1

Co vs. Electoral Tribunal

G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991

Facts:

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the candidate
is herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship of
respondent Ong since Ongs father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned Ongs
residence qualificationsince Ong does not own any property in Samar.

ISSUE/s:

1.) Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;

2.) Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
3.) WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.

RULING:

1.) Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. In the case at bar, the
Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
2.) Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondents father, an immigrant from China was
declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan took his oath, the
private respondent then is a minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in the
province of Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of respondent
Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born Filipino mother, thus the issue of
citizenship is immaterial.
3.) Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The domicile of origin of
the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar.
Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it
remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the residency of respondent Ong has
sufficiently proved.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

 2

Cabiling vs. Hernandez

G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010

FACTS:

The petitioners herein were born of a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino
mother. They were all raised, have resided and lived their whole lives in this country. During
their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of
Registration (ACRs).Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine
citizenship. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however,
failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section
1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.

ISSUE:

Whether late registration of the acquired Filipino citizenship in the Civil Registry encumbers
persons to become naturalized citizens of the Philippines.

RULING:

No. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of
majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was
belatedly done. The SC ruled that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect
Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory
requirements for such election.The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a
century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to
formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the Decision Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.

Republic vs. Sagun

G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent is the legitimate child of father, aChinese national, and mother, a Filipino citizen.
She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio Cityand did not elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. At the age of 33, she executed an Oath of Allegianceto the
Republic of the Philippines. The document was notarized but was not recorded and registered
with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City. In 2005, she applied for a Philippine passport but
was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth
certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of
Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.

ISSUE/s:

1.) Whether respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is authorized
by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; and
 3

2.) Whether the respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law.

RULING:

1.) Yes. But it should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which
authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before
the courts. Respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer
upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
2.) No. Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the
procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent
cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election.All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippinecitizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents
petition before the trial court must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 4

Republic V Huang Te Fu

The Facts:
Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy, a Chinese
businessman allegedly
engaged in the business of manufacturing zippers, married to Irene D. Chan, and born in
Taiwan, filed a petition for naturalisation with RTC of Quezon City. Highlights of his petition to
prove compliance with C.A. 473 are the following:he had resided continuously in the Philippines
for 23 years; received primary, secondary and tertiary education in Philippine schools; and he
derive a monthly income of P15,000.00 from their family business of manufacturing zippers.

After trial, the RTC granted the petition for naturalisation filed by Huang, hence the OSG
appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its brief, the OSG pointed to the following disqualifications
warranting the reversal of Huangs grant of naturalisation: he does not own real estate in the
Philippines; he does not possess a lucrative trade or profession, and is not even included in the
payroll of the company; does not have sufficient monthly income since he merely receives
salary from the family corporation which is not even sufficient for his family, much less lucrative;
in a Deed of Sale executed on August, 2001 for a parcel of land in Antipolo City, Huang signed
in the Deed of Sale and falsely misrepresented himself as a Filipino, exhibiting his lack of good
moral character; and, his income tax returns for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 reveal that his
actual monthly income differs from his monthly income as declared in his petition for
naturalization, leading to the conclusion that either he is evading taxes or concealing the truth
regarding his income; and, on cross-examination by petitioner, he could not cite any of the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution which he is supposed to believe in. In his
Comment, Huang alleged that he merely signed and did not prepare the Deed of Sale; he does
not prepare his income tax returns; most of his expenses are taken care of by his parents who
own the corporation; his tailure to cite particular principles underlying the Philippine Constitution
were brought about by his not having been confronted about it.

The CA denied the OSGs appeal hence, the OSG elevated the case to the Supreme Court on
petition for review via certiorari.

The Issue/s:

Whether or not the grant of Philippine citizenship to Huang was proper.

The Courts ruling:

The Court finds for petitioner.
 5

In Republic v. Hong,1 it was held in essence that an applicant for naturalization must show full
and complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization law; otherwise, his
petition for naturalization will be denied. This ponente has likewise held that [t]he courts must
always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government
and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of law.2

IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU VS. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-

SANTIAGO, super digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

GR # L-83882, January 24, 1989 (Constitutional Law Citizenship, Express Renunciation)

FACTS: In the case at bar, herein petitioner, despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen,
applied and renewed his Portuguese passport. Moreover, while still a citizen of the Philippines,
petitioner also declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of applying for a foreign passport and declaration of foreign
nationality in commercial documents, constitute an express renunciation of ones Philippine
citizenship acquired through naturalization.

HELD: Yes, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of
petitioners Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In a related jurisprudence,
express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

Frivaldo vs COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 PM
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:

Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in
due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States.

Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was
naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the
Martial Law era.
 6

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:

No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims
that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the
alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American
citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD
725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.

Categories: Citizenship, Constitutional Law 1

257 SCRA 727

Petitioner: Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo Respondent: COMELEC Ponente: Justice Cruz
Nature of Action: Petition for Certiorari

Facts:
Frivaldo, J. was elected as a Governor of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. -

On October 27, 1988 the League of Cities of Sorsogon President Salvador Estuye filed a
petition to COMELEC requesting to disqualify Frivaldo from his office on the grounds that he
was a naturalized citizen of the United States of America. -

Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen in Januray 20, 1983. -

Frivaldo admitted but said that he was only forced to do so since the time of Marcos regime he
was considered as an enemy and he went to USA seeking refuge and his naturalization is not
impressed with voluntariness as he went back after the Marcos Regime to the country to help
the restoration of democracy. -

He implies that he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by participating in the election. -

The case was approved by COMELEC and motion to dismiss filed by Frivaldo was denied to
which Frivaldo filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition to the court. Issue: -

Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on
January 18, 1988? Ruling: -

Petition denied, Juan G. Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines and disqualified from serving
as the Governor of the Province of Sorsogon, vacancy shall be filled by the elected Vice-
Governor. -
 7

Local Government Code section 42 indicates that a candidate for local elective office must be a
citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where is running. -

Omnibus Election Code section 117 states that a qualified voter, among other qualifications,
must be a citizen of the Philippines. -

The Court rules that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as
the evidence shown from the certification of US District Court of North California stating that he
is a citizen of the Philippines. -

Frivaldos argument that: he reacquire his Philippine citizenship through the participation in the
election which in his view repatriated him to which the Court refutes that there are proper
methods to which one can reacquire citizen ship either through Direct Act of Congress,
Naturalization or Repatriation to which Frivaldo did not access to. -

Only citizens of the Philippines which have one allegiance can run in local elective office

LABO VS. COMELEC, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989 (Constitutional Law Loss of Citizenship)

FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through
his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian
citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his
naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost
through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance
to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.

AZNAR VS. COMELEC, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

GR # 83820, May 25, 1990 (Constitutional Law Alien, Loss of Citizenship)

FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner challenged respondents right to hold public office on the ground
that the latter was an alien. Respondent maintains that he is a son of a Filipino, was a holder of a valid
subsisting passport, a continuous resident of the Philippines and a registered voter since 1965. He was,
however, also a holder of an alien registration certificate.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is an alien.

 8

HELD: No, because by virtue of his being a son of a Filipino, it is presumed that he was a Filipino and
remained Filipino until proof could be shown that he had renounced or lost his Philippine citizenship. In
addition, possession of an alien registration certificate unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts
whereby Philippine citizenship had been lost is not adequate proof of loss of citizenship.

MERCADO VS.MANZANO, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

307 SCRA 631, May 26, 1999 (Constitutional Law Dual Citizenship, Dual Allegiance)

FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner was seeking the disqualification of respondent to hold elective office
on the ground that he is a dual citizen, having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. Pursuant
to Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
any elective local position.

ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.

HELD: No, because dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual
citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.

Tabasa vs CA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:16 PM

G.R. No. 125 793, 29 August 2006 [Naturalization; Reacquisition; R.A. No. 8171]

FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when
his father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the
Philippines and was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and
detained by the agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed a
request with the BID that his passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a
standing warrant for several federal charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance
with the RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be
deported or detained by the BID.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.

RULING:
 9

No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The
only person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who
lost her Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino,
including his minor children who lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be
applied in his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in
1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at
the time of filing of the petition for repatriation.

Categories: Citizenship, Constitutional Law 1

G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015 David vs Agbay Petitioner,

Renato M. David
Respondents,
Editha A. Agbay and People of the Philippines
Ponente,
Villarama, Jr.
Provisions
Article XII, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution
:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign
investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate
share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be
citizens of the Philippines.

FACTS:

In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his
wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental
Mindoro. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is
public land and part of the salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
 10

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007

, while petitioners MLA
was pending, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225 as evidenced
by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto).

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a
Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that
the subject property was titled land and they have the right and authorityto convey the same. The dispute
had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal
suits between him and private respondents family.

On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution finding probable cause
to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding
information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).

On June 3, 2008, the

CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioners
MLA. It ruled that
petitioners subsequent re
-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.

Petitioner argued that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-
acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on
account of said naturalization. Issue

WoN David be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A.
No. 9225?
Ratio YES

David is rightfully indicted for the falsely representing himself in his MLA. He made an untruthful
statement in his MLA that he was a Filipino citizen at the time he filed the document but he was in fact at
that time a Canadian Citizen. Even though he subsequently reacquired his Filipino citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, that has no retroactive effect in as so far as his false misrepresentation.
Ruling WHEREFORE,
the petition is
DENIED.
The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil
Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED
 11

Grace Poe vs COMELEC

(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
Facts:

In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and
11 months counted from 24 May 2005.

May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before
that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was
born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in
1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition
declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and
obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the
MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly,
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her
biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on
the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read

Dissent)

Held:

Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the
constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.

First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical
of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born
in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That probability
and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that
the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
 12

exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties
and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of
these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in
which the foundling is found.

Case Digest: Vilando v. HRET, Limkaichong & Nograles

FACTS:

In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.She won over the
other contender, Olivia Paras.OnMay 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as
Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of Comelec
Resolution No. 8062 issued onMay 18, 2007.OnJuly 23, 2007, she assumed office as
Member of the House of Representatives.

Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of

Limkaichong were filed before the Commission on Elections(COMELEC)which
reached the Court.

The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by
her detractors.

On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando(Vilando),as
taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district
concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before
the HRET.These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged
the eligibility of one and the same respondent.Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong
was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and
proclaimed.They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose
naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese
citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.Also, they invoked
the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs citizenship, which
necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of
Julio Sy.

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino

citizen.She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was
regular and in order and had already attained the status ofres judicata.Further, she
claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a
 13

collateral attack.

OnMarch 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not
disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives.

The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied
by the HRET in its Resolution datedMay 17, 2010. Hence, this petition for certiorari
filed by Vilando.

ISSUE:

1) Whether Limkaichong is a natural born-citizen

HELD:

Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of

Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime. For this reason,
the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits.This
position finds support in the rule that courts will decide a question,
otherwise moot and academic, if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review. The question on Limkaichongs citizenship is likely to recur if she
would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of
repetition. BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ
March 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen.

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In
1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization
as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act
Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
 14

Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He
ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He
won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that
Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
former citizen:

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand,
if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
 15

place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son
of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his
original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Landmark Case: In Re Mallare, A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974 (Case Digest)

In Re Mallare, A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974

Facts

Mallares father Esteban was the illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, and believed
himself to be Chinese. Mallare became a lawyer, but his admission to the bar was revoked because his
citizenship was questionable.

Issue

Is Mallare a Filipino citizen?

Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the revocation after finding that Esteban was a Filipino because his mother
was not married to his Chinese father. Furthermore, when Mallare came of age, he registered as a voter
and exercised his right of suffrage. The Court considered these acts to be enough to show that Mallare had
elected Filipino citizenship, without needing any formal declaration on his part.

Chan Teck Lao vs. Republic

55 SCRA 1

FACTS: The application for naturalization of Chan Teck Lao was denied on October 31, 1949. Upon
appeal, the Supreme Court on June 15, 1950, reversed this Court's decision. More than 10 years later, the
Office of the Solicitor General filed the petition for the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization,
raising the alleged jurisdictional question based on the subsequent Tan Ten Koc ruling 1960s (an
applicant must present positive evidence the newspaper where his petition was published was indeed of
general circulation in the province where the proceeding was had) that there was no showing or proof that
the Nueva Era was a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Tarlac, where the petitioner then
resided.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of Solicitor General is correct in canceling the naturalization of Chan
Teck Lao on the ground that he failed to follow the publication requirement.
 16

HOLDING: No. The 1967 leading case of Gan Tsitung v. Republic with former Chief Justice Concepcion
as spokesman for the Court, indicates clearly the merit of this appeal by petitioner Chan Teck Lao from a
lower court decision promulgated in 1965 ordering the cancellation of his certificate of naturalization that
dates back to 1952 as a result of 1950 decision of this Tribunal sustaining his plea to become a Filipino.
Gan Tsitung, in language plain and unequivocal makes manifest that no retroactive effect is to be given a
judicial pronouncement that would impose on a party proceeded against in a denaturalization proceeding
a requirement not in existence at a time that his application was heard and favorably acted on. There
would be manifest unfairness in setting aside a decision that had subsequently become final and did lead
to the grant of the coveted boon citizenship. The decision of the lower court of January 20, 1965 ordering
the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of Chan Teck Lao as a Filipino citizen is SET ASIDE
and REVERSED.

Cordero vs COMELEC

The Facts

In the May 1998 elections, Rene Cordero and Truman Lim were candidates for mayor in the Municipality
of Estancia, Iloilo. During the canvassing of votes by the municipal board of canvassers (MBOC),
Petitioner Cordero contested, through his counsel, the inclusion of the election returns from several
precincts.i[6] He objected on the ground that the returns were tampered with, altered, manufactured and/or
lacked material data. Despite these objections, the MBOC included in the canvass the questioned election
returns.

On May 25, 1998, petitioner appealed the MBOC action to the Comelec. On July 11, 1998, he appealed
another MBOC order for the inclusion of a different set of contested election returns ii[7] in the canvass. In
both appeals, he sought the exclusion of such returns.

AASJS vs Datumanong

AASJS vs Datumanong

Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act
No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for
Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."

ISSUE: By recognizing & allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9225 unconstitutional?

HELD: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-
executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of
Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
 17

naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what
really constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003

FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this
case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated,
petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

MACALINTAL, petitioner VS. COMELEC, ROMULO, and BONCODIN,

respondents
(Digest by Tish Bahjin Sourced from Class Digest)

FACTS:

Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court
upholds petitioners right to file the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and
convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering that
public funds are to be used and appropriated for the implementation of said law.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:

(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their
intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution;

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

HELD:

1) NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
 18

Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Overseas Absentee Voting by
Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,
provides:

Sec. 5. Disqualifications.The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

xxx xxx xxx

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years
from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of
the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional in that it violates the requirement that the voter must
be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least
six months immediately preceding the election, as provided under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
which reads: Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election.

For the resolution of this instant issue, the Court has relied on, among others, the discussions of the
members of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter
qualification, in connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, which reads: Sec. 2. The Congress
shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the
Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the
residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction,
which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates
that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of
Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that
qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy
the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in
Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later
 19

became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further weakening petitioners claim on
the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.

Nicolas-Lewis vs Comelec
Posted by kaye lee on 5:06 PM

G.R. No. 162759, 4 Aug 2006 [Citizenship Reacquisition Act of 2003 RA 9189; Dual
Citizenship ]

FACTS:
Petitions for certiorari and mandamus for exercising their rights to suffrage under
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act or RA No. 9189. Petitioners are dual citizens who
retained or reacquired Philippine Citizenship under RA No. 9225, or Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. COMELEC denied their petitions on the
ground that they fail to meet the qualification of 1-year residency required by the
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters
even short of 1-year residency requirement.

RULING:
Yes. There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their
right to vote. Congress enacted RA 9189 pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Article V
of the Constitution, identifying in its Section 4 of the said Act who can vote under it,
among others, are Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country
opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule under the Section 5(d) of
the same Act.

By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional Commission

provided for an exception to actual residency requirement of Section 1, Article 5 of
1987 Constitution, with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents in another country may be allowed to vote even though they
do not fulfill the residency requirement of said Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution.

Romualdez vs RTC, 226 SCRA 408

Facts: Philip Romualdez, the petitioner, is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, the son of the former
Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos.
Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance with his decision to establish his legal
 20

residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, caused the construction of his residential house therein. He
soon thereafter also served as Barangay Captain of the place where he voted. After the people power,
petitioner left the country and fled to America for asylum. When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines in
December 1991, he did not delay his return to his residence at Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the
registration of voters conducted by the COMELEC on February 1, 1992 for the Synchronized National
and Local Election scheduled for May 11, 1992, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct
No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. On February 21, 1992, Donato Advincula, respondent, filed a petition
with the MTC of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters in Precinct
No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166 alleging that Romualdez was a resident of
Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently
arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines and
the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
Romualdez contends that he has been a resident of Tolosa, Leyte, since the early 1980's, and that he has
not abandoned his said residence by his physical absence therefrom during the period from 1986 up to the
third week of December 1991. After due hearing, the Municipal Court of Tolosa, Leyte held in favor of
the petitioner Advincula then appealed the case to the respondent court then it rendered the assailed
decision that the petitioner is disqualified to register as a voter for the 1992 elections and hereby reverses
the decision of the lower court in toto. Hence, this recourse.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petitioner to have voluntarily left the
country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

Held: WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court finds the respondent to be a resident of
Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and qualified to register as a voter thereat. Hence, the instant petition for
exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez from the list of voter of Precinct No. 9, Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte is
hereby ordered DENIED and petition DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 147066, March 26 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a
special registration before May 2001 General Elections for new voters ages 18 to 21. According
to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27,
2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.

A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18,
2001 was passed but it was denied by the COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189
explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more
time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.
 21

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to conduct a special registration
of new voters during the period between the COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000 deadline
and the May 14, 2001 general elections.

HELD:

The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of new voters.
The right to suffrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the proper bounds and
framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus missed their chance.
However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the President issued a proclamation
calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the conduct of special registration for new
voters and that bills had been filed in Congress to amend Republic Act No. 8189.

ISAE vs. QUISUMBING

FACTS:

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel
selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt
from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or
will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members
of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a
salary rate 25% more than local-hires.

When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and
the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in
salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires
should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached
the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
 22

Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:

NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to humane
conditions of work. These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office
or the field but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section
18, Article II of the constitution mandates to afford labor full protection. The State has the right and
duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are
so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must
yield to the common good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3)
prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted
bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped
together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the
School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure;
local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same
working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires
such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits
are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the
latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the
exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.
 23

ECOPvs. NWPC, RTWPB-NCR & TUCPG.R. No. 96169, September 24, 1991
FACTS:
ECOP questioned the validity of the wage order issued by the RTWPB, increasing the minimum wage by
P17.00/day in NCR. The wage order was made applicable to all workers and employees in theprivate
sector, including those who are paid above the statutory wage rate. The NWPC dismissed ECOPspetition.
The Solicitor General commented that the RTWPB may fix minimum wages according to the
salarymethod, while ECOP insisted that the RTWPB may do so only by adjusting floor wages.
ISSUE:
WON the wage order was valid.
HELD:
YES. There are two ways of fixing wage - the floor wage method and the salary ceiling method. Thefloor
wage method involves the fixing of determinate amount that would be added to the prevailing
statutoryminimum wage, while the salary ceiling method involves the application of the wage adjustment
toemployees receiving a certain denominated salary ceiling

SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary
restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners
contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor
dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules
and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the
court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

eld: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On
one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.
1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable
laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and
other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.
Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from
doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as government employees
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
 24

created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in
labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a
writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
i

ii