3/29/2017 G.R.No.

L32974

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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.L32974July30,1979

BARTOLOMEORTIZ,petitioner,
vs.
HON.UNIONC.KAYANAN,inhiscapacityasJudgeoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofQuezon,BranchIV
ELEUTERIOZAMORA,QUIRINOCOMINTAN,VICENTEFERRO,ANDGREGORIOPAMISARAN,respondents.

Salonga,Ordoez,Yap,Sicat&AssociatesandSalvador,Ulgado&Carbonforpetitioner.

JoseA.Cusiforprivaterespondents.

ANTONIO,J.: 1 w p h 1 . t

PetitionforcertiorariandProhibitionwithPreliminaryInjunctiontonullifytheOrderofrespondentJudgedirecting
theexecutionofthefinaljudgmentinCivilCaseNo.C90,entitled"Bartolome Ortiz vs. Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, et al.," and the Writ of Execution issued to implement said Order, allegedly for being
inconsistentwiththejudgmentsoughttobeenforced.

CivilCaseNo.C90wasfiledbyBartolomeOrtizwhosoughtthereviewand/orannulmentofthedecisionofthe
SecretaryofAgricultureandNaturalResources,givingpreferencetothesalesapplicationsofprivaterespondents
Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora over Lot No. 5785, PLS45, located at Barrio Cabuluan, Calauag,
Quezon.

Thefactualbackgroundofthecase,asfoundbyrespondentCourt,isasfollows: t . h q w

... The lot in controversy was formerly the subject of Homestead Application No. 122417 of Martin
DoloricoII,plaintiff'swardwhodiedonAugust20,1931thatsincethenitwasplaintiffwhocontinued
thecultivationandpossessionoftheproperty,withouthoweverfilinganyapplicationtoacquiretitle
thereon that in the Homestead Application No. 122417, Martin Dolorico II named his uncle, Martin
DoloricoIashisheirandsuccessorininterest,sothatin1951MartinDoloricoIexecutedanaffidavit
relinquishing his rights over the property in favor of defendants Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio
Zamora, his grandson and soninlaw, respectively, and requested the Director of Lands to cancel
thehomesteadapplicationthatonthestrengthoftheaffidavit,HomesteadApplicationNo.122417
was cancelled and thereafter, defendants Comintan and Zamora filed their respective sales
applicationsNos.8433and9258thatplaintifffiledhisprotestonNovember26,1951allegingthathe
shouldbegivenpreferencetopurchasethelotinasmuchasheistheactualoccupantandhasbeen
incontinuouspossessionofthesamesince1931andinspiteofplaintiff'sopposition,"PortionA"of
the property was sold at public auction wherein defendant Comintan was the only bidder that on
June8,1957,investigationwasconductedonplaintiff'sprotestbyAssistantPublicLandsInspector
SerapionBauzonwhosubmittedhisreporttotheRegionalLandOfficer,andwhointurnrendereda
decision on April 9, 1958, dismissing plaintiff's claim and giving due course to defendants' sales
applications on the ground that the relinquishment of the homestead rights of Martin Dolorico I in
favorofComintanandZamoraisproper,theformerhavingbeendesignatedassuccessorininterest
of the original homestead applicant and that because plaintiff failed to participate in the public
auction,heisforeverbarredtoclaimthepropertythatplaintifffiledamotionforreconsiderationof
thisdecisionwhichwasdeniedbytheDirectorofLandsinhisorderdatedJune10,1959that,finally,
on appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the decision rendered by the
RegionalLandOfficerwasaffirmedintoto.1

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On March 22, 1966, respondent Court rendered judgment in the aforementioned civil case, the dispositive
portionofwhichreadsasfollows: t . h q w

INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOINGCONSIDERATIONS,judgmentisherebyrenderedawardingLotNo.
5785A of PLS45, (Calauag Public Land Subdivision) onehalf portion of the property in litigation
located at Bo. Cabuluan, Calauag, Quezon, in favor of defendant QUIRINO COMINTAN, being the
successful bidder in the public auction conducted by the bureau of Lands on April 18, 1955, and
herebygivingduecoursetotheSalesApplicationNo.9258ofdefendantEleuterioZamoraoverthe
otherhalf,LotNo.5785BofPLS45,Calauag,withoutprejudicetotherightofplaintiffBARTOLOME
ORTIZ to participate in the public bidding of the same to be announced by the Bureau of Lands,
Manila. However, should plaintiff Bartolome Ortiz be not declared the successful bidder thereof,
defendantsQuirinoComintanandEleuterioZamoraareorderedtoreimbursejointlysaidplaintiffthe
improvementshehasintroducedonthewholepropertyintheamountofTHIRTEENTHOUSANDSIX
HUNDREDTHIRTYTWO(P13,632.00)PESOS,thelatterhavingtherighttoretainthepropertyuntil
after he has been fully paid therefor, without interest since he enjoys the fruits of the property in
question,withprejudiceandwithcostsagaintheplaintiff.2

PlaintiffappealedthedecisiontotheCourtofAppeals.

Two(2)yearsaftertherenditionofthejudgmentbythecourtaquo,whilethecasewaspendingappealandupon
petitionofprivaterespondentsQuirinoComintanandEleuterioZamora,respondentCourtappointedrespondent
VicenteFerro,ClerkofCourt,asReceivertocollecttollsonaportionofthepropertyusedasadiversionroad.On
August 19, 1969, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution annulling the Order appointing the Receiver.
Subsequently, on February 19, 1970, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. A petition for
reviewoncertiorariofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealswasdeniedbythisCourtonApril6,1970.Atthispoint,
private respondents filed a petition for appointment of a new receiver with the court a quo. This petition was
granted and the receiver was reappointed. Petitioner sought the annulment of this Order with the Court of
Appeals,butsaidCourtruledthatitsdecisionhadalreadybecomefinalandthattherecordsofthecasewereto
beremandedtothetrialcourt.

Notsatisfiedwithsuchdenial,petitionerfiledapetitionerforcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamuswithpreliminary
injunctionbeforethisCourt, 3 praying for the annulment of the Order reappointing the Receiver. On July 13, 1970, the
petitionwasdismissedbythisCourtonthegroundofinsufficientshowingofgraveabuseofdiscretion.

II

The judgment having become final and executory private respondents filed a motion for the execution of the
same,prayingasfollows: t . h q w

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to order the issuance of a writ of
execution in accordance with the judgment of this Honorable Court, confirmed by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, commanding any lawful officer to deliver to defendants Comintan
and Zamora the land subject of the decision in this case but allowing defendants to file a bond in
suchamountasthisHonorableCourtmayfix,inlieuoftheP13,632.00requiredtobepaidtoplaintiff,
conditionedthataftertheaccountingofthetoolscollectedbyplaintiff,thereisstillanamountdueand
payabletosaidplaintiff,thenifsuchamountisnotpaidondemand,includingthelegalinterests,said
bondshallbeheldanswerable.

OrderingfurthertheplaintifftorenderanaccountingofthetollshecollectedfromMarchof1967to
December31,1968andfromSeptember1969toMarch31,1970,anddeliversaidtollscollectedto
the receiver and if judgment is already executed, then to Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora
and,

Finally, to condemn plaintiff to pay moral damages for withholding the tools which belong to your
movantinanamountthisCourtmaydeemjustinthepremises.4

Actingupontheforegoingmotion,respondentJudgeissuedanOrder,datedSeptember23,1970,stating,among
others,thefollowing: t . h q w

TherecordsfurtherdisclosedthatfromMarch1967toDecember31,1968,piaintiffBartolomeOrtiz
collected tolls on a portion of the propertv in question wherein he has not introduced anv
improvement particularlv on Lot No. 5785A PLS45 awarded to defendant Quirino Comintan, thru
whichvehiculartrafficwasdetouredordiverted,andagainfromSeptember1969toMarch31,1970,
theplaintiffresumedthecollectionoftoolsonthesameportionwithoutrenderinganyaccountingon
said tolls to the Receiver, who, was reappointed after submitting the required bond and specifically
authorizedonlytocollecttollsleavingtheharvestingoftheimprovementstotheplaintiff.

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ln virtue of he findings of this Court as contained in the dispositive portion of its decision, the
defendantsarejointlyobligatedtopaytheplaintiffintheamountofP13,632.00asreasonablevalue
of the improvements he introduced on the whole property in question, and that he has the right of
retentionuntilfullypaid.Itcanbegleanedfromthemotionofthedefendantsthatifplaintiffsubmits
anaccountingofthetollshecollectedduringtheperiodsabovealludedto,theirdamagesofabout
P25,000.00canmorethanoffsettheirobligationofP13,362.00infavoroftheplaintiff,thereafterthe
possessionofthelandbedeliveredtothedefendantssincethedecisionoftheSupremeCourthas
already become final and executory, but in the interregnum pending such accounting and recovery
bytheReceiverofthetollscollectedbytheplaintiff,thedefendantspraythattheyallowedtoputupa
bondinlieuofthesaidP13,632.00toanswerfordamagesoftheformer,ifany.

On the other hand, plaintiff contends in his opposition, admitting that the decision of the Supreme
Courthasbecomefinalandexecutory(1)theofferofabondinlieuofpaymentofP13,632.00does
not,andcannot,satisfytheconditionimposedinthedecisionofthisCourtwhichwasaffirmedintoto
(2) the public sale of Portion "B" of the land has still to take place as ordained before the decision
couldbeexecutedand,(3)thatwhateversumsplaintiffmayderivefromthepropertycannotbeset
off against what is due him for the improvements he made, for which he has to be reimbursed as
ordered.

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LetitbeknownthatplaintiffdoesnotdisputehishavingcollectedtollsduringtheperiodsfromMarch
1967 to December 31, 1968 and from September 1969 to March 31, 1970. The Supreme Court
affirmedthedecisionofthisCourtitsfindingsthatsaidtollsbelongtothedefendant,consideringthat
the same were collected on a portion of the land question where the plaintiff did not introduce any
improvement.Thereimbursementtotheplaintiffpertainsonlytothevalueoftheimprovements,like
coconuttreesandotherplantswhichheintroducedonthewholeproperty.Thetollscollectedbythe
plaintiff on an unimproved portion naturally belong to the defendants, following the doctrine on
accretion.Further,thereappointmentofaReceiverbythisCourtwasupheldbytheSupremeCourt
whenitdeniedthepetitionforcertiorarifiledbytheplaintiff,bolsteringthelegalclaimofdefendants
over said tolls. Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court rendered the decision of this Court
retroactivefromMarch22,1966althoughpendingaccountingofthetollscollectedbytheplaintiffis
justified and will not prejudice anybody, but certainly would substantially satisfy the conditions
imposed in the decision. However, insofar as the onehalf portion "B" of the property, the decision
maybeexecutedonlyafterpublicsalebytheBureauofLandsshallbeaccomplished.

WHEREFORE,findingtheMotionforExecutionfiledbythedefendantstobemeritorious,thesameis
granted provided, however, that they put up a bond equal the adjudicated amount of P13,632.00
accruing in favor of the plaintiff, from a reputable or recognized bonding or surety company,
conditioned that after an accounting of the tolls collected by the plaintiff should there be found out
anybalancedueandpayabletohimafterreckoningsaidobligationofP13,632.00thebondshallbe
heldanswerabletherefor.5

Accordingly, a Writ of Execution was issued after private respondent Quirino Comintan had filed the required
bond.ThewritdirectedtheSherifftoenforcethedecisionoftheCourt,andstated,partin,thefollowing: t . h q w

But should there be found any amount collectible after accounting and deducting the amount of
P3,632.00, you are hereby ordered that of the goods and chattels of Bartolome Ortiz of Bo.
Kabuluan, Calauag, Quezon, be caused to be made any excess in the abovemetioned amount
togetherwithyourlawfulfeesandthatyourendersametodefendantQuirinoComintan.Ifsufficient
personalpropertycannotbefoundthereoftosatisfythisexecutionandlawfulfeesthereon,thenyou
arecommandedthatofthelandsandbuildingsofthesaidBARTOLOMEORTIZyoumakethesaid
excessamountinthemannerrequiredbytheRulesofCourt,andmakereturnofyourproceedings
withinthisCourtwithinsixty(60)daysfromdateofservice.

You are also ordered to cause Bartolome Ortiz to vacate the property within fifteen (15) days after
service thereof the defendant Quirino Comintan having filed the required bond in the amount of
THIRTEENTHOUSANDSIXHUNDREDTHIRTYTWO(P13,632.00)PESOS.6

OnOctober12,1970,petitionerfiledaMotionforReconsiderationoftheaforesaidOrderandWritofExecution,
alleging: t . h q w

(a)Thattherespondentjudgehasnoauthoritytoplacerespondentsinpossessionoftheproperty

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(b)ThattheSupremeCourthasneveraffirmedanydecisionofthetrialcourtthattollscollectedfrom
thediversionaryroadontheproperty,whichispublicland,belongtosaidrespondents

(c)ThattoassesspetitioneraP25,000.00liabilityfordamagesispurelypunitiveimpositionwithout
factualorlegaljustification.

TheforegoingMotionforReconsiderationwasdeniedbyrespondentJudgeperOrderdatedNovember18,1970.
SaodOrderstates,inpart: t . h q w

ItgoeswithoutsayingthatdefendantComintanisentitledtobeplacedinpossessionoflotNo.5785
A of PLS45 (Calauag Public Land Subdivision) and enjoyment of the tolls from March, 1967 to
March,1968andfromSeptember,1969toMarch31,l970whichwerereceivedbyplaintiffBartolome
Ortiz, collected from the property by reason of the diversion road where vehicular traffic was
detoured.TodefendantComintanbelongsthetollsthuscollectedfromaportionofthelandawarded
tohimusedasadiversionaryroadbythedoctrineofaccretionandhisrightoverthesameisipso
jure, there being no need of any action to possess said addition. It is so because as consistently
maintainedbytheSupremeCourt,anapplicantwhohascompliedwithallthetermsandconditions
whichentitlehimtoapatentforaparticulartractofpubllicland,acquiresavestedrightthereinandis
toberegardedasequitableownerthereofsothatevenwithoutapatent,aperfectedhomesteador
salesapplicationisapropertyrightinthefullestsense,unaffectcdbythefactthattheparamounttitle
isstillintheGovernmentandnosubsequentlawcandeprivehimofthatvestedrightThequestionof
theactualdamagessufferedbydefendantComintanbyreasonoftheunaccountedtollsreceivedby
plaintiff had already been fully discussed in the order of September 23, 1970 and the Court is
honestlyconvincedandbelievesittobeproperandregularunderthecircumstances.

Incidentally,theCourtstandstocorrectitselfwheninthesameorder,itdirectedtheexecutionofhe
decision with respect to the onehalf portion "B" of the property only after the public sale by the
BureauofLands,thesamebeinganoversight,itappearingthattheSalesApplicationofdefendant
EleuterioZamorahadalreadybeenrecognizedandfullconfirmedbytheSupremeCourt.

In view thereof, finding the motion filed by plaintiff to be without merit, the Court hereby denies the
sameandtheorderofSeptember23,1970shallremaininfullforcesubjecttotheamendmentthat
theexecutionofthedecisionwithrespecttotheonehalfportion"B"shallnotbeconditionedtothe
publicsalebytheBureauofLands.

SOORDERED.7

III

Petitioner thus filed the instant petition, contending that in having issued the Order and Writ of Execution,
respondent Court "acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion, because the
said order and writ in effect vary the terms of the judgment they purportedly seek to enforce." He argued that
sincesaidjudgmentdeclaredthepetitionerapossessoringoodfaith,heisentitledtothepaymentofthevalueof
the improvements introduced by him on the whole property, with right to retain the land until he has been fully
paid such value. He likewise averred that no payment for improvements has been made and, instead, a bond
therefor had been filed by defendants (private respondents), which, according to petitioner, is not the payment
envisagedinthedecisionwhichwouldentitleprivaterespondentstothepossessionoftheproperty.Furthermore,
with respect to portion "B", petitioner alleges that, under the decision, he has the right to retain the same until
afterhehasparticipatedandlostinthepublicbiddingofthelandtobeconductedbytheBureauofLands.Itis
claimedthatitisonlyintheeventthathelosesinthebiddingthathecanbelegallydispossessedthereof.

Itisthepositionofpetitionerthatallthefruitsoftheproperty,includingthetollscollectedbyhimfromthepassing
vehicles, which according to the trial court amounts to P25,000.00, belongs to petitioner and not to
defendant/private respondent Quirino Comintan, in accordance with the decision itself, which decreed that the
fruits of the property shall be in lieu of interest on the amount to be paid to petitioner as reimbursement for
improvements.Anycontraryopinion,inhisview,wouldbetantamounttoanamendmentofadecisionwhichhas
longbecomefinalandexecutoryand,therefore,cannotbelawfullydone.

Petitioner,therefore,prayedthat:(1)aWritofPreliminaryInjunctionbeissuedenjoiningtheenforcementofthe
OrdersofSeptember23,1970andNovember18,1970,andtheWritofExecutionissuedthereto,orrestoringto
petitioner the possession of the property if the private respondents had been placed in possession thereof (2)
annullingsaidOrdersaswellastheWritofExecution,dissolvingthereceivershipestablishedovertheproperty
and (3) ordering private respondents to account to petitioner all the fruits they may have gathered or collected
fromthepropertyinquestionfromthetimeofpetitioiier'sillegaldispossessionthereof.

On January 29, 1971, this Court issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On January 30, 1971, private
respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Modification of the Order dated January 29, 1971. This
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wasfollowedbyaSupplementalMotionforReconsiderationandManifestationonFebruary3,1971.Inthelatter
motion,privaterespondentsmanifestedthattheamountofP14,040.96,representingtheamountdecreedinthe
judgment as reimbursement to petitioner for the improvements, plus interest for six months, has already been
depositedbythemincourt,"withtheunderstandingthatsaidamountshallbeturnedovertotheplaintiffafterthe
courtaquoshallhavedeterminedtheimprovementonLot5785A,andsubsequentlytheremainingbalanceof
the deposit shall be delivered to the petitioner (plaintiff therein) in the event he loses the bid for Lot 5785B in
favorofprivaterespondentEleuterioZamora."8 The deposit is evidenced by a certification made by the Clerk of the
Courtaquo.9Contendingthatsaiddepositwasafaithfulcompliancewiththejudgmentofthetrialcourt,privaterespondent
QuirinoComintanprayedforthedissolutionoftheWritofInjunction.

It appears that as a consequence of the deposit made by private respondents, the Deputy, Sheriff of Calauag,
Quezon ousted petitioner's representative from the land in question and put private respondents in possession
thereof.10

OnMarch10,1971,petitionerfileda"CommentonRespondents''MotionforReconsideration'datedJanuary29,
1971' and 'Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation,'" contending that the tender of deposit
mentionedintheSuplementalMotionwasnotreallyandofficiallymade,"inasmuchasthesameisnotsupported
byanyofficialreceiptfromthelowercourt,orfromitsclerkorcashier,asrequiredbylaw"thatsaiddepositdoes
not constitute sufficient compliance with the judgment sought to be enforced, neither was it legally and validly
madebecausetherequisitesforconsignationhadnotbeencompliedwiththatthetenderoflegalinterestforsix
monthscannotsubstitutepetitioner'senjoymentofthefruitsofthepropertyaslongasthejudgmentinCivilCase
No. C90 has not been implemented in the manner decreed therein that contrary to the allegations of private
respondents,thevalueoftheimprovementsonthewholepropertyhadbeendeterminedbythelowercourt,and
thesegregationoftheimprovementsforeachlotshouldhavebeenraisedbythemattheopportunemomentby
askingforthemodificationofthedecisionbeforeitbecamefinalandexecutoryandthatthetollsontheproperty
constituted"civilfruits"towhichthepetitionerisentitledunderthetermsofthedecision.

IV

TheissuedecisiveofthecontroveryisaftertherenditionbythetrialcourtofitsjudgmentinCivilCaseNo.C90
on March 22, 1966 confirming the award of onehalf of the property to Quirino Comintanwhether or not
petitioner is still entitled to retain for his own exclusive benefit all the fruits of the property, such as the tolls
collected by him from March 1967 to December 1968, and September 1969 to March 31, 1970, amounting to
about P25,000.00. In other words, petitioner contends that so long as the aforesaid amount of P13,632,00
decreedinthejudgmentrepresentingtheexpensesforclearingthelandandthevalueofthecoconutsandfruit
trees planted by him remains unpaid, he can appropriate for his exclusive benefit all the fruits which he may
derivefromtheproperty,withoutanyobligationtoapplyanyportionthereoftothepaymentoftheinterestandthe
principalofthedebt.

Wefindthiscontentionuntenable.

Thereisnoquestionthatapossessoringoodfaithisentitledtothefruitsreceivedbeforethepossessionislegally
interrupted. 11 Possession in good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made
knowntothepossessor,byextraneousevidenceorbythefilingofanactionincourtbythetrueownerfortherecoveryof
the property.12 Hence, all the fruits that the possessor may receive from the time he is summoned in court, or when he
answersthecomplaint,mustbedeliveredandpaidbyhimtotheownerorlawfulpossessor.13

However,evenafterhisgoodfaithceases,thepossessorinfactcanstillretaintheproperty,pursuanttoArticle
546oftheNewCivilCode,untilhehasbeenfullyreimbursedforallthenecessaryandusefulexpensesmadeby
himontheproperty.Thisrightofretentionhasbeenconsideredasoneoftheconglomerateofmeasuresdevised
bythelawfortheprotectionofthepossessoringoodfaith.Itsobjectistoguaranteethereimbursementofthe
expenses,suchasthoseforthepreservationoftheproperty,14orfortheenhancementofitsutilityorproductivity.15
Itpermitstheactualpossessortoremaininpossessionwhilehehasnotbeenreimbursedbythepersonwhodefeatedhim
in the possession for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed. The
principal characteristic of the right of retention is its accessory character. It is accessory to a principal obligation.
Considering that the right of the possessor to receive the fruits terminates when his good faith ceases, it is necessary, in
orderthatthisrighttoretainmaybeuseful,toconcedetothecreditortherighttosecurereimbursementfromthefruitsof
thepropertybyutilizingitsproceedsforthepaymentoftheinterestaswellastheprincipalofthedebtwhileheremainsin
possession. This right of retention of the property by the creditor, according to Scaevola, in the light of the provisions of
Article 502 of the Spanish Civil Code,16 is considered not a coercive measure to oblige the debtor to pay, depriving him
temporarilyoftheenjoymentofthefruitsofhisproperty,butasameansofobtainitigcompensationforthedebt.Therightof
retention in this case is analogous to a contract of antichresis and it cati be considered as a means of extinguishing the
obligation, inasmuch as the right to retain the thing lasts only for the period necessary to enable the creditor to be
reimbursedfromthefruitsforthenecessaryandusefulexpenses.17

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AccordingtoManresa,therightofretentionis,therefore,analogoustothatofapledge,ifthepropertyretainedis
amovable,andtothatofantichresis,ifthepropertyheldisimmovable.18Thisconstructionappearstobeinharmony
withsimilarprovisionsofthecivillawwhichemploystherightofretentionasameansordevicebywhichacreditorisable
toobtainthepaymentofadebt.Thus,underArticle1731oftheNewCivilCode,anypersonwhohasperformedworkupona
movablehasarighttoretainitbywayofpledgeuntilheispaid.Similarly,underArticle1914ofthesameCode,theagent
may retain in pledge the things which are the object of the agency until the principal effects reimbursement of the funds
advancedbytheformerfortheexecutionoftheagency,orheisindemnifiedforalldamageswhichhemayhavesufferedas
a consequence of the execution of the agency, provided he is free from fault. To the same effect, the depositary, under
Article1994ofthesameCode,mayretainthethinginpledgeuntilthefullpaymentofwhatmaybeduehimbyreasonof
thedeposit.Theusufructuary,pursuanttoArticle612ofthesameCode,mayretainthepropertyuntilheisreimbursedfor
theamountpaidfortaxesleviedonthecapital(Article597)andtorextraordinaryrepairs(Article594).

Inallofthesecases,therightofretentionisusedasameansofextinguishingtheobligation.Asamplyobserved
byManresa:"Elderechoderetencion,lohemosdicho,eselderechodeprendaoeldeanticresisconstituidopor
laleyconindependenciadelaspartes." 19Inapledge,ifthethingpledgedearnsorproducesfruits,income,dividends
or interests, the creditor shall compensate what he receives with those which are owing him.20 In the same manner, in a
contractofantichresis,thecreditoracquirestherighttoreceivethefruitsofanimmovableofhisdebtorwiththeobligation
to apply them to payment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit. 21 The debtor can not
reacquireenjoymentoftheimmovableuntilhehasactuallypaidwhatheowesthecreditor.22

Applyingtheaforecitedprinciplestothecaseatbar,petitionercannotappropriateforhisownexclusivebenefit
thetollswhichhecollectedfromthepropertyretainedbyhim.Itwashisdutyunderthelaw,afterdeductingthe
necessaryexpensesforhisadministration,toapplysuchamountcollectedtothepaymentoftheinterest,andthe
balancetothepaymentoftheobligation.

We hold, therefore, that the disputed tolls, after deducting petitioner's expenses for administration, belong to
QuirinoComintan,ownerofthelandthroughwhichthetollroadpassed,furtherconsideringthatthesamewason
portionsofthepropertyonwhichpetitionerhadnotintroducedanyimprovement.Thetrialcourtitselfclarifiedthis
matter when it placed the toll road under receivership. The omission of any mention of the tolls in the decision
itselfmaybeattributedtothefactthatthetollsappeartohavebeencollectedaftertherenditionofthejudgment
ofthetrialcourt.

The records further reveal that earnest efforts have been made by private respondents to have the judgment
executed in the most practicable manner. They deposited in court the amount of the judgment in the sum of
P13,632.00incash,subjectonlytotheaccountingofthetollscollectedbythepetitionersothatwhateverisdue
fromhimmaybesetoffwiththeamountofreimbursement.Thisisjustandproperunderthecircumstancesand,
underthelaw,compensationorsetoffmaytakeplace,eithertotallyorpartially.Consideringthatpetitioneristhe
creditorwithrespecttothejudgmentobligationandthedebtorwithrespecttothetollscollected,Comintanbeing
theownerthereof,thetrialcourt'sorderforanaccountingandcompensationisinaccordwithlaw.23

WithrespecttotheamountofreimbursementtobepaidbyComintan,itappearsthatthedispositiveportionofthe
decision was lacking in specificity, as it merely provided that Comintan and Zamora are jointly liable therefor.
When two persons are liable under a contract or under a judgment, and no words appear in the contract or
judgment to make each liable for the entire obligation, the presumption is that their obligation is joint or
mancomunada, and each debtor is liable only for a proportionate part of the obligation. 24 The judgment debt of
P13,632.00should,therefore,beproratedinequalsharestoComintanandZamora.

Regarding Lot 5785B, it appears that no public sale has yet been conducted by the Bureau of Lands and,
therefore, petitioner is entitled to remain in possession thereof. This is not disputed by respondent Eleuterio
Zamora. 25 After public sale is had and in the event that Ortiz is not declared the successful bidder, then he should be
reimbursedbyrespondentZamorainthecorrespondingamountfortheimprovementsonLot5785B.

WHEREFORE, in view hereof, the Order of respondent Court of November 18, 1970 is hereby modified to
conform to the foregoing judgment. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction, dated January 29, 1971, is hereby
dissolved.Withoutspecialpronouncementastocosts.

Barredo(Chairman),Concepcion,Jr.andGuerrero,JJ.,concur. 1 w p h 1 . t

Aquino,J.,concursintheresult.

SantosandAbadSantos,JJ.,areonleave.

Guerrero,J.,wasdesignatedtositintheSecondDivision

#Footnotes t . h q w

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1Annex"B",Petition,pp.2627.Rollo.

2Ibid,pp.3536,Rollo.Emphasissupplied.

3DocketedasG.R.No.L32206,entitleed"BartolomeOrtizvs.Hon.UnionC.Kaynan,Eleuterio
Zamora,QuirinoComintanandVicenteFerro."

4Annex"D",Petition,p.48,Rollo.

5Annex"A",Petition,pp.1720,Rollo.

6Annex"C",Petition,p.38,Rollo.

7Annex"G",Petition,pp.6971,Rollo.

8Privaterespondents'SupplementalMotionforReconsiderationandManifestation,pp.8788,Rollo.

9Annex"B"ofaboveSupplementalMotion,p.9l,Rollo.

10ManifestationofDeputySheriffGregorioB.Pamisaran,p.95,Rollo.

11Article544,NewCivilCode.

12Tacasv.Tobon,53Phil.356Article528,NewCivilCode.

13Araujov.Celis,16Phil.329.

14IVManresa,1951Ed.,pp.293294.

15Ibid.,pp.316318.

16NowArticle594,NewCivilCode.

17Noteseenestecasounasingularidad:Enlasituacionjuridicaprevistaporelart.502,laretencion
seconsidera,nocomomediocoercitivoparaobligaraldeudoralpago,privandoletemporalmentede
losbeneficiosqueelgocedesupropiedadpudierareportarle,sinocomomediodeobteneruna
compansacion.Laretenciontieneenestecasomuchaanalogiaconelpactoanticretico,ypodemos
considerarlacomomedioextintivodeunaobligacion,puestoqueelderechoderetenerlacosadura
soloeltiemponecessarioparacompensarconlosfrutoselcostedelasreparacionesextraordinarias
indespensablesparalasubsistenciadelacosausufructuada.ElCodigosedesviaconscientemente
delaspropiedadesgenuinasdeliusretentionis,peroladesviacionesracionallyvaderechaallogro
deunafinalidadjuridica.'(8Scaevola,Codigo,Civil,1948Ed.,p.478.)

18Facilesdeducir,descartandoelart.494,porsumenorrelacionconelcasoenquenos
encontramos,queelCodigoasimilaelderechoderetencionenlosbienesmueblesalaprenda,yen
losbienesinmueblesalaanticresis,queconfierealacreedorelderechodepercibirlosfrutosdeun
inmuebleconlaobligaciondeaplicarlos,alpagodelosintereses,sisedebieren,ydespuesalde
capitaldesucredito(art.1.881).

Antratandosedecosasmuebles,laleyhacecuantoestaasualcanceparahacerutiloprovechoso
estederecho.Deaquielarticulo1.868:'Silaprendaproduceintereses,compensaraelacreedorlos
quepercibaconlosqueseledebenysinoseledeben,oencuantoexcedandeloslegitimamente
debidos,losimputaraalcapital.'

Respectoalaanticresis,veanselosarticulos1.882y1.883:'Elacreedor,diceelprimero,salvo
pactoencontrario,estaobligadoapagarlascontribucionesvcargasquepesensobrelafinca.Lo
estaasimismoahacerlosgastosnecesariosparasuconservacionyrepacion.Sededucirandelos
frutoslascantidadesqueempleeenunouotroobjeto'.'Eldeudor,diceel1.883,nopuedereadquirir
elgocedelinmueblesinhaherpagadoantesenteramenteloquedebeasuacreedor.'

Laposesionpuederecaerencosasmueblesoinmuebleslaretenciondequehablaelart.453
puede,pues,recaersobreunasootrasindistintamente.Deaquitalvezlageneralidaddela
expresion:retenerhastaelpago.Peroenelart.453setratadegastosreembolsables,deuna
deuda,comoenlosarticulos502,522,1.600,1.730.1.780,1.866y1.881.Debemosdeducirde
aqui,comoalguienlohace,queelderechoderetencionenelposeedorsereduceaunsimple
depositoenlosbienesmueblesyaunameraadministracionenlosmuebles?Quebentajareportaria
esadeduccionalposeedornialpropietario,alacreedornialdeudor,alvencedornialvencido?No
esmaslogicoequipararelderechoderetencionalaprendaoalaanticresis?LaIdeadelCodigoes

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masbienestaquelaotrapropietarioyposeedorgananmasconella.(IVManresa.1951Ed.,pp.
328329.)

19IVManresa,1951Ed.,p.330.

20Article2102,NewCivilCode.

21Article2132,Ibid.

22Article2136,Ibid

23Cf.Articles1278,1279and1283,Ibid

24Cachov.Valles,45Phil,107Ramosv.Gibbon,67Phil.371.

25MemorandumforRespondents,p.195,Rollo.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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