Hanoi, 24 April 2017

UNIT I
Characteristics of Multilateral Negotiations & Main Actors

I/1 Characteristics of multilateral negotiations

Multilateralism: When three of more states choose to cooperate it is with the

expectation that this cooperative arrangement will yield roughly equal reciprocal
benefits.

Multilateralism has different impacts and implications for small and for large
states:

Small states: Multilateralism offers participation in international decision making,

guarantees a certain foreign policy role and a seat at the table. Multilateralism is
also a burden for small states as it involves duties and needs input of resources to
fulfill the envisaged foreign policy role.

Large states: Multilateralism legitimizes the foreign policy of a large state. It is

equally a burden as it requires the large state to influence and persuade smaller
states to support their policy.

Six basic characteristics

(1) Multi-party negotiations

Multilateral negotiations are multiparty negotiations; A large number of parties in a
negotiating process is a challenge to the reconciliation of multifaceted interests;

(2) Multi-issue nature

Negotiations with many parties could be on only one issue, but in fact the large
forums under consideration always do involve many issues. These multiple issues
provide the means and the subject of an agreement because they allow for trade-offs
that provide the network for a single outcome.

(3) Multi-role nature

The multirole nature of multilateral negotiations is the third defining characteristic
In the process of being more or less active in multilateral negotiations parties can
take different roles: Drive/Conduct/Defend/Brake/Cruise;

Drivers are leaders who try to organize the participants to produce an

agreement that is in line with the leaders`/drivers interest;
Conductors - a.k.a. managers also seek to produce an agreement but from
a neutral position with no interest of their own;
Defenders are single issue participants concerned more with promoting their
issue than with the overall success of the negotiations;
Brakers seek to block an agreement and protect their freedom of action, often
with reference to a limited number of issues;
Cruisers have no strong interest of their own and are available to act as
followers;
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 (4) Variable values, parties and roles
Multilateral negotiations are characterized by variable values, parties and roles:
In bilateral negotiations the number of parties is fixed and also the roles that parties
can play. In multilateral negotiations parties must play at all three levels of interaction
on values, parties and roles to come to an agreement.

If they choose to ignore the possibilities opened by various values, roles and parties,
others will make use of them, thereby forcing the other parties to play at the three
levels in response. The immense complexity of having to deal with many parties,
issues and roles is the price to pay for an agreement.

(5) Rule making

The outcomes of multilateral negotiations are mainly matters of rule making rather
than the redistribution of tangible goods. Main goals are often to harmonize national
legislation or to establish rules that can be applied by and to states. This means that
the effect is uncertain and long-range rather than simply being contingent on the
other partys action. Trade-offs between rules is a major part of the structure of
multilateral agreements.

(6) Coalitions
Multilateral negotiations are characterized by coalitions. Through the formation of
coalitions the process of negotiations becomes manageable and less complicated.
The goal of negotiations is to arrive at decisions on issues. It is therefore necessary
to reduce their complexity and make the issues as well as the number of parties
manageable. Packaging, linkages and trade-offs the basic devices of the
negotiation process are all ways of building coalitions among issues, interests and
positions.

I/2 How to negotiate?

Multilateral negotiations often also invoke bilateral negotiations, unilateral moves

and what could be called minilateralism.

Often bilateral negotiations are important building blocks for multilateral

agreements (Bilateral negotiations and agreements between US and China in the
run-up to UNFCCC COP-21 in Paris and the new climate agreement). Unilateral
moves come into play in attempts by states to exercise leadership and also as a
bargaining tactic.

To successfully cooperate is more difficult when the number of involved actors and
states are large because with the growing number of participants it also becomes
more difficult to identify the shared interests. The consequence is minilateralism
which is experienced in most multilateral settings the cooperation in a smaller
group usually involving the most interested or most powerful actors in a
multilateral endeavor (P-5 in UNSC, Weighted votes in IFIs). Minilateralism is
necessary to make multilateral institutions and negotiations work.

I/3 Structure and process of multilateral negotiations

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The more parties negotiate the more issues come up matters tend to become
complicated as many different interests need to be accommodated. Reshaping
positions and rendering them compatible is difficult and time consuming:

- UNCLOS 1967 1982 Third LOS-Conference to negotiate;

- WTO-Doha round no end in sight after start in 2001;
- MEAs faster: 5 INCs in usually 4 years;
- Paris Agreement: 6 years after failed COP-15 Kopenhagen (Cancun, Durban,
Doha, Warsaw, Lima)

Multilateral negotiations are characterized by coalitions (will at a later stage discuss

negotiating blocs and special groups). There is the expectation that a bloc of like-
minded states has a greater chance of having their position accepted than by
pursuing goals individually. Coalitions also help to reduce the complexity of
multilateral negotiations and thereby help to make institutions and negotiations work.
However, establishing a coalition may require difficult negotiations, therefore once
established, coalitions tend to hold their positions often inflexibly because of the high
costs that the formation of the coalition entailed. Expanding the membership of a
coalition often entails difficult renegotiations of the initial joint platform. Coalitions are
reluctant to renegotiate their initial agreement; therefore the existence of coalitions
tends to introduce a certain rigidity into the negotiating process making the
attainment of a consensus more difficult.

Negotiation process is strongly affected by certain structural features:

The quantity of information that increases with the number of participants is
difficult to manage;
For each participant it is difficult to manage the different signals sent to
different audiences and to interpret the statements made by other participants;
A further problem stems from the difficulty of trading concessions in a
multilateral negotiating process.
In bilateral negotiations the principle of reciprocity facilitates the exchange of
concessions. In multilateral negotiations the reciprocal exchange loses its meanings
because a concession offered to one participant may have a different impact on
others or even be considered detrimental to their interests. Devising a package
containing concessions and compensations that satisfies all participants is
complicated and time consuming.

Remedies and trade-offs in view of functional deficiencies

Simplify the issues: Limit the scope of negotiations, narrow the agenda, take an
incremental approach by dividing the subject matter and dealing with the problems
sequentially.

Limit the negotiating forum: Create an ad-hoc forum to avoid wide membership of
an IO, include only governments which are relevant to the subject matter and capable
of implementing a solution (e.g. Contact-group on Yugoslavia in the 90s US, UK,
France, Germany, Russia; Middle East Quartet US, Russia, EU, UN; P5+1 in
Iranian talks, High Ambition Coalition at COP 21). The legitimacy of a decision can
be called into question when the negotiating forum is limited.

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 Regional group system & specialised groups
I/4 Main actors of multilateral diplomacy

In most intergovernmental/multilateral conferences the following main actors can be

detected:
Delegations as representatives of their governments (composition rule 25
UNGA-RoP 5 Rep/5 Alt. Rep);
Secretariat of the International Organisation and its executive head
(Secretary General, Executive Director, Director General);
Presiding officers of the conference (Chair/Co-Chair system);
Various groups of delegations (UN regional groups/specialised groups);
More and more civil society in the form of NGOs or the
scientific/academic community participates in multilateral negotiations and
gains influence in various processes;

I/5 Groups (UN Regional Group System/Specialised Groups)

Functions of groups
To exchange information and enhance negotiating power;
To develop common positions;
UN regional groups have mainly electoral purposes: To agree on
candidates to be put forward by the group or on a common vote for
candidates from outside the group.

Regional Group system of the United Nations

The member States of the UN are unofficially divided into five geopolitical regional
groups, mainly based on geographic criteria (except WEOG). Original purpose for the
formation of these groups was to establish an informal mechanism for sharing and
coordinating the distribution of posts in the UN General Assembly (Election of UNGA-
President, Chairs of the six committees).

Regional groups have taken on a more expansive role and coordinate on elections in
all UN fora (equitable geographical representation and some of the groups also
coordinate on substantive positions and policies African group and GRULAC).

African Group (53)

Asia-Pacific Group (53)
Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) (33)
Central and Eastern European Group (CEE) (23)
Western European and Others Group (WEOG) incl. Aus, NZL, Can, US
(28 + 1 observer)

Special cases and peculiarities of the regional group system

African group and GRULAC: Also discuss substantive positions;

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WEOG: Only coordinates for electoral purposes no discussion of substantive
positions; (there are however exceptions to this rule 2007 to 2009 WEOG
substantive discussions on number of ITLOS-judges)

US: Not a member of any group and attends meetings of WEOG as observer. Only
for electoral purposes is the US considered a WEOG-member;

Israel: Geographically in Asia but membership in the Asian group withheld by

majority of Arab countries. In May 2000 Israel became on a temporary basis and
subject to renewal full WEOG-member for UN in New York. 2004 permanent
renewal for WEOG-membership in New York context remains observer in Geneva,
Vienna, Rome and Nairobi;

Kiribati: Pacific nation of Kiribati is the only UN Member State not being a member of
any regional group. Despite being a MS no permanent representative in NY;

Turkey: Participates fully in both WEOG and Asian group, but for electoral purposes
is considered a WEOG-member.

Cyprus Is member of Asian group: EU represented in three groups WEOG, CEE

and Asian group.)

In an increasingly multipolar world traditional groups such as the UN regional groups

become less relevant in negotiations with the emergence of other established
regional-, sub-regional- or specialised-groups.

Specialised Groups
Specialised Groups: Establishment in view of similar interests/positions in
negotiations; Mostly informal alliances no formal structures or coordinating
mechanisms. These groups also constitute Negotiating blocs - Regional, sub-
regional and cross-regional groupings

Group of G-77 and China: Established in 1964 at the first session of UNCTAD the
G-77 seeks to harmonize the positions of developing countries, articulate their
common economic interests and promoted its negotiating capacity. Although
China is not officially a member of the G-77, it almost always supports its positions.
Largest organisation of developing countries in UN fora.

G-77 seeks to provide the means of developing countries to articulate and promote
their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all
major international economic issues within the UN-system and promotes S-S
cooperation for development.

Statements made on behalf of the G-77 are given precedence in the speakers list
over statements made by the African group, GRULAC and other groups whose
members are also members of the G-77. Already in the 80s the G-77 comprised
more than 120 members now membership stands at 133.

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The country holding the Chair of the G-77 in New York (which rotates every year
2016: Thailand) usually speaks for the G-77 and China. Because the group is so
large, diverse and often with differing interests, individual developing countries also
intervene in debates as do subgroups within the G-77 (African UN regional group
coordination on substantive issues the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and
the LDCs ).

Further examples for regional and sub-regional groups that aim to consult on issues
of common interest (thereby forming negotiating blocs) and to forward their positions
in a multilateral context:

EU 28 Member States spanning three regional groups

ASEAN 10 South East Asia countries which are Members of ASEAN
(ASEAN economic community in 2015; active in security matters with the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF);
CARICOM - English speaking countries in the Caribbean;
League of Arab States;
Nordic Group (WEOG Sub-group);
Group of Pacific Countries; often aligned around membership in the Pacific
Islanders Forum (PIF);
OPEC countries;

AOSIS/SIDS: Acronyms stand for Alliance of small islands states and Small
island developing states. The group was formed to address members common
interests in climate change negotiations but functions also in other UN-contexts. It
has a membership of 44 States and observers drawn from all oceans and regions of
the world - most are members of the G-77.

The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) are States which are particularly
vulnerable to sea-level rise. AOSIS countries are united by the threat that climate
change poses to their survival and frequently adopt a common stance in climate
negotiations. They were the first to propose a draft text during the Kyoto Protocol
negotiations calling for cuts in carbon dioxide emissions of 20% from 1990 levels by
2005.

JUSCAN(N)Z: The group coordinates positions and delivers joint statements in

environmental negotiations and in the climate change process. Among developed
countries JUSCANZ is in many processes the second big grouping after the EU and
often promotes positions different from those of the EU.

The acronym stands for Japan US Canada Australia (Norway) - New

Zealand. The composition of the group has evolved and depending on the issue a
number of other delegations such as Iceland, Mexico and South Korea may
participate

Environmental Integrity Group: A smaller group that consists of the core countries
Liechtenstein, Mexico, Monaco, South Korea and Switzerland. It was formed in 2000
during the climate change negotiations (UNFCCC) in order to uphold environmental
integrity while recognizing the need for flexibility in the negotiating process.

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Umbrella Group: The Umbrella Group is a loose coalition of non-EU developed
countries which formed following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Although there
is no formal list, the Group is usually made up of Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the US.

Specialized groups in multilateral fora other than the climate negotiations

established to enhance the members bargaining power and negotiating
position:

LMMCs: The acronym stands for Like-Minded Megadiverse countries. This

group of 18 developing countries among them Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico
collectively account for 70% of the worlds biological diversity (high rates of biological
diversity in number of species, plants, genetic resources in general) and was formed
in 2002 in the context of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) with the
aim to leverage negotiating strength in the field of access to genetic resources and
benefit sharing (ABS). Group was also active during the negotiations of the Nagoya
Protocol on ABS at COP-10 in Japan in October 2010. Common interests during the
ABS-negotiations: access to biotechnology, avoid exploitation by multinationals, fight
against bio-piracy.

Miami Group: Consisting essentially of Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, US

and Uruguay which are large grain-exporting countries that have invested
considerably in biotechnology and genetically modified agricultural products
and therefore shared common interests in the negotiations of the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety and the subsequent elaboration of a Protocol on Liability
for transboundary movement of LMOs. Nagoya Protocol to the Cartagena Protocol
after six years of negotiations adopted at COP/MOP-5 in Japan in October 2010.

Cairns Group: The Cairns Group is a coalition of 18 agricultural exporting

countries (among the members: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia,
South Africa but also smaller developing nations like Guatemala, Paraguay or
Thailand) established in 1986 to support agricultural trade liberalization and is
playing a key role in the WTO.

The coalition is bringing together developed and developing countries from Latin
America, Africa and the Asia-Pacific region and has been an influential voice in the
agricultural reform debate since its formation. Pronounced positions in areas like
unrestricted market access for agricultural products, abolition of subsidies by
governments for agricultural products.

I/6 Participation of civil society/NGOs

Civil society mostly in the form of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) plays
an important role in multilateral diplomacy and international negotiations. Particularly
in the fields of human rights, development and environment a large number of
NGOs are active and attend meetings and negotiations.

NGOs enjoy access to meetings and intergovernmental negotiations but such

privileges are by no means uniform or universally guaranteed. There is no consensus
neither in the practice of UN Member States or in the theory of international relations
on the participation of civil society in international affairs. There is also no common
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understanding on the exact role to be played by NGOs in multilateral diplomacy
and international negotiations.

Question of legitimacy NGOs do not enjoy a formal mandate from the

constituency whose interests they claim to represent;

NGOs in multilateral decision-making

Three important functions of NGOs/civil society:

Agenda setting function: mobilising sympathy for negotiations and awareness

raising: NGOs mobilise support for a certain problem, awareness raising through
campaigns as happened with the Anti-Torture Convention 1984/87, the Rights of the
Childs Convention 1989, the APM Ottawa Convention 1997 and the Statute of the
ICC 1998;

Standard setting function: developing standards which form the basis of a

draft treaty and working on drafting of text: Development of draft treaties and
participation in meetings as expert-observers or as members of Parties delegations;
Cartagena-Protocol: Liability Greenpeace developed draft text for a Liability
protocol under CPB;

Monitoring function: Participation in the implementation of the instruments

A task for civil society organisations and NGOs which is likely to increase in
importance is to assist in the implementation of agreements. One way this may be
accomplished is by actual supervision of governmental activities (whistleblower-
function, human rights defenders).

Consultative status in ECOSOC

In ECOSOC the consultative or observer status of NGOs has been institutionalised
in Resolution 1996/31 Consultative relationship between the United Nations
and Non-governmental organisations of 25 July 1996. More than 2200 NGOs
are currently accredited with ECOSOC.

The legal basis for this consultative status is Article 71 UN Charter: The ECOSOC
may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental
organisations which are concerned with matters within its competence.

To prevent misuse of the status (rights of participation, right to table proposals,)

granted to the NGOs by ECOSOC a kind of access-control in the form of an
accreditation-mechanism was developed:
In order to gain the consultative status with ECOSOC:
The aims and objectives of the NGO have to be compatible with the
principles of the UN-Charter;
The NGO has to have a representative structure (it has to clear who is
acting and representing the organisation);
It has to have appropriate accountability-mechanisms with regard to its
members; the members should be able to influence/control the decision-
making processes by transparent, democratic procedures;
Rules with regard to finances (where is the funding coming from?);

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The consultative status of ECOSOC granted to an NGO does not automatically
grant similar rights in the General Assembly or other principal organs of the UN.

It is common for the participation of representatives of civil society in most negotiating

conferences to be regulated typically through a mechanism adopted by the
conference or the appropriate entity itself.

Scientific and academic community

The scientific and academic community has - particularly in the environmental field -
and in the context of the negotiations of multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs) a pronounced and very useful role (see also under phases of negotiations
particular important role in the pre-negotiation phase).

Among scientists consensus on scientific facts is built. They agree on basic

parameters and narrow the ranges of uncertainty which in turn furthers success of
negotiations. In recent years an international network of cooperating scientists and
scientific institutions has developed as a major new actor on the scene
demonstrated in their work on ozone-layer, global-warming issues, biodiversity,
chemicals etc. Most high profile example is IPCC created in 1988 to create a
scientific basis for negotiations on climate change.

UNIT II
The conference machinery and decision making

Conference machinery and its role

II/1 The role of the presiding officer/Chairperson

Election: Presiding officers/Chairpersons of a conference are elected by the meeting
in accordance with the rules of procedure of the meeting. Sometimes representatives
of the host country of a conference (COPs in MEAs) are elected.

Criteria: To identify suitable chairpersons usually informal consultations before the

conference are conducted among the main players. Candidates should be
experienced delegates or delegates with a track record of successfully chairing
meetings. Sometimes political considerations also play a role (Co-Chair system
whereby a balanced representation between developed and developing countries is
sought). Once elected the chairperson is denationalised. He does not vote and
has to serve the collective membership of the meeting.

The importance of a chairmens role and his impact on a meeting are governed
by the following factors:
The experience and intelligence of the chair including his grasp of the
ROP;
The degree to which delegates are a homogenous group vis-a-vis the
subject before the meeting or are antagonist whether politically or in
substance;

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 Whether the chair can operate a team with the secretariat, the vice-chair and
the rapporteur and the chairs of the various subcommittees/working groups;

The ideal chairperson

will summarize discussions to the point;
is able to keep statements by delegates within reasonable length;
give rapid and correct rulings to procedural questions;
keeps in touch with delegates before and after sessions as well as with
chairs of the subcommittees operating under his supervision;

It is useful to distinguish between functions of a chairman that follow from the ROP
and those of a more substantive nature (mostly related to assistance in solving
conflicts between delegations) not usually provided for in the ROP.

Procedural functions: ROP of GA have come to serve as a model for other UN-
organs and for most specialised agencies. This has introduced an amount of
uniformity and procedural stability that facilitates the task of the presiding officer.

Duties: Opening, closing and adjourning meetings, giving the floor;

Rights: Power to make proposals for the conduct of the meeting, calling to order of
speakers;

Another presidential function is that of replying to requests for clarifications from

individual delegates
order in which things are taken up
voting

Substantive functions: Procedural functions will normally take up most of the time
of a president but substantive functions can become important and they determine
whether a Chairperson is successful or not.

One task often performed on an ad hoc basis is the appointment of countries or

individuals to new committees and working-groups consult with principal
delegates and regional groups and make sure that those appointed will accept the
nomination.

Most important potential substantive role is undoubtedly role in mediating

between conflicting views. In the order of increasing personal involvement the
following categories of presidential assistance to the solution of conflicts can be
distinguished:
Chair permits time for informal negotiations, chair asked to start meeting later
than scheduled or cancel it.
Chair actively promotes informal negotiations but does not participate.
Chair promotes informal negotiations and takes part in them himself: Various
forms:
May preside over meetings of an informal group but does not attempt to draft a
text.
Presides over meeting and suggests own initiative (CBD COP-10
compromise).
Chair is asked by delegates to produce a compromise.
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II/2 Role of the Bureau

Composition:
Chairperson + Vice-Chairpersons;
Chairs of subcommittees or working groups;
Rapporteur
Secretariat
Representatives of states (composed of at least one representative of each
UN regional group)

Rules of procedure provide for the election of the Bureaus officers by the
governing body (e.g. COP) and specify officers of the Bureau and the number and
duration of terms. In practice informal discussions are held prior to the conference
between the regional groups to decide who will serve on the Bureau. The mandate of
a Bureau covers the conference as well as the intersessional period until the
beginning of the next conference and the election of a new Bureau.

Functions:
At a conference: Daily meetings of the Bureau (or more often) during a
conference to assess and discuss how the meeting is proceeding and how to
organize the remainder of the meeting (timing matters related to certain questions
under negotiation). For the chairperson it is also important to get feed-back on
developments from the various regional groups. Individual delegations can give input
to the bureau via the Bureau-member of their regional group. Bureau members
regularly report back to their constituencies/regional groups. Meetings of the Bureau
are usually closed only Bureau members may attend, no observers.

Intersessionally the Bureau closely works with the Secretariat to provide

administrative and operational advice with regard to the work the governing body has
tasked the Secretariat with (Elaboration of reports, agenda of next meeting). (How
many working groups will be necessary? Length of meetings? Date and location?)

The Bureau is responsible to examine the credentials of delegations where a

separate credentials committee is not established. Credentials are documentary
evidence of a delegations authority to participate in the decision-making of a
conference. Usually they are issued by the Head of State or Government.

II/3 Role of the Secretariat

Treaties establishing an organisation usually contain provisions for a Secretariat. The

functions of a Secretariat may vary but is has an essential role in ensuring the
effective functioning of an organisation or a conference. Secretariats serve the
Members of organisation/Parties of a treaty and in its work are presumed to be
neutral.

The main role of a secretariat is to provide administrative, logistical and procedural

support to the Parties and the Chairperson at conferences and intersessional. Parties
usually assign work to the Secretariat (elaboration of reports, activities required for
the implementation of a treaty).

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Tasks:
Provide logistical support for meetings and conferences (giving notice of dates
and venues, preparing agendas and reports, circulation of these among the
Parties and delegations, arranging translation of documents into official
languages);
Arrange interpretation at meetings, publication and distribution of official
documents;
Report to delegations at beginning of a meeting on intersessional activities;
Coordinate upon request with other relevant international bodies;
Manage information required from delegations and dissemination of
information among Parties;

II/4 Subgroups, working groups and drafting groups

Different from institutionalized and permanent subsidiary bodies of a conference

these subgroups which can operate under various names are usually established
by the Chairperson on an ad-hoc basis. They operate under various names
(Working group, contact group, friend of the Chair group) but basically have the same
functions:
Discuss specific issues in more detail than in plenary or;
Discuss issues in which only a limited number of delegations has an interest;
Allow for progress in larger formations;

When subgroups, working groups or drafting groups are established, their

mandate (which is their tasks and their way of operating) is made clear either in
writing or often only orally by the Chairperson and reflected in the report of the
meeting.

Established by the Chairperson upon his or her own initiative or at the request by
one or more Parties/delegations. After informal consultations Chairperson will
propose a Chair or Co-Chairs for the Working Group. Diligent Chairperson will take
care to have equitable geographical representation and to invite delegations with
strong views on the issue to be discussed. Mandated to solve a particular problem or
issue and given a time to report back to Chairperson on progress.

Participation usually open-ended, which means that every delegation interested

in the topic can attend meetings of a Working Group. In many processes there is an
understanding that not more the two working groups are established and work in
parallel thereby taking the size of delegations and difficulties for smaller delegations
to attend meetings into account.

Sub-groups are established to deal with particular issues that are difficult to
resolve or in which only a small number of delegations has a particular interest
and that could slow down overall progress.
Drafting Groups
They are established by the Chairperson to develop specific language or text on
specific issues. Participation can be open-ended for bigger groups or restricted by
the Chairperson to a few trusted delegates. Usually Drafting Groups meet in closed
sessions.

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In treaty negotiations usually an open-ended Legal Drafting Group or LDG
consisting of legal experts is established. The main function of an LDG is to translate
the decisions of the negotiators and the political compromises agreed upon into
concrete legal language.

LDGs also examine legal questions in general or review in detail the wording of
each article (legal srubbing) before these are adopted by the plenary. LDGs are
usually also tasked to elaborate rules of procedure or
implementation/compliance mechanisms.

II/5 Rules of Procedure

ROP are important because they establish the rules of the game of a conference
or a meeting such as participation, openness of meetings, decision-making or voting.

Definition: Rules of procedure of a conference are all the rules and practices which
determine the status of each of the participants in an international conference and
the conduct of the discussions until the conference adopts its final decision.

Procedural debates have often been characterised as time-consuming,

uninteresting and fruitless. Nevertheless procedure, in any organisation, is
integrally linked to the principle of due process which requires a regularity of
procedure.

Two basic functions of ROPs according to a previous UNSG: The ROP are
intended to protect the rights of individual members. They are equally intended to
permit an orderly conduct of business.

Practically all intergovernmental meetings operate under ROPs, even though in some
cases they are hardly referred to. ROPs and their interpretation follow a remarkably
consistent pattern. Meetings and conferences of different organisations tend to reach
similar conclusions on procedural issues. Procedural decisions are usually the
reflection of the political reality of a conference. States nevertheless tend to follow
precedents in procedural matters as such precedents carry particular weight if they
are accompanied by a reasoned decision of an experienced presiding officer, an
opinion of a legal adviser, or form part of a consistent procedural behaviour.

Conferences do not draft ROPs without reference to previous practice. No

international organisation or conference can carry out its function without clearly
defined ROPs.

For conferences held periodically organs of the UN and UN Specialised Agencies

ROPs exist in the form of permanently available documents which are from time
to time revised. For subsidiary bodies often question on whether to develop their own
set of ROPs or whether to apply the ROP of the governing body mutatis
mutandis with such changes as are necessary on various details.

For ad hoc conferences provisional ROPs are circulated in advance, usually drafted
by the organ which is responsible for the convening of the conference or submitted
by the secretariat at the beginning. In both cases the ROPs have to get the final
approval by the conference.
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Most ROPs cover the following topics (hand out)

There are cases - particularly in multilateral environmental agreements (UNFCCC,

CBD, Rotterdam (PIC), Stockholm (POPs)) - where Parties were unable to agree
on the voting rule in the rules of procedure. All rules have been adopted except
the voting rules which remain in brackets indicating that no consensus exists on
this question. The consequence of not being able to agree on the voting rules is that
decisions have to be taken with consensus.

A detailed knowledge of ROPs is an important tool of every delegate and negotiator.

ROPs can be used as a political instrument in a way which should not be
underestimated. Delegations can use them to determine the direction or the speed of
the organs of a conference on important substantive issues. They can even be used
to prevent debate or action concerning a matter altogether.

Delegations and States frequently choose to contest an issue through the use of
procedural motions rather than contesting the substance of an issue. Often in
such a case there is the estimation by a delegation that it will be easier to find
support for its position on a neutral procedural issue rather than on the
substance. The involved delegations know the substantive issue behind a
procedural debate but nevertheless prefer to leave the substance in the background.

Delegations may also have more flexibility in their instructions on procedural issues
than on substantive issues. Procedural issues in most ROPs are taken by a simple
majority, while in treaty-making conferences issues of substance are usually
decided by a two-thirds majority. For this reason as well, delegations may at times
choose to contest an issue on procedural grounds, rather than as a substantive
issue.

II/6 Rules of decision making and the concept of consensus

States have the sovereign right to accept or reject a draft decision.

Unanimity: A positive affirmation of acceptance by all participants where each
participant has the right to veto a decision.
Consensus: Is more flexible than the concept of unanimity. There is agreement if
none of the participants formally objects. Allows for a veto but the practice has shown
that States are reluctant to veto an outcome that enjoys wide support.
Majority vote: Acceptance to forgo the sovereign right to veto decisions;

Decision making requirements and voting rules (for the cases in which there is no
consensus) are usually either in the treaty itself or in the rules of procedure. Most
rules provide that Parties shall make every effort to reach consensus. If this fails
decisions may be adopted by a qualified (often 2/3) majority. Alternatively: voting by
qualified majority for procedural questions and unanimity/consensus for
substantive/budgetary questions.

Consensus as defined by Article 161 para. 8 lit e UNCLOS is the absence of any
formal objection.

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According to the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter
submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting of the DSB
when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.

In a multipolar international community with close to 200 States resorting to vote is

a risky strategy. No State wants to be put into a position of having to vote against a
proposal. The procedure of adopting proposals, resolutions, draft treaties by
consensus are therefore key to the successful functioning of multilateral diplomacy
and international conferences.

Legitimacy: Consensus based decision-making also has the advantage of

legitimacy. The adoption of a proposal or a binding obligation in a way that there
is no formal objection carries more weight and can be seen as more legitimate in
the international field then a decision based on a vote.

Voting: Votes at the final stages of negotiations are increasingly rare but this is not to
say that they never happen: Prominent recent exception is the adoption by vote of
the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998. Another example is the procedural vote 2003 in
the Sixth Committee on a proposal to negotiate a convention to prohibit all forms of
human cloning (80 to 79, with 15 abstentions).

Recent developments where the exact meaning of consensus is not always clear:

COP-15 UNFCCC Copenhagen 2009:

The so called Copenhagen Accord could because of formal objections by a group
of countries not be adopted by the Conference of the Parties but it was only taken
note of. Disappointment with what by many delegations was perceived as a weak
accord but clarity that no adoption of the Accord was possible because of
several formal objections (led by ALBA-Group: Allianza Bolivariana para los
Pueblos de Nuestra America: Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, and
Ecuador). COP-15 almost derailed the climate negotiations.

COP-10 CBD Nagoya 2010:

Adoption of a package of decisions among them a decision on the Nagoya
Protocol to the CBD on Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) in the field of access
to genetic resources which had been negotiated for the last eight years. At the
beginning of the final plenary (midnight of the last day of the conference) it was
unclear whether delegations from the ALBA-group will try to block the adoption of
the package. Several times objections were voiced and several attempts by the
Chairperson to have the package adopted until the Bolivian delegation was isolated
and would not any longer resist the adoption. In this case again it was clear that there
were no formal objections.

COP-16 UNFCCC Cancun 2010:

Adoption of the Cancun Agreements: A widely shared perception that the Mexican
Presidency of COP-16 had skilfully steered the negotiations to a successful outcome.
Overwhelming sense that Parties were willing to accept the Cancun Agreements.

Bolivia listed a number of substantive concerns and argued that lack of consensus
prevented the proposed decisions from being adopted. Mexican Chair insisted and
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gave an interesting new meaning to the concept of consensus: Consensus
requires that everyone is given the right to be heard and have their views given
due consideration and Bolivia has been given this opportunity. Consensus does not
mean that one country has the right of veto, and can prevent 193 others from moving
forward after years of negotiations on something that our societies and future
generations expect. Integrity of the process mattered. Vast majority seemed
convinced that this was the right approach.

COP-21 UNFCCC Paris 2015

Question of consensus did not appear in COP 21 due to skilful steering of the
proceedings by the French Chairperson. Under the guidance of COP 21 President
Laurent Fabius, COP 21 managed to uphold a highly-transparent and inclusive
process for parties.

The French Presidency learned from Copenhagen that Heads of State and
Government provide political guidance and should not negotiate text. On the
margins of the meetings organized by the French Presidency, a group of
approximately 15 like-minded ministers from different regions and groups was
brought together by the Marshall Islands. These informal meetings formed the
basis of what became known as the High-Ambition Coalition. This loose
alliance, eventually representing up to 100 countries, rallied around a list of
ambitious asks, such as a clear long-term goal and five-year review cycles, creating
a show of solidarity that some said effectively marginalized those not in the group.
Many noted that these ambitious asks eventually found their way into the Agreement.

Another procedural revolution by the Presidency was to keep the full responsibility
for the text's development on the parties' shoulders. Ministers had to engage
with the lengthy, heavily bracketed text parties had developed in the ADP contact
group. By not dropping a surprise text late in the proceedings, the French
Presidency ensured that the text was party-owned and parties understood they
had the collective responsibility for its success or failure. Many parties had
quietly speculated throughout the meeting that the Presidency had its own text, but
regardless of its existence, one was never unveiled. This galvanized ministers to do
the heavy lifting of sorting through options and brackets themselves.

The transparency of the process, as one delegate put it, drove the ambition of what
parties could achieve; this time, there was no easy out of rejecting the President's
text. Above all, the French Presidency said it would, and did, listen. That every party
praised the Presidency is not only a tribute to the French Presidency, but recognition
that they all believed their positions were heard.

UNIT III
Phases in negotiations and Practical advice

Phases in negotiations

III/1 Phases in negotiating legally binding instruments

Pre-negotiation phase
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 1) Problem identification and Fact-finding
This phase can extend over a longer period (several years) before a formal decision
to start an intergovernmental negotiating process is taken. Particular incident or
presentation of new scientific evidence (growing ozone hole that lead to the
Vienna Convention 1985 and Montreal Protocol 1987 on substances that deplete the
ozone layer). Role of science in this phase particularly in MEA-negotiations: IPCC
1990

Example: Mercury negotiations (INC-2 in Chiba in January 2011)

In February 2001 UNEP GC discussed the need for a global assessment of mercury.
Decision 21/5 called for the initiation of a process to undertake a global assessment
of mercury and its compounds.

2003: UNEPs Global Mercury Assessment Report noted that there is sufficient
evidence to warrant immediate action to protect human health and the
environment from the releases of mercury. Compilation of views for presentation
at UNEP GC with a view to developing a legally binding instrument, a non-legally
binding instrument or other measures and actions.

2) Organisation of work and definition of issues

2007 decision to establish an ad hoc open-ended working group (OEWG) of
government and stakeholder representatives to review and assess options.
Definition of issues involved: (reduce atmospheric emissions, management of waste,
reduce demand, sound storage solutions, remediation of contaminated sites etc.).

Financial considerations of a free-standing legally binding instrument or linking it to

existing instruments such as Stockholm-Convention. After two meetings of the
OEWG UNEP GC in February 2009 decided to develop a legally binding
agreement on mercury and requested another OEWG to prepare the INC process.

Third meeting of OEWG: preparation of rules of procedure and request to secretariat

to prepare documentation for INC-1 in June 2010 in Stockholm (Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee INC as the formal negotiating body (options for structure
and description of options for substantive provisions).

The global agreement on Mercury (Minamata Convention) was negotiated in five

sessions of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee between June 2010
and January 2013 and adopted at a formal Diplomatic Conference in
Kumamoto/Japan in October 2013 now in the process of ratification.

Example where a particular incident leads to rapid decision by the international

community and the negotiations of a treaty:

1985 Hi-jacking of the Italian cruise-ship Achille Lauro by Palestinian terrorists

that lead to the death of an Israeli passenger. Group of Austrian tourists was also on
board.

After the hi-jacking a legal analysis (in the Austrian Foreign Ministry) revealed that
international rules were missing to adequately deal with such incidents. Upon an
initiative by Austria, Italy (flag state) and Egypt (place of incident) negotiations started
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at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and lead in 1988 to the adoption of
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA-Convention).

Five steps of formal negotiations

1) Orientation and positioning

Opening plenary session and opening statements by delegations to set out their
initial positions. Also a come-to-know and confidence building phase;
Rarely specific questions addressed in this phase outline of overarching priorities
and general indication of the parameters for the substantive debate which follows

2) Argumentation/search for compromises and solutions

Preparation of an actual negotiating text for consolidation of views in such a
negotiating text (to be repeated in later phases throughout negotiations). Preparation
of text by Chairperson and the Secretariat in consultation with the Bureau.
Articulation of positions regarding the negotiating text; Setting up of drafting
groups and discussion of detailed amendments and changes that results in a
bracketed text.

3) Formula building with counter-proposals and/or alternative drafts

This phase can last over several negotiating sessions and it marks the shift in focus
from the articulation of positions to the actual work of trying to find solutions
and build consensus on the substantive provisions of the negotiating text.
Results of this phase: Identification of amendments which are acceptable or
which are unacceptable or which are agreed on condition of substantive changes;
Newly revised negotiating text:

4) Coalition-building and bargaining

Once the counter-proposals have been introduced and the critical issues indentified.
Start of a process of trade-offs, linkages or devising of packages between
individual delegations and groups/alliances.

5) Emergence of solutions - Agreement or break-down

This is where the factor of timing (proposals/initiatives by chair) is very important.
Negotiators have to decide on whether an agreement is within reach or whether the
situation is further developing into a crisis. Also time to try alternative solutions or
introduce fall-back positions. Either agreement is reached in working groups on
text closing plenary session where the text is approved (by consensus) or a
break-down of the negotiations. Break (cool down period of several months and
restart of stalled negotiations (Biosafety Protocol breakdown of last session
restart under Vienna setting)

Usually even after a final agreement has been reached or a solution found work
continues and details will have to be worked out - political solution has to be put
into a legal language by LDG (either by drafting a resolution later to be adopted by
the plenary or by finalising the negotiating text to be adopted also by plenary)

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Post-agreement phase

Formal adoption of a text at a Diplomatic Conference or opening for signature by

the depository;

Signature, Ratification and Implementation (implementation is actually the

most important phase in the life-cycle of a legally binding instrument).

III/2 Negotiating a resolution

Legal status of resolutions: Resolutions are non-binding and legally of a

recommendatory nature;

The building-blocks of a resolution:

Preamble (PPs) - setting forth the reasons why a certain action/recommendation is
necessary.
Operative parts (OPs) - Contains actions/recommendation

Example of the average procedure for dealing with draft resolutions

In the UN-GA the only real restriction on the freedom to submit a draft resolution is
that in each of the main committees the chair sets a closing date for the submission
of draft resolutions. The agenda of an organisation includes an item the problem
of and there is a secretariat report on the present state of the question. A
representative of the secretariat will usually introduce the item
explaining/commenting on the secretariat report.

The debate then opens with statements in which delegates give their view and
possibly announce that they plan to introduce a draft resolution. During this debate
delegation A may give informally to a number of other delegations a text of a
proposal put in the form of a draft resolution.

Non-Papers
If you wish to underline the provisional or confidential character of this initiative not
even the name of a delegation is put on this draft. This is called creating a non-
paper of which it is sometimes said that it was found lying on the floor

In many cases the heading of the draft will read:

Text suggested by the delegation of

Draft resolution by the delegation of

Co-Sponsors
Basic rule is its more difficult to obtain action than to prevent action. The
situation is difficult for a single delegation or a small number of delegations seeking to
have a proposal adopted.

Whether to aim at a group of formal sponsors or to sponsor a draft resolution

alone is a tactical decision of considerable importance. In certain cases a delegation
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may prefer to sponsor a draft resolution alone, maintaining full freedom of action but
usually a group of sponsors will be constituted.

Criteria for the choice of the group of sponsors will depend on the subject of the
proposal. Usually what is sought is some sort of geographic distribution involving
countries from as many regional groups as possible.

Space left open indicates that delegation A wishes for co-sponsors.

A finds support for its proposal in informal explorations and delegations B, C and D
become co-sponsors. During the process of securing co-sponsors the draft text
undergoes changes demanded by the co-sponsors.

It is now tabled as a formal draft resolution in the name of delegations A, B, C, and

D and the Secretariat will circulate copies to all delegations in the working
languages.

Rule 78 GA-ROP
No proposal shall be discussed or put to the vote unless copies of it have been
circulated to all delegations not later than the day preceding the meeting. This
requirement is waived if there is an unanimous wish to go ahead with a proposal
presented the same day.

Sponsoring delegations will agree that one of them (usually A, the originator of the
text) will introduce the draft resolution orally presenting it in a statement at a
conference session. If A wishes to stay in the background it will ask another sponsor
to introduce the text. Another possibility is that A will make the main introductory
statement and the co-sponsors make supporting statements.

The oral introduction is normally brief and to the point, clarifying the wording that
could give rise to misunderstandings. It is somewhat lengthy in cases where no
previous speech has explained the reasons for the draft resolution. It is common and
useful practice to give after a general introduction a few comments on each of the
paragraphs of the preamble and the operative part.

After the introduction, the debate of the draft resolution can begin.
In the time between the distribution of copies and start of the debate the co-sponsors
will have tried to line up support for their draft in informal contacts in the lobby, at
luncheons, receptions etc.

If the sponsors sense some particular difficulty for other delegations, they may try to
organize an informal meeting to deal with the difficulties. This could lead to a
revised text to be submitted. During the debate in plenary speakers may indicate their
support or suggest amendments. If the delegation proposing the amendments moves
a formal amendment, those amendments will be circulated as a separate document.
Alternatively it may only suggest a desired modification. If a formal amendment is
moved the sponsors can, usually permitted by the president until just before the vote,
to incorporate the amendment in a revision of their draft.

Amendments
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If amendments have been formally adopted, the sponsors can no longer
withdraw their resolution (ROP 80, 122). But they can vote against the amended
draft resolution, which, because of heavy modifications they no longer recognize as
their own draft.

Amendments according to ROP 90 may add, delete or revise part of the

proposal. If an amendment is to delete the entire operative part and thereby make
the proposal meaningless (killer amendment), the president would not permit the
tabling of such an amendment.

A delegation which wishes to propose deletion of a contested word need not submit
an amendment. Under ROP of most organisations explanations of vote are
permitted before or after the voting. This example of a draft resolution assumes
controversy and negotiation. Many draft resolutions are adopted without efforts to
amend and without a vote.

III/3 Approaches to negotiation: Distributive versus integrative

Distributive (competitive) negotiation (competitive, zero-sum, win-lose)
One side wins the other side loses
Fixed resources are divided the more one side gets, the less the other side
One sides interests oppose the other parties interests
Main concern is to maximise outcome for own party
Dominant strategies manipulation, forcing and withholding information
Objective is to increase own value and decrease the opponents value

Integrative (cooperative) negotiation (collaborative, win-win)

A variable amount of resources to be divided exists and both sides can win
Variable amount of resources can be shared equitably
Aim to identify mutually beneficial interests
Main concern is to maximise joint outcomes
Dominant strategies cooperation, sharing information and mutual problem
solving
Objective is to have both sides feel that a compromise has greater value for
both

III/4 Practical advice for negotiators

A lot can be explained theoretically by using scientific means and applied in practice
no matter which multilateral context. Lastly negotiations are an imperfect science. No
matter how well prepared or how perfect the application of theoretical principles will
be in the end the course of negotiations and the outcome will always be
unpredictable and much also depends on unforeseen dynamics and personal
characteristics of the negotiators involved. Or the outcome depends on factors which
cannot be influenced by those negotiating political/economic factors also cultural
factors should not be underestimated
Science can help to become more effective
A certain talent for negotiations (being a good communicator/listener) will give
you the edge
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 Experience is an important factor still learn a lot from older experienced
negotiators and chairman and surprised of their moves that often seem to
anticipate developments

Basics of negotiation theory

Aspirational positions preferred outcome for a negotiator
Bottom line positions red lines/minimum that is acceptable as a compromise

Improving negotiating power through preparation

Importance of thorough preparations for successful negotiations;
Know your own red lines (bottom line) before you start negotiating; Bottom
lines organize the preparations by prioritizing your own objectives the
downside is, that a bottom line is only as sensible as the amount of thought
that has gone into defining it. Does your bottom line reflect developments in
the negotiations is there a need to adapt your bottom line during the course
of the negotiations?
Have own fallback positions ready research alternatives and adapt them to
developments over the course of the negotiations.
Fully understand the proposed deal of the other side/sides research ways to
provide what the other side is likely to want (reading the opponents mind);

3 core tactical principles which are always good advice in negotiations

Never reveal all your positions before final showdown
Be the first or be early to offer concrete language (rather have it deleted than
try to bring new language in)
Hold off until the end (marine decision COP-8 CBD)

Organisational matters

Location (can often not be changed rooms made available by secretariat or

organisation);

Seating arrangement (inclusive/informal setting/formal setting)

Idealiter: Neutral arrangements in which every negotiator has roughly the same kind
of seat, view and access to other members of their respective negotiating team;

A table can be a negotiable item: US and Vietnamese negotiators had a lengthy

negotiations to agree on the shape of the table at the preparatory meeting 1968 of
the 1969 Paris Peace conference to end the Vietnam war.

The US suggested a four-sided table, two sides for the North Vietnamese and the
Vietcong, and two sides for the South Vietnamese and the US. The North
Vietnamese countered that they could not contemplate a setting and a negotiation
that implicitly recognized the Government of South Vietnam. The issue was
eventually resolved by settling for a round table, which each side choosing who could
sit at it.

Time considerations: Very often looming deadlines are necessary in order to make
progress or bring results most likely at very end (importance of staying until the
very end).
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What makes an effective (above-average) negotiator?

In preparation of negotiations
Thoroughly prepared and done homework;
Explore more options and devote more time to consider areas of potential
agreement;
Spend more time considering long-term as opposed to short-term issues;
Set objectives within a range rather than a fixed point;
Not settle on a strict sequence for dealing with issues, but leave open the
order in which they are taken up in negotiations

During actual negotiations:

Use of few irritators (self-praise for fair or generous offers) which do not
persuade and are therefore counter-productive;
Few instant counter-proposals (first think the proposal through);
Initiation of few defend/attack spirals;
Frequent test of own understanding;
Summarizing more often and asking questions more often;
Refrain from diluting arguments with weaker and more vulnerable
statements;

III/5 Tactics in multilateral diplomacy

The use of promises, warnings and threats and other tactical moves occurs in
multilateral diplomacy as often as in bilateral diplomacy. It is just that the interplay of
delegations, secretariat and chairman produces a larger number of combinations of
the use of various tactical devices than are available in bilateral diplomacy.

Focus on tactics to get a proposal adopted or defeated

Essentially a delegation wishing to get a proposal adopted must convince the
required majority of participants including the secretariat that adoption of the proposal
at the particular conference is desirable.

Basic rule is its more difficult to obtain action than to prevent action: A
delegation wishing to oppose a proposal has a larger choice of tactical weapons
available because it can aim not only at outright defeat but also at deferment or
postponement of a decision until a later conference.

The following tactics are a combination of some sort of pressure or persuasion:

1) Intellectual arguments
Many proposals are adopted mainly on their intellectual strength. The proponents
demonstrate that the proposal is coming at the right time and place. In this case
no threats, pressure or rewards are necessary to obtain wide support. Most
secretariat proposals for new initiatives are supported by intellectual arguments.
Delegations putting forward secretariat proposals as their own can and will use
intellectual arguments.

2) Promises
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A delegation may get one or more other delegations on its side by promising
something. The something could be support for some initiative or desire of the other
delegation or it can be economic or financial or political. In some cases a pledge
of mutual support is made. Such a pledge is usually on unrelated issues of
considerable and roughly equal importance. Agreements of mutual support
particularly for candidatures

3) Over-asking or under-offering
In bilateral negotiations it is well known that the party that has certain demands will
overask in the hope that its opponent will finally agree to an offer that corresponds to
what it really wanted. Similarly, the party that has something to offer will often start
offering less than what it is willing to settle for in the end.

The same tactics in multilateral negotiations can be encountered in negotiations

between groups. It sometimes takes the form of deliberately including in the text of a
proposal language known to be unacceptable to others, with the intention of
exploiting the deletion of the passage as a concession.

The other form is a deliberate decision to omit certain words or paragraphs in order to
accede later to a request for their inclusion. In that way a mere gesture can be made
to look like a real concession.

Tactics for opposing a proposal

1) A competing draft resolution can be introduced in such a way that the

sponsors of the first resolution are forced to negotiate some compromise. The
sponsor of the competing resolution can then start delaying tactics by raising
successive difficulties in the negotiation.

2) The argument that no financial and human resources are available for a
proposed new activity. The strength of such an argument will increase or
diminish in the light of the position which the secretariat may be willing to take.

3) Another argument often advanced against a proposal for a new activity is that
other organisations are effectively dealing with the question. Ideally there
should be clarity to which organisation at which moment should deal with any
particular issue. In practice there are overlapping areas of competence
between organisations and different views of governments as to which
organisation should deal with a problem.

4) Arguments frequently heard is the time is not ripe either in general or

specifically, because a proposal must wait for the results of some other activity
or study.

5) Procedural motions can be used to obtain deferment of the consideration of

the proposal.
To suspend the meeting
To adjourn the meeting
To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion
For the closure of the debate on the item under discussion.
Some RoPs know a no-action motion
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Of these motions the first three have a delaying effect. However, motions to
suspend or adjourn a meeting are often made by sponsors of a proposal, in order to
consult each other or negotiate with others. A motion for a closure of the debate is
usually made by those who want to press for a vote in favour of the proposal.

Time changes the balance of power (open ended list of) delaying tactics:

Discussing details
Taking longer adjournments or starting late/finishing early
Seeking further instructions
Diplomatic illness
Abiding by national holidays
Changing the delegation
Raising old issues reopening already agreed text
Insisting on full translations
Requesting a change of venues
Cancelling meetings

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