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Ethnic Division in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Gabriella Gricius

Rich in complexity and ethnically divided beyond what a peace treaty can simply
fix, Bosnia Herzegovina is, to many, the fundamental case study of Europes periphery.
Political breaches and economic disparities combine to create a melting pot where
unemployment, by some estimates, reaches over 40% and writs of the central government
are taken with a grain of salt. High levels of corruption mixed with a propensity to secede
on the behalf of Republika Srpska continue to haunt policymakers worldwide, whether
they be European Enlargement Officers, American security experts or Balkan specialists.
From the standpoint of an American security official acknowledging the large amount of
aid that is given to Bosnia, there are many problems with this picture. The internal strife
after a succession, followed by widespread regional instability and the eventual formation
of an extremist stronghold are risks that the United States cannot allow to take place if it
wants to maintain the success of the Dayton Peace Accords, while preserving stability
and preventing the spillover effect in the wider European region.
Although the Bosnian War of 1992-1995 is generally seen as a 20th century self-
determinism war, the ethnic motivations behind that conflict permanently remain as the
borders of Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, entities
established by the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. While the third autonomous entity,
Brko District, remains neutral, the two larger subsections of Bosnia face the costs of a
violent past and troubles for its complex future daily. Continuing struggles such as the
slow and volatile process to joining both the European Union and NATO generally end in
struggle, as there is little to no internal dialogue on these external issues. Although
Bosnia did enter into the Stabilization and Association Process in 2008 for EU accession,
there has been little to no progress as the Sejdi-Finci 2009 European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) case on governmental ethnic representation has not been determined.
This case states that governments cannot have ethnic discrimination within their regime;
however, there exists this very system within the Dayton Accords which restricts
government involvement to the three ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks.
Other than political issues, however, Bosnia faces struggle with its economic
situation, consequences of the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia and the
large and seemingly unsolvable issue of the Republika Srpska. As a country, Bosnia must
not only deal with its complicated past, it must face the hard economic realities of the
future. Unemployment exceeding 40% has led to protests against the privatization of
popular factories. Austerity measures suggested by the International Monetary Fund have
increased a growing sense of resentment, as it has been illustrated that austerity may be
aggravating living conditions within Bosnia. While many Bosnians, Croatians and
Bosnian Serbs have joined together through protests in the hope of bringing down the
corrupt practices of their government, President Dodik of the Republika Srpska has stated
that the protests are a threat to Republika Srpskas existence, and that he will resort to a
more reactive police presence if protests reach the violent level they have been exhibiting
within the Federation.
The International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia brings historical conflicts to
the present, and although useful in bringing many to justice, keeps old wounds from
healing in present-day Bosnia. It focuses minds on recent conflicts and exacerbates
tensions while concurrently preventing the country from focusing on an integrative
approach. Currently, the Bosnian Serb wartime president, Radovan Karadzic, is on trial
for charges of genocide. It is unfortunate, however, that many of the trials that are taking
place at The Hague are seen by the losers of the conflict, mainly the Bosnian Serb
perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, as being bias towards the victors of the war. Moreover,
countries involved such as Serbia and Croatia are often unwilling and only cooperate to
the extent to which they are forced. Nevertheless, the Tribunal has its benefits. It does
ensure these criminals will never again lead Bosnia into war.
tensions while concurrently preventing the country from focusing on an integrative
approach. Currently, the Bosnian Serb wartime president, Radovan Karadzic, is on trial
for charges of genocide. It is unfortunate, however, that many of the trials that are taking
place at The Hague are seen by the losers of the conflict, mainly the Bosnian Serb
perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, as being bias towards the victors of the war. Moreover,
countries involved such as Serbia and Croatia are often unwilling and only cooperate to
the extent to which they are forced. Nevertheless, the Tribunal has its benefits. It does
ensure these criminals will never again lead Bosnia into war.
While Bosnia may have a central government meant to bring together all three
districts, the fact of the matter is: regional governments pay little to no attention to it.
This stems partially from the lack of participation that Republika Srpska exhibits towards
this government. Milorad Dodik, the President of Republika Srpska, consistently
threatens succession and rarely follows writs of the central government. The lack of
legitimacy also comes from a split on recognition of Kosovo. While the Federation wants
to recognize Kosovo, the Republika Srpska has made itself clear that it stands with Serbia
on the issue that Kosovo remains a part of Serbia, regardless of what the international
community says to the contrary. However, the Republika has also stated that if a majority
of UN/EU states approve Kosovo, the Republika will use this very case as a precedent to
call for a referendum, while otherwise, the ethnic veto can trump the possibility of
succession The complicated foreign relations that the Republika Srpska continues to
follow compound this. Recently, the Republika Srpska opened an Office for Cooperation
Trade and Investment in Washington a move some would label separatist. However,
while the Republika Srpska is busy showcasing its secessionist wants externally, the
presence and actions of the international community within Bosnia point to exactly the
opposite sentiment. The Office of the High Representative, mandated by the Dayton
Peace Accords, is an expression of the foreign authority articulated through a position of
ultimate weight, which aims to put in place the historical civilian portions of the Dayton
Peace Agreement.
Republika Srpska has a history that begins with ethnic strife, which continues to
plague its every move. Its lack of consensus with the central government has led to a
partnership stretching solely to a common currency and fiscal policy. Even the president
consistently meets with his Serbian counterpart to discuss policies to better the conditions
and livelihood of the Serbian people, despite the fact they live in two separate countries
and he does not speak to the central government president. Much of this is attributed to
the Dayton Peace Accords, the end of which gave the Republika Srpska an unprecedented
amount of control. Although the central government was created to bind both parts of
Bosnia together, the new status quo is a weak government whose bonds with the
Republika Srpska are little to none.

Future Conflict
Ethnic division plagues Bosnia specifically through the possibility of succession,
and the probable outcomes from the realization of that goal: an extremist stronghold,
regional violence and internal strife. The continuing importance of the Dayton Peace
Accords, economic concern and hopes for stability that keep the United States engaged.
Future conflict in Bosnia is a situation that is a continuing concern as secessionist
sentiments are seen in the popular culture and political rhetoric of the Republika Srpska.
It is not merely speeches by Dodik that gives rise to such anxieties. Actions by the
general populace, such as the glorification of crimes within the Republika mingled with
racist graffiti and rhetoric, are indicators that the possibility of violence is not so far
fetched. Furthermore, there are many different indicators that have shown although there
is no declaration of independence that result is mainly because they dont have the
international support necessary to support such a move. Small steps taken in the Serbian-
Republika Srpska relationship, such as the Agreement on Special Parallel Relations, a
mutual cooperation agreement which notably provides free movement of peoples, goods,
and capital, illustrate that this Bosnian entity finds more in common with Serbia, than it
does Bosnia. Ethnically, this is no new fact, but a political referendum could result in a
far worse outcome. Another self-determinist war in the Balkans would mean an
acknowledgment of the international community that it did fail in suppressing violence
and tensions from the 1990s. Another war would also provide a perfect breeding
conditions for extremist and ethnic violence a situation that no one wants, repeated.
Despite its removal from typical focuses of American foreign policy, such as the Middle
East and China, Bosnias unstable future combines a number of problems worldwide, all
of which need to be studied and solved.
American interest originates from the peace efforts made as the last Bosnian war
wound to a close. Showing a concentrated effort to avoid further ethnic cleansing, the
acknowledgment of the international community that it did fail in suppressing violence
and tensions from the 1990s. Another war would also provide a perfect breeding
conditions for extremist and ethnic violence a situation that no one wants, repeated.
Despite its removal from typical focuses of American foreign policy, such as the Middle
East and China, Bosnias unstable future combines a number of problems worldwide, all
of which need to be studied and solved.
American interest originates from the peace efforts made as the last Bosnian war
wound to a close. Showing a concentrated effort to avoid further ethnic cleansing, the
Dayton Peace Accords were a masterminded effort by both Western European countries
and the United States. Much of what we have established today as peacekeeping is from
the protocol and supposed success of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995. Unfortunately,
this places a weight upon these Peace Accords, and they must remain successful so that
both our allies and enemies are convinced that we have solved the Bosnian Question.
Even though the primary player in Bosnia right now is the European Union, a Bosnian
failure would ultimately represent a Western failure.
Continued American aid and military force has decreased in the past years,
though the United States continues to support integration within the European Union.
This is primarily achieved through financial aid, such as the $39 million in assistance
during 2012, and $42 million in 2011, given for fighting terrorism and corruption within
the state government. However, this large amount in aid indicates that the United States
is, at the very least, economically interested in ensuring that Bosnia does not fall into a
civil conflict.
While American continued concerns could be traced to the Bosnian war and
economic support, the future potential for increased conflict in Europes backyard, the
current issue of a failed state, is also acknowledged by American intelligence, which
categorizes Bosnia as volatile. The United States has seen examples of what failed
states can give rise to: a center for terrorism, ethnically motivated violence and yet
another possibility for the further development of violence within the same region.
Bosnia may not be in the Middle East, but the Bosniak Muslim population makes up a
large portion of society, and is as of yet largely unencumbered by Islamic extremism that
has swept the rest of the world. While that may be the status quo of today, with the advent
of more violence there is no telling if this population would be riled up significantly to
conduct their own ethnically-motivated violence or if the influx of religiously motivated
terrorists could enhance the stresses of poverty, corruption and unemployment.
From a larger perspective, the United States shouldnt be simply worried about
the internal violence that could very well result from a guerrilla war breaking out within
Bosnia. They should be concerned about the regional impact and the spillover effect.
Instability within Eastern and Central Europe is not a new trend, but neither will the issue
fade into history. The case of Europes periphery has often bled into Western Europe as
ethnic and self-determinist conflict reminds other countries of their own situations and
complaints. The situation of Kosovo is an oft-used example of a successful secessionist
movement, which did not incite regional instability. However, it is one that ignores the
large amount of humanitarian-minded international involvement. There is little to no
chance that larger countries would support a Republika Srpska bid for succession. The
issue of precedent is just too problematic for larger countries with an interest in the
situation, such as the United States or the European Union to support such a move.
However, similar states within the Balkans may view such a movement as inspiration for
their own ethnical independence crusade. This has not occurred as of yet. However,
looking at situations which already exist such as the frozen conflict of Transnistria within
Moldova and currently developing issue of Crimea in Ukraine there is no question that it
may take little more than a spark to set off additional years of bloodshed.
Arbitrarily drawn borders throughout Eastern Europe ignored the ethnical realities
of many countries and peoples, and it is a success that internal strife has not already
consumed a number of countries despite a high probability. American interest, therefore,
does not only extend to Bosnia because of peace accords, it also branches to Eastern
Europe as a whole in advocating the avoidance of regional infighting. However, the real
problem lies in determining which smaller issues will branch into a regional trail of
violence. The impasse plaguing the struggle between Republika Srpska and the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina may lead to destabilization of the country of
Bosnia as it is known, or it may extend into other countries. What this means for
American national security concerns is that both internal and regional issues are
significant in examining Bosnia and the issue of ethnic division, and that one cannot be
ignored for the sake of the other.
While the United States has interest in Bosnia as it relates to the Dayton Peace
problem lies in determining which smaller issues will branch into a regional trail of
violence. The impasse plaguing the struggle between Republika Srpska and the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina may lead to destabilization of the country of
Bosnia as it is known, or it may extend into other countries. What this means for
American national security concerns is that both internal and regional issues are
significant in examining Bosnia and the issue of ethnic division, and that one cannot be
ignored for the sake of the other.
While the United States has interest in Bosnia as it relates to the Dayton Peace
Accords and regional instability, it also has much to do with the possibility of terrorism.
As evident in Syria, when countries fall into disarray and lose key elements of civil
society, there is a strong likelihood that terrorism will be the end result. Without
reasonably robust governments to consistently watch their borders, countries with
internal strife are breeding grounds for new terrorist activity. Though we have experience
with this generally in the Middle East, Europe would be an unprecedented center for this
kind of activity. Because of lax border controls due to the Schengen Agreement
throughout Central, West and East Europe the probability of foreign militants entering
greater Europe through Bosnia, should it turn to internal strife, would be high.
Framing the problem in terms of current events, it resonates clearly when one
compares the Bosnian problem with the situation in Ukraine. While the United States
doesnt have particular interest in Ukraine, the fact that Crimea, the eastern ethnically
Russian portion of Ukraine, may return to the Russian fold sets off warning bells
worldwide. Not only does it peak American security concerns in the case of Russia and
possible expansion, it also illustrates to smaller countries that, even in this day and age, it
is possible to occupy another territory as long as you cite protection concerns. In
particular, Serbia is a candidate for these views because the majority population within
the Republika Srpska is ethnic Bosnian-Serbs. Again American national security advisors
should be apprehensive. If countries call for independence on the basis of ethnicity, much
progress made under the American name for regional stability would be undone.
Bosnia may not be another Afghanistan or Iraq in terms of severity. However, the
ethnic divisions that this country faces are not so easily dismissed. The high intensity of
political rhetoric and actions within the popular culture of Republika Srpska are an
indicator more than anything else that an increased amount of ethnic-nationalist tension
has been building within this region. Despite the lack of serious violence between ethnic
groups as of late due to economic concerns, the issue is undeniably important for
Americans to watch. Through the lens of public relations, the region is important because
at this high tide of anti-American rhetoric, it is significant that we maintain a certain
status worldwide. From an American security concern, Europes proximity to the
problems that Bosnia faces could inflict two damaging consequences: (1) regional
instability that would likely spread throughout the Balkan region, and (2) create a terrorist
epicenter where movement to Europe and other regions would no doubt be exploited.
Bosnia needs all the attention from American security experts it can get, because whether
or not it is considered important, what happens within the small country can impact not
only its Slavic cousins, but the whole of West, Central and Eastern Europe problems
that the United States cannot allow to take root.

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