Ronald King

PHST-P301-23464
Exam #1
September 27, 2016

1. Civil society is defined by Brian OConnell as represent(ing) the balance between the

rights granted to individuals in free societies and the responsibilities required of citizens

to maintain those rights (pp. 10-11). In his Notes for Chapter 1 of Civil Society,

Philanthropy, and the State of the Commons, Sievers quotes Jrgen Kocha. Regarding

civil society, Kocha describes it as:

the space of societal self-organization existing between the state, market,

and private sphere, a realm of associations, circles, networks, and non-

governmental organizations that assume and expect it to be a space of

public discussion, conflict, and understanding, a sphere of independence

of individuals and groups, a realm of dynamic change and innovation and

a place for the pursuit of the common good (pp. 147-8).

Sievers refers to seven defining elements, those institutions that a community

must harbor in order to incubate an effective and robust civil society. These

institutions are philanthropy, the common good, rule of law, nonprofit and

voluntary institutions, individual rights, free expression, and tolerance. Without

each of these elements, Sievers argues, not only can civil society not exist, the

conditions necessary for liberal democracy are missing.

Philanthropy, of course, is voluntary action for the public good (Payton, p. 27).

This maxim implies that an ideal of public good (or common good) must exist
for philanthropic purpose. Although rule of law might not be implemented for

purposes of common good in all arenas, within any civil society the more must be

more than theoretical. Rule of law, also, protects philanthropy in that it ensures

the framework in which an intended gift can be assured of reaching its target,

rather than they who possess the power to wrest it free. Individual rights, a

hallmark of philanthropy (after all, a philanthropist has to have the right to

determine how ones gift is best deployed), is only made possible through rule of

law. The idea of common good would scarcely matter if we did not matter as

individuals. Too, free expression is another necessary condition of philanthropy,

necessary in most cases to discerning the common good, impossible without rule

of law, and one of the most essential natural rights. Philanthropy could be

squashed if not for tolerance. Tolerance is an essential condition for establishment

of the common good. Tolerance is an underrated component of the rule of law

(after all, tolerance ensures that laws are not arbitrarily applied). Individual rights

and the right to free expression, though they would certainly exist, do not mean

much in intolerant spheres. As organized institutional expressions of all these

conditions, nonprofit organizations are a microcosm of civil society in general,

which is to say they simply could not exist without the others.

The institutional structure most heartily referenced by Tocqueville as being at the

heart of civil society in America was the private association. Although the nature

of engagement in private association would extend beyond the churches that were

so familiar to the Europeans that populated the colonies, the conditions fomented

by private associations, and the conditions that would intrigue Tocqueville and
strike him as being so at odds with the violent factionalism of Europe, were

directly attributable to colonial religions embrace of pluralism.

Pluralism, a term that naturally crops up in most literature relating to philanthropy

and civil society, refers to the tendency to acknowledge diverse and divergent

philosophies in the belief that to do so stimulates productive discourse and action

to benefit society as a whole. It is the American tendency to embrace pluralism

that allows for the relative success of the third sector in shaping our world

(O'Connell, p. 75). Tocqueville asserted that the religious underpinnings of

American society tempered the excesses he deemed inherent to democracies. In

embracing pluralism, organized religion in the United States strengthened civil

society by asserting the right of its adherents to participate, priming the pump for

association and participation in secular matters. What was a fairly radical idea in

Tocquevilles day is now accepted fact, and insulates, at least somewhat, from

insularity.

Pluralisms prominence as a factor in the growth of civil society in the Colonies

was, of course, made possible by tolerance. The nascent United States was, of

course, not a true democracy, but a democratic republic. Yet even with the

potential pool of dissenters more than halved (at least those that may have had a

real voice at the time, owing to conditions of wealth that eliminated even many

white males from participation in the political process), enough difference existed

amongst the people that, in order for the people of the United States to be free, it

was imperative that those differences be put aside in order to come together. It
was imperative that the common good be elevated, or at least those aspects of the

common good that were common enough to be agreed upon.

As for the majority of colonists who found themselves without a say in the

direction of their new nation, only their participation in other aspects of civil

society, such as participation in associations that might not have had the draconian

conditions of membership as suffrage, kept their whistle whetted. It must have

been the relative peace with which these people contented themselves with having

their voices heard in these other essential spheres which so impressed

Tocqueville. Without the benefit of tolerance, none of this would have been

possible, nor the conditions which would result in something approaching

universal suffrage over the ensuing 140 years.

As the underpinnings of civil society seem to sway in our current political

climate, one might be tempted to eschew the ideal of free expression. After all, if

the ultimate destination of free expression is the belief that one can be best elected

president by polluting the ears of the electorate with the most daring lies, the

temptation to muzzle in the name of truth is huge (or yuge, as it were). Palmer

Luckey, a man worth nearly one billion dollars, has been found to be exerting his

political influence through the art of shitposting (Ingraham, 2016), defined

ungrammatically but succinctly by urbandictionary.com (what has the world come

to when I have to cite urbandictionary.com in a political analysis) as (w)orthless

overly offensive generally racists posts written in a manner which aggravates

others (Milk, 2010). Not incidentally, the purpose of posting these offensive

memes is to aggravate potential adversaries into bailing on discussion.

Though such acts seem to upend the whole concept of civil society (even having

to live in a world where this is what passes for influence peddling seems to mock

the idea of civil society), these attacks on democratic concepts actually illustrate

the vital importance of the concept. While it would hardly be necessary to

shitpost in a totalitarian society, the presence of such poison necessitates

freedom of response. The whole point of such trolling is to stifle political

discourse and create an environment that furthers the inattention and neglect of

citizens (O'Connell, p. 79). The answer is freedom of discourse. Only through

exposure of these tactics, dissemination of the true purpose of the actors, and

protest of this subversion of liberty can civil society continue to thrive.

2. The Charitable Uses Act of 1601 came about famously because of the

secularization of England directly resulting from Henry VIIIs battle to wrest

control of the Catholic Church in England, resulting in the formation of the

Anglican Church in 1530. The monasteries, among the only institutions that had

attempted to minister to the impoverished, were effectively outlawed by the

Tudors. Prior to the disenfranchisement of the Roman church in England, they

had typically taken nominal responsibility for matters involving the sick and

indigent, although it should be said that any funds collected in England (and

elsewhere) tended to enrich the church itself, rather than the public. Indeed, until

the middle of the 16th century English policy regarding the poor was notable for a

lack of focus on alleviation (Fishman, p. 14). Over the next half-century, as

England wrestled with the problem of poverty, various codifications and

licensures took place, setting a sort of precedent for the idea that the governmental

sector bore some responsibility for the safety of its people. That Englands actions

were taken mostly to protect property owners from the perceived problem of

impoverished robbers and criminals mattered greatly then, but the very act of

governmental intervention in the fortunes of the poor would take on a different

significance by the turn of the 17th century.

 The Statute of Charitable Uses is important to philanthropists in that they

serve to codify what exactly a concerned citizen can do to ensure her gifts can

bring about the realization of the common good. They inject rule of law into a

field that had always been ripe for abuse, codifying for nations that rely upon

common law principles what organizations can and cannot advocate for in the

solicitation and dispensation of funds. This would bear particular importance to

the American Colonies, in that they would adopt English legal standards as well

as become an important outpost for non-Catholic Christianity. The Protestants (as

referred to here in the interest of simplicity and generalization) tended to position

themselves as more responsive to their flock, and more just with the distribution

of charitable acts than their Catholic counterparts. Fair or not, one of the prime

rationales for the outlawing of the Catholic Church in England had been the

accusation that the Catholic Church had failed to provide for the people, and

failed to be accountable to them. The Statute of Charitable Uses was, in many

ways, the inevitable result of this movement, and possibly the first truly modern

manifestation of civil society.

The Statute of Charitable Uses provided a template for partnership

between the public and private sectors, thus exemplifying the potential for strong

civil society. Naturally, in America, the influence of this was noted by the

Revolutionaries, who perceived that the independence granted in these vital

matters via the formation and realization of voluntary association to administer

the will of the state while acting in the best interests of the common good

bolstered the case for self-governance. Nonetheless, many of the Framers believed
that this independence could be troubling to the stability of a nation in the wrong

hands. Being that the Revolution had been sown within voluntary associations,

Hamilton, Jay, and Madison were apprehensive of the instability that could result

from unchecked factionalism. Yet the Federalists insisted upon limiting the

number of voices that could exert their influence through the power to vote,

reasoning that the viability of the new nation counted upon the elite who had, in

their minds, made it happen. Madison recognized the inherent conflict, and wrote

accordingly.

In Federalist 10, Madison addressed the dangers of factionalism. While it

is clear from the rather dismissive tone Madison adopted in writing of factions

and factionalism that the Federalists would not abide a truly democratic society,

Madison bore down upon the heart of the matter. To stifle dissent was to invite the

very instability that the Federalists most feared. As a matter of course consistent

with the Federalists elitist leanings, Madison advocated for Republicanism,

which, while not exactly providing for any real equality, did accommodate the

knowledge that action outside the electoral system was often necessary. The virtue

of the Republican, representative system of government was that it would

modulate the excessive tendencies of factionalism while providing a mechanism

for their legal existence (Madison, p. 12).

Naturally, as the United States essentially ratified Madisons exhortations,

the already vital tradition of civil society thrived. With the frequent need to lobby

ones elected representatives and advocate for the common good, it only made

sense for those with dovetailing interests to combine. Further, the need to act in
concert with likeminded individuals in organized factions legitimized both the

government and factionalism itself. Although certain regions remain suspicious of

factionalism (particularly the South) (Hall, 2013), eventually the strength of the

tradition and the undeniable success so noted by Tocqueville allowed for the

legitimization of the process. This has, naturally, had an invigorating effect on

philanthropy in the United States, where the prevailing belief that an individual

can make a difference by combining with those of similar beliefs helps to seed the

cloud.
 Works Cited

Anheier, H. K. (2005). Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy. London:

Routledge.
De Tocqueville, A. (2003). Democracy in America. Washington: Regnery Publishing.
Fishman, J. J. (2008, April 23). The Political Use of Private Benevolence: The Statute of
Charitable Uses. Retrieved from digitalcommons.pade.edu:
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1486&context=lawfaculty
Hall, P. D. (2013). Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector. Daedalus.
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Retrieved September 18, 2016, from
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Ingraham, N. (2016, September 26). Why is the Oculus founder trying to bring hateful memes
offline? Retrieved from engadget.com: https://www.engadget.com/2016/09/26/why-is-
the-oculus-founder-trying-to-bring-hateful-memes-offline/
Madison, J. (n.d.). The Federalist No. 10: The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against
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Milk, C. (2010, March 26). "Shit Posting". Retrieved from urbandictionary.com:
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Shit%20Posting
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University Press of New England.
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The Statute of Charitable Uses. (1601)
U.S. Const. amend. I.