32. Proceedings: ‘Buddhism into the Year 2000° ! 2 The Sarvastivada and its Critics: Anatmavada and the Theory of Karma Prof, Ales Sanderion “The Sarvastivada, one of the main divisions of the earliest (non-Mahayénist) Buddhism, i notable for the emphasis which it places onthe ABhidharma ts Abidharmapitaka survives ‘with exegesis culminating in the system of the Kashmirian Vaibhasikas expounded in the Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu. Like the Theravadins, the Sarvistivadin Vaibhasikas deny that an unchanging ‘Self [stman, pudgala} i the basis of personality and explain how past (orpresent) action (karma) can bea fruit in the present (or future) simply on the basis ofthe doctrine of Dependent Origination (prattyasamutpada). They also agree with all other Buddhist schools that only intentional actions can lead to retribution: “It is intention [cetana], O monks, that I call Karma” (AN 3, 415). They differ, however, in ther view ofthe mechanism of retibution and in their analysis of action itself. The frst follows their doctrine that phenomena (dharma) exist not merely in the present but also in the future and the past (the sarvastivads). They claim that the transience (anityata] taught by the Buddha refers 10 their present activity [kartra] and not thei existence itself. This enables them to say that a karma inits present mode establishes a connection with is future consequence and in its past ‘mode stimulates that consequence to pass from latency to present actuality. The action itself they analyse int intention and the deed itself, the first a mental phenomenon (caitt and the second a configuration of mailer [rapasamsthanal. In certain cases a self-reproducing {imperceptible form of the latter is believed to arise, an avijapti or ‘non-commiunicator’, Which amounts to an enduring and in some cases growing state of responsibility or ‘eservingness. Inhis commentary on his Abhidharmakosa Vasubandhu presents Sauirantika (Sotra-based) critique of the Kashmitian Vaibhasika doctrines, which accuses it of obscuring the simplicity and economy ofthe Abhidharmic teachings found inthe Soras. The theory of existence in all three times i rejected fora doctrine of momentary existence in which karmic retribution is explained as the culmination ofa gradual change in achain of momentary mind events initiated by the action [citasamtanaparinama). The dichotomy between (mental) intention and (material) deed is rejected: there is only intention, latent and active. The ‘material av jigptis go t00. The facts which they are supposed to explain are accommodated in the model of gradual change initiated in tre flux of mental events. However, both ‘Vaibhasika and Sautrintika accounts of karma ate compromised by aecommodating certain beliefs which cannot be justified in terms ofthe intentionalism ofthe philosophical theory, ‘rescued on Febuary 1990 in Banghok Tala tthe First Ietematonl Conference Buddhism no she ‘Yeor 3h hosted bythe Dramakye Foundation Veaiese canespondence and ren teguss to Profesor Alexis endenca, All Souls College, Oxford OXVEAL, Unned Ringo * (2 o94'by te Diamnakaya Foundation, Klong Sam, Khlong Luang Patan 12120, Thailand34 Proceedings: ‘Buddhism into the Year 2000" notably the beliefs that a donor benefits karmically every time his donation is used by a beneficiary even if he is unaware ofthat use, and that a person who instigates someone to ‘comnmita murder is more karmically disadvantaged ifthe sssaultis successful than itis not Vasubandhu’s commentary on his Abhidharmakosshowsthathe sawareof these difficulties, hut he doce not pretend to solve them. Rath Vaibhtsila and Sautrantike approashor are thoroughly exegetical. They will not jettison a belief supported by the Satras even though it appears to contradict the fundamental teaching. ‘Mahayanists refer to as the Sravakayana or Hinayana, only the Theravada survivesasaliving religion, being practisedin Sri Lanka, Thailand and other parts of Southeast Asia. For knowledge of the other non-Mahayanist Buddhist sects ‘which once flourished on the Indian subcontinent and beyond we depend entirely on ‘what has survived oftheir literature or, in some cases, on Second hand accounts oftheir doctrines found in the writings of those who opposed their views.’ Within this literature one of these sects stands out by reason of the thoroughness with which it systematized its interpretations of the Abhidharma: the sect of the Sarvastivadins. This is the only nikaya apart from the Theravada whose Tripiaka canon survives in its entirety. We also have much of its extensive corpus of post-canonical Abhi dharmic Sistras. The Sarvastivadin Vinaya flourshed principally, though not exclusively, in the northwestem regions of the Indian subcontinent, particularly in Gandhara and Kashmir: The cause of the separation of the first Sarvastivadins from the Theravada (Sthaviravada) is said by unconfirmed and dubious tradition to have been a dispute over a point of Abhidharmic doctrine. It arose, we are told, in the middle of the thd century B.C. between Maudgaliputra-Tisya (Moggaliputta-Tissa) and Katyayaniputra and concemed the existential status ofthe past and the future. To Maudgaliputra-Tisya is ascribed the view known as the vibhajyavada, namely that what exists [ast] is only whatever is in present time, together with a part of what is past, that is, those past intentional actions, good [kusala] or bad [akusala], wrich have not yet given birth to the reward or punishment which are their effects. Against this view, which is that of the Theravada, Katyayaniputra and those that sided with him are said to have insisted ‘on the sarvastivada, ‘the doctrine that everything exists [whether it be present, past ot future].’* According to this view all future events already exist and all past events Continue to exist, not merely those past actions which have yet to bear fruit. The transient existence of an event in present time is seen as just one mode of an eternal existence, its momentary point of passage from existeace in the future to existence in the past Four facts are given by the Sarvastivadins as proof of this doctrine of the real ‘existence of all past and future phenomena, The first is a passage from their Sut rapitaka (‘Samyuktagama 3, 14) in which the Buddha Himself is taken as teaching ‘explicitly that past and future matter [rapa] really exist. The second is a canonical @ eceres ‘Mahayanist Buddhism, which the The Sarvastivada and its Critics 35 passage in which the Buddha teaches the same fact by implication when He says that the arising of any cognition depends on two conditions: the cognitive faculty and its ‘object. Ifthe Buddha had held that past and future phenomena were non-existent, He would nothave said this. Why ? Because mental cognition [manoviiaiana]isone of the forms of cognition, Since He held that it arises, He must have believed that past and future phenomena exist, since these are its objects. ‘These two proofs are scriptural. They are backed up by twonon-seriptural arguments, ‘The firstisas follows. A cognition arises only when there exists an object of cognition Past and future phenomena are cognized, therefore they exist. The seconds that if past events were non-existent a good or evil action could not have an effect in the future, For at the time at which the reward or retribution should arise the action supposed to be the cause of this outcome [ vipakaheru] would have ceased o exist: only an existent ‘cause can give rise to an effect.’ ‘The Sarvastivadins were unique among the sects in taking their name from an Abhidharmic doctrine; and indeed, it was in the seven treatises which compose their ‘Abhidharmapitaka that they deviated most from the other sects. The most fundamental of these seven canonical works is the JAanaprasthana, This, expains Yasomitra, i the “body” ofthe Abhidharma collection, the other six works being the ‘feet’ on which it restsTn Kashmir in about 200 CE. an enormous collective commentary on the Jana- prasthana was composed. This great work, the Mahavibhasa or Vibhaga, is the source Of the name Vaibhasika, ‘adherent of the Vibhasa’ or ‘expert in the Vibhasa” under ‘which the Sarvastivadins are generally known in subsequent accounts ofthe varieties of Buddhist doctrine ‘The Abhidharma texts and the Mahavibhasa were composed in Sanskrit; but apart. from fragments none of them survives except in Chinese, and, in one case, Tibetan translations. However the Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu survives in the original Sanskrit, together with the author's own commentary [-bhasya and the commentary ‘of Yasomitra [-vyakhya (sphutartha)]. This masterly work was composed in the fourth century CE! It presents a systematic account of Vaibhasika Abhidharma in some six hundred (598) verses and elaborates, defends and occasionally criticises its doctrines in the prose autocommentary. The tendency of Vasubandhu’s criticisms is Sautran- tika, a term to whose meaning I shall return, Also Sautrantika is a chapter appended to the commentary in which he refutes the soul-doctrine [pudgalavada, atmavada] of the heretical Buddhist sect of the Vatsiputriyas and that ofthe system of Brahmanical philosophy known as Vaisesika. Vasubandhu refers tothe doctrine he expounds in the verses as ‘the system of the Kashmirian Vaibhasikas’ [kasmiravaibhasika), thereby excluding the tradition of certain non-Kashmirian sub-schools and emphasising the pre-eminence of the Kashmirian scholastic tradition,” His work and that of his ‘commentator Yasoritra are the main basis of the following account of Sarvastivadin doctrine and its Sautrantika critique In this paper the purpose is to consider first how the Vaibhasikas resolved the problem of karma and then to consider the Sautrantika critique oftheir solution. The ‘word “problem ie used because the theory of karma seems at first eight to call into36 Proceedings: ‘Buddhism into the Year 2000 question the truth of two fundamental tenets of Buddhist doctrine: first that all Conditioned things [samskirah] are impermanent [anityah" and second that all phenomena [dharma] are impersonal [anatmana." Intentional actions [cetayitva karma are conditioned events. They ae therefore impermanent. How. then. can they fect the present after their occurrence? And if ll plenomena are impersonal, how an we hold that past actions affect not just the preseat but the present ofthe person who intended the action? The problem was real, both within Buddhism itself, and in relation the non-Budghist, Brahmanical schools of thought. Within Buddhism there were the Arya-simmatiyas of the Vatsiputriya Nikaya, an offshoot of the Sarvast- -vadins, who held thatthe Satras doin fact teach the existence of a personal identity, ‘self [pudgala] whichis the ground and suppor {astaya] of changing mental states. Moreover, they used the theory of karmic retribution as evidence to support theit doctrine.” Outside Buddhism were the various schools of Brahmanical thought, all of which taught some variety of the doctrine thatthe basisorsource of consciousness and action isan eternal (nitya) Self that remembers, recognizes and experiences the effects of its past. ‘THE SARVASTIVADA'S THEORY OF KARMA Anatmavada ‘Vasubandhu begins his refutation ofthese Buddhist ard non-Buddhistsoul-doctrines, with the following: Is there no liberation {possible} in any system otherthan this? There isnot. Why 0? Because [the followers of the inferior religion (Yasomitra: kutirthyal)] do not recognize that that to which they apply the term ‘self’ is nothing more than a series of constituents [skandhasamtana]. What, then {, do they recognize)? ‘They wrongly believe that their identity [atman] isa distinct reality [dravyant ara) [over and above this series]. And from [this] clinging to a Self arse the Allictions [klesal His commentator Yagomitra quotes a hymn to Sakyamuni by the poet Matrceta: ‘The sequence of births does not come to an end Soong 3s the mind retains an sense of personality (1) [ahamkara]. And this sense cannot leave one’s awareness if one believes inthe Self Doctrine. And since no teacher in the world bbut{¥ou) has taught the Doctrine of Selflessness (naratmya vain} there can be rno Way out but Yours.* ‘The Buddha's teaching that all phenomena are impersonal. (sarve dharma anaumnal| means that there is no phenomenon which is 3 Person inthe sense of an entity other than the transient constituents of personality, nor any such entity within or behind phenomena. * ‘Self is purely nominal [prajiaptisat]. Ordinary people and saints alike use it and other terms expressing personal identity,” but the reality {aravyasar] to which the name's applied [prajapyate)is actually this or that sequence of everchanging associations between five changing factors [skandha]: the body or matter [ropa], feelings [vedana], perceptions {samjial, voltions [samskara] and Cognitions [fan The Sarvastivada and its Critics 37 Pratityasamutpaida It was, says Vasubandhu, precisely to counter this idea that the factors constituting individuals require and presuppose a ‘Self” as their basis that the Buddha taught His, doctrine of dependent origination [pratitvasamutpada. The essence of tis doctrine i thatthe coherence of phenomena isnot the result ofan unchanging and transcendental ‘element which unifies them from within but comes about simply because these phenomena are causally related: when A is present B arises." Dharmas ‘There is then no agent of action kartf],only actions arising as transient events within continuum of causally connected states. What, then, isan action? To understand the \Vaibhasikas" answer to this question their classification of phenomena must be understood. This differsin mportantrespects from that ofthe Theravadin Abhidharma and from that accepted by the Sautrantikas. Whatever exists i in one of two classes. Itis ether the result of causes and conditions [samskrtal" or itis not [asamsktal. Three things are not the result of causes and conditions. They are space {akasa]® and the two non-occurrences [nirodha].* The two are: 1. ‘non-occurrence (of the defilements {les} brought about through wisdom’ [pratisamkhyanirodhal, and? ‘non-occurrence as a result'of something other than wisdom’ (apratisam-khyanirodhal. The first is, in the highest case, the nirvana attained by an Arhat while still in his body [sopadhisesanirvanadhatu). The second is the non-occurrence that pertains, for ‘example, t0 all the other consciousnesses that would have ocurred if one kind of consciousness, say a visual consciousness of yellow, had not arisen, orto all the life experiences that would have occurred in a particular incarnation if untimely death hhad_not intervened. ‘These three causally unconditioned [asamskyta] phenomena and one phenomenon which is causally conditioned are free of defilement [andsrava]. This causally conditioned butundefiled dharmais the fourth Trathof the Noble [aryasatyal, the Path tothe Cessation of Suffering [marga}. All other phenomena, ie.allcausally conditioned phenomena except the Path, are defiled [sasraval.” Causally conditioned pheniomena are classified into three types. They are ether (i) material [ripa, (i) mental (ita + catta /caitasa(cittasamprayukta), or (ii) neither ‘material nor mental. ‘These last are termed “conditioned phenomena which are not involved in cognition’ [cittaviprayuktah samskara].™ As Yasomitra explains, they resemble mental phenomena in that they are immaterial [artpin), yet they are unlike ‘mental phenomena proper, such a feelings and volitions, because they do not arise at the same time as cognitions and with reference to the same faculty and object The most basic of these phenomena are sentences [padakiyal, words [namakaya} and letters (vyarijanakaya}, the similarity which defines an animate creature [sativa] 3s a member of @ pamticular species [(nikaya)sabhagatal, the four characteristics {Uaksana] of any conditioned phenomena, namely bieth [jt continuance (sthiti, decline Jara], and impermanence [anityatal, and the socalled “possessions” [prapt and non: possessions" [apraptil which are believed toarise whenever any phenomenon, Conditioned or unconditioned, occurs or does nut occur in a individual seam of38 Proceedings: Buddhism into the Year 2000" conscious existence» Karma Vasubanls begins his exposition of dae subject of karma withthe assertion that itis, the karmas, the actions of sentient beings alone that are responsible for the diversity Of the incarnations of these beings and indeed for the diversity of the universe itself, ‘which exists solely as the receptacle of their experiences (bhijanalokal.” Just as the Self of the Brahmanical schools is ncthing but the Five Factors of Personality {skandha}, so the role which the majority of these schools assign to a world-creating ‘and administering God [Ivara] is taken in Buddhism by the actions of these same 'Self’-less persons. ‘What, then, isan action? It is divided by the Vaibhasikas into two parts: the intention {cetana] which initiates the action and the intended action itself [cetanakytam, cetayitva karma). The intention constitutes action in thought [ménasam karma] and the action which arises from itis either verbal or bodily.” The intention is a mental phenomenon, a citasamprayukta, whereas the verbal or bodily actions which it may initiate are purely material. It may be ethically good [kusala], bad [akusala] or indeterminate [avyakrta Avijnapti Any action of either ofthese two kinds, the verbal or the bodily, is a vijfapti, that is, tosay,anaction which communicates itselfby being audible or visible. [the intention, which gives rise to itis ethically good or bad and not merely indeterminate, then, provided iti intense enough or sufficiently meritorious or sinful in itself, there will also arise a verbal or bodily ‘non-cormmunicator’ [avijtapt),an intemal action which does not communicate itself to anybody else nor, in all cases, to the agent /himself, as we shall see.” Itrises from the communicated action; and, like that action, itis ethically charged." It also resembles that action in that itis an entity under the category of matter (rapa) rather than thought.” However itis unlike such action in that itis perceptible only to the mind and not io the senses.» Itis also different in that iis, self-reproducing [anubandha, pravahal. whereas the outward action is a single, transient event.” In order to remain associated with the skandha-series ofthe individual the avijfapti requires the help of *possessions’ [prapti, those phenomena neither material nor mental (cittaviprayukia] which the Vaibhasikas believe to be necessary if am phenomenon is to belong and continue tobelong to the personality stream in which it ‘The Vaibhasikas’ main arguments for the existence of these non-communicators are the following! 1. If there were no non-communicators, there could be no Pratimoksa cipline, Only ifthe act of undertaking the Buddhist vows to abstain from various actions gives rise to a continuous stream of non-communicated acts of abstention” [viratilaksana avijfaptayah), can we explain how it is that those who have taken these vows are always responsible for any infringement even though they may be unconscious of their vows atthe time when the infringement occurs, Similarly, to take professions at a The Sarvastivida and its Critics 39 the other extreme of the scale of morality, when a person commits himself to murder, theft, hunting or the like as his livelihood this conscious act of non-abstention {avirati| is followed by a stream of ‘non-abstentional non-communicators’ [avirat aksand avijtaptayab] which make him a murderer, thief, or hunter etc. even When he isnot actually committing the sins in question.” 2. If there were no non-communicators, the Buddha would not have taught in the ‘Mahacundasitra that the merit [pupya] that comes to a person who does some pious fact such as donating a garden (drdma] or a monastery to the Sarigha, goes on steadily increasing [pupyavrddh after the act and does so whether the donor is walking or sitting, awake or asleep." The point ofthis argument is the belief thatthe merit eared by such a pious donation is augmented with every use that the beneficiary or beneficiaries make of it. Meritof this kind is called paribhoganvayam punyam, ‘merit, determined by profitable use’ and is distinguished from that derived from such actions ‘as donations to shrines [caitya], in which there is no beneficiary, and in which, therefore, such merit as there is derives solely from the act of surrendering ownership [parityaganvayam punyam). The problem to be explained, then, is the following. If such actions are analysable into nothing but initial intentions {cetana) and the manifest ‘acts which result from them, how could the subsequent use ofagiftby othershave any ‘ongoing karmic consequences for the donor? The Vaibhasikas argue that this problem ‘canbe olved only by assuming that anon-manifestaction-matter,anon-communicator, arises in the stream of the donor every time his gift is enjoyed by another stream. Demeritorious non-communicators of this sort can also arise. This occurs ifthe piftis for an immoral purpose, as is the case in the founding of a Hindu temple in which animal sacrifices will occur.” 3. If there were nonon-communicators, one would escape the karmic consequences of an evil action by having it done by someone else.* In fact, at the moment that a ‘murder is accomplished on a person's instructions an avijfapti arises inthe stream of the instigator, making him a murderer, ‘These arguments also exemplify the classification of non-communicators into three kinds: restraint [samara], non-testraint [asamvara] or neither (naivasamvarasarn- vara]. These pertain respectively to the following three classes of individuals: 1.monks (bhiksu]. nuns [bhiksunil, male novices [sramanera], female probationers [siksamana], female novices [Srimanerikal. male and female lay Buddhists [upasaka, upasika), and male lay Buddhists observing the twenty-four hour fasts [upavasaka, upavasastha, all these, with the exception of the last, having adopted lifelong abstentional vows (pratimoksasamvara] of varying degrees of rigou 2.those such as fishermen and hunters who have committed themselves tolivelihoods that are the antithesis of Buddhist morality: and; 3.the mass of humanity, which falls between these extremes of virtue and sin (madhyastha}. ‘When a person takes Buddhist vows {samvara] or adopts sinfullivelihood, stream ‘of non-communicators will always be initiated. But morally determinate actions of other kinds, committed not only by those who have adopted neither Buddhist nor40. Proceedings: Buddhism into the Year 2000" sinful vocations [naivasarp varasamvarasthal but al by those who have, will give rise tocorresponding non-communicators only under either of two conditions. The first is thatthe manifest action must have been strongly intended. Itmust have been prompted by an exceptionally pure or defiled state of mind [prasadavegs, klesavega). ‘The second is that the manifest action must be particularly virtuous or sinful, A\non- communicator will always arise,even ifthe intention behind the action ishalf hearted, if tis one of alist of charitable donations that benefit the Buddhist Sangha or needy _monks, if it is some pious act such as worshipping a Stapa, if itis a pious vow, for ‘example, not tocat without first venerating the Buddha, or isone of the major sins such as murder, ‘The function of avijnaptimatter [rapa] isto accommodate beliefs which suppose the existence of ethical states independent of consciousness. Now, what these beliefshave in common is that they more or less blatantly contiadict the general Buddhist theory of action, Thus, if itis intention that is all-importent, as this theory maintains, why should the sin of one who instigates a murder be dependent to any extent on whether ‘or not the person engaged to carry out the murder succeeds or fails; why should merit accrue to a donor whenever his gift is used, after the initial intention has expressed itselfin the physical and verbal act of giving: and way should being a Buddhist [sam- vara] or a professional sinner [asarnvara] be considered a moral state over and above the states of mind in which this or that action is performed? Retribution Avijtaptis are only actions of another kind. They make retribution possible in certain ‘cases, but only because one cannot have retribution without an action. The problem. remains: how itis that actions can give rise to consequences after they have ceased 10 exist? The Vaibhasikas’ answer lies not in a particular class of phenomena but rather intheir view nature of any phenomenon. As we have seen earlier, they argued thatthe fact that past intentional actions give rise to effects in the present is one ofthe proofs of the sarvastivada, the doctrine that phenomena exist not merely in the present but also in the future, before they are present, and in the past after they are present no more, ‘They cite the following scriptural verse: Actions do not cease to exist even after thousands of millions of aeons. It is certain that once they obtain the right moment ard all the necessary conditions they subject creatures to their [inevitable] effects Actions, then, are etemal. To exist is their nature [svabhava] regardless of whether they are in the past, the present, or the future. When the Buddha taught that all ‘conditioned phenomena are transitory He was referring only to the process by which all phenomena have been, are, or will be briefly present after having been future and before becoming past. He did not mean that phenomena exist only fora moment after and before their nonexistence in the future and the past respectively. When an intentional action, good or bad, is occurring in the present, it is said to establish a relation with its still future effect, to “seize” or “anticipate” it. with the result that thie effect will pass at some future moment from inefficacious existence to efficacious ‘existence {kartra). When that moment is at hand, the intentional action, which is now The Sarvastivada and its Critics 41 E Al RITIQUE fers cht Gna SS ee obscured the simplicity of the Abhidharmic teachings found in the Satras them. st i st Role Securrence caused by factors other than wisdom” [apratisamkhyanirodha}: this t00 ‘Vebesitas namely te five sene-organ [indrja andthetivekindsofsese-obeet Oe42. Proceedings: ‘Buddhism into the Year 2000° Lvisayal. rejecting their eleventh, the imperceptible avijiapt. They claimed, as we shall see, that the circumstances cited by the Vaibhasikas as evidence of its existence ‘can be explained in purely mental terms. ‘The Sautrintikas also rejected the Vaibhasikas’ dichotomy between actions intention and action as matter. Motivated action, they said, is intention [cetana) throughout. Beginning as resolve [sammkalpacerana] it develops to become verbal or physical Ikriyacecana).* Finally, end most radically, they threw out the doctrine of the existence of phenomena in the past and future, They held that when the Buddha taught that Phenomenz are impermanent He meant that they cease instantaneously and spontaneously as soon as they arise.* The Vaibhasikas” operation in the present {karitra] was also momentary [ksanika}; but their moment [ksana] wasa finite division of time equal to 0.013333 of a second, and therefore infinitely divisible.» For the Sautrantikas, however, a moment is indivisible, like a mathematical point in space. ‘The Vaibhdsikas’ phenomenon, though it was brief enough in its state of activity in the present, had to dwell there long enough tobe the substrate of the four marks of a conditione¢ entity: birth, continuance, decay and impermanence. For the Sautran- tikas, as wehave seen, these marks, being among the cittaviprayukta dharmas, do not really exist (dravyasat]. They exist only nominally [prajlaptisa|: nothing really waits forits end, ‘or however brief a span of time; nor is there any cause ofits destruction, Its cessation is spontaneous, How, then, does the Sautrantika account for the process of karmic retribution taught inthe Sutras? He does so through the theory of ‘the final, critical state [-visesa] of a process of change (parindma] [initiated by intentional action] in the series of [momentary] mental events’ [cittasamténaparindmavisess].* An intentional action, though momentary {ksanika},isa ‘seed’ [bij] which initiates gradual transformation {parinama inthe series of subsequent mind-events; and his ransformationculminates al some future time to give rise in the next moment to the fruition of that action as reward or punishment. The intentional action is necessary ifthe effect isto arise; but itdoes not need, asthe Vaibhasika argued, tocontinue toexistat the time that the effect, arises. The action isto itseffect as the seed is to the fruit: between the two lie processes of gradual transformation [parinamal.* In his Molamadhyamakarika Nagarjuna shows hhow the Sautrantika sees his answer to the problem as avoiding the two extremes of cteralism [sasvatavada] and annihilationism [ucchedavida]:* If [, a8 the Vaibhasika maintains.) an action continued to exist (after its ‘occturren:e] up to the time ofits consequence, it would have to be eternal." If on the otherhand) it ceased to exist [after its occurrence}, then being non-existent what consequence could it produce? (The Sautrantika denies this latter consequence:} The seed initiates a series fof stages} beginning with germination. Itisfromthat series [rather than from the seed] thatthe fruit arises; butthat series does not develop unless there is a seed to start it. Because the series arses from the eed and the Iruitarises irom the series, the Iruitdepends onthe seed, but [the seed] is neither utterly annihilated nor eternal. (Likewise, a mind-event [citta} es ‘The Sarvastivida and its Critics 43 in which there is a good or bad intention} initiates a series of mind-events [citasartna). Its from this [series] thatthe consequence [good or bad, in gooc fr bad incamations} comes about: butthe (series] doesnot get under way without the [initial] mind-event. Because the series arises from the mind-event and the ‘consequence arises from the series, the consequence dependson the [intentional ‘tion: but [the action] is neither utterly annihilated [in the sense that ithas no effect] nor eternal CONCLUSION ‘The Vaibhasika project is primarily exegetical: itoutlines and defends what it sees as the system of the canon itself, It offers this system as a comprehensive description of. cextra-textual reality, because it believes that the Buddha's system isthe only true and truly liberating doctrine; but it demonstrates the necessity of its categories from the ‘evidence of the word ofthe Buddha, Everywhere we encounterarguments in the form: if X were not so, the Buddha would not have made the following statement(s). Inthe introduction to his commentary on his Abhidharmakosa Vasubandhu explains the ‘meaning of the work's ttle in a manner which makes his own commitment to this exegetical perspective entirely clear. He tells us thatthe title Abhidharmakosa means ‘Abhidharma-Sheath and that this is open to two analyses: “The Sheath {kosa} ofthe [Sword which sthe] Abhidharma’ and [The Sword] whose sheathis the Abhidharma’, where Abhidharma means the Abhidharmapitaka. Both senses, he explains, express the fact that his work presents the essential teachings of that partof the Tripitaka, apart considered by the Kasmira-Vaibhasikas, whose view he is representing, to be the ‘word of the Buddha himself. ‘This desire to reflect the teachings of the Buddha is a desire to show their comglete ‘and systematic nature. The Sarvastivadin Abhidharmapitaks reflected by Vasubardhu isitself asystematization ofthe teachings ofthe Sutras, and one which goes far beyond the meaning and implications of those early texts, as both the Sautrantika and the indifferent philologist would agree: they do not support the sarvastivada, the aij- jiaptis, or the various phenomena neither mental nor material among which we find the praptis. Nonetheless, the Sotras remain the ultimate point of reference; and be iefs originating from, or supported by Sutra passages are allowed to compromise what ‘might otherwise have been a more symmetrical doctrine. We have seen evidence of this in the Vaibhagikas’ arguments for the existence of avijiaptis. The theory of intention [cetana], which appears to be the very heart of the Buddhist doctrine of action, is tacitly pushed aside by beliefs which entail aless rational, moremagical view ‘of karmic consequences. "The Sautrantikas” point of view might have been expected to be more consisent. Disearding many of the categories sanctified by the Sarvistivadin tradition they offered a more economic and coherent model of change and responsibility which, as they claimed, was certainly closer tothe position ofthe Sutras. However, their desire for coherence did not tempt them to explain away the maladjusted karma beliefs that ‘appear in these Vaibhasika arguments for the existence of av/napuis. They deny the Conclusion: what the Vaibhasikas call avijaptis are for them simply changes44 Prozeedings: ‘Buddhism into the Year 2000" {parinama) in the stream of consciousness. But they do not deny that merit arises in the donor as the result of an action outside his consciousness and volition, namely the use of hisdonation by aheneficiary, that responsibility arises in an instigator tomurder ‘when and only when the murder has been successfully accomplished, or that acts of lay Buddhist piety are consequential (initiate a change in the stream of consciousness) regardless of the strength of intention, whereas other virtuous acts will do so only if that intertion is intense. Vasubandhu as Sautrantika confronts the first two of these beliefs. He offers no explanation of how these changes can come about. He says only that it is in the nature of things that they do, and admits that the problem is impenetrable. Ifhe prefers the theory of change in the stream of consciousness to that of the avijiapa in these cases, it is only, he says, because itis less unreasonable to believe that an action by one person gives rise to a phenomenon in another's mind. series than to believe, as the Vaibhasikas do, that such an action gives rise to a phenomenon that is connected neither with the body of the agent nor with mind of the person a‘fected.” In the first belief there is only one problem: the basic one of interpersonal causality. Inthe second case there are two: that and the problem of the avijiapu’s materiality. NOTES Abbreviations usd in the text and notes area sted below AN = Afguttara Nikaya MCB = Mélange chinois et bouddhiques, Bruxelles 1931—. Abhiah 3. = Abhidharmakose ‘Abbidh-bh = Abhidharmakosabhasya ‘Abhidh:bovy = Abhidharmakosabhasyavyakhya ‘The tester anslatesthe Sanskit and Pa nikya It refers, nthe words of Hein Becher, 1073 groupor eormanity of monks that mutually scknowledge the validity oftheir upasampads ot higher oration and therefore can join together inthe performance of sts prescribed by Vinay ot Buddhist exlesiasea! aw.” See “Mahayana Literature in 8 Lanka the Eales: Phase’ he Lancaster), Praidpramitaond Related Systems. Studies in honour of Edward Conce, (Bekele “The Groupin Budit States et 1977, 36). 2. This Viaya in en sections’ [DatSdhyayal refered to the Vinay of Kashi, se Bisine Lames, stir du Bouddhime Indien Ges Origins dae Saka (Biboheqve du Muséon, Vo 49, {Louvain Ist Oretalise de Louvain 1958), 191. The Kashmirian Vibhigonthistextis probaly the Vinay the Molesarasivadins (adopt bythe Tibetans, se od p19 3. André Bureau, Les Sects Bouddhiques du Pet Vhicule (Saigon: Eeole Frangaise &'Exuéme Oe 985,33 137 (0) tae Laon opel e967 Aesth one ye arom Utada stam anapatan prtypanna cate savvy kel ast yt pryupannam Sapa cana kara kc yea donaphaan ata aga ce! aya vad ‘toayavadna 4, For the for sara, the Mahivibg's four accounts ofthe nature ofthe diferenc that jccurs when phenomenon pases rom te fte tt he pest and from the preset int the pest {Ge theories of Dharmas [oansformation), Ghossa (change of emphasis), Vesumta pase through « moment of elfen] ond Beka si sell Seinen) see 350 oS (Gppeving he rd. 5. Forthese our arguments, scriptural and rational see Abid 5 252 sarvakalasitoktarvad vaya eee eee eee The Sarvastivida and its Critics 45 gaya pha) and commentary, For the srprl passages sce Louis de Ia Vallée Pusin Gay EAiblthaaocs de Vasubendha (Pres Cour, 1988-31) on $25ab, S10 and 82) 6 Atbiah-ky on 2b: tum Uf jdnaprastana | vaya Srabhtasya sat ph prakraa ‘adh titanakayah dharmacandha, papas, dhsoksya sagliparyay TF Abhich-ewy on" 13: viigayd dvyant carat vf vaibhlsikah 7 ibis va vida Taint &. See Erich Frauvaller,Onthe Dato the Buddhist Mater ofthe Law Vasubandhu (Rone tka orl Medio ed Eauemo Oriente, 19) forthe ler dating (istngshing the Kosaka fromthe hier, Mahayanit autor the frinsia et.) and Stefan Anacker, ever Work f Vasubandi the Budatsr Peychlogieal Doctor (Deh: Motial Banaras, 1983), 724 for the erie ollowing Tpiorephical sours which not so distinguish). See aso agains the distinction) Lambert Schituusen, Sausantka-Vorauseetzungen in Vince und Toh’ in Winer Zeitschrift fr die unde Sad und OstasiensX1(1967), 109-1368 Alayavinn On he Origin and Develgment fa Cental Concept of YopiettaPhocophy (Tokyo: Tnerational faut for Bodin Stade, 1981), 22-263 (01), 9 ABhidh-k 80a: kina vaithasikatsidda pry maydya kth 'Bidharma 10, Abidh-k-vy aloe san valbhisik na KAS ye Bairdsak vba |. 11, Abhidh-k-bh on 2.473: sare sams aniya Candraki, MolamadhyarakakrikyAliy on 1 Guang Agamay anya bat sustarawpadayayadbarmia 12, Abhidhkcbh on 2472: sarve dharma anamina, iid. Pudgalaiicay, 1204 (ed. ‘DwariktsSést, Varanasi Bauddha Barat 1981 (Baud Bharat Series, 5.6), 2nd edie, All pase references in these notes othe Kod, the haya and Yasomi'svyakhya aro this eon Eth aura anginana -Sampyukta 10.7 se La Vallee Poussin, pct vol, 252) Abidhk-bh (1 3.2ab (462) aunt dred Dksavo Blo" srutaan prtaginahprjnpti anopaian na td a amy v(t La Valle Poussin, op. ctv 424 (1) 13. Abhi kb, Poealviiay.1214 yd ari pualo ast ke ea sarsrat no peor, who shisha transite im accordance with his ats] ™ 14 Thi 1189: kita to nyara moh its iy Rrapar vith ina hte skandhasamtana erdtmaprajiapm nyovesyant | kin tar | dravyaram evatmdnam parialpayant|smaerhaprabavas cafes. 1S. Abhidh-vy. 1189: sowakirenipy es rth uktab sthatkre manasina Sama yat jvma prabenaho hails clas hydayad Sadia ea styl | anya sis jet coe nist Faicimyavad nanyas sad opatsnavidhes tanmat ait mga 16. Abhidk-vy. 120: sarvadhannd ann ina cata atmasvabhavah/na cites arma widyata 1 antimdnahservadharnab 2 ossing andar bth Kamara compu (ors) fd bari Csi ess 17 Sethe Manusyakasa quod at Abhidh-k-h,Pudgalaingays, 1201-1202 (..vyaiaha tara evaltat Tip. 1214 10-13 (onthe Buda speaking of His former ive) TB, See Abhidh-kcbh on 3 28a (eter ra sap samutpannan palma). p 488 sant tar eed yo tant say Sayabhorsspstrasndy Bhavan parapet avidyadnay cpa taper ata tesa halpandn pryudistam tar nirhirayy babhavs "ystaivrpadh Yad tapadytetasinn ova ated Danan |" 19, See Abhidh4 16: etupayayjunitaropdayal saski 20, hid 1S tats anti; Abbi aera apasya gai, Abid vy a ine -avakic dy aaa It nvacanam 21, hid 1 Sb: rida apy ssamstta aka dou iodo. 22. Bhi. 1.6 and commentary, also Abbr AD8 092554320. then, teres46 Proceedings: Buddhism into the Year 2000" 23. Abnidh-k 14 sasravangsrava dharma samskr margavajta / Bsr Asravas tegu yasmat ‘samanuseratanasrava marpasatyam tividham py asasrtan I. 24 Abbidhkth 092.36: me sapihars na citena samprayukil na a ropasvabhive it citavipmsy sts ueyante 25. Abidh-kbh on 2.36 (210) eltagrahanam cinasamsnastyapradarsanartham citam iva citena a viprayukt ity ath ..clna apt citenatulyajaiyah te tu tena sahtlambane sarpprayosta ‘advsesanarha viprayukiagrabapam/. Fo the meaning ofthe term citasamprayukta( engaged wits cognition’) see Abhidh-k 2.4 and commentary, which gives the five samats (< sane in samy Drayukta), the ‘equalities’ of substrate (faculty), objet, frm, time and number. 26, See Abhiah-k 235-48 and commentary. According to Yasomita Vasubandhu’s ist is not meant to be exhausve. There are other cittavprayukta phenomena, such as schism (senghabhedal, see Abhidh-kevy 210, 27. Abhidh-k4, 12 and commentary athayad ett sttvabhijanalokasybahudh vaictryam uktam tat tena krtam fa kenacid buddhipvakap tar ign tari | sttvanankarmajamlokavaicitryam Ct Abhidharmadipavibhisspraha (ed. Padmanabh S. Jun, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Volume 4, second edition, Patna: Kash Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959) on 4.1.55}, p. 118% et Ithalu ini karmapi Subkasobbani dvividhasyapisatvabhajanalokasya hithtanimitiany upatau sampartau caveicitryasya Karapam [nesvarakalapursapradhansdayah, "Thess thre kinds of ston [rmenial, physical and verbal), when either good or bad, are, being the causes of whats pleasant and ‘iat isnt, he cause ofthe arising and matntenance of the word in bth is kinds, ke the world of creatures and the receptace-world [which is their habitat), not God, Time, the Individual Soal or Fundamental Matter.” 28, bid 1b; etand cetantkamnca tat The commentary aoc. quotes the canon: dve karma extant arma cetayind ca. 29, Ibid. Led: cetand manasa karma tajam vakkyakarman 30, Abhidh4-h on 111: rOpakryasvabhavp sat visapivat para a vihapayaty vipa. 31. Abhidh-kth on Lt: samasatastu vijiapeisamsdhisambhatam kusalakusalam rapam aijasptib L 32, AbhidhK 47a: navyakrasty avijfapuib. The commentary: ki Karapam /avyakyam hi cittam dturbalam ato na saktapkarmakseptur yon niruddhe "pi tasminnanubadhniy, "Why (is there m0 Such thing as an ethically indeterminate avijnapi?Iis because an ethically indeterminate awareness is weak Trcanot projet an action fof the aviaptikind] whichcould continue undiminishedevenafter that [outward manifest action] had ceased 33, Abhidhk 1.9ab: spam parcendriyany arhah parcaviaprir eva ca, "mater is the five sease- ‘organs he five senseobjects and aja” 34, Abhidh-k ISed: ahanmayatanadharvakhyab sahavijtapeyasmmskrtib, “[These seven entities) together with avijaptisand the [hee] unconitioned phenomena are referred os the harmayatana and as the dhurmadhat the sphere of mental objet) 35. Abi. and commentary (anand Sosa, salut prapipraanda). See son. 31 above 346, Abhidh-k2,36bed: prptir abhah samanvayab / praptyaprapsvasamnapsiind. 237. Abbidskt 383°, ° 238, Abhidh- 580 and Abhidh-kvy alo, 39, Candrakisi, Molamadhyamalacikavyskhys on 17: spunyam ca tathavidham /paibhogdnvay lam iy arta) tad yatha devaklaciprtihipanan yatra bata hanyane | thd yoha ht taken branino ‘hongante ath tathd.taddevakuladyupabhogat atk am saritine parioganvayam ‘punyam ep ata). "Theres also demerit ofthis sort, demerit, that i, which grows with use [by teneficiaies| An example i the founding ofa temple in which living creatures are mmoated, The Sarvastivida and its Critics 47 ‘Whenever living beings are killed there in honour ofthe deity, a commensurate demesit of thi sort tises in the petsonality-teams of the founders as a result of the use of the temple or similar 40, Abhidh-k-bh on 4:4, 41, Eaienne Lamotte, MCB IV (1938) 152: na prapasyant karmap kalpakotsaair apt | stmagrim prdpya balan caphaian hau dein l-Sce aso S. Anacker, oct, 103. The verse i also quoted 5 Candrakini on Molamedhyamakakarika 17.214. 42, See Abhidn- 2.59 and commentary, Vasubandhu uses the trm ‘grah J prati-grah. Vasomitra [gives &-ksjpasa synonym and explains that "to seze’ or" anticipate’ aneffect means tobe esta shed A the cause ofthat effet (ad loc, 333° |. grhpanityavadharanam /pratgrhpant | akspant| hnetubnavendvatishanta ity ahah. The past care which "bestows" its effect in the present steed. the viptkahet; se ibid. on 259%, 43. See, eg, Abhid-k- on 4.36 44 Abhidh-kcbh 15: kab sautrdnikarhad J ye sOrapramanika nam Sistrapramagikis te ‘sutrnkab 45, Fortis usage see. Abhidh-k-bh on 7.1, 1050: vara Sstravirodo name stravirod, "Tk js better to contradict the Sasa rather than the Sowas.” YaSomira ad loc. explains: abuddhottam “bhidharmaststram ity abhiprya, "The point is thatthe AbbidharmaSistra is nt the word f the Buddha himself” The Vaibhasikas hold thatthe Abbidharmapitaka consists ofthe teachings of the Buddha collected and redacied by Katyayanlpusa and oters see Abhidi-k-bh 15", 46. Candrakin introduces the Sautrntika view of retribution refuted in Molamadhyamakalarika 116-11 asthe view of “the follower of another Nikaya'nikayAntariyah(135"in PL. Vahiya'sedton, ‘Buaahist Sanskrit Texts, No. 10, Darbhanga: Mila Intute, 1960); aikanikaykaih (bd. 136") 47-See Abhid-k-bhon 3 (15) onthe Satranika view tat the Abhigharmapizka is contained inthe ‘Stirapitaka itself in the form of such Sotras a5 the Arhavinisea 48, Abhidh-k-bh on 2.584, 320" (atha ko “yar vsamyogo nim...)-327 49, Abhidh-k-bh on 2 36d (Seba between Vaibhasika and Saurantika onthe existence of ppt) 50, Abidi-k-bh on 4a, 578-590: avijaptib parvam evokt/ sp dvavyato nasi sautrantikth..) ‘1, AbhidhAcbh introducing 4.1; on 4.3: samkalpacetana parvam Bhovaty evar calvary ca ars ‘yt aha cetaytv past kryeetanespadyate |... kayakarmasarsabdie cetanivsest 52. For the Sautrntka arguments against the Vaibhtska theory of existence in the future and th: past fee Abhidh-k-bh on 5.26, 53, See Lovie dela Vallée Poussin, “Sarvastvada’, in MCB 5 (1936-7) 140. 54. See Abhidh--bh, Pudgsavinteaya, 1229 (kasha asary aumani vinastat karmapa aystyan Dhalowpaitih.) to 1231" (na punar viptkantaram i) The present author's rendering of par atmavieta follows Vasubandin, fbi. 1230 ya Karmaporvautaroaracitaprasavah suai Iasyd anyathotptih parma | sa punar yo “nantaran phalotpadanasamarthab so ‘nyapariesma Wistatvt partnama ssa The series [samta she sequence of mind-event hat aries inthe ‘wake ofan intentional ston. Te ‘process of change” [parindma) isthe fac that this series chinges {sit proceed. Te fina, ertieal point ofthe process of change’ (parindaviesa is that mindevent inthe series whichhasthe power to piverise directly othe rita beacon. Iescalledparedmavies, Iiteally ‘exceptional change’, because is distinguished [isa by [he fact tat itis} the culminating [moment ofthe process of] change 15. Tid. 1229"- 1230% naiva tu vayam vinagat kammana ayatyam phalopatin brama kim iarhi/ tatsarttipariodmavesidbijaphalavat- But we donot clam that te rebut ee Te les from theo longer existent action. What do you clam then? [We claim ha it arises] frm the Specific transformation ofthe ceri [of events that arises from tat [ction48. Proceedings: ‘Buddhism into the Year 2000" 56, Malamachyamakakariks 17.6 10: thay a pakke cet karma tam niyatim iat irda on nid sat kim phalam janayisyai 61 90 akuraprbltr bjt sanytno“ohipravartate ‘ata palm ge bia ct nabhpravartite 17) Bite ca ya saptinah samtinde cephalad ‘ah Djapanam phalam tasman nocehinnam napi sasvatam 1! [| yas tarde ctacatnay etaso“Bhiprevarate tata pholam re ett sa ca nabhipravartate//9 etc ca yasmatsatanah Suptinde ca phalodbhavah /karmapdrvary pala tasmannocehinnam nap eisvatar 10. 57. One mightargue (withthe Theravilin vibajyavad) tat the action would not be etal, becuse it would cease to exist once its consequence had been experienced. But Candrskir explains for [Nagatuna:ncitad evam parva vinaarahitasyakcaivatpascAd opi vinisenasubandhabhavt | Vinasarahitasya casamskriatvaprasangad asamekstinim ca vipskidardendd avipakatvene Ssdaivavasihtan nityatabhyupagama eva karmspim apapadyate, "This is nots, for what ha been spared ansiilsion up to that point would also be dissociated from aibilation thereafter, being like space and otter such [unconditioned phenomena). Whatever escapes annihilation must be non- Conditioned, and non-condtioned phenomena ae ot seen to undergo any proces of maturation info something else, Because they do ot “mature they endure fr ever. I follows that we would have to accept that aeons are eter 58, Abhidh-k-h on 1.2. 59, See Abhidh-k-bh on ab, FURTHER READING Ancee ares Les Sets Boudahigues du Pest Vehicle Ssgo: Ele Frans de Exe Oren, 1955), Paul. Griftis On Being Mindless: Buddhist Mediation and the Mind-Body Problem (La Salle, ‘hinois: Open Coun, 1986), 43-58. PadmanabhS. Jani “The Sautrntka Theory of Bij’ Studies, 231959), 236-249 Louis de La Vallée Poussin (1), ‘La Controverse du Temps.” Documents a’ Abhidharma 3), MCB, ' (1937), 1158; "Les Deux vert” Documents Abhidharma (8), ibid 159-187 thienne Lamore (ed and w), Le Traté de Act de Varubandhu', MCB 4. (1935), 151-263 English translation: Leo M. Pruden, Karmasiddhi Prakaraa: The Treatise on Action by Vasubandl, Berkeley Asian Humanities Pres, 1988), Lilian Sitbur.fnstanterCause:Le discontinue danslapenséephilosophigue de 'Inde(asis: Librairie Philosophie, 1985. Reprinted Paris: De Boccard, 1989). Van Velie) Le Trai dela Descente dans la Profonde Loi Abhidharmavatiraistra) de Arhat ‘Skandhila Publications de 'stitut Oriemaliste de Louvain 16, Louvain-La-Neuve: Institut Orienaliste de 'Université Catholique de Louvain, 1977) Paul M. Willan, "On the Abhidharma Ontology’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 9 (1981), 227-257 uletin ofthe Schoo! of Oriental and African Caen eeeeeeee eee On the Status of Plants in Earliest Buddhism: Lambert Schmithausen In Vedic religion as well as in Jainism, not only animals bu also plants andeven the elements “especially water and earth -are living, sentient beings, and injuring (especially killing) thera atals retribution. In Vedic religion, killing living beings is enjoined inthe context of ritual, ‘which atthe same time provides means for avoiding retributions, but Brahmacfrins (not yet entitled to ritual and renouncers (who have abandoned ritual) can avoid retribution only by entirely avoiding injuring or killing. The same is tue of the Jainas, who do not believe in ritual. Henee, especially Jaina monks and nuns have to refrain from killing or injuring any Tiving beings, including plants and elements as much as possible. The Buddhists, onthe other hhand, have usually rejected the idea that plans are sentient beings, not to speak of the Clements, Inthe Pratimoksasotra, however, Buddhist monks and nuns, to, ar probibitd from injuring plants and even from digging the earth or spoiling water. The question to be dealt with in my paper is whether at all oF to what extent, such prohibitions presuppose @ belief in the sentience of plants etc. and whether thee are other clues for ascertaining the Status of plants, et, in Earliest Buddhism, The result of my investigation is that there sre Some passages in the Suttaijaka which seem to imply that on the one hand in earliest Buddhism it was sil taken for granted that plants, t00, are living beings. On the other hand, they appear to have been fel to be a kind of border-line case, witha growing tendency 10 ignore thei sentence, more or less, when it raised serious problems of practicability ‘hen asking what status plants had in earliest Buddhism, I put this question, on the one hand, asa historian of ideas. The answer depends on what the sources (in my case mainly the early texts) disclose if one tries to understand them ‘without preconceptions, in anatural way, soto speak. This means, among other things, that one should try to understand a passage, if possible, by itself and against the background of the ideas and terminology or phraseology of its own time, and that one should not lightly follow the interpretations of commentaries stemming from # sein ein 100m Bag, Td te Flatron Cafe ‘Bost oess BUDDHISM INTO THE YEAR 2000 International Conference Proceedings Dhammakaya Foundation Bangkok - Los AngelesNational Library of Thaitand Cataloguing in Publication Data: Dhammakays Foundation Busse into the Year 2000: Intentional Conference Proceedings 1. Boddhism Lie 2943 ISBN974-89209-3.3 Published by he Dhammakaya Foundation Deparment of Intemational Relations 23/2 Moo 7..Khiong Sam, Khlong Luang, Patumthani 12120 ‘Thailand Copyright ©1994 by the Dhammakaya Foundation All rights resved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any processor technique, without the express writen consent ofthe publisher. Printed in Titand by Darnsutha Press, 307 Soi Chandasuk (Lardprao $7) Lardprao Road, Bangkapi, Bengkok 10310 Me vi 481591337 @s) ‘This volume-is respectfully dedicated to Phramonkolihépimuni (Sodk Candasaro) (1884-1959) who staked his life to recover the path to enlightenment, the core of Buddhism that was for so long lost to the world