NOCOM v CAMERINO

2009 || Aszcuna, J.

FACTS

R Oscar Camerino and respondents-intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, the deceased Nolasco Del
Rosario, represented by Mildred Del Rosario, and Domingo Enriquez were the tenants who planted rice and corn
on 3 parcels of land previously owned by Victoria Homes, Inc. Without notifying them, Victoria Homes, Inc. sold
the lots to Springsun Management Systems Corporation (SMSC).
SMSC mortgaged to Banco Filipino (BF). Failing to pay, BF extrajudicially foreclosed and was the highest bidder. SMSC
redeemed the lots from BF. Rs filed a complaint against SMSC and BF for "Prohibition/Certiorari,
Reconveyance/Redemption, Damages, Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order," with RTC
Muntinlupa, which ruled in their favor as Victoria's agricultural tenants, thus allowing them to redeem. Upheld by CA, SC.
P gave Rs Philtrust Bank Managers Checks amounting to P500,000 each, which the latter encashed, representing the price
of their "inchoate and contingent rights" over the subject lots which they sold to him. Rs, with the marital consent of their
wives, executed an "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" in favor of P, allowing him to exercise their rights of redemption under
the previous case.
Rs filed a Motion for Execution. SMSC refused to accept the redemption amount ofP9,790,612 plus P147,059.18 Rs
deposited P9,790,612, P73,529.59, and P73,529.59, duly evidenced by official receipts, with RTC Muntinlupa which
granted the motion for execution. SMSC's TCTs were cancelled and TCTs were issued in the names of Rs. "Irrevocable
Power of Attorney," annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances of TCTs.
R Camerinos asked to revoke the PoA, saying he and Rs were told by counsel it was urgently needed in the legal
proceedings against SMSC; that the contents of the said document were not explained to him; that he had no intention of
executing the PoA.
P said in his Answer with Counterclaim, Atty. Santos informed him of the desire of Rs, to sell and assign to him their
"inchoate and contingent rights and interests" because they were in dire need of money, and that he forwarded all the
payments in order to redeem the lots. P filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his special and/or affirmative defense that
R Camerino had no cause of action or legal right over the subject lots because the latter and his wife received the proceeds
of the Philtrust Bank Managers check in the sum of P500,000 which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003 and
that being coupled with interest, the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" cannot be revoked or cancelled at will by any of the
parties.
Other R's joined and sought nullification of the PoA for being contrary to law and public policy. Their Complaint-in-
Intervention alleged that they had a legal interest in the subject matter of the controversy and would either be directly
injured or benefited by the judgment. They alleged that their consent was vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, machination,
mistake and undue influence perpetrated by their own counsel, Atty. Santos. They claimed that the checks were "Christmas
gifts" given by P.
P filed a Motion to Dismiss because the cancellation of the PoA was actually an action to recover the titles and ownership
over the properties making it a real action and, thus, the docket fees of P3,929 was insufficient
RTC admitted the Complaint-in-Intervention as well as Camerino's Motion for Summary Judgment because there is really
no genuine issue of fact that needs to be tried. P's motion to dismiss denied. RTC then rendered a Summary Judgment
annulling the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" for being contrary to law and public policy, stating:
If pursuant to the spirit of the Agrarian Reform Law, the tenant cannot even sell or dispose of his landholding
within ten (10) years after he already acquired the same or even thereafter to persons not qualified to acquire
economic size farm units in accordance with the provisions of the Agrarian Reform Code, with more reason
should the tenant not be allowed to alienate or sell his landholding before he actually acquires the same.
Under the premises, the aforesaid contract brokered by Atty. Arturo Santos has all really the earmarks of a
champertous contract which is against public policy as it violates the fiduciary relations between the lawyer and
his client, whose weakness or disadvantage is being exploited by the former. In other words, the situation
created under the given premises is a clear circumvention of the prohibition against the execution of
champertous contracts between a lawyer and a client.
A champertous contract is defined as a contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit, whereby the
stranger pursues the partys claim in consideration of receiving part or any of the proceeds recovered under the
judgment (contrary to law)
The intention of the law in prohibiting this kind of contract is to prevent a lawyer from acquiring an interest in the subject of
the litigation and to avoid a conflict of interest between him and his client.
Summary judgment affirmed by CA.
ISSUES

WON summary judgment proper NO

WON non-joinder of indispensable party a ground for dismissal NO
WON the case is a real action NO

RULING

Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, the present case involves certain factual issues which remove it from the
coverage of a summary judgment.
Under Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Summary judgment is a procedural device when there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried. A genuine issue is such
issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue
as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment
must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The incongruence and disparity in the material allegations of both parties have been evident. Rs alleged they were required
by their counsel to sign a document on the representation that it was urgently needed in the legal proceedings against SMSC
but P disproved the vitiated consent on the part of the Rs as they knew fully well that the document they signed, voluntarily
and intelligently, on December 18, 2003, was the said "Irrevocable Power of Attorney." R Camerino alleged he has no
intention to sell, assign, dispose or encumber the lots in question; but P maintained that Camerino agreed to sell and assign
to him his "inchoate and contingent rights and interests" Rs claimed that the amount they received was grossly
disproportionate but P countered that the respondents did not have the amount of P9,790,612 needed to redeem the subject
lots, so he decided to buy their contingent rights and paid each of them P500,000 or a total of P2,500,000 as evidenced by
five (5) Philtrust Bank Managers Check which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003, that he also paid the
amount of P147,059.18 as commission.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. There is lack of authority to
act not only of the absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties
rests on the petitioner or plaintiff. However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner or plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, the latter may dismiss the complaint or petition for the petitioner or plaintiffs failure to comply therefor. The remedy
is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In the present case, the RTC and the CA did not require the
respondents to implead Atty. Santos as party-defendant or respondent in the case.
The record shows that Civil Case No. 05-172 is a complaint filed by respondent Oscar Camerino against petitioner,
denominated as "Petition to Revoke Power of Attorney," that seeks to nullify the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" coupled
with interest dated December 18, 2003; that petitioner be ordered to turn over TCT No. 15898, 15896, and 15897 to him;
and that petitioner be ordered to pay the attorneys fees and other legal fees as a consequence of the suit. This case is
therefore not an action to recover the titles and ownership over the subject properties. For now, the nature of the suit remains
that of personal action and not a real action in contemplation of Rule 4 of the Rules. Hence, the docket fees paid by the
respondents were in order. Should the complaint be amended to seek recovery of ownership of the land, then the proper
docket fees should be paid and collected.