Maedelee Sebastian- De Villa

LLB 3A Special Proceedings

Union Bank vs Santibaez

GR NO 149926 February 23, 2005
Callejo Sr, J
FACTS:

On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibaez
entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00.

In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC,
the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations.

On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement. Again, Efraim and
Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan.

In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. A testate proceeding was commenced before
the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During
the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence,
executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all
its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.

Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, Union
Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and
Florence, before the RTC of Makati City.

Edmund was not served with Summons since he was in the United States. Florence, on the other
hand, filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a
party thereto.

Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to Edmund and Florence as
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint
agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.

Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased
Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out
that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate
proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her
brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the estate of the late Efraim Santibaez can be held liable against petitioners
money claim.

HELD:

The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of
the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 5, Rule 86 of Rules of Court provides; claims which must be filed under the notice. If not
filed barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent,
must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that
they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an
action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the
claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as
herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the
true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court
in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.

The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor
or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of
the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees or heirs.

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any
liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the
late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with
the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the
said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.
Maedelee Sebastian- De Villa
LLB 3A Special Proceedings

ShekervsEstateofAliceOSheker
GRNo157912December13,2007
AustriaMartinez,J
FACTS:

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an
order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agents commission due him
amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred
and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said
money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a
certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation
why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money
claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing,
and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the
Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only
in a suppletory manner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court is applicable in the aforementioned case.

HELD:

Section 2, Rule 72 of Rules of Court provides; ApplicabilityofrulesofCivilActions. In the

absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in
the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in the Rules governing ordinary civil
actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word practicable is defined as: possibletopracticeorperform;capableofbeingputinto

practice,doneoraccomplished. This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in
ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so
would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it
categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special
proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for
complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing,
and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct
probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
Maedelee Sebastian- De Villa
LLB 3A Special Proceedings

People of the Philippines vs.Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova

GR NO 102007, September 2, 1994
Romero, J
FACTS:

In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with
Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National
Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary
to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution,
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its
comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense
charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the
appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on
which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked
the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil
liability.

HELD:

Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment, it
shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Section 1, of Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court. Which reads as; Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions
to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against him.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of
rape.
Maedelee Sebastian- De Villa
LLB 3A Special Proceedings

Alfredo Hilado, Lopez Sugar Corporation, First Farmers Holding Corporation

vs.
Court of Appeals

GR NO 164108 May 8, 2009

Tinga, J

FACTS:

Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private
respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca
Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his death, two (2) civil case were pending against Benedicto
involving the petitioners.

Administratrix Benedicto, then submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real
Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband, which included as among the
liabilities, the liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-
9137 andP35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178. Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private
respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the
estate.

On September 24, 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC: (1) Manifestation/Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings; (2) Omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a
deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents
estate; and (3) pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private
respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been
submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court
to intervene in the intestate proceedings. A petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals by the petitioners.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and decanted that the Manila
RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the deceased
Benedicto.

HELD:

The disposition of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioners be
furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate
proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all
"interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The
instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in
reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and;
(3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the
estate residue.

A deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and
complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from
appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his
administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration.
We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty,
but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so.
Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of
dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to
protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate. On complaints against the
general competence of the administrator. The proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82.

Section 2, Rule 82 of Rules of Court provides; Court may be remove or accept resignation of
executor or administrator. Proceeding upon death, resignation, or removal. If an executor or
administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform
an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or
becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may
remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator
dies, resign, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust
alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining
executor or administrator, administration may be to any suitable person.