xsting dictionaries and do a vast amount of| redefining. What meaning, for example ito be assigned to forbearance When fis determined Jnadvance that you are going wo refuse that ec fond Martini cockeai? You can truly forbear conly when you reftsin from doing something that its posible for you todo. Bu under the dleterminise dispensation itis not possible for you to accept the second cocktail Because ite hhasalready dictated your “No.” [am not ying that nature necessaely conforms to ou ings ‘ie usages, but human language habits that have volved over acons of time cant be neglected Inthe analysis af re choice and determinism. For Bure Refesion Finally, Ido not think thatthe term moral ‘responsibiley ean retain is teaitional mean ing unless feedom of choice exits, From the viewpoint of eties, law, and criminal law it is dificult to understand how 2 consistent Aeterminist Would have a sficent sense of Peeronal responsibilty for the development of decent ethical standards, But the question remains whether there have ever been or ea be any consistenr determinists or whether five choice runs so deep in human nature a5 an innate characteristic that, a6 Jean Paul Surte suggests, “We are not fee 10 cease being fee” ¥, Desi and eae Lamont srgumeat or fe wil: How conning it 2. Expin the lasoship bewcen See wil nd nr repo. amon comet sou the eelsonhip? 3. Dic the ight esos fr suporing the thes of wil, Which ones ae the men open which are he ee cogent 4 Busine an alate Sire’ tur, “We ae at eto cease bing is” What dee stat meat le te? vag Human Freedom and the Self RODERICK M. CHISHOLM [Roderick Chisholm (1916-1999) was profesor emestus of philosophy at Brown University and dicingushed author Se epistemology and metaphics, penning among other ties Peron and Object A Aetaplcal Siudy (1976) and Phowy of Knowledge (1989). In this say, he argues that fice actions ate posible bec cy 7 are caused, by indefinite long sequences of preceding events, but by an agent (oF sell). He cal the former kind of causation een exmazion and the late gent ex satin. Tn his view, when we at fel, we ace ike Genta prime mover tt felt \ tunmoved, an uncaused cane of evenRoderick M. Chisholm: Hamam Frecdone ana the Seif aad Seudy Quesions 1, Whats Chitoln' rgumest aga compatiism? 2. How does e dating Deeen event (or manent) cassion and get (oma en) cen? |, Ho dour tempt ose he oft bermeen determin and the notion of man binge reponse age A aff moves stone, and ic mare bx band, which mane by aa.” 1L-The metaphysical problem of human freedom Imight be summarized nthe following way human beings re responsible agent; but this fact appears co conf wth a deterministic view fof human ation (the view that every event that SS involved in an act cased by some otber rent); and it ali appears t cont with an Indetenminitic view of buman action (the view thatthe act or some event hat sesental tthe ltt is not cased all), To solve the probes, I believe, we must make somewhar fireaching ‘sumptions about the self oF the agent—about the man who performs the at. Peshaps it f needs to remark that, in all ietnood cis imposible ro ay anyhing signi Jeant abot this ancient problem tat has not been sat before Lets considersome decd or minded, that may be attributed ro 4 response agent one Iman, sy, shot another. Ihe man as esponsi- [Ne for what he di then, would ure, what as to happen a the time ofthe shooting Was some: thing that was erly wp vo the man himself "Thete was & moment at which it was tr, both that he cou have red the shot and alo that he {oul have refsned ro ing i And if hiss Soutien eventhough he dd fei he cull have Alone something eseinsead (He ha’ find hin fel the shot “aginst his wi as we sy.) T ‘ink we can say. moe general, te, that fa Ian is response fora cern eeat ofa cera state of ais (in our example, the sbootng of Snother man), then ar esen or sate of airs teas Brougit about by some act of his and the act “eas somthing that warn is power ether to per Them or not operon. ut now if the act which he aid pee was an act chat was ao in his power soto perfomm, then i could not have been caused or deter tine by any event hat was no sel within bis power ciher to bring about oF not to being Shout, For example, what we sy he di was Feally something that was broaght about by fecond man, one who forced his hand upon the triggers, OF who, by means of hyposs om pelle him to perform the ac, chen since the act tras caused by the wcond man ie was aothing hat ‘wae within the power of the fose mato prevent. [And precisely the same thing i ue, T think, i instead of referring t 2 second man who com pelle the firt-one, we speak instead of the Mesesand belie which the is an pens fhe had. Bor i what we say he did was rely something that was brought about by his onn beliefs and desires, if these bi and dessin the particule situation in which e happened 0 have Found hime ese him todo just what it “nas that we ny he did do, then, since eycaused it fe was unable wo do anything other than just vat ews that he did do. Temakesnoiference Ivhether the cause of the deed wat intemal or xterm ifthe cause was some state or event for lebih the man himself was aoc responsible, hen he was not responsible for what Wwe Iave been rmstakenly cling his act. IF Hood caused the poorly constracted dae wo beak, then, given the “Pom Rai ig Mann Feo nthe Sal ogi pals“ nly Tete ray Re 004 p38 epi permisfood and the constization a the dam the beeak, we may say, ud to ovcur and nothing could have happened in its place. And if he flood of| desire aused the weak-villed man t0 give in, the he, 100, had to do jus wht was that he sf do and he was no more responsible than was the dam forthe results that followed, (It ste, fof course, that f the man is responsible for the bits and desires that he happens to have, then hhe may aso be responsible for the things they lead fim to do. But the question now becomes ihe responsible for Use belies an desires he hhappens co ave? If he is, then there was time when they were within his power either to Acquire oF not to acquire, and we ae lf there Toce, with our gener point) ‘One may object: ut surely ithere were such ating 25. man whe relly god then be woul bbe response for things that he woud do, yet, he would be usable ro do aoything other than just what itis tha he docs do, since, being good, the will avaye choose to do’ what is best The answer, T dink, is suggested bya comment that ‘Thomas Reid makes upon anancent author. The author had sai of Cato, "He was good because Ihe could not be otherwise," and Reid observes “Thissoyng, understood tery and sty, 8 ‘ot the prave of Cato, but of his constitution, hich was no more the work of Cato than his essence? IF Cato was himself responsible for the good things thar he dd, then Cato 36 Reid SEES, was such hat, although he had the pote to do what was not good, he eerie is power only fr that which was good All ofthis, i i is tue, may give a certain amount of comlort to those who ae tender” minded. Bue we should eemind thean that it also conflicts with a familiar vew about the nature ‘of God—with the view that St.Thomas Aquinas expreses by sying that “every move ment both ofthe will and of nature proceeds fiom God a the Prime Mover” IF the at of | the sine did proceed from God a the Prime Move, then Gos was in the position ofthese: fond agent we just discussed the man who forced the wigge finger, othe bypnotit—and the sinner, so-called, was net responsible for hat be eid. (This may bea bold assertion, in view ofthe history of western theology, but I rust say that Thave never encountered 9 ingle ‘good reson Fr denying it) “There is one sandant objection to al ofthis and we should consider it bey. 3. The objection takes the form of a strata- igem—one designed to show that determin {and divine providence) i consistent with human responsiblity. The stratagem is one that was used. by Jonathan Edwards and by ‘many philosophers in the present century, ‘most notably, G. E. Moore (One proceed as fllows: The expresion (a) He could have done oxhrwise, itis angued, means no more nor ls than (b) Ihe ha chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise Clnplac of chosen,” ane might say ued," ee ‘uty decid,” “undertakes,” or wille.") The ‘auth of tacement (h, iis then pointed outs consistent with deteriaim (and with divine providence; fr eve iall of the man’s sctions were cuslly determined, the man could sil be such that, Phe had chosen otherwise, then be ‘would have done otherwise. What the murderer sv, let us suppose, alongwith his belies and esis, cansed im to fre the sot yet e was ‘sch that f us then, he had chosen oe decided tutto fre the sor, then he would not have fed it All ofthis is certainly possible. Similly, we ‘ould say, oF he dam, thatthe fod caused tt break and aso thatthe dam was such that, if tere had been no flood or any similar pressure, then the dam would have remained inact. And therefoze, che argument proceeds f(b) i cow sistent with determinism, and (2) and (6) say the sume hing, then (a) ako consistent with sleterminism; hence we can sty thatthe agent fel have done osherwse even though be was ‘aused to do what be did dos and therfore‘Redevick M. Chidbolm: Hieman Freedom and the Seif 405, determinism and moral responsibility are com: patie. Ts the argument sound? The conclusion folks from the premise, but the catch think, lis i he fist premise the one saying that statement (a) ell us no more not ess than what fMtement (b) tel us For (b), it would seem, ould be true while) fale. Thatta, uF ‘man might be such that, ihe had chosen to do ‘otherwise, then he would have dane caherwise, land yet ale such that he could not have done ‘otherwise, Sppose, aRer al that our murderer ould nor hve elven, or could aot have decided, todo otherwise, Then the fst that he happens koto bea man sch that, ithe had chosen not to shoot he would nothave shor, would make no Adfrence Forifhe could norhave chosen norto shoot, then he could noe have done anything ‘other than just what it was that he dit do. In a ‘word: rom our statement (9) above (I he had ‘hosen to do others, then he would have done otherwise"), we cannot make a inference to (a) above (“He could have done otherwise") tuless we can ali ast (He could have chosen wo do otherwise. And therefore, sf we mst reject this shit ftatement (e)y then, even though we may be justified in asserting (b), we are nos justified in ‘sorting (a. Ir the man could not have chosen to-do otherwise, then he would ot have done fetherse-even fhe Was such that, i he bud ‘chosen eo do otherwise, then he woul have ‘one otherwise "The stratagem in question, then, scems to me ‘to work and I would say, theretoe, shat the scription of esponslty cont witha deter ‘inte view of action 1. Perhaps there i ss nce to argv thatthe scription of responility alo comics with an indeterminitie view of action—wvith the view thatthe act, some event that sess to the fc jsnotened ata Ithe atthe ring he hota noe caused allie was oraitous oF ‘apricios, happenings to speak out ofthe ue, then, presumably, no one—and nothing —was responsible forthe ace Our conception of action, fherefre, should be ncither deterministic nor indterministc Is chere any oxhee posi? '. We must no say that every event involved inthe act sented by some ether even; and we ttt not say that he act something that snot Caused all. The possibilty that remains, there fore this: We shoud say tht atleast one of the tents that are involved inthe at caused not by any ocher events, but by something” eke inssead. And this something ese ean ony be the agent—ahe man. If theres an event that is Caused, not by other events, but by the man, then there ate some events involved in the att that are aot caused by ofr evens. Bur ifthe tent in question s caused bythe man then t used and we ae not committed to saying that tere someting involved in the act har n0¢ cased all But this, of cose, is 2 large consequence, implying something of considerable impor about the nature ofthe agent or the man 6. IF we consider only inanimate natural cht, we may say that causation, ii acs {uclaton beeween erent cr sats of afin The hams breaking was an event that was eed by 8 fet of other eventethe dam being weak, the float being stong, and soon. Bur ia man is responsible for a paral deed, then, if what 1 Take si tue, there is some event, ost of | ens that caused, ar by ther evens estates ‘fafa, but by the agent, whatever he may be T shall borrow a pale of medical ers, sing them, peeps, in away that i light liferent fiom that for ahich they were orginally intended. I shall say that when one evento sate ff ais (or set of events sates of ais) uses some other evento sate of afi, then tre have an instanceof tranenntcostion, And Tal ay thar when an agent, as distinguished fiom an event, causes an event or sate of ais, then we have an instanceof umament csation "The nature of what is intended bythe expe Son “immanent causation” may be lusrated bythis sentence from Aristotle's Pes “Thus, a sal moves a stone, and i moved by 4 hand, which is moved bya maa.” (VI, 5, 2569, 6-8) Ifthe man was sponse, then we have inthis ilastration a number of nsenses of causation mnt of them tanseuat bu teas one of them Jmmanent, What the staff di tothe tone as an instance oftanseunt eawsation, and ths we may Aeseribe it 36 2 relation between event he tmotion of che staff eased the motion of the stone" And Silay for wha the hard dil the staf “the motion of the hand case the motion of the staf” And, at we know from Physiology, there are sil other events which {aie the motion of the hand, lence we need hot inuodace the agent st this particular point, 2% Aristotle does—we need no, though we may, ‘We may say thatthe hand wae moved by the rman, but we may al sy dat the motion of the hand was caused by the motion of certain mus ‘les and we may sa thar dhe motion ofthe nus ‘les was caused by certain events that took place within the brain” But some event, and presu ably one of those that took place within the iain, was caused by the spent and not by any ‘other evens, There are of course, objections to thi way of potting he matter, shall consider the wo that Sem to me to be most important 7. One may object, fist "F the man does anything, then, a6 Arr remark suggest, ‘what he does to move the nn. But he cr ‘tainly does no d anything to his Braia-he may ‘ot even know tht he ls» ain And if he flocs do anything to the brain, and if the ‘motion of the hand was caused By something ‘hac happened within the brain then there sno Point in appealing to immancar catsation? a8 being something incompatible with “ranean ‘ausation’for the whole thing, aftr all i 4 ‘matter of causal relations among events or sates orate. ‘The answer to this objection, I think, this: Te is ve thatthe agent does ot de anything with his brain, or &o his brain, in the sense in hich he does something with hishnd and does Something tothe saff. But fan this it does not follow that the agent was not the immanent ‘ase of something that happened within his bain ‘We should note a sel itinction that has been proposed by Profesor A. I. Melden— namely, the distinction between ‘making some thing A happen” and “ding A” If each for the staf and pick ip, then one of the things tha Tos jus chat each for the sa and pick itup. Andis something that Ido then there isa very clear sense in which ie maybe said to be something that I know tht I do, Ifyou ask me, "Are you doing something, o tying todo some thing, withthe sa” T wil have no iiuly in finding an answer. But in deing something with the sa Talo make various things happen which are no inthis same sense things tht I > Tl make various aie aries move wl rea au ber of blades of gras from the presre that had ‘been upon them and T may cause a shadow to ‘move ffom one place to another. TF thee are merely things that I make happen, as distin Buished fom dings that I do, een I may know hothing whatever about them; I may aot ave the slightest idea that, in moving the staf, mn bringing about any such things the motion of sleparices, shadows, and blades of rss, ‘Wie may sys in ansver tothe frst obetion, therefore, that it i true that our agent docs nothing to his bein or with his brain, ut rom this it does no follow that ehe agente ot the immanent cause of some event within his brain, forthe bain event may be something which, ike ‘the motion ofthe ar-parices, he made happen In picking up the staf. The only liference benween the to case this in each is, he made Something happen when he picked up the sal bun the one ease~the motion of the apart les or of the shadow’-it was the motion of the ‘tal that caused the even to happen and in the other ease—the event that took place in the brani was this event tht caused the mation ofthe afl.Roderick M. Chishatma: Hamas Fresdem and the Seif ns ‘The points, ina word, hat whenever a man docs something A, then (by “immanent caus tion”) he makes eran cerebral event happen, sd this cerebral event (by ‘eanseunt causation’) takes A happen, 1. The second objection ie more difficul and ‘once the very concept of “immanent casa tion,” oe causation by an agent, as this concepts tobe interpreted here "The concep subject 10 2 ial which has long been associated with that ofthe prime mover unmoved. We ave id ‘that there mast be some event A, presumably some cerebral ever, which is aused not by any ‘cher event, but by the agent Since A was not ‘rose by any other event then the agent hin Self cannot be said to have undergone any ‘change of produced any other event (suchas a tof wl” or the ie} whic beoughe A about Buti when the agent made Ahappea, there was fo event involved other than A roel no event thi could be described as making A happes, What di the agent's auton cons oP What, for example, i the difference berseen A's ust happening, andthe agents ening Ato happen? ‘Werannotatibute the dillernce to any event that cok place within the agent. And 30 ir a8 the event A ite it concerned, there would seem to be no discemubledilerence. Thus As tote sal thatthe activity ofthe prime mover is nothing in addition to the movion tat i pro- dees, snd Suare ak hat “the action iin eal lay othing bur the effect ast flows from the agent Must we conchae then, that there is ro more to the man’ action in causing event A than there ito the event A'shappening by el? Here we wold ccm to have a dstinction with fut a ifrence—in which case we have led co find rie media berwcen a deterministic and an indcterminitic view of ston “The only answer, this, can be tht thatthe erence betwen the man's casing A, on the fone handy and the event A just happening, on the othr, ein the ft tha, ate st ase Bat por the second, the event A ans aused and was ‘xed by the man, There wa a bein ever As ‘he agent di in ct, cause the bran event; but here was nothing that he did wo casei This answer may aot eniely sts anit will be likely to provoke the following question ut what ae you rely ang tothe tserton that A happened when you ute the Words “The agent cane A to happen? As soon a we have pat the question this way, we see I think, that ‘whatever dificalry we may have encountered is ‘ne that may be raced tothe concept of custon fgencrlly whether “immanent” or “raaeu™ “The problem, in other words snot a problem that is peculiar #9 our conception of human stim. Ita problem that mane faced by a ‘ne who makes use ofthe concept of causation at alland therefore would say its a problem for ‘everyone but the complete indeterminis. For the problem, as we put refering justo “immanent exwsation,” or causation by an agent, swat this "Whats the iference between 05, ‘ofan event A, that A just happened and saying tha someone caused A to happen?” The aslo gous problem, which hols for“wranscunt caus: Hon; or causation by am event eis “Whats the diference between saying, of two events A nd B, tat B happened and then A happened, Sind saying chat Bs happening was the ee of ‘As happening?” And the only annwer that one ‘an give i hist in the one case the agent ‘wat the cause of ’s happening and inthe other ‘as event B vas the atse of A'shappening. The nator of tanec easton ino more cleat than shat of immanent exsition, 9. Bur we may plausibly saya there isa respectable pilesophial tation to which we may appedthat the notion of immanent easy tion, oF causation by an agen, i i fact more ‘eat than that of transeuntcustion, oF eas tion by an event, and that its only by under standing our own causal efficacy, a8 agents, that ‘we can grasp the concept of enue a al. Hane nay be td io ave shown that we do nok dive the concept of enue fom what we Perceive of extemal things. How, then, do we derive i? The ‘most plasble suggestion, seems to ne, that‘of Reid, once again: namely that “the concep tion ofan efficient cause may very probably be lerived from the experience we have hal» of ‘our own porwer to produce cern effects?” IF we did not understand the concept of immanent ‘usation, We would not understnd that of TO. Te may have been noted that 1 have avoided the term "free wl” in all ofthis, For ‘ven f heres such a aula he wil” which Somehow sets our ats agoing, the question of freedom, as John Locke sd sn the question Swhtber the wil be fee”, i is the question “Shesher a ma be fee”* For tthe isa “wil 231 moving ful, the question ie wheter the Iman is ee to wil to-do these things that he does will 0 do-and azo whether he ce nes to will any of those thing that he does wil do and again whether he fee to wal any of those things hat he docs aot will to do Jonathan Edwards ied to restrict hinel tthe ‘question "Is the man fice todo what eis hat he wils?™but the wer to this question will fot tellus whether the man is responsible for what itis that be oes will «0 dor Using stil Another pair of diel term, we may say that the metaphysical problem offcedom does not ‘concern the actus mperatus¢ does no concern the question whether we ae fe wo accomplish \whateveritis thar We will orst out to dotcom ‘ems the acns ius the queation whether we ae fice ro will orto sct out to do howe things that we do will oe er out to do, AL Ifwe are responsible, and ifwhat L have been ting to say is tac then we have pe rogative which some would attibute only to God: cach of us, when wea, 83 prime over ‘unmoved. In dong what we do, wees cern frents to happen, and nothing or no one — ‘uss so cause those events to happen 12. Ite ate thus prime movers unmoved and four actions, or those for which we are respon sible, ae no causally determined, then they are ‘ot causally determined by out desires And this ‘means tha the relation between what we want oF what we desire, onthe one hand, and what ts that wedo, on the other i nota smpe most philsophers wold ave i, We may clstinguish between what we might call the “Hobbit approach and what we might call the *Kantan approach” to this question, “The Hobbise approach isthe one tha i generally accepted at the preset time, but the Kantian approach, T bebeve, i the one that i tue According to Hobbism, if we fon, of some ‘man, what his belief and desires happen 10 be nl how song they are, if we know what he fees certain of, what he desires more than any thing ee, and iF we know the state of his body and what stimuli he is being subjected t0, then we may dds logically, ast wha iis that he will door, more curacy just what i that he wal ey, set out, or undertake to do. Thus Professor Mlden has sid that "the connection between wanting and doing i logic” But according to the Kantian approach to our prob lem, and this isthe one at | would ake, there 15 no such logical connection between wanting an doing, nor need Uhre even be a cus on tection. No set of statements about 4 man's deses, belief, and stimulus itaton a any time implies any statement eclling us what the man wil ty, set out, or uadereake to do a that time. As Reid put i, though we may “reson fiom men’s motives to thei tons andi many «ase, with great probabil,” we can never da with absolute eran.” ‘This means that, in one very sic sese ofthe terns, there can be no scence of man, IF we think of scence ay 3 matter of finding ou what laws happen to Bold, and if the statement of 2 low tell us wat kinds of events ae caused by at other kinds of events, then there wl Be hhuman acons which we cannot explain by subs suming them under any laws, We cnet say “It is causally necessary that, given such and such sesresand belie, and being subject to such and such stimuli, ce agent wil dso and 0.” Fr at times the agent ithe chooses, may ri above his desires and do something ee instes Bat all of tis constene with sing that, Perhaps more often shan not, ou desires do custRoderick M. Chisholm: Human Freedom and the Seif 409 under conditions such that those conditions focestate us to act, And we may also ay, with Teibni, that at other ties ur desies may “netne without ecesitating” 13. Leibnirs phrase presents us with our final pilesophical problem, What docs t mean to ay thats deste, ora mote, might “indie ‘without necessitating”? There is a temptation, certainly, to say that “to incline” means © ‘cause and tha “not to necesate” means ot to cause, but obviously we cannot have it both ways "Nor wll Libnia’s own slain do, In ise ter t0 Coste, he puts the problem as fllows When a choice & proposed, for example to go ‘out oe not to go out, ie isa queston whether, Wich ll the circumstances, internal and extemal, tmocives, perceptions, capostons, impressions, sions, inclinations taken together, Tam sili 2 contingent sate, o whether Iam necessitated to make he choice, foe example, to go out that istosay, whether this proposition ue and deter mined infact, In all shee sircwmtance ten tagetherT sal clone 19 go ots contingent OF recesay-"™ Leni’s answer might be put a8 follows in one sense of the term neces” and “contingent,” the proposition “In all these ‘Sreumtances tale together shal choose to go ‘ut? maybe sid to be contingent snd not nee tseay an in another ens ofthese er sy be sad tbe necessary and not consent. But the sense in which the proposition may be sito be contingent, according to Leiba, only this there no logis contradiction involved in deny: ing the proposition. And the sense in which it maybe sid to be necessary thie see “nothing ‘er occurs without cause or determining cea Son,” the propostion is causally neces. Whenever all the cirsumstances taken together are sch thatthe blunceof deliberation hea ier on one side than onthe other, is ceria and inflbe tha that isthe nde that going to win ‘ot But fwhat we have been saying ise, the proposition “In all these circumstances taken together T shall choose to go out,” may be ‘tally swell logically contingent Hence we snust find another interpretation for Leibnis's ntcment that our motives and deses may Indine us, oF influence us, «choose wiht ‘hereby necestating us to choose, Letus considera public official who has some moral senples but who aso, x one sys conld be had. Because of the scruples that he does have, he woulel never take any positive steps © receive 4 bribe he woul aot actively solicit ‘ne, Hut hi morality has its imis ane i also ich tha, f we were to confront him with ait econ orto let hin see what i about o hap ‘en ($10,000 in ish i Being deposited behind the garage), then he would succumb and be tunable to ress The general situation i fami- [atone and this one reason that pele pry bbe delivered fom temptation, (Te lo jsties Kane's remark: “And how many there ae who ‘nay have led along bamels lie, who are only Jfortwnat avin escaped 80 many temp tions" Ou relation to the mised that we contemplate may not be a mater simply of being able to being it about or not eo bring it about AS St Anselm noted, there aze at lest four possbiles, We may lsat them by re «rence to out public ofc an the event which ‘shi receiving the bribe, in the Following way (iy he maybe able o bring the event about him self facar ene), which ease he would actly ‘ate himself receive dhe bribe; (i) he may be ble to refain from bringing it about himself (nom facere ee), in which cae he would not Inimaclf do anyahing wo insure that he ceive the ‘bbe; (i) he may be able to do something 9 prevent the event from occuring. (cere fe) ia which ease he would make se tha the ‘$10,000 was mole Beind he garage; (i) he may be unable to do anything to prevent the rent foe cccurrng nom facere nao te), i ‘hich cae, though he may not solicit he bribe, the woul allow hime to keep it! We have cnviaged our ofeil aa man who can rest che fempation to (i) but cannot ress the tempea tion to (ie): he can retain from bringing the ‘vent about hinwel, but he cannot beng hin Seifto do anything to prevent ita0 PART FIVE: FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND DETERMINISM. ‘etus think of “ncination without acest ton," chen, in such terms as these, First we may contas the two proposions: (1) He can esis the temptation todo some- thing in order to make A happens (2) He can resist the rmptation to allow A to happen (ve to do nothing to prevent A from happening) ‘We may suppose thr the man has some dese to fave A happen and thus hae a motive fr making A happen. His motive for making A happen, Sgges, is one that nceitter provided that, because ofthe motive (1) ibe; he cannot est ‘the temptation to do something in onde to make Aappen. Hismotve fr msking A happen sone ‘tha tine provided that, because of te motive, (2)isblse; ike our public oficial, he cannot bring himself to do anjhing to prevene A fom ap ening. And therefore we can sy that this motive foc making A happen icone that inline but ds noe nvcesitane peonded that, because of the motive (1 sre and (2 le he can resist he {emptaton to make happen but he cannot ese the tempeaion to allow sto happen NorEs 1. The geneal postion toe presente here sugesed inthe Flowing weings among otete ‘Ato, Endemion Fay che 6; Ncomashern ii, Bi he 1-5; Thomas Reid, nyo the For Burtber Reflecsion “Asive Povo of Man: CA. Campal“a Foe Wl? {Pseudo rolen?™ Ming, 1981 1-65, Reick IM. Chisoim,-Responiatiy and Aoi sd [hurd Tylor, "Detemiation and the Theory of ‘Agency ia Deermiiom and Pr in the ie of Maier Seer. Scney Hook (New Vek, 1988). "Thomas Rey Eyam te Atve Powers of Mansy ch 4 (Work 600, 3. Sema Teac, Fit Pat of the Second Par, gu ("Oa the Vlutay an Iveta) “Tonathan Ewa Pde of the Wil (Now Hive, 1987).6- 1 Moor, fbi (Herne Univesty iar 1912) ch 6 S.A. 1, Molten, Fee Aton (Landon, 1961), ‘pecly ch. 3 Mr. Meds cn er, home Segue the contrary of hone thicae propos br Arto, Pig be ch. Sare, Dip ‘ios Metapbsicar, Dspuetion 18,10. "Res, Woks 524 8. sy oneming Human Undersanding Db ha 9, Meten, 166 20, Reid, Wry, 68, 612, "Late 1 Mr, Cote dela Neca ot dee Coningence” (1707) in Oper Papin el Ex mana, 397°9. 12 In the Preface tthe Metal Een of aig in Kant? Cris of rete Ream sed rh Wonk om he Toy of Enso TK Act (Condon, 1989) 303, TBC: DP Henry, “Seine Amln’s De Grane asi” Pompe Quarter,» (960), 115-26 Se Ancin od tha (an i) especie, maybe ‘hough of at frming the app le andthe upper Fhe corner oft square of apes, s(t (i) he ower et andthe tomer ight. 1. crits have choyght Chisholn's notion o age causation mserious—a ray i Sent kind of causation tan what scene recopniaer-making ee wll aly mye {Chisoln ter etoemaltes the s,s tet what “ha cle ageeetson subspecies of event sation.” How woul hi ew cospae ae agetcasaton and Feel es mero 2 Do you fd Chisholm’ argument pss compas pers? Esplin 8. tfactons were no eased by agents or ees (tere cm), woul fe wl al be pole Way ory not