC:
First, that education through critical pedagogy globalizes the anti-imperialist struggle, and second,
that pedagogy is crucial to challenge power relations.

2. Our authors do more than just complain; critical pedagogy is the

mechanism by which students and teachers can understand and
destroy the evils of labor-capital and imperial relationships
Doughty 08
Reviewed by Howard A. Doughty Howard A. Doughty Faculty of Applied Arts & Health Science Seneca College,
Canada //JJC
McLaren goes further. He laments but does not give in to the ominous resignation
produced by the seeming inevitability of capital even among the most progressive
educators. His mission is to build a robust basis for a return of critical pedagogy. He is
certainly not content to play in the romper room of capitalism with other children who
have subsumed their critique of political economy and are now content to carp about
lifestyles, deconstruct television commercials and indulge in postmodern ironynot, at
least while billions live on less than two dollars a day, genocide remains an active political
strategy and even the once comfortable industrial middle classes are facing the loss of
their privileges and undergoing structural proletarianization. In McLarens schematization,
the instruments of Marxian analysis and the crucial continuation of concern about the labor-
capital dialectic, surplus value extraction, or the structure of property ownership. These,
after all, are not outmoded ways of thought but ongoing principles according to which power is
ultimately distributed and powerlessness endured. He is especially interested in the problems
of the American academy where few contemporary critical educators are either willing or
able to ground their pedagogical imperatives in the concept of labor in general, and in
Marxs labor theory of value in particular. He is eager to rebuild a critical pedagogy [that] has
collapsed into left liberal attempts by progressive educators to remediate the educational
enterprise. At stake is the question of whether teachers and students can go beyond
establishing a measure of compassion for the underprivileged and dispossessed as part
of the emotional arsenal of malcontents, or whether deep and sustained thought can
restore genuine praxis.

3. Extend Stanton 2
Through collaborative education and ethical discussions we can successfully fight imperialism.

4. Now extend Boggs 5 this is crucial offense

Reforming the education system to include critical pedagogy and challenge hegemony can end
state, capitalist, and imperial oppression.

5. Turn: The redefinition of terms and ideas within a new epistemology,

intended to redefine our thought in a new path away from the
Occidental, and coloniality, can solve these problems
Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and
Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality,
http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-
Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.//QM
One of many plausible solutions to the Eurocentric versus fundamentalist dilemma is what Walter
Mignolo, following Chicano(a) thinkers such as Gloria Anzalda (1987) and Jose David Saldvar
(1997), calls critical border thinking (Mignolo 2000). Critical border thinking is the epistemic
response of the subaltern to the Eurocentric project of modernity. Instead of rejecting modernity
to retreat into a fundamentalist absolutism, border epistemologies subsume/redefines the
emancipatory rhetoric of modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern,
located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference, towards a decolonial
liberation struggle for a world beyond eurocentered modernity. What border thinking produces is
a redefinition/subsumption of citizenship, democracy, human rights, humanity, and
economic relations beyond the narrow definitions imposed by European modernity.
Border thinking is not an anti-modern fundamentalism. It is a decolonial transmodern response of
the subaltern to Eurocentric modernity. But border thinking is just one expression of epistemic
decolonization in this case following the Chicano colonial experience inside the US Empire.
There are other decolonial notions such as diasporic thought, autonomous thought, thinking from
the margins, thinking from Pachamama, etc. articulated from other colonial experiences. A good
example of this is the Zapatista struggle in Mexico. The Zapatistas are not anti-modern
fundamentalist. They do not reject democracy and retreat into some form of indigenous
fundamentalism. On the contrary, the Zapatistas accept the notion of democracy, but redefine it
from a local indigenous practice and cosmology, conceptualizing it as commanding while
obeying or we are all equals because we are all different. What seems to be a paradoxical
slogan is really a critical decolonial redefinition of democracy from the practices, cosmologies
and epistemologies of the subaltern. This leads to the question of how to transcend the
imperial monologue established by the European-centric modernity.

6. Turn: Voting affirmative reveals the gaps and omissions of the

knowledge produced by the neg, this is the first step to a true
understanding of the world and eliminating imperialism pedagogy
can solve
Tikly 04
[Leon Tikly, Education and the New Imperialism, Comparative Education, May 2004, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4134648]
The question remains, however, as to whether there can be an alternative to the 'regime of truth' that operates around
the education and development problematic and whether alternative visions of the future, of education and even of
'development' itself are possible? After all, as Mudimbe (1988) reminds us in relation to Africa, even in the most
Afrocentric of perspectives on change, the western epistemological order remains as both context and referent. Indeed, it
will not have escaped the attention of the reader that the present article, like so much 'postcolonial' scholarship, is also
written largely within a western frame of reference, whatever its intentions or commitments! For critics of the new
imperialism this poses a dilemma- is it possible to conceive of a critical social theory and epistemology
on which an alternative to western hegemony can be built , and what ought the role of education
to be in this endeavour assuming it were possible? To some extent, this is not a new problem within the social sciences. It is a
problem of how to go beyond the existing order of knowledge whilst being obliged simultaneously to work within its frameworks. For some critics this has meant
abandoning the whole 'development' problematic entirely. Against this kind of nihilism, however, another view is that such an abandonment is itself a betrayal of
the poor and marginalized. As Tucker (1999) points out, 'If we were to follow this logic, we would also need to abandon concepts such as socialism, cooperation
and democracy because they have also been abused and manipulated for purposes of domination and exploitation' (p. 15). In relation to formal education in
particular, it is often the poorest and most marginalized communities that have struggled hardest, both during the period of European colonialism and
subsequently, to create educational opportunities for their children because formal schooling is still perceived by those with the most to lose as a way out of
poverty and destitution. At a theoretical level I find Santos' (1999) work to be particularly useful in beginning to reconstruct a role for education. He sets out
what he describes as a postmodem critical theory (but for our purposes might equally be described as a new anti-
imperial critical theory). Santos starts by pointing out that Foucault's great merit was 'to show the opacities
and silences produced by modem science, thus giving credibility to alternative "regimes of truth",
for other ways of knowing that have been marginalised, suppressed and discredited by modern
science' (1999, p. 33). Part of this process or silencing has been to obscure the nature and origins of western science
itself. To begin with, modern science developed in the crucible of Enlightenment thought owes much to the Islamic world of scholarship. Secondly, modern
science from its inception has had both emancipatory and regulatory dimensions. It was emancipatory to the extent that it sought to bring the threatening chaos
of unmastered natural forces under control in relation to an emerging liberal notion of freedom and equality. It was regulatory because it excluded from this and
indeed sought to dominate and regulate large sections of humankind including slaves, indigenous peoples, women, children, the poor, etc . Santos'
(1999) plea is for a reinvention of 'knowledge as emancipation' based on the principle of solidarity, and a
commitment to praxis. That is to combine a new knowledge as emancipation with a commitment to
meeting localized needs (here his theory intersects with that of other scholars such as Freire). The principles of
knowledge as emancipation are firstly, that it must move from monoculturalism towards multiculturalism
based on the recognition of the 'Other' (indigenous and colonized peoples, women, rural dwellers etc.) as
producers of knowledge. This means recognizing the silences, gaps and omissions within and
between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic systems of knowledge so as to begin to unearth
alternative ways of knowing the world. However, this also entails a recognition of difference (see also
Crossley & Watson, 2003). Rather than posit one 'knowledge as emancipation' it requires recognizing a multitude of
voices of the historically marginalized and to work towards a theory of translation, a hermeneutics that makes it possible
for the needs, aspirations and practices of a given culture to be understood by another. Thirdly, knowledge
as
emancipation involves developing greater awareness and links between the production of
knowledge and its likely impact, that is, in contextualizing knowledge production rather than
separating it off as a technical area of expertise and in creating an ongoing critical and
deconstructive approach towards forms of knowledge power. Finally, however, and going beyond deconstruction,
Santos (1999) urges us to reconstruct the idea of emancipatory social action and to 'inquire into the specific forms of socialisation, education, and work that
promote rebellious, or on the contrary, conformist, subjectivities' (p. 41).Within the educational sphere and within the context of this article, Santos' challenges
lead us to inquire as to what conditions are necessary for transforming education as a disciplinary technology into a potentially liberatory institution based on a
view of knowledge not as a means of western control and of regulation of non-western populations but of emancipation from the new imperialism. A few brief
points, however, are relevant here. Firstly, as Sardar (1999) has pointed out: Resistancet o Eurocentricisma, and hence development, can only come from non-
Western concepts and categories. The non-Western cultures and civilisations have to reconstruct themselves, almost brick by brick, in accordance with their
This means that the non-West has to create a whole new body
own world views and according to their own norms and values.
of knowledge, rediscover its lost and suppressed intellectual heritage, and shape a host of new disciplines.
(p. 57)
 WOMEN ADV.
The break down of US imperialism is the starting point to lessen feminist
struggle
Mohanty 6(Chandra Talpade, Department of Womens Studies @ Syracuse University, US
Empire and the Project of Women's Studies:
Stories of citizenship, complicity and dissent,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09663690600571209//GLee
The militarized US State and its imperial projects are thus a crucial site of feminist struggle both
in terms of the violence and urgency of the struggles themselves, but also in terms of the
potential interventions feminists could make to unsettle these particular stories and practices of
the US nation/state and thus pave the way for transnational anti-imperialist solidarities. In this
context there are numerous institutional practices and their effects that feminist scholars could examine. These include
detailed analysis of the contradictions of national security/homeland security, the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and 2002, and
the corporate/military nexus in the academy. It is to this last site that I turn now to explore stories of the
nation and of citizenship in Womens Studies projects, as a way to engage in feminist anti-
imperialist praxis. The question I want to ask concerns the place of Womens Studies in the
academyan academy that is corporatized, militarized, and deeply contradictory in terms of its
citizenship projects. The above discussion suggests that stories of citizenship and belonging are central to the
consolidation of empire. Let us now turn to a discussion of the US academy, and a provisional cartography of three
decades of Womens Studies in relation to this analysis of the US imperial state and questions of citizenship. For the
purposes of this discussion I define citizenship as that particular form of belonging to the nation/state
that is based on rights, participation and obligations and anchored in historical geographies of
racial and cultural identities.

All of their evidence of womens rights increasing in the PRC is flawed-

they dont account for the relationship between economic
development and the lack of womens rights in China
Hershatter 7 (Gail, historian of Modern China who holds the Distinguished Professor of
History chair at the University of California, Women in Chinas Long Twentieth Century,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pnb9j.5)//GLee
During the early years of the PRC the party continued to insist, as it had in Yanan and other base areas, that women
would achieve liberation by participating in movements to benefit the nation, specifically those to raise production (Davin
1973, 1975b, 1976; Salaff and Merkle 1973; Croll 1979, 1985c; M. Young 1989; Evans 1999). Womens labor was
regarded as an integral part of state development strategy. Campaigns to publicize women labor models in the 1950s
emphasized womens enthusiasm for labor, their farming skills, and their strong bodies (Davin 1975b, 1976; Sheridan
1976; Hershatter 2000, 2002; T. Chen 2003a, 2003b). In periods of labor shortage, particularly during the Great Leap
Forward of the late 1950s, women were mobilized in great numbers to join in paid urban and rural labor, in many cases
freeing men for more highly skilled work (Andors 1983; Manning 2005). During periods of economic slowdown, such as
the mid-1950s and early 1960s, however, state exhortations emphasized the importance of womens domestic roles: wife,
mother, and housekeeper (Davin 1976; Croll 1980; Andors 1983; Hooper 1984). Kimberley Manning (2005) calls the
official Maoist approach to mobilizing women Marxist maternalist, because it sought to achieve gender equality by
drawing women into remunerated labor, while continuing to attend to their reproductive health and unquestioned role in
maintaining the family. Overall, during the Mao years (194976), paid employment became a standard feature of urban
womens lives (Z. Wang 2003). Studies of urban womens work during that period have focused on state policies that
simultaneously called for gender equity and downplayed gender distinctions in favor of class, with mixed results for
womens status, pay levels, and political activity. Men and women maintained rough wage equity for the
same kind of work, but a gendered division of labor tracked men into the higher-paying state
sector and into more skilled, prestigious jobs across sectors (Davin 1976; Andors 1983; Bauer et al. 1992;
Y. Jiang 2004). These trends have continued and by some accounts intensified during the reform
period (Broaded and Liu 1996; Riley 1997). In times of economic retrenchment women were treated as a
source of surplus labor rather than an integral component of socialist construction (Andors 1983;
Bauer et al. 1992). The state-mandated retirement age for men (sixty) was higher than that for
women (fifty-five; Bauer et al. 1992). Within sectors, men tended to be more politically active and
held a greater proportion of leadership positions (Andors 1983). Scholars have explained this as the
result of negative social attitudes about women in leadership, as well as womens greater
responsibility for household tasks, which drew them away from political meetings outside of
working hours (Z. Wang 2003). In urban neighborhoods, however, formerly unemployed women took on new social
welfare and surveillance tasks, becoming unpaid but locally powerful adjuncts of the state (Z. Wang 2005a, 2005b). In the
countryside, women received equal rights to land during the land reform, although in practice land was cultivated by the
household (Davin 1973). The most important changes for women, however, came with the advent of collective agriculture
and the Great Leap Forward (Davin 1975b, 1976; P. Huang 1990; Gao 1994; Hershatter 2002; Manning 2005; Friedman
2006). If one were to take Joan Kellys (1984) question, Did women have a Renaissance? and adapt it to China by
asking, Did rural women have a Chinese revolution? the Great Leap and collectivization periods would loom much larger
than either 1949 or the Cultural Revolution. As collectivization progressed through mutual aid teams, lower and higher
producers cooperatives, and peoples communes, women were expected to join in collective labor and were remunerated
in work points. The mobilization of their labor was an important component in the states rural
development strategy, which focused initially on intensive cultivation and the diversification of
economic activities, then began to encompass the improvement of agricultural techniques.
Officially reported rates of womens participation in agricultural production reached 60 to 70
percent in 1957, and 90 percent by 1958, dropping again thereafter. Overall, the regional differences in
womens agricultural participation reported by Buck appear to have persisted, with the highest rates in the south (Croll
1979, 1985c). During the Great Leap Forward, as many men were sent to work on steel-smelting or water-control
projects, women took over much of the fieldwork and staffed nascent communal welfare facilities (Croll 1985c; Pasternak
and Salaff 1993; Hershatter 2002; Manning 2005). In the post-Leap period, men began to move into small-
scale rural industries, leaving women to work the land (Andors 1983) in another case of the
feminization of agriculture. Croll notes that state policies on womens labor were founded on contradictory
assumptions: Maos statement that anything a man can do a woman can also do, and the widely shared belief that
womens physical strength and characteristics suited them for lighter and less-skilled tasks (Croll 1985c). Work
At
relationships enlarged womens social networks beyond their natal and marital families (Davin 1988; Hershatter 2000).
the same time, however, women routinely earned fewer work points than men for a full days
labor. Their lesser earning capacity engendered a variety of responses, including low morale,
limited workforce participation, acceptance of their lower remuneration as natural, and spirited
back talk (Davin 1975b, 1976; Parish and Whyte 1978; Andors 1983; Hemmel and Sindbjerg 1984; Croll 1985c; M. Wolf
1985; Potter and Potter 1990; Pasternak and Salaff 1993; Unger 2002). Despite the lower rate of womens daily
work points, their earnings were essential both to the collective and to their households (Pasternak
and Salaff 1993; Hershatter 2003). Work points earned by household members were generally distributed to the head of
household, not to individuals. Throughout the collective period, rural households remained units of
production to a limited degree, with women chiefly responsible for the sidelines that brought in
extra income (when they were permitted) and for the cultivation of the familys private plot (Croll 1981,
1985c, 1994; Hemmel and Sindbjerg 1984; P. Huang 1990; Jacka 1997; Mueggler 1998; H. Zhang 1999b). Women also
performed uncompensated domestic labor such as food processing and preparation, sewing and shoemaking, and child
care (Davin 1975b, 1976; Andors 1983; M. Wolf 1985; Croll 1994; Hershatter 2003; H. Yan 2003). Collective facilities for
all of these were limited to nonexistent, with the exception of a brief and disastrously managed series of experiments with
collective dining halls during the Great Leap Forward (Davin 1975b, 1976, 1979; Croll 1985c; M. Wolf 1985; Gao 1994;
Jacka 1997). In a common pattern, the older generation relied upon work points earned by younger adults, while the
younger adults depended on their elders to provide housing and unpaid domestic labor (Davin 1975b, 1976; Croll 1981,
1983; Hemmel and Sindbjerg 1984; Manning 2005). Domestic work remained the purview of women, socially invisible
(Hershatter 2003) and confined inside the household, which was categorized by the state as a sphere of decreasing
economic importance (Jacka 1997) and a source of potentially bourgeois or feudal thinking (Rofel 1999b). Croll (1985c)
suggests that in the 1960s, the official womens movement changed its emphasis. Rather than regarding womens
participation in social production as the key to emancipation, official campaigns began to target
persistent attitudes about womens inferiority, especially such attitudes among women
themselves. The focus on ideological change rather than production or social arrangements persisted during the
Cultural Revolution and its aftermath. The 1973 campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, whatever its other
entanglements in inner-party politics, provided a rare moment when gender inequality was openly addressed in the
context of a political campaign, as Confucius was excoriated for regarding women as inferior and Lin Biao for acting as his
covert disciple (Andors 1983; K. Johnson 1983; Croll 1980, 1985c). Writing in the early years of the reform period,
European and American feminist scholars offered a mixed assessment of the PRCs success in moving toward gender
equality. An important piece of their critique focused on the gendered division of labor. The party-state, they said, had
made important steps in legislating gender equality, mobilizing women for production, and promulgating the notion that
women were equal to men. But scholars found inadequate the official explanation for persistent inequalitythat remnants
of feudal thinking persisted, particularly among the peasantry. Instead, they emphasized that although women had been
mobilized to join in productive labor, they continued to be tracked into less-skilled, lower paying jobs. In the industrial
sector, women were concentrated in collective neighborhood workshops, where pay and working conditions were worse
than in the state-owned sector (M. Wolf 1985). In the agricultural sector, more work points were allocated to heavy work
performed by men, but heavy often denoted tasks involving large draft animals or the use of machinery presumed to
require a skill; womens jobs paid less even when they involved more physical labor or brought in more income to the
collective (M. Wolf 1985; Jacka 1997). Ever flexible in its content, the gendered division of labor
consistently privileged men. As small-scale industries developed in the countryside, men moved
into nonagricultural or supervisory positions, leaving women to perform the bulk of the less-skilled
farm labor (Andors 1983; Croll 1983, 1985c; M. Wolf 1985; Jacka 1992; Judd 1994). Even as urban and rural
women entered the paid labor force, within the household the bulk of domestic tasks and
childcare continued to be the purview of women, intensifying their workload, especially after
marriage, and affecting their ability to earn wages or work points and participate in political or
leadership activities (Andors 1983; M. Wolf 1985; Pasternak and Salaff 1993; Parish and Busse 2000; Hershatter
2003, 2005a). The domestic workload remained heavy partly because the states accumulation strategy called for
investment in heavy industry rather than in producing consumer goods (clothing, shoes, washing machines) that might
have lessened womens reproductive labor. In Elisabeth Crolls formulation, the government had to a certain
extent come to rely upon female unpaid labour to subsidize economic development programmes
(1983: 9). In the countryside, collectivization not only undermined sidelines, an important sphere of
womens economic activity, but also devalued domestic work of all types (Jacka 1992, 1997; Hershatter
2003). Furthermore, peasant households in the collective prospered according to the number of laborers they had. Thus
parents had an incentive to increase household size; value permanent sons over daughters, who married out; and control
the procurement of daughters-in-law who could give birth to a replacement generation of laborers. The persistence of
patrilocal marriage made it impossible for farming households or the larger collectives based on networks of male kin to
regard daughters as equal to sons (K. Johnson 1983). In short, feminist scholars charged, the Maoist party-
state had subscribed to a reductionist theory of womens liberation, focusing almost exclusively
on bringing women into social production. It had assumed that economic development would lead
to womens equality, rather than using the criterion of womens equality as a means to evaluate
development policies (Andors 1983). It had been inconsistent in its pursuit of gender equality, always
willing to give gender equality a lower priority than class conflict, patriarchal allegiances, or
production goals (K. Johnson 1983; M. Wolf 1985). It had neglected the complex connections between
womens economic role and cultural practices, contenting itself with a conservative approach to
family relations and other social relations in which women were enmeshed (K. Johnson 1983; Jacka
1997). Paradoxically, the materialist approach of the party-state emphasized residual ideological
sources of gender inequality to the neglect of material factors, including those factors newly
created by state development policies themselves. The result, as Margery Wolf (1985; see also H. Yan 2003)
puts it, was a revolution postponed.

US policy is grounded is corporations and the military- that is just a

justification for imperialism, masculinization, and
heterosexualization
Mohanty 6(Chandra Talpade, Department of Womens Studies @ Syracuse University, US
Empire and the Project of Women's Studies:
Stories of citizenship, complicity and dissent,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09663690600571209//GLee
Both US foreign policy and domestic policy at this time are corporate and military
driven. Both have led to the militarization of daily life around the world and in the US
specifically for immigrants, refugees, and people of colorand militarization
inevitably means mobilizing practices of masculinization and heterosexualization. 4
Both can be understood through a critique of the racialized and gendered logic of a
civilizational narrative mobilized to create and recreate insiders and outsiders in the
project of empire building. Thus, for instance, as Miriam Cooke (2002) argues, saving brown women
in Afghanistan justifies US imperial aggression (the rescue mission of civilizing powers), just as the
increased militarization of domestic law enforcement, the border patrol, and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) (now renamed the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration) can be justified in
the name of a War on Drugs, a War on Poverty, and now a War on Terrorism. The clearest effects of
US empire building in the domestic arena are thus evident in the way citizenship has
been restructured, civil rights violated and borders repoliced since the
commencement of the war of drugs, and now the war on terrorism and the
establishment of the homeland security regime. While the US imperial project calls for civilizing
brown and black (and now Arab) men and rescuing their women outside its borders, the very same state
engages in killing, imprisoning, and criminalizing black and brown and now Muslim and Arab peoples within
its own borders. Former political prisoner Linda Evans (2005) calls the US a global police state one that
has adopted a mass incarceration strategy of social control since the Reagan years. Analyzing the
militarization of US society, Evans argues that the new definition of domestic terrorism heralds the now
legal return of the Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) that conducted illegal covert operations in
the 1960s and 1970s against the Black Panther party, the American Indian movement, the Puerto Rican
Independence movement, and left/socialist organizations. Racial profiling, once illegal, is now legitimated
as public policy, including a requirement that Arab and Muslim men from over 25 countries register and
submit to INS interrogation. Similarly, Julia Sudbury analyzes the global crisis and rise in the
mass incarceration of women, suggesting that we must be attentive to the ways in
which punishment regimes are shaped by global capitalism, dominant and
subordinate patriarchies and neocolonial, racialized ideologies (see Sudbury, 2005, p. xiii).
FRAMING
 O/V
A crucial card is McNally 6
This explains how the negs defense of empire is a reason to vote them down in and of itself, as
that defense transforms them into the oppressor

Ontological questioning and your endorsement of that through the ballot

solves
FRAMING
UTIL BAD
 Util = Biopolitics
Biopolitics is rooted in utilitarianism the neg can never solve serious
systematic impacts
Ernst 12 (Anne, Utilitarian Biopolitics: Bentham, Foucault and Modern Power,)
Utilitarian Biopolitics is the study of the relationship between Jeremy Bentham, the eighteenth-
century utilitarian philosopher, and Michel Foucault, his most prominent twentieth-century critic. It
of ers a new perspective on Foucaults biopolitics , drawing on material from the latest edition of
Benthams Collected Works, from yet unpublished Bentham manuscripts, and from Foucaults
recently published lectures at the Collge de France. h is books title Utilitarian Biopolitics
emphasizes the means by which Foucaults thought employed a framework of ideas and
concepts drawn from Benthams writings. Simultaneously, the book also uses Foucaultian
concepts to analyse Benthams theory on power. In doing so, it tests the validity of Foucaultian
concepts and l eshes out new biopolitical concepts (biopolitical pleasure, biopolitical pain and
biopolitical language) at the intersection of Bentham and Foucaults theoretical models, and
stresses the utilitarian origins, construction and operation of biopolitics . h e books main argument
is that Foucault assimilated Benthams utilitarianism when forging his theories on government and
that a recognition of this source of Foucaults inspiration allows for a reconsideration of the
concept of biopolitics itself.
 Util Bad Rights
Emphasis of extinction level impacts destroy fundamental human rights
and values
Daniel Callahan, Co-founder and former director of The Hastings Institute, PhD in philosophy
from Harvard University, The Tyranny of Survival, 1973, p. 91-93.
We do not endorse any ableist language or gendered terms
There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict
on another for the sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to
suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and
manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to
defend the fatherland, to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes
deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that
concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress, or
destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny of
survival as a value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other
values, Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a
destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the
fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic
to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other
rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life- then how will it be possible to honor
and act upon the need for survival, without in the process, destroying everything in human beings
which makes them worthy of survival? To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is
human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be
made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic
victories Yet it would be the defeat of all defeats if, because human beings could not properly
manage their need to survive, they succeeded in not doing so.
 Util Bad Equality
Utilitarianism disregards respect for the individual and perpetuates societal
inequality by evaluating utility as a whole
Freeman 94 Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.
Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the
Priority of Right, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)
The inclusion of all sentient beings in the calculation of interests severely undermines the force of
any claim that utilitarianism is an "egalitarian" doctrine, based in some notion of equal concern
and respect for persons. But let us assume Kymlicka can restore his thesis by insisting that it concerns, not
utilitarianism as a general moral doctrine, but as a more limited thesis about political morality. (Here I pass over the fact
that none of the utilitarians he relies on to support his egalitarian interpretation construe the doctrine as purely political.
The drift of modern utilitarian theory is just the other way: utilitarianism is not seen as a political doctrine, to
be appealed to by legislators and citizens, but a nonpublic criterion of right that is indirectly
applied [by whom is a separate issue] to assess the nonutilitarian public political conception of justice .)
Still, let us assume it is as a doctrine of political morality that utilitarianism treats persons, and only persons, as equals.
Even in this form it cannot be that maximizing utility is "not a goal" but a "by-product," "entirely
derived from the prior requirement to treat people with equal consideration " (CPP, p. 31) Kymlicka says,
"If utilitarianism is best seen as an egalitarian doctrine, then there is no independent commitment to the idea of
maximizing welfare" (CPP, p. 35, emphases added). But how can this be? (i) What is there about the formal principle of
equal consideration (or for that matter occupying a universal point of view) which would imply that we maximize the
aggregate of individuals' welfare? Why not assume, for example, that equal consideration requires maximizing the division
of welfare (strict equality, or however equal division is to be construed); or, at least maximize the multiple (which would
result in more equitable distributions than the aggregate)? Or, why not suppose equal consideration requires equal
proportionate satisfaction of each person's interests (by for example, determining our resources and then satisfying some
set percentage of each person's desires) . Or finally we might rely on some Paretian principle: equal consideration means
adopting measures making no one worse off. For reasons I shall soon discuss, each of these rules is a better explication
of equal consideration of each person's interests than is the utilitarian aggregative method, which in effect
collapses distinctions among persons. (2) Moreover, rather than construing individuals' "interests" as their actual
(or rational) desires, and then putting them all on a par and measuring according to intensity, why not construe their
interests lexically, in terms of a hierarchy of wants, where certain interests are, to use Scanlon's terms, more "urgent" than
others, insofar as they are more basic needs? Equal consideration would then rule out satisfying less urgent interests of
the majority of people until all means have been taken to satisfy everyone's more basic needs. (3) Finally, what is there
about equal consideration, by itself, that requires maximizing anything? Why does it not require, as in David Gauthier's
view, optimizing constraints on individual utility maximization? Or why does it not require sharing a distribution? The point
is just that, to say we ought to give equal consideration to everyone's interests does not, by itself,
imply much of anything about how we ought to proceed or what we ought to do. It is a purely
formal principle, which requires certain added, independent assumptions, to yield any substantive conclusions. That (i)
utilitarian procedures maximize is not a "by-product" of equal consideration. It stems from a particular
conception of rationality that is explicitly incorporated into the procedure. That (2) individuals' interests are
construed in terms of their (rational) desires or preferences, all of which are put on a par, stems
from a conception of individual welfare or the human good: a person's good is defined
subjectively, as what he wants or would want after due reflection. Finally (3), aggregation stems from the fact that, on
the classical view, a single individual takes up everyone's desires as if they were his own,
sympathetically identifies with them, and chooses to maximize his "individual" utility. Hare, for one,
explicitly makes this move. Just as Rawls says of the classical view, Hare "extend[s] to society the principle of choice for
one man, and then, to make this extension work, conflat[es] all persons into one through the imaginative acts of the
impartial sympathetic spectator" (TJ, p. 27). If these are independent premises incorporated into the justification of
utilitarianism and its decision procedure, then maximizing aggregate utility cannot be a "by-product" of a
procedure that gives equal consideration to everyone's interests. Instead, it defines what that
procedure is. If anything is a by-product here, it is the appeal to equal consideration . Utilitarians
appeal to impartiality in order to extend a method of individual practical rationality so that it may be applied to society as a
whole (cf. TJ, pp. 26-27). Impartiality, combined with sympathetic identification, allows a hypothetical observer to
experience the desires of others as if they were his own, and compare alternative courses of action according to their
conduciveness to a single maximand, made possible by equal consideration and sympathy. The significant fact is
that, in this procedure, appeals to equal consideration have nothing to do with impartiality between
persons. What is really being given equal consideration are desires or experiences of the same
magnitude. That these are the desires or experiences of separate person s (or, for that matter, of some
other sentient being) is simply an incidental fact that has no substantive effect on utilitarian
calculations. This becomes apparent from the fact that we can more accurately describe the utilitarian principle in
terms of giving, not equal consideration to each person's interests, but instead equal consideration to equally intense
interests, no matter where they occur. Nothing is lost in this redescription, and a great deal of clarity is gained. It is in this
sense that persons enter into utilitarian calculations only incidentally. Any mention of them can be
dropped without loss of the crucial information one needs to learn how to apply utilitarian
procedures. This indicates what is wrong with the common claim that utilitarians emphasize
procedural equality and fairness among persons, not substantive equality and fairness in results .
On the contrary, utilitarianism, rightly construed, emphasizes neither procedural nor substantive equality among persons.
Desires and experiences, not persons, are the proper objects of equal concern in utilitarian procedures. Having in effect
read persons out of the picture at the procedural end, before decisions on distributions even get underway, it is little
wonder that utilitarianism can result in such substantive inequalities . What follows is that utilitarian
appeals to democracy and the democratic value of equality are misleading . In no sense do utilitarians
seek to give persons equal concern and respect.

Although utilitarianism claims to result in equality, its nature to only regard

people as one entity rather than a group of individuals inherently
contradicts the principle of equality
Freeman 94 Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.
Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the
Priority of Right, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)
To sum up, though utilitarianism incorporates equality as a property of the justification of the
principle of utility, and of the decision process through which that principle gets applied, it does not leave any
place for equality in the content of that principle . On its face, this standard of right conduct directs that we
maximize an aggregate. As a result neither equality or any other distributive value is assigned
independent significance in resulting distributions of goods. Kymlicka claims that, because Rawls sees utilitarianism
as teleological, he misdescribes the debate over distribution by ignoring that utilitarians allow for equality of distribution
too. But the distribution debate Rawls is concerned with is a (level 2) debate over how what is
deemed good (welfare, rights, resources, etc.) within a moral theory is to be divided among
individuals. It is not a (level 3) debate over the distribution of consideration in a procedure which decides the distribution
of these goods. Nor is it a (level 1) debate over the principles of practical reasoning that are invoked to justify the
fundamental standard of distribution.
 Util Bad Immoral
Owning oneself is a moral imperative utilitarianism imposes interpersonal
obligations to society, which destroys morality
Freeman 94 Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.
Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the
Priority of Right, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)
Kymlicka distinguishes two interpretations of utilitarianism: teleological and egalitarian. According to Rawls's
teleological interpretation, the "fundamental goal" (LCC, p. 33) of utilitarianism is not persons, but
the goodness of states of affairs. Duty is defined by what best brings about these states of affairs. " [M] aximizing
the good is primary, and we count individuals equally only because that maximizes value. Our primary duty isn't to
treat people as equals, but to bring about valuable states of affairs" (LCC, p. 27). It is difficult to see,
Kymlicka says, how this reading of utilitarianism can be viewed as a moral theory. Morality, in our
everyday view at least, is a matter of interpersonal obligations-the obligations we owe to each
other. But to whom do we owe the duty of maximizing utility? Surely not to the impersonal ideal
spectator . . . for he doesn't exist. Nor to the maximally valuable state of affairs itself, for states of affairs don't have
moral claims." (LCC, p. 28-29) Kymlicka says, "This form of utilitarianism does not merit serious consideration as a
political morality" (LCC, p. 29). Suppose we see utilitarianism differently, as a theory whose "fundamental principle" is "to
treat people as equals" (LCC, p. 29). On this egalitarian reading, utilitarianism is a procedure for aggregating individual
interests and desires, a procedure for making social choices, specifying which trade-offs are acceptable. It's a moral
theory which purports to treat people as equals, with equal concern and respect. It does so by counting everyone for one,
and no one for more than one. (LCC, p. 25)
 Util Bad Death
Risks taken by the government to increase overall utility will severely
compromise the individual which will result in fatality
Schroeder 86 Professor of Law at Duke (Christopher H., Prof of Law at Duke, Rights
Against Risks,, April, Columbia Law Review, pp. 495-562, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1122636)
Equity has provided a limited answer to the question of acceptable risk . The traditional doctrine of
injunctions against tortious behavior holds that courts may enjoin behavior that is virtually certain to harm
an identifiable individual in the near future .'2 This body of law, however, focuses more on avoidance of harm to
specific persons than on regulation of risk.'3 It is thus inapposite to the questions of modern technological risk, risk that is
quite unlikely to injure any identifiable individual in the short-term, but that carries severe
consequences that are certain to occur to someone in the medium to distant future . Consider the
paradigm of the Acme Chemical Company: Acme Chemical Company is discovered to be storing chemical wastes on its
land in such a way that seepage containing traces of those wastes are entering an underground water system that serves
as the sole drinking water supply for a town several miles away. One of the chemicals has been classified as a carcinogen
in laboratory experiments on mice. Although extrapolating from these results to predictions of human carcinogencity is
somewhat controversial, federal agencies routinely do so. Under one of a number of plausible sets of assumptions, a
concentration of ten parts per billion (ppb) in drinking water is estimated to increase a human's chance of contracting
cancer by one in one hundred thousand if the human is assumed to consume a normal intake over the course of twenty
years. Analyses show that the current concentration in the underground aquifer near Acme's plant is ten ppb. This case
exhibits the typical features of risky actions associated with modern technology. The probability of risk to any
individual is relatively small while its severity is substantial, perhaps fatal. Risk is being imposed
on individuals who have not consented to it in any meaningful sense . Finally, risk is unintentional in the
sense that imposing risk on others is not an objective of Acme's plan.'4 We may assume its executives in fact would be
tremendously relieved if they could avoid the risk.
 Util Bad Racism
Utilitarianism promotes inequity and inherently discriminates against
minority like slavery
Odell, 04 University of Illinois is an Associate Professor of Philosophy (Jack, Ph.D., On
Consequentialist Ethics, Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, Inc., pp. 98-103)
A classic objection to both act and rule utilitarianism has to do with inequity , and is related to the kind of
objection raised by Rawls, which I will consider shortly. Suppose we have two fathers-Andy and Bob. Suppose further that
they are alike in all relevant respects, both have three children, make the same salary, have the same living expenses, put aside the same
amount in savings, and have left over each week fifteen dollars. Suppose that every week Andy and Bob ask themselves what they are
going to do with this extra money, and Andy decides anew each week (AU) to divide it equally among his three children, or he makes a
decision to always follow the rule (RU) that each child should receive an equal percentage of the total allowance money. Suppose further
that each of his children receive five degrees of pleasure from this and no pain. Suppose on the other hand, that Bob, who strongly favors
his oldest son, Bobby, decides anew each week (AU) to give all of the allowance money to Bobby, and nothing to the other two, and that he
instructs Bobby not to tell the others, or he makes a decision to follow the rule (RU) to always give the total sum to Bobby. Suppose also
that Bobby gets IS units of pleasure from his allowance and that his unsuspecting siblings feel no pain. The end result of the actions of both
fathers is the same-IS units of pleasure. Most, if not all, of us would agree that although Andy's conduct is exemplary, Bob's is culpable.
Nevertheless, according to both AU and RU the fathers in question are morally equal. Neither father is more or less exemplary or
culpable than the other. I will refer to the objection implicit in this kind of example as (H) and state it as: ' (H) Both
act
and rule utilitarianism violate the principle of just distribution. What Rawls does is to elaborate
objection (H). Utilitarianism, according to Rawls, fails to appreciate the importance of distributive
justice, and that by doing so it makes a mockery of the concept of "justice ." As I pointed out when I
discussed Russell's views regarding partial goods, satisfying the interests of a majority of a given population
while at the same time thwarting the interests of the minority segment of that same population (as
occurs in societies that allow slavery) can maximize the general good, and do so even though the
minority group may have to suffer great cruelties. Rawls argues that the utilitarian commitment to maximize
the good in the world is due to its failure to ''take seriously the distinction between persons." One person can be
forced to give up far too much to insure the maximization of the good , or the total aggregate satisfaction,
as was the case for those young Aztec women chosen by their society each year to be sacrificed to the Gods for the
welfare of the group.
 Util Bad Value to Life
Utilitarianism destroys value to life by forcing the individual to take risks
on a cost-benefit basis in an effort to increase overall utility of an
entity, while demoralizing the individuals own system of values
Schroeder 86 Professor of Law at Duke (Christopher H., Prof of Law at Duke, Rights
Against Risks,, April, Columbia Law Review, pp. 495-562, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1122636)
From the individual's point of view, the balancing of costs and benefits that utilitarianism
endorses renders the status of any individual risk bearer profoundly insecure. A risk bearer
cannot determine from the kind of risk being imposed on him whether it is impermissible
or not. The identical risk may be justified if necessary to avoid a calamity and unjustified if the product of an act
of profitless carelessness, but the nature and extent of the underlying benefits of the risky action
are fre quently unknown to the risk bearer so that he cannot know whether or not he is
being wronged. Furthermore, even when the gain that lies behind the risk is well-known, the status of
a risk bearer is insecure because individuals can justifiably be inflicted with ever greater
levels of risk in conjunction with increasing gains. Certainly, individual risk bearers may be entitled
to more protection if the risky action exposes many others to the same risk, since the likelihood that
technological risks will cause greater harm increases as more and more people experience that risk. This makes
the risky action less likely to be justifiable. Once again, however, that insight seems scant comfort to
an individual, for it reinforces the realization that, standing alone, he does not count for
much. A strategy of weighing gains against risks thus renders the status of any specific risk victim
substantially contingent upon the claims of others, both those who may share his victim status and those who
stand to gain from the risky activity. The anxiety to preserve some fundamental place for the individual that
cannot be overrun by larger social considerations underlies what H.L.A. Hart has aptly termed the "distinctively
modern criticism of utilitarianism,"58 the criticism that, despite its famous slogan, "everyone [is] to
count for one,"59 utilitarianism ultimately denies each individual a primary place in its
system of values. Various versions of utilitarian ism evaluate actions by the consequences of those actions
to maximize happiness, the net of pleasure over pain, or the satisfaction of desires.60 Whatever the specific
formulation, the goal of maximizing some mea sure of utility obscures and diminishes the
status of each individual. It reduces the individual to a conduit, a reference point that registers the
appropriate "utiles," but does not count for anything independent of his monitoring function.61 It also
produces moral requirements that can trample an individual, if necessary, to maximize utility,
since once the net effects of a proposal on the maximand have been taken into account,
the individual is expendable. Counting pleasure and pain equally across individuals is a laudable proposal,
but counting only plea sure and pain permits the grossest inequities among individuals and the trampling of the
few in furtherance of the utility of the many. In sum, utilitarianism makes the status of any
individual radically contingent. The individual's status will be preserved only so long as that status con
tributes to increasing total utility. Otherwise, the individual can be discarded.

The only way to preserve individualism is to allow all persons to have the
right to own themselves regardless of any negative
consequentialist impacts
Schroeder 86 Professor of Law at Duke (Christopher H., Prof of Law at Duke, Rights
Against Risks,, April, Columbia Law Review, pp. 495-562, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1122636)
2. Liberal Theories in the "Rights" Tradition. A second group of theories avoids the modern criticism of
utilitarianism by making the individual central . Contemporary theorists as diverse as John Rawls, Robert
Nozick, Richard Epstein, Charles Fried, and Ronald Dworkin continue a tradition variously described as the Kantian,
natural rights, or "rights" tradition.62 They all define the requirements of justice in terms of recognizing
and preserving the essential characteristics of individuals as free and autonomous moral
agents.63 In this approach, the individual is defined prior to articulating the terms under which
that individual can be acted upon or interacted with, and those terms are consequently specified
so as to protect and preserve what is essential to the individual . In this context, rights have been called
"trumps" since they constrain what society can do to the individual.64 These theories all aspire to
make the individual more secure than he is under utilitarianism . In the rights tradition, the crucial criteria
for assessing risks derive from the impact of those risks on risk victims, and the criteria are defined independently of the
benefits flowing from risk creation. To be plausible, such a program cannot totally prohibit risk creation, but the ostensible
advantage of this program over utilitarianism is that risk creation is circumscribed by criteria exclusively derived from
considerations of the integrity of the individual, not from any balancing or weighing process.65 The root idea is that
nonconsensual risks are violations of "individual entitlements to personal security and autonomy."66 This idea seems
highly congruent with the ideology of environmentalism expressed in our national legislation regulating technological risk.
Indeed, two scholars have recently suggested a modern rendering of Kant's categorical imperative: "All rational
persons have a right not to be used without their consent even for the benefit of others ."67 If
imposing risk amounts to using another, this tradition seems to be the place to look to secure the status of the
individual.
DEONT KEY
 Deontology First
Deontological principles of rights should be considered first other
interpretations are assigned no moral value if conflicting with the
principles of rights because viewing the debate from a
deontological perspective is the only way to guarantee freedom
Freeman 94 Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.
Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the
Priority of Right, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)
The priority of right asserts then that the reasons supplied by moral motives-principles of right and
their institutional requirements-have absolute precedence over all other considerations . As such,
moral motives must occupy a separate dimension in practical reasoning. Suppose then a supplementary stage of
practical reasoning, where the interests and pursuits that figure into ordinary deliberation and which
define our conception of the good are checked against principles of right and justice. At this stage
of reasoning, any ends that directly conflict with these moral principles (e.g., racist ends or the
wish to dominate others), or whose pursuit would undermine the efficacy of principles of right (e.g., desires for
unlimited accumulation of wealth whatever the consequences for others), are assigned no moral value, no
matter how intensely felt or important they may otherwise be. Being without moral value, they count for
nothing in deliberation. Consequently, their pursuit is prohibited or curtailed by the priority given to
principles of right. The priority of right then describes the hierarchical subordination in practical deliberation of the
desires, interests, and plans that define a person's rational good, to the substantive demands of principles of right.32
Purposes and pursuits that are incompatible with these principles must be abandoned or revised. The same idea carries
through to social and political deliberations on the general good. In political deliberative procedures, the priority of right
means that desires and interests of individuals or groups that conflict with the institutional requirements of principles of
right and justice have no legitimate claim to satisfaction, no matter how intense peoples' feelings or how large the majority
sharing these aims. Constitutional restrictions on majority rule exhibit the priority of right. In democratic procedures,
majorities cannot violate constitutional rights and procedures to promote, say, the Christian religion, or any other aspect of
their good that undermines others' basic rights and opportunities. Similarly, the institutional requirements of Rawls's
difference principle limit, for example, property owners' desires for tax exemptions for capital gains, and the just savings
principle limits current majorities' wishes to deplete natural resources. These desires are curtailed in political contexts, no
matter how intense or widely held, because of the priority of principles of right over individual and general good.33 The
priority of right enables Rawls to define a notion of admissible conceptions of the good: of those desires, interests and
plans of life that may legitimately be pursued for political purposes. Only admissible conceptions of the good
establish a basis for legitimate claims in political procedures (cf. TJ, p. 449). That certain desires and
pursuits are permissible, and political claims based on them are legitimate, while others are not,
presupposes antecedently established principles of right and justice . Racist conceptions of the good are
not politically admissible; actions done in their pursuit are either prohibited or discouraged by a just social scheme, and
they provide no basis for legitimate claims in political procedures. Excellences such as knowledge, creativity, and
aesthetic contemplation are permissible ends for individuals so long as they are pursued in accordance with the
constraints of principles of right. Suppose these perfectionist principles state intrinsic values that it is the duty of everyone
to pursue. (Rawls leaves this question open. cf. TJ, p. 328.) Still, they cannot supply a basis for legitimate
political claims and expectations; they cannot be appealed to in political contexts to justify limiting
others' freedom, or even the coercive redistribution of income and wealth (cf. TJ, pp. 331-32). This is
because of the priority of right over the good. Now return to Kymlicka's argument. Kymlicka says both Rawls and
utilitarians agree on the premise of giving equal consideration to everyone's interests, and that because utilitarians afford
equal consideration, "they must recognize, rather than deny, that individuals are distinct persons with their own rightful
claims. That is, in Rawls's classification, a position that affirms the priority of the right over the good" (LCC, p. 26). Since
"Rawls treats the right as a spelling-out of the requirement that each person's good be given equal consideration," there is
no debate between Rawls and utilitarians over the priority of the right or the good (LCC, p. 40).
 Deontology Good Comparative
By guiding social choice, deontology ultimately achieves the same result
as utilitarianism without compromising the individual
Schroeder 86 Professor of Law at Duke (Christopher H., Rights Against Risks,, April,
Columbia Law Review, pp. 495-562, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1122636)
The rights tradition and utilitarianism, the two grand opponents in American jurisprudence, clash on many different issues
and fronts.235 There are, however, many ways to classify ethical theories, and in one crucial respect these two belong
together. They seek the same kind of answer to the question of conflicting values. For its part, utilitarianism aspires to
clear and unique answers for every question of public choice. If only we can determine the various utility functions of
individuals affected by those decisions-a heroic assumption-the absolutely correct action will be known . Utilitarianism
employs a method for producing that absolute answer that threatens to obliterate the individual,
and hence rights theories reject that method. In affirming the primacy of the individual , however,
those theories do not abandon utilitarianism's ultimate objective to identify absolutes-clear and
definite answers-to guide social choice or to determine the constraints of justice . In this respect, such
theories still live in utilitarianism's shadow.
 Deontology Good Ows Extinction
The utility of a society only has value when its individuals are treated with
dignity. A free society that sacrifices some of its own individuals to
prevent human extinction is morally corrupt.
Shue 89 Professor of Ethics and Public Life, Princeton University (Henry, Nuclear Deterrence
and Moral Restraint, pp. 141-2)
Given the philosophical obstacles to resolving moral disputes, there are at least two approaches
one can take in dealing with the issue of the morality of nuclear strategy . One approach is to stick
doggedly with one of the established moral theories constructed by philosophers to rationalize or make sense of
everyday moral intuitions, and to accept the verdict of the theory, whatever it might be, on the morality of nuclear weapons
use. A more pragmatic alternative approach assumes that trade-offs in moral values and principles
are inevitable in response to constantly changing threats , and that the emergence of novel, unforeseen
challenges may impel citizens of Western societies to adjust the way they rank their values and
principles to ensure that the moral order survives . Nuclear weapons are putting just such a strain on our moral
beliefs. Before the emergence of a nuclear-armed communist state capable of threatening the existence of Western
civilization, the slaughter of millions of innocent human beings to preserve Western values may have appeared wholly
unjustifiable under any possible circumstances. Today, however, it may be that Western democracies, if
they are to survive as guardians of individual freedom, can no longer afford to provide innocent
life the full protection demanded by Just War morality. It might be objected that the freedoms of
Western society have value only on the assumption that human beings are treated with the full
dignity and respect assumed by Just War theory. Innocent human life is not just another value to be balanced side by
side with others in moral calculations. It is the raison detre of Western political, economic, and social institutions. A free
society based on individual rights that sanctioned mass slaughter of innocent human beings to
save itself from extinction would be morally corrupt, no better than soviet society, and not worth defending.
The only morally right and respectable policy for such a society would be to accept destruction at
the hands of tyranny, if need be. This objection is partly right in that a society based on individual rights that casually
sacrifices innocent human lives for the sake of common social goods is a contradiction in terms. On the other hand, even
Just War doctrine allows for the unintentional sacrifice of some innocent human life under certain hard-pressing
circumstances. It is essentially a consequentialist moral doctrine that ascribes extremely high but not absolute value to
innocent human life. The problem for any nonabsolute moral theory, of course, is where to draw the line.

Maintaining proper moral values is the only way to obtain a free society,
which outweighs nuclear extinction
Shue 89 (Henry, Professor of Ethics and Public Life, Princeton University, Nuclear Deterrence
and Moral Restraint, pp. 134-5)
But is it realistic to suppose that American citizens would risk not just their own lives but their families and their nation in
using nuclear weapons to save Western Europe and other free societies from Soviet domination, especially if the United
States allies are not willing to risk nuclear destruction themselves? According to one 1984 poll, 74 percent of Americans
queried believe the U.S. should not use nuclear weapons if the Russians invade Western Europe. Nuclear
Protectionists, however, would reply that further public debate might convince more Americans that deterrence cannot be
had on the moral cheap. If the United States is determined to deter a Soviet attack on Europe, it must
have a moral nuclear strategy that it is willing to implemen t. Without effective population defenses, such a
strategy could require that the United States accept an unequal risk of nuclear destruction to
ensure the survival of free society. In the extreme, this could mean that the United States must be willing
to sacrifice itself for values higher than its own national survival . Thus, Nuclear Protectionism views both
Just War morality and national self-centered as unworkable foundations for U.S. security policy.
 Deontology Good Rights
A deontological framing maximizes the good by emphasizing rights and
acting on an individualist basis
Freeman 94 Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.
Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the
Priority of Right, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)
Many moral views can admit that right acts in some sense promote the good. In Kant, for example, all have a duty to
promote the Realm of Ends; each person's doing so is, we might say, instrumental to realizing this ideal community. But
here the goodness of this end is not an independent variable that is being promoted; this good is just defined as the
state of affairs in which conscientious moral agents all freely act on and from the moral law. By
acting and willing according to this principle, all treat the humanity of others as an end in itself.
Moreover, to say this good is "maximized" when everyone does his or her duty really adds
nothing; and it misleads us as to the structure and content of Kant's principle of right . By contrast
teleological views (1) define the good independent of any moral concepts; and then (2) define the
right purely in instrumental terms of principles of expedience , i.e., as what most effectively and
probably realizes the greatest amount of good.
 Deontology Good Morality
Deontology morality maximizes good to its fullest extent while
utilitarianism is indifferent to distribution of good
Freeman 94 Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.
Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the
Priority of Right, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)
It is perhaps a moral truism to say that people ought to do what they can to make the world as
good a place as possible. But construed in a certain way, this becomes a highly controversial thesis about morality:
that the right act in any circumstance is one most conducive to the best overall outcome (as ascertained, say, from an
impersonal point of view that gives equal weight to the good of everyone). This is Consequentialism.' More simply, it holds
Right conduct maximizes the Good. G. E. Moore held this thesis self-evident. Non-consequentialists argue nothing could
be further from the truth. So far as they do, it appears (to consequentialists at least) they are
committed to the indefensible idea that morality requires us to do less good than we are able to .
John Rawls's teleological/deontological distinction is different. Teleo logical views affirm the consequentialist
thesis that the Right maximizes the Good. But they hold an additional thesis: "the good is defined independently from
the right" (TJ, p. 24), or, as Rawls often says, independ ent of any moral concepts or principles.2 To see how this view
differs from consequentialism, consider a thesis once proposed by T. M. Scanlon.3 A standard objection to
consequentialist views like utilitarian ism is that they are indifferent to the distribution of the good;
this is purportedly a necessary feature of such views, since they define right and justice as
what maximizes overall, or aggregate, good. Scanlon argued there should be a way to incorporate
distributive concerns into a two-level consequentialist view. If we treat fairness or distributive equality as a good in
itself, then it must be considered along with other goods like net aggregate satisfaction in determining the value of
overall outcomes that are to be maximized. Rights could then be introduced at the level of casuistry, to promote the
good of equitable states of affairs. The two-level consequentialist view Scanlon suggests would not be teleological on
Rawls's account; it would be deontological. As Rawls says: If the distribution of goods is also counted as a good,
perhaps a higher-order one, and the theory directs us to produce the most good (including the good of distribution
among others) we no longer have a teleological view in the classical sense. The problem of distribution falls under the
concept of right as one intuitively understands it, and so the theory lacks an independent definition of the good. (TJ,
27)
IMPACT EXTENSIONS
 Cultural Diversity
Neoliberal Imperialism is homogenizing and destroys culture,
and diversity
S Marcos 01 [Subcomandante Marcos, Participant of EZLN, The Fourth World War, International Civil
Commission of Human Rights Observation in La Realidad, October 23, 2001]
This Fourth World War uses what we call "destruction." Territories are destroyed and depopulated . At the
point at which war is waged, land must be destroyed, turned into desert. Not out of a zeal for destruction, but in order
to rebuild and reorder it. What is the primary problem confronted by this unipolar world in globalizing itself?
Nation States, resistances, cultures, each nation's means of relating, that which makes them different. How is it possible
for the village to be global and for everyone to be equal if there are so many differences? When we say that it is
necessary to destroy Nation States and to turn them into deserts , it does not mean doing away with
the people, but with the peoples' ways of being. After destroying, one must rebuild. Rebuild the territories
and give them another place. The place which the laws of the market determine . This is what is
driving globalization. The first obstacle is the Nation States: they must be attacked and destroyed.
Everything which makes a State "national" must be destroyed: language, culture, economy, its political
life and its social fabric. If national languages are no longer of use, they must be destroyed, and a new language
must be promoted. Contrary to what one might think, it is not English, but computers. All languages must be made the
same, translated into computer language, even English. All cultural aspects that make a French person French, an
Italian Italian, a Dane Danish, a Mexican Mexican, must be destroyed, because they are barriers which prevent
them from entering the globalized market. It is no longer a question of making one market for the French,
and another for the English or the Italians. There must be one single market, in which the same person can consume
the same product in any part of the world, and where the same person acts like a citizen of the world, and no longer
as a citizen of a Nation State. That means that cultural history, the history of tradition, clashes with this process and is
the enemy of the Fourth World War. This is especially serious in Europe where there are nations with great traditions.
The cultural framework of the French, the Italians, the English, the Germans, the Spanish, etcetera - everything which
cannot be translated into computer and market terms - are an impediment to this globalization. Goods are now going to
circulate through information channels, and everything else must be destroyed or set aside. Nation States have their
own economic structures and what is called "national bourgeoisie" - capitalists with national headquarters and with
national profits. This can no longer exist: if the economy is decided at a global level, the economic policies of Nation
States which try to protect capital are an enemy which must be defeated. The Free Trade Treaty, and the one
which led to the European Union, the Euro, are symptoms that the economy is being globalized , although
in the beginning it was about regional globalization, like in the case of Europe. Nation States construct their political
relationships, but now political relationships are of no use. I am not characterizing them as good or bad. The
problem is that these political relationships are an impediment to the realization of the laws of the market. The national
political class is old, it is no longer useful, it has to be changed. They try to remember, they try to remember, even if it
is the name of one single statesman in Europe. They simply cannot. The most important figures in the Europe of the
Euro are people like the president of the Bundesbank, a banker. What he says is going to determine the policies of the
different presidents or prime ministers inflicted on the countries of Europe. If the social fabric is broken, the old
relationships of solidarity which make coexistence possible in a Nation State also break down.
That is why campaigns against homosexuals and lesbians, against immigrants, or the
campaigns of xenophobia, are encouraged. Everything which previously maintained a certain equilibrium
has to be broken at the point at which this world war attacks a Nation State and transforms it into something else. It is
about homogenizing, of making everyone equal, and of hegemonizing a lifestyle. It is global life .
Its greatest diversion should be the computer, its work should be the computer, its value as a human being should be the
number of credit cards, one's purchasing capacity, one's productive capacity. The case of the teachers is quite clear.
The one who has the most knowledge or who is the wisest is no longer valuable. Now the one who produces the most
research is valuable, and that is how his salary, his grants, his place in the university, are decided. This has a lot to
do with the United States model. It also so happens, however, that this Fourth World War produces an opposite
effect, which we call "fragmentation." The world is, paradoxically, not becoming one, it is breaking up into many pieces.
Although it is assumed that the citizen is being made equal, differences as differences are emerging: homosexuals and
lesbians, young people, immigrants. Nation States are functioning as a large State, the anonymous State-land-society
which divides us into many pieces.
 Democracy
Imperialism destroys democracy
Mehta 06
[Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Empire and Moral Identity, Ethics & International Affairs, August 30 2006, Wiley interscience]
According to Dana Villa, the concern that the practice of empire building would subvert the moral identity of a
society underlay Socrates criticism of Athenian imperial democracy. As Villa characterizes Socrates view, An
imperial democracy cannot stay a democracy for long, since the basis of democratic justice
equal shares for all demands a self-restraint directly at odds with the energies and ambitions of
imperialism.2 In the eighteenth century, Edmund Burke vigorously stated similar worries about the corrupting effects of
empire on Britain. Empire is a craving for power that can corrupt the citizenry. It alters the balance of the
constitution, and it implicates the nation in crimes for which it scarcely takes responsibility. Almost all empires have
a profound impact on the internal political processes of a nation. Burke worried that the veneer of empire
allowed the most venial of mercantile interests to gain ascendancy over the British constitution, and in a manner that was
corrupting. Empire almost always enlarges the powers of the state at the expense of the people. The vast panoply of
offices, institutions, and networks of patronage and favor that it occasions leads to concentrations of power
that would be disallowed by any robust democratic constitutional scheme. Engaging in the grand project
of building and maintaining an empire hides from view the internal infirmities and fissures that any complex society faces,
and small plutocracies rather than citizens at large will tend to reap the greatest material benefits of these policies.
According to this view, empire enlarges domestic inequalities, and the diversion of energies that it represents can have a
profound impact on the domestic arrangements. U.S. senator J. William Fulbrights impassioned exhortation to his fellow
citizens in The Arrogance of Power expressed many of the same concerns about what the project of empire building was
doing to America, and what this would mean for the rest of the world. The argument that empire corrupts the identity of a
people has obvious appeal. Most peoples have a sense of practical identity, a set of shared values that define who they
are; they like to think of themselves as being shaped by moral ideals, not just by the imperatives of power. These values
provide authoritative constraints on their behavior. It assumes further that this practical identity is not simply an abstraction
but is embodied in these peoples shared practices and institutions. What empire puts at risk, then, is not some abstract
moral value, or even simply the well-being of subject peoples, but rather the constitutive features of a peoples moral
identity. But why, more precisely, have theorists like Socrates and Burke thought that empire would corrupt moral
identity, and especially the moral identity of democratic peoples? The short answer is that empire
appears to stand for everything that democracy stands againstnamely, the lack of properly
authorized political authority. Proper authority in international affairs may be claimed in two ways. Regimes can acquire
authority by some claim to possessing the consent of the people over whom power is being exercised as expressed,
perhaps, in practices of collective decision-making. Or it could at least have the seal of approval of duly constituted
international bodies that formulate the rules of recognition by which states regulate their relations with each other. Thus,
instances where there is some kind of appropriate multilateral authorization for armed intervention are not
characteristically described as empire. Nor are all illegitimate acts of intervention tantamount to carrying out an imperial
project. American intervention in Iraq has many of the hallmarks of an imperial project. This intervention used military
means to acquire power in Iraq. Its consequence will be nothing less than the reconstitution of Iraqi society, and even if
power is transferred to an Iraqi regime, this regime will operate under constraints set by the U.S. military presence in Iraq.
But most of all, the absence of proper multilateral authorization contributed to the sense of illegitimacy of American
intervention in Iraq and earned it the designation imperial.3 Imperial acts seem to be paradigmatic instances of
procedural illegality. And since the essence of legitimate political power is authorization, empire seems manifestly
illegitimate. Whatever the consequential outcomes of an empire, its illegitimacy remains a ground for rebuke. The failure
to secure political authorization for the use of power is a failing that seems to reveal the character of a nations moral
identity. It reveals the propensity of a nation to set itself up as a judge in its own cause, to have little regard for the
opinions of mankind, and to be neglectful of many of the relevant consequences of its actions. There may be times, of
course, when confronted with genocide or serious security threats, that nations may simply have to act on their
consciences, and when the complicated negotiations of international society may be found morally wanting. Such
interventions, however, are exceptions for which clear and forceful justification must be offered. On most occasions,
setting oneself up as a judge in ones own cause is singularly narcissistic or arrogant or both. It suggests an
unwillingness to submit to proper authority: a sentiment incompatible with democratic restraint.
 Economy
Imperialist policies have empirically resulted in massive
economic crashes which creates tension in East Asia.
Johnson 7 (Chalmers, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute, The Costs and
Consequences of American Empire: Is America in Decline? May 6
http://blogcritics.org/politics/article/chalmers-johnsons-blowback-the-costs-and/page-6/) JL
The economic policies dictated by imperial ambition expose the US to
blowback. The classic example of this is its relationship with East Asian client states. In the case
of Japan, in order to further its cold war strategy of proving to the world that free market capitalism
is the only mode of economic development, the US treated Japan as a beloved ward, indulging its
every economic need and proudly patronising it as a star pupil. The US used its influence to admit
Japan into many International Institutions. The US transferred its crucial technology
to Japan on concessionary terms and opened its markets to Japanese
goods while tolerating Japans protection of its domestic market. This led
to the hollowing out of key American Industries such as steel, consumer electronics, robotics,
automotive, camera, and semi-conductor industries. This suicidal economic policy
was
also continued as a trade off to maintain US military bases in Japan.
The long-term impact was that soon the American industries became
uncompetitive vis--vis Japanese industries. With the huge US export market
made available to them, Japan, becoming a five trillion-dollar economy, pursued an aggressive
export led growth. It followed its own brand of state guided capitalism steering clear of market
capitalism and the command economy of the Soviets. Increasingly, it expanded its
production capacity. What was hidden from economic planners was
that Japan generated industrial over capacity that threatened the
health of the economy. The over capacity reached crisis point when other Asian countries
such as South Korea, Hong-Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, emulated the fast catch up strategy
of Japan. There were too many factories, writes Johnson, turning out athletic shoes, automobiles,
television sets, semi-conductors, petrochemicals, steel and ships for too few buyers. The ripple
effect of the over capacity is the increased competition between American and European MNC. This
has resulted in corporations cutting costs by transferring the high paid jobs from the advanced
economy to low wage developing countries. The global demand is on the verge of
collapse, as rich countries do not generate demand on account of
market saturation or stagnant or falling income of its people. In countries
like China, Vietnam and Indonesia the workers who earn low wages cannot buy the goods produced
by them. In East Asian economies financial capitalism spearheaded by the US played an
important role in destabilising the economies. US played an
aggressive role in making the East Asian economies to deregulate the
capital market. The Wall Street Treasury Complex thrust the concept of capital mobility upon
the East Asian countries. The nature of money pumped into the economy of South Korea, Thailand,
Indonesia, and Philippines was hot money. The financial inflows were short term,
speculative, highly liquid and could easily leave the economy. The US accumulated vast funds
(around 3 trillion dollars) especially in the mutual funds. These pools of capital were invested and
transferred out of the Asian economies. The result was catastrophic: East Asian
economies collapsed. Big American companies bought factories and
businesses for a song. Proctor & Gamble picked up several South Korean state of art
Companies at a fraction of the price. In Thailand, American Investment firms bought service, steel,
and energy companies at throw away prices. The Carlyle Group sent Bush senior to Bangkok to
evaluate opportunities to buy real estate at low prices. The economic meltdown
resulted in the largest transfer of wealth in the history of the world.
The smoldering anger of East Asians against US predatory capitalism
is a potential source of retaliatory strikes against US interests in the
region.
Imperialist doctrine has empirically caused economic cave-ins
and a resulting apartheid government, India model proves
Mooers 6, (Collin, THE NEW IMPERIALISTS: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE, Chapter 6, Chair of the Department of
Politics and School of Public Adminstration at Ryerson University, Toronto) WDK
That is why the shift toward a more apartheid-like form of indirect rule
was made in the aftermath of the 1857 uprising. In India and
elsewhere there was a hardening of racial attitudes toward all sectors
of the local population but especially a revulsion occurred against
educated and Westernized members of indigenous societies who
threatened to overturn the difference sustaining British superiority.72
Thereafter, physical distancing and the invention of imperial traditions like
the Indian durbar which drew in equal measure from imagined English and Indian feudal
ceremonies and customs, became the order of the day . As Lytton cynically observed in
1877, the further east you go, the greater becomes the importance of a bit of bunting.73
 Environment
Neoliberal imperialism causes environmental destruction turns
case
Zimmerer 9 [Karl S. Zimmerer is chair of the Department of Geography, University of
Wisconsin, Madison, Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America? Societies and Politics at the
Crossroads, published in 2009, accessed 7/16/13, p. 157]//pheft
Neoliberal trade and economic policies have incurred environmental consequences that are
negative across much of Latin America and the Caribbean. Environmental destruction attributed to
specific policies range from widespread deforestation, overfishing, soil and water degradation,
damage due to mineral and energy resource extraction and processing; industrial waste and
toxin contamination; and urban environment problems such as worsening air and water pollution
(Hindery 2004; Liverman and Vilas 2006; Moog Rodrigues 2003; Speth 2003). If not dismissed outright, these
environmental problems are often regarded as economic externalities that can be treated or regulated
through the further privatization of resources and property. Increasingly, privatization approaches have been
associated with market valuation policiessuch as eco-certification and market-based conservation rewarding
ecological services (Perreault and Martin 2005).
US imperialism creates the most environmental destruction.
Buell in 1 (Frederick, professor of English at Queens College Globalization without
Environmental Crisis:
The Divorce of Two Discourses in U.S. Culture, Pg 64
http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu:2048/journals/symploke/v009/9.1buell.html) JL
The global biodiversity crisis is another multi-source crisis, created by
a wide variety of local actors acting as a part of an extended global system; but the
damage these actors do is to local systems, not to the biosphere as a
whole. It becomes global in its accumulation not just of individual actions (primarily
habitat destruction), but localized effects. Many other new global problems resemble the
biodiversity crisis in being globalized through the bootstrapping of local actions and instances of
local damage into a global nightmare. Many of John Bellamy Foster's [End Page 62] long list of
"urgent problems" are global today, thanks to the spread of industrial systems and practices and
the worldwide accumulation of small impacts this creates. These include: loss of genetic diversity,
acid rain, nuclear contamination, tropical deforestation, the elimination of climax forests, wetland
destruction, soil erosion, desertification, floods, famine, the despoliation of lakes, streams and
rivers, the drawing down and contamination of ground water, the pollution of coastal waters and
estuaries, the destruction of coral reefs, oil spills, overfishing, expanding landfills, toxic wastes, the
poisonous effects of insecticides and herbicides, exposure to hazards on the job, urban congestion,
and the depletion of nonrenewable resources. (Foster 11-2) But environmental crisis has
taken on an even more contemporary global feel as it has begun to share in the
contemporary topos of the trans(-): the evocation of the transnational, transcultural, and (a
necessary part of this, though less commonly added) the transgenic. One sign is that environmental
crisis has become hyperaware of global interactions occurring painfully and even riskily in real time.
These days, lungs in the U.S. contract as fearfully at information about the deforestation of the
Amazon as they do at disputes over national clean air standards. In 1932, Aldo Leopold complained
that "when I go birding in my Ford, I am devastating an oil field and re-electing an imperialist to get
me rubber"; he meant this, Lawrence Buell notes, as "a reductio ad aburdam of purist thinking"
(2001, 302). Contemporary globalization, in the meantime, has institutionalized such discourse as a
part of our normality, not something ridiculous. 7 It is now a staple of social justice rhetoric and
global activism, as when Noam Chomsky points out that American children use baseball bats hand-
dipped in toxic chemicals by Haitian women and corporations are scrutinized for their overseas
labor practices. It is equally a staple of environmental crisis thought, expressed in several ways. For
example, environmental imperialism by a resource-hogging, pollution-
generating North is now a commonplace perception ("a baby born in
the United States creates thirteen times as much environmental
damage over the course of its lifetime as a baby born in Brazil, and thirty-
five times as much as an Indian baby") (Hertsgaard 196); the huge environmental
footprints of consumer items purchased by innocent consumers
extend well across the world, as environmentalists chart these effects; and linkages
between apparently innocent first world choices are exposed as having drastic effects-at-a-distance
 [End Page 63] (as when Theordore Roszak unhappily discovers that "the material from which my
eyeglass frames are made comes from an endangered species, the hawksbill turtle" and is told that
whenever he turns on a light bulb powered by nuclear energy, he is "adding to the number of
anecephalic babies in the world" (Rozak 36).
US imperialism threatens to throw the world into deepening
environmental crisis.
Foster in 6 (John Bellamy, head of the Dept of Sociology at the UO and editor of the Socialist
Review, Naked Imperialism http://www.zcommunications.org/naked-imperialism-by-john-bellamy-
foster) JL
"[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planetno matter
how largeputting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals,
but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military
superpower, with all meanseven the most extreme authoritarian and,
if needed, violent military onesat its disposal." The unprecedented
dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to
which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased
chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological
destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administrations refusal to sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the
Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled
"Apocalypse Soon" in the MayJune 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: "The United States has never
endorsed the policy of no first use, not during my seven years as secretary or since. We
have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weaponsby the decision of one
person, the presidentagainst either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in
our interest to do so." The nation with the greatest conventional military
force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global
power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it
sees fitsetting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to
carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a
quarter of the worlds total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming
and the worlds growing environmental problemsraising the possibility of the collapse of
civilization itself if present trends continue. The United States is seeking to
exercise sovereign authority over the planet during a time of widening
global crisis: economic stagnation, increasing polarization between
the global rich and the global poor, weakening U.S. economic
hegemony, growing nuclear threats, and deepening ecological decline.
The result is a heightening of international instability. Other potential
forces are emerging in the world, such as the European Community and China, that
could eventually challenge U.S. power, regionally and even globally. Third world
revolutions, far from ceasing, are beginning to gain momentum again, symbolized by
Venezuelas Bolivarian Revolution under Hugo Chvez. U.S. attempts to tighten its imperial grip
on the Middle East and its oil have had to cope with a fierce, seemingly unstoppable, Iraqi
resistance, generating conditions of imperial overstretch. With the United States brandishing its
nuclear arsenal and refusing to support international agreements on the control of such weapons,
nuclear proliferation is continuing. New nations, such as North Korea, are entering or can be
expected soon to enter the "nuclear club." Terrorist blowback from imperialist wars in the third
world is now a well-recognized reality, generating rising fear of further terrorist attacks in New York,
London, and elsewhere. Such vast and overlapping historical contradictions, rooted in the combined
and uneven development of the global capitalist economy along with the U.S. drive for
planetary domination, foreshadow what is potentially the most
dangerous period in the history of imperialism.

US military power prevents efforts to slow climate change

Dalby 8 (Simon, PhD Dept of Geography and Environmental Studies at Carleton Univ,
IMPERIALISM, DOMINATION, CULTURE: THE RELEVANCE OF CRITICAL GEOPOLITICSPg
11, April 30 http://montreal2008.ipsa.org/site/images/PAPERS/section3/RC%2015%20-%20Dalby
%20-%203.1.pdf) JL
 Thus to follow David Harveys rendition of the question Iraq is symptomatic of a much larger
imperial ambition, one that he poses as whoever controls the Middle East
controls the global oil spigot and whoever controls the global oil
spigot can control the global economy , at least for the near future. 46 But more so
than this it is important to note that the military operations in the Middle East are also tied into a
particular part of the American political economy, what Nitzan and Bichler call the weapon-dollar
petro-dollar complex; arms companies and logistics firms that provide both military and oil field
services and security. 47 But, and here the argument once again supports Agnew's case that these
recent attempts to assert military control are against the long term thrust of American practice, it is
fairly easy to say that this is fraction of capital that has had its day, new innovations in high tech,
biotech and renewable energy systems are nonetheless delayed and thwarted by this backward
looking policy of trying to maintain control over petroleum in the Middle East. In Bichler and Nitzan's
terms, war in the Middle East facilitates differential accumulation in this sector of the economy.
Thus the struggles within the United States about climate change and
the adoption of new energy strategies, are also an important part of
the larger matter of resisting imperial domination in its more overt
military forms in South West Asia.

Neoliberal forms of government allow for massive destruction

of nature.
Peck et al in 9 (Jamie, in the Department of Geography, University of British Columbia &
Center for Urban Economic Development ,Neoliberal Urbanism: Models, Moments, Mutations
Vol 29 No 1
http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu:2048/journals/sais_review/v029/29.1.peck.html) JL
In light of this, neither deep forms of neoliberalization, nor the ecological dominance or tendential
hegemony of neoliberalism at the global scale,7 necessitate simple convergence in regulatory
forms and institutional structures. Instead, neoliberalization is both predicated on
and realized through uneven spatial developmentits natural state
is characterized by an intensely variegated and persistently unstable
topography.8 Convergence on a unified and monolithic neoliberal end state should not be
anticipated, let alone held up as some kind of litmus test for determining the extent of neoliberal
transformation. Likewise, the long-run sustainability of any given neoliberal
policy project (such as trade liberalization or welfare reform) is not required for
there to be a neoliberalization of policy regimes; neoliberalization
operates through trial-and-error experimentation, more often than not
under conditions of crisis, leading in turn to deep regulatory failures
and highly dysfunctional, disruptive consequences. Congruence and
coherence across policy domains, therefore, are not prerequisites for an
active program of neoliberalization to be under way. Rather, the critical
signifiers of deep neoliberalization include: the growing ecological
dominance of neoliberal structures, discourses, routines, and impulses within state
formations; the intensification of regulatory re-structuring [End Page 52] efforts and crisis-driven
responses within neoliberal parameters; and the mutual interpenetration, heightened congruence,
and increased complementarity of neoliberal reforms.

Preserving hegemony empirically results in the degradation of

nature.
Shrair in 10 (Jamal, MSc in High Energy Physics & PhD in Surface Physics and Electron
Devices at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics ,Environmental Crisis and
Self-Destructive Imperialism 1/22
http://wondersofpakistan.wordpress.com/2010/01/22/environmental-crisis-and-self-destructive-
imperialism/) JL
The present environmental crisis was triggered by the industrial
revolution. As the industrial age started to progress the problem became visible, but it was
simply ignored. From the beginning of the industrial revolution until the last two decades of the
20th century, we paid no attention to the pollution of our common home. The only
important things were maximum profit and minimum loss, industrial
expansion, especially that of the military industries which served the
aims of colonialism, irrational ideological struggle, hegemony, power
politics, etc. The lack of a rational economic order is certainly the primary cause of the
problem: The resources of the planet are unwisely exploited, the
motivation being to make as much profit as possible within the
shortest possible time, while waste is being dumped wherever it is the
cheapest to do so, such as in the oceans. There is no doubt that with a small fraction of what
we have already wasted from the resources of the planet, the entire present world population could
have prospered and enjoyed a very high standard of living if only we possessed and practised a
higher level of social consciousness than we have done in the past one hundred years. As an
example, the total military expenditure in the USA and former USSR in the 1980s alone (!) reached
one trillion USD.
 Extinction
Unlimited imperialist conquest inevitably results in extinction,
every modern war has been a byproduct of the spread of
colonialism
Harvey 06
[David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development, May 17 2006, Chapter 13]
At times of savage devaluation, interregional rivalries typically degenerate into struggles over who is to bear the burden of
devaluation. The export of unemployment, of inflation, of idle productive capacity become the stakes
in the game. Trade wars, dumping, interest rate wars, restrictions on capital flow and foreign exchange,
immigration policies, colonial conquest, the subjugation and domination of tributary economies,
the forced reorganization of the division of labour within economic empires, and, finally, the
physical destruction and forced devaluation of a rival's capital through war are some of the methods
at hand. Each entails the aggressive manipulation of some aspect of economic, financial or state power. The politics
of imperialism, the sense that the contradictions of capitalism can be cured through world domination by some
omnipotent power, surges to the forefront. The ills of capitalism cannot so easily be contained . Yet the
degeneration of economic into political struggles plays its part in the long-run stabilization of capitalism, provided enough
capital is destroyed en route. Patriotism and nationalism have many functions in the contemporary world and may arise
for diverse reasons; but they frequently provide a most convenient cover for the devaluation of both capital and labour. We
will shortly return to this aspect of matters since it is, I believe, by far the most serious threat, not only to the
survival of capitalism (which matters not a jot), but to the survival of the human race. Twice in the twentieth
century, the world has been plunged into global war through inter-imperialist rivalries . Twice in the
space of a generation, the world experienced the massive devaluation of capital through physical
destruction, the ultimate consumption of labour power as cannon fodder. Class warfare, of course,
has taken its toll in life and limb, mainly through the violence daily visited by capital upon labour in the work
place and through the violence of primitive accumulation (including imperialist wars fought against other social
formations in the name of capitalist 'freedoms'). But the vast losses incurred in two world wars were
provoked by inter-imperialist rivalries. How can this be explained on the basis of a theory that appeals to the
class relation between capital and labour as fundamental to the interpretation of history? This was, of course, the problem
with which Lenin wrestled in his essay on imperialism. But his argument, as we saw in chapter 10, is plagued by
ambiguity. Is finance capital national or international? What is the relation, then, between the military and political
deployment of state power and the undoubted trend within capitalism to create multinational forms and to forge global
spatial integration? And if monopolies and finance capital were so powerful and prone in any case to collusion, then why
could they not contain capitalism's contradictions short of destroying each other? What is it, then, that makes inter-
imperialist wars necessary to the survival of capitalism? The 'third cut' at crisis theory suggests an interpretation of inter-
imperialist wars as constitutive moments in the dynamics of accumulation, rather than as abberations, accidents or the
simple product of excessive greed. Let us see how this is so. When the 'inner dialectic' at work within a region drives it to
seek external resolutions to its problems, then it must search out new markets, new opportunities for capital export, cheap
raw materials, low-cost labour power, etc. All such measures, if they are to be anything other than a temporary palliative,
either put a claim on future labour or else directly entail an expansion of the proletariat. This expansion can be
accomplished through population growth, the mobilization of latent sectors of the reserve army, or primitive accumulation.
The insatiable thirst of capitalism for fresh supplies of labour accounts for the vigour with which it
has pursued primitive accumulation, destroying, transforming and absorbing pre-capitalist
populations wherever it finds them. When surpluses of labour are there for the taking, and capitalists have not,
through competition, erroneously pinned their fates to a technological mix which cannot absorb that labour, then crises are
typically of short duration, mere hiccups on a general trajectory of sustained global accumulation, and usually manifest as
mild switching crises within an evolving structure of uneven geographical development. This was standard fare for
nineteenth-century capitalism. The real troubles begin when capitalists , fating shortages of labour supply and as
ever urged on by competition, induce unemployment through technological innovations which disturb
the equilibrium between production and realization , between the productive forces and their accompanying
social relations. The closing of the frontiers to primitive accumulation, through sheer exhaustion of possibilities, increasing
resistance on the part of pre-capitalist populations, or monopolization by some dominant power, has, therefore, a
tremendous significance for the long-run stability of capitalism. This was the sea-change that began to be felt increasingly
as capitalism moved into the twentieth century. It was the sea-change that, far more than the rise of monopoly or finance
forms of capitalism, played the crucial role in pushing capitalism deeper into the mire of global crises and led, inexorably,
to the kinds of primitive accumulation and devaluation jointly wrought through inter-capitalist wars. The mechanisms, as
always, are intricate in their details and greatly confused in actual historical conjunctures by innumerable cross-currents of
conflicting forces. But we can construct a simple line of argument to illustrate the important points. Any regional alliance, if
it is to continue the process of accumulation, must maintain access to reserves of labour as well as to those 'forces of
nature' (such as key mineral resources) that are otherwise capable of monopolization. Few problems arise if reserves of
both exist in the region wherein most local capital circulates. When internal frontiers close, capital has to look elsewhere
or risk devaluation. The regional alliance feels the stress between capital embedded in place and capital that moves to
create new and permanent centres of accumulation elsewhere. Conflict between different regional and national capitals
over access to labour reserves and natural resources begins to be felt. The themes of internationalism and multilaterialism
run hard up against the desire for autarky as the means to preserve the position of some particular region in the face of
internal contradictions and external pressures - autarky of the sort that prevailed in the 193Os, as Britain sealed in its
Commonwealth trade and Japan expanded into Manchuria and mainland Asia, Germany into eastern Europe and Italy
into Africa, pitting different regions against each other, each pursuing its own 'spatial fix'. Only the United States found it
appropriate to pursue an 'open door' policy founded on internationalism and multilateral trading. In the end the war was
fought to contain autarky and to open up the whole world to the potentialities of geographical expansion
and unlimited uneven development. That solution, pursued single-mindedly under United States's
hegemony after 1945, had the advantage of being super-imposed upon one of the most savage
bouts of devaluation and destruction ever recorded in capitalism's violent history. And signal benefits
accrued not simply from the immense destruction of capital, but also from the uneven geographical distribution of that
destruction. The world was saved from the terrors of the great depression not by some glorious 'new
deal' or the magic touch of Keynesian economics in the treasuries of the world, but by the
destruction and death of global war.
 Ethics
Imperialism destroys ethics by valuing security risks over
collateral damage
McNally 6 (David, Professor of political science at York University The new imperialists
Ideologies of Empire Ch 5 Pg 92) JL
Yet, even on Ignatieff s narrow definition, in which human rights are about stopping unmerited
cruelty and suffering, the crucial question is how we are to do so. What if some means to this
ostensible end say, a military invasion can reasonably be expected to produce tens of thousands
of civilian casualties and an almost certain breakdown in social order? Ignatieff s doctrine of human
rights provides absolutely no ethico-philosophical criteria in that regard. Instead, he offers a
pragmatic judgement and a highly dubious one that only U.S. military power can be
expected to advance human rights in the zones where barbarians
rule. But note: this is an utterly ad hoc addition to his theory. In no respect can it be said to flow
from any of his reflections on human rights per se. Moreover, others proceeding from
the same principle of limiting cruelty and suffering have arrived at
entirely opposite conclusions with respect to imperial war. Ignatieff s
myriad proclamations for human rights thus lack any demonstrable tie
to his support of empire and imperial war. This is convenient, of course, since the
chasm between moralizing rhetoric and imperial advocacy allows
Ignatieff to pump out empty platitudes as if these contained real
ethical guidance. Concrete moral choices, involving historical study
and calibrations of real human risk, never enter the equation. So,
Ignatieff can drone on about the world being a better place without
Saddam, never so much as acknowledging the cost of this result: some 25,000
Iraqis killed as a result of armed conflict since the start of the U.S. invasion, and probably
more than 100,000 dead as a result of all the consequences of the U.S. war.24 Nowhere does
he offer any kind of calculus for determining if these tens of thousands
of deaths are ethically justified. Instead, banalities about being rid of Saddam are
offered up without even countenancing the scale of human suffering that Ignatieff s preferred
course of action war and occupation has entailed. But then, Ignatieff shows little regard for
ordinary people in the zones of military conflict. His concern is for the security of the West and of
the U.S.A. in particular. Ruminating about Americas new vulnerability in the world, for instance,
he writes, When American naval planners looked south from the Suez Canal, they had only bad
options. All the potential refuelling stops Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Yemen are
dangerous places for American warships. As the attack on the U.S.S. Cole made clear, none of the
governments in these strategically vital refuelling stops can actually guarantee the safety of their
imperial visitors.25
 Failure
US imperialism creates tension world-wide and hinders the US
ability to promote democracy.
Ottoway 3 (Marina, Senior Associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, International Interventions and Imperialism:
Lessons from the 1990s http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v023/23.2ottaway.html) JL
The evolution of international interventions suggests that U.S. unilateralism, as expressed in
the doctrine of preemptive intervention, is in part an extension of ideas and trends
that emerged in the 1990s. The UN's increasing reliance on partnerships with other
multilateral organization and member country forces, for example, led individual countries to take
on responsibilities traditionally reserved for the UN, albeit with UN consent. U.S. unilateralism
is also a reaction against the frustrating delays and compromises
required to obtain Security Council decisions. But the ideas set forth in the
doctrine of preemptive intervention, and the U.S. attitude toward the UN on display before and
during the Iraq war, break with that trend in significant ways. First, the United States is seeking to
shift final authority for authorizing internal interventions away from the UN and toward itself,
relegating the UN to a position of secondary importance, to be called upon when convenient as a
marginal contributor to essentially American undertakings. Second, by arguing that the
United States has the right to intervene not only to eliminate threats
to itself and international peace, but also to put in place new regimes,
the doctrine of preemptive intervention poses a new threat to the
principle of state sovereignty. Not surprisingly, the debate on imperialism
has intensifiedunilateral American interventionism constitutes a far
greater threat to the foundations of the international system than
even the most aggressive multilateral missions of the 1990s. In [End Page 86]
Namibia, Haiti, and Sierra Leone multilateral interventions supported regime change, but these
cases have been justified as the return of legally recognized powers in place of an illegal de facto
regime. The unilateralist American project appears to go much further. It
justifies regime change not simply as a means of restoring a
legitimate government, but as a means of removing threats to U.S.
security interests as defined by the U.S. administration. Though all states have the right to
defend their security interests, U.S. unilateral interventions, based on
preemption of vaguely defined threats and undertaken without an
international process of legitimization, would provoke widespread
international resentment against the United States , as the war in Iraq already
has. U.S. unilateralism may also furnish a license for unilateral interventions by other states, and
thus become a source of instability. In addition to the threat unilateral interventions
pose to the international system and U.S. moral credibility, the experience of multilateral post-
conflict reconstruction during the 1990s should be a major check on such a project. That experience
demonstrates that interventions, even those with imperial characteristics and significant resources,
often result in very little change to internal power dynamics. Even the tremendous
military power and financial resources of the United States cannot
necessarily keep its attempts to rebuild states and support stable,
benign, and democratic regimes from being thwarted by local political
realities. Rapidly transforming rogue and failed states will prove a
daunting task, and unilateral intervention, shackled by international
resentment and charges of imperialism, is especially unlikely to prove
an effective tool.

Imperialism destroys democracy and results in the downfall of

the US
Johnson 7 (Chalmers, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute, Empire vs
Democracy http://www.antiwar.com/engelhardt/?articleid=10439) JL
 maintaining our empire
By the time I came to write Nemesis, I no longer doubted that
abroad required resources and commitments that would inevitably
undercut, or simply skirt, what was left of our domestic democracy and that
might, in the end, produce a military dictatorship or far more likely its
civilian equivalent. The combination of huge standing armies, almost
continuous wars, an ever growing economic dependence on the
military-industrial complex and the making of weaponry, and ruinous military expenses
as well as a vast, bloated "defense" budget, not to speak of the creation of a whole second Defense
Department (known as the Department of Homeland Security) has been destroying our
republican structure of governing in favor of an imperial presidency. By
republican structure, of course, I mean the separation of powers and the elaborate checks and
balances that the founders of our country wrote into the Constitution as the main bulwarks against
dictatorship and tyranny, which they greatly feared. We are on the brink of losing our
democracy for the sake of keeping our empire. Once a nation starts
down that path, the dynamics that apply to all empires come into play
isolation, overstretch, the uniting of local and global forces opposed
to imperialism, and in the end bankruptcy. History is instructive on this dilemma.
If we choose to keep our empire, as the Roman republic did, we will certainly
lose our democracy and grimly await the eventual blowback that
imperialism generates. There is an alternative, however. We could, like the British Empire
after World War II, keep our democracy by giving up our empire. The British did not do a particularly
brilliant job of liquidating their empire and there were several clear cases where British imperialists
defied their nation's commitment to democracy in order to hang on to foreign privileges.

Imperialism breaks down democratic ideals with a warped set of

values that limit individual liberties
Van Elteren 3 (Mel, Associate Professor of Social Sciences at Tilburg University, US
Cultural Imperialism Today http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v023/23.2elteren.html) JL
In light of the previous discussion, the idea of U.S. cultural imperialism contains a granule of truth
today. However, it is not the spread of uniformity as suchthe focus of early theorists
of cultural imperialismwhether U.S.-style or not, that is the basic problem here, but
rather the kind of culture that capitalist modernity brings. The global
dissemination of Americanized cultural goods and practices involves
the spread of social visions of U.S.-style development, with its heavy emphasis on
"progress" in the form of unlimited, quantitative growth and
economic-technological expansion. It also diffuses a culture of
performance and expressive individualism, so strongly articulated in
U.S. society, which may be harmful for democracy in specific local contexts. 35
American culture has always been characterized by an aesthetic of performance. 36 This is a
culture whose primary sources of attraction and gratification are the sensational spectacle, the
outstanding performance, the extraordinary physical and acrobatic achievement, or the intense
emotional thrill. This tendency is clear in film from the earliest days of silent movies to today's
Hollywood blockbusters, in which narrative has become less relevant than the performance features
and the emphasis lies on body language and action. Even the "high culture" of American literature
displays this character, including self-conscious strategies of impression-management by certain
authors and celebrity cults around them. 37 The transnationalization of the U.S.
culture of performance fits into a more general shift of emphasis from
narrative to performance as the primary source of meaning and gratification in [End Page
180] contemporary Western culture. It is one of the driving forces behind a larger
dehierarchization and democratization on the aesthetic level that has
resulted in the breakdown of the strict dichotomy between "high" and popular culture, and
eliminated the idea of moral and social guardianship. This ongoing process of
democratization in the aesthetic-cultural sphere must not, however, be confused with
democracy. While the latter evokes ideals of social equality and justice, the former basically
refers to an increase in individual freedom and, associated with it,
freedom of self-expressiona tendency that can lead to extreme civil
privatism with no links to any community life or common good
whatsoever. 38 "In this sense of a continuous dehierarchization and an ever-increasing
freedom of self-expression we may speak of a global Americanization of culture," Winfried Fluck
contends in his analysis of the culture of performance. 39 Depending on the particular context, a
culture of performance and self-expression may be either helpful for or harmful to democracyand
sometimes both. In specific instances it may have detrimental effects in terms of
equality, justice, and social cohesion. "The victory of mood over moral
structure in contemporary society" that accompanies the shift from
narrative to performance may also result in a weakened resilience in the face
of oppression and cultural imposition and an emphasis on the rewards of
"immediate experience" 40 what some analysts of contemporary life have called the "experience
economies" of the most developed countries in the world. 41 All of this amounts to a
marginalization of the cultural space for alternative versions of the
good life and a better society. In this regard a critique like Benjamin Barber's about the
spread of U.S. capitalist consumerism through the globalization of trade and industry ("McWorld")
rings true indeed. 42 The McWorld market system will lead to the
standardization of cultures and consumption practices, which, in turn,
will bring other dangers. Transnational corporations raise people's expectations through
advertising, making consumers believe that their purchases will open avenues to a better life of
freedom and opportunity, which generally prove false. McWorld threatens local
democracy [End Page 181] and, more generally, civil society: transnational
corporations have no interest at all in improving people's quality of
life or strengthening civil society. Neither do they promote the kind of transnational
solidarity that might empower global citizens to cooperate in dealing with common problems.
Capitalist culture cannot really satisfy people's needs for community involvement, personal
development, and meaningful relationships. 43
 Feminism
We solve feminism - Imperialism oppresses women by creating
inequalities in the workforce as well as in the social
sphere
Robinson 2002
[William I. Robinson, Latin America in the Age of Inequality: Confronting the New Utopia, International Studies Review,
December 17 2002, Wiley interscience]
The larger structural context for the upsurge in womens struggles is the dramatic change in the status of women in Latin
America in recent decades. Globalization has major implications for the sexual division of labor, for
gender relations, and for the transformation of the family itself. The percentage of women in the labor
force has grown in most regions of the world under globalization. 37 Increased formal sector female participation has
resulted from several factors. Among them are the predictable pattern that accompanies capitalist development in
general, that is, the need for families to send an increasing number of family members into the labor market with the
decline in real wages and household income; the predilection of transnational capital to hire docile female labor,
particularly in maquila production; and so on.38 With the decline in male employment and real wages brought about by
neoliberal restructuring, women have assumed a growing absolute and also relative importance as wage earners, and
their contribution to household economies has increased. The reorganization of production on a global scale is
feminizing the labor force and changing the previous gender demarcation of domestic and wage labor . Gender
inequality is reproduced in the workforce at the same time as it continues in the household: the
systematic subordination of women in the reproduction sphere is coupled with the systematic inequality of women in the
production sphere. It is clear that under globalization there is a transformation of the sexual
division of labor. New forms of labor market segmentation between men and women and wage differentials in the
formal sector converge with unpaid domestic labor and hardship imposed in the sphere of gendered social reproduction,
resulting in a deterioration of the status and social condition of most women. From the
maquilas of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean to the new transnational agribusiness plantations in Chile and
Colombia and the new industrial complexes in Brazils northeast, women in Latin America disproportionatelyand in
some cases, exclusivelyengage in unskilled, laborintensive phases of globalized production.39
 Genocide
The 1acs method of imperialism is uniquely bad it hides
atrocities in the shadows and allow them to escalate to
the point of genocides without anyone thinking twice
about them
Sugirtharajah 11
[R.S. Sugirtharajah, 1. Postcolonialism: Hermeneutical Journey through a Contentious Discourse, Exploring Postcolonial
Biblical Criticism: History, Method, Practice, April 20 2011, Wiley interscience]
Colonial discourse analysis began with several theorists who studied colonialism in the Arab world, such as Albert Memmi
in Tunisia, Frantz Fanon in Algeria, and Edward Said. Since then it has seen several changes. First, the way of doing
postcolonialism has changed. In the initial stages, following Said, Spivak, and Bhabha, postcolonialism was based on, in
Spivak s phrase, a South Asian model 17 and was seen as an anglophone affair limited to the imperial adventures of
the British. Now, postcolonial studies has widened its scope to include not only the other old European empires like the
Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Belgian, and French, and Eastern ones like the Japanese, but also the newer empires like
that of the United States of America. To this one could add the Soviet empire as well, demonstrating that not all
colonialism was from the far right. As Spivak points out, with such a changed and widened focus of attention, the old
model derived from South Asia, which was basically India plus the Sartrian Fanon will not serve We are dealing
with heterogeneity on a different scale and related to imperialism on another model. 18 This also means that the earlier
texts of Fanon, Memmi, and Cabral, which supplied exemplary theoretical underpinning in their time, may not have as
much purchase as they did with the old colonialism. To meet the different demands of the decolonization process which
started soon after the Second World War, and was soon to be caught up in the Cold War and the new imperialism in the
form of globalization, new texts are required. One such, which accommodates the new political geography and neo -
colonial context, especially in Asia, is Kuan - Hsing Chen s Asia as Method . 19 In this volume, Chen takes into account
Japanese military occupation, US imperialism after the Second World War, and the emergence of China as both territorial
and economic superpower. Second, the nature of colonialism has changed. The old territorial colonialism has given way
to new forms under the heading of neo - colonialism. Unlike the old empires, where one knew the boundaries and
identifi ed their power structure, now it is diffi cult to specify the parameters. The new empire has no territorial center of
power or clearly delineated boundaries. As Hardt and Negri put it, it is a decentered and deterritorializing
apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding
frontiers The distinct national colors of the imperial map of the world have merged and blended
in the imperial global rainbow. 20 In this barrierless world it is not the traditional nation - states that wield power
but the transnationals, which have become the fundamental motor of the economic and political transformation of
postcolonial countries and subordinated regions. 21 One such borderless empire is environmental
colonialism. Just as the old colonialists tried to redeem the savages for the Christian Church, the new
conservationists try to save the natural resources not so much for the local people as for the
multinationals. With the professedly altruistic motive of preserving the tropical rainforests, Western
corporations are buying them up as resources. The lands in which the indigenous peoples lived for long ages
have been declared idyllic and turned into wildlife sanctuaries, and local people are forbidden to hunt, cut trees, and
quarry stone. The eviction of the aborigines of Palawan Island in the Philippines, and the bushmen in Botswana, in order
to create national parks are egregious examples of this type of green colonialism. 22 Physical occupation may be a
thing of the past but there is still the desire to extend sovereign rights in a place like Antarctica
where the seabed is rich in gas, oil, and minerals. Colonialist tactics, too, have become much more nuanced.
The old colonialists preached Christianity as a way of saving souls, whereas the current neo - colonialists spread
the virtues of democracy and human rights in order to prepare countries for a liberalized market
economy. According to The Guardian columnist Simon Jenkins, democracy has become the new Christianity. 23 The
word mission has been replaced with the word intervention. The former British foreign secretary, David Miliband,
called for a moral intervention as the West s new mission to encourage democracy through soft or hard power. 24 The
old colonizers saw themselves as masters and used brute force to achieve their goals, but the new colonizers, no
less violent, project themselves as liberators, or, to use the words of Reinhold Niebuhr, tutors of mankind in its
pilgrimage to perfection. 25 Third, there is a remarkable change in the geopolitical landscape. In the north, with the
collapse of the Soviet bloc, the old ways of drawing boundaries determined by the Cold War are no longer politically
tenable. In the south, the emerging markets have altered the old classifi cation of developing and underdeveloped world.
The emergence of China, India, and Brazil as new economic forces on the world stage has unsettled the traditional
Western hold on the economy. Rapid globalization and the free - market economy have called into question what is local
and indigenous. But the structuring of the world is not as rigid as it used to be. The old stringent oppositional division of
colonizer/colonized, East/West, oppressor/ oppressed, and First World/Third World has slowly lost its ideological
purchase. The world has become more unipolar and more singular, and as such it is now much more nuanced and
interrelated. Fourth, a critical practice which started as a political frame of reference and a tool for literary analysis has
moved beyond its general theorizing to a specifi c, deeper, and more practical phase of engagement. Some of the recent
literature offers evidence of engagement of postcolonialism with particular subjects, thus bringing to the fore a variety of fi
elds which are underrepresented in the various earlier anthologies and compilations. To name a few: legal studies,
disability, 26 development, 27 international terrorism, 28 environmentalism, 29 fi lm, tourism, popular music, dance, 30
and the history of book production. 31 These studies extend the central debates and concerns of the theory beyond its
rich theoretical manifestations. More importantly, these engagements have not only answered the earlier accusation that
postcolonialism was pure theory and very much slanted towards high literature, culture, and philosophy, but also
introduced popular cultural forms such as music, fi lms, and sport. Interestingly, a theoretical practice which has its roots
in humanistic tradition has now become a serviceable tool providing challenging refl ections on religions. There are books
using postcolonial insights to study Hinduism, 32 Buddhism, 33 Islam, 34 the Bible, 35 and Christian theology. 36 These
books not only demonstrate how ideologies of empire shaped the construction of the Eastern religions but also show how
the religions themselves offered a form of resistance to colonial rule. Meanwhile, postcolonialism has embraced a
wide variety of disciplinary fi elds which have not usually been open to postcolonial inquiry. It has now expanded to
include all forms of oppression and subjugation ranging from disability studies to queer studies. It has moved
back in time to embrace subjects such as classics 37 and medieval studies which at fi rst glance might not have been
seen as having any postcolonial interest. As Barbara Goff, the editor of Classics and Colonialism , put it, it is no longer
appropriate to account for e.g. British Romanticism without an acknowledgment of the emergence of the British empire.
38 Fifth, the nature of the postcolonial condition has perceptively changed. In the early stages, it was as seen as a newly
acquired territorial freedom enjoyed by former colonized countries soon after the physical departure of Western countries.
Then, with forced and voluntary migration, diasporic status became a new postcolonial status. The resultant border -
crossing anguishes such as yearning for home and recovering the cultural soul were treated as new forms of the
postcolonial condition. While this predicament of dislocation reifi ed the plight and distresses of the metropolitans, the
material conditions of the rural poor were altered by state development policies, agrarian capitalism, and technological
changes in food production in the rural economy, which, in Akhil Gupta s view, have led to a condition of postcoloniality
for the rural poor and peasants. 40 The defi nition of postcoloniality was thrown into further confusion with the recent wars
in Iraq, Iran, Sri Lanka, and the Balkans, which resulted in a great number of internally displaced people forced to live in
detention centers and welfare camps in their own countries. Sixth, the narratives which postcolonialism dealt
with in its initial stages have given way to newer grand narratives. The earlier anti - colonial writers and
activists were wrestling with European expansionism, Enlightenment values, and neo - liberalism. The new metanarratives
are war on terror, ethnic cleansing, environmental catastrophe, and religious fundamentalisms. The earlier
grand narratives resulted in destruction and annihilation of the benighted people, whereas the
new ones speak about the redemption and salvation carried out on behalf of the hapless victims.

Imperialism encourages economic underdevelopment in

colonized countries which leads to famine and imperial
genocide, India model proves
Mooers 6, (Collin, THE NEW IMPERIALISTS: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE, Chapter 6, Chair of the Department of
Politics and School of Public Adminstration at Ryerson University, Toronto) WDK
But it was not for lack of ideological commitment that India failed to overcome its essentially pre-
capitalist dynamic in the second half of the nineteenth century. Colonial officials both at
home and in the colonies saw their civilizing mission as imparting
the benefits of economic improvement and Christian piety. The
gentlemanly capitalism57 that dominated in the colonial
administration sought to link the socialproperty relations which lay at
the heart of Englands seventeenth- and eighteenth-century agrarian capitalist revolution with
the newer forms of financial and service capital that came to prominence in the later nineteenth
century. These officials had read their Locke on property, enclosure, and improvement. They were
also avid proponents of the latest principles of political economy espoused by Malthus, Bentham,
and Mill. It was the liberal empire so vaunted by Ferguson which encouraged
not just chronic economic underdevelopment, but which bears
responsibility for the deaths of millions due to starvation during the
two great waves of famine which swept India in 187679 and 18961900.
Between 5.5 and 12 million died in the famine of 187679 and mortality rates
were highest in areas best served by railways. As Mike Davis has shown in painful detail , it was
the fanatical commitment to free-market and Malthusian dogmas
which made famine a death sentence for millions while British officials
railed against enthusiastic prodigality as they shipped huge grain
exports out of the country. Malthuss injunctions against feeding the
poor and hungry because mother nature had not set enough places
at her table were taken up by British viceroys from Lytton to Curzon with methodical and
 murderous abandon. Just as in England, poor relief in times of poor harvest was considered a
slippery slope leading to more permanent forms of relief. In India, Lytton reasoned, The doctrine
that in time of famine the poor are entitled to demand relief . . . would probably lead to the doctrine
that they are entitled to demand relief at all times, and thus the foundation would be laid for a
system of general poor relief, which we cannot contemplate without serious apprehension.58
Ferguson devotes a scant few lines to the disastrous policies pursued by British officials during the
famine years, admitting that free-market policies may have made things worse
than they might have been, but dismissing criticism that the British did
nothing to avert starvation. He rejects the view that their actions can be likened to other
modern genocides on the grounds that Lytton never planned to kill millions of Indians whereas the
Nazi genocide was intentional.63 However , it is difficult to imagine a more
intentional outcome than that pursued by Lytton and Temple: they knew that other
measures were available and that mass starvation could be averted (as
Temple had done previously in Bengal and Bihar) and yet they proceeded to do the
opposite. Indeed, even byMalthusian standards, it was hardly a situation of letting nature run
its course. The reduction of rations, insistence on hard labour, and collection of the land tax could
have no other outcome than drastically increasing mortality rates. Instead of viewing such actions
for what they were intentional acts of imperial genocide the most that Ferguson
can muster is the rhetorical query: But would Indians have been better off under the Mughals? Or
for that matter, under the Dutch or the Russians?64 In fact, there is considerable evidence to
suggest that the Moguls and Marathas did attempt to tailor their rule to fluctuating ecological and
climactic conditions, especially in drought-prone regions. Moreover, as Davis asserts, There is
persuasive evidence that peasants and farm laborers became
dramatically more pregnable to natural disaster after 1850 as their local
economies were violently incorporated into the world market. What
colonial administrators and missionaries perceived as the persistence
of ancient cycles of backwardness were typically modern structures of
formal and informal imperialism.65

Imperialism is Bad
Ottoway & Lacina- 03, Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson
Center, Political Analyst
Marina Ottaway and Bethany Lacina, International Interventions and
Imperialism: Lessons from the 1990s, The SAIS Review, Summer-
Fall 2003,
http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/sais_review/v023/23.
2ottaway.html
The evolution of international interventions suggests that U.S. unilateralism, as expressed in the doctrine of preemptive
intervention, is in part an extension of ideas and trends that emerged in the 1990s. The UNs increasing reliance on
partnerships with other multilateral organization and member country forces, for example, led individual countries to take
on responsibilities traditionally reserved for the UN, albeit with UN consent. U.S. unilateralism is also a reaction against
the frustrating delays and compromises required to obtain Security Council decisions. But the ideas set forth in the
doctrine of preemptive intervention, and the U.S. attitude to- ward the UN on display before and during the Iraq war,
break with that trend in significant ways. First, the United States is seeking to shift final authority for authorizing internal
interventions away from the UN and toward itself, relegating the UN to a position of secondary importance, to be called
upon when convenient as a marginal contributor to essentially American undertakings. Second, by arguing that the
United States has the right to intervene not only to eliminate threats to itself and international
peace, but also to put in place new regimes, the doctrine of preemptive intervention poses a new
threat to the principle of state sovereignty. Not surprisingly, the debate on imperialism has
intensifiedunilateral American interventionism constitutes a far greater threat to the foundations
of the international system than even the most aggressive multilateral missions of the 1990s. In
Namibia, Haiti, and Sierra Leone multilateral interventions sup- ported regime change, but these cases have been justified
as the return of legally recognized powers in place of an illegal de facto regime. The unilateralist American project appears
to go much further. It justifies regime change not simply as a means of restor- ing a legitimate government, but as a
means of removing threats to U.S. security interests as defined by the U.S. administration. Though all states have
the right to defend their security interests, U.S. unilateral interventions, based on preemption of
vaguely defined threats and undertaken without an international process of legitimization, would
provoke widespread international resentment against the United States, as the war in Iraq already
has. U.S. unilateralism may also furnish a license for unilateral interventions by other states, and
thus become a source of instability. In addition to the threat unilateral interventions pose to the international
system and U.S. moral credibility, the experience of multilateral post-conflict reconstruction during the 1990s should be a
major check on such a project. That experience demonstrates that interventions, even those with imperial
characteristics and significant resources, often result in very little change to internal power
dynamics. Even the tremendous military power and financial resources of the United States
cannot necessarily keep its attempts to rebuild states and support stable, benign, and democratic
regimes from being thwarted by local political realities. Rapidly transforming rogue and failed
states will prove a daunting task, and unilateral intervention, shackled by international resentment
and charges of imperialism, is especially unlikely to prove an effective tool . The international
community still does not have a satisfactory answer to the issues of civil conflict, humanitarian crisis, and state collapse
that have brought the principle of state sovereignty into conflict with the international interest in peace and security. What
is now necessary, however, is not a unilateral U.S. project of regime changes and state transformations, but the
reinvention of international mechanisms in order to make multilateral interventions more
responsive and more effective, while avoiding threats to state sovereignty and independence.
 Structural Violence
The globalized economy under imperialism promotes structural
violence
Demenchonok and Peterson 09
[Edward Demenchonok and Richard Peterson, 1.Globalization and Violence: The Challenge to Ethics, American
Journal of Economics and Sociology, February 18 2009, Wiley interscience]
DESPITE its many benefits, globalization has proven to harbor a good deal of violence. This is not only
a matter of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction inaugurated by the atomic bombing of
Hiroshima, but includes many forms of indirect or structural violence resulting from the routine of
economic and political institutions on the global scale. In this essay, the multifaceted phenomena of violence
are approached from the standpoint of ethics. The prevailing political thinking associated with realism fails to address the
problems of militarism and of hegemonic unilateralism. In contrast, many philosophers are critically rethinking the problem
of global violence from different ethical perspectives. Despite sharing similar concerns, philosophers nevertheless differ
over the role of philosophical reflection and the potentials of reason. These differences appear in two contrasting
approaches associated with postmodern philosophy and discourse ethics. In the analysis of discourse ethics, attention is
paid to Karl-Otto Apels attempt of philosophically grounding a macroethics of planetary co-responsibility. At the heart of
the essay is the analysis of the problem of violence, including terrorism, by Jrgen Habermas, who explains the
phenomenon of violence in terms of the theory of communicative action as the breakdown of communication. Jacques
Derridas deconstruction of the notion of terrorism also is analyzed. According to the principle of discourse ethics, all
conflicts between human beings ought to be settled in a way free of violence, through discourses and negotiations. These
philosophers conclude that the reliance on force does not solve social and global problems, including those that are the
source of violence. The only viable alternative is the dialogical multilateral relations of peaceful coexistence and
cooperation among the nations for solving social and global problems. They emphasize the necessity of strengthening the
international rule of law and institutions, such as a reformed United Nations. THE IMPORTANCE OF the global dimension
has emerged on almost every level of social experience, from the economic and political to the cultural and psychological.
One can view globalizing phenomena and the problems they raise through a variety of lenses, including those of social
justice. These reveal questions of inequality, power, and recognition. Closely related to each is an issue that can become
a distinctive lens of historical perception on its ownthe question of violence. Indeed, the question of violence is
inescapable once one attends to the actual conflicts that the many aspects of globalization and issues of justice have
brought to the fore. In a nuclear age ushered in by the bombing of Hiroshima, war has become a
global danger. The toll taken by the many regional wars and neocolonial conflicts during the Cold
War itself show, further, that the nuclear stalemate was no solution to this recurring danger facing
human society. The problem of violence is itself extremely difficult to untangle, in part because what some thinkers
treat as a matter of human nature has been shown by others not to be a constant of human societies, and by still others to
be something that evolves dramatically with historical change.1 Nevertheless, within this multifaceted problem, two
aspects are becoming more obvious and disturbing: one is the globalization of violence; the other is the spread of
structural violence. First, the complex of change associated with the idea of globalization, despite all its benefits and
promise, is itself frequently a very violent business. One may think, indeed, that the underside of globalization is itself a
host of old and new kinds of violence. We can see this in the new kinds of wars that accompany structural change pushed
forward by global economic pressures,2 in the new weapons of destruction that flow through global networks that often
mix together the movement of arms and illegal drugs,3 as well as in the new kinds of terrorist violence associated with the
idea of a global network.4 One can think also of new kinds of weapons systems associated with space weapons, including
not just missiles but satellite technology, laser-operated devices, and so on.5 And these observations only consider
violence in the familiar sense of actual or threatened harms imposed on bodies and populations. In addition to its direct
manifestations, violence in a broader sense has many indirect and subtle forms. If we think of structural violence, for
example, we can see that many of the economic and environmental changes taking place raise questions of violence as
well.6 The term structural violence does not refer to all the kinds of physical and psychological suffering caused by the
workings of social institutions. Rather, it refers to those institutionally caused harms that are not only predictable but have
been predicted and debated, and for which preventive measures could be taken. The moral force of the notion of violence
is preserved in the case of structural violence when we see that agents have knowingly permitted predictable harms, even
though they have not intended them, as is the case with direct violence. Structural violence in this somewhat
restricted sense includes the poverty that has expanded with the dramatic increases of inequality
that globalization has caused, both on the global scale and within many national societies like the
United States itself. We see such violence in the proliferation of sweatshops and other kinds of harsh labor, including
contemporary forms of slavery and trafficking in humans. We see it, too, in so-called natural disasters, where conscious
policies have made populations vulnerable and unprepared for predictable harms triggered by dramatic weather events.
Facing the combination of the growing scope of structural violence with the evolving conditions of direct violence, we
can think of violence as a key issue in the unfolding conflicts over globalization . While violence is by no
means the only challenge posed by globalization, it is of indisputable importance both for its impact on the lives of
individuals and societies and for its place in the historical problem of finding adequate institutional forms to bring the
processes of globalization into line with the needs and aspirations proper to justice and democracy. In this light, the theme
of violence is a key part of the larger prospect of the kind of social learning that is needed if the new structures and
cultural forms that are needed are to be found/achieved.7 Within this sweeping set of challenges, the problem of ethics
has a key role. But ethics needs to be viewed in the historical terms of globalization itself. In what follows, we will survey
some facets of this problem of ethical reflection and action in the shadow of a violence-prone globalization. In this setting
is it possible to imagine a universal ethics, one that informs a global co-responsibility for shared problems?

US imperialism justifies violence in the name of progress.

McNally in 6 (David, Professor of political science at York Universit The new imperialists
Ideologies of Empire Ch 5 Pg 103) JL
This, then, is the end point of our thinking persons imperialism. Starting from
flowery platitudes about ethics and human rights, it leaves us with
banal defences of an empire that practises torture, uses lies and
deception to justify war, tramples on human rights, and launches a
new arms race. In the process, our imperial apologist fractures logic,
evades evidence, claims moral superiority for his kind, and demonizes
imperialized Others. And so we return to Joseph Conrad. For all the shortcomings of Heart
of Darkness, Conrad intuited the metamorphosis of imperial identity that characterizes the likes of
Michael Ignatieff. Key to Conrads depiction is that the imperialist begins by lying to
himself he spurns reality in favour of his fetish. However much
Ignatieff believes his own mutterings about ethics and human rights,
his pronouncements must be measured against the murders and the
torture carried out by those he nominates as humanitys benefactors and whose crimes he
both evades and backhandedly defends. Ignatieff s talk of morality is an exercise
in imperial fantasy of a sort with which Conrad was familiar. Describing the conversation among
colonial agents in Africa, for instance, Conrads protagonist, Marlow, proclaims: It was as unreal as
everything else as the philanthropic pretence of the whole concern, as their talk, as their
government. In fact, explains Marlow, notwithstanding their soaring proclamations, there was no
more moral purpose at the back of it than there is in burglars breaking into a safe.63 The same, of
course, is true of U.S. imperialism today. Its agents too have the morality of
burglars breaking into a safe. But their crimes, just like those of an
earlier era of colonialists, are of an exponentially higher order. Of course,
they produce reports, make speeches, and utter declarations about civilization, freedom, and
democracy.Where they differ fromConrads obsessive colonialist, Kurtz, is that they never arrive at
the truth. For Kurtz, after devoting seventeen pages to a report on behalf of the International
Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs, finally records a truthful horror. It occurs at the end
of his report, his moving appeal to every altruistic sentiment, as Marlow describes it. Suddenly,
the final words appeared and their message blazed at you, luminous and terrifying, like a flash of
lightning in a serene sky: Exterminate all the brutes!64 At the moment when he wrote those
words, shortly before his death, Kurtz finally looked within himself, to discover that his soul was
mad.65 And this Conradian truth might well be applied to Ignatieff. Defence of empire of
murder, pillage, torture, and deception transforms the defenders
themselves. Whatever values they might have once professed, the
reality of what they defend takes possession of them, turns them into
something other than what they intended. This is a central theme of Heart of
Darkness, which, as I have noted, is a warning to the Western apologist for empire that he is an
accomplice of madness and horror .

Imperialism necessitates violent military backing.

Barkawi 4 (Tarak, lecturer in international security at the Centre of International Studies
Globalization, Culture, and War On the Popular Mediation of "Small Wars"Pg 120
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cultural_critique/v058/58.1barkawi.html) JL
The association between liberalism in politics and economy and peace
drew on core Enlightenment themes and their construction of war. For
classical liberalism, wars were essentially atavistic, "the relics of a dying age that had not yet been
illuminated by the dawn of the Enlightenment" (Joas 2003, 30). As "reform" and "progress"
overcame despots and the warrior castes of the aristocracy, and free trade fuelled prosperity, wars
civil and foreign would pass into history. Easily obscured from view in this vision of
a pacific liberal modernity is the role of force in making liberal the
illiberal as well as specifically liberal tendencies to war, that is, those
tendencies to war generated in a world being made liberal and modern in diverse and important
ways. In particular, European imperial expansion, which involved
widespread use of force, was fundamental to the creation of the
modern international economy. Imperialism set in train modernization
[End Page 120] processes that generated, and continue to generate, social
and political tensions that often take violent form. Creating and
maintaining a free-trading world required, and continues to require,
repeated and sustained use of force. These forceful processes
provided the essential social, political, and cultural contexts of
modern globalizations, and their consequences were quite different from the expectations
of classical liberalism.
 Racism
The affs attempt to secure economic growth/democratic
principles globally is a form of militarized globalization. It
leads to the direct ratcheting up of racism, sexism, and
violence on other countries.
MOHANTY in 6 (CHANDRA TALPADE, Department of Womens Studies, Syracuse
University, Gender, Place and Culture Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 720, February 2006, US Empire and
the Project of Womens Studies: Stories of citizenship, complicity and dissent,
http://www.uccs.edu/~pkeilbac/courses/intlpol/readings/US%20Empire.pdf)
A number of scholars including Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2004) conclude
that since the last decades of the twentieth century, the US rules
through the mechanisms of informal empire managing the flow of
corporate capital globally across and through the borders of
nation/states, as well as through military interventions in countries
that resist this form of capitalist globalization.2 However, I would argue
that these mechanisms of informal and not violently visible empire building are
predicated on deeply gendered, sexualized, and racial ideologies that justify
and consolidate the hypernationalism, hypermasculinity, and neo-liberal
discourses of capitalist democracy bringing freedom to oppressed third world
peoplesespecially to third world women. The US war state mobilizes
gender and race hierarchies and nationalist xenophobia in its
declaration of internal and external enemies, in its construction and
consolidation of the homeland security regime, and in its use of the
checkbook and cruise missile to protect its own economic and
territorial interests. It mobilizes both languages of empire and
imperialism to consolidate a militarized regime internally as well as
outside its territorial borders. Bringing democracy and freedom (or
more precisely the free market) to Afghanistan and Iraq most recently, then,
has involved economic devastation, de-masculinization, destruction of
cultural, historical, natural and environmental resources, and, of
course, indiscriminate massacres in both countries. Similarly, making
the homeland safe has involved the militarization of daily life,
increased surveillance and detention of immigrants, and a culture of
authoritarianism fundamentally at odds with American liberal democratic
ideals. If the larger, overarching project of the US capitalist state is the
production of citizens for empire, then the citizens for democracy
narrative no longer holds. Where US liberal democratic discourse
posed questions about democracy, equality, and autonomy (the
American dream realized), neo-liberal, militarist discourse poses
questions about the free market, global opportunity, and the
protection of US interests inside and outside its national borders.
Capitalist imperialism is now militarist imperialism. Capitalist
globalization is militarized globalization.

US imperialism follows the logic of exclusion which justifies

racism
Flanagan et al 8 (John, Fellow at the University of Washington, Representing Permanent
War Vol 8 No 2 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v008/8.2.feldman.html) JL
The concept imperial formation, recently distilled by Ann Laura Stoler, captures the mobile terrain
on which these battles for an anti-racist historical legibility have been waged. Imperial
formation suggests the shifting degrees of rights, scale, rule, and
violence through which the state projects sovereignty both within and outside
internationally agreed upon borders. They are macropolities whose technologies
of rule thrive on the production of exceptions and their uneven and
changing proliferation. They thrive on turbid taxonomies that produce shadow
populations and ever-improved coercive measures to protect the common good against those
deemed threats to it. Finally, imperial formations give rise both to new zones of
exclusion and new sites ofand social groups withprivileged
exemption (2006, 128). This theory of the shifting cartography of empire as
one built on differential forms of exclusion and exemption that operate
through racist social structures begins to help us see how SNCC and, increasingly,
many others involved in the black freedom movement began to see in Palestine facts . . . that
pertain to our struggle here. A critique of the widespread discourse of U.S. support for Palestines
occupation could challenge the staid exceptionalist arguments that the United States and Israel
were somehow unique in achieving their philosophical commitments and political practices of
freedom and democracy. Indeed, U.S. exceptionalist discourse, as Stoler and David
Bond cogently noteand the black freedom movements post-1967 engagement with Palestine
gives depth, complexity, and specificity tohas historically constructed places
exempt from scrutiny and peoples partially excluded from rights (2006,
95), what Etienne Balibar calls a fluctuating combination of continued
exteriorization and internal exclusion
 Value to Life
Cultural imperialism fuels damaging use of capital for the sake
of power
Harvey in 3 (David, PHD, The New Imperialism, Oxford University Press, http://web.
me.com/eatonak/PE/page10/files/New%20Imperialism.pdf)
It is, of course, the populations of those vulnerable territories who then
must pay the inevitable price, in terms of loss of assets, loss of jobs,
and loss of economic security, to say nothing of the loss of dignity and
hope. And by the same logic that has it that the most vulnerable
territories get hit first, so it is typically the most vulnerable
populations within those territories that bear the brunt of any burden.
It was the rural poor of Mexico, Thailand, and Brazil who suffered most from the depredations that
flowed from the financial crises of the 1980s and 1990s. The very idea that those who irresponsibly
lend might also be held responsible is, of course, dismissed out of hand by ruling elites. That would
require calling the wealthy property-owning classes everywhere to account and insisting that they
look to their responsibilities rather than to their inalienable rights to private property and a
satisfactory rate of profit. But, as Joseph Chamberlain found, it is far easier politically to
pillage and debase far-away populations (particularly those who are racially,
ethnically, or culturally different), than to confront overwhelming capitalist class power at
home. The sinister and destructive side of spatial-temporal fixes to the
overaccumulation problem becomes just as crucial an element within
the historical geography of capitalism as does its creative counterpart
in building a new landscape to accommodate both the endless
accumulation of capital and the endless accumulation of political
power.

Cultural Imperialism becomes a tool of the government to

expand its own power, at the sake of serious global
damage
Harvey in 3, (David, The New Imperialism, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, PHD, 2003l
http://web. me.com/eatonak/PE/page10/files/New%20Imperialism.pdf)
Critical engagement over the years with Marx's account of primitive accumulationwhich in any
case had the quality of a sketch rather than a systematic explorationsuggests some lacunae that
need to be remedied. The process of proletarianization, for example, entails a mix of coercions and
of appropriations of precapitalist skills, social relations, knowledges, habits of mind, and beliefs on
the part of those being proletarianized. Kinship structures, familial and household arrangements,
gender and authority relations (including those exercised through religion and its institutions) all
have their part to play. In some instances the pre-existing structures have to be violently repressed
as inconsistent with labour under capitalism, but multiple accounts now exist to
suggest that they are just as likely to be co-opted in an attempt to
forge some consensual as opposed to coercive basis for working-class
formation. Primitive accumulation, in short, entails appropriation and
co-optation of pre-existing cultural and social achievements as well as
confrontation and supersession. The conditions of struggle and of working-class
formation vary widely and there is, therefore, as Thompson among others has insisted, a sense in
which a working class 'makes itself though never, of course, under conditions of its own choosing.7
The result is often to leave a trace of pre-capitalist socialrelations in
working-class formation and to create distinctive geographical,
historical, and anthropological differentiations in how a working class
is denned. No matter how universal the process of proletarianization, the result is not the
creation of a homogeneous proletariat. 8
 War
US imperialism threatens to spur major world conflict
Kuang et al 5 (Xinnian, teaches modern Chinese literature at Tsinghua University,
Preemptive War and a World Out of Control
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/positions/v013/13.1kuang.html) JL
The existing world order was constructed under the leadership of the United States following World
War II. The United Nations, the representative of this order, is certainly not an entirely democratic
organization. Since its inception, the United Nations has been controlled by two superpowers, the
United States and the Soviet Union. These two superpowers used the United Nations as a stage on
which to vie for power. But it is important to note that [End Page 159] neither the United States nor
the Soviet Union doubted the significance or efficacy of the United Nationsand the United States,
in particular, used the United Nations to export its values to the rest of the world. Both their
confrontations and their mutual hold on power gave the second half of the twentieth century a long
peace. However, after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the surviving hegemon,
the United States, no longer had the patience to use the United
Nations to put forward its own values, but rather pursued what might
be referred to as peace under imperial domination (diguo tongzhi xia de
heping). America's invasion of Iraq has damaged the authority of the
United Nations and the principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty. Before the war
broke out, Bush repeatedly sent out warnings in which he stated that if the Security Council refused
to pass a resolution authorizing the use of force, the United Nations would become irrelevant. Some
hawks in the administration and conservative newspapers even threatened that the United States
could withdraw from the United Nations, bringing it to an ignominious end. The strategy of
preemption as espoused by American neoconservatism , along with new
interpretations of sovereignty, will bring about a revolution in the twenty-first
century, and the war in Iraq will serve as a model. The United States will use its
neo-imperialist imagination in an attempt to recreate the so-called
rogue states and restore world order. The strategy of preemption is a
sign of America's abandonment of both traditional Western
international regulatory systems and the principle of rule by law as established under the
U.N. charter. Instead, America is bringing about the return to an era where
naked power takes preeminence. At a press conference held June 27, 2003, after talks
with the French minister of foreign affairs, Dominique de Villepin, Nelson Mandela commented on
this shift: "Since the establishment of the U.N., there have been no world wars; therefore, anybody,
and particularly the leaders of the superpowers, who takes unilateral action outside the frame of
the U.N. must receive the condemnation of all who love peace." On a visit to Ireland on June 20,
2003, he went on to say, "Any organization, any country, any movement that now
decides to sideline the United Nations, that country and its leader are
a danger to the world. We cannot allow the world to again degenerate
into a place where the will of the powerful dominates over all other
considerations."4 [End Page 160] The strategy of preemption is not simply
a military strategy, but is, in fact, a kind of barbaric politics, a serious
attack against civilized humanity. It is ultimately tied to the question of whether the
world is seeking civilization and order, or whether it is entering into a period of violence and chaos.
The United States' adoption of this strategy provoked the intense
opposition of Europe and, indeed, the entire world because many believe that a
strategy of preemption would take the world in the latter direction. As a result of the Iraq War, a
deep rift was opened up between America and its western European allies, to which the media now
frequently affix the label "Old Europe." Modern history, beginning in 1492, has been a Eurocentric
history of colonialism, imperialism, and expansion. However, the United States has
replaced Europe as imperialist colonizer. The imagination of American
neoconservative politics has inspired the United States to become a
tyrannical and self-appointed hegemon, willfully changing global
boundaries, and a particularly intense force for the destruction of
world order. Europe, on the other hand, has become a force for rationality and civilization. The
 dispute that arose between Europe and America during the Iraq War was both a conflict of potential
profit and a sign of civilizational disparity.

The use of informal imperialism allows concealment of true

motives, fueling dozens of regional conflicts around the
world which can grow into major world wars
Mooers 6, (Collin, THE NEW IMPERIALISTS: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE, Chapter 6, Chair of the Department of
Politics and School of Public Adminstration at Ryerson University, Toronto) WDK
The demise of the formal territorial empires in the second half of the twentieth century and the
consequent decoupling of political power from the extensive reach of capital accumulation has
posed special advantages and problems of its own. For the American empire, from Woodrow Wilson
onward, it was taken for granted that economic prosperity could be secured without territorial
aggrandizement.5 The lack of a formal empire has allowed the American
state to present itself to the world as a non- or even anti-imperialist
power. It has been able to conceal its imperial ambition in an abstract
universalism . . . to deny the significance of territory and geography
altogether in the articulation of imperial power. 6 But policing U.S. interests has
had its own costs and perils. The dogma of economic openness7 was
dependent on either the cooperation of compliant local regimes or,
failing that, an increasing number of small wars which, as one
recent champion of such conflicts admits, might as well be called
imperial wars.8 In the twentieth century alone, it is estimated that
the United States sent troops or sponsored local forces to fight in sixty
such small wars. The hazard of small wars of empire is that they
can turn into major ones, resulting in the perennial danger of
imperial overreach as happened most spectacularly for the U.S. in
Vietnam. American defeat at the hands of the Vietnamese famously established the conditions
for the Vietnam syndrome the belief that the U.S.A. could not and should
not fight wars it could not guarantee it would win. And winning in
military terms meant the deployment of overwhelming force,
preferably against much weaker enemies as in the Grenada or Panama
invasions. The same guiding principle was in force in the 1991 Gulf War. It may have been
premature for George Bush Sr. to declare an end to the Vietnam syndrome after that conflict since
the very small number of allied deaths had not yet sufficiently tested the American publics
willingness to accept a larger number of casualties. The Vietnam syndrome proved alive and well in
the aftermath of the Somalian debacle of 1993 where 1,200 U.S. troops were routed by local
warlords and forced to withdraw. The Clinton Doctrine, which dominated military policy for the
rest of the 1990s, sought to avoid U.S. casualties at all costs. Economic openness, now enshrined
under the equally euphemistic ideology of globalization, would be secured by means of a
modern equivalent of old-fashioned gunboats in cruise missiles and aircraft armed with precision-
guided munitions.9

Imperialism legitimizes baseless invasions in the name of

fighting terror
Mooers 6, (Collin, THE NEW IMPERIALISTS: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE, Chapter 6, Chair of the Department
of Politics and School of Public Adminstration at Ryerson University, Toronto) WDK
American efforts at informal rule have been largely inept: initial
military success based on a strategy of limited war, usually followed by an
escalation of military force due to a flawed reading of indigenous support, has inevitably led
to domestic disillusionment and ultimate withdrawa l.34 Far more
successful have been direct annexations or periods of prolonged
occupation as occurred in Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War Two.35 The United
States has failed in its imperial ambitions when it has attempted to fight limited wars of occupation
and when public support as in Vietnam begins to wane and a sufficiently strong-willed leadership
is lacking.36 The loss of Iran in 1979 to theocratic fundamentalism was a calamity whose
ramifications were and remain incalculable.37 The Khomeini regime legitimated terrorism for the
next generation of Islamo-bolshevism38 the term Ferguson prefers to describe
bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Bin Laden is the offspring of the Middle
Easts distinctive civilization of clashes, a retarded political culture in
which terrorism has long been a substitute for both peaceful politics
and conventional warfare.39 The Bush administration was therefore
correct in claiming there was a connection between the sponsorship of
terrorism and the policies of countries such as Afghanistan, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and Iraq.
They were right to claim that weapons of mass destruction were being
produced by Saddam Hussein; right to claim that further U.N.
inspections would be ineffective in finding them and, therefore, right
in invading Iraq: the only mystery is why Iraq was not invaded before
2003.40
CARDS AND RESEARCH
BRAINSTORMING
 Plan text / lack thereof
We advocate for a discussion and deconstruction of hegemony and
imperialism in order to defeat empire through establishing a longer
sequence of thought and analysis in the debate and educational
spheres.
We advocate that this debate space criticize the imperialist structures and
deconstruct the hegemony of the USA and the PRC in order to
defeat empire.
CARDS FROM OTHER FILES
 Discourse First (copypasta)
Discourse shapes reality specifically in the context of education about
Latin America - even if they win that their plan isnt imperialist, the
way they frame it makes the link exponentially bigger
Beech 2002
[Jason Beech, Latin American Education: Perceptions of Linearities and the Construction of Discursive Space,
Educational Transfer, November 2002, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3099544]
The perspective which stresses 'domination' argues that the similarities of national educational systems in Latin
America do not derive from voluntary educational borrowing. Similarities are rather a result of cultural
imperialism and neo-colonialism exercised especially by international agencies that have
imposed a 'neo-liberal agenda' on Latin American countries in order to keep them economically,
politically and culturally dependent. This view is represented by much of the writing by Martinez Boom (2000)
and Corragio (1997). Even though the sharing of similar problems amongst Latin American nations and the processes of
cultural imperialism can be noted, this article suggests a different perspective- based on the analysis of discourse-to
understand the similarities in the Latin American educational reforms. A perspective that puts discourse at the centre of
the analysis explains the similarity in the latest educational reforms in Latin America by the existence of a regional
educational discourse: a discourse that has Latin American education as its object. The way in which we view
the world, the way in which we think and speak or write about the world affects the way in
which we act upon it. Thus, the existence of a regional educational discourse creates the
conditions of possibility for certain things to be said and done in Latin American education, but at
the same time this discourse implies a limit on educational thought and action. In other words, why is
it that of all the things that could be said and done in Latin American education only certain things are said and done?
Overall, then, this essay offers an analysis of the process by which the Latin American discursive space is constructed in
the educational literature. The argument is that there are a number of themes that dominate contemporary 'Latin
American educational discourse' and that this can partly explain the similarities in the latest educational reforms in the
region. This closed discursive space creates the conditions for the production of certain ideas and practices, but at the
same time it becomes a limit for the production of other ideas and practices.
 Epistemology Stuff (copypasta)
Epistemology disad The way the affirmative understands Latin America
has been constructed through colonialism, their truth claims have
been created in the interest of domination
Casella 99
[Ronnie Casella, Pedagogy as View Sequence: Popular Culture, Education, and Travel, Anthropology & Education
Quarterly, June 1999, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3196072]
Repeated images in travel advertising make evident that U.S. under- standings of Latin America are
discursively constructed, that is, con- nected to a web of meanings found in U.S. popular culture-in Mexican
restaurant chains, for example, or adventure films (such as Mosquito Coast). Today, constructions of Latin America
revolve around a legacy of colonialism and distinctions of class, gender, and race that have
contin- ued to define Latin America as "colorful" and the United States as "sci- entific" (Duncan
1993). As individuals from the United States become more aware of Latin America -through travel,
television, immigration, agreements such as NAFTA-there grows the feeling that the United States must
better monitor and control the activities in Central and South America. Borders between the Americas no
longer seem as pro- nounced. This effect is partly achieved through the overt manipulation of images. When
appropriate and advantageous, Latin America is con- structed as corrupt. When appropriate, it is
pristine, friendly, and color- ful. Brochures take part in this production. They contribute to U.S. un- derstandings of
the world and reiterate and therefore support knowledge about Latin America-about its history, culture, and rela- tionship
with the United States. The advertisements tell us about Latin America, but they also tell us about U.S. power to define
Latin America for political and economic purposes (Munt 1994). How this is accom- plished in the case of brochures is a
trip in itself-a textual tour-a form of "armchair traveling" (Bartkowski 1995) that I call brochure mini tours.

The affs approach to globalized knowledge subverts local knowledge and

prevents opposition, their epistemology is upheld through the
destruction of local knowledges
Alcadipani 11
[Rafael Alcadipani and Alexandre Reis Rosa, From global management to local management: Latin American
perspectives as a counter-dominant management epistemology, Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, January 4
2011, Wiley interscience]
This approach raises arguments both for and against globalization (Kellner, 2002). Those in favour of globalization see
an end to borders as a positive thing, which will create new economic, political, and cultural opportunities. On the other
hand, critics of globalization consider it a form of imperialism that takes advantage of the end of
borders to impose market and capital logics throughout the world (Kellner, 2002). These two possibilities
can lead us to ask: What is managements role in the global picture ? As an area of academic knowledge
and social practice, management is a globally widespread phenomenon. It is taught at almost all the worlds universities,
and practiced professionally and nonprofessionally in all corporations, governments, NGOs, and so forth. However, this
global aspect also implies that management knowledge and practices generated and
developed in Western countries, especially in the United States (US), can then be seamlessly
transferred to other contexts (i.e., Jack, Calas, Nkomo, & Peltonen, 2008). The assumption is that
knowledge in management can be universally applicable and is, supposedly, neutral. The resultant view is
that management globalization is positive, and is indeed an opportunity created by globalization.
On the other hand, if analyzed from a critical perspective and from the viewpoint of Latin America a region
that is a recipient of management knowledge and practicesthe process can pose many problems. This is
especially because globalized management tends to impact management knowledge and experiences
developed locally. The logic behind this impact is linked to a wider context in which epistemologies are based
on a dividing line that creates a hierarchy of knowledge and that subordinates local thinking
(which is considered as particular) to global thinking (which is considered universal. This unequal knowledge-power
relationship, which undermines the particular knowledge of many colonized peoples, is called
coloniality of power by Quijano (2000), and the manner in which this epistemological difference was (re)produced is
called abyssal thinking by Santos (2007). Both of them define lines that divide experiences, knowledge, and social
players into two groups that inhabit each side of the abyss. On one side is the hegemonic, useful,
intelligible, and visible knowledge produced by the North (or First World), and on the other is the
inferior, useless or dangerous, and unintelligible knowledge produced by the South (or Third
World), which is meant to be forgotten. In management terms, this means that the colonial meeting between
Northern and Southern knowledge has created a naturalized view that useful, intelligible, and visible ways to manage an
organization are necessarily found in the knowledge produced in the North. Here North refers to the countries in the
Northern Hemisphere formed by Europe and the US and South refers to countries in the Southern Hemisphere, formed
by regions that were colonized by Europe but which have not achieved the same level of development as the North
(Santos, 1995).

Independent reason to vote neg rejecting the colonizers is the only way
to create a true epistemology
Alcadipani 11
[Rafael Alcadipani and Alexandre Reis Rosa, From global management to local management: Latin American
perspectives as a counter-dominant management epistemology, Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, January 4
2011, Wiley interscience]
To consider management from a Southern point of view means to reclaim the principle that the
world is epistemologically diverse and that this diversity could enrich human capacity to manage
and organize social life. It also means denouncing coloniality and reclaiming other types of
knowledge that have resisted the colonial encounter and that today are deprived of a horizontal
dialogue with Northern knowledge. It is to defend global perspective for management. In this sense, this article
aims at denaturalizing management by exploring its diversity in the world, particularly regarding the way in which
management is conceived and carried out in Latin American contexts and by exploring how this can help change current
global management. This article will show how management has spread around the world as a North American
phenomenon, becoming characterized as an agent of Americanization. We argue that this Americanization of
management led to the emergence of the grobal management perspective and, as a result, took
on the aspect of epistemic coloniality, as problems might emerge during its encounter with local realities. For
this reason, based on ideas conceived by Latin American social scientists and on the experiences of local
organizations, this article defends a global management approach that takes into consideration local
realities and challenges knowledge produced in the North.
 General FW Evd (copypasta)
Understanding the oppression of imperialism is key for scholarly
discussions
Sachs 03
[Aaron Sachs, The Ultimate "Other": Post-Colonialism and Alexander Von Humboldt's Ecological Relationship with
Nature, History and Theory, December 2003, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3590683]
There is no denying the value of the post-colonial critique and its relevance to all studies of travel and the environment.
Post-colonialism, at its best, means recuperating the objects of the traveler's gaze. In a world so profoundly shaped-
damaged, I would argue-by colonialism and imperialism, it is imperative that scholars focus on
celebrating the colonized, on hearing the voices of "others." We must understand all the ways in
which Western civilization has come to depend directly on forms of domination. Indeed, it makes
perfect sense, as David Spurr has noted in The Rhetoric of Empire (1993), that "works once studied primarily as
expressions of traditionally Western ideals are now also read as evidence of the manner in which such ideals have served
in the historical process of colonization."16

Imperialism is held up through discourse, voting aff only normalizes it

more
Pease 02
[Donald Pease, Imperial Discourse, Diplomatic History, December 17 2002, Wiley interscience]
As grounds for associating questions of foreign policy with travelers itineraries and museum exhibits, Endy and Conn
both depended on an understanding of the role that discourse played in fashioning imperialism as an American way of life.
As a discourse, imperialism correlated a broad range of cultural spheres to solicit the publics
consent to imperialism as a U.S. foreign policy but also to the domestic arrangements that policy valorized. It
reorganized such disparate practices as museum displays and traveling abroad within a much more inclusive network of
linguistic and extra-linguistic practices that naturalized imperial norms. Conn highlighted this discourses hegemonizing
effects when he remarked that American imperialism was not exclusively, or even most importantly, an episode in
American foreign relations, presidential policy, or military history. The process of Empire took place on a
multiplicity of terrains, domestic and foreign, public and private . I have mentioned the hegemonizing
aspect of the discourse of imperialism because of the parts played by Wilsons commercial museum and imperial travel in
producing it. In discussing the means whereby the discourse of imperialism forged a hegemony out of
linkages between such unrelated cultural terrains as travel and ethnographic exhibits, I propose an addendum
to Conns and Endys fine essays. In what follows, I hope to track one of the relays whereby imperialism became an
American way of life through an analysis of three interdependent aspects in evidence in Conns and Endys discussions.
The analysis shall begin with an account of how Wilsons museum displaced the distinction between (Europes) territorial
and (U.S.) commercial expansionism from a contested point within the field of debate into a normative presupposition that
regulated its terms. Discussion will then move to a topic that Endy left out of his essay, namely, how the discourse of
imperialism constructed linkages between travel abroad and ethnic and racial hierarchies in the
domestic sphere. The question of the relationship between Conns and Endys knowledges and the hegemonizing
discursive formation they analyze will shape the contours of this entire discussion.

The education created by the affirmative team is uniquely bad because it is

used to engrain colonialism within society
Kumaravadivelu 99
[B. Kumaravadivelu, Critical Classroom Discourse Analysis, TESOL Quarterly, Autumn 1999,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3587674]
Postcolonial theorists offer a refreshingly challenging perspective on education in general and on English language
education in particular. They tell us that education was "a massive canon in the artillery of empire,"
effecting, in Gramsci's (1971) phrase, "a domination by consent" (p. 28). They also tell us that language is a
fundamental site of struggle for post-colonial discourse because the colonial process itself begins
in language. The control over language by the imperial centre-whether achieved by displacing native languages, by
installing itself as a "standard" against other variants which are constituted as "impurities,"or by planting the language of
empire in a new place-remains the most potent instrument of cultural control. (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 1995, p. 283)
Perhaps no language is as much implicated in colonialism as English is. Several postcolonial commentators have
pointed out that the same ideological climate informed both the growth of English and the growth of Empire. In her
pioneering study Masks of Conquest, Viswanathan (1989) argues that in colonial India, the English literary text
functioned as a mask that camouflaged the conquering activities of the colonizing authority. She wonders at the
historical "irony that English literature appeared as a subject in the curriculum of the colonies long before it was
institutionalized in the home country" (p. 3) of England. Noting that "the superiority of English rested on a racialized and
gendered equation between language and nation" (p. 20), Krishnaswamy's (1998) Effeminism: The Economy of Colonial
Desire shows how colonialists relied "heavily upon a vocabulary of effeminacy to describe and codify Eastern languages
and literatures while defining European languages and literatures, especially English, as hard, energetic, rational, and
masculine" (p. 20). Connecting this line of thinking specifically to English language teaching (ELT), Pennycook
(1998), in English and the Discourses of Colonialism, offers an in-depth analysis of what he calls "the continuity of
cultural constructs of colonialism" (p. 19) and demonstrates how ELT is deeply interwoven with the discourses
of colonialism. ELT, he argues, is a product of colonialism not-just because it is colonialism that produced the
initial conditions for the global spread of English but because it was colonialism that produced many of the
ways of thinking and behaving that are still part of Western cultures. European/Western culture not only
produced colonialism but was also produced by it; ELT not only rode on the back of colonialism to the
distant corners of the Empire but was also in turn produced by that voyage. (p. 19)

The education that the aff claims their framework sponsors is just a tool
used by imperialists to hold power and control over their subjects
Tikly 04
[Leon Tikly, Education and the New Imperialism, Comparative Education, May 2004, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4134648]
Modern forms of education with their roots in western cultures and civilizations have been deeply
implicated in and provide a common thread between European imperialism and colonialism and the new
imperialism. Firstly, formal educational institutions have provided a key disciplinary institution within the
context of classical and settler colonialism. It provided in many contexts a basis for the exercise of the pastoral
power of the colonial missionaries who often controlled formal schooling. Through reinforcing and legitimizing the
trusteeship status of the colonial master through a particular interpretation of the bible, it helped to forge the colonized
as colonial subjects rather than as equal citizens. This imperative of schooling, however, often clashed with a more
'modernist', economic imperative, namely to prepare through the inculcation of basic skills, dispositions and attitudes,
indigenous workers intended largely to staff the colonial administrations. For the small minority who progressed beyond
basic education, colonial schooling was also 'disciplinary' in another sense because it inculcated these indigenous elites
into a western way of thinking based on western forms of knowledge, part of a process that scholars such as Ngugi Wa
Thiong'o (1981) and more recently, Nandy (1997) have described as a 'colonisation of the mind'. The effects of colonial
schooling were, however, contradictory. To begin with the experience differed slightly with respect to differing colonizing
powers and contexts. Secondly, however, the effects of schooling on those who were subject to it was to produce a
bifurcation, a split in the loyalties and identities of the colonized that Fanon (1970) captures so vividly in his metaphor of
Black skins white masks. Thirdly, the spread of the western episteme based on Eurocentric conceptions of human nature
and of social reality, led in some cases to the development of oppositional discourses although these were inevitably
couched within a western discursive framework, most usually either liberalism or Marxism. Following independence,
formal education continued to operate as a disciplinary technology in both senses of the term. To begin with, education
remained in missionary hands, although as schooling increasingly became subject to
government control in many countries, it was used by emerging elites as a tool for transforming
colonial subjects into new kinds of postcolonial identities linked to alternative forms of
sovereignty. In some instances, the receivers of formal education remained as subjects of a new
illiberal sovereignty under dictatorial and oppressive regimes or under one party rule. In other cases,
they were constituted more as citizens of an emerging liberal form of state. Postcolonial education was not just
disciplinary in the sense that it sought to forge postcolonial subjectivities in relation to new political imperatives and
identities. It was also disciplinary in that it extended the modernist, economic imperative of
schooling through the gradual expansion of formal education at all levels in the post-
independence period. This belief in the modernist view of the role of formal schooling was a necessary precondition
for the subsequent spread of global governmentality.

This form of education turns the workforce of a nation into human capital
to be spent by the imperialist nation and it entrenches imperialism
into everyday life
Tikly 04
[Leon Tikly, Education and the New Imperialism, Comparative Education, May 2004, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4134648]
Education has historically had a key role to play in relation to the development project for all of
the multilateral agencies. Education was, however, constructed in different ways in relation to the
overall object of development, namely, economic growth and poverty reduction. From the perspective
of the United Nations and the non-aligned movement, for example, education was often constructed as a basic human
right and the extension of education was a means for extending a notion of global citizenship (although as Santos (1999)
reminds us, this form of global citizenship and of human rights implied in these discourses often remained a peculiarly
western one). Of more relevance here was the extent to which education was constructed, following the ground-
breaking theoretical work of Theodore Schultz in the discourses of the World Bank in primarily economic terms as
a question of raising 'human capital'. Human capital theory has remained a central tenet of World
Bank thinking on education and has proved to be a flexible and resilient discursive resource (Fagerlind & Saha,
1989; Ilon, 1996; Rose, 2002; Little, 2003). As Ilon (1996) has argued, in the post-war period and until the late 1970s,
human capital was primarily conceived of in terms of its contribution to raising GNP . In this
discursive context, the World Bank and the other agencies supported a range of projects to expand the skills base of low-
income countries to provide the necessary human capital to kick-start the industrialization process. In this context,
human capital was conceived largely as a 'technical' question of inculcating the necessary skills
required for economic competitiveness and growth . As such, human capital theory contributed to the de-
politicization of development discourse mentioned above through removing reference to the role of education in relation
to reproducing social inequality. In human capital discourses, the notion of skills was itself conceived in
terms of discrete competencies acquired by individuals, with little attention paid to the social
nature of many skills (such as team work, communication, etc.) and to the cultural context of skills acquisition. By
way of contrast, more recent work, within a skills formation framework has emphasized these dimensions as a key to
understanding different skills paths adopted by different countries and regions (Brown 1998; Tikly et al., 2003). In these
formulations, social, cultural and political factors and differences in context are seen to play a key role in determining the
skills formation strategy adopted. Human capital theory also has a distinctive cultural bias. In the 1960s and 1970s, for
example, the development of human capital through education was seen as a key means to promote 'modernization'
(Fagerlind & Saha, 1989). This was achieved through the further institutionalization of a form of western education in the
post-independence era. The nature of this bias has, however, changed in relation to the uses of human capital theory
itself. Given the obvious failure of the human capital/modernization coupling to promote growth
and to reduce poverty, attention shifted during the 1980s to the role of human capital in determining
levels of resource allocation to different levels of education. Here, George Psacharopoulos' (1983) work on
individual and social rates of return to different levels of education was significant. In relation to rates of return analysis,
primary education is seen as a principal means to eradicate poverty because of its relatively high social rates of return to
gross domestic product (GDP) and growth. In this way, human capital theory became linked to structural adjustment
lending and the increased use of development targets by multilateral agencies. This new role for education,
however, only serves to reinforce the new imperialism through further limiting the capacity of low-
income countries to determine their own educational agendas. Dependency and the resulting incapacity
generated are reinforced through the disciplinary mechanisms of poverty-conditional lending, poverty reduction
strategies and international target setting, as highlighted above. Firstly, as has been argued elsewhere and is gradually
being recognized by some of the multi-lateral development agencies themselves, the over-emphasis on primary
education at the expense of other levels of education removes the indigenous capacity for research and innovation which
is centrally important if countries are to link education to indigenously determined future development priorities
(Crossley, 2001; Tikly, 2003b; Tikly et al., 2003). Secondly, as Rose (2003) points out, education and training are treated
as a black box in relation to the underlying processes that take place. In this context, and given the continued hegemony
of western text books, materials and resources, it is likely that education will continue to serve as a basis for
a Eurocentric kind of education for most of the world's children.
 Solvency (copypasta)
Critical broader thinking is the best way to engage in subaltern
epistemologies that are necessary for the deconstruction of power
relations
Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and
Paradigms of Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality,
http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-
Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13. //QM

An inter-cultural North-South dialogue cannot be achieved without a decolonization of power

relations in the modern world. A horizontal dialogue as opposed to the vertical monologue of the
West requires a transformation in global power structures. We cannot assume a Habermasian
consensus or an equal horizontal relationship among cultures and peoples globally divided in the
two poles of the colonial difference. However, we could start imagining alternative worlds
beyond Eurocentrism and fundamentalism. Transmodernity is Latin American philosopher of
liberation Enrique Dussels utopian project to transcend the Eurocentric version of modernity
(Dussel 2001). As opposed to Habermas project that what needs to be done is to fulfill the
incomplete and unfinished project of modernity, Dussels transmodernity is the project to fulfill the
20th Century unfinished and incomplete project of decolonization Instead of a single modernity
centered in Europe and imposed as a global design to the rest of the world, Dussel argues for a
multiplicity of decolonial critical responses to eurocentered modernity from the subaltern cultures
and epistemic location of colonized people around the world. Dussels transmodernity would be
equivalent to diversality as a universal project which is a result of critical border thinking,
critical diasporic thinking or critical thinking from the margins as an epistemic intervention
from the diverse subalterns locations. Subaltern epistemologies could provide, following
Walter Mignolos (2000) redefinition of Caribbean thinker Edouard Glissants concept, a
diversality of responses to the problems of modernity leading to transmodernity .

Engage in border thinking. Border thinking is the redefinition of terms and

ideas within a new epistemology, intended to redefine our thought
in a new path away from Occidental, coloniality
Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and
Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality,
http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-
Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.//QM
One of many plausible solutions to the Eurocentric versus fundamentalist dilemma is what Walter
Mignolo, following Chicano(a) thinkers such as Gloria Anzalda (1987) and Jose David Saldvar
(1997), calls critical border thinking (Mignolo 2000). Critical border thinking is the epistemic
response of the subaltern to the Eurocentric project of modernity. Instead of rejecting modernity
to retreat into a fundamentalist absolutism, border epistemologies subsume/redefines the
emancipatory rhetoric of modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern,
located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference, towards a decolonial
liberation struggle for a world beyond eurocentered modernity. What border thinking produces is
a redefinition/subsumption of citizenship, democracy, human rights, humanity, and
economic relations beyond the narrow definitions imposed by European modernity.
Border thinking is not an anti-modern fundamentalism. It is a decolonial transmodern response of
the subaltern to Eurocentric modernity. But border thinking is just one expression of epistemic
decolonization in this case following the Chicano colonial experience inside the US Empire.
There are other decolonial notions such as diasporic thought, autonomous thought, thinking from
the margins, thinking from Pachamama, etc. articulated from other colonial experiences. A good
example of this is the Zapatista struggle in Mexico. The Zapatistas are not anti-modern
fundamentalist. They do not reject democracy and retreat into some form of indigenous
fundamentalism. On the contrary, the Zapatistas accept the notion of democracy, but redefine it
from a local indigenous practice and cosmology, conceptualizing it as commanding while
obeying or we are all equals because we are all different. What seems to be a paradoxical
slogan is really a critical decolonial redefinition of democracy from the practices, cosmologies
and epistemologies of the subaltern. This leads to the question of how to transcend the
imperial monologue established by the European-centric modernity.

Creating a counter-project to US hegemony solves imperialism by rejecting

its support structure
Slater 08
[David Slater, Chapter 8. Another World is Possible: On Social Movements, the Zapatistas and the Dynamics of
Globalization from Below, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations, January 14 2008, Wiley
interscience]
With reference to the WSF, the above theme can be looked at in terms of the coalescence of a point of arrival and a point
of departure. The siting of the WSF in Porto Alegre was a reflection of a range of influences. The governmental presence
of the Brazilian Workers Party at state (regional) and local (municipal) levels was an enabling presence in terms of
providing a political space as well as needed financial support, together with progressive civil society associations
mentioned above. The setting up of the WSF in Porto Alegre also flowed out of the struggles of social movements in Latin
America, the activities of the Hemispheric Social Alliance and the global wave of anti-neoliberal mobilizations. These
mobilizations, even before Seattle in 1999, were beginning to impact on the decision-making centres of capitalist power,
most notably reflected in the derailment of the transnational corporations MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment)
initiative, which if implemented would have given greater power to big firms over nation-states. But Porto Alegre and the
World Social Forum are not only a point of arrival for these diverse influences and flows of resisting power they have
also become a point of departure for a further broadening of counter-sites to globalization from above. This is clearly
reflected in the inauguration of an African Social Forum in 2001, which met again in Addis Ababa in 2003 (Robert 2003),
and a European Social Forum in 2002, as well as plans to host the 2004 World Social Forum in Mumbai as part of the
formation of an Asian Social Forum. While theWorld Social Forums point of arrival and point of departure may be based in
the struggles against neo-liberalism, the meetings and activities generated by the WSF as a counter-site of protest and an
alternative, counter-hegemonic globalization are motivated by a desire for more democracy, more
social justice and more dignity for the peoples of the world. Not only, as the Zapatistas have done, do they
place onto the agenda the right to have rights, but also the movements and associations belonging to the WSF are
involved in Foucaults three kinds of social struggles, mentioned in the first part of the chapter. But they go further. They
are not only against ethnic and religious domination, capitalist exploitation and new forms of
subjection and subordination, but they are against new forms of imperialist power, of global
colonialism, and moreover they have a vision for an alternative kind of global politics based on
redistribution and recognition the drive towards greater equality together with a greater
recognition of difference. This requires respect for the autonomy of different movements while seeking out what may
be held in common and what might bring movements together in new forms of cooperation. Differences are to be
respected, but commonalities discovered. As Santos (2001) suggests, common ground needs to be identified in, for
example, an indigenous struggle, a feminist struggle and an ecological struggle, without cancelling out in any of them the
autonomy and difference that sustain them. The autonomy and the difference, the commonality and the connectivity, have
to be held in creative tension. This can be done through a struggle for greater democratization which includes an
articulation of struggles rather than a passive acquiescence of their separation (Laclau & Mouffe 2001).22 The idea of
a counter-hegemonic globalization, a globalization from below that not only challenges the neo-
liberal doctrine of capitalist expansion and a resurgent imperialism, but at the same time offers an
alternative vision of how the world could be organized, also can be viewed as offering the
possibility of a counter-geopolitics. A transnational project for global justice and participatory
democracy which does not prioritize any one spatial level, and does not downgrade the relevance of the national level
(Glassman 2001), offers a real alternative to the current hegemony of neo-liberalism . The actual practice
of opposition has also been innovative, as the previous director of the World Development Movement, Barry Coates, has
pointed out. Face-to-face lobbying, alliance-building, the arrival in politicians mailboxes of thousands of letters, cards and
emails from the public, stories placed with sympathetic journalists, working through trade union and political party
structures, and the production of alternative proposals on world trade and investment done through international
coordination via the internet, all came together in a successful campaign to block the MAI initiative (see Green & Griffith
2002). A similar campaign is now underway against the attempt to revive the MAI initiative, which is linked to another
ongoing campaign against the GATS proposal on the privatization of services (see WDM 2003). But also street protests
and demonstrations are a key part of the resistance movement, as was vitally clear on 15 February 2003, when over 8
million people marched on the streets of the worlds five continents, protesting against the imminent invasion of Iraq. The
counter-geopolitics that I have invoked above is rooted in an optimism of the will that goes beyond
national boundaries, that encompasses activists across borders, and provides a new kind of
globalization. It is taken forward by grassroots activists, progressive NGOs, civil society organizations, pressure groups
and critical writers and intellectuals like Eduardo Galeano, Walden Bello, Vindana Shiva and Martin Khor. An
archipelago of resistances that engenders new spatialities of solidarity and hope for a more
emancipatory politics of the future.

Alternative text: engage in scholarly analysis of imperialism as it relates to

micro and macro level politics. This allows us to see the origins of
imperialism within the political and education realm and separate
ourselves from them
Shome 06
[Raka Shome, Postcolonial Interventions in the Rhetorical Canon: An Other View, Communication Theory, March 17
2006, Wiley interscience]
The importance of a postcolonial position to any scholarly practice is that it urges us to analyze
our academic discourses and connect them to the larger political practices of our nations. This means
that in examining our academic discourses, the postcolonial question to ask is: To what extent do our
scholarly practices-whether they be the kind of issues we explore in our research, the themes around which we
organize our teaching syllabi, or the way that we structure our conferences and decide who speaks (and does not speak),
about what, in the name of intellectual practices - legitimize the hegemony of Western power structures ? In
posing this question, the postcolonial perspective does not suggest that as scholars writing in the West all that we do is
legitimize the imperial political practices of Western nations. Rather, the argument is that we need to examine
our academic discourses against a larger backdrop of Western hegemony, neocolonial, and racial
politics. We need to engage in contrapuntal lines of a global analysis where we see texts and
worldly institutions . . . working together (Said, 1993, p. 318). In the pursuit of our scholarly goals, we often do
not stop to think or ask questions about why, for example, research agenda A seems more important to us than research
agenda B? What is the ideology that operates in us that makes research agenda A seem more significant than research
agenda B? How are we always already interpellated into examining A but not B? What does that interpellation say about
our role in reproducing and participating in the hegemonic global domination of the rest by the West? What does it mean,
for instance, when I am told that there is a market for research agenda A but none for research agenda B? Or that if I did
pursue research agenda By I would have to do it in a way that would make it marketable? And what way would that be?
Whose way would that be? Who decides what is marketable? What does the decision have to do with
the political practices of our nations? How does this market serve the capitalistic and racist
hegemony of Western nations? And what is my position, as an intellectual, in reproducing this
hegemony? The point in asking such questions is to recognize the latent ideological structures that inform our
scholarship and practices. As Van Dijk (1993) puts it, often under the surface of sometimes sophisticated scholarly
analysis and description of other races, peoples, or groups . . . we find a powerful ideological layer of self-interest, in-
group favoritism, and ethnocentrism (p. 160). In fact, even when we do sometimes try to break out of the
Eurocentric canons informing contemporary academic scholarship by including alternate cultural
and racial perspectives in our syllabi, we often do not realize that instead of really breaking free of
the canon, all that we do is stretch it, add things to it. But the canon remains the same and
unchallenged. Our subject positions in relation to the canon remain the same and challenged. Instead of
examining how the canon itself is rooted in a larger discourse of colonialism and Western
hegemony, we frequently use the canon to appropriate other voice^.^ The question than arises, so
what is to be done? Perhaps the first step here is to do what Spivak (1990) suggests: to unlearn our privilege (p. 9).
And the first step toward that unlearning requires self-reflexivity; it requires seeing ourselves not sequestered
in an academic institution but connecting things that we think or not think, say or not say, teach or
not teach, to the larger political and ideological practices of our nations in their interactions with
the rest of the world. The solution, however, is not merely to do more rhetorical studies on nonwhite people (e.g.,
Campbells, 1986, study on African American women speakers), for that only becomes a matter of extending, instead of
displacing or challenging, the canon by adding others. Rather, the solution is to critically examine and challenge the very
value system on which the rhetorical canon and our scholarship is based. For instance, rhetoric as a discipline has been
traditionally built on public address. But historically public address has been a realm where imperial voices were primarily
heard and imperial policies were articulated. The colonized did not always have access to a public realm, or if they did,
their speeches were not always recorded in mainstream documents, since the means of production rested with the
imperial subject. All this perhaps means that we have built a lot of our understanding of rhetoric, and the canon of rhetoric,
by focusing on (and often celebrating) imperial voices. This calls for a reexamination of our paradigms. The move here is
parallel to that made by feminists in their challenges of the masculinist biases of the discipline. If rhetorical scholars are
to reexamine the discipline in relation to issues such as imperialism, neocolonialism, and race, then they need to
perhaps do what Spivak (see explanation) suggests, unlearn a lot of the rhetorical tradition and evaluate
critically what kinds of knowledge have been (and continue to be) privileged, legitimated [and]
displaced in our texts and theories and what configuration of socio-political [and racial] interests this privileging,
displacing, and legitimizing has served (and continues to serve) (Conquergood, 1991, p. 193). For one thing, this
means engaging in some serious soul searching to uncover why scholarship in our discipline
has been and continues to be so white (Rakow, 1989, p. 2l2). It is through such postcolonial self-reflexivity of
our discipline, as well as our individual scholarship, that we will be able to continue the task of pushing the traditional
paradigms of rhetoric further in order to create spaces for racially and culturally marginalized voices and perspectives on
rhetoric to emerge - voices and perspectives that would comprise sensitive postcolonial responses to the neocolonial and
racist circumstances of our present time. Second, the postcolonial critique of Western discursive imperialism that
constructs racial others and that legitimizes the contemporary global power structures has important implications for
rhetorical criticism, in that it beckons us to recognize postcolonialism as a timely and important critical and political
perspective. As Williams and Chrisman (1 994) emphasizes with great urgency in their introduction to Colonial Discourse
and Post-Colonial Theory, it is alarming how many of the attitudes, the strategies, and even how much of the room for
manoeuvre of the colonial period [still] remain in place (p. 3) in contemporary social, cultural, and I would add, academic
practices. Given this, it is unfortunate that in our literature we hardly find articles, especially in our mainstream journals,
that examine neocolonial representations of racial others or that analyze, for instance, the discursive processes through
which the (white) West gets constantly legitimized in political, cultural, and social discourses.

The alternative solves by opening up a space for discussion without the

influence of imperialism
Coupland 10
[Nikolas Coupland, Chapter 3. The Global Politics of Language: Markets, Maintenance, Marginalization, or Murder?, The
Handbook of Language and Globalization, October 7 2010, Wiley interscience]
The present - day strength of English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese in the Americas, in Africa, in Asia, in
Australasia and in the Pacific is a direct consequence of European expansion throughout the world since 1492
and of successive waves of colonization. The languages have accompanied political and
economic influence, being invariably backed up by military might . The promotion and hierarchization of
languages often dovetailed with missionary activity: Christianity thus accompanied several European languages world -
wide, just as Arabic has been an integral part of the spread of Islam, and Russian of Soviet communism. While Europeans
were experiencing industrialization and the consolidation of national (that is, dominant) languages, they were deeply
involved in overseas expansion, which contributed to economic boom in Europe. Many of the features of what is now
known as globalization were presciently described by Marx and Engels in their Communist Manifesto of 1848 (1961) .
This text stressed global economic markets, class interests, and ideological legitimation of an oppressive world order. The
project of global dominance has been articulated since before the USA achieved its independence; for instance George
Washington saw the United States as a rising empire (Roberts 2008 : 68). US national identity was forged through
massive violence, the dispossession and extermination of indigenous peoples, the myth of unoccupied territory, the
surplus value extorted from slave labor, and an active process of national imagination used to form a common identity,
one deeply permeated by religion (Hixson 2008 ). The project of establishing English as the language of
power, globally and locally, is central to this empire. The manifest destiny that colonial Americans arrogated
to themselves has been explicitly linked, since the early nineteenth century, to English being established globally:
English is destined to be in the next and succeeding centuries more generally the language of the world than Latin was in
the last or French in the present age (John Adams to Congress, 1780, cited in Bailey 1992 : 103). The whole world
should adopt the American system. The American system can survive in America only if it becomes a world system.
(President Harry Truman, 1947, cited in Pieterse 2004 : 131). The role of scholars in facilitating US empire is explored in
Neil Smith s American Empire. Roosevelt s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (2003) , which traces the shift
through territorial, colonial dominance (the invasion of the Philippines in 1898) to the attempt to dominate globally through
a strategic recalibration of geography with economics, a new orchestration of world geography in the pursuit of economic
accumulation (2003: xvii xviii). Academia services the global needs of the political project, perpetuating a system in
which [ ] global power is disproportionately wielded by a ruling class that remains tied to the national interests of the
United States (ibid., p. xix). In US colonies and in the British Empire, English was privileged and other languages
marginalized. Today s global ruling classes tend to be proficient in English. In the twenty - first century, empire has
increasingly figured in the political discourse of advocates and critics. Englers How to Rule the World. The Coming Battle
over the Global Economy (2008) distinguishes clearly between the corporate globalization of the final decades of the
twentieth century and its successor, imperial globalization based on military dominance. Alternatives to Economic
Globalization ( 2002 : 19) lists the following eight key features of economic/corporate globalization (neo - liberalism): 1
promotion of hypergrowth and unrestricted exploitation of environmental resources to fuel that growth; 2 privatization and
commodifi cation of public services and of remaining aspects of the global and community commons; 3 global cultural
(and, we would add, linguistic) and economic homogenization and the intense promotion of consumerism; 4 integration
and conversion of national economies, including some that were largely self - reliant, to environmentally and socially
harmful export - oriented production; 5 corporate deregulation and unrestricted movement of capital across borders; 6
dramatically increased corporate concentration; 7 dismantling of public health, social and environmental programs already
in place; 8 replacement of the traditional powers of democratic nation states and local communities by global corporate
bureaucracies. Alternatives to Economic Globalization fails to mention language among the features listed under cultural
homogenization, despite referring to a global monoculture and to the unrestricted flow of production and marketing,
needed by large multinational corporations. It seems that not even the best globalization experts are aware of the
tendencies toward linguistic homogenization and of the threats to linguistic diversity mentioned above. Much of the
literature on English as a global or international language has tended to be celebratory and failed to situate English
within the wider language ecology or to explore the causal factors behind its expansion (on these subjects, see Phillipson
1992 and 2008a and Pennycook 1998 ). Influential work by Crystal, Fishman, and Graddol is critically analyzed in
Phillipson 2000 , and books on the world language system by De Swaan and Brutt - Griffler are critically analyzed in
Phillipson 2004 . One of the controversial questions today is to what extent corporate globalization is leading toward
greater homogenization or greater diversification (for instance through localization), as some researchers claim. For
instance Mufwene ( 2008 : 227) claims that McDonaldization does not lead to uniformity because the McDonald menu is
partly adapted to the local diet. Even if McDonald s in India may serve vegetarian burgers in Hindi, this reduction to
superficial adaptation disregards completely the structural and process - related aspects of homogenization (see n. 3 for
examples; also, for a discussion of McDonaldization, see Hamelink 1994 ; Ritzer 1996 ; and Defi nition Box 6.3 in
Skutnabb - Kangas 2000 ). 3 Linguistic globalization needs to be discussed in a politico - economic
framework which relates the hierarchization of languages to global and local power relations. A
typical example of special pleading for English can be found in a book by a political scientist who argues for the formation
of an EU super - state and cites the familiar trope of English as lingua franca, along with young people s consumerism
and global business integration (Morgan 2005 : 57). He seems unaware that there are many lingua francas in Europe;
or that the common transnational youth culture is essentially American and that the convergence of business
practices derives from the US corporate world and from the conceptual universe it embodies. It is false to project English
as though it is neutral, English as a mere tool that serves all equally well, in whatever society they live. The phrase
English as a lingua franca generally decontextualizes users and seems to imply symmetrical, equitable communication,
which is often not the case. It conceals the actual functions that the language performs, English as a lingua academica ,
lingua bellica , lingua culturalis , lingua economica , and so on (Phillipson 2008b ). It also ignores the Anglo - American
semantics and grammar embedded in the language (Wierzbicka 2006 ; M hlh usler 2003 ). It fails to explore the
hegemonic practices of the currently dominant capitalist language or to theorize English linguistic neo - imperialism.
Imperialism needs careful definition if it is to be used analytically . This principle guided the definition of
linguistic imperialism as a variant of linguicism (Skutnabb - Kangas 1988 : 13) operating through structures and ideologies
and entailing unequal treatment for groups identified by language (Phillipson 1992 ). For Harvey ( 2005 : 26), capitalist
imperialism is a contradictory fusion of the politics of state and empire (imperialism as a
distinctively political project on the part of the actors whose power is based in command of a territory and
a capacity to mobilize its human and natural resources towards political, economic, and military
ends) and the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time (imperialism as a diffuse political
economic process in space and time in which command over and use of capital takes primacy). (Emphasis added) The
first of these components of the contradictory fusion is the top - down process of what a state, a combination of states,
or an institution such as a corporation or a university does to achieve its goals which includes the way it manages
linguistic capital. The second is the way economic power flows across and through continuous space,
toward or away from territorial entities (such as states or regional power blocs) through the daily
practices of production, trade, commerce, capital flows, money transfers, labour migration,
technology transfer, currency speculation, flows of information, cultural impulses, and the like
(ibid.). Most of these processes are crucially dependent on language, and constituted by language.
English can be seen as the capitalist neo - imperial language that serves the interests of the
corporate world and of the governments it influences (Phillipson 2008a , 2009 ). This dovetails with the
language being activated through molecular processes of linguistic capital accumulation in space and time , in a dialectic
process at the intersection of economics, politics, and discourses. So far as linguistic neo - imperialism is
concerned, the political mode of argumentation refers to decision - making, language policy, and
planning, whereas the economic mode of argumentation refers to the working through of such
decisions at all levels, to the implementation of language planning decisions, to the actual use of
English in myriad contexts. When English increasingly occupies territory that hitherto was the preserve of national
languages in Europe or Asia, what is occurring is linguistic capital accumulation , over a period of time and in particular
territories, in favor of English. When Singaporean parents gradually shift from an Asian language to the use of English in
the home, this represents linguistic capital accumulation. If users of German or Swedish as languages of scholarship shift
to using English, similar forces and processes are at work. When considering agency in each of these examples, the
individuals concerned opt for the neo - imperial language because they perceive that this linguistic capital will serve their
personal interests best, in the false belief that this requires the sacrifice of their own language. When language shift is
subtractive, and if this affects a group and not merely individuals, there are serious implications for other languages. If
domains such as business, the home, or scholarship are lost, what has occurred is in fact linguistic capital
dispossession . Analysis of the interlocking of language policies with the two constituents of Harvey s contradictory
fusion can highlight both the corporate agendas, which serve political, economic, and military purposes, and the multiple
flows that make use of English for a range of purposes. New discourses and technologies are adopted and creatively
adapted, but in a rigged, so - called free global and local market. The active promotion of other major international
languages such as Chinese, French, Japanese, and Spanish also aims to strengthen the market forces and the cultures
associated with each language; but at present the linguistic capital invested in these languages does not seriously
threaten the current pre - eminence of English. A Chinese global empire may be on the way. International language
promotion itself needs to be seen in economic terms, dovetailing as it does with media products and many commercial
activities. TESOL (the Teaching of English to Speakers of Other Languages) teaching materials, examinations, know -
how, teachers, and so on is a major commercial enterprise for the British and for the Americans and a vital dimension of
English linguistic neo - imperialism. The English language teaching sector directly earns nearly 1.3 billion for the UK in
invisible exports and our other education related exports earn up to 10 billion more (Lord Neil Kinnock, Chair of the
British Council, in the Foreword to Graddol 2006 a work that charts many variables in the global linguistic mosaic,
challenges British monolingual complacency, and aims, as Kinnock stresses, to strengthen the UK s providers of
English language teaching and broader education business sectors ). The major publishing houses are now global.
For instance Pearson Education s international business has been growing rapidly in recent years, and we now have a
presence in over 110 countries ( http://www.pearson.com/index.cfm?pageid=18 ). The website of Educational Testing
Services of Princeton, NJ, which is responsible for the TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language) for language profi
ciency, declares as their mission: Our products and services measure knowledge and skills, promote learning and
educational performance, and support education and professional development for all people worldwide ( www.ets.org ,
About ETS). The entrenchment of English in many countries world - wide and for many cross - national
purposes leads Halliday (2006) to make a distinction between indigenized and standardized Englishes,
which he categorizes as international and global : English has become a world language in both senses of the term,
international and global: international, as a medium of literary and other forms of cultural life in (mainly) countries of the
former British Empire; global, as the co - genitor of the new technological age, the age of information. [ ] they obviously
overlap. [ ] International English has expanded by becoming world Englishes, evolving so as to adapt to the meanings
of other cultures. Global English has expanded has become global by taking over, or being taken over by,
the new information technology, which means everything from email and the internet to mass media advertising, news
reporting, and all the other forms of political and commercial propaganda. Halliday s international is an
unfortunate label, since he is in effect referring to local forms and uses of English, comprehensible within a country, for
instance. His terms also elide the anchoring of global English in the English - dominant countries, where this is the primary
national language and one that also opens international doors. This terminology is a minefield which obscures
power relations and hegemonic practices, nationally and internationally.

Voting affirmative reveals the gaps and omissions of the knowledge

produced by the aff, this is the first step to a true understanding of
the world and eliminating imperialism
Tikly 04
[Leon Tikly, Education and the New Imperialism, Comparative Education, May 2004, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4134648]
The question remains, however, as to whether there can be an alternative to the 'regime of truth' that operates around
the education and development problematic and whether alternative visions of the future, of education and even of
'development' itself are possible? After all, as Mudimbe (1988) reminds us in relation to Africa, even in the most
Afrocentric of perspectives on change, the western epistemological order remains as both context and referent. Indeed, it
will not have escaped the attention of the reader that the present article, like so much 'postcolonial' scholarship, is also
written largely within a western frame of reference, whatever its intentions or commitments! For critics of the new
imperialism this poses a dilemma- is it possible to conceive of a critical social theory and epistemology
on which an alternative to western hegemony can be built, and what ought the role of education
to be in this endeavour assuming it were possible? To some extent, this is not a new problem within the
social sciences. It is a problem of how to go beyond the existing order of knowledge whilst being obliged simultaneously
to work within its frameworks. For some critics this has meant abandoning the whole 'development' problematic entirely.
Against this kind of nihilism, however, another view is that such an abandonment is itself a betrayal of the poor and
marginalized. As Tucker (1999) points out, 'If we were to follow this logic, we would also need to abandon concepts such
as socialism, cooperation and democracy because they have also been abused and manipulated for purposes of
domination and exploitation' (p. 15). In relation to formal education in particular, it is often the poorest and most
marginalized communities that have struggled hardest, both during the period of European colonialism and subsequently,
to create educational opportunities for their children because formal schooling is still perceived by those with the most to
lose as a way out of poverty and destitution. At a theoretical level I find Santos' (1999) work to be particularly useful in
beginning to reconstruct a role for education. He sets out what he describes as a postmodem critical theory (but for our
purposes might equally be described as a new anti-imperial critical theory). Santos starts by pointing out that
Foucault's great merit was 'to show the opacities and silences produced by modem science,
thus giving credibility to alternative "regimes of truth", for other ways of knowing that have been
marginalised, suppressed and discredited by modern science' (1999, p. 33). Part of this process or
silencing has been to obscure the nature and origins of western science itself. To begin with, modern science developed
in the crucible of Enlightenment thought owes much to the Islamic world of scholarship. Secondly, modern science from
its inception has had both emancipatory and regulatory dimensions. It was emancipatory to the extent that it sought to
bring the threatening chaos of unmastered natural forces under control in relation to an emerging liberal notion of
freedom and equality. It was regulatory because it excluded from this and indeed sought to dominate and regulate large
sections of humankind including slaves, indigenous peoples, women, children, the poor, etc. Santos' (1999) plea is
for a reinvention of 'knowledge as emancipation' based on the principle of solidarity, and a commitment to
praxis. That is to combine a new knowledge as emancipation with a commitment to meeting
localized needs (here his theory intersects with that of other scholars such as Freire). The principles of knowledge
as emancipation are firstly, that it must move from monoculturalism towards multiculturalism based on
the recognition of the 'Other' (indigenous and colonized peoples, women, rural dwellers etc.) as producers of
knowledge. This means recognizing the silences, gaps and omissions within and between
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic systems of knowledge so as to begin to unearth alternative
ways of knowing the world. However, this also entails a recognition of difference (see also Crossley &
Watson, 2003). Rather than posit one 'knowledge as emancipation' it requires recognizing a multitude of voices of the
historically marginalized and to work towards a theory of translation, a hermeneutics that makes it possible for the
needs, aspirations and practices of a given culture to be understood by another. Thirdly, knowledge as
emancipation involves developing greater awareness and links between the production of
knowledge and its likely impact, that is, in contextualizing knowledge production rather than
separating it off as a technical area of expertise and in creating an ongoing critical and
deconstructive approach towards forms of knowledge power. Finally, however, and going beyond
deconstruction, Santos (1999) urges us to reconstruct the idea of emancipatory social action and to 'inquire into the
specific forms of socialisation, education, and work that promote rebellious, or on the contrary, conformist, subjectivities'
(p. 41).Within the educational sphere and within the context of this article, Santos' challenges lead us to inquire as to
what conditions are necessary for transforming education as a disciplinary technology into a potentially liberatory
institution based on a view of knowledge not as a means of western control and of regulation of non-western
populations but of emancipation from the new imperialism. A few brief points, however, are relevant here. Firstly, as
Sardar (1999) has pointed out: Resistancet o Eurocentricisma, and hence development, can only come from non-
Western concepts and categories. The non-Western cultures and civilisations have to reconstruct themselves, almost
brick by brick, in accordance with their own world views and according to their own norms and values. This means that
the non-West has to create a whole new body of knowledge, rediscover its lost and suppressed
intellectual heritage, and shape a host of new disciplines. (p. 57)
RESEARCHED CARDS
 The Magic Cards
Anti-imperialism must oppose both America and Chinas empires
Callinicos 14 (October 10, Alex, British political theorist and activist. In an academic capacity,
he serves as Professor of European Studies at King's College London, The multiple crises of
imperialism, http://isj.org.uk/the-multiple-crises-of-imperialism/)
For revolutionaries, opposing Obamas bombing campaignand whatever other military actions
followshould be straightforward. (We should also, of course, oppose NATO expansion in
Central and Eastern Europe.) But this opposition needs to be informed by an understanding that
the latest US intervention in the Middle East takes place against the background of a renewal of
inter-imperialist rivalries on a scale not seen since the end of the Cold War. Anti-imperialism
during that era required, not simply opposing our own imperialism, but also refusing to prettify
the actions of its rival and acknowledging that it too operates according to an imperialist logic.
The same stance is required today, with the complication that today we are seeing multi-polar
interstate competition. This is clearest in East Asia. On a global scale, the US remains the only
world power, but it faces serious regional challenges from Russia and China, and within the
Western bloc Germany and Japan are newly assertive.
 BOGGS FIVE
The neoliberal system is held together by superstitions and definitions of
hegemony and imperialism that normalize the system and
perpetuate capitalist and hegemonic oppression; the educational
system must use critical pedagogy to challenge the normative
definitions and discussions of hegemony in order to eradicate the
capitalist, state, and hegemonic power structures.
Boggs 05
In Peter McLarens Capitalists & Conquerors: A Critical Pedagogy against Empire. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2005. The foreword by Carl Boggs ix-xiii //JJC
McLaren argues persuasively that the power structureintegrated through a vast,
labyrinthine system of capitalist production state governance, and multiple forms of social
dominationmust be denied its "natural definitions of hegemony that ensure perpetual
reproduction of this status quo. The entire neoliberal system is held together by what
appear to be commonsensical myths and deceits, superstitions and beliefs that will have to
be questioned, probed, challenged, ultimately overtunedpart of a Gramscian counter-
hegemonic assaultif that system is to be effectively transformed. While the educational
sphere hardly stands alone as a major locus of ideological con-testation, it being much too
intertwined with the other spheres, it does, how-ever, remain at the core of this process, all the
more to given the increasing centrality of knowledge production, mental labor, technology,
and communications to modern-day capitalist. If the prevailing educational system rein-forces
among students and teachers alike a view of commodification and hierarchy as something
"-natural," that is given, fixed, and irreversible, then logic dictates that subversive assaults
on that system are needed to counter its great hegemonic force. Building upon the classic
contributions of Marx, Gramsci, and Freire, we arrive at a position where critical pedagogy
can be further elaborated and revitalized.
 AT: The aff doesnt do anything
Our authors do more than just complain; critical pedagogy is the
mechanism by which students and teachers can understand and
destroy the evils of labor-capital and imperial relationships
Doughty 08
Reviewed by Howard A. Doughty Howard A. Doughty Faculty of Applied Arts & Health Science Seneca College,
Canada //JJC
McLaren goes further. He laments but does not give in to the ominous resignation
produced by the seeming inevitability of capital even among the most progressive
educators. His mission is to build a robust basis for a return of critical pedagogy. He is
certainly not content to play in the romper room of capitalism with other children who
have subsumed their critique of political economy and are now content to carp about
lifestyles, deconstruct television commercials and indulge in postmodern ironynot, at
least while billions live on less than two dollars a day, genocide remains an active political
strategy and even the once comfortable industrial middle classes are facing the loss of
their privileges and undergoing structural proletarianization. In McLarens schematization,
the instruments of Marxian analysis and the crucial continuation of concern about the labor-
capital dialectic, surplus value extraction, or the structure of property ownership. These,
after all, are not outmoded ways of thought but ongoing principles according to which power is
ultimately distributed and powerlessness endured. He is especially interested in the problems
of the American academy where few contemporary critical educators are either willing or
able to ground their pedagogical imperatives in the concept of labor in general, and in
Marxs labor theory of value in particular. He is eager to rebuild a critical pedagogy [that] has
collapsed into left liberal attempts by progressive educators to remediate the educational
enterprise. At stake is the question of whether teachers and students can go beyond
establishing a measure of compassion for the underprivileged and dispossessed as part
of the emotional arsenal of malcontents, or whether deep and sustained thought can
restore genuine praxis.
 Education solves cap and imperialism
Education empirically creates social justice, and the critical pedagogy that
goes along with it globalizes an anti-imperialist struggle which is
transnational, gender-balanced, and multi-racial.
McLaren 05
Peter McLaren. Capitalists & Conquerors: A Critical Pedagogy against Empire. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2005. //JJC
Against tremendous odds, the challenge of educators over the last sev-eral decades has
been to humanize the classroom environment and to create pedagogical spaces for linking
education to the praxiological di-mensions of social justice initiatives and to that end we are
indebted to critical pedagogy. Given the urgent times we live in, we need to ratchet up the
struggle ahead. This has been the singular challenge of Capitalists and Conquerors. For this
reason, I have attempted to expand the pedagogical encounter to consider its own
insinuation into globalized social relations of exploitation and to live up to its
revolutionary potential of becoming a transnational, gender-balanced, multiracial, anti-
imperialist struggle. Everything in human history passes through the realm of subjectivity and it
is through this dance of the dialectic that we create history. The democ-racy in which we live is
indeed at a tragic crossroads, as is capitalism it-self, and we must fiercely continue to
question the present historical course that has wedded the two together.

Traditional education is a means of extending colonialism and the fact that

is doesnt seem that way only worsens it
Mayo 14
Peter Mayo is a professor, speaker, editor, writer, and head of the Department of Arts, Open
Communities and Adult Education at the University of Malta
http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/19/education-imperialism-and-critical-pedagogy/ //JJC
Education serves as a means to colonise the mental universe (Ngugi Wa Thiong O) of the
colonised, the type of colonisation that cannot be gotten rid off simply through a
declaration of independence. While being formally independent, the formerly officially colonised
would still live a colonised life aping the lifestyle of the colonisers in their own way, their own
quaint way as the colonisers would call it. As Fanon argued with regard to Africa, we would have
a class of Black Skins in White Masks. And in many cases it would be a watered down
education which gives the colonised the illusion of their education being on a par with that
education in the metropole. Fanons description of the R-eating man from Martinique in his vain
quest to learn the colonisers French is a case in point. It also enforces the view that the good
life to which one ought to aspire exists in the colonial centre. Hence once the promised or
augured development does not take off, people from the former colony seek that good life by
emigrating to the colonial centre the empire strikes back which they perceive to be the
Eldorado and where they are often treated as second class citizens. This indicates that the
colonal education they received was delusory in terms of its purportedly being on a par
with the education provided in the colonial centre.

Our critical pedagogy is key to overthrowing capitalism and changing

power relations
McLaren 05
Peter McLaren. Capitalists & Conquerors: A Critical Pedagogy against Empire. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2005. //JJC
The key to resistance, in our view, is to develop a revolutionary critical pedagogy that will
enable the working class to discover how the use value of their labor-power is being exploited
by capital but also how working-class initiative and power can force a recomposition of class
relations by challenging capital as a social relation in all of its complexity. This will require
critical pedagogy not only to plot the oscillations of the laborcapital dialectic, but also to
reconstruct the objective context of class struggle to include schools as major sites of
resistance and transformation. Teachers, students, and community activists must challenge
capital's control of the creation of new species of labor-power through current attempts to
commodity and privatize the process of schooling and social life in general .

Fighting imperialism and promoting understanding can be accomplished by

education and the discussion of ethical dilemmas.
Stanton 02
Domna C. Stanton. Graduate Center, City University of New York. PMLA. https://apps.mla.org/pdf/conf_stanton.pdf
//JJC
If we can establish an ethics of collaboration in difference, then we can also create alliances
among professors of English and the foreign languages and literatures to advocate the
importance to all other disciplines of the interpretive strategies and critical thinking that we do.
And we can work on collaborative projects that will enrich the humanities, the social
sciences, the life sciences, and the professional schools. One important project, in the
light of my remarks, would be the study of the theory, problems, and practice of translation
both in the literal sense in which the field of translation studies has developed and, by extension,
in the metaphoric sense of the multiple ways in which each of us translates othersa
person, an image, a cultureto make them understandable and acceptable to us, a process
that involves gains and losses. Over and beyond cotaught or team-taught, bi- or multilinguistic,
pluridisciplinary courses, which are affordable as meettogether seminars,8 we can work
together to conceptualize the humanistic dimensions of traditional area studies. We can
also refine emerging ones, such as Atlantic studies, Caribbean studies, or migration studies. And
we can create a synergistic major in the humanities and international affairs, which Randa Duvick
describes in her essay Sustaining Foreign Language Enrollments through Collaboration: An
Interdisciplinary Major; develop interdisciplinary studies of media, which would include
visual, print, and technological cultures; and promote courses with colleagues in the
sciences ranging from critical studies of scientific and artistic cultures to the ethical
dilemmas raised by advances in the life sciences.
 Unorganized
Imperialism oppresses women by creating inequalities in the
workforce as well as in the social sphere
Robinson 2002
[William I. Robinson, Latin America in the Age of Inequality: Confronting the New Utopia, International Studies Review,
December 17 2002, Wiley interscience]
The larger structural context for the upsurge in womens struggles is the dramatic change in the status of women in Latin
America in recent decades. Globalization has major implications for the sexual division of labor, for
gender relations, and for the transformation of the family itself. The percentage of women in the labor
force has grown in most regions of the world under globalization. 37 Increased formal sector female participation has
resulted from several factors. Among them are the predictable pattern that accompanies capitalist development in
general, that is, the need for families to send an increasing number of family members into the labor market with the
decline in real wages and household income; the predilection of transnational capital to hire docile female labor,
particularly in maquila production; and so on.38 With the decline in male employment and real wages brought about by
neoliberal restructuring, women have assumed a growing absolute and also relative importance as wage earners, and
their contribution to household economies has increased. The reorganization of production on a global scale is
feminizing the labor force and changing the previous gender demarcation of domestic and wage labor . Gender
inequality is reproduced in the workforce at the same time as it continues in the household: the
systematic subordination of women in the reproduction sphere is coupled with the systematic inequality of women in the
production sphere. It is clear that under globalization there is a transformation of the sexual
division of labor. New forms of labor market segmentation between men and women and wage differentials in the
formal sector converge with unpaid domestic labor and hardship imposed in the sphere of gendered social reproduction,
resulting in a deterioration of the status and social condition of most women. From the
maquilas of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean to the new transnational agribusiness plantations in Chile and
Colombia and the new industrial complexes in Brazils northeast, women in Latin America disproportionatelyand in
some cases, exclusivelyengage in unskilled, laborintensive phases of globalized production.39

Imperialism encourages economic underdevelopment in

colonized countries which leads to famine and imperial
genocide, India model proves
Mooers 6, (Collin, THE NEW IMPERIALISTS: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE, Chapter 6, Chair of the Department of
Politics and School of Public Adminstration at Ryerson University, Toronto) WDK
But it was not for lack of ideological commitment that India failed to overcome its essentially pre-
capitalist dynamic in the second half of the nineteenth century. Colonial officials both at
home and in the colonies saw their civilizing mission as imparting
the benefits of economic improvement and Christian piety. The
gentlemanly capitalism57 that dominated in the colonial
administration sought to link the socialproperty relations which lay at
the heart of Englands seventeenth- and eighteenth-century agrarian capitalist revolution with
the newer forms of financial and service capital that came to prominence in the later nineteenth
century. These officials had read their Locke on property, enclosure, and improvement. They were
also avid proponents of the latest principles of political economy espoused by Malthus, Bentham,
and Mill. It was the liberal empire so vaunted by Ferguson which encouraged
not just chronic economic underdevelopment, but which bears
responsibility for the deaths of millions due to starvation during the
two great waves of famine which swept India in 187679 and 18961900.
Between 5.5 and 12 million died in the famine of 187679 and mortality rates
were highest in areas best served by railways. As Mike Davis has shown in painful detail , it was
the fanatical commitment to free-market and Malthusian dogmas
which made famine a death sentence for millions while British officials
railed against enthusiastic prodigality as they shipped huge grain
exports out of the country. Malthuss injunctions against feeding the
poor and hungry because mother nature had not set enough places
at her table were taken up by British viceroys from Lytton to Curzon with methodical and
murderous abandon. Just as in England, poor relief in times of poor harvest was considered a
 slippery slope leading to more permanent forms of relief. In India, Lytton reasoned, The doctrine
that in time of famine the poor are entitled to demand relief . . . would probably lead to the doctrine
that they are entitled to demand relief at all times, and thus the foundation would be laid for a
system of general poor relief, which we cannot contemplate without serious apprehension.58
Ferguson devotes a scant few lines to the disastrous policies pursued by British officials during the
famine years, admitting that free-market policies may have made things worse
than they might have been, but dismissing criticism that the British did
nothing to avert starvation. He rejects the view that their actions can be likened to other
modern genocides on the grounds that Lytton never planned to kill millions of Indians whereas the
Nazi genocide was intentional.63 However , it is difficult to imagine a more
intentional outcome than that pursued by Lytton and Temple: they knew that other
measures were available and that mass starvation could be averted (as
Temple had done previously in Bengal and Bihar) and yet they proceeded to do the
opposite. Indeed, even byMalthusian standards, it was hardly a situation of letting nature run
its course. The reduction of rations, insistence on hard labour, and collection of the land tax could
have no other outcome than drastically increasing mortality rates. Instead of viewing such actions
for what they were intentional acts of imperial genocide the most that Ferguson
can muster is the rhetorical query: But would Indians have been better off under the Mughals? Or
for that matter, under the Dutch or the Russians?64 In fact, there is considerable evidence to
suggest that the Moguls and Marathas did attempt to tailor their rule to fluctuating ecological and
climactic conditions, especially in drought-prone regions. Moreover, as Davis asserts, There is
persuasive evidence that peasants and farm laborers became
dramatically more pregnable to natural disaster after 1850 as their local
economies were violently incorporated into the world market. What
colonial administrators and missionaries perceived as the persistence
of ancient cycles of backwardness were typically modern structures of
formal and informal imperialism.65

Chinese investment in the natural resources, service industry, schools and

hospitals of developing countries all lead to corruption,
exploitation, and colonialism.
Okeowo 13
Alexis Okeowo. 12 June 2013. The New Yorker. CHINA IN AFRICA: THE NEW IMPERIALISTS?. http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/china-in-
africa-the-new-imperialists //JJC
It happened in Zambia like it could happen elsewhere in Africa. Chinese investors made
deals with the government to mine its natural resources, filling federal coffers with billions
of dollars. Chinese immigrants moved into cities and rural towns. They started
construction companies; opened copper, coal, and gem mines; and built hotels and
restaurants, all providing new jobs. They set up schools and hospitals. But then
instances of corruption, labor abuse, and criminal coverups began to set the relationship
between the Chinese and the Africans aflame. The Chinese have managed to accomplish at
least one impressive thing in Africathey have made everyone else uncomfortable. The
Americans are uneasy, worried about (and perhaps jealous of) Chinas rapid and profitable
investments throughout the continent, and the developmental assistance that it has started to
provide in some areas. Europeans have only to look at trade figures: the share of Africas exports
that China receives has shot from one to fifteen per cent over the past decade, while the
European Unions share fell from thirty-six to twenty-three per cent. China is now Africas
largest trading partner. Some Africans have become resentful, though, unhappy with
unbalanced relationships in which China has taken proprietorship of African natural
resources using Chinese labor and equipment without transferring skills and technology.
China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the
essence of colonialism, Lamido Sanusi, the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, wrote in
the Financial Times earlier this year.

Chinese imperialism in Africa empirically causes poverty, human rights

violation, populist riots, and violence.
Okeowo 13
Alexis Okeowo. 12 June 2013. The New Yorker. CHINA IN AFRICA: THE NEW IMPERIALISTS?. http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/china-in-
africa-the-new-imperialists //JJC
The threat (whether real or imagined) of a looming Chinese imperialist presence in Africa has
given way to what has been called resource nationalism, in which countries aim to take
control of the exploitation of their natural resources. But this idea potentially fails to address the fact
that the Chinese in Africa are people, and not just part of a faceless imperialist mass. Ive spoken to Chinese
investors in Zambia who appear to genuinely want to not just make money but integrate into Zambian communities
and run responsible companies. One complained about how immoral businessmen ruin the efforts
of others who want to pay fair wages and keep their workers safe. In Zambia, a copper-rich
country in southern Africa and the beneficiary of the continents third-highest level of Chinese investment, persistent
unemployment and poverty have left Zambians wondering where exactly the fruits of their
governments lucrative deals with the Chinese have gone . President Michael Sata was elected
in 2011 partly thanks to anti-Chinese sentiment (he likened work at Chinese mines to slave labor and
said he would deport any abusive investors), but immediately forged close ties with
Chinese leaders. Still, his government has tried, at least on the surface, to even its playing field with China by
launching criminal proceedings against former government officials who made corrupt deals with the Chinese, and by
reforming the way foreign investors have to do business in Zambia. It is likely that the country will be only the first of
many to do so. The people of Zambia have been complaining, the countrys finance ministry said last
month, about lack of reliable and accurate information on the resources that are generated in the country or which come
from foreign sources, to develop Zambia. Under a new law, the Bank of Zambia will create an electronic reporting and
monitoring system tasked with overseeing the collection of royalties and taxes from foreign investors. Those same
investorswho, the legislation notes, are benefiting from numerous business incentivesare now required to open and
keep active taxable foreign-currency bank accounts. If they export their goods, as the Chinese owners of copper, coal,
and gemstone mines do, they must deposit their profits in Zambia within two months of the date the goods are shipped
abroad. The ministry added, This is the way to go for a country that is so richly endowed with resources but whose
capacity to unroll development to higher echelons has been hampered by poor transparency and accountability practices.
Chinese owners of copper mines in Zambia regularly violate the rights of their employees
by not providing adequate protective gear and insuring safe working conditions, according to a Human Rights
Watch report. When Zambian employees of the Chinese-owned Collum Coal Mine
protested these poor conditions three years ago, their Chinese managers, who said they
feared for their lives, fired gunshots at the miners, injuring thirteen of them . After Chinese
business interests put pressure on the then-government in Lusaka, the director of public prosecutions suddenly dropped
its criminal case against the managers. Last year, renewed protests at Collum led to hundreds of
miners pushing a mine trolley into a Chinese manager. They killed him, and injured two
other Chinese supervisors.

Chinese economic engagement with other countries, especially through

the AIIB and the Yidai Yilu plans, is a textbook example of capitalist
imperialism and exploitation.
Wong 15
Joseph Wong. 31 May 2015. Is China an Imperialist Power? Policy Options. http://policyoptions.irpp.org/2015/05/31/is-china-an-imperialist-power/ //JJC
This year the talk was all about the proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
basically a World Bank-type financial institution centered in Asia for Asian countries and
bankrolled by Asias largest economy, China. As well, the talk in China was about President
Xis one belt, one road (yidai, yilu) economic plan, a revival of the Silk Road economy
that positioned China centuries ago as the center of the global economy. The one belt
alludes to the westward push along the Silk Road route through Central Asia into Europe. The
one road refers to the planned maritime Silk Road southward throughout Southeast Asia. The
one belt, one road plan involves major commercial and infrastructural investments from China
along these belts and roads to facilitate Chinese trade and investment with their western and
southern neighbors. The Chinese government is slated to finance $40 billion US towards this
effort. When asked why the Chinese government is pursuing this strategy, the answers are
all over the place. One argument is that this is Chinas response to Americas pivot to the
Asia-Pacific that is, if the Americans seek to close off Chinas expanding influence in the
Pacific, then China will simply turn to its west and south. Another response one often
hears is that the AIIB and the one belt one road programs represent Chinas big brother
role in the region. China, which insists it remains a developing world country, has
nonetheless developed capacities that it can and indeed should extend to the aid of its
neighbors, such as rails, ports, industrial investment and so on. Drawing on historical
narratives about Chinas role in mobilizing the third world, the one belt, one road plan is a
contemporary extension of Chinas good will to its developmental brethren, as it has done
in parts of Africa. Another explanation about why China is developing the one belt, one road
program is that the Chinese economy, having benefited from years of economic growth and
industrialization, is experiencing overcapacity. Its manufacturers are manufacturing too much.
There is too much capital for Chinas domestic capital markets. As one person explained
it to me: In China, we are producing 100 miles of railway track when we actually only
need 50 miles of it. We need to offload this overcapacity. This sounds like textbook
Lenin. Peel back the development rhetoric and what we seem to have here is textbook
imperialism. Lenin explained, in reference to the imperialist West, that imperialism is the
highest form of capitalism. In Lenins view, monopoly capitalism means that firms (and
hence countries) need to expand and locate elsewhere to mitigate overcapacity. Finance
capital, he argues, has to find other places to invest in. Manufacturing firms, making too
much stuff for domestic markets, need to find other markets to manufacture for. Governments
consequently have to extend their reach beyond their borders so that economic
overcapacity at home does not threaten domestic stability. The example of railway track
in China they make 100 miles but only need 50 miles captures exactly the logic of
imperialism. The line between exploitation and development is razor thin. But what
strikes me is that so many in China do not see this, especially given the countrys Marxist-
Leninist heritage. But then again, I am also reminded that Western powers, in spreading their
economies and civilizing missions with unapologetic zeal, never thought they were imperialists
either.

Chinese investment super-exploits and oppresses not only foreigners but

the Chinese proletariat, and Chinese economic and military growth
only makes imperialism worse
Prbsting 14
Michael Prbsting. Chinas Emergence as an Imperialist Power. NewPolitics Summer 2014 issue. http://newpol.org/content/china%E2%80%99s-emergence-
%E2%80%A8imperialist-power //JJC
To summarize, the continued existence of a strong, centralized Stalinist bureaucracy and
the brutal suppression of Chinas working class enabled the new capitalist ruling class to
subjugate and super-exploit the majority of the countrys massively growing proletariat.
On this basis, capitalistsboth Chinese and foreignwere able to extract huge amounts of
surplus value destined for capital accumulation. While foreign imperialist monopolies
also profited from this super-exploitation of the working class, it was primarily the Chinese
bourgeoisie that benefited. As a result, Chinese capital was able to develop monopolies that
play an important role not only in the domestic market but also increasingly in the world market.
Today Chinas monopolies are among the most important exporters of capital. China is not only
an emerging economic power, but a political and military power as well. It already has the
worlds second largest military budget. In addition, it is the fifth largest nuclear power and
the fifth largest exporter of arms. Thus China has become a capitalist Great Power on an
economic, political, and military level. It is hardly surprising that the United States, the
strongest Great Power until now, fears Chinas rise more than anything else.

Chinese FDI is rapidly growing, leads to imperialism, and destroys local

environment
Prbsting 14
Michael Prbsting. Chinas Emergence as an Imperialist Power. NewPolitics Summer 2014 issue. http://newpol.org/content/china%E2%80%99s-emergence-
%E2%80%A8imperialist-power //JJC
As we have seen above, Chinas monopolies channel a significant proportion of their foreign
investments to semi-colonial countries like Nigeria, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Greece, and
Venezuela. One can conservatively estimate that 800,000 foreign employees of Chinese
corporations are located in semi-colonial countries. While it is true that China still lags
substantially behind the old imperialist powers in outward foreign direct investment stocks,
its role in the semi-colonial countries is rapidly increasing. In 2010, China became the
third-largest investor in Latin America, behind the United States and the Netherlands. Among
other strategic investments like oil companies, Chinese monopolies focus on the control of
vitally important infrastructure projects like ports. For example, China has already invested
$200 million in building a modern port in Gwadar in Pakistans southwestern province of
Baluchistan, whose national minority is severely repressed by the Pakistani state (with the
support of both U.S. and Chinese money and weapons). Another example is the take-over
of Papua New Guineas $1.37 billion Ramu Nickel mine by the China Metallurgical
Construction Corporation (MCC)one of the largest and most profitable of Chinas state-
owned enterprisestogether with three Chinese steel companies. This represents Chinas
largest investment in the South Pacific. During the next twenty years, this mine is expected to
annually produce 31,650 tons of nickel and 3,352 tons of cobalt, all of which will be shipped to
China. Local communities have resisted these projects as strongly as was possible,
because they devastate the area and poison the water. Basamuk Bay located in this
region is in danger of becoming the dumping area for a hundred million tons of tailings
from the Ramu mine over the next two decades. This will destroy the living conditions of
the local population. Similarly, Chinas state-owned shipping giant Cosco recently took
over Greeces largest port, Piraeus, one of the most important ports in the Eastern
Mediterranean region. Cosco signed a 35-year lease and paid $4.2 billion for the rights.
According to reports, Cosco is seeking to transform Piraeus into a much larger port to rival
Rotterdam in the Netherlands, currently the largest European port. It aims to double the traffic at
Piraeus to 3.7 million containers by 2015. Cosco has also recently expanded in Italy, acquiring
the port of Naples.

Chinas economic engagement with developing countries, especially in

Africa, is just imperialism in disguise that imposes Chinas own
problems of authoritarianism and capitalism
Kiwanuka 13
Jenkins Kiwanuka. Is China promoting a new type of economic imperialism?. 22 July 2013. http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/Is-China-promoting-
a-new-type-of-economic-imperialism-/-/689364/1922306/-/15j6rpfz/-/index.html //JJC
It occurs to me that when the history of how China infiltrated Uganda and other African
countries comes to be written, it may not be different from that of the British colonialists, the
Christian missionaries and the Arabs, all of whom came with small gifts and ended up as
political masters and exploiters of our countrys economy. Where the colonialists
brought bibles, guns and textiles to subjugate our indigenous rulers, China is building
stadiums, multi-storey offices, dams and modern highways under the label of grants or
unconditional long-term loans to lure Africa into its sphere of influence. And it is rapidly
succeeding in shoving America off the stage. At first, the developing countries believed that
communist China, with its newly acquired economic power, was genuinely helping them to
develop their own economies and stop their dependency on capitalist donations. But it
now appears that behind Chinas philanthropic initiatives lies a genuine desire by that
country to find new markets for its products and business contracts for its companies. In this
connection, it is surprising that our leaders did not detect Chinas intentions when a visiting
Chinese minister speculated last year that the oil prices would fall in the next 20 years because
other alternative sources of energy such as nuclear and solar power will have been refined. The
Chinese Minister specifically urged President Museveni to move fast in concluding Ugandas oil
agreements with companies that include one from his own country, but it is obvious that he was
simply trying to strike a quick deal under what might turn out to be Chinas new brand of
economic imperialism. The President revealed the Chinese ministers advice at a special
session of the Uganda Parliament at which he explained why he signed oil agreements without
parliamentary approval. There was even a bigger shock when the President revealed that in
search for advice about how Ugandas newly found oil should be handled, he had approached the
late President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). He did not
elaborate, but since Mobutu is notorious for having exploited the DRCs oil and other minerals to
enrich himself and his family, it sounded strange that President Museveni sought his advice about
Ugandas own oil, a highly sensitive issue. During an official visit to Britain 50 years ago, I
toured industries that included a nuclear power plant. Solar energy was also apparently ready
for exploration at the time because the sun was hanging over Britain and other countries from up
there in the sky. Why, if I may ask, have those alternative sources of energy not been refined up
to now, and what guarantee do the Chinese have that those resources will be fully functional in
the next 20 years to bring down the oil prices? The Economist of January 28, 2012, listed many
problems that face China, some of which are similar to those obtaining in todays Uganda.
These include governance by a system thats out of step (obviously undemocratic) with
global norms, the need for a fairer division of the spoils of growth because many people feel
that too little of the countrys wealth is trickling down to them, the land grabs by local officials
which are a huge source of anger, the unrestrained industrialisation which is poisoning
crops and people, and the growing corruption thats causing fury. China is still ruled by a
Communist Party and is hence considered undemocratic by west European standards.
Emphasising the importance of safeguarding human rights, the Economist said Chinas bloody
past has taught the Communist Party to fear chaos above all other problems. This
should be an eye opener to Ugandas leadership in its handling of the opposition within
and outside the ruling party. Major General Kahinda Otafiire and others have talked about
possible solutions, and renegade General David Sejusa recently raised a storm when he hinted
on issues that his bosses feared might disturb Ugandas future stability. The Economist re-
echoed a warning that has become common. It declared that historys other lesson is that
those who cling to absolute power end up with none. I hope Africas leaders are
listening.

The Orientalist representation of engagement directs it towards an

imperialistic interaction of domination of otherized states
Slater 04- expert in US Hegemony and Socialism (David, Geopolitics and the Post-colonial:
Rethinking NorthSouth Relations, International relations, 6/3/04, //QM
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the emergence of the United States as a global power went
together with a projection of notions of civilization, progress, democracy and order that posited a
subordinate place for the societies of the non-West. The powers of expansion and
intervention, both internally in the territorial constitution of the United States itself, and in
a broader transnational mission of Empire, were intimately rooted in a vision of the United
States as a driving force of Western civilization, diffusing its values to the presumed
benefit of other non-Western societies (Cumings 1999). However, while US-modelled notions of
civilization, progress, democracy and order continued to be transmitted in the period after the Second World War, and
remained part of the Americanizing mission, other concepts came to receive greater emphasis. From the 1950s onward
notions of modernization and development came to be more closely associated with the portrayal
of West/non-West encounters, whereas representations of civilization and order, although still
present, as noted above in the Dulles quotation, became less prominent they were no longer the master signifiers they
had been before 1940. At the same time, democracy and order were resituated in a discursive context
organized around the new signifiers of modernization and development. This does not mean, of
course, that these terms had never been deployed before the Second World War, but rather that
their visibility and discursive weight came to assume greater predominance in the post-War
period. The post-War origins of the discourse of development have been dealt with in considerable
detail by Escobar (1995), while Patterson has traced the links between notions of Western civilization
and modernization. Also, recent contributions (for example, Baber 2001 and Blaney & Inayatullah 2002) have
revisited modernization theory in relation to Cold War politics and the conceptualization of international relations. What
therefore still needs to be examined; or more precisely, what constitutes my own perspective? First, in analysing the
continuing intersections between geopolitical power and the cultural representations of
other, non-Western societies, and particularly Latin America in the example of this study, it
is important to keep in mind that the notion of modernization or more specifically
modernization theory came to be closely associated with the nature and direction of US
interventions in the Third World. There was a specificity about this intersection which contrasts with earlier and
later periods and needs to be understood in its geopolitical and historical context. It not only provides another important
example of the interwoven nature of power, politics and representation but also illustrates the changing
dynamic of US power as it impacted on the Third World. Second, from a post-colonial
perspective, and in the specific setting of this chapter, there are two analytical elements
that can be usefully signaled: a) The power to intervene was certainly not unaffected by
the societies in which that invasive power was projected, since, as was noted in the
previous chapter, resistances and oppositions to US hegemony altered the subsequent
modalities of intervention, and this was particularly the case with respect to both the
Cuban Revolution of 1959 and the Vietnam War, set as they were in a broader context of
accelerating geopolitical turbulence. b) The geopolitics of intervention situated as it was in a
Cold War context had an inside and an outside, since the Cold War had its chilling effect on
domestic politics in the United States itself, and the phenomenon of containment culture was
a reflection of the interweaving of international and national concerns.

Representation of philanthropic aid are used to mask US imperialism and

neoliberal domination
Chapman 05- Department of International Studies (Dennis, Blackwell Publishing, US
Hegemony in Latin America and beyond, International Studies Review, JStor)//QM

Is globalization merely
US imperialism masked as the philanthropic diffusion of neoliberalism
into the Third World? In Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations, David Slater-
drawing primarily from the deconstruction methodology of James Derrida (1992), the critical theory of Michel Foucault
The structural theory of World Systems Theory (although Wallerstein is not cited), and the postcolonial
perspectives of a myriad of Latin American schol- ars-argues that it is. More specifically, Slater asserts
that the United States (with the aid of such neoliberal organizations as the International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank, and the World Trade Organization) has sought to liberate the Third World from its indigence for the
purpose of establishing a Southern hemisphere of "quasi-sovereignties " (see Jackson 1996:60) that
can be easily manipulated politically. Slater argues that the neoliberal order creates an
asymmetry of structure that facilitates the dominance of the North over the South in
"a conscious and often violent intervention on the part of [the US] government which
impose[s] market organization on society for non-economic ends" In short, the United States seeks
to use the neoliberal economic order to achieve its political goal of geopolitical
imperialism.

The idea of growth is rooted in imperialism. Instead we need to turn to

local solutions that are centered around the communities in
question.
Henry 12
Simon Reid-Henry. Monday 5 November 2012, The Guardian. Reid-Henry is a lecturer in the
School of Geography at Queen Mary, University of London and a senior fellow at the Peace
Research Institute, Oslo. His latest book is The Cuban Cure: Reason and Resistance in Global
Science. (http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/nov/05/arturo-escobar-post-
development-thinker) //QM

Coming at a time when western universities were in the grip of the postmodern challenge to
systems of knowledge, Escobar's post-development critique sparked considerable debate.
Coming at a time when mainstream development was beginning to incorporate a softer, more
human approach alongside the market-driven solutions of the 1980s, Escobar found ever more
evidence to support his ideas. As he saw it, the more the development industry claimed to be
improving on past practice as it tramped from anti-poverty to pro-poor to basic human needs
approaches the more it continued to fall into the serious trap of imposing a western agenda on
others.
But if the first finger that people lift to help is on a hand destined to meddle, what are those who
wish to see a fairer world to do? While some anti-development writers have encouraged a back-
to-the-soil populism in response, Escobar's answer is again a good deal more sophisticated. For
him the answer lies in creating space intellectual first and foremost for "local agency" to assert
itself. In practice this means one of two things:
First, it means encouraging local communities and traditions rooted in local identities to address
their own problems. Not buying into the western development agenda does not mean denying
that some societies lack both resources and power relative to others. This was an argument that
Escobar developed in dialogue with feminist scholars like Vandana Shiva, and it can be found
today in such initiatives as the Buen Vivir moment in Latin America.
Second, and related to this first, it means criticising any existing distortions economic or political
that limit peoples' ability to develop. Escobar has therefore been highly critical of free trade
zones, such as the maquiladoras in Mexico, or what is happening on a vaster scale in parts of
China. Instead, he points to a politics of "degrowth" as a way of addressing some of these
distortions.

First, The pursuit of modern economics and US engagement has at its root
in domination and coloniality. This perpetuates total war throughout
the war in the pursuit of a plan. Worse, modern coloniality cannot
solve the problems of the world Its outdated and works to
reproduce the nation again and again, in reproductive
heteronormativity
Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution
to postdevelopment theory and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality,
Global Coloniality, and Anti-Globalization Social Movements,
http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13. //QM

Modernitys ability to provide solutions to modern problems has been increasingly compromised.
In fact, it can be argued that there are no modern solutions to many of todays problems (Santos,
2002; Leff, 1998; Escobar, 2003b). This is clearly the case, for instance, with massive
displacement and ecological destruction, but also developments inability to fulfill its promise of a
minimum of wellbeing for the worlds people. At the basis of this modern incapacity lie both a
hyper-technification of rationality and a hyper-marketization of social life what Santos (2002)
refers to as the increasing incongruence of the functions of social emancipation and social
regulation. The result is an oppressive globality in which manifold forms of violence
increasingly take on the function of regulation of peoples and economies. This feature has
become central to the neo-liberal approach of the American empire (even more so after the
March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq). This modernist attempt at combating the symptoms but
not the cause of the social, political and ecological crises of the times results in multiple cruel
little wars in which the control of territories, people and resources is at stake (Joxe,
2002). Regimes of selective inclusion and hyper-exclusion of heightened poverty for the many
and skyrocketing wealth for the fewoperating through spatial-military logics, create a situation
of widespread social fascism. The ever widening territories and peoples subjected to precarious
living conditions under social fascism suggest the continued validity of a certain notion of a Third
World, although not reducible to strict geographical parameters. In short, the modern crisis is a
crisis in models of thought, and modern solutions, at least under neo-liberal globalization (NLG),
only deepen the problems. Moving beyond or outside modernity thus becomes a sine qua non
for imagining after the third world.
US imperial influence over Asia is rooted in military and strategic
advantages
Bello 98
10/3/98 U.S. Imperialism in the Asia-PacificWalden Bello is a senior analyst of Focus and a
representative in the 14th and 15th congress of the Republic of the Philippines. A 2003 recipient
of the prestigious nobel alternative Right Livelihood award, Walden is considered the most
respected anti-globalization thinker in Asia by the Belgian newspaper "Le Soir". Walden together
with UNDP senior adviser Kamal Malhotra, founded Focus in 1995.
(http://focusweb.org/node/342) //QM

The hundredth anniversary of the United States bursting into the Asia Pacific as an imperial
power provides an opportunity to look more deeply at an imperialism that continues to be
extremely dynamic. When the U.S. erupted into Asia, grabbing the Philippines from Spain in
1898, it was clear that this was not an old-style imperial power. The U.S. had itself emerged from
an anti-colonial war against Great Britain a little over a century earlier, and this fact of its birth
would greatly determine its ideology and practice of imperialism.
Ideology would play an important role in the U.S. imperial enterprise, far greater than it did with
the European colonial powers where mission civilatrice, as in the case of France, was an
afterthought, an obvious fig leaf for economic interests. Imperialism had to be legitimized to the
American people. The emergence of the "Anti-Imperialist League" in the late 1800s with which
Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain) was associated served as a warning that neither the rationale of
christianizing the Catholic heathens of the Philippines articulated by President McKinley, nor that
of Manifest Destiny promoted by Albert Beveridge would do.
Following the ruthless pacification of the Philippines, the U.S. establishment gradually settled on
a justification of colonialism: the export of democracy and the preparation of the Filipino people
for responsible independence. This was not simply propaganda. This justification brought the
colonial enterprise into line with U.S. political values, thus preserving its legitimacy in the eyes of
the American people. The idealist dimension to U.S. imperialism served to legitimize but also
functioned as a source of tension and unpredictability. Indeed, U.S. imperialism developed into a
complex phenomenon, where the cultural ideological dimension coexisted with two other
relatively autonomous drives: the extension of the strategic reach of the U.S. state and the
expansionist dynamic of U,S. economic interests.
Imperialism is often explained primarily as an outcome of economic expansionism. This is
certainly the case in Latin America, where, for example, in the cases of United Fruit in Guatemala
and International Telephone and Telegraph ITT in Chile, political and military initiatives were
undertaken largely to support the interests of particular corporations and to create the political
climate for the expansion of U.S. economic interests as a whole.
Asia was different. In Asia, U.S. strategic interests were paramount. In contrast to Latin America,
commercial rationales were formulated to support the extension of the strategic reach of the U.S.
state. This was true as far back as 1853, when Commodore Matthew Perry brought his ships to
Tokyo Bay to open Japan up to commerce.
It was not unusual that a naval officer rather than a merchant forced Japan to open. In the U.S.s
century-long drive to the western Pacific, trade followed the flag more frequently than the flag
followed trade. In 1898, when the U.S. made its 8,000 mile leap to the Philippines, less than 10%
of U.S. trade crossed the Pacific, whereas 60% crossed the Atlantic. China, Korea, and Japan
were sources of exotic imports rather than significant exports. Investments in the region were
negligible. As Griswold said, "American capital for the exploitation of China [was] being raised
with difficulty."
What lay behind the great leap westward was not a business cabal but a strategic lobby of naval
and political expansionists mainly interested in extending the reach of the U.S. state.
Entrepreneurs operating in Hawaii, the Philippines, China and the interstices of the dominant
European empires vociferously supported the expansion, but they did not constitute the center for
U.S. business. That center was in New York and oriented far more towards Europe than Asia. The
U.S. Navy became particularly adept at invoking a commercial rationale to promote U.S. strategic
extension, and its own role as the cutting edge of that mission. Acquiring bases in the far reaches
of the Pacific would, among other things, provide a powerful impetus to the creation of the "two-
ocean navy." The two-ocean navy was considered necessary to achieve the goal of maritime
supremacy envisioned by the fleets leading strategic thinker, Captain Alfred Mahan.

The South China Sea is inextricably linked to imperialism

Leupp 15 (Gary, Professor of History at Tufts University, Fishing in Troubled Waters: the U.S.
Pushback Against Chinas Claims in the South China Sea,
http://www.kasamaproject.org/2015/11/imperialism-understanding-us-military-maneuvers-in-the-
south-china-sea/)
But maybe whats going on in the South China Sea is best understood in terms of old-fashioned
capitalist competition. Theres a lobby in Washington urging confrontation with China as a good in
itself. Chinas now the number one investor in African mineral resources. Its arguably morphed
from a socialist republic into a capitalist-imperialist state different from, but in some ways
fundamentally similar to, the U.S.

The cause of South China Sea threats is rooted in economic imperialism

Leupp 15 (Gary, Professor of History at Tufts University, Fishing in Troubled Waters: the U.S.
Pushback Against Chinas Claims in the South China Sea,
http://www.kasamaproject.org/2015/11/imperialism-understanding-us-military-maneuvers-in-the-
south-china-sea/)
I dont think island militarization is the issue. I think the cause of mounting South China Sea
(and East China Sea) tension is more fundamental. The U.S. is not concerned with the
construction of artificial islands (in a broader or narrower definition), or even with Chinas claims
to a 12-mile territorial waters limit around some islands, so much as with Chinas rise as a global
economic competitor.

Economic and diplomatic engagement with China is a flawed discussion

it has its roots in imperialism, violence, and militarism, and the
current South China Sea conflict is a conflict of imperialism
Leupp 15 (Gary, Professor of History at Tufts University, Fishing in Troubled Waters: the U.S.
Pushback Against Chinas Claims in the South China Sea,
http://www.kasamaproject.org/2015/11/imperialism-understanding-us-military-maneuvers-in-the-
south-china-sea/)
The story got attention, not because anyone knew what CNAS was, but because it combined its
hawkish recommendation with the statement, Diplomacy and economic engagement with China
will work better when backed by a credible military posture . So the U.S. is to strengthen its
military posture in the South China Seato augment peace and stability there? There, where
the U.S. has no territorial claims. There in that sea, where the PRC, ROC, Vietnam, Philippines,
Malaysia and Brunei all occupy and claim islands. Therewhere the PRC and Vietnam have both
converted reefs to islands through reclamation, in order to build structures including military
runwaysthe U.S. wants to strengthen its military posture. Why? There has not, in fact, actually
been a huge naval buildup (such as suggested by CNAS) since 2012. But from that year the U.S.
has maintained a military base in Australias Northern Territory, facing the South China Sea. 2500
troops are currently stationed here. Lim Lobe calls this deal with Australia the first long term
expansion of the US military presence in the Asia/Pacific region since the Vietnam War. In April
2014 Daniel Russel, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, threatened the PRC with
sanctions (like those the U.S. had applied to Russia) to put more pressure on China to
demonstrate that it remains committed to the peaceful resolution of the problems in the South
China Sea. In May 2015 Obama accused China of using its sheer size and muscle to pursue its
South China Sea claims versus Vietnam and the Philippines. In the same month a CNN team
was given exclusive access to join a surveillance flight over contested waters in the South
China Sea which the Pentagon allowed for the first time in order to raise awareness about the
challenge posed by the islands and the U.S. response. Think of that. The Pentagon was letting
the free press tell you about how important these islands are to the U.S., where the Chinese are
so intent on challenging us. The breathless embedded reporterhonored no doubt by the
Pentagons trustadded: They have learned that the Chinese are themselves displeased by this
U.S. pushback. So: here CNN glorifies U.S. aerial surveillance over Chinese-claimed territory,
embraces (unthinkingly) the notion that China challenges the U.S. in the South China Sea, and
depicts these flights as a U.S. pushbacksome sort of rational response to a provocation. How
many hundreds of years ago did this provocation (by China, of the United States) begin? With
that Buddhist monastery during the Han period, when the ancestors of what became North
American Anglo-Saxons were worshipping Wodin in the German forests? When did the Chinese
start getting uppity with the U.S. over the South China Sea? The need for pushbacks occurred
only recently, as it turns out. As China presses its claimsso far mainly through PR exercises
Washington has adopted the policy of what Beijing used to call fishing in troubled waters.)
Class struggles are the root cause of imperialism
Harvey 04 (David, Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate
Center of the City University of New York, THE NEW IMPERIALISM: ACCUMULATION BY
DISPOSSESSION, Socialist Register, 2004)//BW
In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel notes how the inner dialectic of bourgeois society, producing an
overaccumulation of wealth at one pole and a rabble of paupers at the other, drives it to seek
solutions through external trade and colonial/imperial practices. He rejects the idea that there
might be ways to solve the problem of social inequality and instability through internal
mechanisms of redistribution.10 Lenin quotes Cecil Rhodes as saying that colonialism and
imperialism abroad were the only possible way to avoid civil war at home.11 Class relations and
struggles within a territorially bounded social formation drive impulses to seek a spatio-temporal
fix elsewhere. The evidence from the end of the nineteenth century is here of interest. Joseph
Chamberlain (Radical Joe as he was known) was closely identified with the liberal manufacturing
interests of Birmingham, and was initially opposed to imperialism (in the Afghan Wars of the
1850s, for example). He devoted himself to educational reform and improvements in the social
and physical infrastructures for production and consumption in his home city of Birmingham. This
provided, he thought, a productive outlet for surpluses that would be repaid in the long run. An
important figure within the liberal conservative movement, he saw the rising tide of class struggle
in Britain at first hand and in 1885 made a celebrated speech in which he called for the propertied
classes to take cognizance of their responsibilities to society (i.e. to better the conditions of life of
the least well off and invest in social and physical infrastructures in the national interest) rather
than solely to promote their individual rights as property owners. The uproar that followed on the
part of the propertied classes forced him to recant and from that moment on he turned to be the
most ardent advocate for imperialism (ultimately, as Colonial Secretary, leading Britain into the
disaster of the Boer War). This career trajectory was quite common for the period. Jules Ferry in
France, an ardent supporter of internal reform, particularly education, in the 1860s, took to
colonial advocacy after the Commune of 1871 (leading France into the mire of Southeast Asia
that culminated in defeat at Dien Bien-Phu in 1954); Crispi sought to solve the land problem in the
Italian south through colonization in Africa; and even Theodore Roosevelt in the United States
turned, after Frederic Jackson Turner declared, erroneously, at least as far as investment
opportunities were concerned, that the American Frontier was closed, to support imperial policies
rather than internal reforms.12 In all of these cases, the turn to a liberal form of imperialism (and
one that had attached to it an ideology of progress and of a civilizing mission) resulted not from
absolute economic imperatives but from the political unwillingness of the bourgeoisie to give up
any of its class privileges, thus blocking the possibility of absorbing overaccumulation through
social reform at home. The fierce opposition by the owners of capital to any politics of
redistribution or internal social amelioration in the United States today likewise leaves the country
no option but to look outwards for solutions to its economic difficulties. Internal class politics of
this sort forced many European powers to look outwards to solve their problems from 1884 to
1945, and this gave a specific coloration to the forms that European imperialism then took. Many
liberal and even radical figures became proud imperialists during these years and much of the
working-class movement was persuaded to support the imperial project as essential to their well-
being. This required, however, that bourgeois interests should thoroughly command state policy,
ideological apparatuses and military power. Arendt therefore interprets this Euro-centric
imperialism, correctly in my view, as the first stage in political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than
the last stage of capitalism as Lenin depicted it.13 I will consider this idea further in the
conclusion.

Free trade leads to economic imperialism

Harvey 04 (David, Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate
Center of the City University of New York, THE NEW IMPERIALISM: ACCUMULATION BY
DISPOSSESSION, Socialist Register, 2004)//BW
There are two major points to be made about this system. First, free trade in commodities is often
depicted as opening up the world to free and open competition. But this whole argument fails, as
Lenin long ago pointed out, in the face of monopoly or oligopoly power (either in production or
consumption). The US, for example, has repeatedly used the weapon of denial of access to the
huge US market to force other nations to comply with its wishes. The most recent (and crass)
example of this line of argument comes from the US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick to the
effect that if Lula, the newly elected Workers Party President of Brazil, does not go along with US
plans for free markets in the Americas, he would find himself having to export to Antarctica.19
Taiwan and Singapore were forced to sign on to the WTO, and thereby open their financial
markets to speculative capital, in the face of US threats to deny them access to the US market. At
US Treasury insistence, South Korea was forced to do the same as a condition for an IMF bail-
out in 1998. The US now plans to attach a condition of financial institutional compatibility to the
foreign aid it offers as challenge grants to poor countries. On the production side, oligopolies
largely based in the core capitalist regions, effectively control the production of seeds, fertilizers,
electronics, computer software, pharmaceutical products, petroleum products and much more.
Under these conditions, the creation of new market openings does not open up competition but
merely creates opportunities to proliferate monopoly powers with all manner of social, ecological,
economic and political consequences. The fact that nearly two-thirds of foreign trade is now
accounted for by transactions within and between the main transnational corporations is
indicative of the situation. Even something as seemingly benevolent as the Green Revolution has,
most commentators agree, paralleled the increased agricultural outputs with considerable
concentrations of wealth in the agrarian sector and higher levels of dependency upon
monopolized inputs throughout South and East Asia. The penetration of the China market by US
tobacco companies is set fair to compensate for their losses in the US market at the same time
as it will surely generate a public health crisis in China for decades to come. In all of these
respects, the claims generally made that neoliberalism is about open competition rather than
monopoly control or limited competition within oligopolistic structures, turn out to be fraudulent,
masked as usual by the fetishism of market freedoms. Free trade does not mean fair trade.

Now is key to solve for imperialism

Harvey 04 (David, Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate
Center of the City University of New York, THE NEW IMPERIALISM: ACCUMULATION BY
DISPOSSESSION, Socialist Register, 2004)//BW
The shape and form any new imperialism will take is therefore up for grabs. The only thing that is
certain is that we are in the midst of a major transition in how the global system works and that
there is a variety of forces in motion which could easily tip the balance in one or another direction.
The balance between accumulation by dispossession and expanded reproduction has already
shifted towards the former and it is hard to see this trend doing anything other than deepening,
making this the hallmark of what the new imperialism is all about (and making overt claims about
the new imperialism and the necessity of empire of great ideological significance). We also know
that the economic trajectory taken by Asia is key, but that military dominance still lies with the
United States. This, as Arrighi remarks, is a unique configuration and we may well be seeing in
Iraq the first stage of how it might play out geopolitically on the world stage under conditions of
generalized recession. The United States, whose hegemony was based on production, finance
and military power in the immediate post-war period lost its superiority in production after 1970
and may well now be losing financial dominance leaving it with military might alone. What
happens within the United States is therefore a vitally important determinant of how the new
imperialism might be articulated. And there is, to boot, a gathering storm of opposition to the
deepening of accumulation by dispossession. But the forms of class struggle which this provokes
are of a radically different nature from the classic proletarian struggles within expanded
reproduction (which continue though in somewhat more muted forms) upon which the future of
socialism was traditionally supposed to rest. The unities beginning to emerge around these
different vectors of struggle are vital to nurture, for within them we can discern the lineaments of
an entirely different, non-imperialistic, form of globalization that emphasizes social well-being and
humanitarian goals coupled with creative forms of uneven geographical development, rather than
the glorification of money power, stock market values and the incessant accumulation of capital
across the variegated spaces of the global economy by whatever means, but always ending up
heavily concentrated in a few spaces of extraordinary wealth. The moment may be full of volatility
and uncertainties; but that means it is also a moment of the unexpected and full of potential.

Key to combating orientalism and imperialism is discussion centered

around understanding issues as an intellectual challenge.
Said 78
Orientalism is a 1978 book by Edward W. Said, Said was a Palestinian literary theoretician,
professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public
intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies. //QM
My idea in Orientalism is to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce
a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-
stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent
collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. I have called what I try to
do humanism, a word I continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by
sophisticated postmodern critics. By humanism I mean first of all attempting to dissolve Blakes
mind-forgd manacles so as to be able to use ones mind historically and rationally for the
purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. Moreover, humanism is sustained
by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking,
therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist.

US imperial influence over Asia is rooted in military and strategic

advantages
Bello 98
10/3/98 U.S. Imperialism in the Asia-PacificWalden Bello is a senior analyst of Focus and a
representative in the 14th and 15th congress of the Republic of the Philippines. A 2003 recipient
of the prestigious nobel alternative Right Livelihood award, Walden is considered the most
respected anti-globalization thinker in Asia by the Belgian newspaper "Le Soir". Walden together
with UNDP senior adviser Kamal Malhotra, founded Focus in 1995.
(http://focusweb.org/node/342) //QM
The hundredth anniversary of the United States bursting into the Asia Pacific as an imperial
power provides an opportunity to look more deeply at an imperialism that continues to be
extremely dynamic. When the U.S. erupted into Asia, grabbing the Philippines from Spain in
1898, it was clear that this was not an old-style imperial power. The U.S. had itself emerged from
an anti-colonial war against Great Britain a little over a century earlier, and this fact of its birth
would greatly determine its ideology and practice of imperialism.
Ideology would play an important role in the U.S. imperial enterprise, far greater than it did with
the European colonial powers where mission civilatrice, as in the case of France, was an
afterthought, an obvious fig leaf for economic interests. Imperialism had to be legitimized to the
American people. The emergence of the "Anti-Imperialist League" in the late 1800s with which
Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain) was associated served as a warning that neither the rationale of
christianizing the Catholic heathens of the Philippines articulated by President McKinley, nor that
of Manifest Destiny promoted by Albert Beveridge would do.
Following the ruthless pacification of the Philippines, the U.S. establishment gradually settled on
a justification of colonialism: the export of democracy and the preparation of the Filipino people
for responsible independence. This was not simply propaganda. This justification brought the
colonial enterprise into line with U.S. political values, thus preserving its legitimacy in the eyes of
the American people. The idealist dimension to U.S. imperialism served to legitimize but also
functioned as a source of tension and unpredictability. Indeed, U.S. imperialism developed into a
complex phenomenon, where the cultural ideological dimension coexisted with two other
relatively autonomous drives: the extension of the strategic reach of the U.S. state and the
expansionist dynamic of U,S. economic interests.
Imperialism is often explained primarily as an outcome of economic expansionism. This is
certainly the case in Latin America, where, for example, in the cases of United Fruit in Guatemala
and International Telephone and Telegraph ITT in Chile, political and military initiatives were
undertaken largely to support the interests of particular corporations and to create the political
climate for the expansion of U.S. economic interests as a whole.
Asia was different. In Asia, U.S. strategic interests were paramount. In contrast to Latin America,
commercial rationales were formulated to support the extension of the strategic reach of the U.S.
state. This was true as far back as 1853, when Commodore Matthew Perry brought his ships to
Tokyo Bay to open Japan up to commerce.
It was not unusual that a naval officer rather than a merchant forced Japan to open. In the U.S.s
century-long drive to the western Pacific, trade followed the flag more frequently than the flag
followed trade. In 1898, when the U.S. made its 8,000 mile leap to the Philippines, less than 10%
of U.S. trade crossed the Pacific, whereas 60% crossed the Atlantic. China, Korea, and Japan
were sources of exotic imports rather than significant exports. Investments in the region were
negligible. As Griswold said, "American capital for the exploitation of China [was] being raised
with difficulty."
What lay behind the great leap westward was not a business cabal but a strategic lobby of naval
and political expansionists mainly interested in extending the reach of the U.S. state.
Entrepreneurs operating in Hawaii, the Philippines, China and the interstices of the dominant
European empires vociferously supported the expansion, but they did not constitute the center for
U.S. business. That center was in New York and oriented far more towards Europe than Asia. The
U.S. Navy became particularly adept at invoking a commercial rationale to promote U.S. strategic
extension, and its own role as the cutting edge of that mission. Acquiring bases in the far reaches
of the Pacific would, among other things, provide a powerful impetus to the creation of the "two-
ocean navy." The two-ocean navy was considered necessary to achieve the goal of maritime
supremacy envisioned by the fleets leading strategic thinker, Captain Alfred Mahan.
NEGATIVE
K LINKS
 Cap
Any analysis of poverty that avoids discussion of breaking down
capitalism will fail and only re-entrenches Cap
Jones 07
Professor at the Stanford Department of English, (Gavin, Tqqhe Problem of Poverty
in Literary Criticism, Princeton University Press 2007, http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i8511.pdf)

Most typical is the way that poverty enters as a subcategory, or as an occasional series of
references, within studies of writing by women or by racial/ethnic minorities, and within studies of social class in
literature. Stacy Morgans Rethinking Social Realism (2004), for example, shows how African American
writers and graphic artists confronted the psychological strain of poverty, as a disruption to
radicalized working-class consciousness, alongside their more pervasive consideration of
racial injustice (Morgan is one of the few literary scholars who makes poverty an entry in her index).20 Amy
Langs The Syntax of Class (2003) refers throughout to the power of poverty to determine the
class positions of characters, yet the book remains mostly interested in the ways that
social class, as a broader category of identity, interacts with gender and, to a lesser extent, with race.
Langs study adds to a strong critical focus on domesticity as the locus of U.S. class consciousness, which
tends to emphasize how the middle class anxiously constructed itself against representations of the working
classes. Within this literature on class, however, the referencing of poverty has often remained
vague and has refused to coalesce into a focused and specific analysis , as we shall see.
Critics have tended to discuss representations of human subjects understood to be poor
without explicitly targeting or debating poverty as a distinct form of socioeconomic
suffering (a point that can apply to primary texts as well). Why has an overwhelming concern with the socially
marginalized emerged without a sufficient framework in which to situate an explicit discussion of material
deprivation? The answers, I suggest, lie both within the characteristics of contemporary critical methodologies,
and within the nature and difficulty of poverty itself as a category. The obvious reason for the neglect
of poverty lies in the notorious downgrading of class as a category of literary analysis,
which reflects the silencing of working-class consciousness and the masking of class
segregation in American society.21 In their unusually statistical analysis of the breadth of articles that
have appeared in American Quarterly since its inception in 1949, Larry Griffin and Maria Tempenis conclude
that there is a long-standing bias in American studies toward the multicultural questions of
gender, race, and ethnicity at the expense of analyses of social classan emphasis on
questions of identity and representation rather than on those of social structural position .
Griffin and Tempenis argue that disciplinary borders within American-studies scholarship have hampered
engagement with social-science methodologies that have maintained an emphasis on socioeconomics.22 Writing
in the early 1990s, John Carlos Rowe makes a similar point. Methodologies divide social theorists, who have
emphasized changing class divisions since World War II, and postmodern critical theorists for whom the
concept of class has become almost an embarrassment in its maintenance of rigid Marxist distinctions. 23 If the
1980s saw an explosion of interest in race and gender (ironically, Rowes own book, At Emersons Tomb,
analyzes the politics of classic American literature almost solely from the perspectives of race and gender), then
the 1990s saw the emergence of the nation as a category that some critics describe as threatening to displace
class altogether from the front line of critical analysis.24 The theoretical and critical movement now to decenter
the nation itself in an effort to think transnationally may have originated from social theories of globalized
capital, yet the greatest influence on literary scholarship has been work that stresses not global inequity but the
international flow of cultural commodities and ethnic identities.25 Rimstead has even argued that postcolonial
modes of criticism have tended to place perceptions of poverty outside the developed world.26 At the very least,
the theoretical unsettling of the nation as a unit of analysis can act to distract attention from the social
experience of class difference, and can neutralize awareness of the state as the domain of welfare and the
regulator of social resources by which economic inequities get maintained or reduced

Class struggles are the root cause of imperialism

Harvey 04 (David, Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate
Center of the City University of New York, THE NEW IMPERIALISM: ACCUMULATION BY
DISPOSSESSION, Socialist Register, 2004)//BW
In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel notes how the inner dialectic of bourgeois society, producing an
overaccumulation of wealth at one pole and a rabble of paupers at the other, drives it to seek
solutions through external trade and colonial/imperial practices. He rejects the idea that there
might be ways to solve the problem of social inequality and instability through internal
mechanisms of redistribution.10 Lenin quotes Cecil Rhodes as saying that colonialism and
imperialism abroad were the only possible way to avoid civil war at home.11 Class relations and
struggles within a territorially bounded social formation drive impulses to seek a spatio-temporal
fix elsewhere. The evidence from the end of the nineteenth century is here of interest. Joseph
Chamberlain (Radical Joe as he was known) was closely identified with the liberal manufacturing
interests of Birmingham, and was initially opposed to imperialism (in the Afghan Wars of the
1850s, for example). He devoted himself to educational reform and improvements in the social
and physical infrastructures for production and consumption in his home city of Birmingham. This
provided, he thought, a productive outlet for surpluses that would be repaid in the long run. An
important figure within the liberal conservative movement, he saw the rising tide of class struggle
in Britain at first hand and in 1885 made a celebrated speech in which he called for the propertied
classes to take cognizance of their responsibilities to society (i.e. to better the conditions of life of
the least well off and invest in social and physical infrastructures in the national interest) rather
than solely to promote their individual rights as property owners. The uproar that followed on the
part of the propertied classes forced him to recant and from that moment on he turned to be the
most ardent advocate for imperialism (ultimately, as Colonial Secretary, leading Britain into the
disaster of the Boer War). This career trajectory was quite common for the period. Jules Ferry in
France, an ardent supporter of internal reform, particularly education, in the 1860s, took to
colonial advocacy after the Commune of 1871 (leading France into the mire of Southeast Asia
that culminated in defeat at Dien Bien-Phu in 1954); Crispi sought to solve the land problem in the
Italian south through colonization in Africa; and even Theodore Roosevelt in the United States
turned, after Frederic Jackson Turner declared, erroneously, at least as far as investment
opportunities were concerned, that the American Frontier was closed, to support imperial policies
rather than internal reforms.12 In all of these cases, the turn to a liberal form of imperialism (and
one that had attached to it an ideology of progress and of a civilizing mission) resulted not from
absolute economic imperatives but from the political unwillingness of the bourgeoisie to give up
any of its class privileges, thus blocking the possibility of absorbing overaccumulation through
social reform at home. The fierce opposition by the owners of capital to any politics of
redistribution or internal social amelioration in the United States today likewise leaves the country
no option but to look outwards for solutions to its economic difficulties. Internal class politics of
this sort forced many European powers to look outwards to solve their problems from 1884 to
1945, and this gave a specific coloration to the forms that European imperialism then took. Many
liberal and even radical figures became proud imperialists during these years and much of the
working-class movement was persuaded to support the imperial project as essential to their well-
being. This required, however, that bourgeois interests should thoroughly command state policy,
ideological apparatuses and military power. Arendt therefore interprets this Euro-centric
imperialism, correctly in my view, as the first stage in political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than
the last stage of capitalism as Lenin depicted it.13 I will consider this idea further in the
conclusion.

Unchecked capitalism leads to economic imperialism

Harvey 04 (David, Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate
Center of the City University of New York, THE NEW IMPERIALISM: ACCUMULATION BY
DISPOSSESSION, Socialist Register, 2004)//BW
There are two major points to be made about this system. First, free trade in commodities is often
depicted as opening up the world to free and open competition. But this whole argument
fails, as Lenin long ago pointed out, in the face of monopoly or oligopoly power (either in
production or consumption). The US, for example, has repeatedly used the weapon of denial of access to the
huge US market to force other nations to comply with its wishes. The most recent (and crass) example
of this line of argument comes from the US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick to the
effect that if Lula, the newly elected Workers Party President of Brazil, does not go along
with US plans for free markets in the Americas, he would find himself having to export to
Antarctica.19 Taiwan and Singapore were forced to sign on to the WTO, and thereby
open their financial markets to speculative capital, in the face of US threats to deny them
access to the US market. At US Treasury insistence, South Korea was forced to do the same as a
 The US now plans to attach a condition of financial
condition for an IMF bail-out in 1998.
institutional compatibility to the foreign aid it offers as challenge grants to poor countries.
On the production side, oligopolies largely based in the core capitalist regions, effectively control the production
of seeds, fertilizers, electronics, computer software, pharmaceutical products, petroleum products and much
more. Under these conditions, the creation of new market openings does not open up
competition but merely creates opportunities to proliferate monopoly powers with all
manner of social, ecological, economic and political consequences . The fact that nearly two-
thirds of foreign trade is now accounted for by transactions within and between the main transnational
corporations is indicative of the situation. Even something as seemingly benevolent as the Green Revolution
has, most commentators agree, paralleled the increased agricultural outputs with considerable concentrations
of wealth in the agrarian sector and higher levels of dependency upon monopolized inputs throughout South
and East Asia. The penetration of the China market by US tobacco companies is set fair to
compensate for their losses in the US market at the same time as it will surely generate a
public health crisis in China for decades to come. In all of these respects, the claims generally
made that neoliberalism is about open competition rather than monopoly control or limited competition within
oligopolistic structures, turn out to be fraudulent, masked as usual by the fetishism of market freedoms. Free
trade does not mean fair trade.
 Fem
Issues devoid of gender are a clear indicator of hegemonic masculinity;
this has created a situation where masculine is the norm.
Kronsell 06, Annica Kronsell: Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Lund,
edited by Brooke A. Ackerly: Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at
Vanderbilt University, Maria Stern: Lecturer and Researcher at the Department of Peace and
Development Research, Goteborg University, and Jacqui True: Senior Lecturer in the Department
of Political Studies at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, Feminist Methodologies of
International Relations, 2006, Cambridge University p. 109
I became interested in what Hearn and Parker (2001: xii) call the silent unspoken, not necessarily easily observable, but
fundamentally material reality" of institutions. Silence on gender is a determining characteristic of
institutions of hegemonic masculinity and this is a key point. It indicates a normality and simply "how
things are." men are the standards of normality, equated with what it is to be human , while this is not
spelled out (Connell 1995: 212). Hegemonic masculinity "naturalizes the everyday practices of
gendered identities" (Peterson and True 1998: 21). This has led to the rather perplexing situation in
which "men are persons and there is no gender but the feminine (Butler 1990: 19). Hence, masculinity
is not a gender; it is the norm. It should be noted that in the Swedish context, this masculinity norm derives from a
standard associated with white, heterosexual, male bodies. What I focus on is the normality, reproduced within
organizations and how that can be approached methodologically. The goal is to problematize
masculinities and the hegemony of men (cf. Zalgwski 1998a: 1). This is a risky enterprise because
masculine norms, when hegemonic, are never really a topic of discussion. They remain hidden - silenced
yet continue to be affirmed in the daily practice of the institutions. Kathy Ferguson (1993: 8), for one, suggests
we challenge that which is widely acceptable, unified, and natural, and instead perceive it as being in need of explanation.
Breaking the silence is to question what seems self-explanatory and turn it into a research puzzle ,
in a sense, by making the familiar strange . It means giving the self-explanatory a history and a context. Cynthia
Enloe (2004; 1993) encourages feminists to use curiosity to ask challenging questions about what
appear as normal, everyday banalities in order to try to understand and make visible, for example, as
she does, the gender of` international relations (IR) both as theory and as practice. The first step is to
question even the most banal or taken-asgiven of everyday practices of world politics . In her
study on womens collective political organizing in Sweden, Maud Eduards (2002: 157) writes that the most
forbidden act" in terms of gender relations is to name men as a political category, which transfers
men from a universal nothing to a specific something. If this is so, how can we actually study such silences?
What are the methods by which we can transcend this silence on gender?
FRAMING
 Util Inevitable
Utilitarianism inevitable even in deontological frameworks
Green, 02 Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua,
November 2002 "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do
About It", 314)
Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which.
If thats what we mean by 302 balancing rights, then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve
moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but
dogmatism all the same. However, its likely that when some people talk about balancing
competing rights and obligations they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their
use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of
people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: It doesnt matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his
death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!19 That is why angry protesters say things like, Animals
Have Rights, Too! rather than, Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits! Once again,
rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer . But sometimes
rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands
of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the rights of those children. One finds
oneself balancing the rights on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to
sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day ones underlying
thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss . And whats
wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there
really are rights, etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it
represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

Compromising moral values and trading off for other injustices proves
deontology is impossible
Spragens 2K Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University (Thomas A.,
Political Theory and Partisan Politics- "Rationality in Liberal Politics" pg 81-2)
My thesis that all three layers/forms of political association are important in a well-ordered liberal democracy also implies
the untenability of Rawls's argument that agreement regarding norms of social justice is a possible and sufficient way to
overcome the deficiencies of the modus vivendi approach. In the first place, as I have argued in more detail elsewhere,
the fundamental unfairness of life and the presence of gratuitous elements in the moral universe
make it impossible to settle rationally upon a single set of distributive principles as demonstrably
fair (See also, Spragens 1993). Simply put, the problem is that the contingencies of the world ineluctably allocate assets
and sufferings quite unfairly. We can cope with and try to compensate for these "natural injustices," but
only at the price of introducing other elements of unfairness or compromising other moral values .
The other major problem in this context is that real world human beings are not deontologists: their moral
intuitions about distributive justice are permeated and influenced by their moral intuitions about
the' good. The empirical consequence of these two difficulties is the falsification of Rawls's hermeneutic claims about an
overlapping consensus. Rational people of good will with a liberal democratic persuasion will be able
to agree that some possible distributive criteria are morally unacceptable. But, as both experience
and the literature attest, hopes for a convergence of opinion on definitive principles of distributive
justice are chimerical.
 Util Good Prevents Atrocities
We must choose the lesser evil. Utilitarianism limits further atrocities
against civilization.
Issac 02 Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the
Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2,
Ends, Means, and Politics, p. Proquest)
WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would
mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency
in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more
ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression
of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is
only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico,
Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that
the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government
has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the
middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of
people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply
makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to
kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary
injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life . This premise is
inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion.
Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good
society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice
can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something
well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically
necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better
society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be
necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations
our
choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It
is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have
to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a
rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a
righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do?
Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil.
Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means
when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about
the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies.

Moral policy only blocks decision making necessary to limit injustice and
atrocities.
Issac, 02 Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the
Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2,
Ends, Means, and Politics, p. Proquest)
As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military
intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which
intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would
have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power
through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to
ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a
Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and
international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of
global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any
account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at
hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in
which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise
of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to
effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of
power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are
necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not
to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo
Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral
goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal
integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the
achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally
compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is
hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2)
it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of
powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of
politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically
repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and
(3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions;
it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant . Just as the
alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of
communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important,
always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic
and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those
who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
 Util Good Morality
Utilitarianism is the only moral framework and alternatives are
contradictory
Nye, 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Nuclear Ethics pg. 18-19)
The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34
Imagine that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where an army
captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. When you ask the
reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly
innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty
hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will
free the other. Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you.
Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but
preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point of the story is to show the
value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would
refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before
the consequentialist burden? Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? What if killing
or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear
device? At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity
of the self is more important than the lives of countless others? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist
approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the
consequences? Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do
what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth
century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. Now that it may be
literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory .35 Absolutist
ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.
 Util Good Conflicting Values
Only consequentialism can resolve conflicting moral values
Bailey, 97 (James Wood 1997; Oxford University Press; Utilitarianism, institutions, and Justice
pg 9)
A consequentialist moral theory can take account of this variance and direct us in our decision
about whether a plausible right to equality ought to outweigh a plausible right to freedom of
expression. 16 In some circumstances the effects of pornography would surely be malign enough to justify our banning
it, but in others they may be not malign enough to justify any interference in freedom. I? A deontological theory, in
contrast, would be required either to rank the side constraints, which forbid agents from
interfering in the free expression of others and from impairing the moral equality of others, or to
admit defeat and claim that no adjudication between the two rights is possible. The latter
admission is a grave failure since it would leave us no principled resolution of a serious policy
question. But the former conclusion is hardly attractive either. Would we really wish to establish as true for all times and
circumstances a lexical ordering between two side constraints on our actions without careful attention to consequences?
Would we, for instance, really wish to establish that the slightest malign inegalitarian effect traceable to a form of
expression is adequate grounds for an intrusive and costly censorship? Or would we, alternatively, really wish to establish
that we should be prepared to tolerate a society horrible for women and children to live in, for the sake of not allowing any
infringement on the sacred right of free expression?18 Consequentialist accounts can avoid such a
deontological dilemma. In so doing, they show a certain healthy sense of realism about what life
in society is like. In the world outside the theorist's study, we meet trade-offs at every tum. Every
policy we make with some worthy end in Sight imposes costs in terms of diminished achievement
of some other plausibly worthy end. Consequentialism demands that we grapple with these costs
as directly as we can and justify their incurrence. It forbids us to dismiss them with moral
sophistries or to ignore them as if we lived in an ideal world.

Morals and questions of human dignity will constantly conflict making

deontological policy making impossible
Kateb 92 William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Emeritus, Princeton University
(George, Cornell University Press; The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture pg
14-15)
Let us say that a society of rights-based individualism encourages these and other crepuscular activities to become topics
for open and popular discussion; that that fact can be taken as a paradoxical sign of the moral grandness
of such a society, for practically every desire can be honestly admitted and talked about despite
shame or without shame; that a society devoted to rights has no absolutely compelling
arguments, in every case, to prohibit them and that, nevertheless, civilization (democratic or not) so we are trained to
understand it commits us to continue to condemn and prohibit them. The issue must be raised in dismay, and I am not
able to deal with it adequately. Can rights conflict? It is not agreeable to admit that a particular right of one
person may apparently conflict with a different right of someone else. Familiar antagonisms include that
between the rights to a fair trial unprejudiced by excessive publicity and the right of press to
report a story and its background fully, or that between the right to privacy again, the right of the
press to do what it thinks is its work. Though I believe, as I have said, that some rights (including
freedom of the press) are more fundamental than others, in some conflicts no clear priority is likely to
be established and only ad hoc adjustments are desirable. To be sure, although these conflicts
may be less frequent or stark than is claimed by those who are impatient with the rights in
question, conflicts nevertheless take place. This is a fact of life which no appeal to an elaborated theory of
rights can eliminate. If it is a shortcoming in the theory of rights, it is also a shortcoming that no supplementary principle
such as utilitarianism can make good.
 Util Good Best for Policy Making
The impossibility to attain knowledge of every outcome or abuse leaves
utilitarianism as the only option for most rational decision-making
Goodin 95 Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social Sciences at the
Australian National University (Robert E., Cambridge University Press, Utilitarianism As a Public
Philosophy pg 63)
My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public
officials that makes utilitarianism more plausible for them (or, more precisely, makes them adopt a form of
utilitarianism that we would find more acceptable) than private individuals. Before proceeding with that larger argument, I
must therefore say what it is that is so special about public officials and their situations that makes it both more
necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism . Consider, first
the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and
uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices-public and private alike- are made under some degree of uncertainty,
of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on
the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible
choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, at relatively poorly informed as to the
effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are
generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as
a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy
makers to use the utilitarian calculus if they want to use it at all to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing
aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general
rule. But they cannot be sure what the payoff will be to any given individual or on any particular
occasion. Their knowledge of generalities, aggregates and averages is just not sufficiently fine-
grained for that.

Not knowing conditions for each individual or ramifications forces us to

adopt utilitarianism. Policy makers must use in their decision
making
Goodin 95 Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social Sciences at the
Australian National University (Robert E., Cambridge University Press, Utilitarianism As a Public
Philosophy pg 63)
Furthermore, the argument from necessity would continue, the instruments available to public policy-makers
are relatively blunt. They can influence general tendencies, making rather more people behave in certain sorts of
ways rather more often. But perfect compliance is unrealistic. And (building on the previous point) not knowing
particular circumstances of particular individuals, rules and regulations must necessarily be
relatively general in form. They must treat more people more nearly alike than ideally they should,
had we perfect information. The combined effect of these two factors is to preclude public policy-
makers from fine-tuning policies very well at all. They must, of necessity, deal with people in
aggregate, imposing upon them rules that are general in form. Nothing in any of this necessarily
forces them to be utilitarian in their public policy-making, of course. What it does do, however, is
force them- if they are inclined to be utilitarian at all-away from direct (act) utilitarianism. The
circumstances surrounding the selection and implementation of public policies simply do not
permit the more precise calculations required by any decision rule more tailored to peculiarities of
individuals or situations.
 A2: Util/Consequences =Racist
It is racist not to consider consequences the only moral stance is to
consider link turns and long-term effects.
Marc Trachtenberg is professor in the department of history at the University of Pennsylvania.
He also teaches political science courses. Source: Ethics, Vol. 95, No. 3, Special Issue:
Symposium on Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence (Apr., 1985), pp. 728-739 Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381047
No one today would defend slavery, of course; but the more I thought about it, the clearer it
seemed that before the Civil War one should have indeed tried to balance all the relevant
considerations: that the institution of slavery was not so absolute an evil that it was
morally imperative to do whatever was necessary to eradicate it immediately, without
regard to any other consideration. In fact, if it was obvious that it would take a war-as it turned
out, a long and gruesome war-to abolish slavery, the suffering and anguish that that war would
produce should certainly have been taken into account . And one should have given some
thought to what would happen to the ex-slaves, even in the event that the North were to
win: if one could predict that there was a good chance that slavery would be replaced by
another brutal and repressive system-by in fact the kind of system that took root in the
South after Reconstruction- then this too should have been entered into the balance . And it
also would have made sense to look at just how brutal the slave system was: there are different degrees of
loathsomeness, and this could have made a difference in one's assessments. (Questions of degree are of course crucial if
we are interested in striking a balance.) Finally, arguments about peaceful alternatives -the bidding up of the price of
slaves by the federal government, for instance, to make the institution economically irrational in comparison with free
labor-would certainly have had a place; historical experience-an analysis of the peaceful way slavery had in fact been
ended in the British Empire is the most obvious case-might also have played a central role. Why shouldn't these
things all be taken into account? Are we so convinced of the rightness of our personal moral values that we
can turn a blind eye to the kinds of considerations that might moderate the force of our commitment? One wonders
even whether it can ever be truly moral to simply refuse to weigh these sorts of factors
seriously. One can take the argument a step further by means of a hypothetical example. Suppose, in this case,
that the Southerners had told the abo- litionists that, if the North did come down to free the
slaves, before they arrived the slaves would all be killed. Certainly at this point considerations other
than the moral impermissibility of slavery would have to be taken into account. In such a case, an absolutist
position-that the institution of slavery was so great an evil that it had to be rooted out
without regard to consequence-reveals itself as inhuman and, indeed, as morally pre-
posterous. There has to be some point where issues of balance become morally salient ;
and thus in general these basic moral issues have to be approached in nonabsolutist -and by that I
mean more than just non- deontological-terms.
 A2: Good Intentions/Intervening Actors
Their ethics can rationalize every evilall actions can be described as
having "good intent".
Porter '96 (Jean, U of Notre Dame, "'Direct' and 'indirect' in Grisez's moral theory," Theological
Studies, Dec., 57(4), ProQuest)
Nonetheless, Grisez's reformulation is more than a clarification. The relationship between the agent's intention and the
causal structure of the act did play a crucial role in traditional moral theology, because it provided an objective basis for
assessing the intention of the agent. Without some such basis, the agent's intention could be described in terms of
whatever could be said to be the agent's purpose or motive in acting. In that case, it would be difficult to see how the
doctrine of double effect would rule anything out, since any act can be said to be directed
to some good or other, in terms of which the agent's intention could be described. As Elizabeth Anscombe
remarks: For after all we can form intentions; now if intention is an interior movement, it would appear that we can choose
to have a certain intention and not another, just by e.g. saying within ourselves: "What I mean to be doing is
earning my living, and not poisoning the household"; or "What I mean to be doing is helping those good
men into power; I withdraw my intention from the act of poisoning the household, which I prefer to think goes on without
my intention being in it." The idea that one can determine one's intentions by making such a little speech
to oneself is bosh.(45) The question that arises is: Does Grisez's interpretation of the direct/indirect distinction
similarly provide an objective criterion for determining what the agent's intention is? Or does it leave open the possibility of
describing the agent's intention in terms of whatever good purposes motivate the act in question? If the latter is the case, then
Grisez cannot really distinguish between those acts which attack an instance of a basic good, and other, similar acts which merely allow damage to some instance of a basic good, simply on the basis of an analysis of the structure of the act. In
that case, we must suspect that his distinction between direct and indirect harms actually reflects prior moral evaluations, which rest on other considerations. In order to address these questions, it will be helpful to take each of the two
considerations which Grisez puts forward in turn. Hence, we will first examine the criterion of goodness of intention, and then the criterion of indivisibility of performance. GOODNESS OF INTENTION AND THE DESCRIPTION OF AN ACT What
does it mean to say that an act may be morally justified, if the agent's intention is morally good, and the bad effect is not necessarily included in the attainment of the intended good? As we have already indicated, Grisez does not hold that the
necessity in question is causal. Rather, in these cases, the bad effect is not necessary to the attainment of the good end because it is not necessarily included in the very idea of the good end. In such cases, the good and bad effects may be said
to flow indivisibly from the agent's action, and the moral character of the action is determined by the good outcome at which he aims rather than by the bad outcome which he permits. And so, for example, a woman who shoots her would-be
rapist in self-defense does not intend his death; she intends to stop his attack, and only accepts his death as a side effect (in the moral, not the causal sense) of her act. (This assumes, of course, that it is really necessary to kill the assailant, and
also that the woman's purpose is good, in the sense that she is not using the necessity for self-defense as a pretext to kill out of hatred or a desire for revenge.) On the other hand, if the proposal which the agent chooses, and which therefore
determines his will, necessarily includes bringing about a death, then the act is ipso facto ruled out: On this analysis, choosing to kill is adopting a proposal precisely to kill or to do something understood in such a way that its meaning includes
bringing about death. For example, people who choose to shoot someone in the heart or to administer a lethal dose of opiates ordinarily understand what they choose as ways of ending life, and when a proposal is so understood, its very
meaning includes bringing about death.(46) What is the distinction between a proposal for action which necessarily includes the intention to kill, and a proposal which does not? Grisez rules out the traditional answer, that the distinction lies in the
causal relation between the victim's death and the good sought by the agent, and he does not offer any alternative criterion in the physical order, Thus, when Grisez says that an action with both good and bad effects is not defined by the bad
effect unless it is necessarily included in the agent's intention, the kind of necessity in question would appear to be logical necessity. In support of this interpretation, consider the following: If an action's description, however limited, makes plain
that such an action involves a choice to destroy, damage, or impede some instance of a basic human good, the wrongness of any action which meets the description is settled. Additional factors may affect the degree of wrongness, but further
descriptions of the act cannot reverse its basic moral quality. So, moral norms derived from this mode of responsibility can be called "moral absolutes."(47) If this interpretation is correct, then Grisez would be relying on a familiar feature of the
logic of action descriptions, namely, the fact that any action may be described correctly in an indefinitely large number of ways. Thus, the action of the woman who stops her assailant by cutting his throat can be described as stopping an attack,
or as stopping an attack by killing one's attacker, or as killing an attacker, or as killing a person, or as cutting a person's throat, or as making slashing motions with a knife. Clearly, each of these descriptions conveys something different about the
action; but it is equally clear that none of them is incorrect as a description of the act and, correlatively, none is logically necessitated by the facts of the case. Thus nothing prevents Grisez from fixing on the first of these descriptions as the
agent's "proposal," that is to say, the description under which her will is determined. Nothing prevents this, but nothing requires it either. Herein lies the difficulty in Grisez's analysis. Supposedly, the fact that an act's description clearly indicates
that it involves a choice to "destroy, damage, or impede" some instance of a basic good serves to distinguish it from an act which indirectly brings about the same effect. But as we noted above, an act which involves indirect killing in Grisez's
terms can also be described in terms of the killing which it brings about. To continue with his own example, the action of a woman who stops her attacker by cutting his throat can be described as an act of self-defense by killing, or even just as an
act of killing. By the same token, an act which is a direct act of killing in Grisez's terms could be redescribed in terms of the good sought, in such a way as to omit any mention of the killing itself. How, then, can Grisez distinguish between
forbidden acts of killing and permissible acts which have deadly side effects on the basis of the description of the act alone? Perhaps the key to Grisez's response can be found in a remark immediately preceding the passage quoted above:

"Descriptions of actions adequate for moral evaluation must say or imply how the agent's will bears on relevant
goods."(48) Following this line of analysis, Grisez could admit that there are indefinitely many correct descriptions for
every act, and yet still hold that only one of these is morally relevant, namely, that which describes the act in terms of what
the agent does in fact intend. Yet this argument does not resolve the difficulty. If one accepts the Thomistic principle that
every action is directed knowingly towards the attainment of some good (as Grisez does), then it follows that every
action can be described in terms of some good which the agent is voluntarily seeking .
Why should the agent not describe his intention in terms of that good, relegating the harms
which he [or she] brings about to foreseen but not chosen aspects of the act ? This brings us to
the position which Anscombe described as "bosh," namely, that the agent can determine his intention simply by focusing
on the good at which he aims. ***Edited for gendered language
 A2: Principles 1st
Principles must be verified by policy analysislooking at the principle in a
vacuum has no value
Minteer 2004 (Ben, et al, Human Dimensions of Biology Faculty, ASU School of Life Sciences,
JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, v!7, p. 139-140)
In sum, Dewey argued that moral principles should operate very differently than the way most contemporary
environmental ethicists employ them in discussions regarding environmental policy making and problem solving Ethical
theories are, in this opinion, critical instrumentalities - tools for analyzing and interpreting particular
social problems and conflicts, not fixed ends to which we owe any son of special treatment or
obedience. As a result, the "rightness" of moral claims depends on their ability to
contribute to the resolution of specific problematic situations - an ability determined
through intelligent appraisal and inquiry not On the intrinsic nature Of the principle itself
(Dewey. 1989, p. 280). In making this move, Dewey significantly shifted discussions of moral theory and argument away
from a preoccupation with the ontological status and justification of general moral principles and moved it toward the
refinement of the process of intelligent inquiry and the development of better and more effective methods of deliberation,
cooperative problem solving, and conflict resolution. It is important to note that in arguing for the instrumental and
experimental role of moral principles in problematic situations, Dewey did not deny the existence of Such
principles, nor did he reject their role within moral deliberation and decision-making. He only Sought to
put them in their proper place. Historically successful moral principles promoting the good and the right were
not to be uncritically accepted before experimental inquiry, just as I hey were not to be cast aside simply because they
trafficked in generalities or presumed to hold a universal currency. Instead, they should be understood as potentially
useful resources for comprehending and ultimately transforming particular unstable and disrupted moral contexts: In moral
matters there is ... a presumption in favor of principles that have had a long career in the past and that have been
endorsed by men of insight.... Such principles are no more to be lightly discarded than are scientific principles worked out
in the past. But in one as in the other, newly discovered facts or newly instituted conditions may give rise to doubts and
indicate the inapplicability of accepted doctrines (Dewey, 1989, p. 330). Still, in Dewey's way of thinking, the conceptual
and practical demands placed on previously held moral principles by the emergence of new experiences and
evolving factual circumstances required an adaptive moral system, one in which
standards, rules, and principles would necessarily undergo various degrees of revision
and reinterpretation in order to meet new socio-historical conditions and changing individual
desires Often, this process led to the formulation of entirely new principles as moral inquirers responded to the dynamic
and evolving quality of human experience: In fact, situations into which change and the unexpected enter are a challenge
to intelligence to create new principles. Morals must be a growing science if it is to be a science at all, not merely because
all truth has not yet been appropriated by the mind of man, but because life IS a moving affair in which Old
moral truth Ceases to apply Principles are methods of inquiry and forecast which require Verification
by the event: and the time honored effort to assimilate morals to mathematics is only a way of bolstering up an old
dogmatic authority, or putting a new one upon the throne of the old. But the experimental character of moral judgments
does not mean complete uncertainty and fluidity. Principles exist as hypotheses with which to experiment (Dewey, 1959,
p. 221).
FRAMEWORK
 Framework 1NC
1. Interpretation - The aff must defend a U.S. legislative/ executive/ or
judicial policy that engages diplomatically and/or economically with
the P.R.C.

Resolved proves the framework for the resolution is to enact a policy.

Words and Phrases 64 Permanent Edition
Definition of the word resolve, given by Webster is to express an opinion or determination
by resolution or vote; as it was resolved by the legislature; It is of similar force to the word
enact, which is defined by Bouvier as meaning to establish by law.

USFG is 3 branches of government.

Oxford Dictionary( Federal Government http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/federal-
government)
the system of government as defined in the Constitution which is based on the separation of
powers among three branches: the executive, the legislative and the judicial
Engagement is an Agreement
Dictionary.Com( Engagement, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/engagement?s=t)
A pledge; an obligation or agreement
P.R.C. is the Peoples Republic of China
People Republic of China is a country in East Asia
Dictionary. Com (P.R.C, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/people-s-republic-of-china)
2. Violation- They do not defend the USFG as the actor to engage with
the P.R.C.
3. Vote negative
a. Competitive Equity-Debate is a game. Without an equal
playing field, there is no fun which ruins any type of
knowledge production/ education within this round.
More varsity debaters will quit debate, and fewer
novice/jv debaters will join.
b. Fairness - If the affirmative does not defend the
resolution, there are an incredibly large number of
non-falsifiable, unpredictable, totalizing, and personal
claims they can make it is impossible to anticipate
how to be negative. This independently short-circuits
their solvency claims because the AFF is structured
to keep the NEG from being in a position to actually
test the validity of their claims.
c. Switch-Side Debate is Best spending every round
talking about the failure of the IR system is
unproductive you cannot know if your argument is
true unless you consider both sides of it there is no
 reason why voting affirmative is key to anything
they can run their kritik when you are negative
d. There is no risk of offense they can read any
argument they want as the negative and they can
even offer an ethical justification for federal
government action make them show you why NOT
defending the resolution is necessary for their
criticism to be successful.
e. Topicality before advocacy - you can vote negative to
endorse their project there is no reason why voting
affirmative is important, and your vote signifies that
you do not believe that they are topical, not that you
dont believe in their project
This is a prior question that must be resolved first it is a pre-condition for
debate to occur
Shively, 2k (Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, Ruth Lessl, Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 181-2)JFS
The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-
some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular,
they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of
agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the
ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of
contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at
all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect . We agree on
some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications,
and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John
Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have
been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is
reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and
within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are
not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have
utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must
agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot
have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully
stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no
complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In
other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is
being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the
subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an
understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the
contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it.
In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

Debate Deliberation requires a Central Stasis

Goodin and Niemeyer 03(Dr. Robert E. Goodin received his P.H.D. from Oxford, Editor of the Journal of Political
Philosophy and British Journal of Political Science, a Professor of Government at the University of Essex and a Professor
of Social and Political Theory at Australian National University, Dr. Simon Niemeyer is a Fellow at the Australian Research
Council, Where Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy,
Political Studies Association, 2003 Vol. 51, 627- 649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-
3217.2003.00450.x/epdf)
Deliberation, Aristotle and Hobbes tell us, begins when we turn our minds to something individually, in the case of choosing
some personal course of action; collectively, in the case of choosing some joint course of action.7 What it means to turn our mind to
something collectively is conventionally understood (just as deliberative democrats would have it) to involve, most centrally,
discussing it among ourselves. Thus, juries officially begin to deliberate only once they reach the jury room and discuss
the case together, after all the evidence has been heard. So the judge admonishes them at the beginning of the trial.8 Likewise,
deliberative assemblies formally begin to deliberate only after the chairperson has called the meeting to order and put a question to
members for debate. So Roberts Rules say.9 And so judges suppose, in what they count as the judicially cognizable legislative
history of the assemblys deliberations (McKinney and Sweet, 2002): legislative intent is DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 629
judicially inferred from reports of discussions of formal groups formally assembled, not the private intentions of the bills sponsors
and supporters as recorded in their diaries or notes or off-the-record comments. In all those ways, we are led to suppose (with
contemporary deliberative democrats) that deliberation in the sorts of collective settings that characterize political life, anyway
consists principally in interpersonal communications , paradigmatically conversational,
dialogic or discursive in form. Here, we query that proposition. Our thesis is that much (maybe most) of the work of
deliberation occurs well before the formal proceedings before the organized talking together
ever begins. Deliberation, the Oxford English Dictionary tells us, consists essentially in the consideration and
discussion of the reasons for and against a measure by a number of councillors (emphasis added). In that
definition, we propose that consideration should enjoy pride of place. Even among deliberative democrats , discussion is not
(usually) seen as an end in itself. It is supposed instead to be a means to a more considered, reasoned decision. The whole
point of deliberation, political or otherwise, is usually to make our decision processes more
reflective: to help us choose a course of action, after due consideration, rather than merely picking some course of action after
hardly a moments thought, with scant regard to evidence or argument (Manin, 1987, pp. 3514; Ullmann-Margalit and Morgenbesser,
1977). Certainly, consideration necessarily comes temporally prior to discussion. An internal process of weighing of reasons
necessarily precedes any participation in a public discursive interchange. That, after all, is how we decide what position to take in the
ensuing public discussion. Ideals of deliberative democracy may require that we go into public discussions with an
open mind, in the sense of a willingness to change our opinions in the light of subsequent
evidence and argument. But if everyone came to the process with a completely open mind, to the extent that no one was
prepared to take any position to start with, the deliberations would have nowhere to begin. Internal-reflective processes are also
involved in responding to the arguments and evidence presented by others in discussion. Much of the work in understanding what
others are saying, whether in a formal meeting or an everyday conversation, inevitably occurs inside our own heads. We get their
jokes, catch their allusions, complete their conversational implicatures, fill in suppressed premises of their argument-sketches, and so
on (Grice, 1975; Mansbridge, 1999). Empathetic extensions of that sort are crucial in enabling us to make sense of one another over
the course of discussions, democratic or otherwise. So too, we argue, do they loom large in the run-up to those discussions. And so too
might they do likewise, we suggest, even in the absence of any formal discussions. Imagining ourselves in the place of
another for purposes of trying to understand what the other is saying is broadly of a cloth with imagining
ourselves in the place of another for purposes of trying to understand what the other is or might be feeling or desiring (Goodin, 2000,
2003). The motivations might be different. But the process is broadly the same .10 As a modest step
toward establishing those larger arguments, we here examine how deliberations actually proceeded in a citizens jury on an Australian
630 ROBERT E. GOODIN AND SIMON J. NIEMEYER environmental issue. There, just as our model of democratic deliberation
within hypothesizes, deliberation of the more internal-reflective sort did indeed precede and did indeed do more to change peoples
attitudes than formal group deliberations of the more discursive sort.

The Ks individualistic rejection fails- Only top down policy action changes
the State
Wendt 03( Alexander Wendt is the author of Social Theory of International Politics published by
Cambridge University Press and Quantum Mind and Social Science Unifying Physical and Social
Ontology, Cambridge University Press,Wendt is the co- editor of the journal International Theory,
Wendt is established as one of the most prominent constructivist scholars, Why a World State is
Inevitable, University of Chicago, http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/9/4/491.full.pdf+html)
Self-Organization and Upward Causation The micro-foundations of teleological processes are described by selforganization theory,
which shows how order can emerge in a system as a result of the interactions of elements following purely local rules. Adam Smiths
invisible hand is perhaps the most well-known example of such a dynamic (Ullman-Margalit, 1978). A more recent example is
Thomas Schellings (1971) classic study of racial segregation. Schelling built a simple model of an initially completely white
neighborhood which showed that, if families vary in their tolerance for black neighbors, with a few leaving the neighborhood when
the first black family moves in, more when two black families move in, and so on, the eventual result will be a wholly black
neighborhood, even though almost no white families were opposed ex ante to living in an integrated one. Similarly, in his application
of complexity theory to world politics, Robert Jervis (1997) reads balance of power theory in self-organizational terms as a result
of decisions taken by individual states in response to local threats, a macro-level pattern of balancing emerges over time. In each case,
systemic order grows from a bottom-up or upward causal process, without central
coordination. In this respect selforganization theory has a strong methodological individualist orientation
(Epstein and Axtell, 1996: 1617). The mechanisms by which order grows are negative and positive feedback (see Jervis, 1997).
Negative feedback can work either at the micro-level by punishing individuals behavior, or at the macro-level through systemic
European Journal of International Relations 9(4) 498 Downloaded from ejt.sagepub.com at GEORGETOWN UNIV LIBRARY on
July 5, 2016 compensation (as in stock market corrections). Both help to maintain a systems status quo , or
homeostasis, as in the operation of the balance of power in anarchy. Negative feedback has been amply studied
by social scientists in the past without self-organization theory (Witt, 1997: 4901), and so the theorys novelty lies primarily in its
emphasis on positive feedback, in which behaviors or effects are amplified by a dynamic of increasing returns (Pierson, 2000) or
autocatalysis (Swenson, 1997).21 Importantly, when positive feedback effects cross a threshold or tipping point the resulting non-
linear dynamics can induce system change. There is nothing intrinsically teleological about negative and positive feedback. Both
involve only efficient causation, albeit of a circular or reciprocal kind, in which X causes Y, Y feeds back on X, X stabilizes or
reinforces Y, and so on. Self-organization theorists who focus on such feedback dynamics tend not to see their work as teleological.
On other hand, some self-organization theorists do make a connection to teleological explanation, suggesting the latters status in the
theory is currently unresolved (Hodgson, 2001: 369). The feature of self-organizing systems that raises the
question is their end-directedness, which is generated by the interaction of self-organization with
macro-level boundary conditions exercising downward causation on a systems parts . Boundary
Conditions and Downward Causation Just as self-organization theorys bottom-up story is rooted in methodological
individualism, the top-down story is rooted in methodological holism. Holism describes systems
that have a structural integrity constituting them as irreducible totalities, or more than the sum of
their parts (Wendt, 1999). This integrity stems from macro-level organizing principles or boundary conditions, which separate a
system from its environment and impose a degree of closure on its internal processes.22 Boundary conditions may be organic (like
DNA) or social (like cultures of anarchy, see below). What both types share is that they encode information at the system level. This
does not mean that the system exists wholly separate from its elements, just that it is not
reducible to them. Parts and whole are mutually constitutive parts only have the identity they do in virtue of the whole (one
cannot be a slave if there is no slavery), and the whole cannot exist without its parts. Holism implies a hierarchy of interdependent
levels, each having its own causal powers.23 The conventional view of the relationship between levels involves only upward causation
the interaction of elements at the micro-level generates patterns at the macro. Such reductionism assumes that all causation is
mechanistic. Armed with the concept of formal causation, however, we can Wendt: Why a World State is Inevitable 499 Downloaded
from ejt.sagepub.com at GEORGETOWN UNIV LIBRARY on July 5, 2016 make sense of the holist claim that systems have a top-
down explanatory role. A familiar example in world politics is the way in which the norms of the Westphalian system constitute states
with external sovereignty, an irreducibly social status with rights and obligations that would not exist without those norms. This
example describes a static effect of the system. A more dynamic formal causal effect is captured by the
concept of downward causation. Downward causation refers to the way in which boundary conditions constrain and
govern the interaction of a systems parts.24 The effect here is conservative, geared to system maintenance (see Juarrero, 1999: 131
50). The information within boundary conditions defines what kinds of interactions are inconsistent with the operation of a system,
and on this basis the system selects for the behavior and character of its parts, which determine[s] in part the distribution of lower
level events and substances.25 The in part here is important, since there may be many ways to satisfy a systems requirements
they may be multiply realizable the choice of which occurs at the micro-level.26 To that extent the effect of macro-
level constraints will be weak (Juarrero, 1999: 126). However, this does not undermine the main point that by virtue of their
boundary conditions, systems are able to monitor and intervene in their own functioning to sustain
themselves.27 This presupposes an efficient causal mechanism and as such depends on interactions at the micro-level (cf. Elster,
1982), but it is not reducible to the latter, since efficient causation requires the separate existence of cause and effect. In a structured
totality parts and whole are mutually constitutive, which means their interaction cannot be mechanica l (Emmeche
et al., 2000: 25; Juarrero, 1999: 133). Downward causation may be conceptualized in terms of a program.28 The conventional view
of explanation is process-oriented we explain X by identifying the micro-level process that caused it. Often this approach
is sufficient, but in situations where an outcome is multiply realizable it will fail to capture relevant explanatory
facts and so lack causal depth (Meyering, 2000: 190; R. Wilson, 1994). Although he does not use this terminology, a
good example in IR scholarship is Waltzs (1979) theory of how anarchy causes balancing. A process theory of balancing would look
to the microlevel at how individual states perceive and react to threats. Such a theory would tend to see balancing as intentional. In
contrast, Waltz looks to the macro-level at how the anarchic structure of the international system selects for balancing over time
states that fail to balance are simply eliminated, leaving only balancers.29 Importantly, his theory does not require that states intend to
balance or even be aware of the systems logic. In effect, the anarchy program controls what kinds of efficient causal European
Journal of International Relations 9(4) 500 Downloaded from ejt.sagepub.com at GEORGETOWN UNIV LIBRARY on July 5, 2016
pathways get activated, enabling Waltz to introduce a higher-level explanatory framework that simplifies the data relative to process-
explanations, and from which we can derive testable hypotheses.

Truth Testing key to Validate K Impacts

Roogeveen and Johar 02( Gita Johar is the Vice Dean for Research at Columbia Business School and a
Professor at Columbia Business School, She has a P.H.D. from NYU, Anne L. Roogeveen has a P.H.D. and Masters in
Marketing from Columbia University, Professor of an MBA core course in marketing as well as electives in Marketing
Research, Marketing Experiments, and Marketing Strategy, Perceived Source Variability Versus Familiarity: Testing
Competing Explanations for the the Truth Effect, Journal of Consumer Pychology, Laurence Earlbaum Associates,
http://ac.els-cdn.com/S105774080270226X/1-s2.0-S105774080270226X-main.pdf?_tid=630c548c-43b6-11e6-b49b-
00000aacb35d&acdnat=1467836310_a0047af56bd098e80013a2a4e93bd3a1)

This article tests 2 competing explanations for the truth effect, the finding that repeated statements are believed more than new
statements. Previous research has put forth 2 explanations for this effect-subjective familiarity and perceived source variability. The
subjective familiarity explanation holds that repeated statements feel more familiar and are
therefore believed more than new statements. This explanation has received strong support in the literature. The
source variability explanation holds that people attribute repeated statements to different sources; this belief, that multiple
sources endorse the statement, increases belief in repeated statements relative to new
statements attributed to a single source. However, previous studies testing this explanation have confounded source
variability with source credibility. This research aims to tease apart the effects of subjective familiarity and source variability while
holding source credibility constant across conditions. Results of the first 2 experiments manipulating number of sources and
measuring recognition implicate subjective familiarity rather than perceived source variability as the mechanism underlying the truth
effect. However, the third study demonstrates that source variability does enhance belief in repeated
statements that are initially perceived as low in plausibility. Theoretical and practical implications
are discussed. You are flipping through a magazine and see an ad for Take Control, a spread made from natural soybean extract.
The ad says "Take Control tastes great and helps promote healthy cholesterol levels!" Do you believe it? What if you then see a picture
of Regis Philbin with his testimonial "Sounds too good to be true? Wait 'ti1 you try it. It's deliciousand helps me look after my
cholesterol!" -will his testimonial increase your belief? Without product experience, you may be forced to depend on cues (such as
how familiar the claim feels or how many people you know support the claim) to judge the veracity of product claims. If you
repeatedly hear "Take Control tastes great and helps promote healthy cholesterol levels." the claim --- Requests for reprints should be
sent to G~ta Venkatararnani Johar, Department of Marketing, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, Uris Hall, 3022
Broadway, Room 519, New York, NY 10027-6902. E-mail: gvj I @columbia.edu will feel familiar to you. This familiarity increases
your belief in the claim (Hawkins & Hoch, 1992). This finding, that repeated exposure to ambiguous statements (statements
that could be judged as either true or false) increases the rated truth of these statements compared to a
single exposure, is known as the "truth effect" (Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991; Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 1989;
Bacon 1979; Gigerenzer, 1984; Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino 1977; Schwartz 1982). But what happens when you hear others making
product testimonials? It seems reasonable to assume that if you hear the statement from different people on each exposure, the more
likely you are to believe that the statement is true. So if you hear the Take Control claim from Regis once and Rosie once will you
believe it more than if you just hear the claim from Regis both times? And if you cannot recollect the source but you recognize seeing
the claim multiple times, will you attribute different exposures to different sources and hence increase your belief in the claim? This is
the intuition behind the notion of source variability. 82 ROGGEVEEN AND JOHAR This article explores the possibility that the truth
effect can be explained by peoples' perceptions that they have heard the repeated statement before and their attribution of the previous
exposure to a source other than the one currently relating the claim. Thus, perceiving that previous exposure was from a different
source could enhance people's belief in the repeated statement. Specifically, this article tests competing explanations for the truth
effect. Is the truth effect due to subjective familiarity or is it due to perceived source variability? LITERATURE REVIEW The truth
effect is the finding that repeated statements are believed more than new statements. It appears to be generalizable across many
conditions. It occurs for statements about general topics (Hasher et al., 1977), trivia statements (Bacon, 1979), opinion statements
(Arkes et al., 1989), and product related claims (Hawkins & Hoch, 1992; Law, Hawkins, & Craik, 1998). It works for statements that
are repeated minutes apart (Schwartz, 1982), and statements that are repeated weeks apart (Hasher et al.). It works for both verbal
statements (Hasher et al.) and written statements (Schwartz). It works when the statement is in the context of all repeated statements
(Schwartz), and when it is interspersed among new statements (Hasher et al.). It works when the participant is asked
to rate the validity after each repetition (Hasher et al.), and when the participant is only asked to rate the
validity after the final repetition (Schwartz). It even works when the participant is told that the statement is repeated (Bacon). In
general though, the largest increase in rated truth-value occurs after the first repetition (Arkes et al., 1991). In addition, to judging
repeated statements as more true, people are also likely to rate statements that arejudged to contradict statements that they have
previously heard as more false (Bacon). The most important criterion of these statements is that they are ambiguous; otherwise the
veracity of the claim can be judged independent of exposure
 Overview
Extend our interp- The aff must defend the U.S.F.G policy that engages with P.R.C.
Violation-
a. Their agent isnt the U.S.F.G.
b. They dont engage directly with the P.R.C.

Extend Shivley- Debate is a game that is contingent upon a shared starting point. We must
agree upon the rules, the regulations, and the topic to ever engage in productive debate
that generatse knowledge. The resolution uniquely offers such as starting point to engage
in a meaningful discussion because if frames the topic for the entire year. Such policy
education is key to interacting with the real world because the debate space creates
effective policy makers. Debaters learn technocratic solutions that could be applied to
large scale problems. Only an organic, resolute starting point generates such key
education- and that is the resolution. Debate is like a social interaction similar to school. It
may not be technically equal, but is still net beneficial. Goodin and Nieymeye further state
that deliberation within debate requires an open mind. They conclude that discussing
conflicting methodologies are beneficial. Goodin further states that discussion is not an
end to itself- so any type of alt solvency that K attains from simply their discussion is
doomed: the aff is too utopian and ignorant to assume discussing creates any effectual
change. Discussion within the debate space is only part of the answer. Proves you default
do policy framework that is based upon a central stasis in which we roleplay the state
through Fiat.
 Impacts
Competitive Equity- Without a joint resolution, 1AC can say anything or nothing, making it
impossible to negate because we cant prepare for their aff. The aff is already ahead before
the round starts because they already get the perm, first/last speech, choose the specific
discussion, unlimited pre- round prep, and judges won't vote on presumption. This
impacts accessibility because small schools with fewer coaches cant prepare against the
unlimited number of affs while big schools with more staff are inherently advantaged by
having more resources to prepare for an already unequal playing field.
Fairness- 2 impacts.
a. Without a fair playing field, extremely unpredictable affs ultimately win-
this leads to a race to the bottom in which the aff simply makes the most
ridiculous affs to exploit the neg. I.E.: Agamben who is bad still wins
round because we cant prepare by simply saying Agamben alt is bad.
Both teams never actually dont become engaged or empowered to join
conversation. Turns all the Ks education claims because we are excluded
from dialogue within the debate space. The aff is like a boring teacher
that lectures its frightened/ zoned out students on why the world sucks.
b. Extend Roogeveen and Johar- You should regard the affs
impacts as false because the neg cant test the validity of their
claims by engaging in a confirmation bias. Without clash in the
debate, the affs impacts are never tested- proven in how the aff
could easily shift out of Disads, CPs, and a Case Debate. The aff
precludes any truth effect necessary to evaluate their truth
claims as valid.

Alt Fails-
1. Extend Wendt- The state is inevitable because top down
approaches are absolutely necessary to create effectual change
in the law. Bottom Up methodology such as the ( Insert Ks Alt)
ultimately fails because the state is structured such that any
individual resistance cant spill over to solve broader technocratic
problems and because the neg reduces the state to its individual
parts rather than a holistic system that is greater that the sum of
its indivudal parts. The alt cant access a causal depth of
explanation necessary to change the state. For example, the Civil
Rights Bill and 13th Amendment only succeeded, albeit partially,
through using the state. Empirics prove- the neg cant list a single
individual rejection that has actually created change in policy.
Have a very high threshold for any type of alt solvency.
 Pre- Empts from 1NC

Switch-Side Debate is Best the aff shouldve run the same argument
on the neg. Complaining on modern IR theory is unproductive, the aff
should defend a policy action on the aff that clashes with the neg that
the ballot resolves. Net benefit is the fairness impacted above.
a. There is no risk of offense if we give are able to defend how
a topical version of the plan solves in the direction the
impacts of the aff. Make them prove an extremely high
threshold of why the state is uniquely bad and not
contingent on policy reform.
b. Topicality before advocacy - you can vote negative to
endorse their project there is no reason why voting
affirmative is important, and your vote signifies that you do
not believe that they are topical, not that you dont believe
in their project.
 Cards

Deliberation breaks Hegemonic Norms

Urbinati 00 ( Nadia Urbaniti is a Ph.D., European University Institute, Florence, 198, She is a political theorist who
specializes in modern and contemporary political thought and the democratic and anti-democratic traditions. She co-
chaired the Columbia University Faculty Seminar on Political and Social Thought and founded and chaired the Workshop
on Politics, Religion and Human Rights. She is co-editor with Andrew Arato of the journal Constellations: An International
Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory. She is a member of the Executive Committee of the Foundation Reset
Dialogues on Civilization-Istanbul Seminars. Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation, Sage
Publications Inc., Political Theory, Volume 28, Number 6, JSTOR, pg. 758- 786, http://www.jstor.org/stable/192219?
seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)

INDIRECTNESS IN POLITICS has never enjoyed much fortune in demo- cratic theory. Direct ruling had generally been seen as
paradigmatic of democ- racy because it entails a fusion of "talking" and "doing" in political action, and the
full participation of all citizens in the process of decision making. ' The modern "discovery" of
representation has left the normative value of this paradigm unchallenged. Too often, representation has been given merely an
instrumental justification and has been seen as a pragmatic expedient to cope with large territorial states, or a useful "fiction" by
means of which the method of division of labor has been adapted to the function of government.2 Particularly since the French
Revolution, democracy has come to denote, like Athens, a state of perfection that the moderns admire and long for all the while
knowing it is unattainable to them: "Today, in politics, democracy is the name of what we cannot have-yet cannot cease to want."3
While, there- fore, for thinkers such as George W. F. Hegel and Benjamin Constant "classi- cal" democracy was the name of
something the modems could no longer have, for contemporary democrats it has become the name of a good
society we can still have, provided we interpret it as a ceaseless process of political education in
citizenship. The former explained (and rationalized) the indirectness of sovereign action through representation as a destiny the
moderns could not escape.4 The latter turned their attention away from representation and looked for some reminder of
directness within civil society.5 In either case, representa- tion has been associated with the
weakening of self-government. For demo- crats in particular, it has held little appeal, first because it is seen as
justifying a vertical relation between the citizens and the state, and second because it is seen as
promoting a passive citizenry.6 Even the attempt to make it more con- sistent with the democratic principle of equality,
for instance by making it proportional, has been considered not only useless but also insincere. It is use- less
because proportionality cannot fill the gap between the citizens and their representatives. It is insincere because proportional
representation can actu- ally become a way of using minorities' representation to legitimize the major- ity's decisions. Proportional
and descriptive accuracy in representation, Hannah Pitkin has argued in her seminal book, takes away with its left hand what it
gives with its right: it meticulously reflects the social topography but, at the same time, makes the assembly into a
"talking rather than acting, de- lib- erating rather than governing" body.7 Finally, in a proportional electoral sys- tem the
costs-governmental instability and fragmentation of the electorate- outweigh the benefits. In sum, there is no way of making
representation be what it cannot be: a valid substitute for direct democracy. My intention is not to put into question the normative
value of direct par- ticipation but to argue for the relevance of representation. I think this is not only necessary
but also worthy, particularly if we value the deliberative char- acter of democratic politics. When we express our dissatisfaction
with the way in which we are represented, we implicitly allude to some ideal of repre- sentation. As for the character of democratic
politics, focus on deliberation allows us to perceive participation and representation not as two
alternative forms of democracy but as related forms constituting the continuum of politi- cal action
in modem democracies. Seen from this angle, the distinction between direct and indirect politics is a
promising path of interpretation: it frames the institutional and sociocultural space within
which the various components of political action-from opinions and will formation to decision
making- take shape. Contemporary democratic theory encourages the revision I am proposing. Indeed,
while until recently the defense of representative democracy has gen- erally been endorsed by the neo-Schumpeterian theorists of
electoral democ- racy against the proponents of "participatory democracy,"8 now representa- tion attracts the interest of democratic
scholars in a more direct way. In his Inner Ocean, George Kateb writes that the institution of representation is the source of the "moral
distinctiveness" of modern democracy, and the sign of its superiority to direct democracy.9 Even more radically, David Plotke states
that in a representative democracy, "the opposite of representation is not par- ticipation" but
exclusion, while Iris Marion Young argues that "the elevation This content downloaded from 141.161.133.104 on Fri, 08 Jul 2016
14:30:59 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 760 POLITICAL THEORY / December 2000 of direct democracy to the
apex," as the only "real" democracy, "is mistaken"; in fact, "political representation is both necessary and desirable."10 I find the
'rediscovery' of representation both interesting and compelling."1 However, a systematic and comprehensive defense of the normative
core of representative democracy is still missing. In writing this essay, I have been inspired by three main ideas. First, public discourse
is one of the main fea- tures that characterize and give value to democratic politics. Second, indirect- ness (and representation, which
is a type of indirectness) plays a key role in forging the discursive democratic character of politics. Third, representation highlights the
idealizing and judgmental nature of politics (its reflexivity, in contemporary terminology), an art by which individuals transcend the
imme- diateness of their experience and interests, and "educate" their political judg- ment on their own and others' opinions.'2
Representation-and the electoral trial that is a necessary part of democratic representation-projects citizens into a future-oriented
perspective, and thus confers politics an ideological dimension.'3 In this sense, it gives ideas full residence in the house of politics.
Representation is a comprehensive filtering, refining, and mediating process of politica l will
formation and expression. It shapes the object, style, and pro- cedures of political
competition. Finally, it helps to depersonalize claims and opinions, and in this way makes them a
vehicle for the mingling and associat- ing of citizens . Representation can never be truly 'descriptive' of society
because of its unavoidable inclination to transcend the 'here' and 'now' and to project instead a "would-be" or "ought-to-be"
perspective. Hegel captured extremely well the idealizing function of representation when he pointed out its power of unifying the
"fluctuating" "atomic units" of civil society.
 Cant Solve
The ballot fails doesnt create any real change, and turns their solvency
because we think weve helped
Ritter 13, JD U Texas Law, B.A. cum laude Trinity University, 13
(Michael J., OVERCOMING THE FICTION OF SOCIAL CHANGE THROUGH DEBATE:
WHATS TO LEARN FROM 2PACS CHANGES?, National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol.
2, Issue 1)
The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a
debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or
in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be
proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed
debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of
competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive
interscholastic debate concerns the following: What is the best model to promote social
change? But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: Can debate cause
social change? Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies
or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen
not to prove this fundamental assumption, whichas this article arguesis merely a fiction that
is harmful in most, if not all, respects.
IMPERIALISM/HEG GOOD
 Solves Democracy
Hegemony allows for democratic influence which leads to stability
Andrea E. Varisco 13, Ph.D. candidate at the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit of
the University of York, holds a Master in International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies
specialisation from the Australian National University and the International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo and a Master in Politics and Comparative Institutions from the University of Milano,
6/3/13, Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?,
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-
global-peace/
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse and dissolution of the USSR, the bipolar
international system transformed in unipolarity and the US emerged as the only superpower. In a
unipolar system the power of a state is not balanced and controlled by the other states, this
inequality allows the hegemon of the international system to influence and shape the rest of the
world. After 1989 the US has been considered the militarily, economically and technologically
leading country of the world (Brooks and Wohlforth), a lonely superpower able to impose its will
on another countries (Huntington, 39) and, in some cases such as the 2003 war to Iraq waged
without the United Nations (UN) Security Council consensus, to act outside the laws of the
international community.
Traditional analytic approaches have little to offer in making sense of these seemingly
contradictory trends. One conventional route, for example, would be to frame the international
dynamic as one of rising and falling powers, pitting Chinas advance against the United States
decline. But this exaggerates the United States weaknesses and underestimates Chinas. For all
its problems, the United States is well positioned to thrive in the twenty-first century, whereas
China faces a multitude of challenges, including slowing growth, rampant corruption, an aging
population, environmental degradation, and wary neighbors. And no other country is even close
to having the necessary mix of capacity and commitment to be a challenger to the United States
for global preeminence.
 Solves War
The Loss of hegemony leads to a domino effect ending in the apocalypse
Andrea E. Varisco 13, Ph.D. candidate at the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit
of the University of York, holds a Master in International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies
specialisation from the Australian National University and the International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo and a Master in Politics and Comparative Institutions from the University of Milano,
6/3/13, Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?,
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-
global-peace/
A return to multi-polarity will therefore imply more instability among great powers. But
great power rivalry will not be the only source of possible instability for the future
multi-polar world. The current distribution of power allows not only great powers but
also middle, small powers and non-state actors to have military capabilities that
could threaten the global security. In particular, the presence of nuclear weapons constitutes a further
reason of concern and implies that the future world could carry not only the potential instability of multi-polarity and great
powers rivalry, but also the dangers entailed in nuclear proliferation. The future multi-polar world will thus
be potentially more unstable than all the other multi-polar periods history has
experienced until nowadays: for the first time in history, the world could become both
multi-polar and nuclear. While some scholars argue that nuclear deterrence could reduce the war-proneness of
the coming multi-polar system (Layne, 44-45), the majority of them consider the presence of
nuclear weapons as a source of instability (McNamara; Rosen; Allison). In particular, regional powers
and states that are not great powers armed with nuclear capabilities could represent a cause of concern for global
security. A nuclear Iran could for example attack or be attacked by Israel and easily
involve in this war the rest of the world (Sultan; Huntley). A war between Pakistan and
India, both nuclear states, could result in an Armageddon for the whole Asia. An attack from the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) on Japan or South Korea will trigger an immediate
reaction from the US and a nuclear proliferation domino effect in East Asia (Huntley, 725).
Terrorists armed with nuclear weapons could wreak havoc and target the heart of the most powerful countries of the world
(Bunn and Wier). Iran, Pakistan, DPRK, terrorist groups will rarely be great powers or poles in a future multi-polar world.
Nevertheless, the effects of their actions could easily reverberate all over the globe
and represent another cause of potential instability . For the first time in history, the stability of the
future world will therefore depend not only on the unpredictable effects of the rivalry among great powers, but also on the
dangerous potential of middle and small powers and non-state actors armed with nuclear weapons.

US unilateralism can stop conflicts before arising and is key to the global
economic order
Andrea E. Varisco 13, Ph.D. candidate at the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit
of the University of York, holds a Master in International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies
specialisation from the Australian National University and the International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo and a Master in Politics and Comparative Institutions from the University of Milano,
6/3/13, Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?,
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-
global-peace/
This unbalanced preponderance has been promoted and reinforced by some factors. The US geographic position assured
the security of the country for many years: while other states for example China, Russia and the European countries
are land powers surrounded by potential enemies, the US is isolated and too far away from its potential threats. As a
result, no country in the last 70 years tried to attack American soil. This geographical security is strengthened by an
unchallengeable military power. According to latest data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
in 2011 US military spending accounted for more than 40 per cent of the world total, followed by China with approximately
8 per cent, and Russia, United Kingdom and France with a percentage between 4 and 3.5 per cent each (Background
Paper on Military Expenditures, 5). US military capabilities assure it a strong sea and air power and
allow it to projects its force globally, enabling it to hit a target everywhere at every time. Yet the
notion of hegemony does not only imply geographical security and military preponderance, but
also influence and cultural hegemony. In Gramscis notion of hegemony one of the most quoted definitions of
the concept the hegemonic ruling class of a capitalist society has for example the power to
influence and persuade the subordinated social classes to accept and adopt its values . As a great
power during the Cold War, and as a lonely superpower in the last 20 years, the US played a key role in the
architecture of the new world order (Ikenberry). From an economic point of view, the US laid the
foundations of the global liberal economic order long before the unipolar era , supporting the Bretton
Woods system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which was replaced in 1994 by the World Trade
Organization, and indirectly controlling some international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank. Nowadays, the US controls around the 17 per cent of the total votes of the IMF and it is the
largest shareholder in the World Bank, leading to the tradition that the President of the World Bank has always been a US
citizen nominated by the US President, while the President of the IMF has always been a European.

Hegemony creates peace by preventing both great power and regional

conflicts
Stephen M. Walt, 2002, American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John
F. Kennedy School of Government, AMERICAN PRIMACY: Its Prospects and Pitfalls,
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/swalt/files/art1-sp2.pdf
A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher
level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer
important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American
primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the
past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars
and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example,
great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the
United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition , for at least two
reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers
are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a hegemonic
war (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is
reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers.
Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides
can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed,
however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try .8 12 NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE REVIEW The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in
Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed
abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the
United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because
the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out . What Joseph Joffe has
termed the American pacifier is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one.
This tranquilizing effect is not lost on Americas allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S.
dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want Uncle Sam to
leave.9 Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well ,
because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity . World politics might be more interesting if
the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more
exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine
heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than interesting decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

Hegemony has proven to prevent great power wars; multipolarity fails

Andrea E. Varisco 13, Ph.D. candidate at the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit
of the University of York, holds a Master in International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies
specialisation from the Australian National University and the International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo and a Master in Politics and Comparative Institutions from the University of Milano,
6/3/13, Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?,
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-
global-peace/
During the 20th century multi-polar international systems resulted in instability and led to two world
wars in less than 50 years. The balance of power and the system of alliances of the early 20th century
was swept away by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914. That event triggered World War I, a
global conflict that caused the death of more than 15 million people in less than five years. After few decades, the
multi-polar world emerged by World War I with a new system of alliances and the multilateral
body of the League of Nations was not able to tame the totalitarian aspirations of Hitler. The German invasion of
Poland in 1939 triggered World War II, the deadliest conflict of the history which resulted in millions of deaths and in the
holocaust. Since the end of the World War II the world has never been multi-polar again , nevertheless
these historical accounts seem to indicate how multi-polarity often created an unstable and unpredictable world,
characterized by shifting alliances and by the aspiration of the rising powers to change the balance of power and create a
new order. These historical features of multi-polarity will likely distinguish also the future multi-polar world, in spite of its
strong economic interconnection and institutionalization. History indeed has also shown how the effects on stability of a
global economy and of multilateral institutions have been sometimes overestimated. The multi-polar world at the
beginning of the 20th century was highly economically interconnected and characterized by a large cross-border flows of
goods, capital and people, at the point that the ratio of trade to output indicates that Britain and France are only slightly
more open to trade today than they were in 1913, while Japan is less open now than then (The Economist, 99; Van den
Bossche, 4). Nevertheless, this high interconnection was swept away by World War I. Furthermore, the presence of
the League of Nations did not prevent World War II; likewise, the multilateral organization of the
UN has not always been effective in promoting peace and securit y, and membership in the
European Union did not prevent European countries from having different positions and antithetic
behaviors in the wake of US war in Iraq in 2003. A shifting from a well defined hierarchy of power to a
great power rivalry will therefore result in a less stable world order.

Hegemony is key for a secure nation, and stable global economy

Stephen M. Walt, 2002, American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John
F. Kennedy School of Government, AMERICAN PRIMACY: Its Prospects and Pitfalls,
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/swalt/files/art1-sp2.pdf
Primacy Provides Security. Perhaps the most obvious reason why states seek primacyand why the United States
benefits from its current positionis that international politics is a dangerous business. Being wealthier and stronger than
other states does not guarantee that a state will survive, of course, and it cannot insulate a state from all outside
pressures. But the strongest state is more likely to escape serious harm than weaker one s are, and it
will be better equipped to resist the pressures that arise . Because the United States is so
powerful, and because its society is so wealthy, it has ample resources to devote to whatever
problems it may face in the future. At the beginning of the Cold War, for example, its power enabled the United
States to help rebuild Europe and Japan, to assist them in developing stable democratic orders, and to subsidize the
emergence of an open international economic order.7 The United States was also able to deploy powerful
armed forces in Europe and Asia as effective deterrents to Soviet expansion. When the strategic
importance of the Persian Gulf increased in the late 1970s, the United States created its Rapid
Deployment Force in order to deter threats to the Wests oil supplies ; in 199091 it used these
capabilities to liberate Kuwait. Also, when the United States was attacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network in
September 2001, it had the wherewithal to oust the networks Taliban hosts and to compel broad international support for
its campaign to eradicate Al-Qaeda itself. It WALT 11 would have been much harder to do any of these things if the United
States had been weaker. Today, U.S. primacy helps deter potential challenges to American interests in
virtually every part of the world . Few countries or nonstate groups want to invite the focused enmity of the United
States (to use William Wohlforths apt phrase), and countries and groups that have done so (such as Libya, Iraq, Serbia,
or the Taliban) have paid a considerable price. As discussed below, U.S. dominance does provoke opposition in a number
of places, but anti-American elements are forced to rely on covert or indirect strategies (such as terrorist bombings) that
do not seriously threaten Americas dominant position. Were American power to decline significantly, however, groups
opposed to U.S. interests would probably be emboldened and overt challenges would be more likely. This does not mean
that the United States can act with impunity, nor does it guarantee that the United States will achieve every one of its
major foreign policy objectives. It does mean that the United States has a margin of security that weaker
states do not possess. This margin of safety is a luxury, perhaps, but it is also a luxury that few Americans would
want to live without.

Hegemony key to prevent terrorism, and destabilize the possibility of Asian

War
Richard N. Haas November/December 2014, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, The
Unraveling: How to respond to a Disordered World, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2014-10-20/unraveling
But if attempts at regime change should be jettisoned, so, too, should calendar-based commitments. U.S.
interests in Iraq were not well served by the inability to arrange for the ongoing presence of a
residual U.S. force there, one that might have dampened the feuding of Iraqi factions and provided
much-needed training for Iraqi security forces. The same holds for Afghanistan, where all U.S.
forces are due to exit by the end of 2016. Such decisions should be linked to interests and conditions
rather than timelines. Doing too little can be just as costly and risky as doing too much . Other
things outsiders could usefully do in the region include promoting and supporting civil society,
helping refugees and displaced people, countering terrorism and militancy, and working to stem
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (such as by trying to place a meaningful ceiling on
the Iranian nuclear program). Degrading ISIS will require regular applications of U.S. airpowe r
against targets inside both Iraq and Syria, along with coordinated efforts with countries such as Saudi
Arabia and Turkey to stem the flow of recruits and dollars. There are several potential partners on the
ground in Iraq, but fewer in Syria -- where action against ISIS must be undertaken in the midst of a civil
war. Unfortunately, the struggle against ISIS and similar groups is likely to be difficult, expensive, and long.
In Asia, the prescription is considerably simpler: implement existing policy assiduously. The
Obama administrations pivot, or rebalance, to Asia was supposed to involve regular high-level
diplomatic engagement to address and calm the regions all-too-numerous disputes; an increased
U.S. air and naval presence in the region; and the building of domestic and international support
for a regional trade pact. All these actions can and should be higher administration priorities, as
should a special attempt to explore the conditions under which China might be prepared to reconsider its
commitment to a divided Korean Peninsula.

Lack of a hegemon leads to global disorder

Richard N. Haas November/December 2014, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, The
Unraveling: How to respond to a Disordered World, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2014-10-20/unraveling
In his classic The Anarchical Society, the scholar Hedley Bull argued that there was a perennial tension in
the world between forces of order and forces of disorder, with the details of the balance between them
defining each eras particular character. Sources of order include actors committed to existing
international rules and arrangements and to a process for modifying them; sources of disorder
include actors who reject those rules and arrangements in principle and feel free to ignore or
undermine them. The balance can also be affected by global trends, to varying degrees beyond the
control of governments, that create the context for actors choices. These days , the balance between
order and disorder is shifting toward the latte r. Some of the reasons are structural, but some are the
result of bad choices made by important players -- and at least some of those can and should be corrected.
The chief cauldron of contemporary disorder is the Middle East. For all the comparisons that have been
made to World War I or the Cold War, what is taking place in the region today most resembles the Thirty
Years War, three decades of conflict that ravaged much of Europe in the first half of the seventeenth
century. As with Europe back then, in coming years, the Middle East is likely to be filled with mostly weak
states unable to police large swaths of their territories, militias and terrorist groups acting with increasing
sway, and both civil war and interstate strife. Sectarian and communal identities will be more powerful
than national ones. Fueled by vast supplies of natural resources, powerful local actors will continue to
meddle in neighboring countries internal affairs, and major outside actors will remain unable or
unwilling to stabilize the region.

Imperialism good key to US hegemony

Boot 03 (Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, U.S.
Imperialism: A Force for Good, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/us-
imperialism-force-good/p5959)//BW
What is the greatest danger facing America as it tries to rebuild Iraq: Shiite fundamentalism?
Kurdish separatism? Sunni intransigence? Turkish, Syrian, Iranian or Saudi Arabian meddling? All
of those are real problems, but none is so severe that it can't readily behandled. More than
125,000 U.S. troops occupy Mesopotamia. They are backed up by the resources of the world's
richest economy. In a contest for control of Iraq, America can outspend and outmuscle any
competing faction. The greatest danger is that America won't use all of its power for fear of the "I"
word -- imperialism. When asked on April 28 on al-Jazeera whether the United States was
"empire building," Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld reacted as if he'd been asked whether
he wears women's underwear. "We don't seek empires," he replied huffily. "We're not
imperialistic. We never have been." That's a fine answer for public consumption. The problem is
that it isn't true. The United States has been an empire since at least 1803, when Thomas
Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory. Throughout the 19th century, what Jefferson called
the "empire of liberty" expanded across the continent. When U.S. power stretched from "sea to
shining sea," the American empire moved abroad, acquiring colonies ranging from Puerto Rico
and the Philippines to Hawaii and Alaska. While the formal empire mostly disappeared after the
Second World War, the United States set out on another bout of imperialism in Germany and
Japan. Oh, sorry -- that wasn't imperialism; it was "occupation." But when Americans are running
foreign governments, it's a distinction without a difference. Likewise, recent "nation-building"
experiments in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are imperialism under another
name. Mind you, this is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is
hardly one of unadorned good doing; there have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the
mistreatment of the Indians. But, on the whole, U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for
good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and
Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has
helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea and Panama. Yet, while
generally successful as imperialists, Americans have been loath to confirm that's what they were
doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that "imperialism" carries, there's no need for the
U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice. That doesn't
mean looting Iraq of its natural resources; nothing could be more destructive of the goal of
building a stable government in Baghdad. It means imposing the rule of law, property rights, free
speech and other guarantees, at gunpoint if need be. This will require selecting a new ruler who
is committed to pluralism and then backing him or her to the hilt. Iran and other neighbouring
states won't hesitate to impose their despotic views on Iraq; we shouldn't hesitate to impose our
democratic views.

Imperialism good but needs reforms

Kaplan 14 (Robert D., a contributing editor at The Atlantic, and a senior fellow at the Center for
a New American Security, In Defense of Empire, The Atlantic,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/04/in-defense-of-empire/358645/)//BW
However patronizing this may sound, the European imperialists could be eminently practical men,
becoming proficient at the native languages and enhancing area expertise. Nazis and
Communists, by contrast, were imperialists only secondarily; they were primarily radical utopians
who sought racial and ideological submission. Thus, the critique that imperialism constitutes evil
and nothing more is, broadly speaking, lazy and ahistorical, dependent as it often is on the very
worst examples, such as the Belgians in the 19th-century Congo and the Russians throughout
modern history in Eurasia. Nevertheless, the critique that imperialism constitutes bad American
foreign policy has serious merit: the real problem with imperialism is not that it is evil, but rather
that it is too expensive and therefore a problematic grand strategy for a country like the United
States. Many an empire has collapsed because of the burden of conquest. It is one thing to
acknowledge the positive attributes of Rome or Hapsburg Austria; it is quite another to justify
every military intervention that is considered by elites in Washington. Thus, the debate Americans
should be having is the following: Is an imperial-like foreign policy sustainable? I use the term
imperial-like because, while the United States has no colonies, its global responsibilities,
particularly in the military sphere, burden it with the expenses and frustrations of empires of old.
Caution: those who say such a foreign policy is unsustainable are not necessarily isolationists.
Alas, isolationism is increasingly used as a slur against those who might only be recommending
restraint in certain circumstances. Once that caution is acknowledged, the debate gets really
interesting. To repeat, the critique of imperialism as expensive and unsustainable is not easily
dismissed. As for the critique that imperialism merely constitutes evil: while that line of thinking is
not serious, it does get at a crucial logic regarding the American Experience. That logic goes like
this: America is unique in history. The United States may have strayed into empire during the
Spanish-American War of 1898 and the resultant war in the Philippines. And it may have become
an imperial Leviathan of sorts in the wake of World War II. At root, however, the United States
was never meant to be an empire, but rather that proverbial city on a hill, offering an example to
the rest of the world rather than sending its military in search of dragons to slay. This, as it
happens, is more or less the position of the Obama administration. The first post-imperial
American presidency since World War II telegraphs nothing so much as exhaustion with world
affairs. Obama essentially wants regional powers (such as Japan in Asia, and Saudi Arabia and
Israel in the Middle East) to rely less on the United States in maintaining local power balances.
And he wants to keep Americas enemies at bay through the use of inexpensive drones rather
than the deployment of ground forces.

Imperialism key to global stabiltity

Rather than Obamas post-imperialism, in which the secretary of state appears like a lonely and
wayward operator encumbered by an apathetic White House, I maintain that a tempered
imperialism is now preferable. No other power or constellation of powers is able to provide even a
fraction of the global order provided by the United States. U.S. air and sea dominance preserves
the peace, such as it exists, in Asia and the Greater Middle East. American military force,
reasonably deployed, is what ultimately protects democracies as diverse as Poland, Israel, and
Taiwan from being overrun by enemies. If America sharply retrenched its air and sea forces, while
starving its land forces of adequate supplies and training, the world would be a far more anarchic
place, with adverse repercussions for the American homeland. Rome, Parthia, and Hapsburg
Austria were great precisely because they gave significant parts of the world a modicum of
imperial order that they would not otherwise have enjoyed. America must presently do likewise,
particularly in East Asia, the geographic heartland of the world economy and the home of
American treaty allies. This by no means obliges the American military to repair complex and
populous Islamic countries that lack critical components of civil society. America must roam the
world with its ships and planes, but be very wary of where it gets involved on the ground. And it
must initiate military hostilities only when an overwhelming national interest is threatened.
Otherwise, it should limit its involvement to economic inducements and robust diplomacy
diplomacy that exerts every possible pressure in order to prevent widespread atrocities in parts of
the world, such as central Africa, that are not, in the orthodox sense, strategic. That, I submit,
would be a policy direction that internalizes both the drawbacks and the benefits of imperialism,
not as it has been conventionally thought of, but as it has actually been practiced throughout
history.
 Solves Terrorism
Imperialism is key to combatting terrorism
Boot and Kirkpatrick 3 (Jeane Kirkpatrick, Max Boot, Senior Fellow for National Security
Studies, U.S. Imperialism: A Force for Good, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/us-imperialism-force-
good/p5959)
The record of nation-building during the past decade is clear: The United States failed in Somalia
and Haiti, where it pulled out troops prematurely. Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan show more
promise because U.S. troops remain stationed there. Afghanistan would be making even more
progress if the United States and its allies had made a bigger commitment to secure the
countryside, not just Kabul. If we want Iraq to avoid becoming a Somalia on steroids, we'd better
get used to U.S. troops being deployed there for years, possibly decades, to come. If that raises
hackles about American imperialism, so be it. The United States is going to be called an empire
whatever it does. It might as well be a successful empire.
 Solves Relations
Turn imperialism helps US-Sino Relations
Cheng 12 (Dean, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Complicated History of
U.S. Relations with China, Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/the-complicated-history-of-us-relations-with-
china)//BW
The result of these commercial, religious, and political connections was that relations between the
U.S. and China were good for much of American history. In the late 1800s, the powers of Europe
and Japan were expanding their colonial empires. Some of them wanted to break China up into
colonies, but U.S. leaders believed it would be better for American interests if China remained
independent and united. So, the U.S. supported an Open Door policy, which meant that China
would have an open door to foreign investment and trade, but no nation would control it. This
was a fundamental part of U.S. policy toward China through the end of World War II, and it kept
China from fragmenting and limited foreign exploitation. When Japan tried to expand its empire in
the early 1930s, the U.S. believed this violated the Open Door policy. Americas opposition to
Japanese expansion ultimately led the U.S. to deploy its Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor, where
Japan attacked it on December 7, 1941. Even before then, American volunteers, such as the
famed Flying Tigers, were fighting in China. When the U.S. entered the war, it flew squadrons of
B-29s from China, and sent it substantial amounts of aid. After the war, it was the U.S. that
insisted that China be included as one of the five Permanent Members of the U.N. Security
Council. Sino-American relations were not always good. The U.S. passed the Chinese Exclusion
Act in 1882; this marked the first time the U.S. had restricted immigration. The U.S. later
prohibited Chinese immigrants from obtaining citizenship because of their race, which it had
never done before. When U.S. forces joined other nations in protecting Americans and
Europeans in Peking during a rebellion (called the Boxer Rebellion) that began in 1899, some
Chinese branded the U.S. a foreign exploiter. Yet, after the war, the U.S. used some of the
reparations that China paid to establish the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Fund, an influential
education program in China.
 No Solvency
Too little too late imperialism has already taken roots in China
Waldron 91 (Arthur, Lauder Professor of International Relations in the Department of History at
the University of Pennsylvania, The Warlord: Twentieth-Century Chinese Understandings of
Violence, Militarism, and Imperialism, The American Historical Review, Vol. 96, No. 4, Oxford
University Press)//BW
ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE ADOPTED images, organizations, and rhetoric from Europe and the
Soviet Union during the 1920s, they never really adopted the essence of the Marxist
understanding of militarism, which saw it as the product of capitalism and imperialism and which
thus rejected any suggestion that a militarist held genuine autonomous power. No matter how
carefully they couched their arguments in Marxist terms, the Chinese continued to understand
that power came from the barrel of a gun and to act accordingly. No matter how hard they tried to
be Marxist economic determinists, Chinese on the left ended up as idealists of violence. No one,
not even Chen Duxiu, discarded completely the idea that the junfa had some independent power
derived from arms and not economics. The problem for Chinese thinkers was not the intellectual
status of violence but rather how to rid society of the pathology created when it was unleashed.
Some argued that violence should be used against violence: Gao Yihan, as we have seen, was
looking for the non-warlord general who would sweep the others away. Chen Duxiu envisioned a
powerful party that would crush the warlords. This approach usually included a strong central
force reforming China and pulling it together. Still others advocated a federal system of local
government as the only solution. The Western argument about militarism, in other words, was
transformed in its journey to China. This transformation may be seen clearly in Hu Shi's critiques
of the usage of the new (and he thought inappropriate) word junfa by Chen Duxiu and Liang
Shuming.

The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable Any alternative to US primacy

results in Nuclear Prolif and Global Instability
Tooley, 3-19 [Mark Tooley, Graduate from Georgetown University, Work at the CIA, 3-19-
2015, Christianity and Nukes American nuclear disarmament will not leave the world safer or
holier, The American Spectator, http://spectator.org/articles/62090/christianity-and-nukes] Jeong
Much of the security of the world relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which continues to
deter, protect, and intimidate. Doubtless China would vastly expand its own relatively minimal
nuclear arsenal and seek parity at least with Russia absent overwhelming U.S. power. Russias
nuclear arsenal is engorged far beyond its strategic needs, and that arsenal has in fact been
blessed by the Russian Orthodox Church, which evidently also falls outside the ecumenical
consensus. Some religious idealists imagine that disarming the West, mainly the U.S., will
inspire and motivate the world to follow suit. Such expectation is based on a fundamentally and
dangerously false view of global statecraft and human nature. The power vacuum that
American disarmament would create would inexorably lead to a far more dangerous and
unstable world where nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would
exponentially proliferate. American military and nuclear hegemony for the last 70 years has
sustained an historically unprecedented approximate global peace and facilitated an even more
unprecedented global prosperity. There is indeed a moral and strategic imperative for
America today, which is to deploy its power against further nuclear proliferation and to
deter aggression by current nuclear actors, while also developing technologies and defensive
weapons that neutralize nuclear armaments. If Irans genocidally ambitious regime is in the end
prevented from nuclearizing, it will only be thanks to American power. And if it does nuclearize,
only American and Israeli nukes, perhaps joined by Saudi nukes, will deter its murderous designs.
Christian teaching and humanity should demand no less.
Turn - American Primacy de-escalates South China Sea Tensions
disproves their ONLY specific scenario
NYT, 5-29 [ New York Times: Editorial Board, 5-29-2015, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/pushback-in-the-south-china-sea.html] Jeong
The United States has good reason to push back more forcefully against Chinas grab for power
in the South China Sea, as Defense Secretary Ashton Carter did on a trip to Asia this week. Beijing has repeatedly
ignored earlier warnings to moderate the aggressive behavior that is unsettling its regional
neighbors and further undermining its relations with the United States . On Friday, American officials disclosed
that China had installed two mobile artillery vehicles on an artificial island it is building in the sea, which is rich in natural resources like oil
and gas and where China clearly hopes to establish some form of hegemony. The weapons are not considered a threat to American naval
forces. Still, they reinforce fears that China intends to militarize the Spratly Islands, a collection of reefs and rocks also claimed by the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan, and use them to control the waterways shipping lanes and dominate its smaller neighbors.
Chinas ambitions have become increasingly clear since 2012 when it publicly asserted a claim to
80 percent of the South China Sea. In recent months, photographic evidence from commercial satellites and American spy
planes has left little doubt that China is moving with alarming speed to turn the Spratlys into more substantial land masses, complete with
runways and harbors. Some American officials now believe China regards its claims in the South
China Sea as nonnegotiable. If so, thats terrible news for the region but also ultimately for China, which claims it prizes
stability but will find it impossible to realize its economic goals if Asia is in constant tension. Chinas bullying on the South
China Sea has already caused many Asian countries to forge closer defense ties with the United
States. Now, the Obama administration has decided to more firmly underscore Americas intention to remain a Pacific power and to
ensure that the region and its waters remain accessible to all nations. That is a role the United States has played
constructively for decades, promoting a stability that has allowed Japan, South Korea and other
countries, including China, to develop. There should be no mistake: the United States will fly,
sail and operate wherever international law allows, as forces do around the world, Mr. Carter
said in his speech. He also called for an immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by all
claimants. Although the administration would obviously prefer a peaceful resolution of all
South China Sea disputes, it cannot allow Chinas claims to go unchallenged . It sent a
surveillance plane close to one of Chinas artificial islands, is considering air and sea patrols that could go closer to disputed reefs and
shoals, and is expanding military exercises with regional partners. President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China plan to meet later
this year. In the meantime, American officials and their Chinese counterparts must avoid any miscalculation that could lead to a direct
confrontation.

Eclipse of US Heg a long time away assumes their defense

Salvatore Babones is an associate professor of sociology and social policy at the
University of Sydney, 6-11-2015, "American Hegemony Is Here to Stay," National
Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089
Ultimately, it is inevitable that in the long run American power will weaken and
American hegemony over the rest of the world will fade. But how long is the long
run? There are few factual indications that American decline has begunor that it will
begin anytime soon. Short-term fluctuations should not be extrapolated into long-
term trends. Without a doubt, 1991 was a moment of supreme U.S. superiority. But so
was 1946, after which came the Soviet bomb, Korea and Vietnam. American
hegemony has waxed and waned over the last seventy years, but it has never been
eclipsed. And it is unlikely that the eclipse is nigh .

US allies ensure that US heg will last for centuries

Salvatore Babones is an associate professor of sociology and social policy at the
University of Sydney, 6-11-2015, "American Hegemony Is Here to Stay," National
Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089
Is it reasonable to treat Americas English-speaking allies as integrated components
of the U.S. power structure? Of course, they are not formally integrated into the U.S.
state. But the real, effective borders of countries are much fuzzier than the legal lines
drawn on maps. The United States exercises different levels of influence over its
sovereign territory, extraterritorial possessions, the English-speaking allies, NATO
allies, other treaty allies, nontreaty allies, client states, spheres of influence,
exclusionary zones and even enemy territories. All of these categories are fluid in
their memberships and meanings, but taken together they constitute more than just
a network of relationships. They constitute a cooperative system of shared
sovereignty, something akin to the power structure of the Roman Republic. No other
country in the world possesses, has ever possessed, or is likely to possess in this
century such a world-straddling vehicle for the enforcement of its will. More to the
point, the U.S.-dominated system shows no signs of falling apart. Even the revelation
that America and its English-speaking allies have been spying on the leaders of their
NATO peers has not led to calls for the dissolution of NATO. The American system
may not last forever, but its remaining life may be measured in centuries rather than
decades. Cycles of hegemony turn very slowly because systems of hegemony are
very robust. The American power network is much bigger, much stronger and much
more resilient than the formal American state as such.

Saying imperialism is the root cause for all oppression masks more violent
forms of oppression

Halliday 99
[Fred, Middle East Report, The Middle East at the Millennial Turn
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer213/213_hallliday.html]

Recent developments in the Middle East and the onset of new global trends and uncertainties
pose a challenge not only to those who live in the region but also to those who engage it from
outside. Here, too, previously-established patterns of thought and commitment are now open to
question. The context of the l960s, in which journals such as MERIP Reports (the precursor of
this publication) and the Journal of the North American Committee on Latin America (NACLA)
were founded, was one of solidarity with the struggles of Third World peoples and opposition to
external, imperialist intervention. That agenda remains valid: Gross inequalities of wealth, power
and access to rightsa.k.a. imperialismpersist. This agenda has been enhanced by political and
ethical developments in subsequent decades. Those who struggle include not only the national
groups (Palestinians and Kurds) oppressed by chauvinist regimes and the workers and peasants
(remember them?) whose labor sustains these states, but now also includes analyses of gender
oppression, press and academic suppression and the denial of ecological security. The agenda
has also elaborated a more explicit stress on individual rights in tandem with the defense of
collective rights. History itself and the changing intellectual context of the West have, however,
challenged this emancipatory agenda in some key respects. On the one hand, oppression, denial
of rights and military intervention are not the prerogative of external states alone: An anti-
imperialism that cannot recognizeand denounceindigenous forms of dictatorship and
aggression, or that seeks, with varying degrees of exaggeration, to blame all oppression and
injustice on imperialism, is deficient. The Iranian Revolution, Bathist Iraq, confessional militias in
Lebanon, armed guerrilla groups in a range of countries, not to mention the Taliban in
Afghanistan, often represent a much greater immediate threat to human rights and the principles
in whose name solidarity was originally formulated than does Western imperialism. Islamist
movements from below meet repressive states from above in their conduct. What many people in
the region want is not less external involvement but a greater commitment by the outside world,
official and non-governmental, to protecting and realizing rights that are universally proclaimed
but seldom respected. At the same time, in a congruence between relativist renunciation from the
region and critiques of "foundationalist" and Enlightenment thinking in the West, doubt has been
cast on the very ethical foundation of solidarity: a belief in universal human rights and the
possibility of a solidarity based on such rights. Critical engagement with the region is now often
caught between a denunciation of the West's failure actively to pursue the democratic and human
rights principles it proclaims and a rejection of the validity of these principles as well as the
possibility of any external encouragement of them. This brings the argument back to the critique
of Western policy, and of the relation of that critique to the policy process itself. On human rights
and democratization, official Washington and its European friends continue to speak in
euphemism and evasion. But the issue here is not to see all US involvement as inherently
negative, let alone to denounce all international standards of rights as imperialist or ethnocentric,
but rather, to hold the US and its European allies accountable to the universal principles they
proclaim elsewhere. An anti-imperialism of disengagement serves only to reinforce the hold of
authoritarian regimes and oppressive social practices within the Middle East.