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Blacklock's Response To Cross Motion For Emailing April 18 2017 PDF
Blacklock's Response To Cross Motion For Emailing April 18 2017 PDF
FEDERAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
Plaintiff
(Responding Party)
-and-
FEDERAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
Plaintiff
(Responding Party)
-and-
Bank of Canada
Defendant
(Moving Party)
Court File No. T-897-15
FEDERAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
Plaintiff
(Responding Party)
-and-
FEDERAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
Plaintiff
(Responding Party)
-and-
Library of Parliament
Defendant
(Moving Party)
MOTION RECORD
FOR RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS CROSS MOTIONS
HAMEED LAW
43 Florence Street
Ottawa, ON
K2P 0W6
Per: Yavar Hameed
Tel: (613) 232-2688 ext. 228
Fax: (613) 232-2680
Tel: 819-994-2226
Fax: 819-953-9269
Table of Contents
FEDERAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
Plaintiff
(Responding Party)
-and-
FEDERAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
Plaintiff
(Responding Party)
-and-
Bank of Canada
Defendant
(Moving Party)
1
Court File No. T-897-15
FEDERAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
Plaintiff
(Responding Party)
-and-
FEDERAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
Plaintiff
(Responding Party)
-and-
Library of Parliament
Defendant
(Moving Party)
2
DEFENDANTS BANK OF CANADA, CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION AGENCY AND
LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT
2. The Plaintiff also responds herein to the cross-motions of the Defendants Bank of
Canada (the Bank), Canadian Transportation Agency (CTA) and the Library of
Parliament (the Library). The Bank supports the motion of the AG and contends that it
would not be appropriate to proceed with a non-AG case in parallel to that of an AG case
as being a waste of resources. However, proceeding with a non-AG case would neither
waste court resources and would not be a duplication of resources for the Bank. The Bank
has yet to respond to the merits of the allegations raised in the claim against it. The CTA
supports the AGs position and rejects the idea of proceeding in parallel with a non-AG
case. The Library similarly supports the AGs position and suggests that the action
against the Library should have been discontinued based on the result in Court File No.
T-1391-14 in Finance. The Library, however, has neither filed a motion for summary
judgment nor is it prepared to proceed to trial. Its position, like that of the other non-AG
defendants supports the extraordinary and unprecedented strategy of proceeding to an
assessment of damages on all cases without the consent of the Plaintiff, without a defined
procedure.
3. The Plaintiff, over the last three years, has paid $75,865 in costs to the Attorney
3
General without being permitted to bring a single case of password-protected copyright
breach to trial. The AG has enjoyed the fact. Enjoy, the AG wrote on the most recent
cost award; Christmas came early. Counsel for the Bank of Canada described the award
as a wonder kick in the knackers for Blacklocks. 1
4. The Plaintiff maintains its view of proceeding with the Health Canada action and a
non-AG case. The approach of proceeding with these cases in tandem responds to all of
the concerns raised by the parties and does not place an undue or duplicative cost burden
on any Defendant.
Facts
5. The Plaintiff relies on the facts as contained in its affidavit in support of its motion
for stay in addition to those facts and the evidence adduced in the affidavit of Jennifer
Jans affirmed April 18, 2017.
6. The Plaintiff has recently signed a licensing agreement for $11,470 plus applicable
tax with the Senate of Canada, confirming the applicability of the value of its rate card. 2
7. Contrary to the assertion of Nick Fillmore in his affidavit sworn in support of the
AGs cross-motion, his organization One Big Campaign was a revenue generating
registered third party advertiser for the 2014 Ontario election 3 that generated funds from
the dissemination of the Plaintiffs material.
8. The Plaintiff has discovered exchanges between the Department of Justice and
other Defendant counsel through an Access to Information request 4 relating to how it is
being characterized and castigated following the release of the decision in Court File No.
T-1391-14.
1
Exhibit E to the Affidavit of Jennifer Jans, affirmed April 18, 2017 (Jans Affidavit).
2
Exhibit G to the Jans Affidavit, affirmed April 18, 2017 (Jans Affidavit).
3
Exhibit A to the Jans Affidavit, affirmed April 18, 2017.
4
Exhibit E to the Jans Affidavit, affirmed April 18, 2017.
4
Blacklocks writers as part of its examination for discovery in Court File No. T-1391-14.
These examinations reveal the intention of the writers to irrevocably assign copyright to
Blacklocks. 5 There is no controversy or mischief in respect of the copyright assignment
by writers to Blacklocks. The attack being raised by the Defendant in respect of the
copyright assignment to Blacklocks is vexatious.
2. Issues
10. Should the Court accept the joint proposal of the Defendants to proceed with the
trial of two issues rather than the Plaintiffs proposal?
i) AG Response
11. The AG rejects the proposal of the Plaintiff to proceed with the Health Canada
action first on four grounds: a) limitations issue; b) the need for amendments to the
Plaintiffs action in Health Canada; c) unavailability of a Defendant witness; and d) the
difference in respect of issues raised by Health Canada action. None of these reasons
support the conclusion that the Plaintiffs proposed remedy is not consistent with Rule
385(1)(a) as being a just, most expeditious, least expensive method of proceeding.
Significantly, the Defendants have provided no counter-proposal as to any single case
proceeding to trial pending a stay of other cases. In this regard, the AGs response to the
Plaintiffs proposal is contingent on the Courts acceptance of its unprecedented forced
solution for assessing damages in all files followed by liability.
5
Exhibit F to the Jans Affidavit, affirmed April 18, 2017.
5
Canada in the Federal Court on January 24, 2017. According to section 43.1(1) of the
Copyright Act, the limitation for copyright actions is three years from the date that the
action giving rise to the action was discovered by the Plaintiff:
43.1 (1) Subject to subsection (2), a court may award a remedy for any act or omission
that has been done contrary to this Act only if
(a) the proceedings for the act or omission giving rise to a remedy are commenced
within three years after it occurred, in the case where the plaintiff knew, or could
reasonably have been expected to know, of the act or omission at the time it
occurred; or
(b) the proceedings for the act or omission giving rise to a remedy are commenced
within three years after the time when the plaintiff first knew of it, or could
reasonably have been expected to know of it, in the case where the plaintiff did not
know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, of the act or
omission at the time it occurred.
13. The Plaintiff discovered that the Defendant had been distributing its articles without
permission or licensing agreement by virtue of its review of a return from an Access to
Information Act (ATI) request that was filed on April 7, 2014. The return was received by
the Plaintiff on May 12, 2014. Accordingly, the entire scope of dissemination of articles
by the Defendant is consistent with the discoverability principle of section 43.1(1)(b) of
the Copyright Act as the action was commenced within three years of May 12, 2014.
14. The articles that were disseminated by the Defendant date from July 4, 2013 until
March 24, 2014. The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff knew or ought to have known
that its articles were being disseminated as of July 4, 2013 when a Health Canada
employee purchased an individual subscription. However, it stands to reason that the
Plaintiff could not have already known about unauthorized dissemination that was to
occur in the future.
15. Moreover, whether there has been a breach of the Copyright Act does not require
knowledge of the Plaintiff. Indeed, the Defendant appears to be relying upon its argument
of copyright misuse to conclude that its own allegation of the Plaintiffs constructive
knowledge bars it from relying upon the Copyright Act that occurred within three years of
6
the filing of its action. This is not an issue of limitations.
16. The Plaintiff maintains that it was reasonable to file an ATI request in May 2014
and that it could not have reasonably known that a violation of its copyright had occurred
at or prior to that time. At the time, the Plaintiff had no filed an action against a single
government department and was unaware of how its works were being treated by the
Defendant.
17. To the extent that the Defendant takes the position that the Plaintiff may only be
entitled to partial recovery for unauthorized dissemination of its material on or January
24, 2014, such an argument ignores the discovery of copyright breaches that occurred in
April 2014. It is also a clear abuse of the good faith filing of the Plaintiffs action in Superior
Court on May 2, 2016. However, in any event it does not address the unabated
dissemination of dissemination of the Plaintiffs material to hundreds of recipients since
that date even in the face of repeated warnings. In this sense, the limitations defence
does not preclude or significantly limit the Plaintiffs action.
18. The Defendants arguments regarding copyright misuse have been pleaded in
every case such that the litigation in Health Canada requires precisely the same kind of
evidence as with other cases. The argument of copyright misuse is no different than what
the Defendant intends to lead in each of its actions.
19. Amendments to the Health Canada action may be required in view of the
Defendants concealment of ongoing copying of passwords and distribution of works.
Possible amendments required would be to trace the scope of dissemination by the
Defendant, which has already been materially pleaded. It is conceded that amendments
can and may be necessitated as a result of discoveries; however, this prospect exists for
each action filed by the Plaintiff for which the particulars regarding dissemination, scope
of distribution can only be properly identified with an examination of the Defendant in
every case.
7
(c) Unavailability of defendant witness
20. The Defendant contends that it cannot proceed to trial on the Health Canada
matter in the absence of evidence from Mr. Mark Montreuil. Mr. Montreuil was not listed
as the person who purchased an individual subscription to Blacklocks on two occasions
either in 2013 or 2014. The Defendant has records of how it used and disseminated
Blacklocks content such that the involvement of Mr. Montreuil does not appear to be
germane to any matter in issue. The Plaintiff has no interest in calling Mr. Montreuil as a
witness at trial.
21. The Plaintiff is not asserting that its claim is for the quote that Mr. Montreuil had
requested, unlike the claim that was advanced in the Finance action. The action is for
damages based on the scope of dissemination by Health Canada. This information is
discernible through the Defendants own records.
22. The Defendant has not pleaded any fact or adduced any evidence that would make
Mr. Montreuils essential for Health Canadas defence. In the event that Mr. Montreuils
evidence is necessary for assessing the scope of Health Canadas dissemination of
Blacklocks material, the AGs proposal cannot be advanced until his return in 2020. In
the event that Mr. Montreuils evidence relates to an argument of copyright misuse, this
has not been pleaded by the Defendant in its statement of defence and there is no
corresponding fact adduced to support such an argument by the Defendants affiant, Ms.
Aboueid.
d) Health Canada case raises different issues than the remaining cases
23. The Defendants contention that the Health Canada action raises different issues
than the remaining actions is unclear and/or without merit. The Health Canada action is
one of the remaining actions as an outlier or not its facts must be addressed by the
Court. The Defendants contention that the Health Canada issues are different implies
that a trial judge would not address scope of distribution in a meaningful way to assess
at which point the scope of distribution supports a conclusion of copyright violation.
8
24. Given that the Finance case has already decided that a limited scope distribution
case to six persons in particular circumstances of an unsolicited article would not
constitute a violation of the Copyright Act, the Court will need to provide some rationale
as to an assessment of how scope impacts upon a determination of copyright violation.
25. The AG is also incorrect in stating that unauthorized password sharing or misuse
is not a common issue to other actions. For every case for which there has been either
media monitoring or mass distribution, the password to an individual Blacklocks
subscription was shared without permission.
26. The AG also misstates that there is only one Blacklocks article related to the CFIA
matter, despite the Plaintiffs discovery of CFIAs procurement of multiple Blacklocks
articles as part of a media monitoring list. The CFIA case is not on all fours with the
Finance case, but rather it raises issues that can be completely dealt with in the context
of the Health Canada action.
27. While the Plaintiff concedes that the Health Canada case does raise the issue of
ongoing breaches of the Copyright Act, the existence of this issues does not displace the
necessity of looking at character of dealing in its entirety, which includes issues of scope,
password sharing and misuse of an individual subscription. These issues are germane
to all of the actions and will be dealt with in the Health Canada case.
28. The Defendant AG cites a third-party affidavit from Mr. Nick Fillmore attacking the
Plaintiffs copyright enforcement as cruel. The affidavit and its characterization by the AG
is a gross misrepresentation of fact. The Defendants in the case relating to Mr. Fillmore
are political activists who copied works owned by the Plaintiff and other creators as a
fundraising tool by registering with Elections Ontario to use fundraising proceeds on
9
political polling; 6 declined a $5,000 settlement offer from the Plaintiff; 7 and embarked on
unnecessarily complicated proceedings that cost the Plaintiff signficant legal costs. The
Defendants organization, One Big Campaign (OBC) has publicly apologized for
republishing Blacklocks copyright protected work without its permission. 8
29. The Defendant AG falsely asserts the Plaintiff has never sold any licensing
agreement at values sought in individual claims. This is incorrect. For example, the
Plaintiff has sold licensing agreements at a range of fees listed on its standard rate card,
including $11,470 plus tax to the Senate of Canada. 9
30. All of the other non-AG defendants support the position of the AG in submitting
that Health Canada should not be identified as the lead case. However, the non-AG
defendants do not provide a clear reason why a case against the AG and a non-AG case
should not proceed in parallel. To the extent that all parties are concerned with scope of
distribution placing Health Canada as a potential outlier, the issue is resolved completely
by virtue of allowing a case relating to a non-AG defendant to proceed to trial.
31. The Plaintiff submits that the Health Canada action will encompass all issues that
may arise in respect of improper use and sharing of a password by a federal department.
By allowing the litigation of a non-AG Canada case to proceed in parallel, the respective
Defendants cost burdens will not be duplicated and the net result will address the
Defendants preoccupation that the reasoning in a copyright decision involving broad
scale distribution of copyright protected content will not provide guidance relating to a
more modest distribution.
6
Exhibit A to the Jans Affidavit, affirmed April 18, 2017.
7
Exhibit D to the Jans Affidavit, affirmed April 18, 2017.
8
Exhibit B to the Jans Affidavit, affirmed April 18, 2017.
9
Exhibit G to the Jans Affidavit, affirmed April 18, 2017.
10
B. Response to the AGs Proposal
34. The Defendant suggests that if the CFIA solicited additional articles of the Plaintiff
through Health Canada, that this would lead to separate actions. The implication is that
those actions should proceed separately, which is a wasteful and illogical approach to
litigation. The Plaintiff is entitled to proper discovery that bears upon any amendment to
its pleadings. It is sharp practice for the Defendant to benefit from its own mistake. Such
an approach should not be countenanced by the Court.
35. The Defendant now advances a new preliminary argument whereby it seeks to
challenge the standing of the Plaintiff to maintain all of its actions. The Plaintiff cannot
prevent the Defendant from raising whatever argument it may seek to bring in any action,
but its novel argument is speculative and not based on the facts of the various actions
advanced by the Plaintiff.
36. Both the theory of the Defendants case and the relevant jurisprudence cited by
11
the Defendant are of no assistance to its copyright assignment argument, which is
designed to protect the rights of the copyright owner. The AG has examined each of the
writers who assigned copyright to Blacklocks. Writers swore under that they understood
that they had signed over copyright to the Plaintiff in the context of their examination as
part of the pretrial discovery process in Court File No. T-1391-14: 10
I signed over copyright material to them (Dale Smith, Examination no. 15-
1249.6, Court File T-1391-14, Dec. 17, 2015, paragraph 19);
They have ownership (Justin Ling, Examination no. 15-1249.4, Court File T-
1391-14, Dec. 17, 2015, paragraph 28);
Igave them complete, utter rights forever on this material (Mark Bourrie,
Examination no. 15-1249.5, Court File T-1291-14, Dec. 17, 2015, paragraph
34); From all my time in the business, whoever publishes the article has the
copyright (Alex Binkley, Examination no. 1249.2, Court File T-1391-14, Dec.
17, 2015, paragraph 65);
The company thats paying you for your work retains the copyright (Alex
Boutelier, Examination no. 15-1249.3, Court File T-1391-14, Dec. 17, 2015,
paragraph 77);
Were straying off from what the copyright issue is, which was what my
understanding was that this examination was supposed to entail; I just submit
articles. Its always Blacklocks its the same with any publication (Kaven
Baker-Voakes, Examination no. 15-1249.1, Court File T-1391-14, Dec. 17,
2015, paragraphs 50, 117).
37. Section 13(4) of the Copyright Act does require an assignment to be made in
writing; however, the written agreements that confirm copyright assignment meet both the
spirt and the letter of the law. Because the writers confirm orally and in writing Blacklocks
copyright, there is no legitimate purpose being advanced by the Defendant.
38. By contrast, when the Defendant first raised its copyright misuse argument in 2014
10
Exhibit F to the Affidavit of Jennifer Jans affirmed April 18, 2017.
12
it relied on the US jurisprudence relating to the Righthaven LLC litigation strategy whereby
an arms length, non-publisher effectively used a limited conveyance of copyright interest
to enforce copyright on behalf of its clients. 11 This argument was never further advanced
by the Defendant and is completely distinguishable from the online news company that is
operated by Blacklocks.
39. To this end, Blacklocks reserves its right and does edit and rewrite all works
published by the Plaintiff for continuity and editing purposes. A similar contention has
already been dealt with by the Federal Court, which decided that even contributions from
multiple volunteers over decades that have not been subject to assignment do not
invalidate copyright, but suggest joint ownership. 12 The Defendants attempt to raise a
technical argument that does not accord with the facts of the case or the purpose of
Copyright Act is without merit.
41. No bifurcation proceeding will capture all cases. Since the Defendant AG claims
an unrestricted right to copy passwords and distribute works, Government of Canada
agents despite repeated and explicit warnings from the Plaintiff continue to copy the
Plaintiffs works. Harm to the Plaintiff is ongoing. Additional claims will, therefore, need to
be filed by the Plaintiff as they are documented.
42. The Plaintiff seeks to proceed on a reverse method of trial procedure, for which
11
See for example: M. Haslach, Trouble for Trolling: Courts Reject Copyright Trolling Tactics 9 Wash J. L.
Tech. & Arts 93 (2013) <online: http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/1296 >
12
Canadian Standards Association v. P.S. Knight Co. Ltd., 2016 FC 294 (CanLII) at paras 44-53.
13
there is no precedent over the Plaintiffs objection. The procedure contemplated is
expansive, expensive and - according to the logic advanced by the Defendants in their
2016 stay motion duplicative and wasteful. Because the assessment of damages
cannot resolve the ultimate issues of liability in each case, it cannot resolve any case,
which is one of the relevant consideration in terms of assessing the appropriateness of
bifurcation. 13
43. For many cases the Plaintiff is seeking modest and nominal damages. If damages
are assessed at a nominal level, there is no advantage to the parties, which will want to
proceed to trial. For cases of greater distribution scope, like Health Canada, if damages
are assessed at a more nominal value, there is also no advantage to the parties as the
Defendants fully intend to raise their arguments of fair dealings and copyright misuse.
44. That there is a cost to litigation, is endemic to the court process, but it is not a
problem that is solved by the AGs proposal. The Defendants have an available remedy
of bringing a summary judgment in any given case which with the exception of the
CFIA action - they have refused to do. Instead, their reverse bifurcation approach delays
proceeding to trial with no concession or indication that the Defendants are limiting or
forgoing any procedural right they may have relating to their arguments on liability.
Ultimately, by operation of the Defendants proposal, each of the actions may still proceed
serially to trial.
45. Although the list of issues to consider in respect of whether to apply bifurcation in
a given case will vary with the facts and circumstances of each case, some of the relevant
considerations are as follows: 14
o whether the issues of liability are clearly separate from the issues of
remedy;
13
Merck & Co. Inc. v. Brantford Chemicals Inc., 2004 FC 1400 (CanLII) at para. 5.
14
Merck & Co, supra at para. 5.
14
practice requiring the single trial of all issues in dispute;
o whether the trial judge will be better able to deal with the issues of the
injuries of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's losses, by reason of having first
assessed the credibility of the plaintiff during the trial of the issue of
damages;
o whether, if the issues of liability and damages are severed, there are
facilities in place which will permit these two separate issues to be tried
expeditiously before one court or before two separate courts, as the case
may be;
o whether there is a clear advantage to all parties to have liability tried first;
o whether it is certain that the splitting of the case will save time, or will lead
to unnecessary delay;
o whether, or to what degree in the event severance is ordered, the trial of the
issue of liability may facilitate or lead to settlement of the issue of damages;
and
o whether it is likely that the trial on liability will put an end to the action.
46. The Defendants provide an overly simplified and inaccurate view of both an
assessment of damages and the corresponding procedural steps required to treat such
an assessment for all remaining cases. The Defendants provide no clear or accurate
assessment of the discovery necessary to probe the scope of distribution of the Plaintiffs
material in each case. While the Plaintiff has done access to information searches these
documents searches and results effectively represent the tip of the iceberg. Searches
have not been conducted of each of hundreds of recipients of the Plaintiffs material,
requiring at a minimum a mosaic of rippling distribution possibilities. Content
management and software has not been reviewed. Hard copies of material has not been
assessed. Undertakings and advisements with respect to Ministerial consultations
15
including the sharing of the Plaintiffs material has not been done. Undertakings and
advisements relating to third party distribution, receipt and republication has not been
undertaken. It is submitted that extensive discovery will be required in each case to be
able to assess the scope of distribution alone.
47. With contradictory information provided by the Defendants in cases such as CFIA,
a comprehensive fair and encompassing review will need to occur. That breaches
continue to be discovered by the Plaintiff, further complicates the assessment of
distribution size.
48. Moreover, distribution and its scope do not constitute a standalone issue, but it is
one that bears directly upon liability and the character of dealing. In this sense, there is
not a logical divide between scope of distribution, which will inform the applicability of fair
dealing in each case. By contrast, the Defendants have not indicated a willingness to
concede any issue relating to fair dealing based on distribution size alone. Assuming that
distribution size can be efficiently assessed for every single case in a cost-saving manner,
which is not conceded, it simply provides a precursor for an equally and even more
complex assessment of fair dealing in every case.
49. The Defendants also do not concede the unit value of a license for the Plaintiff and
continue to contest, the Plaintiffs rate card as well as asserting a formula for the average
value of a story. No evidence has been adduced to date by the Defendants establishing
market value of stories or setting up a benchmark that could either deny or affirm the
applicability of the Plaintiffs rate card. To this end, there is considerable evidence that
can and will likely be called by the Defendants to attempt to provide a context and
measure of what the applicable market rate of the Plaintiffs content should be.
16
extensive and argument will be required to arrive at a unit measure.
51. In short, the assessment of damages component of the trial is complex, varied and
will exceed the two day estimate that the Defendant has stipulated without any breakdown
of the nature of the evidence to be presented and without regard to the scope of discovery
required.
52. By contrast, the Plaintiffs proposal, which seeks to advance two actions involving
an AG and a non-AG defendant has significant potential to advance the jurisprudence
dealing with the particularities of the AGs media monitoring and distribution procedures
and provide a correspondingly lower scope distribution case without added burden to the
AG.
53. The Plaintiff has not complicated or delayed case management procedures, yet in
three years has been unable to proceed to trial on a single case of password and
copyright breach: This is not a situation where Blacklock can be faulted for any behaviour
that tended to unnecessarily lengthen the duration of the proceeding. Nor was it one
where Blacklock failed to make any admission or where it took any steps that were
improper, vexatious or unnecessary. 15
54. The Plaintiff has acceded to the Defendants strong inclination towards staying all
actions, now only to be faced by a contrary tactic that seeks a joint trial on a bifurcated
issue that will not resolve the litigation. By virtue of the Plaintiffs approach, at least two
cases will be advanced to finality in a manner that will provide relevant benchmarks and
sign posts for the overall litigation. This would be achieved without disproportional
expense to any one party. The Plaintiffs proposal remains more just, expeditious and
cost-effective than that of the Defendants and predicates itself on the same logic that all
defendants espoused before this Court in these files one year ago.
55. For the reasons, it is submitted that the Plaintiffs proposal be adopted in this matter
15
1395804 Ontario Ltd. (Blacklocks Reporter) v. Canada (Attorney General) (Justice Gascon, August 16, 2016
cost award) at para. 13.
17
and that each party bear its own costs for the purpose of this motion.
4. Remedy
a. That the parties proceed to trial with action T-117-17 as filed against Health
Canada;
b. That the parties proceed to trial with one action as filed against a non-AG
Canada Defendant in any of T-745-15 (Bank of Canada); T-897-15
(Canadian Transportation Agency), or T-1726-15 (Library of Parliament);
c. That pending the disposition of the actions described above, all other
actions case managed by the Federal Court relating to copyright
infringement of the Plaintiff be stayed;
d. That each party bears its own costs for this motion.
HAMEED LAW
Barristers and Solicitors
43 Florence Street
Ottawa, ON
K2P 0W6
18
Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42
Dockets: T-2090-14
T-1862-15
T-1726-15
T-1234-15
T-1085-15
T-897-15
T-745-15
T-477-15
T-269-15
Docket: T-2090-14
BETWEEN:
Plaintiff
and
Defendant
Page: 2
Docket: T-1862-15
BETWEEN:
Plaintiff
and
PARKS CANADA
Defendant
Docket: T-1726-15
BETWEEN:
Plaintiff
and
LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT
Defendant
Page: 3
Docket: T-1234-15
BETWEEN:
Plaintiff
and
Defendant
Docket: T-1085-15
BETWEEN:
Plaintiff
and
Defendant
Page: 4
Docket: T-897-15
BETWEEN:
Plaintiff
and
Defendant
Docket: T-745-15
BETWEEN:
Plaintiff
and
BANK OF CANADA
Defendant
Page: 5
Docket: T-477-15
BETWEEN:
Plaintiff
and
Defendant
Docket: T-269-15
BETWEEN:
Plaintiff
and
Defendant
Page: 6
ORDER ON COSTS
WHEREAS, in a single judgment issued on June 27, 2016, the Court dismissed the nine
motions for appeal brought by the Plaintiff, 1395804 Ontario Ltd. (operating as Blacklocks
Reporter) [Blacklock], against nine orders issued on March 3, 2016 [the Orders] by Madam
Prothonotary Tabib imposing a stay of proceedings in nine different actions [the Nine Actions]
filed by Blacklock against the Defendants, namely six federal government departments
represented by the Attorney General of Canada [the AGC] and three Crown corporations and
agencies (the Bank of Canada, the Library of Parliament and the Canadian Transportation
Agency);
AND WHEREAS the Courts judgment ordered the parties to file written submissions
UPON reading the written costs submissions filed by Blacklock and by each of the AGC,
the Bank of Canada, the Library of Parliament and the Canadian Transportation Agency
AND UPON determining that, for the following reasons, costs shall be awarded to each
1. Rule 400(1) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 [Rules] provides that the Court
shall have full discretionary power over the amount and allocation of costs and the
2. In the exercise of its discretion, the Court is invited to consider a non-exhaustive list of
factors at Rule 400(3). These factors include, among other things, the result of the
proceeding, the importance and complexity of the issues, any written offer to settle, the
3. As per Rule 407, party-and-party costs are assessed in accordance with column III of
the table to Tariff B, unless the Court decides otherwise. The costs are typically
4. As a general rule, a successful party should recover its entire costs without reduction
5. Blacklock submits that an appropriate costs order for both the nine appeals before this
Court and the original motions before Prothonotary Tabib should add up to a total of
$5,000.00 plus disbursements for all Defendants. Blacklock claims that it would be
unfair for it to face multiple costs orders in respect of appeals which were closely
connected and driven by the main dispute between Blacklock and the AGC, which were
all dealt with in the same judgment, and where the participation of Defendants other
6. The Defendants each come up with a higher proposal in their respective submissions,
supported by detailed bills of costs. While there are slight differences in the bills of
costs submitted by the AGC, the Bank of Canada, the Library of Parliament and the
Canadian Transportation Agency, suffice to say that they are all based on column III of
the table to Tariff B, and refer to units for 1) preparation and filing of a contested
filing of written costs submissions requested by the Court. As a reference, the AGCs
bill of costs adds up to $2,835.00 plus disbursements of $470.99. The Defendants bills
of costs also each contain a claim to double the amount of costs to account for the offer
7. I do not agree with Blacklocks submissions and instead side with the Defendants on
many fronts relating to the costs issue. However, further to my review of the detailed
costs claims by the Defendants and of their offers to settle, and considering the
particular circumstances of this case, I am not persuaded that the Defendants, and more
specifically the Defendants other than the AGC, are entitled to the full amount of costs
8. Looking at the Rule 400(3) factors relevant to this matter, the result of the proceeding
evidently supports an award of costs in favor of the Defendants as the nine appeals filed
9. I further agree with the Defendants that the appeals raised important issues regarding
the unnecessary duplication of legal resources and the real risk of contradictory
decisions in the Nine Actions. The appeals also involved relatively complex issues
appeals, I discussed in detail the so-called White factors developed by the Court in
White v Ebf Manufacturing Ltd, 2001 FCT 713 and the extent to which they applied (or
10. I pause to observe that, in its submissions on costs, Blacklock itself acknowledges that
the issues raised by its appeals were of moderate complexity and that the questions
11. The Rule 400(3) factors include any written offer to settle, and it is not disputed that
the Defendants each offered to settle their respective appeals on the basis of Blacklock
agreeing to discontinue the appeal on a without cost basis and that, in exchange, the
Defendants would forego half of the costs awarded in their favor by Prothonotary Tabib
in the Orders. These offers were clear and unequivocal, were presented in a timely
12. Furthermore, as reflected by the extensive written submissions filed by the parties and
the oral pleadings at the hearing before this Court, I am also satisfied that Blacklocks
motions for appeal required a significant amount of work for the parties.
13. Turning to the conduct of the parties, I agree with Blacklock that this is not a situation
where Blacklock can be faulted for any behavior that tended to unnecessarily lengthen
the duration of the proceeding. Nor was it one where Blacklock failed to make any
admission or where it took any steps that were improper, vexatious or unnecessary.
14. In those circumstances, I conclude that, in light of the applicable Rule 400(3) factors,
the Defendants are at first glance entitled to their costs on the basis of the mid-point in
column III of the table to Tariff B, which is the usual fall-back position for costs
FCA 115 [Air Canada] at para 21). The Defendants have in fact not requested costs
higher than the amounts specified in column III, and I see no reasons in this case to
Page: 10
15. Turning to the more specific items described by the Defendants in their respective bills
of costs, I first observe that the duration of the hearing on Blacklocks motions for
appeal of the Orders was 2.5 hours, not 3 hours. In addition, I do not agree that, in the
context of a motion where units are claimed for the hours of appearance on such
motion, costs can also be also granted for preparation for hearing as this would
justified to allot the same number of units for the preparation of the written costs
submissions as for the preparation of the contested motion itself, since the former
16. The Defendants bills of costs therefore need to be adjusted accordingly. Using the
AGCs bill of costs as a reference, these adjustments reduce the base costs to some
$1,820.00.
17. Regarding the offer to settle, the Defendants claim that they not only made written
offers to settle to Blacklock but that such offers meet the requirements of Rule 420(2)
18. Rule 420(2) provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, a defendant shall be
entitled to costs at double the party-and-party costs where such defendant makes a
written offer to settle and the plaintiff obtains a judgment less favourable than the terms
19. Blacklock objects to these claims to double costs and argues that the offers to settle
made by the Defendants did not contain the element of compromise required to qualify
20. I agree with Blacklock that, in order to be acceptable under Rule 420(2), an offer to
position, I do not consider that offering to forego half of the costs awarded by
Prothonotary Tabib in her Orders, as the Defendants did in this case, can be qualified as
an insufficient compromise falling below the requirements for a valid offer to settle
21. The offer made by the Defendants may perhaps lie at the low end of the spectrum, but
this is not a situation where all the benefits of the offer to settle are one-sided, as
Blacklock would have received something further to the offer to settle (Sanofi at
para 32). Of course, more generous compromises could perhaps have been offered by
copyright violation desired by Blacklock. However, that does not mean that the offers
by the Defendants to forego a portion of the costs they earned in the Orders appealed by
Blacklock did not contain an element of compromise and an incentive to accept. On the
contrary, I find that they did and that they constitute a proper offer to settle.
22. That being said, awarding costs at double the usual party-and-party rate is not automatic
and is subject to the discretion of the Court, and I can order otherwise depending on the
particular circumstances before me (Sanofi at para 34). In this case, in determining the
Page: 12
ultimate costs amount to be granted, I am thus mindful that the compromise offered by
Other factors
23. I also cannot ignore the fact that, even though Nine Actions are involved and as many
motions for appeal were filed by Blacklock, the Defendants other than the AGC mostly
relied upon and reiterated the submissions put forward by the AGC, both in their written
24. In the circumstances, I am therefore not convinced that the interests of justice would be
well served by granting the full amounts of costs claimed by the Defendants other than
the AGC. I further note that the amounts claimed in the Nine Actions filed by Blacklock
are modest, ranging from $10,000 to $55,000 when they are specified. That militates in
favor of using my discretion not to award, on these appeals of orders dealing with an
interlocutory matter, costs that could end up being punitive or disproportionate to the
25. An award of costs is not an exercise in exact science. I thus conclude that it would be
more appropriate to award a lump sum based roughly on the mid-point of column III of
the table to Tariff B, bearing in mind the Rule 400(3) factors listed above, the
adjustments needed to be made to the Defendants bills of costs, the content of the
offers to settle made by the Defendants, and the more secondary role played by the
26. While discretion should be prudently exercised, it must be borne in mind that the
exercise (Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma v Maple Leaf Meats Inc, 2002 FCA 417
[Consorzio] at para 10). A lump sum award of costs presents the advantage of saving
costs to the parties that would otherwise be incurred in the assessment process
27. In the circumstances of this case, and having regard to the submissions of all parties, I
therefore award the AGC single costs of $3,750.00, inclusive of disbursements, and I
award each of the Bank of Canada, the Library of Parliament and the Canadian
AND UPON determining that, in the June 27, 2016 judgment, the Orders of Prothonotary
Tabib were upheld and that there are no reasons to reconsider the awards of costs issued by
AND UPON concluding that the costs as awarded are appropriate and satisfy the general
objectives of costs award as they serve to provide compensation, promote settlement and deter
1. The Plaintiff Blacklock shall pay to the Defendant AGC costs in the total amount of
2. The Plaintiff Blacklock shall pay to the Defendant Bank of Canada costs in the total
3. The Plaintiff Blacklock shall pay to the Defendant Library of Parliament costs in the
4. The Plaintiff Blacklock shall pay to the Defendant Canadian Transportation Agency
5. All costs awarded shall by payable by the Plaintiff Blacklock within 30 days from the
6. The costs awarded are for the appeals brought by the Plaintiff Blacklock and do not
Denis Gascon
Judge
Date: 20160329
Docket: T-646-15
BETWEEN:
Applicant
and
Respondents
I. Introduction
[1] This is an application under Rules 61 and 300 of the Federal Court Rules, SOR/98-106,
and the Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42 [the Copyright Act] by the Canadian Standards
Association [the CSA] for the following relief relating to an alleged copyright infringement by
Page: 2
P.S. Knight Co. Ltd. and Gordon Knight [collectively Knight] of the 2015 version of the
(a) a declaration that Knight has infringed copyright in the CSA Code;
(b) an injunction restraining Knight (and related companies, employees, officers, directors,
(c) delivery up of all copies of the alleged copy pursuant to section 38 of the Copyright Act;
(d) damages including profits, or in the alternative, an award of statutory damages in the sum
of $20,000 per work infringed pursuant to section 38.1 of the Copyright Act;
(h) such further and other relief as this Honourable Court may deem just.
II. Background
[2] The Applicant CSA is a standards development, testing and certification organization
with headquarters in Rexdale, Ontario that develops standards in fields such as health and safety,
preserving the environment and facilitating trade. The CSA claims copyright ownership in its
publication, the 2015 CSA Code. The 23rd edition of the CSA Code, published in early 2015, is
the subject of this application and is allegedly being infringed [the 2015 CSA Code].
[3] The Respondents, P.S. Knight Co Ltd. [Knight Co] and its president and director
Gordon Knight are commercial competitors of the CSA based in Alberta. Prior to the companys
Page: 3
incorporation in British Columbia in 1985, Peter Knight, Gordon Knights father, published the
Electrical Code Simplified book [the ECS] and publication of subsequent editions of this book
[5] The CSA Code and the ECS are different publications that serve different purposes. The
CSA Code is a complete code of electrical standards, some 700 pages in length, while the ECS is
[6] The CSA Code is written in consultation with various stakeholders. The CSA has
obtained assignments of copyright from a number of authors since at least 2010, although Knight
disputes the completeness of these assignments. Editions of the Code are repetitive and based on
previous versions, and therefore Knights position is that the CSA did not obtain valid copyright
over the entire work, given the lack of assignments from earlier contributors. Further, Knight
asserts that since 2010 not all contributors as authors have provided written assignments.
[7] The CSA has registered the copyright for the 2015 edition of the Code and a Copyright
[8] When the first ECS book was developed in the 1960s by Peter Knight, he had a good
working relationship with CSA: he was provided with advanced copies of changes to the CSA
Code, and he in turn provided CSA with copies of the ECS. The ECS focussed on the residential
any infringement of the CSAs copyright in the Code and to ensure that attribution of CSA
copyright ownership of the excerpts from the CSA Code used in the ECS was included in Peter
[10] In one of the letters, Peter Knight wrote that he was very careful to avoid any
[11] In 1969, a letter sent to Peter Knight gave him permission to quote from the CSA Code,
provided he recognizes the CSA as the source. This permitted right to use excerpts from the
Code was purportedly assigned from Peter Knight to Knight Co after it was incorporated in the
1970s to 1980s. The CSA did not have knowledge or approve of this assignment at the time of
the alleged assignment. The only evidence of such an assignment was given by Gordon Knight in
his affidavit.
[12] In 1974, the ECS was expanded to include the industrial market and the ECS was split
into two books: ECS Book I covered residential electrical code and ECS Book II covered
[13] The CSA began to sell its own annotated version of the Code in 1990.
[14] In 2004, negotiations between Knight Co and the CSA resulted in an offer by the CSA to
purchase Knight Co for what Gordon Knight claimed was a mere 20% of the value of Knight
[15] Following these negotiations, the relationship between the parties deteriorated. The CSA
stopped providing advanced copies of the CSA Code to Knight and sent letters reminding Knight
of their copyright in the Code. By letter dated July 12, 2007, the CSA offered to grant a license
to Peter Knight personally to reproduce excerpts from the Code, subject to certain conditions,
that could not be assigned or transferred to any other person or legal entity. The proposed license
terms were limited, personal (to P. Knight), revocable, non-transferable, non-divisible, non-
bare permission.
[17] Peter Knight retired in 2010 and sold Knight Co to Gordon Knight. In 2011, the CSA
wrote to Knight Co to make clear that any license that may have existed was terminated.
[18] The next edition of the CSA Code was published in 2012. The CSA learned that Knight
was intending to put out a new version of the ECS, which is the subject of a related action in
Court file T-1178-12, yet to be scheduled for a hearing. After that action was commenced, the
Page: 6
relationship between the parties worsened, and Gordon Knight started a website that criticizes
the CSA. The CSA launched a defamation proceeding in the Ontario Superior Court, which is
currently pending.
provinces. In particular, Knight points to the Electrical Code Regulations, Alta Reg 209/2006, s
3(a) made under the Safety Codes Act, RSA 2000, c S-1. Those regulations declare the CSA
Code in force in the Province of Alberta in respect of electrical systems. In Ontario, the CSA
Code has been declared in force, with some amendments, and other provinces have also adopted
[20] In 2013, Gordon Knight lobbied a Member of Parliament to ask questions in the House of
Commons relating to how the federal government viewed the CSA. In response, the Minister of
Industry stated that the CSA is not a regulatory entity, but rather a not-for-profit- membership-
based association. The Minister also stated that standards belong to the CSA and that they may
need to be purchased unless an agreement is made with the CSA for free public access.
[21] Knight has now produced and threatens to distribute, as of March 1, 2016, what the CSA
claims is essentially an identical copy of the CSA Code [the Knight Code]. This is the alleged
infringing work at issue. Knight does not deny that the Knight Code is a substantial copy of the
CSA Code.
Page: 7
[22] Knight has admitted that Knights interest in publishing the Knight Code is purely
commercial, and offers to sell the Knight Code at about one third of the price the CSA charges
those affidavits. The CSAs affiant is Doug Morton, Director, Government Relations and
Standards Policy & Accreditation, CSA Standards. Knights affiant is Gordon Knight, President,
[24] The relevant provisions of the Act are attached hereto as Annex A.
IV. Issues
B. If copyright does subsist in the 2015 CSA Code, does the CSA own valid copyright in
that Code?
i. because of a license, or
V. Analysis
[27] Knights position is that the CSA cannot rely on the presumption in section 53 of the
Copyright Act, given that the registration is dated three days after this action was commenced,
and three months after publication of the 2015 CSA Code. Accordingly, Knight argues that there
[28] The CSA relies on the presumptions in sections 34.1 and 53 of the Copyright Act and
2014 FCA 135 at para 68 [POPS], which states that the Court can rely on the certificate of
registration as evidence of a copyright in the absence of credible evidence to the contrary. The
CSA states that they obtained the copyright registration in the ordinary course of business and
not on the eve of trial, a tactic criticised by the Federal Court of Appeal in CCH Canadian Ltd v
[29] I find that the CSA is not entitled to rely on the presumptions of validity and ownership
under the copyright registration obtained. The Copyright was not registered until three days after
this application was started. No previous copyright registration in earlier versions was made.
Page: 9
This registration of the 2015 CSA Code can hardly be said to have been made in the ordinary
course of business.
[30] That being said, even without any presumption arising from registration, for validity or
indicated on the work in the usual manner, there is a presumption that the author owns valid
copyright. The inside cover of the CSA Code contains such information and given the evidence
discussed below, I find that the CSA has the benefits of the presumption of ownership, and has
[31] Knight argues as well that the CSA did not exercise sufficient skill and judgment in
compiling the works of others in the form of the Code and that the Code is not sufficiently
original to justify copyright protection. In More v Bauer Nike Hockey Inc, 2010 BCSC 1395
[Bauer], the British Columbia Supreme Court discussed at paragraphs 77-83 that the CSA
[32] However, the affidavit evidence of Mr. Morton demonstrates that developing the CSA
Code does in fact involve significant skill and judgment (CCH, above, at para 16). Moreover,
Peter Knight acknowledged copyright in a letter dated December 3, 1968, where he stated that in
the development of the ECS he was very careful to avoid any infringement of C.S.A.s
copyright.
Page: 10
[33] Moreover, the 2015 CSA Code is an improvement over a previous work. An
improvement is an original work and capable of separate copyright when the additions and
improvements to a previous work are substantial (DRG Inc v Datafile Ltd, [1988] 2 FC 243
(FCTD); affd [1991] FCJ No 144 (FCA), quoting from Fox, The Canadian Law of Copyright
hours went into the production of the latest edition of the CSA Code. This constitutes a
substantial undertaking of skill and judgment. Given the evidence that the CSA has obtained the
assignments from many, if not all, the authors who contributed to those improvements, the CSA
owns the copyright in the current 2015 edition to the extent these authors additions and
[34] Knight also argues that the CSA is a government organization and that because the Code
is incorporated by reference into the Provincial laws, the Crown owns the copyright, not the
CSA. Knight relies on the decision in Bauer, above, where the B.C. Supreme Court held, at
paragraphs 72-73, that the CSA is accredited and supervised by the Standards Council of
Organizations and for the Approval of National Standards of Canada states that standards
development organizations (including the CSA) must have a process for standards development
and keep the Standards Council updated on these procedures. The standards must only be
published with approval in accordance with the requirements of the standards development
Page: 11
organization. As such, Knight submits the CSA is controlled by the Standards Council and
section 12 of the Copyright Act does apply, as Ontario published the Code.
[36] In reply, the CSA points out that the Ontario publication is an amended version and not
CSA also notes that the provinces seek permission from the CSA before referencing or
reproducing the CSA Code. Section 12 of the Copyright Act provides that ownership of
copyright belongs to Her Majesty when it is, or has been, prepared or published by or under the
direction or control of Her Majesty or any government department. Absent these conditions,
[37] The CSA is not a government organization or under government control. Mr. Morton
provides cogent evidence that the CSA is an independent association in the form of a corporate
profile. Moreover, the House of Commons has commented that the CSA is independent of the
government. Provincial governments also ask permission from the CSA before referencing or
[38] Further, there is no evidence that any level of the Crown claims ownership. In addition to
the statements made in the House of Commons, Gordon Knight has provided no evidence that
the Crown can be reasonably found to own the 2015 CSA Code. There is also no evidence the
CSA is controlled by any level of government, or that the standards in the CSA Code are not
approved by the Standards Council of Canada. The CSA is accredited by the Standards Council,
[39] Copyright is a creature of statute, and the rights and remedies provided in the Copyright
Act are exhaustive (CCH). Copyright in the CSA Code therefore only belongs to the Crown if the
requirements set out in section 12 of the Copyright Act are met; namely, the Code must have
been prepared or published by or under the direction or control of Her Majesty or any
does not constitute preparation or publishing by the government or under their direction.
[40] In considering the above evidence in light of the fact that the CSA has undertaken
significant effort and expense produce and publish the CSA Code, it would be contrary to a
purposive construction of the Copyright Act to strip the CSA of its rights in the 2015 CSA Code
B. Public Policy
[41] Knight also advances a public policy argument. In R v Edwards, A Unit of SPX Canada
Inc, 2002 CarswellOnt 2083 (WL Can) (Ont Ct J) [Edwards], the Ontario Court of Justice held
the CSA Code is law and that a violation of it would constitute an offence. In BC Jockey Club v
Standen (Winbar Publications), (1985) 22 DLR (4th) 467 (BC CA), the concurring judgement
added that there may be situations where material becomes part of the public domain: a judges
reasons may be such an example. By extension, Knight argues that law incorporated by reference
would form part of the public domain and could not be copyrighted. Knight also points to an
Order of the federal government that anyone may, without charge or request for permission,
reproduce federal law (Reproduction of Federal Law Order, SI/97-5, (1997) C Gaz II, 444).
Page: 13
[42] The CSA has invested significant resources into developing the Code. While the amount
of money they recover in selling the Code may exceed those costs, excess revenue is used in the
development of other Codes, an activity that is in the public interest of society. Further, the CSA
Code is a voluntary standard and legislatures are not required to enact it as law.
owner of copyright in its Code and other standards, even when referenced in legislation, but
there is also no evidence whatsoever that the Crown in the Right of Alberta, or any other
Province, claims to own copyright in the CSA Code. Provincial government authorities request
C. If copyright does subsist in the 2015 CSA Code, does the CSA own valid copyright in that
Code?
[44] Knight submits that the copyright in the CSA Code belongs to third parties. The CSA is a
corporation that only facilitates creation of the Code. Accordingly, the only way the CSA owns
copyright is if it was assigned to the CSA or if it was developed by employees. Given it was
developed by volunteer committees and there was no evidence of assignment in the 83 years
[45] Knight provides two examples of unnamed authors. Gordon Knight affirmed that his
father had contributed to the CSA Code and argues that the Court should infer this is true, even
in the absence of Peter Knights testimony. The second example given is Ms. Annie Pereira, who
is acknowledged in the front of the 2012 CSA Code for her contributions in eight editions.
Page: 14
However, the evidence fails to prove either person contributed as author; there is no non-hearsay
evidence regarding Peter Knights contribution, and Ms. Pereiras contributions are not specified.
[46] Knight relies primarily on three cases to have the Court find that the CSA does not own
that provided for a sharing of intellectual property relating to software programs. The respondent
employee obtained copyright registrations relating to software that did not reflect the applicant
employers interest and refused to tell the applicant what the certificate of registration covered.
In discussing the evidentiary burden, the Court found that the applicant had established an
interest in the certificates, and therefore the respondent was required to show that the certificates
only covered the portion of the work that pre-dated his employment. The respondent could not
do so, and the Registrar of Copyrights was directed to amend the register to reflect joint
[47] In POPS, above, the Court found that a certificate could be struck because it contained
the incorrect first author. In Kelley Estate v Roy, 2002 FCT 950, the Court expunged a
registration where the balance of the evidence overcame the presumptions in the Copyright Act.
[48] Knight invites the Court to draw an adverse inference from all the evidence, including the
lack of assignments, and either expunge the certificate of registration relied upon by the
Applicant or at least discount the certificate as evidence of copyright. In reply, the CSA submits
that at most the above case law relied on by Knight would not invalidate the copyright, but only
Page: 15
relate to the question of joint ownership. While the certificate may need to be amended, it does
not mean that the CSA does not have valid ownership of copyright in the 2015 CSA Code.
[49] Knight also states that because they have raised arguments about the propriety of the
CSA to produce the assignments. Knight relies on Eli Lilly & Co v Nu-Pharm Inc, [1997] 1 FC 3
(FCA) [Eli Lilly] for the proposition that while the general rule is that the party who asserts must
prove, the onus shifts if the subject-matter lies within the knowledge of the other party. As the
CSA has not produced the affidavits proving assignment, the Court should draw an adverse
inference.
[50] In reply, the CSA submits that the purpose of such an evidentiary onus is so that the party
having control over the documents is obliged to produce them. In this case, the CSA had
provided the assignments to Knight in discovery in related litigation, and because Knight could
have just as easily presented them as evidence, there should be no adverse inference drawn.
[51] Mr. Morton has affirmed that the CSA has obtained executed assignments from those
authors who contributed to improvements in the 2012 and 2015 editions, which were provided to
Knight in discovery. The only evidence to the contrary provided by Knight relates to uncertain
and unsubstantiated assertions that Peter Knight, and possibly Annie Pereira, may have
contributed to earlier editions of the CSA Code, although neither contributed to the 2015 CSA
Code. Knight has not presented any reliable evidence to challenge the authorship provided by the
CSA of additions to the 2015 CSA Code made by authors who assigned their rights in their
Page: 16
contributions to the CSA in order to trigger reversing the onus as discussed in Eli Lilly, above.
Even if Knight had provided some evidence, disclosure of the assignments to Knight during
discovery makes Knight the most appropriate party to have put those facts and arguments into
Gordon Knights evidence is qualified with phrases such as it is my belief and it appears,
and contains no direct personal knowledge. Gordon Knight acknowledged that his belief was
based on intellectual and experiential understanding, not on any direct or substantial facts.
Gordon Knight was not present at the drafting of the CSA Code and is not in a position to be able
to question the assignments. I agree that based on the evidence before the Court, the CSA has
established its ownership of copyright in the 2015 CSA Code, at least insofar as the subject
matter contributed by the authors to the 2015 CSA version of the Code was assigned to the CSA.
before the Court to dispute the validity of ownership by the CSA in the original content in the
D. Does Knight have a defence (1) because of a Licence, or (2) because the Knight Code
reproduction is fair dealing?
[54] Knight believes that the correspondence between the CSA and Peter Knight in the 1960s
constitutes a subsisting perpetual license to reproduce any version of the CSA Code. Knight
Page: 17
argues that because it was granted for consideration, the dissemination and promotion of the
[55] I disagree. The letters (the purported license) only allowed Peter Knight to quote from the
and there is no evidence of any valid license in writing having been assigned to Knight Co or
Gordon Knight. Even if there were a license, the CSA put Knight on notice that any such license
[56] Moreover, as the CSA rightfully points out, Peter Knights purported letters with the
CSA in 1969:
[58] Knight also submits it is entitled to the defence of fair dealing. Knight advocated for a
broad interpretation of research and private study and submits that the Court should look to the
understand the law. As well, given that research can be conducted with a view to profit, the
commercial aspect is irrelevant, and due to the high CSA revenues from the 2015 Code relative
to the cost of producing it, the CSA will not be adversely affected.
[59] Knight cannot rely on fair dealing as the allegedly infringing Knight Code work is a
complete copy of the 2015 CSA Code. One of the considerations enunciated by the Supreme
Court of Canada in CCH, above, was the extent of the copying. When 100% of a work is copied,
the dealing cannot be fair. Further, the argument that it is for educational purposes has no merit.
The Knight Code is clearly a competitive commercial undertaking by Knight to compete with the
2015 CSA Code, and they have no valid claim to fair dealing.
VI. Remedies
[60] The CSA is only entitled to damages from the date following the date of the written
assignments from the authors of the 2015 CSA Code (Denturist Group of Ontario v Denturist
[61] Nevertheless, given that I find that copyright subsists in the 2015 CSA Code, that the
CSA owns the copyright in that Code, and that Knight has admitted it produced the Knight Code
Page: 19
knowingly and wilfully as a substantial infringement of the 2015 CSA Code, I find that the CSA
is entitled to:
(a) a permanent injunction, enjoining the Respondents from infringing the CSAs copyright
in the 2015 CSA Code;
(b) an order for delivery up of all copies of the Knight Code produced to the date of this
[62] While Gordon Knight is the sole directing mind of the corporate Respondent and
responsible for day-to-day activities of the Respondent Corporation, there is no evidence before
the Court that he acted outside his duties as a director and officer of PS Knight Co Ltd. and no
real argument was presented at the hearing on this issue. I do not find personal liability by
Gordon Knight, but his public commentary on the CSA, which is the subject matter of a separate
law suit in the Ontario Superior Court, is a matter for that Court to decide and this decision
should have no bearing on that case independent of the findings of copyright ownership and
infringement.
[63] Costs are awarded to the CSA. If no agreement on costs can be reached between the
parties, I ask that each party submit their written submissions on costs within two (2) weeks of
JUDGMENT
2. PS Knight Co Ltd, its officers, directors, employees and any related companies under its
or any other act that contravenes the CSAs copyright in the 2015 CSA Code, without the
3. PS Knight Co Ltd shall deliver up to CSA all copies of the Knight Code produced to the
date of this judgment or hereafter, and any plates or electronic files of the Knight Code;
4. PS Knight Co Ltd shall pay statutory damages to the CSA in the amount of $5,000,
interest;
"Michael D. Manson"
Judge
Page: 21
ANNEX A
Copyright and Moral Rights in Works Droit dauteur et droits moraux sur les
oeuvres
Copyright
Droit dauteur
created after June 7, 1988, other than a map, tlcommunication, une oeuvre littraire,
chart or plan, dramatique, musicale ou artistique;
(h) in the case of a computer program that can g) de prsenter au public lors dune exposition,
be reproduced in the ordinary course of its use, des fins autres que la vente ou la location,
other than by a reproduction during its une oeuvre artistique autre quune carte
execution in conjunction with a machine, gographique ou marine, un plan ou un
device or computer, to rent out the computer graphique cre aprs le 7 juin 1988;
period of fifty years following the end of that anne suivant celle de la premire publication
calendar year. de loeuvre.
27 (1) It is an infringement of copyright for 27 (1) Constitue une violation du droit dauteur
any person to do, without the consent of the laccomplissement, sans le consentement du
owner of the copyright, anything that by this titulaire de ce droit, dun acte quen vertu de la
Act only the owner of the copyright has the prsente loi seul ce titulaire a la facult
right to do. daccomplir.
(2) It is an infringement of copyright for any (2) Constitue une violation du droit dauteur
person to laccomplissement de tout acte ci-aprs en ce
qui a trait lexemplaire dune oeuvre, dune
(a) sell or rent out, fixation dune prestation, dun enregistrement
sonore ou dune fixation dun signal de
(b) distribute to such an extent as to affect communication alors que la personne qui
prejudicially the owner of the copyright, accomplit lacte sait ou devrait savoir que la
production de lexemplaire constitue une
(c) by way of trade distribute, expose or offer violation de ce droit, ou en constituerait une si
for sale or rental, or exhibit in public, lexemplaire avait t produit au Canada par la
personne qui la produit :
(d) possess for the purpose of doing anything
referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c), or a) la vente ou la location;
(e) import into Canada for the purpose of doing b) la mise en circulation de faon porter
anything referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c), prjudice au titulaire du droit dauteur;
a copy of a work, sound recording or fixation c) la mise en circulation, la mise ou loffre en
of a performers performance or of a vente ou en location, ou lexposition en public,
communication signal that the person knows or dans un but commercial;
should have known infringes copyright or
would infringe copyright if it had been made in d) la possession en vue de lun ou lautre des
Canada by the person who made it. actes viss aux alinas a) c);
38 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the owner of 38 (1) Sous rserve du paragraphe (2), le
the copyright in a work or other subject-matter titulaire du droit dauteur peut, comme sil en
may tait le propritaire, recouvrer la possession de
tous les exemplaires contrefaits doeuvres ou
(a) recover possession of all infringing copies de tout autre objet de ce droit dauteur et de
of that work or other subject-matter, and of all toutes les planches qui ont servi ou sont
plates used or intended to be used for the destines servir la confection de ces
production of infringing copies, and
may give rise to an award of statutory damages dauteur que si le droit dauteur de lune ou de
with respect to a work or other subject-matter lautre a t viol par suite de lutilisation des
only if the copyright in that work or other services mentionns ce paragraphe.
subject-matter was actually infringed as a
result of the use of a service referred to in that Violation rpute: paragraphe 27(2.3)
subsection.
(1.11) Pour lapplication du paragraphe (1), la
Deeming infringement of subsection violation du droit dauteur vise au paragraphe
may reduce the amount of the award under autre objet du droit dauteur sont incorpors
paragraph (1)(a) to less than $500, but not less dans un mme support matriel ou dans le cas
than $200. o seule la violation vise au paragraphe
27(2.3) donne ouverture aux dommages-
Special case intrts prtablis, le tribunal peut, selon ce
quil estime quitable en loccurrence, rduire,
(3) In awarding statutory damages under lgard de chaque oeuvre ou autre objet du
paragraph (1)(a) or subsection (2), the court
(d) in the case of infringements for non- Cas o les dommages-intrts prtablis ne
commercial purposes, the need for an award to peuvent tre accords
be proportionate to the infringements, in
53 (1) The Register of Copyrights is evidence 53 (1) Le registre des droits dauteur, de mme
of the particulars entered in it, and a copy of an que la copie dinscriptions faites dans ce
entry in the Register is evidence of the registre, certifie conforme par le commissaire
particulars of the entry if it is certified by the aux brevets, le registraire des droits dauteur ou
Commissioner of Patents, the Registrar of tout membre du personnel du Bureau du droit
Copyrights or an officer, clerk or employee of dauteur, fait foi de son contenu.
(3) A certified copy or certificate appearing to (3) Les copies certifies conformes et les
have been issued under this section is certificats censs tre dlivrs selon les
admissible in all courts without proof of the paragraphes (1) ou (2) sont admissibles en
signature or official character of the person preuve sans quil soit ncessaire de prouver
appearing to have signed it. lauthenticit de la signature qui y est appose
ou la qualit officielle du signataire.
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-646-15
APPEARANCES:
SOLICITORS OF RECORD: