Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Gill, Bates. 1991. China Looks To Thailand
Gill, Bates. 1991. China Looks To Thailand
Gill, Bates. 1991. China Looks To Thailand
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucal.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian
Survey.
http://www.jstor.org
CHINALOOKS TO THAILAND
Exporting
Arms,ExportingInfluence
- R. Bates Gill
526
R. BATESGILL 527
This articletracesthedevelopment ofSino-Thairelationssincetheearly
1980s,especiallywithintheframework ofburgeoning militarycooperation
betweenthe two countriesand particularly Chineseweaponstransfers to
Thailand. Withan understanding of thiscrucialaspectof PRC-Thailand
ties,we can proceedto analyze morecloselythe practice,patterns,and
prospectsofChinesearmsexportsand Beijing'sintentions and influencein
Thailand,in SoutheastAsia, and alongChina'sstrategicperiphery.In the
process,we can gaingreaterinsightintotheimportant PRC foreignpolicy
tool ofarmstransfers and intothebroaderpictureofPRC securitypolicy.
A BuddingRelationship,
1978-84
Beforethe December 1978 Vietnameseinvasionof Cambodia,Thailand's
mostpressingthreatto stabilityand securitycame fromcommunistinsur-
gencies. FromBangkok,thesemovements werenotseenas indigenousbut
ratheras exports,mainlyby Beijing. In the 1950s the PRC had actively
participated in thecreationand supportoftheCommunistpartiesofThai-
land and Malaysia,bothofwhichcarriedout insurgency campaignsin the
Thai hinterlands, typicallyunderethnicChineseleadership.WhileBang-
kok withstoodthecommunist-led challenge,it was neverthelessa nagging
provocationthatseverelystrainedrelationsbetweenChina and Thailand.
Even aftertheestablishment of diplomaticrelationsin 1975,Beijingcon-
tinuedopenlyto encourage"revolutionary struggle"by communistinsur-
gentsfighting in Thailand. But in 1978thethreatening situationalongthe
Cambodia-Vietnamese border,cappedby theVietnameseinvasion,led to a
greatturnaboutin the Sino-Thairelationship.The exposureof China's
southernflankto Hanoi's expansionistdesignswas not seen in Beijingas
an isolatedincident,but a keystonein the larger"arc of encirclement"
constructedby Moscow around China. In February 1979 the PRC
launchedits short-lived "lesson" againstVietnam,whichprovedto be a
costlyblow to PRC lives,materiel,and prestige.This setbackforcedBei-
jing to seek alternative avenuesto achieveits strategicand politicalgoals
againstHanoi and in SoutheastAsia overall. One avenueled directlyto
Bangkok.
Strategically, Beijing wished to see the eclipse of Soviet and Soviet-
backedVietnamesestrength in theregion;politically,
it soughtto establish
a moreinfluential regionalpresenceby developingclosertieswithSouth-
east Asian countries.Openingup a cooperativerelationship withThailand
servedBeijingin both of theseobjectives.ThroughThailand,the PRC
could: (1) militarily supportCambodianresistancegroups,principally the
KhmerRouge,in theirstruggle"to bleed Vietnamwhite"and overthrow
the Hanoi-backedgovernment in Phnom Penh; and (2) see to it that a
favorablepoliticalatmosphere-a neutralor evenpro-Beijing leadershipin
528 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 6, JUNE1991
PhnomPenh-was establishedin Cambodia. By offering supportdirectly
to Thailand,Beijingstrengthened thefrontlineagainstfurther Vietnamese
militaryexpansion while politicallyenhancingChinese influenceon
Cambodianissuesin Thailandand, by extension,in theothercountriesof
SoutheastAsia. The supplyof arms,both throughand to Thailand,be-
came the principalmeans by whichthese severalstrategicand political
goals would be met.
In theimmediateaftermath of theVietnameseinvasionand occupation
of Cambodia,Deng requestedThai cooperationin supplyingCambodian
resistanceforceswith"materialaid." Deng hoped that"the Government
ofThailandwill permitChina to sendmaterialaid to Cambodiavia Thai-
land.... The relationship betweenCambodia and Thailand or between
Cambodia and SoutheastAsia is one of mutualdependence.If one falls,
theotherwillbe in danger.Therefore, it is impossibleforThailandto stay
aloof."2 A yearlaterthefirstvisiteverto China by a Thai parliamentary
delegationarrivedin Beijing along withthe Thai air marshal. During
thesemeetings, Deng made clearBeijing'swillingness to standon theside
of Thailand if Vietnamattackedit. People's LiberationArmyChief-of-
StaffYang Dezhi warned,duringhis January1983 visitto Thailand,that
"if Vietnamdaresto makean armedincursionintoThailand,theChinese
armywillnotstayidle. We willgivesupportto theThai peopleto defend
theircountry."3The questionofdirector indirectmilitary intervention
by
the PLA was neverruledout and was leftforthe authorities in Hanoi to
ponder. But in the early 1980s,Beiing providedlittlemorethan moral
supportto the Thais and the vague promiseof "sidingwithThailand" in
case of an attackfromVietnam. The firsthintsof moredirectand con-
cretemilitarycooperationbetweenBeijingand Bangkokdid not surface
untilthe middleof the decade.
Transfersof MajorWeapons,1985-87
From 1985, China offereda wide rangeof militaryexportsto Bangkok,
includingartillery,
munitions,armoredpersonalcarriers,aircraft,tanks,
missiles,and naval vessels. The firsttransferof major weapons4was a
tems,whichare not yet fullydevelopedand exportedby the PRC, are also consideredas
"major conventionalweapons"by some observers.
5. BangkokPost,7 March 1987.
6. Bangkokwas givena ten-yeargrace periodbeforerepayment, in installments,and it
could be made in agriculturalproducts. See "'Friendship' Arms Sales," Far EasternEco-
nomicReview[FEER] (March 19, 1987), pp. 15-16; "Thais to Pay 5% of Cost of China
Arms,"International Herald Tribune,May 12, 1987.
530 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 6, JUNE1991
of potentialpolitical
took a back seat to more importantconsiderations
leverageand strategicmaneuvering.
ExpandingExportsand
Cooperation,1988-91
In March 1988 a second major purchasingwave by Thai defenseforces
began. General Chawalit reportedlyapprovedthe purchaseof 23 T-69
MBT, 360 APC, an antiaircraft radarguidancesystem,and 130mmam-
munition.Laterin theyear,theRoyal Thai Navyannounceditsintention
to acquire Jianghu-class frigatesfromthe PRC.7 In addition,Thailand
soughtto buya numberofmissilesfromChina,includingtheHY-5 porta-
missile,the HQ-2Jmobilesurface-to-air
ble surface-to-air missile,a truck
mobilemultiplerocketsystem,tacticalsurface-to-surface missiles,a ship-
to-airmissilesystem,and air-to-airmissiles.At thebeginningof 1989,a
thirdwave of purchaseswas in the worksinvolvinglargerand moreso-
phisticatedweapons. Afteran extremelyimportantSino-Thai military
consultationin late November1988,theThai militaryexpressedan inter-
estin acquiringa squadronofF-7 fighter jets (an upgradedPRC versionof
the Soviet MiG-21), threesubmarines,missiles,additionalMBTs, and
moreAPCs. By the end of 1989,however,afterconsiderabletesting,the
F-7 purchasewas put offand has notbeen renewedseriously.In August
1990, Bangkokapprovedthe purchaseof at least 50 C-801 ship-to-ship
missiles,one ofChina'slatestweaponsdevelopments.Capable ofsinkinga
destroyer-sizedvessel,thesemissilesare expectedto armtheJianghu-class
frigatesbeingdeliveredto Thailand.
In addition to increased contacts througharms transfers,Beijing-
Bangkokrelationsstrengthened throughothermilitary-related exchanges.
High-ranking of bothcountriesmeton a consistent
militaryofficials basis
to arrangethearmstransfers to Thailandwhiledeliberating on thestrate-
gic and politicalsituationtheyfaced in SoutheastAsia. In 1988 major
exchangesoccurredin whichperhapsas manyas 200 studentsand faculty
membersofThailand'sAir War Collegeand ArmyWar Collegemade two
separateobservation visitsto China in Apriland October. Severalongoing
trainingprograms theuse and maintenanceof Chinesemilitaryequip-
for
mentstrengthened PRC influence in Thailandas well. Anotherimportant
indicationof growingmilitarycooperationwas the developmentofjoint
jor armstransactions
relativeto theirweaponstradeactivitiesin the late
1980s.
InfluenceThroughArmsSales: Tenuousor
Tenacious?
The questionof how muchinfluence one countrycan projectthroughthe
vehicleof arms transfers is oftenansweredin two words: "not much."
But, in meetingthe goals thatmotivatedarms transfers to Thailand,the
PRC has had some success. Due in partto theweaponsexportedto Thai
armedforces,and throughThailandto theCambodiaresistance, Vietnam
expansionist policyis in retreat.Furthermore, China has strengthened the
positionof Thailand while improvingSino-Thairelations,developments
that would suggesta greaterChinesepresencein SoutheastAsia in the
yearsahead. Chinesearmstransfers also help to projecta favorablepolit-
ical outcomeforBeijingin the region. Any settlement on the futureof
Cambodia,an agreementthatwill have far-reaching consequencesforthe
futureof all of SoutheastAsia, cannotnow be concludedwithoutthepar-
ticipation,cooperation,and agreementof Beijing. Chineseleadersmust
recognizethesuccesstheyhave metwiththeirarmsexportsto theregion,
bothfroma strategicand a politicalpointof view. It wouldbe unrealistic
to assumethePRC willsoon foregothegainsmade in theregionthrough
armstransfers.
Of course, "influence"is a two-waystreet,and requirescooperation
fromthepartnerin any relationship.FromThailand'spointof view,it is
likelya continuedBeijing presencethrougharms transferswill be en-
couraged. The acquisitionof arms fromChina improvesThai defenses,
and ifit can continueto be doneat relativelylow cost,wouldmeetGeneral
of officialSino-Indonesianrelations(XingXian
SitthiSawetsila,that led to the restoration
Ribao, July5, 1990,in FBIS, DR/EA, July10, 1990,p. 51).
17. "Alliesin Isolation: Burmaand China Move Closer,"Jane'sDefenceWeekly, Septem-
ber 15, 1990,p. 475.
538 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 6, JUNE1991
Chawalit'srequirement that "we need to make our armedforcesstrong
witha limitedbudget."18DevelopingclosertieswithBeijingalso provides
Bangkokwithcertainassurancesand confidencein the face of Hanoi's
powerfulmilitary.As Thai poweris advancedin bothmilitaryand polit-
ical aspects,so too is Bangkok'sstandingwithinASEAN and withinthe
regionas a whole. As a practicalpoint,relianceon PRC weaponry,espe-
cially"big-ticket"itemssuch as the frigateand the APCs and tanks,will
lead to furtherdependenceas indicatedby the plans forrepairand co-
productionfacilities.China's politicalclout in Thailand was certainly
strengthened when Beijingacted quicklyto be the firstto recognizethe
new Thai government installedafterthe February1991 coup. Withthe
Thai militaryin controlunderthe leadershipof General Suchinda and
with the political fortunesof General Chawalit appearingever more
favorable,the interestsof Sino-Thaimilitarycooperation,includingarms
exports,maybe givenan evenfurther boost. Both Suchindaand Chawalit
havebeeninstrumental in developingThailand'sarmsexporttiesand close
militaryalignmentwiththe PRC.
FutureProspects
A numberoffactorscan weighagainstgainsin influence soughtby China
througharms transfers, both in SoutheastAsia and elsewhere.Overall,
Chinesearmstransfers will no doubtbe affected by eventsleadingup to
and duringthe 1991 GulfWar: majorarmsexportersmaybe waryabout
providingwithoutquestionlargeamountsofweaponsto potentially expan-
sionistregionalpowersforfearof causingnegativeinternational repercus-
sions. Also, at a worldwidelevel,as theSino-Sovietnormalization process
progresses,China's use of arms transfers to combatSoviet-led"socialist
hegemony"maylose itslegitimacy.Regionally,diminished Sovietinterest
in SoutheastAsia overall,and in supportingVietnamparticularly, could
reduceBeijing'surgeto armThailandand theCambodianresistance.Per-
haps most importantly, as the commonanti-Vietnamese frontloses its
urgency-eitherthroughgenuineVietnameseconcessionsor theestablish-
mentof a more "friendly"government in Phnom Penh or Hanoi-this
principalraisond'etreofclose Beijing-Bangkok relationscould also dimin-
ish and withit the foundationforexpandedPRC influencein Thailand
and the region.
In 1990 a divergenceof views emergedbetweenThailand and China
concerningthefutureroleoftheKhmerRouge and Bangkok'sopeningto
Hanoi. Thailandwishedto see moreflexibility in China's SoutheastAsia
policy,therebyallowinga more substantivepeace processto move for-