Duran v.

Olivia (1961)

Topic: Motion to dismiss petition (Cadastral Proceeding (before judgment)

Doctrine: Rules of Court is applicable in a suppletory character in land registration cases. Therefore, a
motion to dismiss, which allows the court to expeditiously resolve cases, is available to the parties even
though it is not one of the pleadings specified in the Land Registration Act (Act 496)

Jose Duran and Teresa Diaz Vda de Duran vs. Bernabe Olivia, Fe Almazan, Heirs of Vicente Godesano,
Manuel Arce and Esperanza Salud

FACTS:

Jose and Tereza Duran filed an application for registration in their names of 16 lots (Lots 1-16) under
Plan PSU-128386 in the CFI of Camarines Sur. Oppositors filed motion to dismiss on the ground that
the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots because the lots were already registered
and certificates were issued to them (Olivia, Almazan, Godesano, Arce and Salud all had lots
assigned to them and evidenced by certificates of title to their names). Applicants however contend that
the court has jurisdiction to consider the application even though the certificates of title have already
been issued.

The CFI dismissed the case (two successive orders of dismissal). Applicants appeal.

ISSUE #1: WON motion to dismiss available in a land registration case

Applicant Durans: Motion to dismiss not available in Land Registration Act

SC: Rules of Court applied in suppletory character whenever practicable and convenient. While the
Land Registration Act does not provide for a pleading similar to a Motion to Dismiss, applying the
Rules of Court in land registration cases is necessary to expedite resolution of LR cases.

ISSUE #2: WON oppositors failed to prove similar identities of the lots covered by their titles and the
ones applied for

SC: we find no reason to overturn the trial court's findings that indeed the lots are similar.

ISSUE #3: WON certificate of title based on mere homestead, sales, or free patent covering private
land is null and void; that it is the decree of registration, not the certificate which confers the character
of inconstestability of title (and that applicants were deprived of due process...etc)

SC: no merit. A patent once registered becomes indefeasible as a Torrens title (S 122 of Act 496). SC
discussed purpose of Torrens System. Homestead patent, once registered under LRA, cannot be the
subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any title issued thereon is null and void. Same thing
for sales patent.

Since the respondents already held indefeasible certificates of title under the LRA, the CFI was without
jurisdiction to entertain the application of the Durans (long line of decisions have upheld this principle).

In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an
earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void.1 This
is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land
thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings
being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and
within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person.
Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first registered owner in the
Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered
in his name. Hence, the later applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied
for is already covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To
declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to
quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in the efficacy of the registration law.