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Running Head: BIOTERRORISM

From Salmonella to Anthrax: The Threat of Bioterrorism

Katie Hearns

Glen Allen High School

Abstract
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Biological warfare has been prevalent for centuries, but there is a current shift away from

warfare and towards bioterrorism. Given that the majority of countries listed as sponsors of

terrorism by the U.S. Department of State are considered to be developing biological warfare

programs, in addition to the accessibility and low cost of the weaponry, the threat of a terrorist

attack is significant. Depending on the agent and method of dispersion chosen, the lethality of

the attack will vary, yet the repercussions will greatly impact any community. Any size group is

capable of coordinating a destructive biological attack. However, the purpose and the capabilities

of the organization rely on the organization and its size. Larger groups have the capability to

inflict more damage, yet they are also less likely to attack. The purpose of the paper is to identify

what the United States should do to prepare for the worst case situation of high impact and low

probability attacks from the larger groups.

Introduction

600 B.C. - During battle, cadavers were employed to infect an enemys water supply.

1346 - 1347 A.D. - The Mongols catapulted corpses onto their enemies, causing an outbreak of

the plague across Europe. 1763 A.D. - The British gave Native Americans smallpox infected

blankets, diminishing the native population. 1978 A.D. - An exiled Bulgarian was attacked with

Ricin and an umbrella (Szinicz, 2005).

Throughout history, biological warfare, the utilization of biological materials as weapons

of war, has been a prominent form of weaponry partially due to its easy accessibility and

inexpensiveness. Additionally, in comparison to other weapons, less of the material is needed to

create the the same amount of damage, resulting in the classification biological agents as

weapons of mass destruction(Szinicz, 2005). In some cases, depending on the agent and method

of dispersion, the attack could be undetectable. For example, aerosol anthrax is invisible,
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odorless, and tasteless (Henderson, 1999). Furthermore, there is no reliable method to determine

if there is an anthrax cloud in the air, making the threat of attack more serious and the idea of

attack more terrifying for the everyday individual (Inglesby et al., 1999).

Despite international efforts to prevent the use of biological weapons, the possibility of a

threat should be investigated for national security. When the Biological Weapons Convention met

in 1972, of the one hundred and sixty-two parties present, twenty nations refused to sign their

agreement to refrain from using biological warfare (Lennane, 2011). However, the most

significant threat is no longer biological warfare, but rather bioterrorism, the use of biological

materials in terrorist attacks. Five of the seven countries given by the U.S. Department of State

as sponsors of terrorism are suspected of developing biological weapons programs. The

suspicions are not baseless; in 1995, Iraq admitted to possessing anthrax, botulinum toxin, and

aflatoxin ready to use as weapons (Kortepeter & Parker, 1999). But bioterrorisms threat is not

simply international. Both the United States (Kortepeter & Parker, 1999) and Japan (Henderson,

1999) have experienced bioterrorism from inside their own borders, increasing the need for

adequate preparation in case of an attack.

Biological Agents

The NATO handbook identifies thirty-nine agents as biological warfare (Kortepeter &

Parker, 1999). Of these thirty-nine, there is a dirty dozen of the most common agents, with

anthrax, the plague, smallpox, and botulinum toxin as some of the most threatening (Szinicz,

2005). The lethality of each attack depends on the agent utilized as well as the dispersion

method.

For large scale attacks with the intent to kill large amounts of people, aerosol dispersion

is the most deadly. Aerosol is undetectable for some agents, like anthrax (Henderson, 1999).
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Additionally, depending on the weather when released, the casualties could greatly increase. For

example, if released on a windy day, the wind would carry the biological agent, spread it to more

areas, and infect greater numbers of people (Kortepeter & Parker, 1999). When testing anthrax

during World War II at Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland, the researchers waited for the

windless days to prevent the spread of the agent to other places and increase the safety of

surrounding areas (Manchee, Broster, Stagg, & Hibbs, 1994).

Also, lethality is largely determined by the chosen agent of the attack. For example, to

kill fifty percent of a one hundred square kilometers area, eight metric tons of ricin, a biological

agent, are needed or only a kilogram of anthrax is needed to have the same impact. Anthrax is

much more lethal and more practical because less is needed to have the same number of

casualties as other biological agents. It is incredibly deadly; in 1970, the World Health

Organization estimated that if an aircraft release of 50 kg of anthrax over a developed urban

population of 5 million would be 250,000, 100,000 of whom would be expected to die without

treatment(Inglesby et al., 1999, 2). But not only does anthrax eliminate populations wholesale,

it renders the cities in which they live uninhabitable for generations(Harris & Paxman, 2007).

Anthraxs longevity is exemplified by the anthrax experiments on Gruinard Island; anthrax

spores were released during World War II and measurable contamination was likely to persist

until well into the 21st century (Manchee, Broster, Stagg & Hibbs). Anthrax can also be

contracted naturally when a person is exposed to anthrax-infected animals or anthrax-

contaminated animal products. The disease most commonly occurs in herbivores, which are

infected by ingesting spores from the soil (Inglesby et al., 1999, 2). However, it would be most

destructive if it was intentionally released as greater numbers of people would be infected and

the weapon could be engineered to inflict greater damage onto a population.

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Another lethal agent is smallpox. It can remain deadly for over twenty-four hours if

released in aerosol form. Smallpox is an extremely communicable virus; one person could infect

ten to twenty others. Additionally, humans are the only organisms which can be affected by it.

Smallpox can be transmitted through respiratory droplets or contact with infected material on

mucous membranes (Belongia & Naleway, 2003). In regards to prevention, as of 1999, less than

twenty percent of the population was estimated to be immune even with vaccines (Kortepeter &

Parker, 1999). Yet now it is predicted that almost everyone is susceptible to smallpox since

vaccinations have stopped. If the infected person is treated three to four days after exposure, then

it is possible to save the person; however, it is unlikely to be diagnosed during this time period

(Henderson, 1999).

Plague would destroy the population, but it would also be terrifying due to the reputation

of the disease. Additionally, treating a large population affected by any agent would exhaust

resources and medical facilities (Kortepeter & Parker, 1999).

Potential Groups

Each potential terrorist group or individual is motivated by a purpose, whether it be

ideological or political terrorism, criminal, or state sponsored motivators. One example of a

political terrorist attack is by a religious cult called the Rajneeshees, who released salmonella

into local salad bars in Oregon to impact the local election (Kortepeter & Parker, 1999). A

Japanese religious group called Aum Shinrikyo released Sarin nerve gas on the subway, killing

twelve people (Tucker, 1999), and unsuccessfully dispersed aerosol anthrax throughout Tokyo

eight times to further their purpose of taking control over Japan and eventually the world

(Henderson, 1999). Irrespective of the the groups destructive purpose, the physical and

psychological repercussions on the community are all significant despite organization size.
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There are three main types of groups involved in bioterrorism. The most common type is

individuals or very small groups. They are often times just hoaxes and are mainly unthreatening

the majority of the community. Yet these individuals still have a great capacity for murder and

and the creation of chaos. An example of this type would be the anthrax hoaxes that occurred

during the 1990s. No one was killed; however, they created panic and disrupted the general

populations peace (Kortepeter & Parker, 1999).

Secondly, there are small terrorist groups which have greater access to various biological

agents than individuals. An example of this size group is the Rajneeshees (Kortepeter & Parker,

1999). They had some following, but it was local. Due to their larger size they were had more

resources and therefore have more potential to inflict greater numbers of casualties on a

community.

The third significant organization type is the large group. They are the most threatening

because they are the most funded, could have the possible support of a nation, have the greatest

access to biological agents, research, and dispersion methods However, large groups are unlikely

to attack, but if they did, it would cause the most damage to the population (Kortepeter & Parker,

1999). Aum Shinrikyo is a perfect example of this group. They were well financed with an

annual revenue of around $30 million (Henderson, 1999). In addition to their nerve gas attacks,

they also released anthrax. Thankfully, their anthrax release was unsuccessful, yet if they were

successful the consequences would be devastating for the population because they utilized one of

the most lethal agents and had a greater amount due to their large pool of resources (Kortepeter

& Parker, 1999).

Necessities and Difficulties of Preparation

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One of the greatest difficulties with protecting the population in the event of an attack is

the lack of detection of that attack. Currently, the only way to positively know of an attack is

through the symptoms of the infected, meaning that the attack is already over. All actions at this

point are reactionary instead of preventative, which makes preparation more difficult. For

example, there are no detectors that can determine an anthrax cloud. Additionally, with aerosol

anthrax being odorless, tasteless, and invisible, detection of an attack is almost impossible until

symptoms arise. Henderson asserts that even after the agent utilized in the attack is detected,

there are difficulties in treating the infected.

Then patients would begin appearing in emergency rooms and physicians offices with

symptoms of a strange disease that few physicians had ever seen. Special measures would

be needed for patient care and hospitalization, obtaining laboratory confirmation

regarding the identity of microbes unknown to most laboratories, providing vaccine or

antibiotics to large portions of the population, and identifying and possibly quarantining

patients. Trained epidemiologists would be needed to identify where and when infection

had occurred, so as to identify how and by whom it may have been spread. Public health

administrators would be challenged to undertake emergency management of a problem

alien to their experience (1999, 1279).

The steps taken after an attack are not limited to simply treating the victims, but also expanded to

determine the attackers and their methods of attack.

Due to the multiple possible agents and similar symptoms, treatment after an attack is

difficult. In the event of a smallpox attack, it would be almost impossible to effectively mitigate

the effects of the attack. Smallpox symptoms include a fever and a headache, which can be

confused with the flu; only after two to three days when a rash appears is it distinguishable as
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smallpox. Depending on the population and the strain of smallpox, there is around a thirty

percent mortality rate. Pre-exposure vaccination helps protect an individual, but it stops being

effective ten to twenty years after vaccination (Beeching, Dance, Miller, & Spencer, 2002).

However, there are only five to seven million vaccines worldwide, which is smaller than the total

population of New York City. Additionally, as smallpox is eradicated, there are no more

manufacturers of the vaccine (Henderson, 1999). Yet these difficulties are only for smallpox.

When considering the various multiple agents possible for use by bioterrorists, these numerous

precautions needed to be taken are multiplied to adequately prepare for each situation.

Current Preparations

The United States has taken steps to prepare the nation in the instance of a bioterrorist

attack. In 1995, the Presidential Decision Directive 39 defined broad responsibilities and

coordination relationships among the federal agencies involved in defending the country against

bioterrorism. In 1998, the Presidential Decision Directive 62 and 63 elaborated the Presidential

Decision Directive 39 and sought to define a better organizational structure. And the 1997

Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act instructed the Department of Defense to

prepare local, state, and federal agencies to cope with chemical, biological, and nuclear threats

to conduct exercises and preparedness tests. The Office of Emergency Preparedness is in charge

of organizing all health and medical assistance, yet currently they are underfunded and

therefore less effective in achieving their purpose (Henderson, 1999, 1279). Later, in 2002, the

Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act was passed to prepare

and respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies (Harrison & Halpern, 2003).

Presently, it is assumed that a chemical and biological attack are similar so the responses

are similar; however, this is untrue in reality. In case of a biological attack, first responders
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should be doctors and disease specialists, but these groups receive little training for possible

attacks. However, the Hopkins Center is combating this lack of preparation by creating the

Working Group on Civilian Biodefense to determine which agents are most threatening and how

to respond in case of an attack (Henderson, 1999). Yet due to the lack of funding towards

preparedness organizations, like the Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the lack of training

for response teams, the United States is insufficiently prepared for an attack and a great number

of civilians would affected.

Steps for the Future

Although erecting global agreements to halt the use of biological warfare is important, in

reality it will not stop a bioterrorist attack. Terrorists do not abide to global agreements; they will

attack to fulfill their purpose even if it deviates from the expectations of the rest of the global

community.

Due to the difficulty to acquire and distribute biological weapons wide-scale, only

smaller bioterrorist attacks are likely while larger attacks are improbable. And although there is

a low probability of a large bioterrorist attack, the United States is incredibly unprepared, leading

to negative physical effects on the community and environment for many years following the

attack.

Large-scale attacks would impact a greater number of people and cause large-scale panic.

To combat the negative effects of a potential attack, the United States needs to increase

preparedness. The response teams need increased training and specialization towards biological

attacks. The United States must differentiate between chemical attacks and biological attacks to

adequately prepare in the event of either. But the preparation should also expand to the general

population. In case of an attack, the public should have information about symptoms from each
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agent easily available to them as well as the next steps to take towards treatment and the limiting

of the spread of the agent.

Further research needs to be conducted. One of the biggest threats of biological agents

currently is that an aerosol attack can only be detected after the attack through the symptoms of

the victims. Universities and organizations need to develop detectors that can sense aerosol

biological agents to give first response teams more time to act and to give people near the

infected area time to prepare themselves against the attack.

With proper preparation, the threat of a bioterrorist attack is reduced. It would become

less of a destructive event of nightmares and apocalyptic, horror films and instead become a

manageable bump in the road. With more preparation, fewer people would become casualties in

an attack. With more preparation, there is more peace of mind and fewer worries because the

path towards safety is more prominent and clear.

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