Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A. G.R. No. 197293, Alfredo Mendoza V. People of The Philippines and Juno Cars, Inc., April 21, 2014
A. G.R. No. 197293, Alfredo Mendoza V. People of The Philippines and Juno Cars, Inc., April 21, 2014
A. G.R. No. 197293, Alfredo Mendoza V. People of The Philippines and Juno Cars, Inc., April 21, 2014
Facts:
In this case Juno Cars, Inc. hired Alfredo Mendoza as a trade-in/ used car
supervisor. Upon a partial audit conducted by its dealer/ operator, it was discovered
that 5 cars had been sold and released by Mendoza without the dealers or the
finance managers approval. The said audit also showed that the buyers of the
subject cars made payments but Mendoza failed to remit such payments.
Consequently, Juno Cars filed a complaint against Mendoza alleging that the latter
pilfered an amount to its prejudice and damage. Mendoza raised Juno Cars
supposed failure to prove ownership over the 5 cars or its right to possess the
purported unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered damage.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the public
prosecutor on the basis of its own findings of lack of probable cause.
Ruling:
The High Tribunal ruled in the affirmative. While the information filed by the
public prosecutor was valid, the trial court still had the discretion to make its own
findings of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of Mendoza and
proceed with the trial. The executive determination of probable cause concerns
itself with whether there is lack of evidence to support an information being filed.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The Constitution prohibits the
issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge has not
personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, he may produce allows a
determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte. For this reason, Sec. 6, Par.
(a) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates the judge to
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable
cause. Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge
Capco-Umali correctly dismissed the case against Mendoza.
B. G.R. NO. 187769, ALVIN PATRIMONIO V. NAPOLEON GUTIERREZ AND OCTAVIO MARASIGAN, III, JUNE 4, 2014
Facts:
The trial court ruled in favor of Marasigan and found petitioner, in issuing the
pre-signed blank checks, had the intention of issuing the check even without his
approval. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Under Art. 1878, Par. 7 of the Civil
Code, a written authority is required when the loan is contracted through an agent.
In the case at bench, the petitioner is not bound by the contract of loan since
the records reveal that Guttierez did not have any authority to borrow money in
behalf of petitioner. Records do not show that the petitioner executed any special
power of attorney in favor of Guttierez to borrow in his behalf, hence, the act of
Guttierez is in violation of the said provision, and thus, he should be the only one
liable for the loan he was not able to settle.
Facts:
In this case, Democrito Paras was charged with one count of rape. The
Regional Trial Court found Paras guilty as charged which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals . Paras appealed the decision of CA before the Supreme Court. The Court
affirmed the judgment of conviction against Paras. However, Police Superintendent
Roberto R. Rabo, Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court that
Paras had died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of Paras is extinguished together with his
criminal liability in case of death pending appeal?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Under Art. 89, Par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death of an accused pending his appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil liability ex delicto. The Court, in People v.
Bayotas, enunciated the following guidelines construing the above provision in case
the accused dies before final judgment:
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a)
Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) xxx; e) Quasi-delicts.
Moreover, upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to
stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
In this case, when Paras died on January 24, 2013, his appeal to the Court
was still pending. The death of Paras, thus, extinguished his criminal liability, as well
as his civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the crime committed.
F. G.R. NO. 205867, MARIFLOR HORTIZUELA V. GREGORIO TAGUFA, ET AL.,
FEBRUARY 23, 2015
Facts:
The MCTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that Mariflor resorted to a wrong
remedy in filing the case. The RTC however reversed the MCTC. It ordered Gregoria
to reconvey the property to Mariflor. On petition for review to the CA, the latter
reversed the RTC. Although an action for reconveyance, the same is clearly an
attack on the validity of OCT No. P-84609, which is not allowed by Sec. 48 of PD
1529, which proscribes collateral attacks on Torrens titles. The issue of whether or
not a title was fraudulently issued should be treshed out in a direct proceeding.
Consequently, Mariflor appealed to the SC. She maintains that her action was not
an action to nullify the title, but merely to reconvey the property covered by that
title, as Gregoria was clearly aware of the sale by Atty. Marquez to her husband,
Runsted. On the other hand, the respondents argue otherwise. The fact that
Mariflor filed the action for reconveyance was because she failed to file within one
year the action for reversion as a remedy provided under Act 496. Further, Mariflor
being an American citizen, is not allowed to own land in the Philippines.
Issue:
Ruling
The complaint of Hortizuela was not a collateral attack on the title warranting
dismissal. As a matter of fact, an action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy,
an action in personam, available to a person whose property has been wrongfully
registered under the Torrens system in anothers name. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree is not sought to be set aside. It does not seek to set aside
the decree but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks
to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner.
Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an
innocent third person for value. It is also noteworthy to point that Gregoria Tagufa
never acquired any valid right or legal title over the property.
G. G.R. NO. 206004, JOSEPH TIMBOL V. COMELEC, FEBRUARY 24, 2015
The Facts:
In this case, Joseph Timbol filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Councilor of
the Sangguniang Panglunsod on October 5, 2012. On January 17, 2013, he received
a notice from the election officer for him to appear before her office for a
clarificatory hearing on his certificate of candidacy. During the hearing, Timbol,
assisted by counsel, argued that he was not a nuisance candidate, alleging that in
the 2010 elections, he ranked 8th among all the candidates for the Sangguniang
Panglunsod, and he had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign. While his
name already appeared in the list of nuisance candidates in the COMELEC website,
the panel assured him that his certificate of candidacy would be given due course
and his name deleted in the list of nuisance candidates. Indeed, the election officer
thru a Memorandum dated January 17, 2013 recommended that Timbols COC be
given due course. Despite the recommendation, his name was not deleted from the
list, and since the printing of ballots for the automated election will be held on
February 4, 2013, he filed before the COMELEC on February 2, 2013 a petition
praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidtates.
Issues:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying due
course to the certificate of candidacy of Joseph.
I.
There are recognized exceptions to this rule. The court has taken cognizance
of moot and academic cases when:
(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a
situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the
issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench,
the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading
review.
The court may no longer act on petitioners prayer that his name be included
in the certified list of candidates and be printed on the ballots as a candidate for
Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with the court his Petition
for Certiorari on March 15, 2013, 39 days after respondent began printing the
ballots on February 4, 2013. Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded,
with the winners already proclaimed.
II
Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, the State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service. This, however, does not guarantee
a constitutional right to run for or hold public office. To run for public office is a
mere privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Among these limitations is
the prohibition on nuisance candidates.
That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of
candidates did not cure the defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he
would not have to file the Petition had been given an opportunity to be heard in the
first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, respondent
denied petitioners Petition on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had
already begun on February 4, 2013.
H. G.R. NO. 205136, OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA V. COMELEC, DECEMBER 2, 2014
Facts:
COMELEC argued that Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly as the latter was
never an official candidate because she was not eligible for the post by reason of
her age, and that; moreover, the COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it
contained a material misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the office she
seeks to be elected to. Olivia countered that although Kimberly may not be qualified
to run for election because of her age, it cannot be denied that she still filed a valid
COC and was, thus, an official candidate who may be substituted. Olivia also
claimed that there was no ground to cancel or deny Kimberlys COC on the ground
of lack of qualification and material misrepresentation because she did not
misrepresent her birth date to qualify for the position of councilor, and as there was
no deliberate attempt to mislead the electorate, which is precisely why she
withdrew her COC upon learning that she was not qualified.
Issue:
Ruling:
The High Tribunal ruled in the affirmative. COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to
have filed a valid COC and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia. Firstly,
subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course
to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the COMELEC has the
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC.
The next question then is whether Olivia complied with all of the
requirements for a valid substitution; The High Tribunal also answered in the
affirmative. First, there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberlys COC after the last day
for the filing of COCs; second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same
political party to which Kimberly belongs; and third, Olivia filed her COC not later
than mid-day of election day.
I. G.R. NO. 193707, NORMA DEL SOCORRO V. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN
WILSEM, DECEMBER 10, 2014
Facts:
In this case, Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem were married in
Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem.
Unfortunately, their marital bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Socorro and her son came home to the
Philippines. According to Norma, Van Wilsem made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Van Wilsem never gave support to their common son. Socorro filed a
complaint against Van Wilsem for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust
refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the
complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Since Van Wilsem is a citizen of
Holland or the Netherlands, the agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of
his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his
child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
mean that Van Wilsem is not obliged to support Socorros son altogether. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Van Wilsem
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such
laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Van Wilsem
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged
to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Van Wilsem to
plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves
in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the
most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. In the light
of the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
FACTS:
On the evening of May 14, 1989, Baleriano Limbag awoke when Edigardo
Geroche, Roberto Garde, and Generoso Marfil suddenly entered into his house and,
without a search warrant, began scouring the place for firearms, but instead food
and took away his airgun. Limbag also sustained injuries as a result of the raid.
Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde, and Generoso Marfil were all charged with
the crime of Violation of Domicile, under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, and
Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the above-mentioned accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Less Serious Physical Injuries, but acquitted them of the
crime of Violation of Domicile because, according to the trial court, the prosecution
failed to prove that the petitioners were public officers, which is an essential
element of the crime.
The petitioners then appealed their case to the Court of Appeals (CA), praying
that the decision of the lower court be reversed. The CA, however, ruled that the
petitioners should not be convicted of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries
but, rather, Violation of Domicile, considering their judicial admissions that they
were the barangay captain and part of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU).
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
The Court explained that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case
for review to the appellate court. As such, the accused waives the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy, and gives jurisdiction to the courts to examine
the records of the case, and impose the proper penalty, even if this means
increasing the penalty previously imposed. It is the duty of the appellate courts to
correct the errors that they may find in the assailed judgment.
That being the case, the petitioners could not have been placed in double
jeopardy when the CA set aside the original ruling of the trial court, and instead
found them guilty of Violation of Domicile
One of the essential elements of the crime of Violation of Domicile is that the
accused be a public officer or employee.
In the present case, the Court adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the CA. In their testimonies and pleadings, Geroche did not deny that he was
the barangay captain. Likewise, Garde and Marfil did not refute the fact that they
were CAFGU members. By virtue of their positions, they are considered to be public
officers or employees. Hence, they can be found guilty of Violation of Domicile, as
all the elements for the crime are met.
(The Court modified the penalty imposed by the CA in their decision. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court sentenced the petitioners to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from two years and four months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four years, nine months, and ten days of prision correccional, as
maximum.)