PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS AND GENERAL CONCEPTS

PARAAQUE KINGS v. CA, G.R. No. 111538

Facts:

Catalina Santos, the defendant, sold her eight parcels of land to her co-defendant David
Raymundo for Five Million pesos. Subsequently, she caused the lands reconveyance in her name for
Nine Million Pesos, in order to offer it to the current lessee, Paranaque Kings, Inc. of the subject
premises, for the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos. Finding the offered price to be ridiculous, the
plaintiff filed an action for the nullity of the deed of sale, and furthermore prayed that the lands be
sold to it at the more favourable price of Five Million Pesos by reason of its right of first refusal.

The trial court dismissed the action for lack of a valid cause of action, reasoning that the
complaint shows that the defendant had respected the lessees right of first priority by offering the
lands to the latter. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling and added that the plaintiff-
appellant, as the prospective buyer, cannot dictate its own price and forcibly ram it against Santos.

Issue: Does the complaint have a cause of action?

Held: Yes.

In determining whether allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it

must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the
existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case.

If Santos never decided to sell at all, there can never be a breach, much less an enforcement
of such right. But on September 21, 1988, Santos sold said properties to Respondent Raymundo
without first offering these to petitioner. Santos indeed realized her error, since she repurchased the
properties after petitioner complained. Thereafter, she offered to sell the properties to petitioner
for P15 million, which petitioner, however, rejected because of the ridiculous price. But Santos again
appeared to have violated the same provision of the lease contract when she finally resold the
properties to respondent Raymundo for only P9 million without first offering them to petitioner at such
price.

Whether there was actual breach which entitled petitioner to damages and/or other just or
equitable relief, is a question which can better be resolved after trial on the merits where each party
can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defences.
REPUBLIC VS VDA. DE NERI

FACTS:

Heirs of Vda. De Neri filed an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title for a parcel
of land in Cagayan De Oro. CFI of Misamis Oriental issued a notice of initial hearing addressed to the
Bureau of Lands, OSG and Bureau of Forest Development. Bureau of Lands and OSG failed to filed an
opposition and to send a representative during hearing, thus OCT 0662 as issued in favor of the heirs.
Five years later, the SG filed a complaint for the annulment of OCT 0662and reversion of the
property covered by the title.

ISSUE:
Whether the failure of the respondents to specifically deny the petitioners averment
constituted an admission.

RULING:
Yes. The private respondents failed to specifically deny the petitioners averment in its
complaint that LRC Plan SWO-150 had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. The
private respondents thereby impliedly admitted that the Director of the Bureau of Lands had not
approved any survey plan as required by Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239.40

In light of the private respondents admission, the petitioner was relieved of its burden of still proving
that the Director of the Bureau of Lands had not approved any survey plan of Lot 2821 before the trial
court rendered its decision.

NOTE
Burden of proof is the duty of the party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

The party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be determined by the pleadings, not by who is the
petitioner or the defendant. Test or determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to
an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show facts averred as the basis for the
relief he seeks to obtain and based on the result of an inquiry which party would be successful if he
offers no evidence.

In civil cases:

1. Plaintiff has the burden of proving material allegation of the complaint which are denied by the
defendant.
2. Defendant has the burden of proving the material allegation in his case where he sets up a
new matter.

GR: All facts in issue and relevant facts must be proven by evidence.

Exception:

1. Allegation contained in the complaint or answer immaterial to the issue.

2. Facts admitted or which are not denied in the answer, provided they have been sufficiently
alleged.
3. Those which are the subject of an agreed statement of facts between the parties; as well as
those submitted by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case.
4. Facts which are the subject of judicial notice.
5. Facts which are legally presumed.
6. Facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party.

OSG is relieved of its burden of proving that DBL had no approved any survey plan of the land
before the trial court rendered its decision. This is because heirs impliedly admitted that DBL
had no approved any survey plan as required by law.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES INC. v. BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP. and MITSUI SUM TOMO
INSURANCE CO. LTD.

FACTS:

Sumitomo Corporation (Sumitomo) shipped through MV Eastern Challenger V-9-S, a vessel owned by
petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (petitioner), 31 various steel sheets in coil weighing 271,828
kilograms from Yokohama, Japan for delivery in favor of the consignee Calamba Steel Center
Inc. Upon unloading from the vessel, nine coils were observed to be in bad condition. The second and
the third shipment of steel coils were the same, it is received in bad order. Calamba Steel filed an
insurance claim with Mitsui through the latters settling agent, respondent BPI/MS Insurance
Corporation (BPI/MS), and the former was paid. BPI/MS then subrogated Calamba Steel and filed a
complaint for damages against Eastern Shipping Lines and ATI. The RTC ruled in favor of BPI/MS
Insurance. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the issue with regards to the liability of Eastern Shipping can be
entertained by the present court

RULING: NO.

It is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put in issue.
Questions of fact cannot be entertained.

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question
of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.

In this petition, the resolution of the question as to who between petitioner and ATI should be liable
for the damage to the goods is indubitably factual, and would clearly impose upon this Court the task
of reviewing, examining and evaluating or weighing all over again the probative value of the evidence
presented something which is not, as a rule, within the functions of this Court and within the office
of a petition for review on certiorari.
SASAN v. NLRC, GR. No. 1762240

Facts:

Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCI Bank), a banking entity, a domestic corporation, entered into a
Contract for Services with Helpmate Incorporation (HI) which engaged in the business of providing
janitorial and messengerial services. In their contract, HI shall shire and assign workers to E-PCI Bank
to perform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. Rolando Sasan and other seven others
were among those employed and assigned to E-PCI Bank at its branches in Cebu city and Visayas.

More than one year of service, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu
City separate complaints against E-PCI Bank and HI for illegal dismissal. In their position papers,
petitioners claimed that they had become employees of the bank because they performed continuous
services to the bank for more than one year; that E-PCI bank had direct control and supervision over
them; and the dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter has no power to do so since they
had become regular employees of E-PCI Bank.

E-PCI Bank averred that HI has every RIGHT TO TERMINATE the petitioners for the reason
that it was HI that paid petitioners wages and exercised direct control and supervision over the work
of petitioners. Hence, E-PCI Bank could not be held liable.

HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR and E-PCI Bank
was one of its clients. Petitioners were its employees, part of its pool of janitors/messengers assigned
to E-PCI Bank.

On the basis of the parties position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez
rendered a Decision finding that HI was NOT a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not
possess the required substantial capital or investment as required under the Labor Code. Therefore, HI
is a LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTOR and E-PCI Bank is liable because it is the employer of the petitioners.

E-PCI Bank and HI appealed to the NLRC. To support its allegation that it was a legitimate job
contractor, HI submitted several documents which it did NOT present before the Labor Arbiter
Gutierrez. In order to show that it has substantial capital or investment they presented photocopies of
the following: Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing
Amended Articles of Incorporation, General Information Sheet Stock Corporation, Audited Financial
Statement, Transfer Certificate of Title and Tax Declarations.

The NLRC took into CONSIDERATION the documentary evidence presented by HI for the FIRST
TIME on appeal and, on the basis thereof, modify the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez and declared HI
as a highly capitalize venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered a labor-only
contractor.

Petitioners filed Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC. Petitioners sought
recourse with CA by filing a petition for Certiorari but the CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC erred in ACCEPTING and APPRECIATING the pieces of evidence
presented before it for the FIRST TIME on appeal.

Held:

The issue is not a novel procedural issue and that Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases
allowing the NLRC to admit evidence not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the
NLRC for the first time in labor cases. The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from
receiving evidence on appeal as TECHNICAL RULES of EVIDENCE ARE NOT BINDING in LABOR CASES.

The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of
Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor
cases. The NLRC and Labor Arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain
the fact in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all
in the interest of substantial justice, in keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may
consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on
appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the
latter could submit counter-evidence.
FACTUM PROBANDUM AND FACTUM PROBANS

FAR EAST MARBLE (PHILS.), INC., et al vs. CA and BPI

FACTS:

BPI filed a complaint before the RTC Manila for foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin
against Far East Marble. BPI alleged in its complaint that on various dates and for valuable
consideration, it extended to Far East several loans, evidenced by promissory notes, and credit
facilities in the form of trust receipts, and that despite repeated requests and demands for payment
thereof, Far East had failed and refused to pay.

Far East admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes but alleges that
said notes became due and demandable because more than 10 years had elapsed from the dates of
maturity up to the time the action for foreclosure was filed, thereby raising the affirmative defenses of
prescription and lack of cause of action.

BPI opposed to their affirmative defense of prescription since within 10 years from the time its
cause of action accrued, various written extrajudicial demands were sent by BPI and received by Far
East. BPI maintained that the ten-year prescriptive period to enforce its written contract had not only
been interrupted, but was renewed.

THE TRIAL COURT dismissed the complaint against Far East for lack of cause of action and on
ground of prescription.

The COURT OF APPEALS remanded the case to trial court for further proceedings.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Far East.

ISSUES and RULING:

1. Whether the dispute between Far East and BPI raised pure question of law which bars
the CA from deciding the same

No.

The Court ruled that the dispute between Far East and BPI raised a question of fact. It said:
From the foregoing exchange of pleading, the conflicting allegations of fact by the contending parties
sprung forth. It is thus quite obvious that the controversy centered on, and the doubt arose with
respect to, the very existence of previous demands for payment allegedly made by BPI on petitioner
Far East, receipt of which was denied by the latter. This dispute or controversy inevitably raised a
question of fact. Such being the case, the appeal taken by BPI to the Court of Appeals was proper.

The Court also distinguished a question of law from a question of fact, to wit:
 It has been held in a number of cases that there is a "question of law" when there is
doubt or difference of opinion as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-
litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to
fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of
law.

2. Whether BPI has sufficiently established its cause of action in the complaint

Yes

Section 3 of Rule 6 states that a "complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action." Further elaborating thereon, Section 1 of
Rule 8 declares that every pleading, including, of course, a complaint, "shall contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts . . .
omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts."

"Ultimate facts" are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the
primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant
while "evidentiary facts" are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts.

Basically, a cause of action consists of three elements, namely:

(1) the legal right of the plaintiff;

(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and

(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right

A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the
allegation may be vague or indefinite, for in such case, the recourse of the defendant would be to file
a motion for a bill of particulars. It is indeed the better rule that, pleadings, as well as remedial laws,
should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims so as to avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities.

In the case at bar, the circumstances of BPI extending loans and credits to Far East and the
failure of the latter to pay and discharge the same upon maturity are the only ultimate facts which
have to be pleaded, although the facts necessary to make the mortgage valid enforceable must be
proven during the trial.

VERDICT: Petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED

JOSELITA SALITA vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS

G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994

FACTS:

Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila. A
year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on
the ground of Joselitas psychological incapacity which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage
although the same became manifest only thereafter. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition,
Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. Subsequently, in his Bill of
Particulars, Edwin specified that at the time of their marriage, Joselita was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable
to understand and accept the demands made by his profession that of a newly qualified Doctor of
Medicine upon his time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her
even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.

Still petitioner was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She insists that the allegations in the Bill
of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of ultimate facts, and fail to point out the
specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of
Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husbands cause of action. She rationalizes that her
insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding
circumstances of time, place and person does not call for information on evidentiary matters because
without these details she cannot adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of
particulars filed in amplification of the petition is sufficient.

HELD:

Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly from the basis of the primary
right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omission of the defendant. It refers to
acts which the evidence on trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the
existence of those facts. The Supreme Court ruled that on the basis of the allegations, it is evident
that petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already
alleged that petitioner was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession. To
demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts facts
necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. The additional facts called for by petitioner regarding
her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the
function of a motion for bill of particulars.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the questioned
Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Salcedo- Ortanez v. Court of Appeals G.R. 160261

Facts:

On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-
Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City
presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.

Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits
"A" to "M". Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. These tape
recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to
wire tap his home telephone.

Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence on

9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence.

A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.

Issue:

Whether or not the tape-recordings are admissible in evidence?

Held:

Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of
the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both
parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the
subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section 2

thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for
violation of said Act.

We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the applicability of American
jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes are inadmissible in
evidence under Philippine law.

People v. Navarro

FACTS:

Lingan and Navarro had an altercation. As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him and
gave him a fist blow on the forehead. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on
tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200.

HELD: Yes. The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.
Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by
the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played
in the court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons
such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording; that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the
tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of
the tape presented by the prosecution.
EDGARDO A. GAANAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-69809 (October 16, 1986)

Facts:

Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainants
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed
with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the
proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico
telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the
direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.

When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement.
Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions.
Laconico answered Yes. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver
the money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the
then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the
Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should
receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by
agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant
to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened
to the telephone conversation without complainants consent, complainant charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200,
which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition for
certiorari

Ruling:

1. Whether the phrase any other device or arrangement in R.A. 4200 known as Anti-
Wire Tapping Law does not cover extension line.
 The law refers to a tap of a wire cable or the use of a device or arrangement
for the purpose of a secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There
must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a
device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,

dictelegraph or other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA4200, as the use thereof cannot
be considered tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use.

Rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of
its parts.

The phrase device or arrangement, although not exclusive to that enumerated, should be
construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the
use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

A person calling another by phone may safely presume that the other may have an extension
line and runs the risk of being heard by third party.

Framers of R.A. 4200 were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording a
telephone conversation that merely listening thereto and not contemplate the inclusion of
an extension telephone as prohibited.

Mere act of listening to a telephone conversation in an extension line is not punished

by Anti-WireTapping law.
CLASSIFICATION OF EVIDENCE

PEOPLE V. PRECIOSO

FACTS:

Four armed men whose faces were covered with handkerchiefs and stockings entered the
Galvadores' store. They woke up Leah Alimpoos, her niece Maryjane, and Paquito, a househelp and
told her to wake up her sister Irene. Leah recognized one of them as Rolando Precioso, their neighbor,
through his physique and voice. Precioso and two other armed men then accosted Leah to the
Galvadores' house and woke up Irene and her husband Rafael. Rafael then woke up their househelp
Teresita to let Leah in. To her surprise, three armed men burst into the house, but she also recognized
Rolando through his physical appearance, his clothes and his voice.

The men ransacked the house and proceeded to rape Leah and Teresita. Two of them were
revealed to be Rolando Precioso and Gerardo Monforte after their face covers came off when they were
raping the two women. The armed men left. They took with them valuables, cash, personal
belongings, and stocks of the store.

The men were charged with the composite robbery in band with multiple rape and were
convicted in the lower court after settled that Precioso and Monforte were identified as two of the four
armed men. They appealed to the Supreme Court (NOTE: Automatic Review ata kaya diretso)

On appeal, they contended that the lower court erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, in ruling on the basis that they were positively identified by the victims, and that they had no
motive of committing the crime

ISSUE:

Whether the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses is credible

HELD:

Yes. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses identifying the accused is credible because
the witnesses for the prosecution testified in a clear, consistent and forthright manner. The testimonies
of the complainants were congruent and mutually corroborative of each other, and were confirmed by
those of the other prosecution witnesses. Their minor errors and inconsistencies do not affect the
substance of their declaration or adversely reflect on their veracity. On the other hand,
 The Court said that the testimony of the accused have no weight as compared to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses because it only consists merely of denials and alibi, without
any other credible evidence to sustain their exculpatory claims and defense and, thus, are negative
and self-serving.

In this case, the Court ruled that the witnesses positively identified them especially since they
were neighbors and their voices were recognized and their faces were seen. It also stated that the
rape victims, being young barrio girls, would have no ill-motive to testify and would not air-out such
things that affect their honor.

The Court also ruled that the defense of alibi interposed by appellants is weak because they
failed to demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to be there by convincing evidence.
Preciosos claim that he was sleeping in the house of his grandmother is weak, as that house is only
around 150 meters away from the house of the Galvadores spouses. It is not enough to prove that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must likewise show that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. As for Monforte, his alibi that he was
working at the time, is disproved by the fact that the saw mill where he works for has been out of
power for several weeks and was closed at the time of the crime.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

Expert Travel vs. CA

Facts:

Korean Airlines (KAL), private respondent, is a corporation established and registered in the
Republic of South Korea and licensed to do business in the Philippines. Its general manager in the
Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim, while its appointed counsel was Atty. Mario Aguinaldo and his law
firm.
On September 6, 1999, KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint against ETI (Expertravel &
Tours Inc.) with the RTC of Manila, for the collection of sum of money.
The verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo, who
indicated therein that he was the resident agent and legal counsel of KAL and had caused the
preparation of the complaint.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized
to execute the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7
of the Rules of Court.
KAL alleged that the board of directors conducted a special teleconference on June 25, 1999,
which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It was also averred that in that same teleconference, the
board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of
non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the
corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
TC - denied the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo
Kim that the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999, during
which it approved a resolution.
ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was inappropriate for the
court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing. However, the
same was denied by the TC.
ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of the RTC. In its
comment on the petition, KAL appended a certificate signed by Atty. Aguinaldo dated January 10,
2000 which states that, Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo & Associates or any of
its lawyers are hereby appointed and authorized to take with whatever legal action necessary to
effect the collection of the unpaid account of Expert Travel & Tours..
CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping
executed by Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court. According to the
appellate court, Atty. Aguinaldo had been duly authorized by the board resolution approved on
 June 25, 1999, and was the resident agent of KAL. As such, the RTC could not be faulted for
taking judicial notice of the said teleconference of the KAL Board of Directors.
The petitioner asserts that compliance with Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court can be
determined only from the contents of the complaint and not by documents or pleadings outside
thereof. Hence, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, and the CA erred in considering the affidavit of the respondents general manager, as
well as the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certification and the resolution of the board of directors
contained therein, as proof of compliance with the requirements of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court.
The petitioner also maintains that the RTC cannot take judicial notice of the said teleconference
without prior hearing, nor any motion therefor. The petitioner reiterates its submission that the
teleconference and the resolution adverted to by the respondent was a mere fabrication.
The respondent, for its part, avers that Atty. Aguinaldo, as the resident agent and corporate
secretary, is authorized to sign and execute the certificate of non-forum shopping required by
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, on top of the board resolution approved during the
teleconference of June 25, 1999.
The respondent also points out that the courts are aware of the development in technology;
hence, may take judicial notice thereof without need of hearings.

WON Courts are allowed to take judicial notice with respect to teleconferencing as a mode
of transacting business.

Yes. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter
must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of
men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are
generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions
may be made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group
communication (three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium.
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of
private corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange
Commission issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, providing the guidelines to be complied
with related to such conferences. Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the
Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business
transactions or corporate governance.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, G.R. No.172551

Facts:

This is a question of the propriety of the just compensation of a land covered by CARP pegged
by the lower court. In the determination of the JC, the lower court adopted the computation made by
another branch in a different case.

Issue: Is the taking of a judicial notice of one court of the contents of records of other cases valid?

Held:

No. The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the
purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally,
courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge." They
may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the
same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party;
or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear
boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF SERO (Judicial Notice)

FACTS:

Respondents, through their attorney-in-fact, filed a complaint against several defendants for recovery
of ownership and declaration of nullity of several Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs), four of which are
registered in the names of the petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and the
Republic. The RTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the respondents had no cause of
action, and that the action was barred by prescription and laches.

The appellate court held that the complaint alleged ultimate facts constituting respondents cause of
action; that the respondents cannot be faulted for not including therein evidentiary facts. A prior case
was decided by the Supreme Court on the issue of reconveyance of property.

ISSUE: WoN there is no need for judicial notice

HELD: NO

While a trial court focuses on the factual allegations in a complaint, it cannot disregard statutes and
decisions material and relevant to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a
motion to dismiss, every court must take judicial notice of decisions this Court has rendered as
provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

In reversing the Orders of the RTC, the Court of Appeals failed to consider the decision of this Court
in Mactan-Cebu International Airport v. Court of Appeals, on November 27, 2000, which settled the
issue of whether the properties expropriated under will be reconveyed to the original owners if the
purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other
than the expansion or improvement of the Lahug airport.
In said case, the Court held that the terms of the judgment were clear and unequivocal. simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different
use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

Garcia v. Garcia-Recio, 366 SCRA 437

Facts:

Roderick A. Recio (Filipino) was married to Editha Samson (Australian) in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce was
issued by an Australian family court. On 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. Grace Garcia and
Recio got married on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license,
respondent was declared as single and Filipino. On 1995, they lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. In accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided and Grace filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of bigamy in the RTC; respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she only found out about Recios
marriage to Editha Samson in November 1997. In his Answer, Recio averred that, as far back as 1993,
he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his
first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. On 1998, Recio was
able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia. He prayed that the complaint
be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. The trial court declared the marriage
dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element
of the marriage which is Recios alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its decision
on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage, thus,
there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Samson was proven.

(2) Whether or not Recio was proven to be legally capacitated to marry Garcia.

Held:

(1) No. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence the courts cannot grant it. Before
a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient.

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign
country. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as
a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The divorce decree between respondent and
Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Compliance with Articles 11, 13, and 52 of the Family Code is not necessary as respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. The burden
of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution
or defense of an action." It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power
of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative.

(2) The most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence; if any,
which show Recio's legal capacity to marry Garcia. Garcia contends that in view of the insufficient
proof of divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Recio replies that the
Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal
capacity to marry under Australian law. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree
a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed
and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected. Even after the divorce became absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage
may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof
of good behavior. On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: "1.
A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy." It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, the ruling of the trial court which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored Recio's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on
this matter. Based on the above records, it cannot be concluded that the respondent was legally
capacitated to marry the petitioner on January 12, 1994. Neither the court can we grant petitioner's
prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may
turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of
the divorce decree.
SALUDO Jr. v. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, Inc.

FACTS:

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's
AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened
when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the
United States some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his
principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with
other delegates from the Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi
Tanaka. The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from
respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance
covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding
statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000.
Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20,
2000.

Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion
for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his
Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any
allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he
was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the
court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all
the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He
was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been
such ever since his admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only
because he has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any
event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of one's residence.

HELD:

That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at
the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it
consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was
the representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so
because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions." Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the law in force in the Philippines, including its Constitution.

The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as
those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof,
and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." Moreover, "though
usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as
a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court
sits." Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at
the time could be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of
common knowledge in the community where it sits.

Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice
of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a
congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in
which he shall be elected.

CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. versus PHILBANKING CORPORATION.

G.R. No. 150731

FACTS: Casent Realty Development Corp. executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare Realty.
These promissory notes were used by Rare Realty as a security for a loan that Rare Realty obtained
from Philbanking wherein a Deed of Assignment was executed. When Rare Realty failed to pay its
debt, the bank went after the security of the loan. The bank demanded payment based on the
promissory notes issued by Casent Realty Corp to Rare Realty by virtue of the deed of assignment.

On a separate loan with Philbanking, Casent Realty satisfied its obligation by executing a Dacion en
pago.

Philbanking filed for a complaint for the collection of payment against Casent based on the promissory
notes. Casent Realty, in its answer, raised that a Dacion en pago was already executed which
extinguished its obligation. Philbanking failed to file a reply.

Casent Realty points out that the defense of Dacion and Confirmation Statement, which were
submitted in the Answer, should have been specifically denied under oath by respondent in accordance
with Rule 8, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. Its failure constituted an admission on the part of the
bank.
Philbanking claimed that even though it failed to file a Reply, all the new matters alleged in the Answer
are deemed controverted anyway, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 10:
Section 10. Reply.--A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in
denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make
issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the
answer are deemed controverted.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under
oath constitute a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of these documents

HELD:
Yes. Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect, respondent admitted the genuineness and due
execution of said documents. This judicial admission should have been considered by the appellate
court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions.--An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceeding in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

We agree with petitioner. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a
written instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section
10 which merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is
based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise,
the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted. Since respondent failed
to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath,
then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to
evidence.

LANDBANK V. WYCOCO

FACTS:

The undisputed antecedents show that Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690
hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice land. In line with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) of the government, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9 million. In November 1991, after the DARs evaluation of the
application and the determination of the just compensation by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),
a notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property for P1,342,667.46 was sent to
Wycoco. The amount offered was later raised to P2,594,045.39 and, upon review, was modified to
P2,280,159.82. The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located
therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just compensation

The only issue left is for the determination of just compensation or correct valuation of the land owned
by the plaintiff subject of this case.
The evidence presented by Wycoco in support of his claim were the following: (1) Transfer Certificate
of Title No. NT-206422; (2) Notice of Land Valuation dated June 18, 1992; and (3) letter dated July
10, 1992 rejecting the counter-offer of LBP and DAR. On the other hand, DAR and LBP presented the
Land Valuation Worksheets.

On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there
is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public knowledge
that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to
150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the
entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also awarded
Wycoco actual damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest.

ISSUE: Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, was the compensation arrived at supported by evidence

HELD: In arriving at the valuation of Wycocos land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged
prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of its
intention to take judicial notice thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon.

After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter
is decisive of a material issue in the case.

Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court
should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a
valuation without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of determining just
compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be
appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current
value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. [33] Since these
factors were not considered, a remand of the case for determination of just compensation is
necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where
the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. To say that a
court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence
will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court
assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and
he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known,
the basis of his action.

GENER v DE LEON (2001)

Facts:

A parcel of agricultural land at Norzagaray, Bulacan with an area of 4 404 sq.m. is the subject
of dispute between the parties. In 1998, Gener filed two criminal cases for malicious mischief against
the helpers and brothers of Gener de Leon for entering the subject land and destroying the crops
planted by Gener. In 1990, de Leon filed a complaint for forcible entry against Gener before the MTC,
alleging that he is the original claimant and actual possessor in good faith of the disputed land. Gener
presented a notarized Deed of Sale executed in 1988 by the heir of the previous owner, Benjamin
Joaquin, as well as proof of payment of tax of the property.
 The MTC ruled in favor of de Leon. On appeal to the RTC, it reversed the MTC. The CA
reversed the ruling of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC.

Issue: Whether the respondents cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed.

Held: Yes. In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical and
material possession of the property involved. The Rules of Court requires that in action for forcible
entry, the plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the possession of land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth and that the action shall be filed within one year from the time of such
unlawful deprivation of possession. The one year period within which to bring an action for forcible
entry is generally counted from the date of the actual entry by the defendant on the land.

To support their allegation of prior possession, De Leon primarily relied upon the testimonies
of their witnesses. While Gener was his own sole witness, his testimony of prior possession was
substantiated by several documentary evidence, which were quite damaging to the existence of
respondents alleged cause of action for forcible entry. The twin incidents which became the subject of
Criminal Cases No. 3998 and 4043, evidenced by Sinumpaang Salaysay and Complaint show that
prior to 1989, the alleged date of forcible entry of petitioner, he was already in possession of the
disputed land. As against the testimonial evidence relied upon by the respondent, the documentary
evidence of petitioners prior possession, must prevail. Since the respondents cause of action has
prescribed, the MTC was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject ejectment case.

The Court also ruled that The MTC of Norzagaray should have taken judicial notice of the
criminal cases involving the subject land and pending in its docket. While, as a general rule, courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, this rule is subject
to the exception that in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a
court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as read
into the records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference
is made to it, by the name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated.

THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, all surnamed

DIMAGUILA, vs.JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO, G.R. No. 201011 January 27, 2014

FACTS:

On July 5, 1993, respondent spouses, filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages before the
RTC against the Dimaguilas alleging that the parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a
residential house and lot in Laguna covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. The Monteiros anchored their
claim on a Deed of Sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila.

The Dimaguilas argued that there was no co-ownership at all since the property had long been
partitioned to Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila. The defendants claim that they are Vitalianos heirs
and further averred that the Monteiros claim to the property is null for they were not heirs of either
Perfecto or Vitaliano.

The Monteiros admitted in the amended complaint the defendants allegation of a partition and
aver that a third of Perfectos share was sold to them through a Bilihan; and that, upon their attempt
to take possession of that portion, they found that the Dimaguilas were occupying it.

The Dimaguilas, in their answer to the amended complaint now contravened their original
answer that the subject property was actually divided into northern and southern halves, replacing it
with a division into two and share and share alike. This resulted to an admission of a co- ownership,
contrary to their original position. According to the Dimaguilas, the Bilihan also violated Article 1485
of the Civil Code for not specifying the metes and bounds of the property sold and that, even if it was
specified, the sale was still void since a co-owner can only sell his undivided share in the property.

The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro after perusing evidence aliunde of a cadastral map
of Liliw, Laguna and a corresponding list of claimant as to show that the property had indeed been
partitioned into southern and northern portions. The RTC concluded that the Dimaguilas were stopped
from denying this partition and the Bilihan document was regular and authentic absent any evidence
to the contrary.

The Dimaguilas appealed their case to the CA which affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether there was a pa1iition of the subject property; and

2. Whether the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the subject property was sold to the respondent
spouses.

HELD:

YES on both. Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of
proof to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit,
and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, synonymous with the term "greater
weight of the evidence."

Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of

belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners
would actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the
respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to corroborate
the petitioners' admission.

The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map and the list of
claimants presented by the respondent spouses, on the ground that they violated the rule on
hearsay and the best evidence rule.

Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.

Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of
claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was
Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of such documents. The
second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps
records of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants,
as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best
evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides
that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The necessity of this rule consists in the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the
innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

By filing the notice of consignation and tendering their payment for the redemption
of the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the property, the petitioners, in effect, admitted the
existence, due execution and validity of the Bilihan. Consequently, they are now estopped from
questioning its admissiblity in evidence for relying on such for their right of redemption.
ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 113779-80 February 23, 1995

Facts:

The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For
even if the commission of the crime can be established, without proof of identity of the criminal
beyond reasonable doubt there can be no conviction. In the case at bench, the identification of the
petitioner cannot rest on an assured conscience. We rule that petitioner is entitled to a mandatory
acquittal.

Complainant CIPRIANA F. TORRES is a public school teacher of Kaligayahan Elementary School,

Novaliches. Her work requires her to leave her maid, JOVINA MADARAOG TORRES, alone in her house
at Block 45, Lot 28, Lagro Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City. Her husband is in Australia while her
children go to school.

The incident transpired at around 8:45 in the morning of July 19, 1988. Somebody knocked at the
gate of the Torres residence pretending to buy ice. As the maid Madaraog handed the ice to the buyer,
one of the robbers jumped over the fence, poked a gun at her, covered her mouth, and opened the
gate of their house. The ice buyer and his companions barged in. Numbering four (4), they pushed
her inside Torres' house and demanded the keys to the car and the safety vault. She told them she
did not know where the keys were hidden. 6 They tied up her hands and dragged her to the second
floor of the house. Petitioner was allegedly left downstairs as their lookout.

On order of the accused, Madaraog sat on Torres' bed, her body facing the bedroom door with her
back on the vault. They also gagged her mouth and ransacked Torres' room. One of the accused
stumbled upon a box containing keys. They used the keys to open drawers and in the process found
the car key. Petitioner was then summoned upstairs and given the car key. He tried it on the car and
succeeded in starting its engine.

In twenty (20) minutes, accused were able to loot the vault and other valuable items in the house.
They then tied Madaraog's hands and feet to the bed's headboard and escaped using Torres' car.
Still gripped with fear, Madaraog loosened her ties with her fingers, hopped to the stairs and cried for
help. Her neighbor Semia Quintal responded and untied her. They also sought the help of Angelina
Garcia, another neighbor. It was Garcia who informed Torres that her house was burglarized.

Torres reported the robbery to the police authorities at Fairview, Quezon City and the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI). On July 25, 1988, Madaraog and Quintal described the physical features of the
four (4) robbers before the NBI cartographer. One of those drawn by the artist was a person with a
large mole between his eyebrows. On August 30, 1988, petitioner was arrested by the NBI agents.
The next day, at the NBI headquarters, he was pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution
witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crimes at bench.

SEMIA QUINTAL averred that she saw petitioner allegedly among the three (3) men whiling away their
time in front of Alabang's store some time before the crimes were committed. Quintal is a neighboring
maid.

MARY BARBIETO likewise declared that she saw petitioner allegedly with several companions
standing-by at Torres' house that morning of July 19, 1988. She is a teacher and lives within the block
where the crimes were committed.

Petitioner ALVIN TUASON, on the other hand, anchored his defense on alibi and insufficient
identification by the prosecution. he has lived within the neighborhood of the Torres family since 1978.
He averred that on July 19, 1988, he was mixing dough and rushing cake orders from 7:00 o'clock in
the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon at his sisters' TipTop bakeshop in Antipolo Street, Tondo,
Manila. It takes him two (2) hours to commute daily from Lagro, Novaliches to Tondo.

He was arrested more than one (1) month after the robbery. On August 30, 1988 at about 8:00
o'clock in the evening, he was in their house watching a basketball game on T.V. and went out to buy a
cigarette. On his way back, a person accosted him and asked his name. After he identified himself, a
gun was poked at his right side, a shot was fired upward, and five (5) men swooped on him without
any warrant of arrest. He asked them if he could wear t-shirt as he was naked from waist up. They
refused. They turned out to be NBI agents of one of whom a certain Atty. Harwin who lived in Lagro,
Novaliches. He was shoved into the car and brought to the NBI headquarters. He was surprised when
an NBI agent, whose identity was unknown to him, pointed to him as one of the suspects in the
robbery in the presence of Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses.

Petitioner's sister ANGELI TUASON, part-owner of TipTop Bakeshop corroborated his story. She
testified that on July 17, 1988 she asked her sister Mary Ann to remind petitioner to work early on
July 19, 1988 since Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays are busy days as she caters to schools.

Issue:

Whether the prosecution properly identified the accused as one of the robbers.

Ruling:

No.

Time and again, this Court has held that evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from the
mouth of a credible witness but the same must be credible in itself. The trial court and respondent
appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of prosecution witness Madaraog that from her vantage
position near the door of the bedroom she clearly saw how petitioner allegedly participated in the
robbery. After a careful review of the evidence, we find that the identification of petitioner made by
Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve as a basis for conviction of petitioner.

Firstly, it must be emphasized that of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, only the maid Madaraog
actually saw petitioner in the act of committing the crimes at bench. Witnesses Quintal and Barbieto
testified they only saw petitioner at the vicinity of the crimes before they happened. There is, however,
a serious doubt whether Madaraog and Quintal have correctly identified petitioner. At the NBI
headquarters, Madaraog described petitioner as 5'3" tall and with a big mole between his
eyebrows. While Quintal also described petitioner as 5'3" and with a black mole between his
eyebrows. On the basis of their description, the NBI cartographer made a drawing of petitioner
showing a dominant mole between his eyes. As it turned out, petitioner has no mole but only a scar
between his eyes. Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2" and not 5'3" tall. There is a big difference between a mole
and a scar. A scar is a mark left in the skin by a new connective tissue that replaces tissue injured. On
the other hand, a mole is a small often pigmented spot or protuberance on the skin. If indeed
Madaraog and Quintal had a good look at petitioner during the robbery, they could not have
erroneously described petitioner. Worthy to note, petitioner was not wearing any mask in the occasion.

The doubtful identification of petitioner was not at all cured by the process followed by the NBI agents
when petitioner was pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses in their
headquarters. Madaraog's identification of petitioner from a line-up at the NBI was not spontaneous
and independent. An NBI agent improperly suggested to them petitioner's person.

This damaging testimony of the petitioner was not rebutted by the prosecution. The NBI agent
present during the identification of petitioner was not presented to belie petitioner's testimony.
Consequently, the identification of the petitioner in the NBI headquarters is seriously flawed.
According to writer Wall, the mode of identification other than an identification parade is a
show-up, the presentation of a single suspect to a witness for purposes of identification.
Together with its aggravated forms, it constitutes the most grossly suggestive identification
procedure now or ever used by the police.

The respondent appellate court, however, dismissed this claim of petitioner as self-serving. Again, the
ruling misconstrues the meaning of self-serving evidence. Self-serving evidence is not to be literally
taken as evidence that serves one's selfish interest. Under our law of evidence, self-serving
evidence is one made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a
witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of
opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission
would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a party's testimony
in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-examination. Clearly,
petitioner's testimony in court on how he was identified by the prosecution witnesses in the NBI
headquarters is not self-serving.

Petitioner's main defense is alibi. He professed that on July 19, 1988 he was mixing dough at TipTop
Bakeshop from 7:00 o'clock in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. With the usual traffic
jam, it takes him two (2) hours to commute from Lagro to Tondo. It was thus physically impossible for
him to be at the locus criminis. He said he learned about the robbery thru his neighbor three (3) days
thereafter. He did not flee. He was arrested by the NBI agents more than one (1) month after the
crimes were perpetrated.

Judges should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi. Alibi should be considered in light
of all the evidence on record for it can tilt the scales of justice in favor of the accused.
Although alibi is known to be the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove, nevertheless, where the evidence for the prosecution is weak and betrays lack of
concreteness on the question of whether or not the accused committed the crime charged, the
defense of alibi assumes importance.

Republic Glass Corp v. Lawrence Qua, GR No. 144413 (30 July 2004)

Facts:

Republic Glass Corporation (RGC) and Gervel, Inc. (Gervel) together with Lawrence C. Qua
(Qua) were stockholders of Ladtek, Inc. (Ladtek). Ladtek obtained loans from Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (Metrobank) and Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) with RGC,
Gervel and Qua as sureties. RGC, Gervel and Qua executed Agreements for Contribution, Indemnity
and Pledge of Shares of Stocks. The Agreements all state that in case of default in the payment of
Ladteks loans, the parties would reimburse each other the proportionate share of any sum that any
might pay to the creditors. Under the same Agreements, Qua pledged 1,892,360 common shares of
stock of General Milling Corporation (GMC) in favor of RGC and Gervel. The pledged shares of stock
served as security for the payment of any sum which RGC and Gervel may be held liable under the
Agreements. Ladtek defaulted on its loan obligations to Metrobank and PDCP. Metrobank filed a
collection case against Ladtek, RGC, Gervel and Qua to the RTC. During the pendency of Collection
Case, RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7 million. Metrobank executed a waiver and quitclaim in favor
of RGC and Gervel. Based on this waiver and quitclaim, Metrobank, RGC and Gervel filed a joint
motion to dismiss the Collection Case against RGC and Gervel.

Issues: Whether the principle of estoppels applies to Quas judicial statements that RGC ad Gervel
paid the entire obligation.

Held: No. The essential elements of estoppel are inexistent. While Quas statements in the Collection
Case conflict with his statements in the Foreclosure Case, RGC and Gervel miserably failed to show
that Qua, in making those statements, intended to falsely represent or conceal the material facts.
Both parties undeniably know the real facts. Nothing in the records shows that RGC and Gervel relied
on Quas statements in the Collection Case such that they changed their position or status, to their
injury, detriment or prejudice. RGC and Gervel repeatedly point out that it was the presiding judge [ in
the Collection Case who relied on Quas statements. RGC and Gervel claim that Qua deliberately led
the Presiding Judge to believe that their payment to Metrobank was for the entire obligation. As a
result, the presiding judge ordered the dismissal of Collection Case against Qua. RGC and Gervel
further invoke Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court to support their stance. A party may make
judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) during the trial either by verbal or
written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The elements of
judicial admissions are absent in this case. Qua made conflicting statements not in the same case as
required in Section 4 of Rule 129. To constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in
the same case in which it is offered. If made in another case or in another court, the fact of such
admission must be proved as in the case of any other fact, although if made in a judicial proceeding it
is entitled to greater weight. Qua does not deny making such statement but explained that he
honestly believed and pleaded in the lower court and in CA that the entire debt was fully extinguished
when the petitioners paid P7 million to Metrobank. Quas explanation substantiated by the evidence on
record. As stated in the Agreements, Ladteks original loan from Metrobank was only P6.2
million. Therefore, Qua reasonably believed that RGC and Gervels P7 million payment to Metrobank
pertained to the entire obligation. However, subsequent facts indisputably show that RGC and Gervels
payment was not for the entire obligation.

FULE v. CA

Facts:

This is a case involving violation of BP blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law).During the pre-trial
conference in the Trial Court, the prosecution and the defense entered into a Stipulation of Facts.The
contents of which states that the accused (Fule) issued a post dated check in favor of the complaining
witness,(Nadera) but the same was dishonored when it was presented for payment because said
checking account was closed. During the second hearing, petitioner-appellant(Fule) waived the right to
present evidence, and in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts.

RTC: convicted petitioner-appellant (Fule)

CA: Affirmed RTCs decision

Issue:
 W/N CA erred in affirming RTCs decision which convicted the petitioner-appellant based solely
on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his
counsel.

Held:

The petition is with merit.The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which is applicable to this
case since the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered

during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing
and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]

The omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the
Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the
accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because
Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the
prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts,
as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of
relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said
evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond
reasonable doubt.

The case is remanded to RTC for further reception of evidence.

PEOPLE V. BANDANG

FACTS:

A case was filed against Mariam Bandang, Ading Salamat and Rakima Abubakar for selling
shabu in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

The RTC convicted them based of the stipulation of facts of the prosecution. There, The
evidence for the prosecution established the following: In the morning of May 2, 2000, the Narcotics
Group Intelligence Division of the Philippine National Police was notified by an informant about the
drug trafficking activities of appellants Mariam Bandang and Rakima Abubakar. The PNP then
conducted surveillance and buy-bust operation. PO1 Carpentero pretended to be a buyer. In the car,
the PO1 Carpentero and the accused closed the deal where a black shoulder bag with (7) transparent
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance was given. PO1 Carpentero then introduced
herself as a police officer and arrested the three appellants.

According to the accused, the court erred in convicting accused on the basis solely
of the stipulation of facts in the pre-trail order. Accused said that stipulation of facts
regarding the corpus delicti cannot be used because her counsel, Atty. Enriquez, did not
sign it.

ISSUE: Is the accused correct?

Held:

NO. We do not agree with the accused.

First, her conviction is not based solely on the Stipulations of Facts. In Fule vs. Court
of Appeals, we ruled that while the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel
indeed renders a stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence, however, the prosecution has
a remedy. What the prosecution should do is to submit evidence to establish the elements
of the crime instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the
stipulation of facts. In the present case, this is what the prosecution did.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the
transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and
(3) that the buyer and seller were identified.

A review of the records of this case reveals that the prosecution has proven all these
elements. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from
the seller. In the present case, this was sufficiently proven by PO1 Carpentero, the poseur-buyer. She
gave a detailed account of how the sale took place, from the initial negotiation to the eventual delivery
of the dangerous drugs. That appellants knew that what they sold and delivered to PO1 Carpentero
were dangerous drugs is evident from the narration of both witnesses that when they asked appellants
whether they have license to carry or sell shabu, the latter merely replied no. They did not refute that
the substance they delivered to PO1 Carpentero was shabu.

PEOPLE VS. POLICARPIO

FACTS:

Operatives of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame headed by P/Capt. Gabriel Paile went
to Bagong Bayan, Kalawaan, Darangan, Binangonan, Rizal, after receiving information that the
accused alias Dupong is engaged in the sale and distribution of marijuana and other
prohibited drugs and tagged as the main source at the area.

The team was organized earlier and was dispatched to the target area to entrap the
accused Romeo Policarpio, accordingly, Pat. Mangila will pose as a buyer and was handed the
marked P20.00 bill (Exhibit "I" to "I-3") with which to buy the stuff before they proceeded to
the area of operation.

The poseur buyer Pat. Enrico Mangila, together with the informant, looked for the
accused, Pat. Mangila and the informant were able to locate the accused in front of his house.
Thereafter, Pat. Mangila was introduced by the informant to the accused as the person who needs
some marijuana leaves, and after they had talked with the accused for a while, the accused gave Pat.
Mangila two small plastic bags containing dried marijuana leaves and rolling paper (Exhibit "B" to "B-
4").

In turn Pat. Mangila gave to the accused the marked P20.00 bill (Exhibit "I" to "I-3"). As
previously arranged, Pat. Mangila scratched his head and his companions, Pfc. Basco and Mendiola
grabbed and arrested the accused. From the accused was confiscated the marked P20.00 bill on
his front pocket. After the arrest of the accused, the latter led his captors to his house and the
operatives seized another six (6) small plastic bags of dried marijuana leaves together with
rolling papers contained in a bigger plastic bag marked Tie Tae Toe (Exhibit "C" to "C-6")
placed on a top of the refrigerator at the kitchen of their house.

Arrested with the accused is a certain person Rogelio Policarpio, who turned out to
be his cousin and who was earlier convicted by this Court for Possession of Dried Marijuana
Leaves in Criminal Case No. 273-B of this Court. The accused and the confiscated prohibited
drugs were brought to Camp Crame and the Marijuana leaves were turned over to the PCCL
for examination (Exhibit "D"). The PCCL conducted examination over the evidence thus (sic) over,
and rendered its Chemistry Report with the finding that the evidence thus examined gave a
positive result for the test for marijuana (Exhibit "A" to "A-3").

The accused Romeo Policarpio signed a bond paper acknowledging that the six (6)
small plastic bags of marijuana leaves were confiscated from him (Exhibit "G" to "G-2"). He
likewise signed a document acknowledging the fact that the marked P20.00 bill was confiscated
from him (Exhibit "F" to "F-1"). Similarly, accused signed a sworn statement where he opted not
to give statement until he is represented by a counsel (Exhibit "J" to "J-2").

WHETHER THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WERE VIOLATED BY THE APPREHENDING NARCOTICS AGENTS.

RULING:

Appellant claims that Exhibit G which is a receipt signed by appellant acknowledging that six
(6) small plastic bags of marijuana leaves were confiscated from him and Exhibit F a receipt signed by
appellant acknowledging that the P20.00 bill involved in the purchase of the marijuana leaves was
confiscated from him are not admissible in evidence as they were taken in violation of his
constitutional right.

The records show that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to be silent and that
he may refuse to give a statement which may be used against him, that is why he refused to give
such a written statement unless it is made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper he
signed to this effect. However, he was made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic
bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by signing a receipt and to sign a
receipt for the P 20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried marijuana leaves he sold to Pat.
Mangila.

Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these
alleged receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the
offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from
him. It is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such
receipts.

NO DOUBT THIS IS A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF APPELLANT

TO REMAIN SILENT WHEREBY HE WAS MADE TO ADMIT THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE
WITHOUT INFORMING HIM OF HIS RIGHT. SUCH A CONFESSION OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

G.R. No. 144639. September 12, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENNY GO, appellant.

FACTS:

VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES

On April 28, 1999, SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea and a confidential informant conducted a test buy
operation at the residence of appellant at 1480 General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila during which they
purchased from him P1,500.00 worth of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The police officers
did not immediately arrest him, however. Instead, they applied for a Search Warrant for appellants
residence from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City based on their firm belief that there was a
large quantity of illegal drugs in his house.

On June 14, 1999, a raiding team composed of SPO1 Fernandez and SPO1 Serquea, together with PO2
Abulencia, PO3 Noel Adtu and PO2 Gerardo Jimenez, proceeded to appellants residence armed with
Search Warrant No. 99-0038issued by Br. 109 of the RTC of Pasay City commanding them to make an
immediate search anytime of the day or night of appellants residence and to seize and take possession
of METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), weighing scale, other drug paraphernalias and
proceeds of the above crime.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE

In November 1998, while appellant was walking along Gen. Luna Street, he was accosted by SPO1
Serquea and another police officer who accused him of manufacturing shabu and divested him of
money amounting to more than P5,000.00. He was later released as the policemen could not charge
him with anything.

On July 14, 1999 at around 5:30 in the afternoon, Jack Go opened the door of their house after
hearing somebody shout that the car had been bumped. Five armed policemen then entered the
house, one of whom handcuffed him while two went up to the upper floor of the house and searched
for about thirty (30) minutes.

At past 6:00 p.m., as the two kagawads entered the house which was already in disarray, SPO1
Fernandez formed two groups to conduct the search at the second floor: (1) that of PO2 Abulencia,
with Kagawad Lazaro to serve as witness, and (2) that of SPO1 Serquea, with Kagawad Manalo to
serve as witness.

PO2 Abulencia, together with Kagawad Lazaro, searched the room of Jack Go. SPO1 Serquea,
accompanied by Kagawad Manalo, searched the study room where he seized documents, passports
and assorted papers.

After the search, the policemen and barangay kagawads went down with three boxes containing
passports, money and assorted Chinese medicine.

When appellants wife arrived at around 7:30 p.m., SPO1 Fernandez ordered her to open the safe
(kaha de yero) inside appellants room where the police officers seized money, passports, bankbooks,
Chinese currency and pieces of jewelry.

The seized items were placed on appellants table on the first floor of the house where they were
inventoried by SPO1 Fernandez during which the barangay kagawads did not see either Exhibit A, the
plastic bag containing the suspected shabu, or the weighing scale.

When appellant arrived at around 8:30 p.m., he was handcuffed and likewise made to sign the
Inventory Receipt without having been able to read its contents. Jack Go was prevented from
explaining its contents to him.

HELD:

While an inventory of the seized items was prepared, also by SPO1 Fernandezs admission, it
did not contain a detailed list of all the items seized, particularly the voluminous
documents. After the inventory had been prepared, PO2 Abulencia presented it to appellant
for his signaturewithout any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to sign
such receipt and to the assistance of counsel. Neither was he warned that the same could
be used as evidence against him.

The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative
of appellants custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the
manner by which the raiding team conducted the search of appellants residence.
At the same time, it is unclear whether appellant was furnished a copy of the Inventory
Receipt as mandated by Sec. 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, an examination of Exhibit Z, the Return of Search Warrant No. 99-0038

submitted by SPO1 Fernandez to Br. 109 of the RTC of Pasay City was not verified under
oath, as required by Section 12 (a) (formerly Section 12), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

Given the foregoing deviations from the normal and prescribed manner of conducting a
search, as disclosed by the members of the raiding team themselves, the reliance by the
trial court on the disputable presumption that the police officers regularly performed their
official duty was evidently misplaced.

The Affidavit of Orderly Search is not of any help in indicating the regularity of the
search. Not having been executed under oath, it is not actually an affidavit, but a pre-
prepared form which the raiding team brought with them. It was filled up after the search
by team leader SPO1 Fernandez who then instructed appellant to sign it as he did instruct
Jack Go, Kagawad Manalo andKagawad Lazaro to sign as witnesses.

More importantly, since the Affidavit of Orderly Search purports to have been executed by
appellant, the same cannot establish the propriety and validity of the search of his
residence for he was admittedly not present when the search took place, he having arrived
only when it was almost through.

At the same time, the raiding team characterized the seizure of the assorted documents, passports,
bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as seizure of evidence in plain
view.

Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the passports,
bankbooks, checks, typewriter, check writer, dry seals and stamp pads and other assorted documents
does not fall within the plain view exception. The assertions of the police officers that said objects
were inadvertently seized within their plain view are mere legal conclusions which are not supported
by any clear narration of the factual circumstances leading to their discovery. PO2 Abulencia could not
even accurately describe how the raiding team came across some items.

However, the illegal character of said dry seals and stamp pads cannot be said to have been
immediately apparent. For SPO1 Fernandez had to first make an impression of the dry seal
on paper before he could determine that it purported to be the seal of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact
not established until after they had been turned over to the Chinese embassy and Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation for verification. It is, therefore, incredible that SPO1
Fernandez could make such determination from a plain view of the items from his vantage
point in the sala.

In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the plain
view doctrine to justify the seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The things belonging
to appellant not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly described, must thus
be ordered returned to him.

People vs Barlis

FACTS:

On 30 January 1990, Jonathan Barlis, accompanied by his uncle, Pfc. Patrocinio Mercado of the
Northern Police District, surrendered to Pfc. Mariano Rivera at the QC police station. Jonathan
admitted that he was with the group which was responsible for the killing of Honorina Ballerda inside
her house. Thereafter, assisted by Atty. Confesor B. Sansano, Jonathan signed a sworn statement
wherein he narrated in detail how the crime was committed and the extent of his participation therein.
 Trial proceeded against Jonathan Barlis only because the two other accused remained at large.
Trial court convicted him on the basis of the circumstantial evidence and his extrajudicial confession.

On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to his sworn
statement which was taken without the assistance of a lawyer. He alleges that he surrendered to the
police only to help them find the real culprits, that Pfc. Rivera misled him into signing the sworn
statement by telling him not to worry, and that he was brought to the Office of the IBP-Quezon City
Chapter where Atty. Sansano signed the document without conferring with him.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the circumstantial evidence and his
extrajudicial confession.

HELD:

Since the alleged robbery was not conclusively proved in this case, the appellant could only be
convicted of homicide.

The only evidence of the taking of the personal property of the victim is the extrajudicial
confession of the appellant. Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, "an extrajudicial
confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti." Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon
which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a
house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was
committed. It is made up of two elements:

(a) that a certain result has been proved, for example, a man has died or a building has
been burned; and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act. Section 3, Rule
133 does not mean that every element of the crime charged must be clearly established by
independent evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that there should be
some evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession.
Otherwise, utility of the confession as a species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in addition
to the confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify conviction independently of such
confession. Otherwise stated, the other evidence need not, independently of the confession, establish
the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecution failed to corroborate the extrajudicial confession of the appellant on the
robbery with evidence of corpus delicti. In short, the robbery was not conclusively proved. The death
of the victim has been sufficiently established by evidence independent of the appellant's
extrajudicial confession, namely, the unrebutted testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Adela Argate, Dr. Dario Gajardo, and Wilma Ballerda.

JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS V. CARMELA ESTRADA

FACTS:

Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc. (Maxicare) formally appointed Estrada as its General Agent
granting her a commission. Maxicare had a "franchising system" in dealing with its agents whereby an
agent had to first secure permission from to list a prospective company as client. MERALCO account
was included as corporate accounts applied by Estrada. Estrada submitted proposals and made
representations to the officers of MERALCO regarding the MAXICARE Plan but MERALCO directly
negotiated with MAXICARE from December 1, 1991 to November 30, 1992 and was renewed twice for
a term of 3 years each. Eventually, Estrada through counsel demanded her commission for the
MERALCO account and 9 other accounts but it was denied by MAXICARE because she was not given
a go signal to intervene in the negotiations for the terms and conditions.

Maxicare contends that Estrada herself admitted that her negotiations with Meralco failed as shown in
a letter (which she attached in her complaint) by Maxicares counsel to Estrada. The letter contains a
unilateral declaration by Maxicare that the efforts initiated and negotiations undertaken by Estrada
failed and that effectively declares that Estrada is not the efficient procuring cause of the sale, and as
such, is not entitled to commissions.

The RTC ruled that Maxicare liable for breach of contract and ordered it to pay Estrada actual damages
in the amount equivalent to 10% of P20,169,335 representing her commission for Meralco. CA
affirmed the trial courts decision in toto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the letter of Maxicare to Estrada declaring that she fails in negotiating with
MERALCO constitutes judicial admission.

RULING:

In spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a partys pleading, the trial court is still given leeway
to consider other evidence presented.

As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a judicial
admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two exceptions:
1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown
that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission
by denying that he made such an admission.

For instance, if a party invokes an admission by an adverse party, but cites the admission out of
context, then the one making the admission may show that he made no such admission, or that his
admission was taken out of context. This may be interpreted as to mean not in the sense in which the
admission is made to appear.

In this case, the letter, although part of Estradas Complaint, is not, ipso facto, an admission of the
statements contained therein, especially since the bone of contention relates to Estradas entitlement
to commissions for the sale of health plans she claims to have brokered. It is more than obvious from
the entirety of the records that Estrada has unequivocally and consistently declared that her
involvement as broker is the proximate cause which consummated the sale between Meralco and
Maxicare.

UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION VS. CA, 33 SCRA 1

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari by the UFC against the CA decision of February 13, 1968 declaring the
BILL OF ASSIGNMENT rescinded, ordering UFC to return to Magdalo Francisco his Mafran sauce
trademark and to pay his monthly salary of P300.00 from Dec. 1, 1960 until the return to him of said
trademark and formula.In 1938, plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. discovered a formula for the
manufacture of a food seasoning (sauce) derived from banana fruits popularly known as MAFRAN
sauce. It was used commercially since 1942. In 1960, the plaintiff secured the financial assistance of
Tirso T. Reyes who, after a series of negotiations, formed with others defendant Universal Food
Corporation eventually leading to the execution on May 11, 1960 of the aforequoted "Bill of
Assignment" (Exhibit A or 1).

On May 31, 1960, Magdalo Francisco entered into contract with UFC stipulating among other
things that he be the Chief Chemist and Second Vice-President of UFC and shall have absolute control
and supervision over the laboratory assistants and personnel and in the purchase and safekeeping of
the chemicals used in the preparation of said Mafran sauce and that said positions are permanent in
nature.

Magdalo Francisco was appointed Chief Chemist with a salary of P300.00 a month. He kept the
formula of the Mafran sauce secret. Thereafter, however, due to the alleged scarcity and high prices of
raw materials, on November 28, 1960, Secretary-Treasurer Ciriaco L. de Guzman of UFC issued a
Memorandum duly approved by the President and General Manager Tirso T. Reyes that only Supervisor
Ricardo Francisco should be retained in the factory and that the salary of plaintiff Magdalo V.
Francisco, Sr., should be stopped for the time being until the corporation should resume its operation.
On December 3, 1960, Tirso T. Reyes, issued a memorandum to Victoriano Francisco ordering him to
report to the factory and produce "Mafran Sauce" at the rate of not less than 100 cases a day so as to
cope with the orders of the corporation's various distributors and dealers, and with instructions to take
only the necessary daily employees without employing permanent employees. Again, on December 6,
1961, another memorandum was issued by Reyes, instructing the Assistant Chief Chemist Ricardo
Francisco, to recall all daily employees who are connected in the production of Mafran Sauce and also
some additional daily employees for the production of Porky Pops. One January 9 and 16, 1961,
UFCauthorized Porfirio Zarraga and Paula de Bacula to look for a buyer of the corporation including its
trademarks, formula and assets at a price of not less than P300,000.00. Due to these successive
memoranda, without plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. being recalled back to work, he filed the
present action on February 14, 1961. Then in a letter dated March 20, 1961, UFC requested said
plaintiff to report for duty, but the latter declined the request because the present action was already
filed in court.

ISSUE: Was the Bill of Assignment really one that involves transfer of the formula for Mafran sauce
itself?

RULING:

No. Certain provisions of the bill would lead one to believe that the formula itself was
transferred. To quote, the respondent patentee "assign, transfer and convey all its property rights
and interest over said Mafran trademark and formula for MAFRAN SAUCE unto the Party of the Second
Part," and the last paragraph states that such "assignment, transfer and conveyance is absolute and
irrevocable (and) in no case shall the PARTY OF THE First Part ask, demand or sue for the surrender of
its rights and interest over said MAFRAN trademark and mafran formula.
 However, a perceptive analysis of the entire instrument and the language employed therein
would lead one to the conclusion that what was actually ceded and transferred was only the use of the
Mafran sauce formula. This was the precise intention of the parties.

Most importantly, it is alleged in paragraph 3 of the respondents' complaint that what was
ceded and transferred by virtue of the Bill of Assignment is the "use of the formula" (and not the
formula itself). This incontrovertible fact is admitted without equivocation in paragraph 3 of the
petitioner's answer. Hence, it does "not require proof and cannot be contradicted." The last part of
paragraph 3 of the complaint and paragraph 3 of the answer are reproduced below for ready
reference:

... and due to these privileges, the plaintiff in return assigned to said corporation his interest and
rights over the said trademark and formula so that the defendant corporation could use the formula in
the preparation and manufacture of the mafran sauce, and the trade name for the marketing of said
project, as appearing in said contract ....

Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's complaint.

Fabia v. IAC, G.R. No. L-66101

Facts:

Petitioners Jose and Anita Fabia were originally defendants in a case filed by respondents
(Angel Mararac and Remedios Alejandro, Eugenio, Gildo and Romeo Mararac, represented by their
mother, Carlina Rafanan), to exercise their right of legal redemption under Article 1621 of the Civil
Code over a parcel of land sold to petitoners.

Issue:

Whether or not the land in question may be considered rural for purposes of legal redemption;
and if so, are respondents guilty of laches so as to prevent them from redeeming the property in
question

Held:

The reason of the law in question is to foster the development of agricultural areas by
adjacent owners who may desire the increase for the improvement of their own land (Del Pilar v.
Catindig). The intention of the law in giving this right of redemption is to protect agriculture, by the
union of small agricultural lands and those adjoining thereto under one single owner for their better
exploitation.

The land in question cannot be legally classified as rural land since it is principally used for
residential than agricultural purposes. From the respondents complaint alone, the land is admittedly
residential as described in said complaint. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 129, of the Rule of Court
Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or
proceedings do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to
have been made through palpable mistake.

No such palpable mistake has been shown. Evidence militates against the respondents'
contention that the above description does not bind them. The description was merely copied from the
deed of sale between the property's original owners and the petitioners when the self-same document
was presented by the respondents as their own evidence of the petitioner's Declaration of Property for
Tax Purposes which contains the assessor's official finding and classification that the land covered by
the declaration is residential. A residential home lot is not converted into agricultural land by the
simple reservation of a plot for the cultivation of garden crops or the planting of bananas and some
fruit trees. Nor can an orchard or agricultural land be considered residential simply because a portion
thereof has been criss-crossed with asphalt and cement roads with buildings here and there. The same
rule is applied here. The land, subject matter of the petition, being primarily residential, cannot be
considered as rural for purposes of legal redemption under the law. Undeniably, the land adjoining that
which is sought to be redeemed is a piece of residential land on which the respondents live. This is
deemed an admission by the respondents of the residential character of their own land thus
disqualifying them from rightfully redeeming the property in question.
Dolores Granada v. Philippine National Bank, GR No. L-20745 (1966)

Facts:

Granada seeks to review the decision of the CA reversing that of the CFI of Negros Occidental
and ordered Granada to pay PNB. There is no dispute as to the amounts involved, Granada represent
the balances due and unpaid on sugar crop loans applied from and granted by PNB to Dolores,
Estrella, Feliza and Corazon, all surnamed Granada. The only issue raised by Granada emanated from
an amended complaint filed by the attorney of the PNB branch in Bacolod, Negros Occidental when it
was alleged that the defendants Dolores and Estrella, together with Feliza and Corazon, who are now
dead, as representatives of their parents Cristeta and Matias, borrowed from and were granted by the
plaintiff a sugar crop loan for the cultivation and production of sugar canes in hacienda Cristeta. It
appears that the original complaint alleged that the Granadas secured crop loans and received the
money as evidenced by various promissory notes and that the balances were not paid, hence it was
prayed that the Granadas be sentenced to pay the same plus interest and costs. Cristeta Granada, in
his answer under oath, significantly denied that she has given or granted any authority to Dolores,
Estrella, Feliza and Corazon, or to any of them, to borrow money or secure a loan in her behalf from
the bank. A trial was held and plaintiff presented the promissory notes whose genuineness and due
execution were unquestioned; proof of the receipt of the loans by defendants and the amounts still
unpaid thereon in spite of demands. All this evidence was admitted without objection on the part of
the defendants.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed an error in the application of facts and law.

Held: No. As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party
and binding upon it. However, that is not an absolute and inflexible rule. Every admission is to be
taken as an entirety of the fact which makes for the one side with the qualifications which limit,
modify or destroy its effect on the other side. The reason for this is that, where part of a statement of
a party is used against him as an admission, the court should consider and weigh any other portions
connected with the statement which tend to neutralize or explain the portion which is against interest.
In other words, while the admission is admissible in evidence, its probative value is to be determined
from the whole statement and others intimately related or connected therewith as an integrated unit
for, as said by the Supreme Court, although acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be
contradicted, however, evidence aliunde can be presented to show that the admission was made
through palpable mistake.
ROSALINA CUNANAN vs. RAFAEL AMPARO and BONIFACIO SORIANO
G.R. No. L-1313
February 16, 1948

FACTS:
Rosalinda Cunanan was the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Isaac Cunanan and
Candida Joaquin. Soriano filed a money claim for P880 as the amount of the decedents indebtedness.
Cunanan filed a motion setting out Sorianos claim and several other debts. To pay these obligations,
and because funds were needed to defray the expenses on the farm, she asked the court for authority
to negotiate a loan in such amount or to sell so much of the property described in the inventory as
might be sufficient to satisfy the said obligations. The motion was granted.

Cunanan manifested to the court that she had tendered to Soriano P880 but the latter refused
to accept it on the ground that the money was Japanese notes and had no value. She prayed that the
Soriano be ordered to accept, and to return the possession of two parcels of land which had been
conveyed to him.

Judge Paredes authorized the deposit with the clerk of court P880 in full payment of the
obligation Sorianos favour, and ordered him to deliver the property to Cunanan. However, Soriano
failed to return the properties, which prompted Cunanan to file a complaint for contempt of court.
Soriano was exonerated, but the order to return the lots still subsists. Soriano filed a motion for
reconsideration. Judge Amparo, the presiding judge of the CFI set aside the order of the Judge
Paredes stating that the court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to
the estate.

ISSUE: WON the court has jurisdiction to order delivery of the lots to the estate.

HELD: YES.

This power is a mere consequence of the power to approve Soriano's claim; a power which the
court undoubtedly had and which Soriano himself invoked with full knowledge of then facts. As a
general rule, with the consent of the parties matters affecting property under judicial administration
may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of the intestate proceeding provided the
interests of third persons are not prejudiced. Determination of title to property is within the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The respondent Soriano's objection relates exclusively to the
procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice
which may be waived. Certainly, there is waiver where, as here, and has been pointed out, the party
who raises the objection was the one who set the court in motion, and who, by failing to disclose the
existence of a sale under pacto de retro, suppressed jurisdictional facts that might be in the way of his
claim's success.
 Soriano is bound by his own petition and by the court's adjudication of his claim made in
consonance with his prayer. A party cannot trifle with a court's decision or order which he himself
sought with full awareness of his rights under the premises, by taking it or leaving it at pleasure. The
allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusively as against the pleader.
A party cannot subsequently take a position contradictory of, or inconsistent with, his pleadings.

JOES RADIO V. ALTO ENTERPRISES

FACTS:

Joes Radio and Electric Supply and the Bolinao Electronics Corporation (BEC) entered into a
"dealership agreement", BEC bound itself to sell and deliver to Joes 500 television sets in two
shipments of 250 sets, the first shipment to be made within 90 days from May 23, 1953, and the next
shipment within 60 days after the completion of the first shipment. Alto Electronics Corporation was
subrogated to the rights and obligations of the Bolinao Electronics Corporation in the agreement in
1953; and in that year Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., issued in favor of Joes a surety bond to
guarantee the full and faithful performance by the Alto Electronics Corporation under the agreement.
The first shipment of 250 television sets was totally delivered, and totally paid for. Thereafter, Joes
Radio deposited with appellant Alto Electronics Corporation the sum required under the dealership
agreement as advance partial payment for the 250 sets of the second delivery. No delivery having
been made on this second batch, suit was commenced against the Alto Enterprises and Alto Surety &
Insurance Co. in January 1954.

During the pendency of the case, but before trial was held, the parties entered into another
agreement, where Alto admitted having received P66,150 from Joes Radio, as advance partial
payment for the remaining 250 television sets slated for delivery by the Alto Electronics Corporation;
and that, as of the date of the additional agreement, said sum, together with interest thereon,
amounted to P70,008.75. Under the terms of the second instrument, the said appellant agreed to
liquidate this indebtedness by delivering to appellee 66 television sets of various models, delivery to
commence within five days after the signing of the agreement and to be completed within 90 days
thereafter. However, of the 66 television sets required to be delivered under the agreement, Alto
Electronics Corporation was only able to deliver 13 sets. Besides these 13 television sets, Alto
Electronics also delivered two other sets which were accepted by the Joes Radio as "deposit pending
receipt of letter of approval from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.

Because of failure of Alto Electronics Corporation to comply fully with the said additional agreement,
Joes Radio reactivated the suit. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Joes Radio. Against this
decision, Alto Electronics Corporation and Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court, since the amount involved is far in excess of
P50,000.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in not crediting the Alto with the sum of P2,928.24,
representing the cost of three (3) TV sets delivered to and accepted by the Joes Radio
Ruling: As regards the appellant Alto Electronics Corporation, there is another reason why the first
assigned error could not be given merit, and that is, its admission under paragraph 5 of its amended
answer of paragraph 11 of the amended and supplemental complaint which in effect admitted the
allegations contained in the said paragraph of the complaint, viz., "That under the aforesaid
agreement, defendant delivered to plaintiff only 13 television sets with a total value
of P20,629.98 leaving an unpaid balance of P49,378.77". It is a familiar doctrine that an admission
made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive
as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be
ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not.

Tee Bi vs Chartered Bank

A general admission of the truth of the allegations set forth in a pleading is not an admission
of the truth of an impossible conclusion of fact drawn from other facts set out in the pleading, nor of a
wrong conclusion of law based on the allegations of fact well pleaded, nor of the truth of a general
averment of facts contradicted by more specific averments. Thus, if a pleader alleges that two pesos
were borrowed on one day and two more borrowed on another making five Pin all, a stipulation of the
truth of the allegations in the pleading does not amount to an admission by the opposing party that
twice two make five. Again if a pleader alleges that one hundred pesos were loaned without interest
for one year and had not been paid, and that the borrower is indebted to the lender in the sum of one
hundred and ten pesos, that being the amount of the capital together with interest for the year for
which the money was loaned, a stipulation as to the truth of the allegation set forth in the pleadings is
not an admission of the truth of the conclusion of law as to the interest due by the borrower. These
elementary principles have been quite fully developed in a great variety of cases arising on demurrers,
and sufficiently dispose of the attempt of counsel to fix the attention of the court upon this single
averment of the answer, apart from the context and to the exclusion of the specific allegations of fact,
the truth of which, as stipulated by the parties, cannot be questioned.
CONCEPT OF RELEVANCE AND CONDITIONAL ADMISSIBILITY

G.R. No. L-28607 February 21, 1929

PRATS & COMPANY vs. PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, a

corporation

FACTS:

Action for the recovery of money filed by plaintiff against respondent for a P117,800.60 by
reason of a loss sustained by fire. The Respondent countered that the fire was caused by the Plaintiff.
The trial court ruled in favour of the respondent for the submission of fraudulent claim with false proof
thus, the plaintiff appealed their case to the Supreme Court.

Francisco Prats, Elias Hanna and Isidro Bejar registered under two mercantile partnerships for
the purpose of engaging in a business. Bejar and Hanna were Turkish nationals with unsavoury
reputations for insurance around Manila. These three purchased a one storey-building (old and
scarcely like a shed) at Plaza Gardenia where they place their assembled merchandise. The building
was located in an area inconvenient for traders and outside the ordinary channels of business (out of
the way, garud).

Nine (9) policies amounting to P160,000 has been taken out for the goods in the merchandise
which were only valued at P68,753 under the Hanna, Bejar & Co. However, when Prats applied for
another insurance with the Respondent for P200,000, the Respondent refused to issue a policy if Bejar
and Hanna had an interest in the goods to be insured. Prats assured the agent of Phoenix that Hanna
and Bejar were not part of the Prats & Co. The policy value was increased up to P410,000 for only
goods valued at P230,000 at most. Furthermore, the earlier nine policies taken out were then
endorsed by Hanna, Bejar & Co to Prats & Co.

On the part of the goods, the Plaintiff stated that they purchased twenty-two (22) cases of silk
valued at P43,400 for France though it appears that such transaction is fictitious. Such fact was
offered by the Respondent as evidence to the courts.

ISSUE:
 Whether the plaintiff has a right to recover under their insurance policy.

HELD:

No, the plaintiff cannot recover under their insurance policy. The Court ruled that the
Respondent were able to prove their case under two defences: (1) the fire was set up with the
purpose of defrauding the respondent and (2) the plaintiff filed a fraudulent claim with false proof
which is in violation of the policy.

The proof of fictitious silk goods was submitted by the Respondent. Furthermore, it was shown
that 45 cases of old stock from HBC were deposited to the HBC offices rather than at Plaza Gardenia.
It was theorized that the old stock were transferred to Plaza Gardenia to swell the debris of the fire
while other items from the Gardenia Plaza were withdrawn without an invoice. Such item of proof,
although circumstantial in nature, is competent and should have been admitted by the trial court.

Moreover, Prats was seen to have bought cans of petroleum with a certain Osete. This Osete
person instructed a boy that he should not turn on the alarm when the fire is underway. It was
substantiated by a neighbour tried to turn on the alarm but was turned away by the boy stating that it
was already alarmed. Such claim was easily disproved when the Fire Chief himself, turned on the
alarm when he appeared in the scene and the alarm box was undisturbed. He also noted that the
smoke emitted from the fire was black which is characteristic of combustion through petroleum. The
smell as well as the merchandise soaked with petroleum was also noted.

In relation to this case, the court reiterated that justice is more expeditiously and effectively
observed in courts where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favour.
The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objection to its materiality or technical objection to the
form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first
instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether
testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney
offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the
attorney that the proof offered will be connected later.
PEOPLE VS. ABALOS

FACTS:

On or about March 9, 1966, an information was filed with the Court of First Instance of Sulu, presided
over by respondent Judge, accusing Mohammad Ussam Dambong, Jikiri Dambong, Amiril Habissi and
Ahmad Intoman, of the crime of double murder upon Abdulhadi Maoludani and Maoludani Habissi, with
multiple frustrated murder upon the persons of Sarahani Maoludani, Marajuko Maoludani and
Abdulrajik Maoludani, allegedly committed on February 6, 1961, in Sulu.

On trial, the prosecution introduced evidence tending to show that defendant Mohammad Ussam
Dambong had, on February 6, 1961, gone to the place of the crime, accompanied by his co-
defendants, and then fired at and killed Maoludani Habissi and Abdulhadi Maoludani, as well as shot
the other persons named in the information.

Thereafter defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong testified that the casualties and the injuries were
due to shots fired, not by him, but by Abdulkadil Habbisi because, as a police sergeant in the
performance of his duty, he (Mohammad Ussam Dambong) had merely fired into the air, to stop a
fight between two groups of persons, to one of which the victims belonged. The defense having
completed the introduction of its evidence, the prosecution called Majid Andi as rebuttal witness.

After the preliminary questions propounded to him, the defense objected to further questions, upon
the ground that Madjid Andi appeared to have witnessed the occurrence and that his testimony should
have been introduced when the prosecution presented its evidence in chief. Respondent Judge
sustained the objection, but, later, reconsidered his resolution, as the prosecution explained that it had
discovered Madjid Andi sometime after the introduction of its evidence in chief and that the testimony
of said witness would merely rebut that of defendant Mohammed Ussam Dambong.

The prosecution resumed the examination of Madjid Andi. He said that he was present when the
shooting took place, that Maoludani Habissi and Abdulhadi Maoludani were shot by defendant
Mohammad Ussam Dambong, not by Abdulkadil Habbisi, and that the latter was not even at the scene
of the occurrence. The prosecution then asked Madjid Andi whether Mohammad Ussam Dambong was
in the courtroom. The defense objected to this question as improper for rebuttal, and one that should
have been asked during the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence in chief. Respondent Judge
sustained the objection and ordered the testimony of Madjid Andi stricken from the record, as
improper for rebuttal.
ISSUE:

Whether respondent Judge erred in ordering the testimony of Madjid Andi stricken from the records?

RULING:

Under the circumstances, it is obvious that, in directing that the testimony of Madjid Andi be stricken
from the record and not allowing said witness to identify the person who committed the crime
aforementioned, respondent Judge had committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.

Trial courts have ample discretion to determine whether or not the parties should be allowed to
introduce evidence in rebuttal. Moreover, its resolutions on these matters are interlocutory in nature
and will not generally be reviewed, except on appeal taken from a decision rendered on the merits.
Judicial discretion, however, is not unlimited. It must be exercised reasonably, with a view to
promoting the ends of justice, one of which is to ascertain the truth. Hence, whenever discretion is
vested, it must be understood to be a sound one, inasmuch as the interest of justice, equity and fair
play cannot be advanced otherwise. This is particularly with respect to rules of procedure, especially
those governing the admission or exclusion of evidence. As a matter of general practice, it is deemed
best to resolve doubts in favor of the admission of the contested evidence, without prejudice to such
action as the court may deem fit to take in deciding the case on the merits. This practice has added
importance as regards the evidence for the prosecution in criminal cases, for, once the accused has
been acquitted, there is no means to secure a review by appeal, no matter how erroneous the action
of the lower court may have been. Hence, We have been constrained to suspend the proceedings in
the criminal action involved in the case at bar, to forestall a possible miscarriage of justice.
OBJECT AS EVIDENCE

PEOPLE VS TACIPIT

FACTS:

Eden Molina invited some of her friends, including Onelia Pamittan (17 years old, complainant)
and Roland Tacipit (accused, a married man) to her house for some snacks.

After eating snacks, the group decided to go home however, Roland Tacipit restrained Onelia, held her
left hand and her notebooks and told her friends to go ahead. Despite her cries and pleas for help,
the house owners did nothing to help her. Elmer even said that they were sweethearts.

It was getting dark and on their way, they passed through a coconut plantation and there, Rolando
raped Onelia. Onelia reported the incident to her uncle. They reported the incident to the
police, submitted her clothing and herself for examination and investigation. Upon showing
of probable cause, the MTC issued a warrant of arrest against the accused.

DEFENSE:

The accused claimed that they were sweethearts and that the complainant voluntarily yielded herself
to him. As proof of their relationship, he presented a ring engraved with the name Onelia.

SUPREME COURTS RULING: The accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt (RECLUSION
PERPETUA)

Although there was an absence of external injuries on the body of the complainant,
the clothes worn by her at the time of the offense speak well of the use of force and the
presence of a struggle. (Her T-shirt and bra were torn therefore showing that they were
forcibly removed. Her shorts and panty had blood stains.)

The accused's reliance on the defense that he and the complainant were lovers is unfounded.
Even if it were true, such relationship would not give the accused the license to deflower the
complainant against her will, and will not exonerate him from the criminal charge for rape. The
alleged proof of such relationship, the ring with complainant's name engraved on it, does
not even fit the fingers of the complainant. The accused's act of accompanying the complainant
up to a point near her house does not appear to be a gesture of love. If the accused was not obsessed
with a sense of guilt, he could have accompanied the complainant to the home since it was already
dark at night.

Villaflor vs Summers

Facts:

Emeteria Villaflor is charged with the crime of adultery.Upon petition of the fiscal,the court
ordered the defendant to submit her body for examination to determine if she was pregnant or not.
The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination was in violation of the
constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination.

Issue:

W/N the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians violates the
Philippine Bill of Rights and Code of Criminal Procedure.

Held:

No.

Philippine Bill of Rights and Code of Criminal Procedure provides that , no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

The decision in the case of Holt v United States provided that, the prohibition of compelling
man in criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may
be material. Also,The Supreme Court sets a limit to the protection only to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an
admission of his guilt. Considering the proposition, an ocular inspection of the body is permissible.
People v. Jara, Vergara, and Bernadas

Facts:

The three appellants were all sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. 2564 for robbery with homicide.
In the companion case of parricide, one was sentenced to another death penalty while the two other
appellants received sentenced ranging from 12 to 20 years of imprisonment.

The autopsy reports submitted by Dr. Rufino Ynzon, the City Health Officer of Puerto Princesa on the
examination of the cadavers of the deceased victims indicate that death in both cases resulted from
"hemorrhage, intra-cranial secondary to multiple comminuted-depressed fracture of the cranial
bones."

Felicisimo Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife, Luisa, together with her
friend, Amparo Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a defense and testified that at the time the killings
took place at Alvin's Canteen at Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, he was fast asleep with his
grandchildren at his step-daughter's house in Pineda Subdivision. The other accused, Reymundo
Vergara and Roberto Bernadas retracted their respective extra-judicial confessions admitting their
participation in the crimes charged and Identifying their mastermind" as the accused Jara during
proceedings before the Inquest Fiscal. They contested the admissibility of the extra-judicial
confessions and the subsequent re- enactment of the crime on the ground that their participations in
these occasions were not free and voluntary and were without the benefit of counsel.

Held:

During the investigation at the scene of the crime, blood stains were found splattered in the trousers
and shirt worn by accused Jara. His eyeglasses were also smeared with blood. When asked to explain
the presence of said blood stains, accused Jara told the police that before he learned about the killing,
he was with his stepdaughter Minerva Jimenez in the public market dressing chickens. He also said in
his testimony in open court that when he saw his wife lying dead on the bed, he approached her and
hugged her in his effort to wake her up. After a laboratory examination of the eyeglasses, trousers,
and shirt, the NBI biologist verified in her report that the blood stains were not chicken blood but
human blood. The blood stains found in accused Jara's trousers formed certain Identical circular
patterns, a splattering of blood which, according to the NBI biologist, could be caused by an
instrument like that of a hammer. Such circular patterns will only occur at the time of the impact of
the instrument, the very moment it hits the victim. He further explained that there was no possibility
of the splattering of blood if the victim died hours before because blood starts to coagulate or clog 15
minutes after the wound is caused The blood of the deceased victims in the case at bar had already
coagulated in the morning of June 9, 1978 when accused Jara claimed that the blood stains on his
shirt were smudged when he hugged his wife. A failure to get evidence on the blood types of the two
victims keeps this second circumstantial evidence, together with the clear motive, from being well-
nigh conclusive. However, it is still strong evidence in the chain of circumstances pointing to Jara as
the killer of his wife.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS G. RUIZ

G.R. No. L-33609 December 14, 1981

Facts:

At about 6:30 P.M. of May 30, 1968, accussed Jesus Ruiz was informed that the loading of copra on
M/V Sweet Hope that day was given to their rival union. The unloading was allegedly ordered by Atty.
Jose Ong Oh, Jr., the deceased. So the accused went to find the deceased but he was not able to find
him. Later, the deceased came to his house.

According to Carmelito Omboy who arrived at the vicinity almost at the same time that the deceased
reached the place as the latter was followed by the former from the wharf, the deceased greeted the
accused "Jesse, Jesse" extending his arms to the accused who, however, slapped them and kicked the
rattan stool and said, 'Sit down' to the deceased in a commanding manner; that the deceased picked
up the rattan stool and placed it in front of the accused and sat on it; that accused demanded, "Why
did you load without asking permission?"; that the deceased answered "Jesse, easy, easy"; that
accused then splashed a glass of wine on the face of the deceased and throw the glass to the concrete
pavement; that the deceased stood up, wiped his face, removed his eyeglasses and wiped it with his
T-shirt, wore his eyeglasses again and sat down anew, but accused with his right hand slapped him on
the left cheek; that the deceased's face was turned to the right due to the impact of the slapping, only
to be met by the shot from accused's black revolver when the deceased turned his face to the front;
that the accused got the revolver from his right waist and that only one shot was fired; that the
deceased jerked a little and fell to his left side, meanwhile the accused stood up still holding his
revolver, raised it, turned its drum and tucked it on his right waist; that thereafter, the accused turned
to his right, and went upstairs of his house and threw his firearm; that after a while, accused came
down from his house, passed by the body of the deceased, walked along Roxas Street and proceeded
to the Municipal Building.

The result of the paraffin test conducted on the accused also on May 31, 1968 by Lt. Col. Minardo B.
Piones, showed that the right hand of the accused was positive for the presence of nitrates, while his
left hand was negative

On June 4, 1968, Lt. Col. Perez arrived in Agusan and at the residence of the accused the latter
surrendered to the former a Cal. 357 Magnum firearm with five have ammunitions and one spent
shell, which firearm was found ballistically to be the firearm from which the recovered bullet or slug
that killed Atty. Jose Ong Oh, Jr. (deceased) was fired.

On June 5, 1968, the next day after the accused surrendered the aforesaid firearm, he executed a
third affidavit in whic, accused, among others, admitted that the surrendered firearm is his own
unlicensed revolver that killed the deceased, but that the killing was accidental as the forefinger of the
deceased's left hand was inserted into the trigger guard of said revolver causing it to fire and hitting
the deceased himself.

Issue:

Whether the plea of self-defense must be appreaciated.

Ruling:

We agree with the court a quo in rejecting the plea of self-defense.

Thus, the supposed aggression committed by the deceased according to appellant and his witnesses
was in whipping out his gun and pointing it at appellant after a heated exchange of angry words. It is
entirely belied by the fact that no gun was found near the fallen body of the deceased or in the
immediate vicinity thereof, and that the slug that caused the death and extracted from the brain of the
deceased was fired from appellant's unlicensed gun, as established by the ballistic examination
conducted by an expert, Capt. Constantino Y. Leyva, Chief of the PC Central Laboratory, Camp Crame.

If the appellant fired his unlicensed gun with his right hand, as the presence of nitrates thereon would
prove, and there being no nitrate found on his left hand, when he was subjected to paraffin test the
day following the shooting incident also in Camp Crame, the defense theory that the deceased pulled
out a gun which appellant tried to wrest from the deceased with his left hand, and that in the course
of the struggle for the possession of the gun, it went off with the deceased's finger also pressed
against the trigger, would be pure concoction. Under such theory, the left least, of the deceased that
supposedly fired the gun. But paraffin test conducted on June 2, 1968 showed both hands of the
deceased negative for nitrates. It was the left cheek of the deceased that was found positive for the
presence of nitrates, which shows that the gun was close to the face when it was fired.

If there was a struggle for the possession of the gun of the deceased as claimed by appellant, there is
the much greater likelihood of the gun being held down on the level of the body during the struggle,
not the level of the head. That the gun was fired close to the face is more indicative of a deliberate
aim with complete freedom from any force that could distort its accuracy, as would happen in a hand-
to-hand struggle for the possession of the gun. The entry of the slug through the mouth, likewise,
renders appellant's version of how the gun went off while he and the deceased who allegedly pulled
out his gun very improbable, as was his first version, as given in his statement. An these
improbabilities and plain untrustworthiness in the testimony of the appellant, and the physical findings
of experts, would make the version of the prosecution that it was appellant who drew his own gun
from his right waist and fired at the deceased directly on the face, at close range, easily the more
natural and thus the more credible of the diametrically conflicting versions of the defense and the
prosecution.

In the protective surrounding of appellant's residence where his confrontation with the deceased took
place, and appellant having been quite justifiably angered by what he heard that the deceased had a
rival union to load his copra, by which act he felt cheated and unjustly discriminated, together with the
numerous members of his union, and his anger perhaps showing itself very visibly because he had
been drinking in celebration of his son's birthday, the deceased could not have assumed the
aggressive stance portrayed of him. It was appellant, therefore, who deliberately fired at the
deceased, infuriated by how he felt seriously aggrieved by the deceased's act in violating an
agreement on the loading of the latter's copra by the two rival unions under some kind of rotation
scheme.

The element of unlawful aggression not having been established, appellant's plea of self-defense, or
even that of incomplete self-defense, must fall. The other requisite of self- defense which is that of the
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression must, likewise, have
to be found wanting, once the basic requisite of unlawful aggression is shown to be non-existent.
Neither could it be said, from how the evidence has been analyzed above, that the appellant gave no
provocation, which is the third and last requisite of the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

PEOPLE, plaintiff-appellee vs. ADELINO BARDAJE, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

VERSION OF THE COMPLAINANT (MARCELINA CUIZON, 14 years old):

She claimed that she was kidnapped and raped by Bardaje.

VERSION OF THE ACCUSED:

ADELINO admitted having had carnal knowledge of MARCELINA but denied having raped her. He
claims that they eloped.

CEFERINO ARMADAS TESTIMONY (He is the owner of the hut where Marcelina was allegedly brought
the second time): He corroborated that portion of ADELINO's testimony regarding their stay in his
house adding that MARCELINA and ADELINO had told him that they had eloped.

MEDICAL CERTIFICATE BY DR. VITUS HOBAYAN, JR.

1. No evidence of external injuries around the vulva or any part of the body.

2. Hymen no intact, presence of old healed laceration at 4, 7, 12 o'clock.

3. Vagina easily admits two fingers.

4. Vaginal smear negative for spermatozoa.

Explaining the "old healed laceration", the doctor stated that laceration may have been caused by
possible sexual intercourse or other factors, and if it were intercourse, he estimated that it could have
occured " say, two weeks or one month" or possibly more.

ISSUE: Whether Adelino was correctly found guilty of Forcible Abduction and Rape

HELD: On the basis of the evidence, testimonial and documentary, the Supreme Court found that the
guilt of ADELINO has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

In crimes against chastity, the conviction or acquittal of an accused depends almost entirely on the
credibility of a complainant's testimony since by the intrinsic nature of those crimes they usually
involve only two persons the complainant and the accused. The offended party's testimony,
therefore, must be subjected to thorough scrutiny for a determination of its veracity beyond
reasonable doubt.

1. According to the medical findings, "no evidence of external injuries was found around the vulva or
any part of the body" of Complainant, a fact which is strange, indeed, considering that Complainant
was allegedly "dragged" slapped" into unconsciousness, "wrestled" with, and criminally abused.
Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than witnesses put
together. We are also faced with the medical finding of "old healed lacerations" in the hymen which,
according to the testimony of the examining physician would have occurred two weeks or even one
month before if said lacerations had been caused by sexual intercourse. This expert opinion bolsters
the defense that MARCELINA and ADELINO had previous amorous relations at the same time that it
casts serious doubts on the charge of intercourse by force and intimidation.

2. By Complainant's own admissions about the huts where she was raped were highly improbable and
contrary to human experience because it challenges human credulity that she could have been
sexually abused with so many within hearing and distance.

The totality of the foregoing circumstances count with such great weight and significance that they
lend an aura of improbability and reasonable doubt to the allegation that MARCELINA had been
"kidnapped" or "illegally detained".

In respect of the alleged confession of ADELINO, suffice it to re-state that "an extrajudicial
confession made by an accused shag not be sufficient ground for conviction unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is proved when the evidence on
record shows that the crime prosecuted had been committed.

That proof has not been met in the case at bar, the evidence establishing more of an elopement rather
than kidnapping or illegal detention or forcible abduction, and much less rape. Moreover, ADELINO,
aged 18, was by himself when being investigated by soldiers, without benefit of counsel nor of anyone
to advise him of his rights.
The medical report, Exhibit "B", implied that MARCELINA could have had sexual intercourse previous
to December 14th. On the other hand, ADELINO had testified that he and MARCELINA used to go
together to Tacloban, and while there several times, "we had sexual intercourse because she likes it."

PEOPLE v VALLEJO

Facts:

In 1999, 9-year old Daisy Diolola of Rosario, Cavite went to the house of her tutor, Aimee
Vallejo. Daisys body was discovered the next day by a fisherman. The police investigation showed that
Gerrico Vallejo, brother of Aimee was the last person seen to be with Daisy before her disappearance.
Vallejo was invited by the policemen for questioning. The police also recovered the shirt and short
worn by Vallejo, and were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination. The NBI Medico-Legal
Officer conducted physical examination of Vallejo, as well as conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of
the victim.

While in detention, Vallejo voluntarily confessed to several people that he raped and killed
Daisy. At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron
Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-appellant, as well as buccal swabs and hair
samples from the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The samples
were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination. Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic
Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests on the specimens collected by Dr. Vertido. She testified that
the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of
accused-appellant and the victim.

In 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding Vallejo guilty of the offense charged.

Issue: Whether the DNA evidence should be enough to convict accused-appellant.

Held: Yes. DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her genetic
code. Except for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is
committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim's body for the
suspect's DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference
sample taken from the suspect and the victim. The vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded
positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of
accused-appellant.
People v. Cajumocan

FACTS:

At 11:30 p.m. of September 30, 1999, while the deceased, Apolinario Mirabueno, was asleep beside
his fourteen year old brother Leo inside their house in Sitio Waray, Barangay Plaza Aldea, Tanay, Rizal,
the latter was roused from his slumber by the rustling of dried leaves outside the house. He saw a
solitary figure walk toward their house, paused outside their room, and removed the fish net covering
the window and looked inside the house. From the light of the fluorescent lamp inside the house, Leo
recognized the man as appellant Cornelio Cajumocan, who drew a gun and shot Apolinario in the
head, and thereafter ran away. Leo cried out to his older sister, Margarita and they brought Apolinario
to a hospital in Morong, but he was declared dead on arrival

During the arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de parte pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.

Dr. Emmanuel Reyes, Medico-Legal of the PNPC Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
conducted the physical examination of the victims cadaver. According to his report, the victims death
resulted instantaneously. The cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage secondary to gunshot
wound of the head.

Ernesto Carpo, an inspector/investigator of AFSLAI Security Service where appellant was employed as
a security guard was presented by the defense as its first witness. The head of the security guards
stationed in the Cruz property informed Carpo that appellant was picked up by Tanay police authorities
because he was a suspect in a killing incident. Carpo made inquiries and found out that appellants
tour of duty was from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m., and concluded that he never left the place as shown by a
photocopy of the Detail Order signed by the head of the security guards stationed in the Cruz
property. They told him that the place where the shooting incident took place was about one kilometer.
Carpo inspected the logbook and saw the signature of the appellant.

For his part, appellant testified that prior to 7 p.m. on September 30, 1999, he arrived at his
assignment in the Cruz property, located in Sitio Bathala, Plaza Aldea, Tanay, Rizal. He went to their
outpost, signed the logbook and stayed up to 8:30 p.m. He then went to the bodega where
construction equipment and materials were kept and, upon seeing that they were secure, he returned
to the outpost and watched television. He asked permission from the head of the security guards to
sleep. At 7 a.m., he signed the logbook to end his tour of duty. While still at the compound, police
officers from Tanay, Rizal came and invited him to the police station. During the investigation, he
denied any participation in the killing of Apolinario. The following day, on October 1, 1999, he was
brought to Camp Crame to undergo paraffin testing. The paraffin test showed him negative for powder
burns.

ISSUE: Whether the negative findings of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant is conclusive
proof of his innocence;

HELD: As to the first issue, appellant alleges that the trial court failed to give consideration to the
results of the chemical test indicating that appellant was negative of gunpowder nitrates consequent to
the paraffin test conducted.

Paraffin tests, in general, have been rendered inconclusive by this Court. Scientific experts concur in
the view that the paraffin test has proved extremely unreliable in use. It can only establish the
presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand; still, the test alone cannot determine whether
the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The presence of nitrates should be
taken only as an indication of a possibility or even of a probability but not of infallibility that a person
has fired a gun, since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder.

Appellants argument that the negative result of gunpowder nitrates from the paraffin test conducted
on him the day after the crime was committed, thereby showing an absence of physical evidence that
he fired a gun, is untenable. In the case of People v. Manalo, we stressed:

x x x even if he were subjected to a paraffin test and the same yields a negative finding, it cannot be
definitely concluded that he had not fired a gun as it is possible for one to fire a gun and yet be
negative for the presence of nitrates as when the hands are washed before the test. The Court has
even recognized the great possibility that there will be no paraffin traces on the hand if, as in the
instant case, the bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol.

In People v. Abriol, et al., we reiterated the rule on the admissibility of this kind of evidence:

A paraffin test could establish the presence or absence of nitrates on the hand. However, it cannot
establish that the source of the nitrate was the discharge of firearms. Nitrates are also found in
substances other than gunpowder. A person who tests positive may have handled one or more
substances with the same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and leguminous plants. Hence, the presence of nitrates should only be
taken as an indication of a possibility that a person has fired a gun. However, it must be borne in mind
that appellants were not convicted on the sole basis of the paraffin test.

Paraffin tests, it must be emphasized, merely corroborate direct evidence that may be presented by
the prosecution.

In the case at bar, the positive, clear and categorical testimony of the lone eyewitness to the crime
deserves full merit in both probative weight and credibility over the negative results of the paraffin
test conducted on the appellant. Verily, establishing the identity of the malefactor through the
testimony of the witness is the heart and cause of the prosecution. All other matters, such as the
paraffin test, are of lesser consequence where there is positive identification by the lone eyewitness,
Leo Mirabueno, of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, a paraffin test cannot be
considered as conclusive proof of appellants innocence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RUDY BUDUHAN AND ROBERT BUDUHAN

TOPIC: Admissibility of paraffin tests

FACTS: Two groups of men were in a beerhouse. The group of Buduhan comprised of four men and
the group of Erese. The four armed men declared a holdup and shot at six men, injuring four and
killing two of them. Two on duty investigators of a nearby police station were informed of the shooting
and while on the way, they saw the four men running away from the scene. The four were arrested
due to their suspicious actions and they were later identified as the suspects in the robbery homicide.

The paraffin test conducted yielded negative results.

HELD: A paraffin test was conducted on the apprehended suspects. Police Inspector Chua-Camarao
explained that the purpose of conducting a paraffin test was to determine the presence of gunpowder
residue in the hands of a person through extraction using paraffin wax. The process involves two
stages: first, the paraffin casting, in which the hands of the subject are covered with paraffin wax to
extract gunpowder residue; and second, the paraffin examination per se, which refers to the actual
chemical examination to determine whether or not gunpowder residue has indeed been extracted. For
the second stage, the method used is the diphenyl amine test, wherein the diphenyl amine agent is
poured on the paraffin casts of the subjects hands. In this test, a positive result occurs when blue
specks are produced in the paraffin casts, which then indicates the presence of gunpowder residue.
When no such reaction takes place, the result is negative.

Although they tested negative, the forensic chemist pointed out that the paraffin test is merely a
corroborative evidence, neither proving nor disproving that a person did indeed fire a gun. The
positive or negative results of the test can be influenced by certain factors, such as the wearing of
gloves by the subject, perspiration of the hands, wind direction, wind velocity, humidity, climate
conditions, the length of the barrel of the firearm or the open or closed trigger guard of the firearm.
DNA EVIDENCE

Tijing v. Court of Appeals, Gr. No. 125901 (8 March 2001)

Facts: Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo,
Manila.

According to Bienvenida, in 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry
job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she
returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually
let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from
the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida proceeded to Angelitas house but did
not find them there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told
Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelitas house after three days, only to discover that
Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to the barangay chairman and also
to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and
her husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other
places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts. In 1993,
Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of
Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going
to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four
years. The brother of the late Tomas Lopez, Benjamin Lopez, pointed out that the boy was already
named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her
demand to do so. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in
order to recover their son. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., her testimony was supported by her clinical records. The second witness, Benjamin
Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas
Lopez as the latter was sterile and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an
adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children.

Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child, at the age of 42, she gave birth to John
Thomas Lopez at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. And that she has two
other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez. The birth of John Thomas was registered by her
common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila.

Decision of RTC: Trial Court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not
have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is impossible. The minor and Bienvenida
showed strong facial similarity, Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same
person who is the natural child of petitioners. Petition for Habeas Corpus is granted. It ordered
Angelita to immediately surrender the child. Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal. The sheriff
implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor in which Angelita peacefully
surrendered the minor and turned over the custody of the child.

Decision of CA: Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The
appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. The evidence adduced by
Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?

(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is
the son of petitioners?

(3) Is the use of DNA test allowed?

Held:

(1) Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody
of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.

(2) Yes. The evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is
actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr. First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear
children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent
ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of
marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no
evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who
allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge
order from the clinic were ever submitted. Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that
Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother,
Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez
was only an adopted son. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years,
they also bore no offspring. Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas
Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the
alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth
should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent
register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty
days after the birth. Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private
respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because
even private respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the
other data in said birth certificate. Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child
and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and
head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material
evidence to establish parentage. Needless to stress, the trial courts conclusion should be given high
respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner
concerned. Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenidas giving birth to Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log
book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners. All these considered, the court constrained to
rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners.

(3) Not necessary. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. We have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it
was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this
case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of
parentage and identity issues.

People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224

Facts:

In the evening, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off.
She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She
noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She
went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the
door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a
lifeless body that was cold and rigid. She found out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter,
Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by
Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines
protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of
Isabel, Cion, called the police.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylynss
death, however, he was placed under police custody.

Held:

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellants gene type.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave
biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victims
body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be
transferred to the victims body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that
there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain

which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the
perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three
requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting
from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. Hence, a
person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and
DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved

People vs. Umanito, G.R. No. 172607

Facts:

Umanito was convicted of the crime of rape. A child, BBB, was born out of the criminal act.
The case focused on the DNA testing of buccal swabs and blood stains taken from Umanito, the child
BBB, and the mother AAA, in order to establish the filiation of BBB and Umanito.

Issue: actually, di ko po alam ung issue; the case merely discussed the procedure and admissibility of
the DNA testing; di naman kasi nag-object si Umanito, :-D

Discussions:

DNA samples were thus extracted from AAA and BBB in the presence of Judge Fe, the
prosecutor, the counsel for the defense, and DCA De la Cruz. On 8 February 2008, DNA samples were
extracted from Umanito at the New Bilibid Prisons by NBI chemist Aranas, as witnessed by Judge Fe,
the prosecutor, the defense counsel, DCA De la Cruz, and other personnel of the Court and the New
Bilibid Prisons.

At the hearing, Provincial Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Opiana, presented Mary Ann T. Aranas, a
Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation who testified on the examination she
conducted, outlining the procedure she adopted and the result thereof. She further declared that using
the Powerplex 16 System, Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on
FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and Rufino Umanito y Millares, to determine whether or not
Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete Match in
all of the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y Milalres and [BBB]; That
based on the above findings, there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Rufino Umanito y
Millares is the biological father of [BBB].

That considering that under Section 9, A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, if the value of the Probability of
Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity, the instant case was
set for reception of evidence for the accused on April 29, 2008 to controvert the presumption that he
is the biological father of [BBB].

The DNA samples were collected by the forensic chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation whose qualifications as an expert was properly established adopting the following
procedure:
 a) The subject sources were asked to gargle and to fill out the reference sample form.
Thereafter, the chemists informed them that buccal swabs will be taken from their mouth and
five (5) droplets of blood will also be taken from the ring finger of their inactive hand;

b) Pictures of the subject sources were taken by the NBI Chemist;

c) Buccal swabs were taken from the subject sources three (3) times;

d) Subject sources were made to sign three (3) pieces of paper to serve as label of the three
buccal swabs placed inside two (2) separate envelopes that bear their names;

e) Blood samples were taken from the ring finger of the left hand of the subject sources;

f) Subject sources were made to sign the FTA card of their blood samples.

The buccal swabs and the FTA cards were placed in a brown envelope for air drying for at least
one hour.

g) Finger prints of the subject sources were taken for additional identification;

h) The subject sources were made to sign their finger prints.

i) Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz and Prosecutor Maria
Nenita A. Oplana, in that order, were made to sign as witnesses to the reference sample forms
and the finger prints of the subject sources.

j) After one hour of air drying, the Buccal Swabs and the FTA papers were placed inside a
white envelope and sealed with a tape by the NBI Chemists;

k) The witnesses, Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz,
Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Opiana including the NBI Chemist, affixed their signatures on the
sealed white envelope;

l) The subjects sources were made to sign and affix their finger prints on the sealed white
envelope;

m) The chemists affixed their signatures on the sealed envelope and placed it in a separate
brown envelope;

n) The subjects sources were made to affix their finger prints on their identification places and
reference forms.

The same procedure was adopted by the Forensic Chemists of the NBI in the taking of DNA
samples from the accused, Rufino Umanito at the New Bilibid Prison in the afternoon of February 8,
2008.

In order to arrive at a DNA profile, the forensic chemists adopted the following procedure: (1)
Sampling which is the cutting of a portion from the media (swabs and FTA paper); (2) then subjected
the cut portions for extraction to release the DNA; (3) After the DNA was released into the solution, it
was further processed using the formarine chain reaction to amplify the DNA samples for analysis of
using the Powerplex 16 System, which allows the analysis of 16 portions of the DNA samples. The
Powerplex 16 System are reagent kits for forensic purposes; (3) After the target, DNA is multiplied,
the amplified products are analyzed using the genetic analyzer. The Powerplex 16 System has 16
markers at the same time. It is highly reliable as it has already been validated for forensic use. It has
also another function which is to determine the gender of the DNA being examined.

Mary Ann Aranas, the Forensic Chemist, in her testimony explained that the DNA found in all
cells of a human being come in pairs except the mature red blood cells. These cells are rolled up into
minute bodies called "chromosomes," which contain the DNA of a person. A human has 23 pairs of
chromosomes. For each pair of chromosome, one was found to have originated from the mother, the
other must have came from the father. Using the Powerplex 16 System Results, the variable portions
of the DNA called "loci," which were used as the basis for DNA analysis or typing showed the
following: under "loci" D3S1358, the genotype of the locus of [AAA] is 15, 16, the genotype of [BBB]
is 15, 16, one of the pair of alleles must have originated and the others from the father. The color for
the allele of the mother is red while the father is blue. On matching the allele which came from the
mother was first determined [AAA], has alleles of 15 or 16 but in the geno type of [BBB], 15 was
colored blue because that is the only allele which contain the genotype of the accused Rufino Umanito,
the 16 originated from the mother, [AAA]. In this marker [BBB] has a genotype of 15, 16, 16 is from
the mother and 15 is from the father.

In the analysis of the 16 loci by the Forensic Chemists, amel on the 13th row was not included
because this is the marker that determines the gender of the source of the loci. The pair XX
represents a female and XY for a male. Rufino Umanito has XY amel and [BBB] and [AAA] have XX
amel. For matching paternity purposes only 15 loci were examined. Of the 15 loci, there was a
complete match between the alleles of the loci of [BBB] and Rufino.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court rules that based on the result of the DNA
analysis conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation, Forensic Division, RUFINO UMANITO y
MILLARES is the biological father of [BBB].

Augustus Caezar Gan v Francheska Pondevida assisted by Bernadette Pondevida

FACTS:

Bernadette Pondevida, worried that she would not be able to send her 3 yr old daughter
Francheska to school, wrote Agustus Gan demanding support for their love child but the latter
denied paternity. Bernadette then filed a complaint for support pendente lite.

Gan moved to dismiss the case saying that in Francheskas birth certificate, the father was
indicated as unknown. The motion was dismissed by the RTC. The court ordered Gan to recognize
Francheska as his illegitimate child and support her. The CA likewise dismissed his petition.

Petitioner claims that in an action by a child against his putative father, adultery of the child's
mother would be a valid defense to show that the child is a fruit of adulterous relations for, in such
case, it would not be the child of the defendant and therefore not entitled to support. Parenthetically,
how could he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery when it was not even hinted that he was
married to the mother of Francheska Joy. Petitioner consents to submit to Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA)
Testing to resolve the issue of paternity, which test he claims has a reputation for accuracy.

ISSUE:

WON the Court should grant Gans request for DNA Testing to resolve the issue.

HELD:

No, It is not for the SC at this instance to review or revise the decision rendered by the trial court
for to do so would obsturct the decision which may be rendered by the Court of Appeals in the
main case for support.

In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There
may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse
him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away.

Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the instant petition was denied.
Estate of Rogelio Ong v Minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz

FACTS:

A complaint for compulsory recognition was filed by Joanne represented by her mother Jinky
with a prayer for support pendent lite. When Joanne was born, all bills was paid by Rogelio recognizing
the child as his but thereafter abandoned the latter and stopped support alleging that he is not the
father of the child. The RTC declared Joanne as an illegitimate child of Rogelio and ordered him to
support the child until she reaches the age of majority. Rogelio died during the pendency of the case
with the CA. However, before his death, Rogelio volunteered that he and JInky should submit
themselves to DNA Testing. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA contending that
it is no longer feasible to conduct a DNA Test due to the death of Rogelio.

ISSUE:

WON DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.

HELD:

Yes.

The New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or
upon application of any person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation.

SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following:

(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
 (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and

(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting
the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.

The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA Testing. For as long as there
exist biological samples of the deceaseds DNA, the analysis is still feasible. DNA Evidence allows the
conduct of DNA testing by using biological samples--organic material originating from the person's
body, such as, blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials- that is
susceptible to DNA testing.

In case proof of filiations or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be

difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.

ANDAL v. PEOPLE

Facts: Petitioners convicted of rape with homicide seek a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a claim
of mistrial and/or that the decision if the RTC was void. The petitioners argue that the trial court was
ousted of jurisdiction to try their case since the pre-trial identification of the accused was made
without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver from the accused. The testimony of
Olimpio Coralles, Nenita Siscar, mother of the victim, Amelia Maderazo, the senior police inspector, and
Dr. Antonio Vertido, the Medico-Legal officer, spawn and generate the following facts that constitute an
unbroken chain of events leading to the inevitable conclusion of guilt on the part of accused-
appellants, to wit:

1. On July 4, 1994, Nancy Siscar together with her mother, Menita, were walking to school between 8
and 9 oclock in the morning. Three men, standing along the Barangay road, wolf-whistled several
times at Nancy and laughed mockingly at both mother and daughter. Nenita Siscar the saw the three
mens faces. With the help of Olimpio Corrales, she later identified them as Jurry Andal, Ricardo Andal,
and Edwin Mendoza. (TSN, pp. 36-40, Sept. 1, 1995).

2. On July 6, 1994, between 6 and 7 oclock in the morning, Olimpio Corrales was on his way home
from the farm he was tilling. While walking along the Barangay road, he saw the three accused-
appellants standing along the road. He was only three meters away from them (p.15. Records). Nancy
Siscar then came along with her way to school. Jurry Andal suddenly approached her and hit her on
the abdomen. Nancy fell backwards on the ground. Jurry Andal hoisted her on his shoulder and carried
her to the forest. The other accused-appellants hurriedly picked-up Nancys bag, shoes, and other
belongings, and followed Jurry Andal to the forest (tsn, pp. 5-20, Feb. 10, 1993).

3. Upon seeing the above stated incident, Olimpio ran to his house full of fear. A short while later, at
around 8 oclock, accused-appellants came to Olimpios house and threatened him with death should
tell anyone about what he had witnessed (tsn, pp. 20-21, 24, Feb. 10, 1995).

4. The Philippine National Police of San Luis, Batangas then received a report about a lifeless body in
the creek at the boundary of Barangay Banoyo and Mahabang Parang. Police Senior Inspector Amelia
Amando Maderazo, together with SPO2 Lolito Dinglasan, SPO2 Dante Dawis, and SPO3 Ronald
Macatangay, immediately proceeded to the place. There they found the lifeless and nude body of a
woman at 11:30 p.m. on July 6, 1994. The body was later identified as that of Nancy Siscar. She was
lying face down on the ground. When her body was turned, her eyes were full of worms and she was
already in the early stage of decomposition. Further, her half-slip had been twisted or wound up like a
rope and tied tightly around her neck. Scattered beside her were her shoes, umbrella, bag, and other
personal belongings (tsn, pp. 5-7, Sept. 1, 1995).

5. The postmortem examination of the body of Nancy Siscar revealed that she had been sexually
abused (p. 9, Records; tsn, pp. 30-36, Aug. 4, 1995).

Issue: WON a writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

Held: No. The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire into questions
of violation of the petitioners constitutional rights and that this court has jurisdiction to entertain this
review. The jurisdiction of this court has been expanded to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

In this case findings show that there was no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and a
resultant deprivation of liberty or due process of law. The accused were sentenced to the supreme
penalty of death as a result of a valid jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial.

Evidence related:

Circumstantial evidence is that which indirectly proves a fact in issue. The fact-finder must draw an
inference from such evidence. It is at times essential to resort to circumstantial evidence since on
direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the
community (People v. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191 [1995]). An accused can be convicted based on
circumstantial evidence where the circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person
(People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 [1995]). Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction
a beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Tabao, 240 SCRA 758 [1995]).
CABATANIA V. CA

FACTS:

Florencia Regodos was a househelper in household of Camelo Cabatania. According to her,

during her employment there, they had an affair. He promised her that he would support her if she got
pregnant. She did. Cabatanias wife sent her home, following suspicions of her being pregnant, but
Cabatania brought her to Bacolod where he rented a house for her. She gave birth to her son there.

Camelo, however, alleged that that although he hired Florencia, she would often go home to
her husband and return to work the following morning. This displeased his wife, leading her to look for
another job. They later met in town, had dinner, spent the night there, and had sexual intercourse.
While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was
pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the following day.

In March 1982, she was rehired by the Cabatanias. Camelos wife noticed that Florencias
stomach got bigger and she asked who the father of the child was. Florencia said it was Camelo. She
was then sent away and they no longer saw each other.

Thus, Camelo was surprised when a case for recognition and support for Florencias child,
Camelo, was filed against him. He vehemently denied her claims, but despite this and the fact that she
misrepresented herself as a widow even though her husband was alive, the trial court decided in her
favor because of the fact that the child, when he was presented in court, bore a resemblance of both
Florencia and Camelo. The appellate court affirmed the ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether the evidence presented in the lower courts is sufficient to establish Cabatanias
paternity.

HELD:
 No. the Court reiterated that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation because an order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be
an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation
is established by clear and convincing evidence.

In this case, the Court ruled that the copy of the childs birth and baptismal certificates that
were prepared without the knowledge or consent of Cabatania is not competent evidence of paternity
because it was not shown that he, the putative father, had a hand in the preparing these certificates.
The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the
information of a third person. Thus, these certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal
certificates are inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence.

Also, the court ruled that in this case, both the trial court and the appellate court were
incorrect when they brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition
that she was a widow. It said that the fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid
subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage
is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.

The court finally said that since genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis are
now prevalent, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features no
longer suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City) REYNALDO DE VILLA, petitioner, JUNE DE
VILLA, petitioner-relator, vs. THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.

Facts: By the final judgment, in the People vs.Reynaldo de Villa, the court found petitioner guilty of
rape. Three years after the promulgation of the decision, the court once more faced with the question
of Reynaldo de Villa's guilt or innocence.

Petitioner-relator in this case, June De Villa, is the son of the Reynaldo. He alleges that during the trial
of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if
Reynaldo was the father of the victim's child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed during the
pendency of the automatic review of the petitioner's case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of
paternity.

Reynaldo De Villa filled a Motion for partial reconsideration of the decision, where once more prayed
that DnA tests be conducted. The motion was denied with finality resoultion. Hence, the Decision
became final and executory on January 16, 2002.

Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn
Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa
himself. The identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa,
were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which showed
that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the
absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioners sample and those of any of
the other samples, including Leahlyns.

Ruling:

1. Whether DNA Evidence although discovered after trial, does meet the criteria for
newly discovered evidence that would merit a new trial.
 No.

Although DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after trial, it does not meet the criteria for
newly discovered evidence that would merit a new trial such evidence disproving paternity
could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.

The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus
has long attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002.
Moreover, upon examination of the evidence presented by the petitioner, the court do not find
the DNA Evidence falls within the statutory or jurisprudential definition of newly-discovered
evidence.

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met:

a) That the evidence was discovered after trial;

b) That the said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence;

c) That it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and

d) That the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the
judgment.

It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this instance, although
DNA Evidence was undoubtedly discovered after trial, we nonetheless find that it does not
meet the criteria for newly discovered evidence that would merit a new trial.

The lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part
of the client, or on the part of the counsel. A client is bound by the acts of his counsel,
including the latters mistake and negligence.

Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which
the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown
individual, is of no moment in determining an individuals guilt.

SEPARATE OPINION Justice Carpio:

1. This case should not close the door to a convicted felon who after final judgment acquires
DNA results exonerating him of the crime for which he was convicted while final
judgment enjoy the presumption of correctness, the confining and traditional legal
procedures must respond the revolutionary way that DNA results have been proving the
innocence of convicts.

2. Before the enactment of states providing for post-conviction DNA testing, American courts
had no precedents to work on to justify post-conviction DNA testing and the reversal of
final judgments of conviction when the DNA results turned out to be exculpatory. Even in
the absence of statutes, American courts allowed post-conviction DNA testing by requiring
the convict to apply for such testing before the verdict could be vacate. Under American
Jurisprudence, post-conviction DNA testing is availed through a petition for habeas corpus
and motion for new trial.

3. The rectification of a wrong is the underlying reason for the allowance of post-conviction
DNA testing and the eventual reversal of the verdict based on exclusionary DNA result.
Even the most stringent ability that DNA result could prove the convicts innocence. For
ultimately, it is the primary duty of the court to prevent the miscarriage of justice.
DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE

People v. Amestuzo

FACTS: The trial court convicted all the accused of robbery with rape. Only herein accused-appellant
Bagas appealed to this Court. The accused narrates that a group of policemen, together with suspect
Ampatin, went to the handicrafts factory where accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell
cutter. They were looking for a certain "Mario". Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the
back of his neck with a gun and uttered, "Niloloko lang yata tayo ng taong ito" and "Magturo ka ng tao
kahit sino." It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was the first
person Ampatin chanced to look upon. Thereafter, he was arrested.

Accused-appellant also makes much ado about the manner in which he was presented to the
complainants for identification. It is alleged that the identification was irregular as he was not placed
in a police line-up and instead, made to stand before the complainants alone.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the identification was irregular.

2. Whether the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

1. No. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. The
fact that he was brought out of the detention cell alone and was made to stand before the accused by
himself and unaccompanied by any other suspects or persons does not detract from the validity of the
identification process.

2. No. Accused-appellant's alibi sufficiently corroborated by the testimonies of his co-workers and his
employer who categorically stated that they were with accused-appellant on the night of the crime.
 Accused-appellant vehemently argues that it was physically impossible for him to have been
present at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.

First, the crime was committed around 9:30 in the evening but accused-appellant, as well as
two other witnesses, testified that he worked in the factory until 10 p.m.

Second, there was only one door in the factory which was the only means of entrance and exit
and this door was kept locked after ten p.m. that night. Ocasla was the only person who had a key to
this door.

Third, the windows on the first floor of the building consisted of hollow blocks with small holes
which do not allow passage. The second and third floor windows were 14 and 21 feet high,
respectively. There was no possible means of exit through these windows without accused-appellant
getting hurt or injured.

Lastly, the crime took place in Kalookan City around 9:30 p.m. while accused-appellant's place
of work was in Pasay City. Assuming for the sake of argument that he was able to leave the premises
after 10 p.m. that night, by the time he reaches Kalookan, the crime would have already been
completed.

The Court has held that where an accused sets up alibi as a defense, the courts
should not be too readily disposed to dismiss the same, for, taken in the light of all the
evidence on record, it may be sufficient to reverse the outcome of the case as found by the
trial court and thereby rightly set the accused free.

People v. Berami alias Domeng

Facts:

It was about 6:30 in the evening of April 13, 1966, that an assailant suddenly shot Quirico
Maningo, then seated on a chair facing the main door of the sala of his rented house in Rizal Street,
Suba District Danao City. His adopted son Danilo Maningo, was seated one meter away from his right
side. Several successive shots were fired at Quirico Maningo. He saw his father, Quirico Maningo,
slump to the floor, wounded, with blood on his neck and breast He looked towards the main door
where the shots came from and saw the accused holding a .38 caliber revolver. He was easily
Identifiable, as there was a "big light" at the main door of the house. Appellant was standing on a
bright spot as he fired his gun several times at Quirico Maningo. When the firing ceased, the witness
ran towards the main door of the house and saw two persons, one of them being the accuse Berame
scampering away.

In a swampy area at the back of the hospital near the cemetery of Danao City, where it was
suspected one of the alleged assailants was hiding, they saw footprints and recovered a rubber
shoe. Appellant was required at the trial to put it on. It turned out that it corresponded exactly
with his right foot. Moreover, appellant took flight after the killing and hid himself He did not
surrender until almost a month later, on May 8, 1966. At about the same time, a certain Jorge Durano,
whose house was located at the back of the hospital near the seashore and cemetery of Danao City,
testified that he saw a person walking fast going towards a barrio in the north near the swampy area,
his attention being called to such individual wearing rubber shoes.T he trial court both considered
direct and circumstantial evidence resulting in the conviction for the crime of murder of Domiciano
Berame, now appellant, for the killing of the deceased Quirico Maningo.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court was correct in convicting Berame?

Ruling:
 The appealed decision, moreover, finds impressive support from circumstances that point
unerringly to appellant's guilt. They simply cannot be explained away. That could be the reason why
his counsel did not even bother to do so. As noted in the decision, a rubber shoe left in a swampy area
by someone leaving in a hurry the scene of the crime was just the right size. It did fit appellant's right
foot. That was demonstrative evidence of the most persuasive kind. So it has been held time
and time again. First there was United States. v. Tan Teng. decided in 1912. Of more recent vintage
is People v. Otadora, promulgated in 1950. The appealed decision was likewise based on the fact of
appellant having been in hiding for sometime with the evident purpose of evading arrest. He did not
surrender until after the lapse of a month. That again was a circumstance that could not be ignored.
There is relevance to this excerpt from the opinion of Justice Malcolm in United States v.
Sarikala: "Third, Sarikala left the scene of the murder immediately thereafter. Flight, when
unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. 'The wicked flee, even
when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion. "

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ANASTACIO BULAWIN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

The charge is murder. Defendant Anastacio Bulawin was found guilty thereof by the trial court.

Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals.

On September 23, 1963 was the barrio fiesta of Barrio Mabatao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. A political
meeting was, on the night of September 22, being held at the fair grounds of the barrio. About 12:30
o'clock in the early morning of September 23, 1963, Ciriaco Jimenez was leisurely walking towards the
meeting place. Just as he was about twenty meters therefrom, he was shot. The bullet, found its mark
"at the back of his buttocks, two inches below the waistline." About 6:00 o'clock p.m. on the same
day, September 23, Ciriaco Jimenez died at the Aurora Provincial Hospital.

The People's case was built mainly on the testimony of three witnesses: Candido Autor, Sergeant
Roberto Laurie of the Philippine Constabulary and Aniceto Dacalos.

According to Autor, at about 12:00 o'clock in the morning of September 23, 1963, he was passing
water beside a small road about twenty meters from the place where the political meeting was being
held. He claimed to be just about one fathom from and to the left of appellant Anastacio Bulawin when
the latter with a pistol shot Ciriaco Jimenez. He assailed that he saw the actual shooting but was in
contradiction when cross examined.

Sergeant Roberto Lauries testimony was also taken, however, his attention was drawn to his affidavit
and was impaired. He did not put the statement of deceased Ciriaco Jimenez in writing.

Aniceto Dacalas testimony was not also admitted because his name was not amongst those who gave
affidavits to back up the criminal charge.

ISSUE:
Has the People discharged its heavy burden of proving the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:

No, the guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

There are doubts on the sufficiency of Peoples evidence. It exhibits a gap between doubtful evidence
and proof beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence does not produce in an unprejudiced mind that
moral certainty so necessary to bring about conviction in a criminal case. It is in this context the court
is unprepared to send appellant to jail for life, or, for that matter, for a long term of imprisonment.
Because, the court is not morally convinced.

There are circumstances which cast a heavy pall of doubt on the sufficiency of the People's evidence.
At about 4:00 o'clock that morning of September 23, appellant herein was placed under arrest in his
own home. He was brought to the PC barracks. And yet, at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that
day, he was released by Capt. Golez who told him: "We cannot detain you here because there was no
complaint filed. However, you should report to this headquarters every day." If really this man were
pinpointed by the deceased at about 2:00 a.m. of September 23 as the author of the grave crime
of murder it must be borne in mind that the affidavits were executed not on the 23rd of September
but on October 3, 1963 it does not seem probable that the peace officers would release him so
soon. He was arrested because he was just a mere suspect.

In addition, there is deficiency on the demonstrative evidence which would positively connect
appellant with the crime. Nothing in the record shows that the officers even made any effort to locate
the alleged pistol used by appellant. Nor is there evidence that appellant has had one.

The appellant also left his barrio on the 29 th of September 1963,days after the death of Jimenez
because he was warned daily by his neighbours thus it is an instinct of his self-preservation.

Nonetheless, where the evidence for the prosecution is weak and betrays lack of concreteness on the
question of whether or not defendant is the author of the crime charged, alibi as a defense assumes
importance

In the end, it must be bore in mind that, by Constitution and law, a defendant in a criminal case is
entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond a reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE vs. LUIS DELMENDO

FACTS:

Luis and Florentino were guilty of murder because they were positively identified by the witnesses
Magdalena and Elpidio, widow and son of the victim, identity corroborated by Col. Minardo Finones
because of positive for powder burns. The testimonies of the witnesses were given only 16 days after
the shooting.

ISSUE

Whether the testimonies of the widow and son relative to the identity of the malefactors cannot be
believed and relied upon

HELD:

Yes, they cannot be believed.

In convicting the two accused for the murder of the victim in this case, the conviction must be
based on evidence that is clear, positive and strong creating a moral certainty as to the guilt of the
accused. The charge against them must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since the two alleged
eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime are the widow and son of the victim, their testimonies
pointing to the accused as the perpetrators must be subjected to a rigid test which should
demonstrate beyond cavil their truthfulness, honesty and rectitude as actual eyewitnesses to the
perpetration of the criminal act. There must never be any shadow of doubt, any cloud of suspicion or
deception to conceal the facts and disguise the truth. The first, if not the basic foundation upon which
the prosecution builds its case against the accused is proof beyond reasonable doubt that it is the said
accused who committed the crime charged.

People vs Baquiran:

The natural reaction of one who witnesses a crime and recognizes the offender is to reveal it to
the authorities at the earliest opportunity
. Suspicion is no identification.

People vs Cunanan:

The natural reaction of one who witnesses a crime is to reveal it to the authorities unless, of course,
he is the author thereof. It defies credulity that not one or two but five such witnesses made no effort
to expose Cunanan if they really knew that he was the author thereof. This stultified silence casts
grave doubts as to their veracity. (There should be a valid explanation as to why Peoples witnesses
did not report the identity during a long period of time.)

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

CITIBANK, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) and INVESTORS FINANCE
CORPORATION, doing business under the name and style of FNCB Finance, - versus-
MODESTA R. SABENIANO,

Respondent.

FACTS:

Sabeniano was the petitioners client, which holds substantial deposits and money market
placements in her behalf. Because of the petitioners alleged refusal to return her deposits and the
proceeds of her money market placements, Sabeniano filed a case for Accounting, Sum of Money, and
Damages on August 8 1985 which was subsequently amended to include additional claims to
deposits inadvertently excluded from the original one.

In their joint answer, the petitioners admitted that in 1979, Sabeniano had obtained several
loans from them which were secured by a Declaration of Pedge of her Dollar Accounts in Citibank-
Geneva, and Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with FNCB Finance. Her
subsequent failure to pay back the loan impelled the petitioners to set off the loan amount with such
deposits. In 1995 ten years after the suits filing - the trial court ordered the setoff amounting to
$149,632.99 as null and void; thus, it is the petitioners obligation to refund the said amount to
Modesta. The latter, however, was adjudged as still indebted to the petitioners for P1,069,847.40.

The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision with modification: It ordered the accounting of
Sabenianos deposits and money market placements, as well as the payment of exemplary damages.
Although she had succeeded before the appellate court, she filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45,
asking the Supreme Court to take cognizance of questions of facts raised therein.

ISSUES:
 1 Were the promissory notes that Sabeniano had executed genuine as to belie the
petitioners claim that they along with the deeds of assignment of her FNCB Finance
market placements are simulated?
2 Were the respondents loans existing?

HELD:

1 Petitioner Citibank alleged that it had already paid to respondent the principal amounts and
proceeds of the money market placements which are evidenced by PNs No. 23356 and 23357,
upon their maturity. Petitioner Citibank further averred that respondent used the P500,000.00
from the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357, plus P600,000.00 sourced from her other
funds, to open two time deposit (TD) accounts with petitioner Citibank, namely, TD Accounts
No. 17783 and 17784.

Petitioner Citibank did not deny the existence nor questioned the authenticity of PNs No.
23356 and 23357 it issued in favor of respondent for her money market placements. In fact, it
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the said PNs, but qualified that they were no longer
outstanding. In Hibberd v. Rohde and McMillian,[32] this Court delineated the consequences of such
an admission

By the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an instrument, as provided in this
section, is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that:

1 He signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority;
2 that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the
pleading of the party relying upon it;
3 that the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as
a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.

The effect of the admission is such that in the case of a promissory note a prima facie case is
made for the plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and entitles him to a
judgment on the pleadings unless a special defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by
the defendant.

Since the genuineness and due execution of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are uncontested,
respondent was able to establish prima facie that petitioner Citibank is liable to her for the amounts
stated therein. The assertion of petitioner Citibank of payment of the said PNs is an affirmative
allegation of a new matter, the burden of proof as to such resting on petitioner Citibank. Respondent
having proved the existence of the obligation, the burden of proof was upon petitioner Citibank to
show that it had been discharged. It has already been established by this Court that

As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the
plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove
payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing
with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.

When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the
burden of proving that it has been extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such
defense to the claim of the creditor. Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the
burden of going forward with the evidence as distinct from the general burden of proof shifts to the
creditor, who is then under the duty of producing some evidence of non-payment.

Reviewing the evidence on record, this Court finds that petitioner Citibank failed to
satisfactorily prove that PNs No. 23356 and 23357 had already been paid, and that the amount so
paid was actually used to open one of respondents TD accounts with petitioner Citibank.

SECOND ISSUE: The totality of petitioners evidence as to the existence of the said
loans preponderates over respondents. Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence
adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party.
 It bears to emphasize that the proceeds of the loans were paid to respondent in MCs. The
second set of PNs is a mere renewal of the prior loans originally covered by the set-off. Considering
that the Managers Checks were crossed for payees account only and eventuall paid, it is presumed
that the checks were properly deposited to Sabenianos account. Her bare allegation that she did not
receive these checks, for this implies that there were irregularities.

NAPOCOR V. CODILLA

FACTS:

M/V Dibena Win, a foreign-registered ship, collided with a power barge of the NAPOCOR
moored in the International Port of Cebu. It was operated by Bangpai Shipping. NAPOCOR filed a
complaint of damages against Bangpai. It later impleaded Wallem Shipping, the ship agent of Bangpai.

In the RTC, NAPOCOR filed a formal offer of evidence after adducing evidence. These were
marked as Exhibits A-V. The respondents objected and the judge, Codilla, ordered to strike-out
Exhibits; A, C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, and S for being mere photocopies. The court did so
because even though NAPOCOR was given all the opportunities to present the originals of the stricken-
out pieces of evidence, they failed to do so.

The lower court also ruled that these photocopies cannot be originals under the Electronic
Evidence Rule, as claimed by NAPOCOR because the information in those Xerox or photocopies was
not received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically and these photocopies were not
authenticated.

NAPOCOR filed a petition for Certiorari with the CA, contending that the trial court was wrong
to strikeout the photocopies. CA dismissed the petition because the trial judge was correct in holding
that the photocopies were inadmissible due to these copies not being the originals and that these
pieces of evidence are not electronic evidence because the contents were not received, retrieved, or
produced electronically. And that they never produced the originals.

On appeal to the SC, NAPOCOR argued that the photocopies it presented as documentary
evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic
document" can also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as
photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by sight
or other means".
ISSUE:

Whether the pieces of evidence stricken-out are admissible as original documents

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the pieces of documentary evidence offered by NAPOCOR
are inadmissible because as photocopies of manually produced documents, they are not covered by
the Rules on Electronic Evidence. In deciding the issue, the SC checked each document offered by
NAPOCOR and found out that all of these documents are photocopies wherein some of the information
contained therein were not electronically produced or recorded, such as: signatures and handwriting
of the persons in the document.

The Court also ruled that the lower courts are correct in excluding the pieces of evidence
offered because they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being
incompetent pieces of evidence. It further explained that the best evidence rule was designed to guard
against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of
the originals. And that in this case, NAPOCOR should have presented the originals, but despite
demands, they failed to do so.

G.R. No. L-40098 August 29, 1975

ANTONIO LIM TANHU, DY OCHAY, ALFONSO LEONARDO NG SUA and CO OYO, petitioners,
vs. HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge, Branch III, CFI, Cebu and TAN
PUT, respondents.

FACTS:

An original complaint was t filed by respondent Tan Put against the spouses-petitioners Antonio Lim
Tanhu and Dy Ochay. In an amended complaint, their son Lim Teck Chuan and the other spouses-
petitioners Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo and their son Eng Chong Leonardo were included as
defendants.

In said amended complaint, respondent Tan alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan,
who was a partner in the commercial partnership, Glory Commercial Company with Antonio Lim Tanhu
and Alfonso Ng Sua.

She alleged that defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua, Lim Teck Chuan, and Eng
Chong Leonardo, through fraud and machination, took actual and active management of the
partnership and although Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the manager of Glory Commercial Company,
defendants managed to use the funds of the partnership to other properties. After the death of her
husband, she asked the defendants of the properties and for liquidation of the business including real
estate in Hong Kong. But respondents kept promising only but failed to do it. She was induced by
fraud to execute a quitclaim of all her rights and interest in the partnership. Thus, it should be
declared void. That she was made to sign a receipt for 65,000 pesos but no such amount was given to
her. Defendants refused to liquidate and to give her share.

The admission of said amended complaint was opposed by defendants upon the ground that there
were material modifications of the causes of action previously alleged, but respondent judge
nevertheless allowed the amendment reasoning that there were no changes on the main causes of
action and on the reliefs sought. In a single answer with counterclaim, defendants denied specifically
not only the allegation that respondent Tan is the widow of Tee Hoon because, according to them, his
legitimate wife was Ang Siok Tin still living and with whom he had four (4) legitimate children, a twin
born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hongkong, but also all
the allegations of fraud and conversion quoted above, the truth being, according to them, that proper
liquidation had been regularly made of the business of the partnership and Tee Hoon used to receive
his just share until his death, as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what
corresponded to him were all given to his wife and children

Plaintiff answered the same, denying its material allegations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tan Put is the legal wife of deceased.

HELD: NO. The pieces of evidence presented to disprove that Tan Put was the legal wife are as
follows:

1. Tan Put presented a certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage. The primary
evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may
also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily
explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible
evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for
its non-production is first presented to the court. However, there being absolutely no showing as to
unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said
certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law,
since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the
same is hearsay.

2. Antonio Nuezs testimony that he witnessed the wedding was given very little evidentiary value.
Besides, in the portion of the testimony of Nuez it appears admitted that he was born only on March
25, 1942, which means that he was less than eight years old at the supposed time of the alleged
marriage. If for this reason alone, it is extremely doubtful if he could have been sufficiently aware of
such event as to be competent to testify about it.

3. Annex C purports to be the certificate of birth of one Antonio T. Uy supposed to have been born on
March 23, 1937 at Centro Misamis, Misamis Occidental, the son of one Uy Bien, father, and Tan Put,
mother. Significantly, respondents have not made any adverse comment on this document. It is more
likely, therefore, that the witness is really the son of plaintiff by her husband Uy Kim Beng. But she
testified she was childless. So which is which? In any event, if on the strength of this document,
Nuez is actually the legitimate son of Tan Put and not her adopted son, he would have been but 13
years old in 1949, the year of her alleged marriage to Po Chuan, and even then, considering such age,
his testimony in regard thereto would still be suspect.
4. The income tax return of the deceased Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan indicates that the name of his wife
was Ang Siok Tin and (2) the quitclaim, , wherein plaintiff Tan Put stated that she had been living with
the deceased without benefit of marriage and that she was his "common-law wife".

5. The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
Prefect of the Philippine Independent Church, Parish
official records corresponding to December 1949 to
between Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan and Tan Put. Neither
respondent.
City and a similar certification of the Apostolic
of Sto. Nio, Cebu City, that their respective
December 1950 do not show any marriage
of which certifications have been impugned by

6. A written agreement was also presented. It was executed in Chinese, translated into English by the
Chinese Consul of Cebu. It provides that Tan Put and Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan two lived together but
were incompatible so they terminated the relationship of common law-marriage and promised not to
interfere each other's affairs from now on. It also provides that Tan Put received P40,000.00 for her
subsistence.

AIR FRANCE vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Carrascoso was with a group of 48 pilgrims who left Manila for Lourdes. Air France (AF), issued
Carrascoso a first class round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome, through its authorized agent
Philippines Airlines. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because there was a white man (according to the witness Ernesto Cuento) who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, Carrascoso
refused, and told AF's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. A commotion ensued.
According to Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class. They pacified
Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man. Plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the
plane.

ISSUES and RULING:

Is the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso admissible in evidence?

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his
notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence (Carrascoso's testimony) which is
incompetent.

The Supreme Court ruled otherwise. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident.
Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible. Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue
happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of
the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the
declarant". The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and
related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?

The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention and held that there is no question that
Carrascoso was issued a first class ticket and apart from his testimony, the exhibits presented by
Carrascoso and Rafael Altonaga, AFs own witness, confirmed Carrascosos testimony that the space
was confirmed for first class.

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong.

The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over
written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that
the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs FELIPE TANJUTCO

FACTS:

Felipe Tanjutco is the private secretary of Roman R. Santos, and is entrusted with the duty of
depositing large sums of money in the bank for the latter. He was accused of qualified theft after
taking or stealing various sums of money belonging to Roman. After trial in the CFI, he was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The CFIs decision was based on the findings
that it was in the discharge of this duty that the accused betrayed the confidence reposed on him by
his employer by retaining for his personal use part of the money entrusted to him, resulting in
shortage in the accounts of the employer.

ISSUE:

WON the contention of the accused that the lower courts findings were not supported by
evidence tenable.

HELD:

It is true that not a single witness testified to having personally seen the accused in the act of
falsifying the duplicate deposit slips or bank statements. But direct evidence on this point is not
imperative. No other conclusion could be drawn from the facts than that the falsified documents were
the ones prepared by appellant to hide his misdeeds. Even assuming the evidences are circumstantial,
they nevertheless constitute legal evidence that may support a conviction, affording as they are basis
for a reasonable inference of the existence of the fact thereby sought to be proved.

Contrary to appellant's contention, there is even no necessity for all these duplicate deposit
slips to be identified one by one, before they may properly be considered against the accused. These
slips were not only bundled into a bunch and formally presented; they had also been consistently
referred to as one of the bases of the prosecution's claim that the misappropriation amount totalled
P400, 086.19. As ruled by the Court in another criminal case, the absence of any record of the formal
presentation of certain exhibits does not render their consideration reversible error, if repeated
references thereto in the course of the trial by counsel for the accused and of the court convincingly
show that the documents were part of the prosecution's evidence. No error, therefore, was committed
by the trial court in giving due credence and weight to the deposit slips.

Appellant also challenges the competence of 40 duplicate deposit slips which do not bear his
signature, and urges that the amount covered there P233,744.63 should be deducted from the
total amount covered by the duplicate deposit slip, coming from the files of Don Roman Santos.

These 40 duplicate deposit slips were admitted by the Court below, not to prove falsification,
but only to establish the fact that accused-appellant has received money to be deposited for the
account of his employer, and determine the exact amount thus received. The relevancy of these
documents to prove that fact is not affected by the absence of appellant's signature thereon.

In the first place, having been passed upon and favourably considered by the trial court, the
matter of relevancy of these documents ordinarily cannot be reviewed on appeal. This lies within the
sound discretion of said court and deserves the respect of the appellate tribunal. Secondly, most of the
amounts covered by these 40 deposit slips are sufficiently backed by the original deposit slips and the
bank ledgers. And, there is no showing that the figures indicated in both the original and duplicate
slips are separately treated or that the amount thus covered is included twice in the summing up of
the missing amounts. As regards those without corresponding originals, we have given the reason for
their inclusion in the total sum for which appellant is accountable, in our discussion of those
individuals items. Furthermore, it appearing that even some of the original deposit slips delivered to
the bank do not bear appellant's signature, the absence alone of such signature is no indication that
the 40 duplicate slips in question were not in fact prepared by him.

It must be remembered that the prosecution had to prove the amount allegedly embezzled by
the accused. This, the prosecution tried to do by establishing the amounts received by the accused-
appellant and comparing it with those deposited in the bank; the resulting difference being treated as
the amount abstracted from the funds of the complainant. Under this theory, the ledgers and bank
statements naturally are not just secondary, but the primary evidence of the deposits made, while the
monthly bank statements found in the files of complainant Roman Santos which were supposed to
confirm the amounts he had ordered the accused-appellant to be deposited, are the best evidence of
the amounts actually entrusted to the latter. Consequently, the trial court committed no error in ruling
in favor of the admissibility of the above-mentioned exhibits.

We also find as untenable appellant's allegation that there was no "positive, direct evidence" to
show that the monthly bank statements found in the file of the complainant were the same documents
delivered by him to the latter. By urging in his Fifth Assignment of Error the deduction from the total
sum covered by all the duplicate deposit slips coming from the files of complainant, of the amounts
covered by the 40 unsigned deposit slips, claiming that the resulting difference is the "correct total
amount covered by duplicate deposit slips for which accused can be held liable" said accused-appellant
in fact acknowledged that these duplicate deposit slips were the ones delivered by him to complainant
Santos.

In other words, the lower court gave due weight to the report of the auditors because it was
found to be clear and duly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence (monthly bank
accounts, bank statement, deposit slips the materiality and relevancy of which were already here
sustained) presented during the trial, to which conclusion the SC fully agree

Interpacific Transit Inc. V. Rufo and Josephine Aviles, G.R. No. 86062 (June 6, 1990)

Facts:

Rufo and Jospehine are the sub-agent of ITI and as such, they are enjoying its trust and confidence.
However, when they collected the payments for airway bills from its various clients amounting to
P204,030.66, instead of remitting it to their principal, they unlawfully converted it to their own
personal use and benefit. At the trial, the prosecution introduced photocopies of airway bills
supposedly received by the accused which was done in the direct examination of witnesses. The
defense objected invoking the best evidence rule. The prosecution said that it would submit the
original bills in due time so the court allowed the markings of the document. However, the prosecution
neither submit nor did it prove their loss to justify their substitution of secondary evidence.
Nevertheless, when the certified photocopies of the bills were formally offered in evidence, the defense
interposed no objection. The RTC acquitted Aviles on the grounds that; Aviles and ITI are creditor and
debtor and the outstanding account was in the nature of indebtedness, the certified photocopies were
inadmissible since the loss was not proved and one of the witnesses testified that the originals were
still in the ITI bodega. A motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC. It can no longer be the
subject of an appeal under the double jeopardy rule. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, since no
evidence of civil liability was presented; there is no need to present evidence of payment of an
obligation which was not shown to exist.

Issue: Whether or not the photocopies of airway bills are admissible in evidence to prove the civil
liability.

Held: Yes. The certified photocopies of airway bills should have been considered. The lower courts
confined themselves to the best evidence rule and the nature of the documents being presented which
they held that did not come under any of the exceptions to the rule. There is no question that the
photocopies were secondary evidence and as such were not admissible unless there was ample proof
of the loss of the originals; and neither were the other exceptions allowed by the Rules applicable. The
trouble is that in rejecting these copies under Rule 130, Section 2, the respondent court disregarded
an equally important principle long observed in our trial courts and amply supported by jurisprudence.
This is the rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered
as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time is premature. Identification of documentary
evidence is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence an
exhibit. The formal offer as exhibit is done only when the party rests its case and not before. The
mere fact that a particular document is Identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or
has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide to formally offer it if it
believes this will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter
event, the trial court is, under Rule 132, Section 35, not authorized to consider it. Objection to the
documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier. The Identification of
the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as
evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the Identification and marking of the document is
not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really
matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit. In the case at
bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the private respondents as secondary
evidence only when they, were being Identified for marking by the prosecution. They were
nevertheless marked as exhibits upon the promise that the original airway bills would be submitted
later. It is true that the originals were never produced. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the defense
did not object when the exhibits as previously marked were formally offered in evidence. And these
were subsequently admitted by the trial court. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed
admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. This is true even if by
its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged
at the proper time.

Evangeline Imani v Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company

FACTS:
 Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favour of Metrobank with 6 other co-
sureties binding themselves to pay whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but
not exceeding 6 Million. Later, CPDTI obtained 2 additional loans evidenced by promissory notes
signed by 2 of her co-sureties but defaulted in its payments even after several demands by
Metrobank, which then filed a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties. Metrobank won, a
property owned by Imani was levied by the sheriff and filed to consolidate such to Metrobanks name.

Imani opposed, stating that it is part of her conjugal property. As Evidence, she submitted the
affidavit of the former owner of the land attesting that Imani and her husband were the vendees of
the subject property. She also presented photocopies of the checks allegedly issued as payment for
the sale.

The RTC ruled in favour of Imani, reasoning that the loan proceeds never redounded to the
benefit of the family of Imani. RTC annulled the sale and levy. Metrobank appealed, and the CA
reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

WON the affidavit presented is sufficient to establish that the subject property is conjugal.

HELD:

The affidavit is insufficient. The said affidavit can hardly be considered sufficient evidence to
prove her claim that the land is part of her conjugal property. The affidavit has no evidentiary weight
because the former owner of the land was not presented to affirm the veracity of his affidavit.

The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay.

In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative value and is
inadmissible.

The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v. Del Monte Works, Inc., Narciso
Morales and Spouse (2005)

FACTS:
 Respondent Del Monte Works incurred a debt from Solidbank. The debt was evidenced by a
promissory note. The obligation to pay became due and demandable but Del Monte Works did not pay.

Solidbank filed a case against the respondent for the collection of sum of money. One of the
evidences presented in the photocopy of the promissory note.

*Contention of Respondent: In its answer, it averred that the promissory note is void because it has
no consideration. The photocopy of the promissory note must not be admitted because it is a mere
hearsay for not complying with the Best Evidence Rule.

The RTC immediately denied the presentation of the photocopied promissory note.

HELD:

The petition is meritorious. The Best Evidence Rule does not apply in this case thats why a
secondary or photocopied evidence may be admitted.

It should be noted that respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of the
promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that as far as the parties herein are concerned, the
wording or content of said note is clear enough and leaves no room for disagreement.

Arceo v. People

FACTS: Petitioner Arceo obtained a loan from private complainant Cenizal for which petitioner then
issued a postdated check. However, the check was dishonored. Cenizal filed a complaint for estafa and
violation of BP 22 against petitioner. The check in question and the return slip were however lost by
Cenizal as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence. Cenizal executed an Affidavit of Loss
regarding the loss of the check in question and the return slip.

Petitioner claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite the failure
of the prosecution to present the dishonored check during the trial.

ISSUE: Whether there is a need to present the check

HELD: No. The best evidence rule applies only where the content of the document is the
subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the
circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.

The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. Hence, the
subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its content.

ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Magdayao issued a check amounting to Php600,000 to Ricky Olvis as payment of his obligation.
However, when Olvis tried to deposit the check, it was dishonored for being drawn without sufficient
fund. Olvis went back to Magdayao to demand payment. He was promised another set of checks if he
returned the original. Olvis returned it but was not given the promised new set of checks. Olvis then
filed a case against Magdayao under BP 22. However, since he had returned the original to Magdayao,
Olvis was only able to present a photocopy of the check with the notation DAIF or drawn against
insufficient fund.

When Olvis is called to identify the person who gave him the check, Magdayao failed to appear. He
also failed to appear in subsequent hearings although they later filed a motion to suspend the hearing
due to the failure of Olvis to,present the original document. The trial court ruled against Magdayao and
this was sustained by the appellate court.

HELD:

Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifically provides that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
thereof. The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence
is the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and
withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is
that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or
devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. As long as the original
evidence can be had, the court should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature,
such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or
destroyed or cannot be produced in court.

However, the mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against
whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. Secondary evidence may
be admitted when (1) the offeror has proven that he has done all in his power to secure the
best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document, (2) the notice
may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in
the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, (3) the party in custody
of the original has sufficient time to produce the same, and (4) such party having the
original of the writing fails to voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it.

In his Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the trial court, the Magdayao admitted that he received the
original copy of the dishonored check from Olvis. In fact, he used the original document as bargaining
chip to convince the court to grant him time to adduce the evidence already in his possession.

Citibank vs Teodoro

Facts:
 Citibank operates a credit card system and the respondent Teodoro was one of the
cardholders. Teodoro made a lot of purchase using his card, and was billed accordingly, and that he
tendered various payments. The Bank claimed that as of 1995, Teodoros outstanding obligation of
about 191K, it presented statement of account of the respondent here. However, the total amount in
the PHOTOCOPIED sales invoices presented was only 24K (which was admitted as evidence in the TCs
but not in CA, because of best evidence rule). The bank also presented their super-duper only witness
Hernando but not actually present in the signing of the application and sales invoices. Teodoro
countered that the witness was not present during the signing of any, and that it was proven by
another witness Hipolito from Equitable Credit card Network Inc. that Hernando failed to follow up his
request for the original sales invoices as advised by hipolito.

Issue:

W/N the PHOTOCOPIED sales invoices can be admitted as evidence in this case.\

Held:

No. SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.

Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1)
the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the
reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to
which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order may
be changed if necessary.

In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the
photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that the originals had
been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for
them.

Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions
that were not met, because the sales invoices might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez,
testifying that he had requested the originals from Equitable, failed to show that he had subsequently
followed up the request.

Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A
photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other originals.

In the present case, triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the sales invoice
only once. During the trial, Hernandez explained that an original copy had gone to respondent,
another to the merchant, and still another to petitioner

Each of these three copies is regarded as an original in accordance with Section 4 (b) of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were unavailable, and that
due diligence had been exercised in the search for them.
TAMAYO V. SENORA

FACTS:

Police Chief Inspector Antonieto Senora was driving a motorcycle along an intersection when a tricycle
driven by Leovino Amparo bumped his motorcycle from behind. The vehicle was pushed into the path
of an Isuzu Elf Van driven by Elmer Polloso and the van ran over Senora which resulted in his death.
The heirs of the victim filed a civil case for damages against Amparo, Polloso and Cirilo Tamayo, the
employer of Polloso. The trial court ruled that the three defendants are solidarily liable for actual
damages, life indemnity, loss of earnings and attorneys fees. The court also modified the life
expectancy formula from 2/3 (80- age at death) to 2/3(55-age at death) ; 55 representing the
retirement age of PNP officials.

ISSUE: Whether the documentary evidence presented suffices to prove the gross annual income of
the victim.

RULING:

In computing for the net earning capacity of the victim the Supreme Court provided the formula life
expectancy X (gross annual income-living expenses). It also upheld the decision of CA that the
formula for computing life expectancy is 2/3 (80- age at death). Gross annual income, on the other
hand, requires the presentation of documentary evidence for purpose of proving the victims annual
income and the pay slip of Senora is a sufficient documentary proof thereof.
EDSA SHANGRILA(ESHRI) VS BF CORP

FACTS:
ESHRI entered into a construction agreement with BF whereby the latter shall build for the
former. The contract provided that BF shall submit monthly progress billings (PB) to ESHRI while
ESHRI shall re-measure the accomplished work and prepare the progress payment certificates (PPC).
ESHRI submitted to ESHRI PB 1-19 but the latter only paid PB 1-13 and no longer re-measured and
paid PB 14-19, claiming that they overpaid the first PBs. A case for collection of money and damages
was then filed by BF before the RTC which ruled in their favor. On appeal to the CA by ESHRI, the RTC
granted BFs petition for the execution pending judgment. Unhappy, ESHRI assailed said execution
before the CA which issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing the RTC judge and his
officers to stop such execution. Later on, the CA rendered its decision in favor of BF for the collection
of money and damages.

ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in admitting the photocopies of PB 14-19.

RULING:
No. Rule 130, Sec. 3 provides that the secondary evidence may be used when:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse partys custody or control. If the document is in the
custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary
evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.
In this case, the manifestation of the lawyers proved that the originals were in the custody of
ESHRI and they failed to produce it despite reasonable notice.

NOTE
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against
whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that
he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce
the document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or
made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum,
provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same .
When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses
to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
BANK OF COMMERCE vs.GOODMAN FIELDER INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. No.
191561

Facts:

Keraj, represented by its purported owner Amarnani, sought a distributorship agreement from
Goodman. As a pre-requisite to Goodman's consent, a credit line/bank guaranty in the amount
of P500,000.00 was required from Keraj. Amarnani thus applied for a credit line/bank guaranty with
the Bacolod branch of Bank of Commerce (petitioner).

Pending submission of the required documents for processing and approval of the credit line,
Amarnani, by letter of August 21, 2000,2 requested the issuance of a conditional certification from
petitioner's branch manager Aragon.

Petitioner then sent a letter to Goodman, certifying therein that Keraj has arranged for a credit
line in the amount of P500,000.00, subject to the compliance by Keraj of the policies, terms and
conditions imposed by the bank on said credit line. The said credit line will be used exclusively for
settling any obligations of Keraj, against your Goodman.

Keraj did not follow up their application and the credit line was not approved. A year later,
Goodman claimed sums of money, representing the defaulted obligations of Keraj, against Bank of
Commerce, pursuant to the credit line. The claim was not heeded by Bank of Commerce with the
defense that the letter merely certifies that Keraj applied for one, but no actual line was approved
for failure of Keraj to submit the requirements in its application.

Issue: whether the letter sent by petitioner be construed as a bank guaranty or merely as a
certification of kerajs application for a credit line

Held:

SC applied the Sec.13 of Rule 130 of ROE. Amarnani's letter-request of August 21, 2000 for a
conditional certification from Aragon was granted two days later when Aragon issued the letter-
certification addressed to respondent. Within that period, it could not have been possible for petitioner
to even process the application, given that Amarnani had not even complied with the requirements as
he, himself, indicated in his letter-request to Aragon to "please tell [him] the requirements for the
credit line so [he] c[ould] apply."

The Distributorship Agreement between respondent and Keraj was forged on October 2, 2000
or 39 days after the issuance of the letter-certification, long enough for respondent to verify if indeed
a bank guaranty was, to its impression, granted.
 In light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner could not have conveyed that it was issuing
a bank guaranty in favor of Amarnani.

CONCEPT OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

G.R. No. L-27134 February 28, 1986

COMPANIA MARITIMA vs. JOSE C. LIMSON

FACTS:

On October 8, 1962, plaintiff Compania Maritima filed a complaint against defendant Jose C. Limson
for collection of the sum of P44,701.54 representing the balance of defendant's unpaid accounts for
passage and freight on shipments of hogs, cattle and carabaos abroad plaintiff's vessel from various
ports of Visayas and Mindanao for the period from October 1957 to February 1961. Attached to said
complaint was the statement of account supporting plaintiff's claim for unpaid passage and freight.
Defendant filed a motion for bill of particulars asking that plaintiff attach to the complaint the bins of
lading referred to in said statement of account in order to enable defendant to answer plaintiff's
complaint. Plaintiff opposed said motion. The Court however ordered plaintiff to attach photostat
copies of the bills of lading upon which the statement of account was based. Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration of said order was denied by the Court but upon motion of plaintiff said order was
modified to allow plaintiff to attach duplicate originals of the bills of lading instead of photostat copies
thereof.

On July 16, 1963, defendant filed his answer to the complaint denying any liability to plaintiff.
Defendant alleged that he had already fully paid for all the shipments he made and that a number of
the bills of lading submitted by plaintiff as basis of its claim are not properly chargeable to defendant
since he was not the shipper nor had he authorized said shipments which were made by parties other
than those for whom defendant is liable or who had been duly authorized by defendant to make said
shipments. Defendant further set up a counterclaim for the refund of the rebate to which he was
entitled to pursuant to an agreement that he had with plaintiff for shipments made by him from
Davao, Cotabato, Dadiangas, Iligan and Masbate and for cost of foodstuffs sold or delivered to plaintiff
in the total amount of P411,477.45.
The bills examined by the Commissioner had been classified and regrouped by him into (1) original
bills of lading signed by defendant or his agent; (2) original bills of lading without signature of
defendant or his agent; and (3) charges with no original bills of lading, to wit:

(1) Original bills of lading duly signed by

defendant or his agent.................... P68,209.76

(2) Original bills of lading without

the signature of defendant............ 310,317.21

(3) No original bills of lading............... 166,867.28

Said Commissioner recommended that only the amount of P68,209.76 supported by original bills of
lading signed by defendant or his agent is properly chargeable to defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not all bills of lading should be accounted for

HELD:

We find that the Court a quo erred in rejecting the bins of lading signed by "Perry" where defendant
appeared shipper or consignee, those signed by "Perry" where persons other than defendant-appellant
as shipper and the bills of lading unsigned by defendant.

With regards to the 91 controverted bills of lading signed by "Perry" with Limson as shipper or
consignee in the total amount of P61,981.50, witness Cabling testified that the signatures therein are
those of Cipriano Magtibay alias "Perry" who took delivery of the cargoes stated therein after signing
the delivery receipts.

On the other hand, Nolasco Cruz Ilagan, delivery order clerk of Compania Maritima, testified to this
wise:

I will mention some of his representatives: For hog the authorized representative is Cipriano Magtibay
or Perry; and for cattles, carabaos and cows, is Eye, Mario, Mr. Marcelino Tinoco and others whom I
don't remember the names. When these representatives of Mr. Limson take delivery of the shipments,
I let them sign the delivery orders

With respect to the 662 unsigned bills of lading with freight charges totaling P260,170.23, delivery
receipts were issued upon delivery of the shipments. Cabling and Ilagan who were presented the
plaintiff as witnesses testified that the ordinary procedure at plaintiff's terminal office was to require
the surrender of the original bill of lading, but when the bill of lading cannot be surrendered because it
had not arrived or received by the consignee or assignee, the delivery of the cargo was authorized just
the same, and the delivery receipt was prepared based on the ship's cargo manifests or ship's copy of
the bill of lading. This accommodation was specially given Limson, because defendant was a regular
shipper and ship chandler of plaintiff, and was a compadre of Cabling.

Plaintiff also presented Exhibits B-276 to 1018 in the total amount of P81,462.92, bills of lading not in
the name of defendant Limson, but which Limson himself signed, thereby proving that defendant took
delivery of shipments in the names of others, shipper or consignee, and which the corresponding
charges were debited to his account.
With respect to defendant's sole assignment of errors, namely, that Court a quo erred in declaring
defendant liable in the amount of P166,867.28 which represents charges for freight where the
originals of the bills of lading were not submitted, We find merit in the contention of plaintiff that the
respondent Court correctly held defendant liable for said amount because the same actually
represented freight charges based on the carbon originals of the ship's copy of the bills of lading
where Limson appeared as consignee in the amount of P84,529.42 and those based on the ship's
cargo manifests, where defendant appeared as consignee in the amount of P81,874.10. Respondent
Court admitted in evidence said copies of the bills of lading which were not considered by the
Commissioner because they are not actually the original copy of the bill of lading. The Commissioner
accepted only the originals of the bills of lading because he did not consider even duplicate originals
duly signed as originals. The ship's copies of the bills of lading and the cargo manifests were
substantiated by other supporting documents which were found after the report of the Commissioner
from among the records salvaged from the San Nicolas bodega fire or which were found among the
records kept on plaintiff's terminal office. Said documents were presented in lieu of corresponding
original of the consignee's copy of bill of lading which could not be submitted to the Commissioner nor
presented as plaintiff's evidence to the Court because they were lost or destroyed during the
remodelling of plaintiff's office building or during the fire at plaintiff's bodega at San Nicolas where
they were brought for safekeeping. All said documents were presented as evidence to prove that all
the freight charges for the shipments evidence thereby were duly earned by plaintiff and were
properly debited in defendant's charge account. Apparently, the Commissioner rejected plaintiff's
claims which were not actually supported by the original of the bills of lading notwithstanding the fact
that duplicate original of the said documents and other secondary evidence such as the ship cargo
manifests have been presented as evidence. As stated above, witnesses Cabling and Ilagan testified
that the practice was that when the originals of the bins of lading could not be surrendered because
they have not yet been received by the consignee, the delivery of the cargo was nevertheless
authorized and a delivery receipt was prepared on the basis of the ship's cargo manifests or the ship's
copy of the bills of lading. This only shows that the ship's cargo manifests or the ship's copy of the
bills of lading can be accepted as evidence of shipments made by defendant since he was allowed to
accept delivery of said shipments even without presented his copy of the bill of lading.

The Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga v. Hon. Hermogenes Reyes and Andres Guevarra

Facts:

The Fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Guevarra, which alleged that
the defendant maliciously intended to publish in the weekly paper Ing Magumasid, a squib in verse
lashing out on the reputations of Clemente Dayrit, on one hand, and Mariano Nepomuceno, on the
other.

In the joint trial, the fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the prosecution, the
aforementioned Exhibits A, B, C, and D, which are copies of the Ing Magumasid containing the libelous
article with the innuendo, another article in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its
translation into Spanish. Counsel for the defendant objected to this evidence, which objection was
sustained by the court.
 The respondent maintained that the informations exclusion of the libelous articles led to their
inadmissibility in evidence. The petitioner, on the contrary, contended that the exhibits in question are
the best evidence of libel.

Issues:

1 Is an information charging a libel published in an unofficial language without a copy of

the libelous article but only a translation into Spanish, valid?
2 Are the petitioners exhibits admissible?

Held:

1 The general rule is that the complaint or information for libel must set out the
particular defamatory words as published, and a statement of their substance and effect is
usually considered insufficient." But this general rule does not exclude certain exceptions,
such as, cases where the libel is published in a non-official language. "When the
defamation has been published in a foreign tongue, it is proper, and in general, necessary,
to set out the communication as it was originally made, with an exact translation into
English; and if from the translation no cause of action appears, it is immaterial that the
foreign words were actionable. If the libelous article had been published in one of our
official languages, English or Spanish, it would have been necessary to follow the general
rule; but since the article in question was published in the Pampango dialect, it is sufficient
to insert a Spanish translation in the information.
2 The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of
libel or slander. The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay.
The rule which requires the production of the best evidence is applicable to the present
case: Certainly, the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its
translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the
best evidence of an article published in it. Here, Judge Reyess refusal to admit such
evidence is an abuse of discretion.

People of the Philippines v. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, GR No. L-14257 (31 July 1959)

Facts:

Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and others were charged with the crime of falsification of public documents
in their capacities as public officials and employees. They made it appear that certain relief supplies
and/or merchandise were purchased by Gonzales for distribution to the victims of calamity, such
quantities, prices, business establishments or persons engaged appear in the public documents when
in fact, there is no distribution of relief goods that had ever been made. The prosecution presented to
a witness a booklet of receipts containing invoices of the Metro Drug Corp. The salesman as the
witness said that the booklet contained the triplicate copies, the original invoices were sent to Manila
office of the company, the duplicates to the customers, and the triplicate remained in the booklet. He
further explained that in preparing receipts for sales, two carbons were used between the three
sheets, the original, the duplicate and triplicate so that the duplicates and the triplicates were filed out
by the use of the carbons in the course of the preparation and signing of the originals. As the witness
was explaining the figures or words appearing on the triplicates, Hon. Bienvenido M. Tan, interrupted
the proceeding holding that the triplicates are not admissible unless it is first proven that the originals
were lost and cannot be produced. Another witness, the accountant of the Metro Drug Corporation in
Manila, said that sales in the provinces were reported to the Manila office of the Metro Drug
Corporation, and that the originals of the sales invoices are transmitted to the main office in support of
cash journal sheets, but that the original practice of keeping the original white copies no longer
prevails as the originals are given to the customers, while only the duplicate or pink copies are
submitted to the central office in Manila. After the cross-examination of the last witness, the
prosecution again went back to the identification of the triplicate invoice. It was at this stage that the
judge told the prosecution that the law applicable is Section 46, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which
requires the production of the originals. In response to the above ruling, the special prosecutor
claimed that the evidence of the prosecution would not be able to secure the production of the
originals on account of their loss. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the duplicate/triplicate copies of the invoice receipts are admissible.

Held: Yes. The invoice which were produced by the use of carbon sheets, and which thereby produced
a facsimile of the originals, including the figures and the signatures on the originals, are regarded as
duplicate originals and may introduced as such, even without accounting for the non-production of the
originals. The admissibility of the duplicates or triplicates has long been settled. When carbon sheets
are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the
outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces 2 facsimile upon
the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made
the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals
and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of
the others. Being a carbon copy of the original and bearing as it does the signature of the appellant is
admissible in evidence and possess all the probative value of the original, and the same does not
require an accounting for the non-production of the original. SEC. 386 provides that the best evidence
rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. A
"duplicate sales slip" has been held to be primary evidence. (People vs. Stone, 349 III. 52, 181 N. E.
648) Two principal authors on the law on evidence have sustained the theory of the admissibility of
duplicate originals, as follows: (1) Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. I, p. 661: SEC. 420. Duplicate
originals. Where letters are produced by mechanical means and, concurrently with the original,
duplicate are produced, as by placing carbon paper and writing on the exposed surface at the same
time, all are duplicate originals, and any one of them may introduced in evidence without accounting
for the nonproduction of the other. (2) Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 168: SEC. 100.
Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the same machine as the original, are
duplicate originals, and these have been held to be as much primary evidence as the originals

MAHILUM et al v CA

Facts:

In 1935, the heirs of Pedro Mahilum executed a Deed of Definite Sale of a parcel of land in
Negros occidental in favor of Gorgonial Flora Sotes in consideration of P2,000. The Deed of Sale was
thumbmarked and signed and acknowledged before the Notary public Nicolas Deastua. Sotes paid
taxes for the parcel of land as evidenced by Tax Declarations 4232 and 4995 in the name of Sotes.

Sotes filed an action for Partition and Damages against the heirs of Mahilum at the CFI.
Petitioners claim that they never sold the parcel of land. The CFI dismissed the complaint. The CA
reversed the ruling and ordered the partition of the subject land.
Issue: Whether the Deed of Sale was admissible.

Held: YES. The Deed of Sale is itself a signed carbon copy or duplicate executed at the same time as
the original. Duplicate original may be introduced in evidence without accounting of the other copies.

A public document likewise enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed; private transactions have been fair and regular; and the regular course of business has
been followed.

SECONDARY EVIDENCE

LAZATIN v. CAMPOS, G.R. L-43955

Facts:

One month after the death of Dr. Mariano Lazatin, his widow Margarita De Asis, commenced
an intestate proceeding before the CFI of Pasay. Two months after, Margarita De Asis, also died leaving
a holographic will. Private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of the late Margarita.
Petitioner, Renato Lazatin, filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita as on ADOPTED CHILD
on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano
Lazatin. According to Benjamin Lazatin, the petitioner was an illegitimate child of Dr. Lazatin and was
later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified and state that petitioner was adopted by both
Mariano Lazatin and his wife Margarita De Asis.

The respondent court heard petitioner`s motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate
of Margarita De Asis, at which hearings he presented NO DECREE OF ADOPTION in his favor. Instead,
petitioner attempted to prove, over private respondents` objections, that he had recognized the
deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death, formerly he was
known as Renato Lazatin but was compelled to change his name to Sta. Clara when the deceased
spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife. Photographs were also intended
to be presented by petitioner like photograph of Irma Veloso, one of the private respondents, where
she addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner
when he was a boy; document showing that petitioners real name is Renato Lazatin.

When Renato Lazatin could not present evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption,
respondent court discontinued the hearing and barred the introduction of petitioner`s evidence.
According to court`s findings, all the evidence submitted by petitioner do not prove or have no
tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding where the adoption of the petitioner were
taken up by any court. Neither do the evidence tend to establish the presence of any record of a
proceeding in court where the adoption was held.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge (Judge Jose Campos) erred in declaring that petitioner
has failed to establish by competent evidence his alleged status as an adopted child of the deceased
Lazatin.

Held:

Secondary evidence is admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost
or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish
the former existence of the instrument.

Petitioner`s flow of evidence does not lead to any proof of judicial adoption. It cannot pluck
from his chain of evidence any link to the real existence of a court decree of adoption in his favor. No
judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented. It
shows from the certification from the CFI-Manila secured by the plaintiff`s counsel that among the
salvaged records, there has not been found, after a diligent search, any record regarding the adoption
of Mr. Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara. The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila that
their pre-war records of the decisions of the CFI-Manila were either destroyed or burned does not
furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner. If ever, there was really
such adoption, petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy of the newspaper publication of the
adoption or a certification of the publishing house to that effect. Petitioner`s failure on this point is
another indication of the non-existence of the adoption paper.

As pointed out earlier, petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper
and its subsequent loss or destruction. Therefore, respondent judge correctly ruled that he could not
allow petitioner to introduce evidence that he had enjoyed the status of an adopted child of the
deceased spouse without first producing COMPETENT and DOCUMENTARY evidence that there had
been judicial proceedings which resulted in the final judgment of a competent court decreeing his
adoption.
ONG CHING PO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD PARIAN

Facts: On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong (vendor) sold a parcel of land to private respondent Soledad
Parian. The said sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale (Exhibit A) written in English.
Subsequently, the document was registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila, which issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9260 dated September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent.

According to private respondent, herein vendee, she entrusted the administration of the lot
and building to petitioner Ong Ching Po, her husbands brother when she and her husband settled in
Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it.
Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate the said premises. Petitioner claims that he is in position
of the said land not as a trustee but because the vendor actually executed also a deed of sale in his
favor marked as Exhibit B although this Deed of sale is not original but only mere photocopy and
Exhibit A, also a deed of sale in favor of private respondent was executed only because the latter was
to be made a dummy by petitioner Ong Ching Po. Hence, premises considered, Ong Ching Po claims
that he should be adjudged as it lawful owner.

Issues: Whether or not the court a qou erred when it gave full faith and credit to the Deed of Sale
(Exh. "A") in favor of private respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh. "B") in favor of
petitioner Ong Ching Po.

Ruling: The Court of Appeals is correct in not giving any credence to Exhibit "B", because these
documents had not been properly authenticated. Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court: Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and lost or
destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the recollection of the witnesses.

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed.
But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former
existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss;
contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court (De Vera v. Aguilar,
218 SCRA 602 [1993]).Petitioners failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due execution
of the deed of sale, Exhibit "B".The due execution of the document may be established by the:

(1) Person or persons who executed it;

(2) By the person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or

(3) By any person who was present and saw it executed or

(4) Who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or

(5) By a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution
thereof (De Vera v. Aguilar, supra).

Petitioner Yu Siok Lian(wife of petitioner) testified that she was present when said document
was executed, but the trial court rejected her claim and held: If it is true that she was present, why
did she not sign said document, even merely as a witness? Her oral testimony is easy to concoct or
fabricate. Furthermore, she was married only on September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong Ching Po, in
Baguio City where she apparently resided, or after the deed of sale was executed. The Court does not
believe that she was present during the execution and signing of the deed of sale involved therein,
notwithstanding her pretensions to the contrary.
E. MICHAEL & CO., INC., vs. ADRIANO ENRIQUEZ,

Facts:

The action is based on a sale with a right to repurchase made by Adriano Enriquez in favor of
E. Michael and E. Michael & Co., sociedad en comandita, of which appellant claims to be the successor,
by reason of an instrument, duly executed and delivered by said companies to appellant, transferring
property, business and assets of every kind, including the land which is the subject of this litigation.

It is alleged in the complaint that the time to repurchase having expired, the title to the
property became absolute in appellant and that it is accordingly the owner of the land described in
said instruments.

On the trial appellant sought to prove the execution and delivery of the conveyance
transferring to it the land described in the sale with right to repurchase. The trial court prevented
appellant from the proving the fact. Appellant also attempted to prove the fact that the instrument
so executed and delivered was lost, it being his purpose to lay the basis for the introduction of
secondary evidence as to its contents. The trial court also prevented appellant from proving
that fact.

Issue/s: 1) What are the preliminaries for the admission of the secondary evidence?

2) Whether the trial court erred in preventing the appellants counsel to prove the due
execution and delivery of the instrument because its question describing the instrument as
transfer or cession.

Ruling:

1) Section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:

"An original writing must be produced and proved, except as otherwise provided
in this Act. If it has been lost, proof of the loss must first be made before evidence can be
given of its contents. Upon such proof being made, together with proof of the due execution of
the writing, its contents may be proved by a copy or by a recital of its contests in some
authentic document, or by the recollection of a witness."

The writing itself must be produced unless it has been lost or destroyed in which case, before
its contents may be proved by other evidence, it must be shown by the person offering the
secondary evidence :

(1) That the document was duly executed and delivered, where delivery is necessary, and

(2) That it has been lost or destroyed.

The execution and delivery of the document may be established:

by the person or persons who executed it;

by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged;

 by any person who was present and saw it executed and delivered;

After its execution and delivery, any person who saw it and recognized the
signatures; or

by a person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed the
execution thereof.

The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact.

The loss may be shown:

by any person who knew the fact of its loss;

by anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place
where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or

by any other person who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
court that the instrument is indeed lost.

After proper proof of the due execution and delivery of the instrument and its loss or destruction, oral
evidence may be give of its contents:

by any person who signed the document, or who read it, or who heard it read knowing; or

it being proved from other sources, that the document so read was the one in question.

Such evidence may also be given:

by any person who was present when the contents of the document were talked over between
the parties thereto to such an extent as to give him reasonably full information as to its
contents;

by any person to whom the parties to the instrument have confessed or stated the contents
thereof;

by a copy thereof; or

by a recital of its contents in some authentic document.

2) Yes.

The mere fact that counsel for appellant, in putting his question to the witness,
characterized or described the instrument as one of transfer, while objectionable, was not
 sufficient to cut him off altogether from proving the execution and delivery of the
document if other requisites were present.

While it is always best to avoid characterizations of that kind, its harm is minimized where the
case is tried before a court instead of a jury, the court well knowing that it cannot accept
the characterization as evidence but must go to the document itself or the evidence
of its contents to determine its nature and legal effect.

Trial courts should not be so strict with reference to matters of the character under
discussion as to cause a miscarriage of justice; but on the other hand, they should see to it
that they are not impose on by the introduction of fabricated testimony and that injustice
shall not result from an evasion of the rules of evidence by designing persons.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILS v. JOSE LAVA

FACTS:

Jose Lava along with 30 other persons were captured by the Philippine Constabulary on Oct. 1965 on
the ground that they were high ranking officials of the CPP NPA together with some seized documents
and written materials that were allegedly communications and letters to their other members.

The seized documents were placed in the office of the Phil Constabulary however on Sept. 1968 the
said office was burned down along with the seized documents. A reconstitution proceeding was filed
for the destroyed documents which was granted and all docs were eventually reconstituted. The
reconstituted documents were used as secondary evidence against the accused, of which he assailed
its validity claiming that the said documents were inadmissible and that the originals must be
presented.

ISSUE: WoN the reconstituted documents are admissible as secondary evidence

HELD: YES

The documents may be used as evidence in lieu of the destroyed original copies as long as there is a
valid reconstitution proceeding which is verified and granted by the court. The reconstituted
documents which were verified by the custodian who held the documents shall be admissible as
secondary evidence. It existence of the said documents were never questioned hence, there is
presumption that the destroyed documents did in fact exist.
G.R. No. L-23893 October 29, 1968

VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC. vs. EUSEBIO E. FERRER, PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO.,
INC. and PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC

FACTS:

Jose Villarama sold his 2 Certificate of Public Convenience to PANTRANCO with the condition
that Villarama "shall not for a period of 10 years from the date of this sale, apply for any TPU service
identical or competing with the buyer." Barely 3 months after the sale, Villa Rey Transit Inc. was
organized and it bought 5 CPC from Valentin Fernando. Before the sale is approved by the PSC, the 2
of the 5 CPCs were levied in favor of Eusebio Ferrer, creditor, against Fernando, the debtor. Ferrer
then sold the 2 CPC to PANTRANCO. PANTRANCO now assails that Villa Rey Transit Inc. is an alter ego
of Jose Villarama, thus the corporation cannot operate under the 2 CPC pursuant to the condition
agreed upon by PANTRANCO and Villarama.

ISSUE: Whether or not the photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers presented by
PANTRANCO showing that Villarama had co-mingled his personal funds and transactions with those
made in the name of the Corporation is admissible

RULING: YES.

Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for the admissibility of
secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party, thus:
 (1) opponent's possession of the original;

(2) reasonable notice to opponent to produce the original;

(3) satisfactory proof of its existence; and

(4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in court.

Villarama has practically admitted the second and fourth requisites. As to the third, he
admitted their previous existence in the files of the Corporation and also that he had seen some of
them. Regarding the first element, Villarama's theory is that since even at the time of the issuance of
the subpoena duces tecum, the originals were already missing, therefore, the Corporation was no
longer in possession of the same. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce
secondary evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is enough
that the circumstances are such as to indicate that the writing is in his possession or under his control.
Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument should, on being notified
to produce it, admit having it in his possession. 14 Hence, secondary evidence is admissible where
he denies having it in his possession. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a copy
thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is "when the
original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court." The originals of the vouchers in
question must be deemed to have been lost, as even the Corporation admits such loss. Viewed upon
this light, there can be no doubt as to the admissibility in evidence of Exhibits 6 to 19 and 22.

COMPAIA MARITIMA VS. ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION

FACTS:

Compaia Maritima and Allied Free Workers Union entered into a contract of arrastre and
stevedoring services. The stevedoring services of the union was not compensated and they picketed
for nine days. The trial court awarded the company actual damages of P450, 000, moral damages of
P50, 000 and attorney's considering of P20, 000.

ISSUE:

Whether the pieces of evidence was sufficient to support the award of Php520k

SUPREME COURT RULING:

No.

The SC said that on the basis of the reports of the two accountants hired by the company, the
amount of damages does not reach the sum of P 450,000 fixed by the trial court. The damages,
shown in the accountants' reports and in the statement made by the consignees chief clerk (who did
not testify) amount to P349, 245.37, or much less than P450, 000.

The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because of the
rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss-of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole", the original writings need not be produced. That rule cannot be
applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records, on which the accountants'
reports were based, was not duly established. It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that
the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the company, of the
summary may be tested on cross-examination.

What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a
private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports
or the like". That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a
preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the production of the records in court
and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court.

PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

LUCIO R. CRUZvs. COURT OF APPEALS AND CONRADO Q. SALONGA

G.R. No. 79962 : December 10, 1990. 192 SCRA 209

Facts:

The private respondent Conrado Salonga filed a complaint for collection and damages against
petitioner Lucio Cruz in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City alleging that in the course of their
business transactions of buying and selling fish, the petitioner borrowed from him an amount of
P35,000.00, evidenced by a receipt dated May 4, 1982, marked as Exhibit D, reading as follows:

5/4/82

Received the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Cash from Rodrigo Quiambao and Conrado Salonga on
the day of May 4, 1982.

Sgd. Lucio Cruz

Cruz denied having contracted any loan from Salonga. By way of special defense, he alleged that he
was a lessee of several hectares of a fishpond owned by Nemesio Yabut and that sometime in May
1982, he entered into an agreement with Salonga whereby the latter would purchase (pakyaw) fish in
certain areas of the fishpond from May 1982 to August 15, 1982. They also agreed that immediately
thereafter, Salonga would sublease (bubuwisan) the same fishpond for a period of one year. Cruz
admitted having received on May 4, 1982, the amount of P35,000.00 and on several occasions from
August 15, 1982, to September 30, 1982, an aggregate amount of P15,250.00. He contended
however, that these amounts were received by him not as loans but as consideration for their
"pakyaw" agreement and payment for the sublease of the fishpond.

At the trial, the private respondent claimed that aside from the amounts of P35,000.00 (Exh. D),
mentioned in the partial stipulation of facts, he also delivered to the petitioner P28,000.00, which
constituted the consideration for their "pakyaw" agreement. This was evidenced by a receipt dated
May 14, 1982 marked as Exhibit I and reading as follows:

May 14, 1982

Tinatanggap ko ang halagang dalawampu't walong libong piso (P28,000.00) bilang halaga sa
pakyaw nila sa akin sa sangla sa kahong bilang #8 maliit at sa kaputol na sapa sa gawing may
bomba. Ito ay tatagal hanggang Agosto 1982.

SGD. LUCIO CRUZ

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. found that the transactions
between the petitioner and the private respondent were indeed "pakyaw" and sublease agreements,
each having a consideration of P28,000.00, for a total of P56,000.00.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed. Exhibit "I" is very clear in its non-reference to
the transaction behind Exhibit "D." What only gives the semblance that Exhibit "I" is an explanation of
the transaction behind Exhibit "D" are the oral testimonies given by the defendant and his two
witnesses. On the other hand, Exhibit "I" is very clear in its language. Thus, its tenor must not be
clouded by any parol evidence introduced by the defendant. And with the tenor of Exhibit "I"
remaining unembellished, the conclusion that Exhibit "D" is a mere tentative receipt becomes
untenable.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in (1) disregarding parol evidence to Exhibits "D" and "I"
despite the fact that these documents fall under the exceptions provided for in Sec. 7, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court and thereby in (2) making a sweeping conclusion that the transaction effected between
the private respondent and petitioner is one of contract of loan and not a contract of lease.

Ruling:

Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and therefore, there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the
contents of the writing, except in the following cases:

a) When a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;

b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement" includes wills.

The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the parties have reduced their agreement to
writing they have made such writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is
not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived or abandoned.

The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at bar, Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the
existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement, but Exhibit D does not contain such
an agreement. It is only a receipt attesting to the fact that on May 4, 1982, the petitioner received
from the private respondent the amount of P35,000. It is not and could have not been intended by the
parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact, Exhibit D does not even
mention the transaction that gave rise to its issuance. At most, Exhibit D can only be considered a
casual memorandum of a transaction between the parties and an acknowledgment of the receipt of
money executed by the petitioner for the private respondent's satisfaction. A writing of this nature, as
Wigmore observed is not covered by the parol evidence rule.

A distinction should be made between a statement of fact expressed in the instrument and the terms
of the contractual act. The former may be varied by parol evidence but not the latter. Section 7 of
Rule 130 clearly refers to the terms of an agreement and provides that "there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the
contents of the writing."

The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's receipt of the P28,000.00 is just a statement of fact. It is
a mere acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made by the private respondent. Its reference
to the amount of P28,000.00 as consideration of the "pakyaw" contract does not make it part of the
terms of their agreement. Parol evidence may therefore be introduced to explain Exhibit I, particularly
with respect to the petitioner's receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 and of the date when the said
amount was received.

Even if it were assumed that Exhibits D and I are covered by the parol evidence rule, its application by
the Court of Appeals was improper. The record shows that no objection was made by the private
respondent when the petitioner introduced evidence to explain the circumstances behind the execution
and issuance of the said instruments. The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as soon as
the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection
must be made when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the
objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answer.

For failure of the private respondent to object to the evidence introduced by the petitioner, he is
deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.

We find that it was error for the Court of Appeals to disregard the parol evidence introduced by the
petitioner and to conclude that the amount of P35,000.00 received on May 4, 1982 by the petitioner
was in the nature of a loan accommodation. The Court of Appeals should have considered the partial
stipulation of facts and the testimonies of the witnesses which sought to explain the circumstances
surrounding the execution of Exhibits D and I and their relation to one another.

We are satisfied that the amount of P35,000.00 was received by the petitioner as full payment of their
"pakyaw" agreement for P28,000.00 and the remaining P7,000.00 as advance rentals for their
sublease agreement.
MACTAN CEBU v CA and Chiongbian

Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation proceeding on several parcels of land in
Lahug,Cebu to expand Lahug Airport. Judgment was rendered in favor of the Phil. Govt. Some of the
defendants-landowners appealed the case to CA in which they were able to obtain a modified
judgment allowing them to repurchase their lots if it is no longer used as an airport. However, Virginia
Chiongbian,one of the landowners, didnt appeal and accepted the compensation paid by the govt.
When no expansion was made by the govt to the airport, the purpose for which the property was
expropriated ceased to exist. Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of her lot. Testimonies of
Chiongbian and Bercede were offered to prove the existence of an alleged written agreement
evidencing a right of repurchase. Objections to said testimonies were made but disregarded by the
trial court. RTC ruled in favor of Chiongbian. CA affirmed the RTCs decision.Hence,the petition.

Issues:

1. W/N CA erred in affirming the RTCs decision that there was a repurchase agreement and
ignoring the petitioners protests on the admission of the respondents oral evidence.
2. W/N CA erred in holding that decision in Limbaco case is applicable at bar.

Held:

On the first issue, only the testimonies of Chiongbian and Bercede were offered as evidence to
prove the existence of a written agreement evidencing her right of repurchase. Said testimonies
cannot be sustained for being in violation of the Parol evidence rule. Under the parol evidence rule,
when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. In addition, both
testimonies are inadmissible for being hearsay. Evidence is hearsay if its probative value is not based
on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the
witness stand.

Further, the lower court erred in disregarding the objections of the government when said
testimonies were presented as evidence. It is the rule in evidence that objections in the admissibility
of evidence must be raised, otherwise, it is deemed waived.

On the second issue,the decision in Limbaco case is not applicable at bar. The contract
involved in said case is a contract of sale while in the present case,it involves an expropriation suit.

As a general rule, contemporaneous agreements if not contained in the written agreement is

deemed waived, however, if such agreement is the moving cause or the inducing factor in the entering
into the contract of the parties, then it can be admissible as evidence in court to support said
agreement.

RAFAEL S. ORTAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES, AND
ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES, respondents.

FACTS:

On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in
Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively.

Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the
titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles.
Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession
of another person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain
conditions.

Petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer with
counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions which
were never reflected in the deeds of sale

During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the sale was
subject to the above conditions,[7] although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale.
Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was
barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually
dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the court a quo.

Hence the petition.

ISSUE:

W/N the oral conditions precedent to a contract of sale are admissible as parol evidence

HELD:

The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible.

First, private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has
an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as
written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written
contract which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is
deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other
than the contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the
truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the
parties.

Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement
Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantation where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a contract
may be established by parol evidence. However, the material facts of that case are different from this
case. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any pre- conditions or other
agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms.

Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that:

The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the terms of a written instrument by testimony
purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally
agreed upon by the parties.

Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such fraud or mistake
exists in this case.

Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is admissible
under the exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to
express the true intent of the parties. Such exception obtains only in the following instance:

"[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the
parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic
evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the
facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to
enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument."

Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents contention that they "put in issue by the
pleadings" the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Record shows
that private respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did
not reflect the intention of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private respondents). Such issue must
be "squarely presented." Private respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4)
conditions which they tried to prove during trial by parol evidence.

Their case is covered by the general rule that the contents of the writing are the only repository
of the terms of the agreement.

Thus, the case is remanded to RTC for proper disposition.

CONDE vs CA

FACTS:

Dominga Conde(petitioner) and others, as heirs of Santiago Conde, sold with right of
repurchase a parcel of land to Casimira Pasagui (Married to Pio Altera) for P165. 3 years after the
sale, the cadastral court of Leyte adjudicate the lot to Pio Altera, subject to the same right of
repurchase by Dominga Conde.

4 years after the transfer of land to Pio, private respondent Paciente Cordero, as
representative of Pio, signed a document in the Visayan dialect, the English translation of which reads:
Memorandum Of Repurchase Over A Parcel Of Land Sold With Repurchase Which Document Got Lost.
Neither of the vendees-a-retro, Pio Altera nor Casimira Pasagui, was a signatory to the deed because
Pio was ill at that time and Casimira is in Manila. The document was executed in favor of Dominga
constituting the repurchase of the said land from Pio.

Subsequently the Pacto de retro document was found and Pio sold the land to spouses Ramon
and Catalina Conde. Thus, Dominga filed a complaint for quieting of title contending that she validly
repurchased the land and presented the Memorandum of repurchase as evidence.

Spouses Ramon and Catalina Conde adduced evidence that Paciente Cordero signed the
document of repurchase merely to show that he had no objection to the repurchase; and that he did
not receive the amount of P165.00 from petitioner inasmuch as he had no authority from his parents-
in-law who were the vendees-a-retro.

RTC and CA ruled in favor of Spouses Ramon and Catalina Conde stating that there is no valid
repurchase.

ISSUE

WON there is a valid repurchase.

HELD

Yes. There is nothing in the document of repurchase to show that Paciente Cordero had signed
the same merely to indicate that he had no objection to petitioner's right of repurchase. Besides, he
would have had no personality to object. To uphold his oral testimony on that point, would be a
departure from the parol evidence rule and would defeat the purpose for which the doctrine
is intended.

... The purpose of the rule is to give stability to written agreements, and to
remove the temptation and possibility of perjury, which would be afforded if parol
evidence was admissible.

If, as alleged, petitioner exerted no effort to procure the signature of Pio Altera after he had
recovered from his illness, neither did the Alteras repudiate the deed that their son-in-law had signed.
Thus, an implied agency must be held to have been created from their silence or lack of action, or
their failure to repudiate the agency.

INCIONG VS CA

Facts:
In February 1983, Rene Naybe took out a loan from Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC) in the
amount of P50k. For that he executed a promissory note in the same amount. Naybe was able to
convince Baldomero Inciong, Jr. and Gregorio Pantanosas to co-sign with him as co-makers. The
promissory note went due and it was left unpaid. PBC demanded payment from the three but still no
payment was made. PBC then sue the three but PBC later released Pantanosas from its obligations.
Naybe left for Saudi Arabia hence cant be issued summons and the complaint against him was
subsequently dropped. Inciong was left to face the suit. He argued that that since the complaint
against Naybe was dropped, and that Pantanosas was released from his obligations, he too should
have been released.

ISSUE: Whether or not Inciong should be held liable.

HELD: Yes. Inciong is considering himself as a guarantor in the promissory note. And he was basing
his argument based on Article 2080 of the Civil Code which provides that guarantors are released from
their obligations if the creditors shall release their debtors. It is to be noted however that Inciong did
not sign the promissory note as a guarantor. He signed it as a solidary co-maker.

A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor does not become a solidary co-
debtor to all intents and purposes. There is a difference between a solidary co-debtor and a fiador in
solidum (surety). The latter, outside of the liability he assumes to pay the debt before the property of
the principal debtor has been exhausted, retains all the other rights, actions and benefits which
pertain to him by reason of the fiansa; while a solidary co-debtor has no other rights than those
bestowed upon him.

Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states that the three signatories therein
are jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all of them may be proceeded against for the entire
obligation. The choice is left to the solidary creditor (PBC) to determine against whom he will enforce
collection. Consequently, the dismissal of the case against Pontanosas may not be deemed as having
discharged Inciong from liability as well. As regards Naybe, suffice it to say that the court never
acquired jurisdiction over him. Inciong, therefore, may only have recourse against his co-makers, as
provided by law.

REMALANTE VS TIBE

FACTS:
This is a dispute between Remalante and Tibe regarding the ownership of six parcels of land.

Cornelia Tibe filed a complaint for the annulment of certain contracts and documents before the trial
court against Paciano Remalante. She alleged that through fraud, deceit, abuse of confidence and
misrepresentation, Remalante induced her to sign 3 Affidavits of Transfer covering Lots 1, 2 and
3, which thereafter transferred said lots to Remalante. Further, he alleged that Remalante forged her
signature in a Deed of Absolute Sale covering her other Lots 4, 5 and 6 which transferred said
lots to Remalante. Paciano Remalante denied all allegations and declared that he is the absolute owner
of the six parcels of land.

In Tibes evidence, it showed that on December 15, 1965, Remalante came to her house and
requested her to sign papers purported to be bail bonds for his provisional liberty in connection with a
concubinage case filed against him by his wife. However, Tibe later on discovered that these were
Affidavits of Transfer, donating Lots 1, 2, 3 to Remalante, and Deed of Absolute Sale in favour of
Remalante for her other Lots 4, 5, 6.

In Remalantes evidence, he claimed that he bought Lots 1, 2, and 3 from Silvino Alminario. He
agreed to have the lands transferred to Tibe to accommodate her request to use the properties as
collateral in securing a loan from a bank. However, upon learning that Tibe did not apply for a loan,
Remalante reported the same to their municipal mayor and had Tibe summoned and to sign the
Affidavits of Transfer to Tibe. As to Lots 4, 5,6, they were voluntarily sold by Tibe to him as evidenced
by the Absolute Deed of Sale.

TC: The trial court awarded Lots 1, 2, 3 covered by the Affidavits of Transfer to Remalante and
annulled the Deed of Absolute and awarding Lots 4, 5, 6 to Tibe.

CA: Set aside the decision of the trial court, annulled the Affidavits of Transfer and Deed of Absolute
Sale and awarded the six parcels of land to Tibe as the absolute owner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in awarding Lots 1 2 3 to Tibe

Whether or not CA erred in not giving credence to TCs decision

RULING:

The elevated case involves appreciation of facts and the Supreme Court can only entertain pure
questions of law. Because Remalante has failed to build a case for the reversal of the CAs decision,
such decision is affirmed in toto.

As to Lots 1, 2, 3, Remalantes contention that he bought the same from Silvino Alminario has no
merit because Silvino himself rebutted this contention in his testimony during the trial. There was no
sale between him and Remalante and that he only sold the same to Tibe. Further, Silvino cannot read,
write and understand English in which the deeds of sale he allegedly executed in favour of Remalante
were written.

As to the Affidavits of Transfer and Deeds of Sale covering Lots 1-6, they were executed through
substantial fraud and error as they were purported to be bail bonds when they were signed by Tibe.
Tibe has been held to be an illiterate for she cannot read, write nor understand English. Had she
known that the documents were actually Affidavits of Transfer and Deeds of Sale, she would not have
signed the same.

Neither can Remalante invoke the Parol Evidence Rule (which he erroneously reffered to as Best
Evidence Rule) to argue that the Affidavits of Transfer and Deeds Absolute Sale were the conclusive
evidences that he is the absolute owner of the subject lots because the validity of these
agreements has been put in issue. (See exceptions when parol evidence can be presented
question on validity of the agreement)

Therefore, Cornelia Tibe is the absolute owner of the six parcel of lands.
ROBLES v. LIZARRAGA HERMANOS, G.R. L-26173

Facts:
 Haciend Nahalinan belonged originally to the spouses Zacarias Robles and Anastacia de la
Rama, parents of the present plaintiff, Zacarias Robles. Upon the death of Zacarias Robles, Sr., his
widow was appointed administratrix of his estate. After then, she leased the hacienda to the plaintiff
for the period of six years beginning at the end of the milling season. It was stipulated that any
permanent improvements necessary to the cultivation and exploitation of the hacienda should be
made at the expense of the lessee without right to indemnity at the end of the term. As the place was
in a run-down state, and it was foreseen that the lessee would be put to much expense in bringing the
property to its productive capacity.

Three years before the lease was expire, Anastacia de la Rama died leaving as heirs Zacarias
and his six siblings. Lizarraga Hermanos came forward with a proposal to buy all of the properties
belonging to the Robles which included other properties in addition to the hacienda Nahalinan.

In the course of the negotiation , it was proposed that Zacarias should surrender the last two
remaining years of his lease and permit Lizarraga hermanos to take possession .

Zacarias alleges that, in consideration that the he shorten the term of his lease, the defendant
agreed to pay him the VALUE OF ALL THE BETTERMENTS THAT HE HAD MADE ON THE HACIENDA AND
TO PURCHASE FROM HIM ALL THAT BELONGED TO HIM PERSONALLY ON THE HACIENDA ACCORDING
TO A VALUATION TO BE MADE AFTER THE HARVEST. The plaintiff agreed to this and the instrument of
conveyance conveyed the property to Lizarraga Hermanos.

In the deed of conveyance that was written in Spanish stated that what was conveyed by the
plaintiff is not defined as being, in part, the hacienda Nahalinan nor as including any of his rights in or
to the property conveyed other than those he possessed in the character of heir.

Furthermore, Zacarias says that, when the instrument was presented to him, the promise of
the defendant to compensate him for the improvements and to purchase the existing crop and other
things was wanting. He says that upon his calling attention to this, the representative of the defendant
explained that it is not unnecessary in view of the confidence existing between the parties.

On the part of the defendant, he claimed that the agreement with respect to the compensating
the plaintiff for improvements and other things was never made. But it was not corroborated by
witness of the defense Carmelo Lizarraga that a few days before the conveyance was executed the
plaintiff proposed that the defendant should buy all the things that the plaintiff then had on the
hacienda, whereupon the Lizarragas informed him that they would buy those things if an agreement
should be arrived at as to the price. There is also direct testimony of the plaintiff and his brother Jose
to the effect that the agreement was as claimed by the plaintiff.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in admitting oral evidence of a contract different form that
expressed in the contract of sale.

Held:

The case is not one for the REFORMATION OF A DOCUMENT on the ground of mistake or fraud
in its execution. The purpose is TO ENFORCE AN INDEPENDENT OR COLLATERAL AGREEMENT WHICH
CONSTITUTED AN INDUCEMENT TO THE MAKING OF THE SALE, OR PART OF THE CONSIDERATION
THERFOR. There is no rule of evidence of wider application than that which declares extrinsic evidence
inadmissible either to contradict or vary the terms of a written contract.

There is no rule of evidence of wider application than that which declares extrinsic evidence
inadmissible either to contradict or vary the terms of a written contract. The execution of a contract in
writing is deemed to supersede all oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its terms and the
subject-matter which preceded the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident, fraud or
mistake of fact. But it is recognized that this rule is to be taken with proper qualifications; and all the
authorities are agreed that proof is admissible of any collateral, parol agreement that is not
inconsistent with the terms of the written contract, though it may relate to the same subject-matter.
As expressed in a standard legal encyclopedia, the doctrine here referred to is as follows: "The rule
excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the
admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements
between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written
agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in
equity."

In the case before us the deed of conveyance purports to transfer to the defendant only such
interests in certain properties as had come to the conveyors by inheritance. Nothing is said concerning
the rights in the hacienda which the plaintiff had acquired by lease or concerning the things that he
had placed thereon by way of improvement or had acquired by purchase. The verbal contract which
the plaintiff has established in this case is therefore clearly independent of the main contract of
conveyance, and evidence of such verbal contract is admissible under the doctrine above stated. The
rule that a preliminary or contemporaneous oral agreement is not admissible to vary a written contract
appears to have more particular reference to the obligation expressed in the written agreement, and
the rule had never been interpreted as being applicable to matters of consideration or inducement. In
the case before us the written contract is complete in itself; the oral agreement is also complete in
itself, and it is a collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related
matters.

MARTINA YACAPIN and her husband RAMON NERI LIAN, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FAUSTINO
NERI, Defendant-Appellant.

FACTS:
 Linan and Yacapin, husband and wife, were the owners of various parcels of land which
they sold with the right of repurchase to Faustino Neri, their nephew, for Php5,000.00, agreeing to pay
quarterly an enormous "rental" for the property. On 1912, as the rent was not paid, the parties
executed a second document (Exhibit 2), increasing the amount of the debt of Php9,000. On 1913. A
third document (Exhibit 3) was executed increasing the debt to 14,000. On 1914, the amount grew to
14,000.00 so they executed a fourth document (Exhibit 4) which on its face is an absolute sale of the
property to Neri for a sale price of P19,000. Neri also agreed that he would execute another document
stating that the absolute sale was "simulated," and that plaintiffs still had the right to redeem the
property. However, Neri delayed and finally refused the execution of the last document. The spouses
then brought the present action to redeem their property.

Judge J. P. Weissenhagen held that Exhibit No. 4 was null and void as not containing the true
agreement between the parties, and ordered it cancelled. The court extended the time to repurchase,
and further held that Neris possession was in bad faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not Exhibit No. 4, the absolute sale to Neri, was null and void as not
containing the true agreement between the parties

RULING: NO. IT IS VALID.

The sale of the property was made, as Exhibit 4 shows it was made, but this final contract did
not embody in it all the terms and agreements between the parties at that time. As part of the
consideration, the real inducement on plaintiffs part for making that contract, defendant agreed to
execute another document giving plaintiffs the right to redeem the property.

The Encyclopedia of United States Supreme Court Reports, vol. 6, p. 417,

says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The most solemn transactions and judgments may, at the instance of the parties, be set aside
or rendered in operative for fraud. The fact of being a party does not estop a person from
obtaining in a court of equity relief against fraud. It is generally parties that are the victims of
fraud. The court of chancery is always open to hear complaints against it, whether committed
in pais or by means of judicial proceedings. (Johnson vs. Waters, 111 U. S., 640, 667; 28 L.
ed., 547.)"

The defendant perpetrated a fraud on his kinsmen when he failed and finally refused to put
into writing the other contract made at the same time as Exhibit 4. We are not unmindful of the fact
that we may seem to be modifying this written contract. But the evidence shows overwhelmingly that
we are simply forcing the defendant to live up to his contract in its entirety, and preventing him from
committing a fraud.

It is not a question of mutual mistake, but of a clearly established promise on the part of the
defendant to give a counter contract expressing the plaintiffs right to redeem, and that this promise
was part of the consideration, inducing the plaintiffs to execute Exhibit 4, which is an absolute sale of
the property to defendant.

The defendant was guilty of a fraud in procuring the absolute deed to the property, and he
should be compelled to perform the full terms of his contract.

DE LE RAMA v. LEDESMA

FACTS:
On August 18, 1967, Salvador de la Rama, one of the incorporators of the Inocentes de la Rama Inc.
filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental docketed as Civil Case No.
8284, concerning a money claim against Rafael Ledesma who is his own nephew and purchaser of his
shares of stock in aforesaid corporation.

In his answer, Ledesma admits the allegation in the complaint except: (a) the alleged verbal
understanding between De la Rama and himself regarding the unpaid war damage claim; (b) the
alleged equity of De la Rama in the said claim as such equity is with the corporation itself, and not
with the stockholders individually; and (c) his liability for either moral or exemplary damages, much
less for attorney's fees, the same having no basis at all in law or in fact. By way of special defense,
Ledesma claimed that the indorsement by De la Rama of the Stock Certificate in question without
qualification or condition constituted the sole and exclusive contract between the parties and to allow
De la Rama to prove any alleged simultaneous oral agreement would run counter to the Parol Evidence
Rule and the Statute of Frauds.

HELD:

There is merit in appellee's contention that the alleged oral reservation and the sale of the shares of
stock were made simultaneously and contemporaneously, so that to allow De la Rama to prove the
same would run counter to the Parol Evidence Rule.

In his brief, appellant alleged that "at the time he sold his shares of stock to the defendant in 1958 he
has reserved to himself the said benefits and to which defendant agreed." (Brief for Appellant, p. 3).
Again, in his third assignment of error he claims that the lower court erred in holding that the disputed
oral reservation, cannot be proved under the Statute of Frauds and the Parol Evidence." (Ibid., p.11.)

It is a well accepted principle of law that evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument. (American
Factors (Phil.) Inc. vs. Murphy Tire Corporation, et al. (C.A.) 49 O.G. 189.)

While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. (Yu Tek & Co. v.
Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384.) Indeed, the exceptions to the rule do not apply in the instant case, there
being no intrinsic ambiguity or fraud, mistake, or failure to express the true agreement of the parties.
If indeed the alleged reservation had been intended, businessmen like the parties would have placed
in writing such an important reservation.

G.R. No. L-46943 June 8, 1978

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ALBAY, Branch I,
presided by JUDGE ROMULO P. UNTALAN, CARMEN MYRICK SALVACION MYRICK, CELSO
MILLABAS, JOSEFINA MILLABAS, and CELERINA MILLABAS

Facts:

On September 28, 1971, respondent, filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay a complaint
to annul a supposed conditional donation of two parcels of land located at Comum Camalig, Albay, a
donation which they had allegedly made in 1963 to the Philippine National Railways (PNR). The ground
for the annulment was the alleged non-fulfillment of the five conditions of the. No deed of donation or
actionable document was annexed to the complaint. The PNR in its answer denied the donation for
lack of sufficient knowledge thereof but it contradicted 'that denial by stating in its affirmative
defenses that the donation was unconditionally made by the late Antonio J. A. Myrick and that the
plaijtiffs are guilty of laches. No deed of donation was attached to the answer to sustain the defense
that the donation was pure and unconditional. In the complaint it was alleged that Antonio was
deceased brother of plaintiffs Carmen Myrick and Salvacion Myrick but it was not alleged that he was
the donor or that the plaintiffs are his legal heirs.

At the hearing of the case on March 6 (11), 1974, while plaintiff Salvacion Myrick was testifying, she
was asked to identify a deed of donation dated August 23, 1962 made by her brother, Antonio. After
SAlvacion identified the deed of donation, her counsel asked them the conditions of the Donation, but
the PNR objected to the question, since the counsel of the respondents were trying to elicit oral
evidence which is violative of the parol evidence. However, the TC overruled the objection, and now
this petition.

Issue:

W/N the TC committed grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining the objection of the petitioner.

Held:

The plaintiffs in paragraph four of their complaint merely alleged that the donation was subject to five
conditions. Then, they prayed that the donation should be annulled or rescinded for noncompliance
with those conditions.

At the trial they tried to prove those conditions by parol evidence. Obviously, they could not introduce
parol evidence to vary the terms of the agreement because they did not plead any of the exceptions
mentioned in the parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the general rule that the contents of the
writing constitute the sole repository of the terms of the agreement between the parties.

Thus, it was held that where there is no allegation in the complaint that there was any mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement or that it failed to express the true intent of the parties, parol
evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of the agreement.

On the other hand, if the defendant set up the affirmative defense that the contract mentioned in the
complaint does not express the true agreement of the parties, then parol evidence is admissible to
prove the true agreement of the parties The plaintiffs or their predecessor, the donor, Antonio J. A.
Myrick, could have asked for the reformation of the deed of donation. Instead of doing so, they asked
for its annulment or rescission on the theory that there was non-compliance with the supra resolutory
conditions of the donation But whether the action is for revocation or reformation, it was necessary for
the plaintiffs, in order to prove that the donation was conditional, to plead that the deed of donation
did not express the true intent of the parties. Not having done so, their parol evidence on the alleged
conditions is dismissible upon seasonable objection interposed during the trial by the donee's counsel.
Other considerations may be adduced to fortify the holding that the plaintiffs cannot prove the
conditional character of the donation.

It should be observed that the action for annulment was brought by the alleged collateral relatives of
the deceased donor. Their capacity to bring the action has not been specifically pleaded .

The anomalous or odd situation in this case is that the plaintiffs belatedly filed an action to annul (not
reform) a donation made by their collateral relative. Evidently, they had no copy of the deed of
donation because they did not attach a copy thereof to their complaint. They were not cognizant of the
terms thereof. They did not know the exact date of the donation and the description, location and area
of the lands donated- They pretended that five conditions were engrafted on the deed of donation
which to the does not take any condition at all. How they came to know of those conditions, when they
were not the donors, was not pleaded in their complaint.
JULIO VS DALANDAN

FACTS:
An affidavit was subscribed and sworn to by Clemente Dalandan, deceased father of the
defendants, acknowledging that a four hectare piece of Riceland belonging to Victoriana Dalandan,
deceased mother of the plaintiff, was posted as security for an obligation which Clemente Dalandan
assumed but, however, failed to fulfill resulting to the foreclosure of said land. The document provided
that (a) he owed someone a sum of money; (b) that as security thereof, he gave a parcel of land to
the creditor; (c) that in view of his failure to pay the debt, the mortgage was foreclosed; (d) that he
felt bound by such foreclosure; (e) that he therefore promises to replace said land by another lot or
farm of approximately the same area on the condition that his children should not be forced to give
the harvest, and on the further condition that substitution should not be required immediately. After
the death of Clemente, plaintiff requested the defendants to deliver the land but they refused.

ISSUE:
Whether their trust may be proved by parol evidence.

RULING:
Defendants argue that by the express terms of Article 1443 of the Civil Code, "No express
trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parol evidence." This
argument overlooks the fact that no oral evidence is necessary.

While it is true that said deed did not in definitive words institute defendants as trustees, a
duty is therein imposed upon them when the proper time comes to turn over both the fruits and the
possession of the property to Victoria Julio. Not that this view is without statutory support. Article
1444 of the Civil Code states that: "No particular words are required for the creation of an express
trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." In reality, the development of the trust as a
method of disposition of property, so jurisprudence teaches, "seems in large part due to its freedom
from formal requirements." This principle perhaps accounts for the provisions in Article 1444 just
quoted. For, "technical or particular forms of words or phrases are not essential to the manifestation of
intention to create a trust or to the establishment thereof." Nor would the use of some such words as
"trust" or "trustee" essential to the constitution of a trust. Conversely, the mere fact that the word
"trust" or "trustee" was employed would not necessarily prove an intention to create a trust. What is
important is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship which in law
is known as a trust. It is unimportant that the trustor should know that the relationship which he
intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the
relationship which is called a trust. Here, that trust is effective as against defendants and in favor of
the beneficiary thereof, plaintiff Victoria Julio, who accepted it in the document itself.
G.R. No. L-25931 October 30, 1978

ROBERTO LABASAN, AVELINO LABASAN, JOSEFINA LABASAN, and MARCELA

COLOMA, petitioners,
vs.
ADELA LACUESTA, DOMINGA LACUESTA and NORBERTO LACUESTA,

FACTS:

On April 20, 1927, spouses Lacuesta executed a document transferring ownership of their
unregistered and irrigated land to spouses Labasan for an amount of Php 225. The document
stipulated that the amount is for an urgent need for money and that within ten years from
conveyance, the vendor shall have the right to repurchase the land. On 1943, upon the lapse of the
redemption period, Lacuesta sought to repurchase the land but Labasan refused and claimed
ownership. Hence, the complaint. The trial court ruled in favor of defendant Labasan due to
petitioners failure to repurchase within the stipulated time. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
the lower courts decision. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: What is nature of the document marked Exhibit "1-A"

RULING:

Examining Exhibit "1-A" in this case, it is evident that the terms of the document are not clear and
explicit on the real intent of the parties when they executed the aforesaid document. In view of the
ambiguity caused by conflicting terminologies in the document, it becomes necessary to inquire into
the reason behind the transaction and other circumstances accompanying it so as to determine the
true intent of the parties. Once the intent becomes clear then it shall be made to prevail over what on
its face the document appears to be. Each case is to be resolved on the basis of the circumstances
attending the transaction.

In the present case, the collective weight of the following considerations lead the Court to agree with
the findings and conclusion of the appellate court that Exhibit "1-A" is a mere loan with security
and not a pacto de retro sale.

The reason behind the execution of Exhibit "1-A" was that the Lacuestas were in "urgent necessity for
money" and had to secure a loan of P225.00 from Gelacio Labasan for which the riceland was given as
"security". In Jayme, et al. v. Salvador, et al., 1930, this Court upheld a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo which found the transaction between the parties to be a loan instead of a sale of real
property notwithstanding the terminology used in the document, after taking into account the
surrounding circumstances of the transaction. The Court through Justice Norberto Romualdez stated
that while it was true that plaintiffs were aware of the contents of the contracts, the preponderance of
the evidence showed however that they signed knowing that said contracts did not express their real
intention, and if they did so notwithstanding this, it was due to the urgent necessity of obtaining
funds. 7"Necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present emergency, will
submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them."

HENRY W. PEABODY & CO. v. J.F. BROOMFIELD AND JAMES ROSS

Facts:

This action was instituted by the plaintiff in the CFI of Manila to recover a sum of money of the
two defendants. The liability which is sought to be established is based upon a document purporting to
be a contract of guaranty signed by the two defendants.

Henry W. Peabody and & Company, a partnership having its office in the New York.
Commercial Vehicle Company (CVC), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling
automobiles and automobile supplies in the City of Manila, its purchases being made in the United
States through the plaintiff. The capital resources of CVC were apparently inadequate for the business
it was conducting and it was compelled to rely upon the credit extended to it by the plaintiff.

Agent P.M. Scott, represented the plaintiff in Manila as local manager. To be able to determine
whether orders given by CVC for goods shipped from the United States were from responsible people
must be a member of the Board of Directors (BOD) of CVC. In conformity of this provision, Scott
became a member of the BOD. However, the taking of shares by Scott was a mere formality and the
real subscriber or party in interest was the house of Henry W. Peabody & Company itself.

CVC was notified by the plaintiff that its capital must be increased, therefore a Board of
Meeting was conducted, where Edward B. Bruce, J.F. Bromfield, James Ross and P.M. Scott were
present constituting the Board of Directors. It was decided that CVC should remain firm or else the
plaintiff will discontinue or curtail its credit. CVC`s auditor and accountant was also called to make a
statement as to the company`s financial condition. He said that the company`s affairs were in an
excellent shape and that it could then be liquidated at profit.

One alternative, however, had been suggested, and was already to some extend under
consideration. This was that a few responsible persons interested in the success of the Commercial
Vehicle Company should sign a contract of guaranty, holding Henry W. Peabody & Company harmless
in case the Commercial Vehicle Company should prove unable to satisfy any debt which it might
contract with the former. In these case, Bruce, Bromfield , Ross and Scott agreed to sign the guaranty.
That Scott made this agreement is proved not only by the testimony of Ross but also by a letter
written a few days by Scott himself to Bradlee, to his own house in New York City. Bruce was the one
who prepared the agreement but upon receiving the document, Scott appears to have put it away,
without signing it himself; and it remained in his possession until produced two years later at the time
demand was made upon the guarantors for the communication acknowledging the receipt of his
document to Bruce. The record fails to show that Scott sent any written communication acknowledging
the receipt of this document to Bruce; and it can be surmised that he wished to reflect upon whether
to put his own name upon it. In the end if not at once he evidently decided not to do so. It is
possible that Scott may have imagined that his participation in the contract was waived by the failure
of Bruce, in his note of transmissal, to mention as a condition of the liability of the signatory parties
that Scott himself should also sign. At any rate, it is so contended here in behalf of the plaintiff on this
appeal; and one of the questions to be decided in this case is whether or not the delivery of the
guaranty to Scott in the manner above stated operated as a waiver of the requirement of his
signature.

Issue:

Whether or not the delivery of the guaranty to Scott in the manner above stated operated as a
waiver of the requirement of his signature.

Held:

A question has been asked as to whether it would be possible to allow a recovery in favor of
the plaintiff to the extent to which the defendant herein would have been liable if Scott had signed the
guaranty. This suggestion contemplates performance by Scott and the enforcement of the obligation
as thus reformed or completed. Apart from the fact that no such relief is sought by either litigant, it is
apparent that the facts involved supply no basis for any such equitable adjustment of liability. The
plaintiff neither asks nor offers to do equity. It stands upon its legal right under the supposed contract,
and is met by a defense based on the assertion that no contract was made. The case must, in our
opinion, be determined on the issue thus defined. In this connection it should be observed that by the
terms of the contract in question the liability of the parties was solidary and not apportionable

But the further question may be asked; Cannot the court ignore the written contract as
incomplete and yet permit recovery upon the oral contract made by the four individuals who agreed to
become guarantors? The impossibility of such a course must be apparent when it is considered that
the parties to the preliminary negotiation intended that a contract should be executed as the formal
repository of their agreement. It was, indeed, necessary that their agreement should be reduced to
writing in order to satisfy that provision of the law which says that a promise to answer for the debt or
default of another shall be unenforceable unless reduced to writing and subscribed by the party to be
charge. (Section 335, subsection 2, Code of Civil Procedure.) It is therefore evident that the parties
could not have intended that any contract should exist except that which should be executed in
accordance with this intention. Their purpose, as we have seen, failed of effect because the agent of
the plaintiff, himself one of the proposed guarantors, refrained from performing the act which would
have made him liable with the other signatory parties. The necessary consequence, in our opinion, is
that no action can be maintained by the plaintiff either on the preliminary verbal agreement or the
imperfect contact which failed of effect.

It is no doubt true that if the three gentlemen who signed the contract (Exhibit B) had so
desired, they could upon learning of Scott's failure to sign the document, have forced him to sign it or
return it to them; and this could have been accomplished by legal action, supposing that the parties
could have had access to his letter file and have obtained the communication to Bradlee in which the
making of the agreement is admitted in writing. We are unable, however, to see that this circumstance
strengthens the case of the plaintiff company as against them.

From what has been said it is apparent that the trial court committed no error in absolving the
defendants.
LAND SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (LSDC) vs. GARCIA PLANTATION
CO., INC.

G.R. No. L-17820

April 24, 1963

FACTS:

This is a case of specific performance of contract filed by LSDC against Garcia Plantation for the
recovery of the sum of P5,955.30, representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of two
tractors, bought by Garcia Plantation from LSDC.

Defendant admitted the execution of the two promissory notes.

when the plaintiff presented Atty. Lucido A. Guinto, Legal Officer of the Board of Liquidators, to
testify on the true agreement and the intention of the parties at the time the letter was drafted
and prepared, the lower court, upon the objection of the counsel for defendants, ruled out said
testimony and prevented the introduction of evidence under the parol evidence rule (Sec. 22, Rule
123).

THE LOWER COURT dismissed the case, stating that the action was premature.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in excluding parol evidence

HELD:

Yes.
The lower court should have admitted the parol evidence sought to be introduced to prove the failure
of the document in question to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. It should not
have improvidently and hastily excluded said parol evidence, knowing that the subject-matter treated
therein, was one of the exceptions to the parol evidence rule. When the operation of the contract is
made to depend upon the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent,
such may be established by parol evidence. This is not varying the terms of the written contract by
extrinsic agreement, for the simple reason that there is no contract in existence; there is nothing to
which to apply the excluding rule.

Market Developers INC. v IAC

FACTS:

June 20, 1978, petitioner Market Developers, Inc. (MADE) entered into a written barging and to wage
contract with private respondent Gaudioso Uy for the shipment of the former's cargo from Iligan City
to Kalibo, Aklan, at the rate of P 1.45 per bag.

The petitioner was allowed 4 lay days and agreed to pay demurrage at the rate of P5,000.00 for every
day of delay, or in excess of the stipulated allowance. On June 26, 1978, Uy sent a barge and a
tugboat to Iligan City and loading of the petitioner's cargo began immediately. It is not clear who
made the request, but upon completion of the loading on June 29, 1978, the parties agreed to divert
the barge to Culasi, Roxas City, with the cargo being consigned per bill of lading to Modem Hardware
in that City. This new agreement was not reduced to writing.

The shipment arrived in Roxas City on July 13, 1978, and the cargo was eventually unloaded and duly
received by the consignee. There is some dispute as to the timed consumed for such unloading. At any
rate, about six months later, Uy demanded payment of demurrage charges in the sum of 40,855.40
for an alleged delay of eight days and 4/25 hours.

MADE ignored this demand, UY filed suit. Was sustained by the trial court, which ordered the
petitioner to pay him the said amount with interest plus 40000 attorneys fee and cost of the suit. The
decision was fully affirmed on appeal to the respondent court, which is the reason of this petition.
Agreeing with the trial court, the respondent court held that since the diversion of the cargo to Roxas
City was not covered by a new written agreement, the original agreement must prevail.
It is this conclusion that is now disputed by the petitioner, which contends that the first written
contract was replaced by a new verbal agreement that did not contain any stipulation for demurrage.

ISSUE:

W/N parol evidence in the case is applicable.

HELD:

The contract executed by MADE and Uy was a contract of affreightment. As defined, a contract of
affreightment is a contract with the shipowner to hire his ship or part of it, for the carriage of goods,
and generally takes the form either of a charter party or a bin of lading.

Article 652 of the Code of Commerce provides that "a charter party must be drawn in duplicate and
signed by the contracting parties" and enumerates the conditions and information to be embodied in
the contract, including "the lay days and extra lay days to be allowed and the demurrage to be paid
for each of them."

But while the rule clearly shows that this kind of contract must be in writing, the succeeding Article
653 just as clearly provides:

If the cargo should be received without a charter party having been signed, the contract shall be
understood as executed in accordance with what appears in the bill of lading, the sole evidence of title
with regard to the cargo for determining the rights and obligations of the ship agent, of the captain
and of the charterer.

The court read this last provision as meaning that the charter party may be oral, in which case the
terms thereof, not having been reduced to writing, shall be those embodied in the bill of lading.

The parol evidence rule is clearly inapplicable because that involves the verbal modification usually not
allowed a written agreement admittedly still valid and subsisting. In the case at bar, the first written
agreement had not merely been modified but actually replaced by the second verbal agreement, which
is perfectly valid even if not in writing like the first. As has been correctly held:

No principle of law makes it necessary that a new contract upon the same subject between the same
persons shall be reduced to writing because the old contract was written.

Regarding the bill of lading, an examination thereof will reveal that there is no condition or
requirement therein for the payment of demurrage charges. Under the afore-quoted Article 653 of the
Code of Commerce, therefore, there was no reason to read any stipulation for demurrage into the
second contract.
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.
121506

FACTS:

Sometime in 1949, officers of the National Airport Corporation informed the owners of the
various lots surrounding the Lahug Airport that the government will purchase their lands for the
expansion of the airport.

Initially, Inez Ouano did not want to sell her property because she does not have enough to
bequeath to her grandchildren and the price offered by the government was very low but she agreed
because the government was going to expropriate it anyway. She was also reassured by the promise
that the land will be returned to her when not in use.

Eufemio Vercide, one of the affected landowners testified that in a meeting called by the NAC,
the landowners were given documents to sign, and he asked for a rider or certification which would
indicate that the land will be returned to him should it not be used by the airport. The Deed of Sale of
the property of Inez did not have any rider as that of Vercide.

When private respondents learned that other landowners were able to recover their property and
that Pres Aquino ordered that Lahug Airport will be transferred in Mactan, they wrote to Capt. Oppus
thay they intend to repurchase the property owned by Inez. This was denied because the Deed of Sale
does not contain any right to repurchase thus properties had become absolute properties of NAC.

HELD:

Under the parol evidence rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced
into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be,
between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than
the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain
or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, the failure of the
written agreement to express the true intent of the parties thereto. In the case at bench, the fact
which private respondents seek to establish by parol evidence consist of the agreement or
representation made by NAC that induced Inez Ouano to execute the deed of sale; that the vendors
and their heirs are given the right of repurchase should the government no longer need the
property. Where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the moving cause of the written contract, or
where the parol agreement forms part of the consideration of the written contract, and it appears that
the written contract was executed on the faith of the parol contract or representation, such evidence is
admissible. It is recognized that proof is admissible of any collateral parol agreement that is
not inconsistent with the terms of the written contract though it may relate to the same
subject matter. The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not
extend so far as to preclude the admission of existing evidence to show prior or
contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such evidence may
be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to
such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity.[

More importantly, no objection was made by petitioner when private respondents

introduced evidence to show the right of repurchase granted by the NAC to Inez Ouano. It
has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the
admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, and if not so made, it will be
understood to have been waived.

ABRENICA v. GONDA, G.R. No. 10100

FACTS:

The plaintiff filed an action to compel the defendant to return to him two parcels of land which
he alleged were sold by him under right of repurchase to the defendant on February 21, 1916, for the
sum of P75 and for the period of seven years. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant refused to
deliver said property to him when, upon the expiration of the period mentioned, he endeavored to
redeem the same and tendered payment to the defendant of the sum aforesaid.
 Manuel Gonda, who had already sold said parcels to the other defendant Marcelino de Gracia,
alleged that about 19 years ago he was the sole possessor and owner of said parcels, and in the
course of the trial endeavored to prove that they had been sold to him by the plaintiff and his mother.

ISSUE:

Whether the court founded its judgment on inadmissible and illegal evidence which was
rejected by the same court during the course of the trial?

RULING:

Now then, it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection
against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, and that if not so made, it
will be understood to have been waived. The proper time to make a protest or objection is when, from
the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the
proof, the inadmissiblity of the evidence is, or may be, inferred.

A motion to strike out parol or documentary evidence from the record is useless and
ineffective if made without timely protest, objection, or opposition on the part of the party against
whom it was presented.

It is held in general that by failing to object to the proof of an oral contract a party waives the
benefit of the statute and cannot afterward claim it.

As no timely objection or protest was made to the admission of the testimony of the plaintiff
with respect to the contract; and as the motion to strike out said evidence came too late; and,
furthermore, as the defendants themselves, by the cross-questions put by their counsel for the
witnesses in respect to said contract, tacitly waived their right to have it stricken out, that evidence,
therefore, cannot be considered either inadmissible or illegal, and court, far from having erred in
taking it into consideration and basing his judgment thereon, notwithstanding the fact that it was
ordered to be stricken out during the trial, merely corrected the error he committed in ordering it to
be so stricken out and complied with the rules of procedure herein before cited.