Matthew Dawson

Prof Babcock

English 137H

9 November 2016

Sabermetrics: A Baseball Revolution

Baseball is a game deeply rooted in Americas culture and history and over the years it

seems like not much has changed. Sure, rules have been modified and teams have been added

and subtracted since its origins in the late 1800s, but to the casual fan its the same game.

However, to the players, coaches, executives, and hardcore fans, an entire new aspect has been

added to the game through the research and analytical study of baseball statistics, called

sabermetrics. Old statistics are reweighted and used to form new, advanced statistics. With the

progression of new stats and a revamped outlook on the game, traditional philosophies and

strategies have become trite and player performance is evaluated under new methods and

statistics. Major League Baseball has experienced a shift in player evaluation and in-game

philosophies because of the introduction of sabermetrics, which helped to level the playing field

for large and small-market teams.

Since baseballs origins, traditional stats have been used in managerial decisions to judge

a players ability. Ted Williams, one of the greatest hitters of all time, once said, "baseball is the

only field of endeavor where a man can succeed three times out of ten and be considered a good

performer" (Palmer 6). Williams is making an obvious reference to batting average (BA), which

is hits divided by at bats. Batting average has long been considered the main indicator of a

hitters ability. A player who got a hit around 3/10 times when at bat has a batting average of .300

and is considered a good hitter. Other traditional stats used to measure a players ability are runs
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batted in (RBI) and homeruns (HR). Runs batted in simply measures how many runs are scored

as a result of the hitters at bat, not including runs scored off a fielders error. Homeruns count as

any time a player rounds all four bases off their own hit, once again excluding errors. Of the

three, batting average is used most often for top of the lineup hitters, whose primary goal is to get

on base. RBIs and HRs more commonly measure a middle of the lineup power hitters ability to

drive in runs (score points). These stats were the basis for daily managerial decisions such as

making a lineup and higher managerial decisions such as signing free agents and trades.

Managers focus on traditional offensive statistics for most decisions except for shortstop

and centerfield. These two positions are generally viewed as defensive first positions, where

defensive statistics are valued more than offensive statistics. Fielders in a traditional sense are

judged off the amount of errors committed which directly correlates to fielding percentage.

Fielding percentage measures the rate that players make outs through a putout (catch) or assist

(throw) without an error. At valuable defensive positions like centerfield and shortstop, managers

prefer players that make plays at a .980 rate or around 98% of total chances.

Along with traditional stats, teams employed scouts to grade players current and

projected values. Scouting is essentially the eye test, where the scout subjectively judges a

player. Scouts judge a players physique and rate their ability in five categories: hitting for

average, hitting for power, fielding, throwing, and running. Scouts prefer players with a lean, tall

build as they can always add muscle and are easier to project. Players are then rated on the 20-

80 Scale where 80 is perfect major league skill, 50 is average, and 20 is no major league ability

(McDaniel). Scouting is used primarily in higher managerial decisions like drafts and trades in

order to predict the long-term value of a player.

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The rules of baseball have changed over the years, but baseball has been using many of

the same statistics since its origins. The game was rooted in tradition and coaches were afraid of

change but desperately needed new ideas, and that is why sabermetrics was invented.

Sabermetrics is in a broad sense the pursuit of objective baseball knowledge through analysis

of baseball stats (Birnbaum). While some of the ideas of the sabermetric revolution existed

before the 1970s, these philosophies were not useful until they became practical in two senses.

First, analysis required the power of a computer which was limited to those who worked at

companies or higher institutions. This greatly limited the number of people who could perform

rigorous baseball analysis. Second, the salaries of baseball players were not at the extremes they

are today. One of the early pioneers, who questioned baseballs conventional wisdom, was Dick

Cramer. Soon after graduating from Harvard, he got a job at a pharmaceutical company and used

his research computers to analyze the game in the late 1960s. He discovered the stat on-base plus

slugging (OPS), and did studies on clutch hitting. Cramer, along with 15 like-minded baseball

researchers, joined forces in the inception of the Society of American Baseball Research (SABR)

in 1971 (Schell). At this time, baseball executives were unaware of the organizations findings

and since the public rarely had access to computers baseball information and statistics was often

limited or unavailable.

Early adopters of sabermetrics were ignored until Bill James started his series of books

challenging traditional baseball. His first book the 1977 Baseball Abstract caught the attention of

baseball executives and made some discoveries that are still prominent today. His books marked

the first time that executives in baseball considered that these radical ideas might be effective,

and sabermetrics was launched into the mainstream. James first challenged how fielders were

evaluated. Traditionally, fielders were judged on their amount of errors (E), which is when the
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fielder makes a mistake on a playable ball that allows the batter to reach base. James stated in his

abstract that the error was the only major statistic in sports of what an observer (the official

scorer) thinks should have been accomplished (Lewis 66). With this major flaw in mind, he

invented a new stat called range factor (RF) that simply measured the amount of successful plays

per game (Lewis 69). RF considers a players ability to get to balls other players couldnt (the

players range), which would not be accounted for by errors. James second abstract in 1978

focused on the hitters and challenged the notion of RBIs and BA. At the time, players were paid

large amounts based on their RBI total, but the stat itself is team-dependent. A player on a better

team that has teammates who reach base more has more opportunities to drive in runs and collect

RBIs. James realized that RBI was an unsatisfactory measure of an individuals abilities but

rather reflected the on-base capabilities of the hitters in front of the batter. He concluded players

should be judged their ability to create runs. He tried various stats but eventually came up with

the equation for runs created, which is runs created = (hits + walks) * Total bases / (at bats +

walks) (Lewis 77). The equation makes no reference to BA, RBIs, and stolen bases (SB), which

are all stats conventionally used to judge hitters. Analysts also noted that outs were more

valuable than originally thought. Some coaches were willing to bunt, sacrificing an out in order

to move a runner to the next base. However, this practice is counterproductive when the goal is

to create runs. Essentially, giving away outs in a sacrifice bunt makes a team less likely to score.

The most important hurdle for the sabermetric revolution was to integrate the newfound

philosophies and statistics into the MLB. Sabermetrics finally made it to an executive office,

once computers became more popular and powerful and society transitioned into the internet age.

The internet allowed for a wider scope of people to obtain baseball information and finally the

information fell into the right hands. Billy Beane, the general manager of the Oakland Athletics,
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turned to sabermetrics after three of his best players were lost to free agency in order to compete

in a league that faced the most severe salary inequality of all major American sports. Beane hired

Paul DePodesta, who played baseball at Harvard and graduated with a degree in economics, to

help instill James theories from his baseball abstracts. The pair themselves did not make many

new discoveries as even Bean himself said, we invented nothing. We stole everything (Costa).

The pair focused on the concept that anything that increases the chance of making outs is

harmful to creating runs. While other teams continued to focus on traditional stats like BA and

RBIs, Beane and DePodesta focused on on-base percentage (OBP), which is just the percentage a

hitter reaches base and avoids outs. This revolutionary stat allowed the Oakland Athletics to tie

the New York Yankees for the most total wins in the 2002 season. The stark difference is the

Athletics were 28th in payroll with a $39,679,746 payroll while the Yankees led the MLB with a

payroll of $125,928,583 (Orinick). Therefore, Beane and DePodesta successfully implemented

James sabermetrical and radical ideas into the MLB resulting in innovative stats and modern

baseball management philosophies.

Another result of the introduction of sabermetrics in the MLB is that it allowed small-

market teams to compete with teams that generate more revenue; however, since the sabermetric

revolution is in full bloom today, its true impact is limited. From the time Beane incorporated

sabermetrics to the league, the Athletics have made the playoffs five out of the last thirteen years

and won no World Series (Oakland Athletics Team History). On the other hand, the Yankees

have made the playoffs ten of the last thirteen years (New York Yankees Team History).

Simply put, what was once an advantage for the Athletics is now commonplace in the MLB.

Teams with almost limitless funds can invest in sabermetrics the same way that teams with

limited funds can, so sabermetrics hardly levels the playing field like it once did. Occasionally,
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progressive teams will make a new discovery in sabermetrics only to be mimicked once other

teams catch on to their competitive advantage. An example of this is defensive shifts. Defensive

shifts use batted ball data and place infielders where hitters are more likely to hit the ball usually

by stacking three infielders on one side of the field instead of the conventional two. Progressive

teams like the Pirates heavily employed shifting and had success in three consecutive years. The

rest of the MLB has caught on as the MLB went from around 2,000 shifts in 2011 to about

30,000 in 2016 and once again limited the advantage the small-market Pirates once had (Dewan).

A team can exploit a new-found loophole through sabermetrics for a limited time as the MLB is

a game full of copycats.

While most executives and coaches in baseball are on-board with the sabermetric

revolution, some traditionalist players and coaches simply do not believe in sabermetrics or

believe it has impacted the game negatively. Many of the traditionalist players have announced

their frustration with the direction of the sport, most notably former Yankee Goose Gossage who

stated, "The game is becoming a freaking joke because of the nerds who are running it They

don't know s---" (Gossage Rips). Those with a more rational argument say that players can

adjust to changes caused by sabermetrics. An obvious example is once again the shift as

infielders position themselves on the side of the field that the batter normally hits the ball toward.

The batter can alter his approach and hit the ball to the side of the field with less fielders. Some

batters have taken advantage of the shift and other sabermetrical approaches against them. Is this

enough to make sabermetrics go away? No, the shift is effective more times than not, but in

certain scenarios it should not be used depending on the batter and the situation of the game.

Sabermetrics will require a balance of stats and information along with human input and will

constantly have to adapt in the future.

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In conclusion, baseball is the same game to casual fans, but behind the scenes the

Sabermetric manifesto has changed how players are evaluated and the sports in-game strategies.

The revolution was brought into mainstream by Bill James Baseball Abstract and into executive

offices by Billy Beane after the Athletics lost three of their best players due to free agency.

While sabermetrics have become commonplace and no longer level the competition between

large and small market teams, progressive teams will forever be exploiting newfound efficiencies

until the rest of the MLB catches on and imitates. Bill James originally stated that sabermetrics

was "the search for objective knowledge about baseball", and with that the search will never

end.
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Works Cited

Birnbaum, Phil. "A Guide to Sabermetric Research." Society for American Baseball Research.

Web. 02 Nov. 2016. <http://sabr.org/sabermetrics>.

Costa, Brian. "Bill James and Billy Beane Discuss Big Data in Baseball." WSJ. 21 Sept. 2015.

Web. 04 Nov. 2016. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-discussion-with-baseball-

revolutionaries-billy-beane-and-bill-james-1442854375>.

Dewan, John. "Early Season Shift Leaders." Bill James Online. Web. 04 Nov. 2016.

<http://www.billjamesonline.com/early_season_shift_leaders_/>.

"Gossage Rips Bautista, 'nerds' Ruining Baseball." ESPN. Web. 06 Nov. 2016.

<http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/14943065/goose-gossage-rips-jose-bautista-

toronto-blue-jays-nerds-ruining-baseball>.

Lewis, Michael. Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game. New York: W.W. Norton,

2003. Print.

McDaniel, Kiley. "Scouting Explained: The 20-80 Scouting Scale." FanGraphs Baseball. 4 Sept.

2014. Web. 29 Oct. 2016. <http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/scouting-explained-the-20-

80-scouting-scale/>.

"New York Yankees Team History & Encyclopedia | Baseball-Reference.com." Baseball-

Reference. Web. 29 Oct. 2016. <http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/NYY/>.

"Oakland Athletics Team History & Encyclopedia." Baseball-Reference. Web. 29 Oct. 2016.

<http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/OAK/>.

Orinick, Steve. "MLB Team Payrolls." Major League Baseball Team Payrolls 1998-2016. Web.

08 Nov. 2016. <http://www.stevetheump.com/Payrolls.htm>.

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Palmer, Peter, Gary Gillette, Stuart Shea, and Rick Benner. The 2006 ESPN Baseball

Encyclopedia. New York: Sterling Pub., 2006. Print.

Schell, Richard. "SABR, Baseball Statistics, and Computing: The Last Forty Years." Society for

American Baseball Research. Web. 08 Nov. 2016. <http://sabr.org/research/sabr-baseball-

statistics-and-computing-last-forty-years>.