IEE ELECTRONICS DIVISION: CHAIRMANS ADDRESS
To see and not be seen
K.L. Fuller, BSc(Eng), FEng, FlEE
Indexing terms: Radar and radionavigation, Eleclronic warfare
Abstract: Surprise has always been an important
element of military tactics, and electronics must
make its contribution to the element of surprise. It
does this by radar, and by the various counter-
measures that can be used against radar. The
paper discusses the parallel development of radar
and electronic countermeasures and shows how
the battle between them has worked with the laws
of physics to define modern radar and counter-
measure systems. Radar was first used to see
approaching enemy aircraft at long range, so that
fighters could ambush them. Radar allowed its
user to see the enemy and to predict his move-
ments, without being detected himself. The initial
advantage of the radar was reduced by the dis-
covery that the radars own transmissions could
be heard at much greater ranges than those at
which it could detect its targets, and that it was
capable of being deceived by false targets. These
two principles lie at the heart of the art of
countermeasures. The subsequent development of
military radar has been much concerned with
countering these countermeasures, which have
themselves grown progressively more sophisti-
cated. The importance of the parasitic relationship
between the two is emphasised. The paper
describes two of the latest developments: channel-
ised receivers that can intercept many radars
simultaneously, and the PILOT radar which has
been specifically developed to make its transmis-
sions virtually indetectable.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with the tactical problem of
seeing what someone else is up to, without giving oneself
away while doing so. Although the paper deals with
radar and methods of detecting or countering radars, a
good way to introduce the subject i s perhaps to go back
to consider two ancient heroes, Achilles the Greek and
his Trojan opponent, Hector.
Let us imagine Hector and Achilles hunting for each
other, with spear and shield in hand, preparing to do
battle with each other outside the walls of Troy. Between
the Greek ships and the town of Troy we can imagine a
hill, with Hector climbing up one side of it, and Achilles
Paper 6910F (E15). to be delivered before the IEE Electronics Division
on the 11th October 1989
Mr. Fuller is Director of Philips Research Laboratories, Cross Oak
Lane, Redhill, Surrey RH1 5HA, United Kingdom
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climbing up the other. Clearly, the first one to see the
other has the best chance of getting his spear thrust in
first, and has the chance of defeating his enemy without
giving him the opportunity to retaliate. The art of seeing
without being seen is thus intimately connected with the
element of surprise and the tactical advantages that can
arise therefrom.
To continue our story of Achilles and Hector, we can
introduce some advanced technology, and give Achilles a
periscope. With this he can see over the top of the hill
and watch Hectors movements before Hector can see
him, and thus he can gain the element of surprise, or does
he? What if Hector can see Achilless periscope before
Achilles can see Hector through it? Then the supposed
advantage becomes a liability. Unless of course we give
Achilles a bent periscope so that it does not matter if
Hector does actually see it first; in fact it may be to
Achilless advantage if Hector is deliberately mis-
informed.
We can continue this story of advancing technology
for another 3000 years, until by now Achilles has a radar
and Hector has a receiver with which he can listen for
transmissions from Achilless radar, The technology has
Hector and Achilles
Fig. 1 Early use idradar
come up to date, but the tactical essentials are still the
same.
The first complete radar system for which the tactical
uses had been properly worked out was the well known
Chain Home system. It took the element of surprise away
from the bomber and gave it instead to the fighter.
During the Battle of Britain the bombers were amazed
and disconcerted that wherever they went, there were
fighters waiting for them.
Because the location of the British coast was well
known, and the Chain Home system was switched on
continuously, there was little to be learnt from knowing
where the transmissions were coming from.
Immediately the radar is placed on a moving platform,
however (a ship, or a ground vehicle, or especially an
aircraft) the transmissions from the radar can give away
the location and intentions of the platform, if the radar
user is unlucky or unwise in the use of his radar, and the
listener has the resources to understand what he hears. In
the first place, if the radar can be heard at all, it indicates
that the platform is out there. Secondly by tracking the
direction to the radar, the course of the platform can be
estimated; thirdly by identifying the type of radar the
platform itself can often be identified, and its intentions
can be deduced. For example, search radars are generally
considered relatively harmless, whereas trackers mean
that the use of the radar has a definite interest in the
target he is tracking which is generally not benign.
I hope it is now becoming clear why one should wish
to see without being seen, and also to know when
someone is watching you. This battle is of great impor-
tance to the design of radars, but if you try to learn about
radar in most text books, they will tell you all about how
to design the radar to the last detail, but with scarcely a
reference to possible countermeasures, unless such a
mention is relegated to one of those obscure chapters at
the end of the book along with sections on detecting the
Loch Ness monster and other improbable fairy tales.
In a similar way, the study of countermeasures often
takes only a passing interest in what the radar is actually
trying to d o by transmitting all those signals.
There is a strong and dangerous tendency to see radar
and countermeasures as independent of one another,
despite their obvious interaction. To try to overcome this,
at Philips Research Laboratories, we have put the radar
people and the countermeasures people in the same
laboratory to help and encourage each other, but none-
theless it sometimes seems that each group can be largely
ignorant about what motivates the other.
In fact, however, the relationship between counter-
measures and radar can accurately be described as para-
sitic. If there were no radar, there would be no
countermeasures to it, but equally the countermeasures
constantly threaten to incapacitate their hosts. In prac-
tice, however, countermeasures can never render radar
completely useless, because then they would lose their
own reason for existing, and so both evolve from the con-
tinuous vital struggle between them.
The aim of this paper is therefore to consider the radar
and the countermeasures together, to see how both are
trying to discover similar information by making the best
use of the very different strengths available to them.
The radars aim is to see the platform carrying the
countermeasures before it is detected by those counter-
measures.
Radar
In order to examine this battle between the radar and the
countermeasures in greater detail, we must look more
closely at the two protagonists.
The most typical form of radar is the rotating antenna
forming a relatively narrow beam which is scanned
through space, and along which the radar transmits a
series of pulses of radio-frequency energy. Range is mea-
sured by seeing how long it takes for the pulse to reach
the target, be reflected off it and return to the receiver.
From the measured range, and knowing the direction of
the beam when any echo is received, the classic radar
builds up a so-called plan position indicator (PPI)
picture; i.e. a radar map of its surroundings. This
describes a basic search radar, but other variations in
radar designs and uses are almost limitless. Radars can
also measure height by scanning the beam in elevation,
and some can measure the speed of approach, or regres-
sion, of their targets by making use of the Doppler effect,
whereby the frequency of the signal that comes back to
the radar is shifted relative to that which was transmitted
by an amount proportional to the speed of the target.
The first element of any countermeasures system is the
intercept receiver, the system that listens to the radars
transmissions in order to try to deduce what the radar is
doing. This receiver is generally sensitive to a wide range
of radio frequencies and uses antennas that can receive
signals arriving from most or all directions, so that it can
detect all the radars which might pose a threat to its user.
The receivers are broadband and the antennas are wide-
beam. Because of the distinctive nature of radar signals
and of the way in which they are used, radar intercept
receivers are almost always separate systems from com-
munications intercept receivers.
The various other countermeasures that try to disable
or deceive the radars rely firstly on the intercept recei-
vers. The use of other countermeasures (e.g. jamming)
without first finding out whats out there is likely itself to
attract unwanted attentions in the same way as might the
careless use of radar transmissions.
The intercept receiver, together with the system for
interpreting its output, are known somewhat cryptically
as electronic support measures (ESM). This receiver can
have directional antennas and can calculate the direc-
tions from which the intercepted signals are coming, but
it cannot measure the range or location of the transmit-
ters, although various schemes are sometimes used to try
to estimate these, either from the strengths of the received
signals, or by triangulation from several receivers.
The great advantage possessed by the ESM system
however is that the signals it receives are much stronger
than those received by the radar. This is because the
radar signals have to travel to the target and be partially
reflected back to the radar, whereas the ESM receiver can
intercept them after only a single trip.
The radar range equation
The reflection of the radar signal generally involves the
target intercepting only a small amount of the transmit-
ted signal, and then scattering it over a wide volume.
power o f radar
as seen by E S M
size o f target
as seen by radar
I
0 1 2 4
relotive range
Fig. 2 Fall o f f o f aignal with incrensing range
This process is very different from specular reflection
from a mirror, and the effect is very different from just
doubling the path length. It changes the fall off in signal
strength with range from a square-law process to one fol-
I E E P R O C E E D I N G S , Vol. 137, P i . F, N o . I , F E B R U A R Y 1990
lowing a fourth-power law. This generally makes life
much easier for the ESM receiver and makes it always a
severe struggle to get the full range performance from the
radar.
It can be seen that an obvious way to try to defeat the
radar is to try to reduce the reflectivity of the target. This
is the subject known as stealth which is currently of
great interest, not least in the USA, where the motivation
of the design of the B2 bomber, which is far and away the
worlds most expensive aircraft, is to minimise its radar
and other signatures. The full study of stealth is a very
big subject, but an obvious effect of it in the battle
between radar and countermeasures is that it is obviously
no use reducing the radar signature of a platform if you
then mount a large, highly visible, radar on it, broad-
casting a signature to the countermeasures community
like a big neon sign saying look, here I am.
The very high path loss of the radar signal means
that the long-range radars must transmit very high
powers from high-gain antennas and receive the reflected
signal with very low noise receivers. At this point some
Fig. 3 L A R 2 air route surveillance radar
numbers may he included to indicate the scales we are
talking of. As an example we may take a large air-route
surveillance radar such as the Signaal LAR 2, as can be
seen at Heathrow airport.
This transmits a peak power of 150 kW at a frequency
of about 1.3 GHz, or 23 cm wavelength, through an
antenna of 75 m2 aperture, with 35 dB gain. The trans-
mitter device is a high-power travelling-wave-tube ampli-
fier. It can detect a small airliner at about 450 km range.
The received peak power is then about 6 fW (6 x
W), and the overall attenuation between the transmitter
and the receiver is about 195 dB. The receiver noise
figure for the system is better than 3.5 dB, giving a system
noise floor of about 3 x W.
A small burglar alarm, however, which works over a
range of only a few metres may transmit only a few milli-
watts from an aperture of a few square centimetres. These
large differences in transmitter and antenna parameters
are almost entirely accounted for by the r4 power fall off
with range.
The problem of transmitting high powers without
damaging sensitive receivers connected to the same
antenna can, not surprisingly, be very severe. Switching
in the receiver circuits only after transmitting the RF
IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 137, P t . F , N o . 1. F E B R U A R Y I990
pulse allows the receiver to be sensitive to small signals
without being overloaded by the transmitter. Some iso-
lation is provided by a device called a circulator which
routes power travelling from the transmitter through to
the antenna while at the same time routing waves
received in the antenna back to the receiver. As a final
precaution the receiver is preceded by a shunt diode lim-
iting circuit that goes short circuit should any excessive
transmit power be reflected back from the antenna
towards the receiver.
We shall see later that this struggle between the effects
of a single-way propagation and the ESM receiver mis-
match to the radar is at the heart of the current elec-
tronic battle to see and not be seen.
The ESM does not have things all its own way
however, because the radar has control of its own trans-
missions, and knows exactly what its received signal
should look like, whereas the ESM receiver has only an
approximate idea of the radars characteristics, and must
be general enough to be able to detect a wide variety of
different radars. This means that whereas the radar recei-
ver is optimally matched to receive its own transmissions,
the ESM receiver is poorly matched to the radar, and
this takes away much of the advantage which it had
gained from the one-way propagation discussed above.
M TI
One of the most common reasons for the radar to want
to control its transmissions adaptively is to employ what
is known as moving target indication (MTI).
Besides getting back reflections from their intended
targets, radars frequently receive unwanted echoes from
the land or from the sea surface. Such unwanted echoes,
as well as echoes from rain or snow, are known as
clutter. Fortunately the wanted echoes are generally
from targets moving at higher speeds than the back-
ground clutter, and by measuring the Doppler shifts
associated with the target, the targets of interest can be
separated from the clutter.
Although this can be done without affecting the
radars sensitivity, it does not come entirely free. In order
to get good range information from a radar, we need to
use a low pulse repetition frequency (PRF) so that all the
echoes from one pulse have come back before the next
pulse is transmitted, so that there is no ambiguity about
the pulse with which the echo is associated. Unfor-
tunately this does not allow good MTI performance.
The radar receiver effectively recovers a difference fre-
quency between the transmitter frequency and the,
Doppler shifted, received frequency. Because the trans-
mitter is pulsed, this notional beat frequency can only
actually be sampled when the echo pulses from the target
are received. Thus in order to have an accurate practical
reconstruction of the ideal Doppler signal a lot of pulses
must be transmitted in a short time; i.e. a high PRF must
be used. This in turn can lead to range ambiguities. In
fact it is a general principle that good range resolution
and good Doppler resolution tend to be incompatible,
and compromises are needed.
The radar can thus choose its mode depending on the
quality of moving target indication which it requires.
This is particularly true of modern airborne radars with a
look down capability which try to find small targets
against a heavy clutter background. Because the ESM
has only relatively inaccurate information about the
radars transmissions it cannot coherently detect its
signals and cannot measure the radars velocity by means
of the Doppler shift. This is not in itself a problem for the
3
 ESM receiver because it is not affected by clutter. We
shall see later, however, that this lack of coherence
severely restricts the ESMs ability to intercept the trans-
Fig. 4 Clutter reduction with M T l
a NoMTI
h MTI an
missions from frequency-modulated continuous wave
(FMCW) radars, which can be thought of as pseudo-
Doppler systems.
The use of MTI, and especially so-called multi-mode
operation of the radar, can however also cause significant
processing problems for the ESM. These changes of
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mode make life more complicated for the ESM which is
trying to classify the radars, and the high PRF modes can
threaten to overwhelm the ESM systems processing
capacity.
Having looked at some of the basics of radar, and sug-
gested how the radars design can affect the task the ESM
has in detecting it, perhaps we should now look in
greater detail at the ESM system itself.
Fig. 5 Ships mast showing ESM receivers below radar antenna and
trucking radar in foreground
Electronic support measures (ESM)
Electronic support measures is the blanket term to cover
the art of electronically detecting the intentions of a
scenario. In general, the ESM system to achieve this
would consist of the following subsystems:
Receiver: (e.g. an antenna system) to intercept the air-
borne signals and provide electronically useable signals
Detector: to detect and demodulate the information con-
tained in these signals
Identifier: the characteristic information contained in
these signals is measured/memorised e.g. pulse radio fre-
quency, pulse repetition interval, amplitude, direction,
intrapulse modulation, duration, amplitude.
Sorter: for each emitter there will be a stream of data and
it is only necessary to store these data when a noticeable
change occurs. The emitters are therefore sorted out on
an historic basis, nonchanging inputs being ignored.
The easiest case to imagine is the situation with a high-
power (say tens of kilowatts) pulse radar used as a sur-
veillance system. Remembering the radar fourth-power
law which gives ESM its range advantage, and adding to
this the fact that the short pulse lengths used means that
the radar must transmit a high peak power, the transmis-
sions become very easy to see using even the crudest lis-
tening techniques. In addition, other parameters of the
pulsed radar, such as a pulse repetition interval, pulse
width etc., are easy to identify.
 As an example, the simplest ESM receiver could
consist of a crystal detector and an earphone! The fre-
quency of the detected buzz, which tells us the PRF, is
often in itself enough to identify the radar. A simple
direction finding system can be made by fixing four such
receivers together at right angles and checking which
receivers have the loudest incoming signals.
Three more sophisticated examples of ESM receivers
are:
IFM-instantaneous frequency measurement: This is a
subsystem to measure the radio frequency (RF) of each
emitter; it does so sequentially by using direct frequency
discriminators. It offers a high probablility of intercept,
but has limited sensitivity and overloads easily since it
can only handle one signal at a time.
Superhet: this is a frequency-conversion system to
measure RF, based on the known basic superheterodyne
principle. It provides a very sensitive, but narrowband
system.
Channelised receivers: this is a system of many narrowly
spaced receiving channels used to measure RF. This aims
to give the best of both worlds, having a large probability
of intercept with a high degree of sensitivity. Each
channel is a complete radio receiver tuned to a particular
filter characteristic an the assembly of many channels
constitutes a fully parallel receiver with inherently high
data rate capabilities.
Choice of radar frequency
It was assumed when considering ESM receivers that
they had to be wideband to accommodate the range of
frequencies used by the radars. But what is it that deter-
mines the operating frequency of the radar?
Conceptually, a radar system can be designed to
operate on almost any frequency, but in practice the
choice is limited by the particular application and by
practical considerations. Factors that affect the choice
are, for example, the acceptable size of the antennas, the
size and nature of the targets, the required range per-
formance of the system and the extent to which low-
elevation coverage is important.
Antenna size is a function of operating frequency in
that in order to achieve sufficient gain and beamwidth
the antenna aperture will generally not be smaller than
15-20 wavelengths wide: this is about 1-2 m in the
microwave bands, but in excess of 150 m at HF.
The size and nature of the intended targets are rele-
vant because the reflection characteristics involved are
strongly dependent on the carrier frequency.
Given that the antennas can be made suitably large,
the range performance of a radar can be most severely
affected by the losses suffered during the propagation of
the signal from the transmitter to the target and back to
the receiver. The four effects that dominate are as
follows :
(a) Refraction through the lower atmosphere, caused
by changes in air density with height, results in the earth
appearing flatter than it is in reality
(b) Reflections from the earths surface lead to a
reduction in the low-elevation coverage of the radar, an
effect which worsens as the frequency is reduced
(c) Diflraction around the curvature of the earth, which
allows low frequencies to enjoy enhanced propagation
IEE P R O C E E D I N G S , Vol. 137, PI. F , N o . 1. F E B R U A R Y 1990
(d) Attenuation caused by atmospheric gases such as
oxygen and water vapour (which prevents certain spot
frequencies such as 60 GHz from being used), and also by
scattering from airborne water droplets e.g. rain and fog
etc., which leads to attenuation that rises steadily with
frequency.
We have seen that the interaction between radar fre-
quency and the antenna design is frequently critical to
the choice of frequency.
The purpose of the antenna is to focus the radar
energy. The classic form of antenna consists of a point
feed, with the radiation being focused by a parabolic
reflector, in a manner rather like a car headlamp. Lenses
are little used for focusing radar signals because at the
wavelengths involved they tend to be very bulky, certain-
ly more so than a reflector. The number of antenna
designs is limitless, but a couple of examples are worth
mentioning.
One variant of the reflector antenna is the slotted
waveguide, where many small apertures along the length
of the transmission medium are arranged to radiate in
phase to form a narrow beam. The slotted waveguide
Fig. 6 Typical marine slotted waveguide antenna
gives a compact, cheap, design which is ideally suited to
civil marine radar applications, where its use is now
almost universal.
Another variant which is currently much discussed is
the active electronically steered phased array antenna,
where a whole face of small radiators is controlled so that
all the elements radiate to form a narrow beam in the
chosen direction. By controlling the phases in real time
completely electronic scanning can be obtained and the
conventional mechanical tuning gear can be completely
eliminated.
The electronically steered phased array is sometimes
seen as the ultimate in antenna design and an enormous
amount of effort is currently being expended in this area.
Although there is no doubt that this approach is well
suited for some applications, the economics of some of
the current phased array projects must be in doubt.
Phased arrays are very complex and expensive, whereas
mechanical turning gear is cheap and simple. Before a
steerable phased array solution can be recommended for
a problem the cost performance trade-offs must be care-
fully considered, and the glamour factor must be dis-
counted.
The frequencies that are used for operational radars
range from HF (30 MHz) to millimetre waves (100 GHz).
HF radars, because of their size and limited application,
5
 are rare. The most common application is over the Tracking radars
horizon radar (OTHR), which relies on propagation via
the upper reaches of the atmosphere (the ionosphere) to A tracking radar differs from the search radars we have
achieve very great ranges of 300 km or more). been implicitly discussing up to now because instead of
VHF/UHF radars (frequencies of hundreds of MHz) the antenna rotating continuously it stares continuously
were among the first to be employed, and they still have at one target, moving only as required to keep the target
a use today in long-range search applications such as air within its beam. This is done so that more information
traffic control, air-route surveillance radars. It is easy to can be obtained from the single target than if the radar
generate large powers at these frequencies, but the were scanning. This extra information translates into the
antennas are still rather cumbersome, and ground reflec- precise estimates of the targets position and velocity,
tions prevent this type of system from being able to which are typically needed for fire-control applications.
detect low-elevation targets. An interesting future use of
VHF radar is for detecting stealth targets such as the B2 FMCW radar
bomber, as stealth techniques are much less effective at
these frequencies. CW radars have very simple transmitters, but in their
Following this progression upwards in frequency, the basic form they cannot measure range. Consider,
microwave bands (approximately 1-20 GHz) offer the however, the case of a stationary target, with zero
greatest promise for radar systems. Within these bands it Doppler shift, which cannot be seen by a CW radar. By
is possible to achieve reasonably high gains and narrow analogy with the process which generates the Doppler
beamwidths with relatively small antennas; the effects of shift, if, instead of the target moving, we change the
ground reflections become progressively less noticeable, transmitter frequency in a linear manner, we can in fact
and the frequencies are sufficiently low not to suffer generate a range beat which is analogous to the Doppler
excessive atmospheric attenuation. Generally, the lower beat which we get from a moving target. This is the basis
part of this band is used for long-range applications such of the frequency modulated CW (FMCW) radar. This
as search radar, and the higher part for shorter-range technique has long been used in radioaltimeters.
navigation and tracking roles. For multiple target radars, Fourier analysis is used to
Finally we come to the millimetre wave part of the process the frequency information into range informa-
spectrum, which extends from 30GHz to more than tion.
100GHz. Radars operating on these frequencies are for
specialised applications only. The major advantage is
that very narrow beamwidths (hence high angular
resolutions) are attainable using very small antennas, for
example, a typical parabolic reflector antenna would be
only 15 cm in diameter. However, it is difficult to gener-
ate RF power at these frequencies, and the attenuation
caused by the atmosphere is high, and so these radars
generally are limited to a maximum range of a kilometre
or so. Applications for millimetre wave radar include
weapons guidance, obstacle avoidance and radar
imaging.
We have examined the relative merits of the whole
spectrum of frequencies that are employed in real radar
systems, but to conclude this aspect it is important to
state that at least 95% of all operational radars work in
the 1-10 GHz band, using frequencies roughly centred
around 1.5 GHz (L-band), 3 GHz (S-band), or 10 GHz
(X-band).
This observation is often itself used to restrict the
coverage of ESM receivers to simplify their design. In fact
about half of all radar systems operate in the X-band,
and most other threats to airborne radars are crowded in
the band 6-18 GHz, so the coverage of simple aircraft
radar warning receivers, which merely warn of direct
threats to the platform, is frequently restricted to that
band.
Fig. 7 P I L O T F M C W navigation radar
CW radars

We have seen that high PRF radars give good MTI per-
formance and can complicate ESM receiver design. An
extreme case of this would be to go to one continuous
pulse or continuous-wave (CW) transmissions.
The earlier applications of CW radars were to give
good MTI for tracking radars. A CW radar has a perfect
ability to classify targets according to speed, by analysing
the Doppler shift. Also, by working out positive and
negative Doppler shifts, the received signals can be sorted
into approaching and receding targets.
6 IEE P R O C E E D I N G S , Vol. 137, PI. F , N o . I , F E B R U A R Y 1990
FMCW modulation is used in the new Signaal/Bofors
PILOT radar because it turns out to be very difficult for
ESM systems to cope with, I mentioned earlier that high
PRF radars posed problems for ESM systems, and
implied that the same might be true for CW radars. It is
certainly true for FMCW radars.
The key is that the radar can integrate its CW reflec-
ted signals coherently over the whole of the frequency
sweep, thus narrowing the receiver noise bandwidth and
increasing its sensitivity. I mentioned above that the

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 ESM cannot coherently detect the radars signals and
hence it cannot narrow its bandwidths in the same
manner. We shall see below, in the discussion of the
PILOT radar, that this can reduce the detectability by
something like 40 dB, and can more than compensate for
the radars r4 propagation losses.
One problem with CW radar is that of separating the
transmitted and received signals.
Because the radar is transmitting and receiving simul-
taneously, it is difficult to stop leakage of the transmitted
signal swamping the targets in the receiver. Traditionally
the transmitter has been isolated from the receiver by
using separate antennas. but this is not always a practical
solution. Today work is being carried out on single-
antenna CW radars that adaptively cancel out the trans-
mitter leakage in the receiver. This solution is used
successfully in the PILOT radar.
This concludes the consideration of the design of
radars and passive countermeasures. However, in addi-
tion to the detection of the radars transmissions, it is
also possible to take direct actions against the radar.
Such activity is called active countermeasures, or elec-
tronic countermeasures (ECM).
Active countermeasures
As well as listening to the radars transmissions, the use
of active countermeasures can give away information
about the user. It can alert the radar operator to the fact
that the enemy is there, and it can also alert him to the
fact that the enemy is aware of his presence.
If the radar is a real threat either to oneself or to ones
friends, however, the disruption of its operations can
often give a sufficiently great tactical advantage to over-
come the disadvantages. An extreme case is when the
platform carrying the countermeasures is under attack
from a missile using radar guidance, in which case it is
obviously sensible to use every possible means to try to
disrupt the operation of the radar.
The simplest conceptual way of jamming a radar is to
broadcast noise at it, some of which will get into the
radars receiver and degrade its sensitivity, so that targets
begin to be lost under the higher receiver noise level. This
noise jamming can sometimes be countered in turn by
keeping some of the radars output power in reserve spe-
cifically to give a capability for burning through the
jamming. Noise jamming can also be countered by
increasing the radars transmitter bandwidth forcing the
jammer also to spread his power over a wider bandwidth,
and reducing the spectral density of the noise which he
can inject into the radar receiver.
Jammers, and countermeasures generally, can be
divided between self-protect devices, which are designed
to counter radar threats t o the same platform as that on
which the countermeasure is mounted, and stand-off
devices, which are designed to attack radars which pose a
threat to other friendly forces, rather than to the carrier
of the countermeasures itself.
Noise jamming is the oldest countermeasure to radar.
The second oldest, which also achieved great notoriety
during the Second World War, is the use of chaff or
window to completely white out the radar picture.
Chaff consists of a great many (millions) of short pieces of
metal which are resonant to the frequency of the radar to
be jammed. These have a very large radar reflectivity for
their weight and volume, and large clouds of chaff can
form extremely large radar targets over very large areas.
IEE P R O C E E D I N G S , V o l . 137, Pt. F, Nu. I , F E B R U A R Y I990
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Chaff was used with devastating effect during the Second
World War, but its effectiveness since then has been
much reduced by the use of MTI to find the targets
amidst the chaff clouds since the targets are usually
moving at a different speed from the chaff. In fact the first
MTI radars were built by the Germans towards the end
of the Second World War as a counter to Allied chaff.
Chaff can still be very effective, however, for short
periods of time if used in the critical phase of an engage-
ment as part of a sophisticated countermeasures plan in
order to decoy radar-guided missiles or guns.
A more subtle approach to deceiving a tracking radar
is the technique called range gate pull-off (RGPO). This
relies on the fact that, when most tracking radars look
for the return from the target after each pulse is trans-
mitted, they only look over a short range interval
around the last known position of the target. This simpli-
fication is made to reduce the complexity of the sub-
sequent processing. The range interval over which the
&
g& <,+:?$. ?:
4-J- R x pulse
Fig. 8
-
Ranyr yare pull off
increase delay t o pull o f f
radar looks for the target is called the range gate. Range
gate pull-off involves retransmitting a delayed version of
the radar pulse to persuade the range gate to follow this
pulse rather than the true return. The actual range is nor-
mally only a second-order parameter for the tracker, but,
once the range gate has been pulled off the target, the
artificial target can be switched off, and the tracker will
then realise that it has lost its target.
The use of range gate pull-off, and the countering of
the countermeasure, is an interesting and illuminating
skirmish in the war between radar and countermeasures.
The simplest RGPO can be defeated by tracking the
leading edge of the returned pulse, so that false targets
behind the true one are ignored. The leading edge tracker
can itself be countered by delaying the pulse by an
amount just slightly less than the radars pulse repetition
interval, so that it appears before the true reflected signal
associated with the next pulse.
This tactic can again be countered by jittering the
radars pulse repetition interval, but if the jitter is not
truly random, the RGPO can predict it and take into
account when determining how much delay to give the
retransmitted pulse.
Intelligent trackers can also ignore the pull-off signal if
the genuine pulse is still present, and can reject false
pulses if they are too large to be the returns from a
genuine target. Coherent radars also force the delay
circuit to preserve the phase structure of the signal it
delays, and CW radars can further complicate the design
of the delay circuit.
The most drastic countermeasure to a radar is to
attack it with a missile designed to home onto its own
transmissions. The counter to this is to control the
radars emissions so that it does not transmit for long
enough for the missile to get accurate guidance informa-
tion - in short, to switch the radar off. The principle of
7
 the antiradiation missile (ARM) can also be used by mis-
siles using radar seekers, by giving them a home-on-jam
capability, to home in onto jammers. If the jammer itself
is a stand-off jammer, however, the missile will then still
miss its target, but it then stands a t least some chance of
destroying the jammer, which may sometimes be a
worthwhile aim in itself. So far, antiradiation missiles are
large and expensive devices, but the prospect of smaller,
cheaper systems will make them a threat which will need
to be considered by more types of radars.
One solution to the problem of the antiradiation
missile is the use of bistatic radar. In bistatic radars the
Tx
Fig. 9 Eistafir radar principle
transmitter and the receiver are separated by a distance
comparable to the range of the target. In use the receiver
would be placed where the information from the radar
will be used (for example, near the anti-aircraft battery)
and a number of cheap transmitters would be placed
some distance away. An ARM would then attack the
transmitter, but would not harm the receiver or the anti-
aircraft battery. If reserve transmitters were available at
other sites, the ARM would have done no damage to
radar system. If the transmitters can be made cheaper
than the ARMS, it will not be cost-effective to knock
them out. Such systems also offer some immunity to
jamming and other countermeasures techniques. The use
of bistatic radar is complicated by problems of geometry
and of synchronising the transmitter and the receiver;
such radars are therefore still in the research phase but
are an exciting idea offering a new degree of flexibility to
the radar designer.
The PILOT radar
From ideas still in the research phase we can move to an
example of a radar, designed specifically as a new
advance in the To see and not be seen battle, which has
recently moved from research, through development and
into production.
This is the Signaal/Bofors PlLOT FMCW tactical
naval radar. PILOT has been designed using FMCW
transmissions primarily because its waveform is very
badly mismatched to current ESM receivers.
PILOT makes use of the ease with which FMCW
radars can use frequency agility, and spreads its signals
over a bandwidth of up to 50MHz. Its receiver however
can make optimal use of its knowledge of the transmitted
8 I E E PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 137, P t . F , N o . I . F E B R U A R Y 1990
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signal in order to integrate the received power coherently
over the whole sweep period of 1 ms, so that the receiver
noise bandwidth is only 1 kHz. This allows the transmit-
own ship with radar other ship w i t h E S M
(target f o r r a d a r )
awn ship radar ( F M C W or pulse)
detects target a t 15km range
E S M detects pulse radar at > 2 5 k r n range
H
ESM detects FMCW radar
a t only 2 5 k r n range
Fig. 10 P I L O T range aduanruge against E S M
ted power to be reduced to 1 W. This low power level is
very dificult for ESM receivers to detect.
For example, a typical good naval tactical ESM
system on a small boat could detect PILOT at only
2.5 km range instead of the range of more than 30 km at
which it could detect a conventional radar of similar per-
formance. PILOT on the other hand could detect the
ship carrying the ESM at typically 15 km range, the same
as a typical pulse radar. The essential point, however, is
RX that the ESM can detect the pulse radar before the radar
can detect the boat. This is the usual tactical situation
between ESM equipments and pulse radars. PILOT
however has reversed this. The range at which it can be
detected is now much less than that at which it can see its
targets. It is truly a radar for seeing without being seen,
and can be said to be tactically indetectable, in that the
intercept range is sufficiently short to be tactically useless.
Although the main incentive for developing PILOT
has been to make it difficult to detect, the use of FMCW
modulation has also enabled it t o have a completely
solid-state transmitter at low cost and has given it
superior range resolution to equivalent pulse radars.
Although the technique has first been employed for naval
surface ships, it is also very relevant to submarine and
airborne search radars.
Any future ESM system which tries to detect PILOT
still cannot know the radars waveform as accurately as
the radars own receiver does, and must therefore operate
in a noise bandwidth equal to the radars transmitter
bandwidth of 50 MHz, rather than in its receiver band-
width of 1 kHz. The ratio between these two bandwidths,
50000:1, means that the ESM will never regain all the
advantage it has lost to the radar with the invention of
PILOT.
Philips channelised receiver ESM system
The state of the art in ESM receivers can similarly be
illustrated by the Philips channelised receiver which is
currently being developed by PRL and MEL. Channel-
ised receivers are used to measure the frequency of trans-
missions by monitoring simultaneously contiguous
frequency slots. These slots are carefully chosen to cover
fully a band or bands of interest. A typical receiver
intended for radar monitoring might consist of 100 chan-
nels covering a total of 1 GHz. Utilising in-channel pro-
cessing means that frequency is measureable down to a
1 MHz resolution. The channelised approach gives rise to
a number of very significant advantages. Above all else it
r
70 time, ps
Fig. 11 Pulse response ofparollel channels of channelised receivers
Transients are removed in subsequent processing
makes frequency measurement possible in high density,
high dynamic range and high data rate environments
where conventional one-signal-at-a-time systems would
fail. Another, related, advantage is that they are equally
at home with CW or near CW signals, and can handle
pulse and CW signals simultaneously with no loss of
data. A good channelised receiver must have the follow-
ing features:
(i) low cost per channel
(ii) low intermodulation distortion to avoid spurious
response
(iii) high dynamic range
IEE PROCEEDINGS, V o l . 137, Pf.F , N o . I , FEBRUARY 1990
(iv) fast time-domain response to detect short pulses
(v) good adjacent-channel frequency selection
(vi) good signal processing (one report out for one
signal in)
PRL has pioneered a new approach to frequency chan-
nelisation based on the use of single chip radio-receiver
techniques to include all the above features. This solution
provides better performance at lower cost than acousto-
optic and SAW frequency channelisers, which have
achieved only modest dynamic range over limited band-
widths even after many years of development. In addition
to the fundamental performance advantages, the single
chip approach provides a neat, fully integratable, cost-
effective and reliable solution.
Conclusion
Of course neither PILOT nor the channelised receiver
can be the end of our battle between seeing and being
seen, since as each advance is made in either radar or
countermeasures, so it is itself countered. But we have
also seen that things never quite go back to where they
started from. In the case of PILOT for example, the ESM
will never be able to regain all it has lost, and any
attempts to counter PILOT will raise the cost of ESM
systems substantially, whereas PILOT itself is essentially
a low-cost system, so that here the forces of economics
are, for once, very much on the side of the radar. On the
other hand, where the platform is of higher value, the
channelised receiver represents a real advance over exist-
ing ESM systems.
9