Feldman 1

Parker Feldman

Professor Fowler

Honors PS 1010

29 March 2017

How the Promise of a "Great Society" Failed Detroit; The Legacy of Urban Blight

City blight, specifically blight in Detroit, is an entity that will not be brought down

overnight. It is a proverbial hydra, with multiple heads, that will need to be tackled one head at

a time, and slowly changed over the course of a few decades through policy. Policy, which seems

to be the only entity that can counter this problem, is roughly defined as A course or principle of

action adopted or proposed by an organization or individual (Oxford, 322). As noted in the

Kraft and Furlong reading, Any assessment of a public problem requires thinking about its

causes, how it came about and why it continues. The answers make a big difference in whether

and how public policy might resolve the problem (Kraft-Furlong, 129). Though many

governmental policies try to address the issues facing large urbanized areas such as Detroit in

regards to their overwhelming quantity of urban blight, none seem to make an incredible impact

because the vast majority of these policies do not address the foremost deep-rooted causes of this

issue.

Due to the crash of the housing market in both the 1930s and the early 2000s, the

sudden shift to suburban living and housing abandonment in the early 1950s, and the role that

developing technology played through the 1940s and 50s, urban blight has become a very large

issue effecting Detroit and many other urbanized areas. Blight is a very prominent issue, and

should be treated as such because blight has a multitude of effects, both directly and indirectly,
 Feldman 2

on the community that it subsides and in the communities around it. Housing or neighborhood

blight decreases property values of all structures around it, it poses an immediate health risk to

anyone living in the vicinity, and poses immediate psychological affects on an individual living

among blighted areas. Though all of this information is readily available, and well known, not

many people stress the issue of urban decay and blight removal nearly as much as it should be.

One individual who is well known for putting their foot down when it came to urban blight was

Lyndon B. Johnson. Major housing legislation was enacted in three of President Johnson's five

years in office, and [These] bills established a Department of Housing and Urban Development

and created several innovative programs to help low-income families and individuals obtain

adequate housing and to assist the nation's cities in rebuilding their deteriorating areas

(Billitteri, 1).

The Model Cities Program was a large part of U.S. President Lyndon Johnson's Great

Society and War on Poverty. The Model Cities Program, which at the time of Congresss

approval of it was known as demonstration cities, was an important part of the Great Society

concept because this program aimed to establish a coordinated, multi-fronted attack on urban

blight and substandard housing nationwide. This plan, proposed and passed at the national level

of government, authorized special federal grants to urban areas for a coordinated attack on

Blight that would tackle social problems as well as such physical problems as substandard

housing (CQ Public Affairs, 1). This government plan also incentivized governments of

blighted cities to contribute to eradicating this problem by writing off expenses going towards

the removal of blight, and guaranteeing federal grants equal to as much as 80 percent of the

financial contribution towards the issue (CQ Public Affairs, 2). The grant funds were allocated

to be spent first to help fund any new or existing program in the plan which did not receive
 Feldman 3

sufficient federal aid. If any funds remained they were to be used to alleviate the costs of the

local contribution to these federally assisted programs(Walling, 3), this meaning that people had

to pay less money out of their earnings for taxes towards these programs that the government

requires an individual to contribute funding to. By the time President Johnsons time was done in

office in 1969, the program was well established, only struggling in a minimalistic sense, and

was projected to thrive and continue to serve its intended purpose.

However, after very close votes in Congress over reducing federal aid spending to many

of Johnsons programs, Congress threatened quite a few times to stop supplying the funds to fuel

these programs. Funds were starting to be provided at much lower levels than was authorized,

and this led to the eventual collapse, and overall failure of the Model Cities Program. The Model

Cities Program was backed socially by a vast majority of people, and embraced fully the idea

that a society does not need to suffer through blighted housing, increasing socioeconomic

barriers, and inadequate housing. Citizens of big cities, where most of the U.Ss population

resides, fully backed this plan, and did not throw up any barriers to stop it. The main barrier

came from the national governmental sphere of influence, and the local city-oriented sphere of

influence. From the perspective of the government, Johnsons Model Cities Program was costly,

and was not likely to succeed, and was deprioritized. This deprioritization arose because during

the latter half of Johnsons time as president, federal budget policy was dominated by the

unexpectedly expensive Vietnam War, thus leading to excess federal money to be moved away

from his social welfare programs, and funneled into military and defense spending.

The largest problems facing the success of Johnsons Model Cities Program came from

the very thing that he was so desperately trying to fix; the blighted cities themselves. The cities

were given excess government funding and aid to reduce the amount of blight in their allocated
 Feldman 4

areas, and were even coerced with illegitimate power in the form of incentives and bribes to

participate in Johnsons programs, but still, this had a minimalistic effect at most. Johnsons

solutions proved to be only temporary as blighted areas still increased in numbers, and the work

involved was not viewed as equivalent to the reward of completion. When Johnson first

introduced these new social-welfare based programs, cities were onboard and ready to act, but

towards the end of his term, when defunding of these programs began, major cities immediately

lost interest in their continued efforts towards blight removal and housing redevelopment. Cities

did not view the 80% excess reimbursement for their efforts as worthwhile to contribute any

major change to their urban development and planning agenda, and basically did not continue to

embrace and partake in the program.

Johnsons Model Cities Program, at its induction, overcame many different social barriers

placed before it. Alan Mallach, an expert on how federal policy should shape Americas

distressed older cities, says that The federal government should pursue opportunities to make

catalytic investment in transformative projects and maximize the potential of the cities anchor

institutions to build the local and regional economy (Mallach, 1). This is exactly what Johnsons

Model Cities Program set out to do, and at first it was accomplishing its goals, successfully

increasing blight removal efforts made by local and national communities, and reduce[ing]

blighted areas by a margin of 10-17% in many large cities(Congress and the Nation, 2).

Johnsons program bridged social gaps, and many different affluent people were providing aid to

the effort such as J.P Morgan, and both the Henry Ford and the Rockefeller Foundations. But

this effort fell short of its goal when cities did not feel as if the work was worth their overall

compensation and benefit, thus the policy slowly went into a downwards spiral. The main

catalyst for the failure of Johnsons Model Cities Program was the diversion of social interest,
 Feldman 5

and the deviation of government funds to these programs that was spurred by the introduction of

America into the Vietnam War. Congress had absolute power in this situation, because they had

legal-rationale authority to deny Johnson his funding for his programs in the interest of the

nation, which is exactly what happened. Johnsons funds for his programs were nearly reduced to

less than a fourth of what they were originally, and ultimately the programs were placed on the

backburner.

One can trace the initial limitations to the success of Johnsons Model Cities Program to

the governmental sphere, specifically congress, and it is easy to see where social change was

limited. But, instead of placing the blame solely on congress, one must put themselves in their

own shoes, and consider the limitations that congress itself faces when dealing with legislation

requiring large amounts of federal aid. On the eve of adjournment in the fall [of 1966],

[Congress] approved a near record $58.1 billion fiscal 1967 defense appropriations bill,

including Vietnam-related funds estimated at more than $13 billion. Estimates near the end of the

session set the cost of the war at $2 billion a month (Politics and National Issues, 2). In the face

of these rising defense costs, Johnson made claims that the nation could afford both the Vietnam

war and his proposed social welfare programs, but, his republican opposition said that the choice

must be made between one or the other, and that America could not currently afford both guns

and butter. By mid-1966, it was apparent that the fiscal 1966 budget, originally estimated at

below $100 billion, had ballooned to $107.0 billion. The fiscal 1967 budget was expected to

reach $126.7 billion (with a $9.7 billion deficit for the year) (Politics and National Issues, 2),

thus forcing congress to choose the protection of the country over the remodeling of the country.

Economic limitations were the root cause of Johnsons programs failure, which caused the
 Feldman 6

governmental sphere of power to not be cooperative enough with Johnson to let his programs

survive and perform how they were preordained to.

Learning from this failure, current legislators and advocates for the reduction of blight in

urban environments can take away two very helpful tips for succeeding in making a positive

social impact. One of these lessons being to more carefully plan out their policy design before

implementing legislature. The term policy design refers to the careful consideration, during the

policy formulation stage, of the role of government agents and the target population (Kraft-

Furlong, 137). This meaning that if legislatures more carefully plan out exactly what role

government will have in implementing their policies, and specify exactly which areas/cities will

be affected by their policy, it will be a lot easier to enact social change, and to regulate exactly

what the policy is achieving and who/what it is affecting. If this lesson was applied to targeted

blight removal policy, specifically legislation affecting Detroit, it would make it a lot easier to

allocate funding to specific areas, plan out exactly when and where government funded workers

will be contributing to blight removal efforts, and slowly contribute to the seemingly impossible

effort of removing urban blight entirely.

The second historical lesson learned from Johnsons failure to succeed is the idea that a

coordinated effort must be as centrally focused as possible. This meaning that the efforts should

deal with local governments of effected areas, rather than the National government, and should

be appropriated government funding from the city/states budget, not from the federal budget.

This idea will lead to less confrontation and controversy over the usage of these funds, and will

eliminate the possibility of a sudden redistribution of previously allocated funds to other areas of

focus. Johnsons biggest downfall was the restrictions placed on him by a constantly changing

federal budget and social interest. Keeping the efforts local eliminates this possibility entirely,
 Feldman 7

and almost assures that all funding allocated at the beginning of the fiscal year will be strictly

used for the cause of reducing urban blight, and keeping at-risk areas from becoming blighted

themselves.

Urban blight is a pressing issue facing the city of Detroit, and the demands to counteract

it are morphing, skewing, and increasing daily. Learning from Johnsons mistakes in his Model

Cities Program, effective headway can be made into reducing blight in Detroit and in other urban

cities within the U.S. Though Johnsons efforts may have failed in the end, he succeeded in

getting his programs passed, and provided a good springboard for future policies involving urban

city renewal in the future. The issue with failed policy is not that the policy needs to get better,

it needs to become smarter. Policy needs to have a pinpoint focus to successfully make a large

impact in any community, and Johnsons failures in his Model Cities Program provide perfect

insight to Detroit policy makers on how to make their policies smarter and ultimately

successful at achieving their goals of blight reduction and eradication in and around the Detroit

metropolitan area.
 Feldman 8

Works Cited

(1) "Economic Policy, 1965-1968 Overview." Congress and the Nation, 1965-1968. Vol. 2.

Washington: CQ Press, 1969. 119. CQ Public Affairs Collection. Web. 28 Mar. 2017.
(2) "art, n.1." OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2016. Web. 24 March 2017.
(3) Kraft, Michael E., & Furlong, Scott R. 2010. Public policy: Politics, analysis, and

alternatives (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press, Chapter 5). Web. 26 March 2017.
(4) Walling, Dayne. "Battling Blight." The American City & County 129.2 (2014): 14.

ProQuest. Web. 26 Mar. 2017.

(5) Billitteri, Thomas J. "Blighted Cities." CQ Researcher 12 Nov. 2010: 941-64. Web. 12

Feb. 2017.
(6) Alan Mallach, Facing the Urban Challenge: Reimagining Land Use in Americas

Distressed Older CitiesThe Federal Policy Role. Brookings Research, Brookings.edu.

Web. 28 March 2017.

(7) "Economic Policy, 1965-1968 Overview." Congress and the Nation, 1965-1968. Vol. 2.

Washington: CQ Press, 1969. 119. CQ Public Affairs Collection. Web. 28 Mar. 2017.
(8) "Politics and National Issues, 1965-1968 Overview." Congress and the Nation, 1965-

1968. Vol. 2. Washington: CQ Press, 1969. 1. CQ Public Affairs Collection. Web. 28 Mar.

2017.