Philosophyand PhenomenologicalResearch

Vol. LXXIII,No. 3, November2006

Pessimism
Schopenhauer's
JORDI FERNANDEZ

Macquarie University
TheAustralianNationalUniversity

My purpose in thisessay is to clarify and evaluate ArthurSchopenhauer's grounds

forthe view thathappiness is impossible. I shall distinguishtwo of his arguments for
that view and argue that both of them are unsound. Both arguments involve prem-
ises grounded on a problematic view, namely, that desires have no objects. What
makes this view problematicis that,in each of the two arguments, it conflicts with
Schopenhauer's grounds for other premises in the argument. I shall then propose a
way of fixing both arguments. The solution involves substitutingthe view that
desires have no objects with the view that we have a desire to have desires. The
latter view, I shall argue, can do the grounding work that the former does in
Schopenhauer's argumentsbut, unlike it, the view that we desire to desire is con-
sistentwith Schopenhauer's grounds for the rest of premises in those arguments.

1. Introduction
My purposein thisessayis to clarifyArthur Schopenhauer's groundsfor
the view thathappinessis impossible.I shall distinguishtwo of his
arguments forthatview,I will highlight a problemthatis commonto
bothof themandproposea solutionto it thatis consistent withseveral
ofSchopenhauer's views.
In sectiontwo,I shallspell out theview containedin Schopenhauer's
claim thathappinessis impossible.I shall call this view 'conditional
pessimism'.In sectionthree,I shalldiscussSchopenhauer's reasonsfora
differentview,thatis, theview thatdesiringis painful.Schopenhauer's
reasonsforitarebasicallytwo,namely,thatdesiresoriginate in needsand
thatthoseneedsarepainful.In sectionfour,I shall discussan argument
forSchopenhauer's conditionalpessimismthatcombinesthe view that
desiringis painfulwiththe view thatsatisfyingall of our desiresis
impossible,whichI willcall 'theargument fromthelack of satisfaction'.
In sectionfive,I will discussa different argument for Schopenhauer's
conditional pessimism,whichI shall call 'theargument fromboredom'.
The argument fromboredomalso involvestheview thatdesiringis pain-
ful,but it combinesit withtheview thatsatisfying any of our desires
leadsus to boredom.In sectionsix,I shallarguethata singleview under-

646 JORDIFERNANDEZ
lies boththeviewthatsatisfying all of our desiresis impossibleandthe
view thatsatisfying any of our desiresleadsus to boredom.This is the
view thatdesireis aimless.I will thenpointout that,as a result,the
premisesin each of thetwo arguments arebasedon conflicting assump-
tions.For, I shall argue,themost reasonablereadingof the claim that
desiresoriginate in needsentailsthatdesireis notat all aimless.1
In sectionseven,I shall considera possiblewayof fixingbothargu-
ments,whichI shalleventually reject.This potentialsolutioninvolvesa
distinctionbetweenthe will in itselfand specificdesires.In sections
eight,nineandten,I shall proposean alternative wayof dissolvingthe
tensionbetweenthepremisesin botharguments. The proposedsolution
will involvetheview thatwe havea desireto havedesires.My sugges-
tionis thatthisview can help Schopenhauer to accountforboredomas
well as our incapability to satisfyall of our desires.So Schopenhauer's
appeal to the view thatdesire is aimlessbecomesunnecessary. The bot-
tom line is that,althoughSchopenhauer tooka stepin thewrongdirec-
tion,thereis an openpaththatleadsfromhis view thatdesiresaregener-
atedbyneedsto his conditional pessimism.In orderto pursuethispath,
one needstoendorsetheviewthatwe havea desireto desireanddropthe
view thatdesireis aimless.For theview thatwe havea desireto desire
providesSchopenhauer withgroundsforkey premisesin both of his
arguments forpessimism. And,unliketheviewthatdesireis aimless,the
viewthatwe havea desireto desiredoes notconflictwithhis view that
desiresarecausedbyneeds.

2. Schopenhauer'spessimism
One oftheviewsthatSchopenhauer is bestknownforhavingdefended is
theview thathas come to be knownas 'Schopenhauer's pessimism'in
This is basicallytheview thathappinessis
thephilosophicalliterature.
impossible:
Everything in lifeproclaimsthatearthlyhappinessis destinedto be frustrated or recog-
nizedas an illusion.The groundsforthislie deep in theverynatureof things.2

supposedto
Whatexactlyis 'happinessis destinedto be frustrated'
means'an imperishable
mean?By 'happiness',Schopenhauer satisfaction'
thatis, a stateof
whichcannotagainbe disturbed',
or 'thatcontentment
permanent then,Schopenhauer's
Apparently,
pleasure.3 claimthathappi-

1 of Schopenhauer's in sectionsfourand five,as well

The reconstructions arguments
oftheproblemdiscussedin sectionsix, owe a huge deal to Ber-
as theidentification
nardRegister's workon Schopenahuer.For Reginster'sown views on Schopen-
hauer,see his (2006).
2 WWR II 46, p. 573.
3 WWR I 65, p. 362.

SCHOPENHAUER'SPESSIMISM 647
ness is destined to be frustrated
should be construedas the view that a
stateof permanentpleasure is impossible to achieve. However, Schopen-
hauer qualifies thispositionabout permanentpleasure. Afterpointing out
that 'such a thing cannot be conceived', he appends the following pro-
viso:

However,if we wishto give an honorary, or so to speak an emeritus,positionto an old

expressionthatfromcustomwe do notlikeentirelyto discard,we may, metaphorically
and figuratively,
call thecompleteself-effacement and denialof the will,truewill-less-
ness,whichalonestillsand silencesforeverthecravingof thewill;whichalone gives that
contentmentthatcannotagain be disturbed; whichalone is world-redeeming; and which
we shall now considerat theconclusionof our whole discussion;theabsolutegood,the
summumbonum;and we mayregardit as theonlyradicalcure forthe disease against
whichall othergood things,
suchas all fulfilled
wishesandall attainedhappiness,are only
palliatives,anodynes.

It thereforeseems more accurateto attributeto Schopenhauer the view

that,as long as desires arise in us, permanentpleasure is impossible. To
appreciatewhat this view involves exactly, it is also necessaryto note
thatSchopenhauerconstruespleasure as theabsence of pain:

We feelpain,butnotpainlessness;worry, butnotfreedom fromworry;fear,butnotsafety

and security.We feelthe desireas we feel hungerand thirst; butas soon as it has been
itis likethemouthful
satisfied, offoodwhichhas beentaken,and whichceases to existfor
our feelingsthe momentit is swallowed. We painfullyfeel the loss of pleasuresand
enjoyments, as soon as theyfailto appear,butwhenpainscease even afterbeingpresent
fora longtime,theirabsenceis notdirectly felt,butat mosttheyare thought of intention-
allyby meansof reflection. For onlypain and lack can be feltpositively, and therefore
theyproclaimthemselves; well-being, on thecontrary, is merelynegative.5

The upshot is that the qualified version of Schopenhauer's pessimism

thatI just referredto needs to be read as the view that, as long as desires
arise in us, sufferingis inescapable. Let us call this view 'Schopenhauer's
conditionalpessimism' or, forshort,'CP':

(CP) As long as desires arise in us, sufferingis inescapable.

The factthat Schopenahuerheld CP, as opposed to an absolute formof

pessimism, explains that he exhorts us to will-lessness as the road to
'salvation' or 'liberation' despite his pessimism.6 The thoughtis simply
that if Schopenhauerwere an absolute pessimist, then it would be very
hard to understandwhy he would exhort us to give up our desires.

4
WWR I 65, p. 362.
WWR II 46, p. 575.
Salvationas will-lessness
is discussed,forinstance,
in WWR I 70, pp. 402-408.

648 JORDIFERNANDEZ
Clearly,thereis a point in pursuingwill-lessnessonly if suffering
is
somehowavoidablethrough it.
So muchforwhat'happinessis destinedto be frustrated'
means.What
are Schopenhauer'sgroundsforCP? For thenextthreesections,1 shall
addressthisquestionin detail.

3. Needs,desiresand suffering
One maydistinguish, at least,two arguments forCP thataresupported
by a fairamount oftextual evidence. Both arguments share,as theirfirst
premise, theclaimthathavingdesiresnecessarily involvesa kindof pain
or suffering.But theydiffer in theirsecondpremises.In orderto yield
CP, one ofthearguments combinestheclaimthathavingdesiresis pain-
fulwiththeclaimthatsatisfying all of our desiresis impossible.The
otherargument combinesit withthe claim thatsatisfying any of our
desiressoonyieldsto boredom, whichis takento be a formof suffering.
Let us examine,firstofall,thepremisesharedbybotharguments.
The startingpointof botharguments forCP is the above-mentioned
claimthathavingdesiresinvolvesa kind of suffering. Let us call this
viewthe'painfiilness ofdesire'viewor,forshort,'(D - > P)':

(D - > P) Havingdesiresis painful.

The painfulness ofdesireviewis a consequenceof two morebasic views

on thenatureofdesireendorsedby Schopenhauer. Thesetwo viewscon-
stitutewhatwe maycall 'Schopenhauer's need-basedmodelof desire'or,
to abbreviate,the'NB modelofdesire'.Whatarethosetwoviews?
Firstofall, Schopenhauerbelievedthatall desiresstemfromneeds:

Forall striving withone's own state

springsfromwantor deficiency,fromdissatisfaction
or condition[...].7

Schopenhauer a need is painful.He

also heldtheview thatexperiencing
speaksofthedesirethatarisesfromsomeneed thus:

We call itshindrance an obstacleplaced betweenit and itstemporary

through goal, suf-
fering.

We can thensummarize NB modelof desirein the fol-

Schopenhauer's
lowingpairoftheses:

(D - > N) Anydesireis generated

bya need.

(N - > P) Anyexperience
ofa needis painful.
7 wwr 156, p. 309.
8 WWR I 56, p. 309.

SCHOPENHAUER'SPESSIMISM 649
GivenSchopenhauer's NB model of desire,we can see why he would
endorse
naturally (D - > P). But(D - > P) alone will not allow Schopena-
huerto reachCP. Thus,Schopenhauer uses (D - > P) in combination
with
twofurtherthesesin orderto obtainCP through two differentroutes.Let
us examinethosetworoutesinorder.

4. The argumentfromthelack ofsatisfaction

Schopenhauer seemsto haveheldtheview thatwe cannotsatisfyall of
our desires.Thus, commenting on humandesires,Schopenhauer com-
plainsthatthey'buoy us up withthevain hope thattheirfulfillment is
always thefinal of We
goal willing.'9 may call thisthe 'the lack of satis-
faction'viewor,forshort,'LS':

(LS) all of ourdesiresis impossible.

Satisfying

The firstargument forSchopenhauer's conditionalpessimismthatI will

be concerned withhas (D - > P) and LS as its premises.Thus,theargu-
ment,whichI shall refer to as 'the argument fromthe lack of satisfac-
tion',has thefollowingstructure:

(D - > P) Havingdesiresis painful.

(LS) all ofourdesiresis impossible.

Satisfying

Therefore,

(CP) As longas desiresarisein us,suffering

is inescapable.

Schopenhauer theargument
presents fromthelackofsatisfaction
ina spe-
ciallygraphicmannerinthefollowing
passage:
All willing springs fromlack, fromdeficiency, and thus from suffering.Fulfillmentbrings
this to an end; yet forone which that is fulfilledthere remain at least ten that are denied.
Further,desiring lasts a long time, demands and requests go on to infinity;fulfillmentis
only apparent; the wish fulfilledat once makes away fora new one; the formeris a known
delusion, the lattera delusion not as yet known. No attained object of willing can give a
satisfactionthatlasts and no longerdeclines; but it is always like the alms thrown to a beg-
gar, which reprieves him today so thathis miserymay be prolonged till tomorrow.10

The argumentfromthe lack of satisfactionhas been attributed to

Schopenhauer by severalcommentatorsundersome form.When David
Cartwright, forinstance,discusseswhetherSchopenhauer's
'metaphysics
of thewill' is thebasis uponwhichhe arguedforpessimism,this is the

9
WWR I 29, p. 164.
10
WWR I 38, p. 196.

650 JORDI FERNANDEZ

argumentthatis being consideredand attributedto Schopenhauer. Also,
it is what Mark Migotti calls Schopenhauer's 'argument to the
metaphysicalthesis' (the metaphysicalthesis being the claim that all life
is suffering).12Bryan Magee attributesthis argumentto Schopenhaueras
well. He triesto motivateit by invitingus to share the intuitionthat the
satisfactionof our desires 'can neverbe morethantemporary,and then we
are on the rack once more.' Unhappiness or dissatisfaction,he tells us,
mustbe our normalstate.13Finally, the argumentfromthe lack of satis-
faction seems to be the argument that Georg Simmel attributesto
Schopenhauerwhen, defendinghim froma certainobjection, he sympa-
theticallycommentsthat'inasmuch as it follows fromthe unitarynature
of will thatit nevercan really be pacified,the negative balance of suffer-
ing over happiness in life is established.'14There is, then, a number of
commentatorsthat seem to attributesome version of the argumentfrom
the lack of satisfactionto Schopenhauer.
A certainworryabout the argumentfromthe lack of satisfactionmer-
its consideration.Perhaps a person with some unsatisfieddesires could
neverthelessescape suffering providedthatthe numberor intensityof her
satisfieddesires exceeds that of her unsatisfieddesires. If so, then CP
would appear not to follow fromLS and (D - P). It may seem as if
Schopenhauertherefore needs to rule out the just-mentionedpossibility.
And it may seem as if his view thatpleasure is the absence of sufferingis
playing that role exactly: If pleasure is only 'negative', then no matter
how manydesires we manage to satisfy,the pleasure that we obtain thus
can neveroutweigh the sufferingthat stems frompossessing unsatisfied
desires.15In fact,the reason why CP does follow fromLS and (D - > P)
is not that the possibility described above is somehow ruled out. The
reason is that'sufferingis inescapable' in CP mustbe read as saying that
the presenceof some suffering,no matterhow briefor mild, is guaran-
teed. Recall that Schopenhauerraised the bar for happiness very high.
Happiness is meant to be a state of permanentsatisfaction.All he needs
to show in orderto show thatsuch a state is impossible to achieve is that
we will always experiencesome suffering.And the constantpresence of
some unsatisfieddesires is enough to guaranteethis.
Thus, the argumentfromthe lack of satisfactiondoes succeed in deliv-
eringCP. But the argumentfromthe lack of satisfactionis not Schopen-

11 See Cartwright's (1988).

12 s (1995). Migotti' fromminein thathe chooses to use
differs
s terminology
In Migotti'
the expression'Schopenhauer'spessimism'to referto the view thatlife is not
choiceworthy.
1J See
Magee's (1983), p. 219.
14 See Simmers
(1986), p. 53.
I thankan anonymous refereeforthissuggestion.

SCHOPENHAUER'SPESSIMISM 651
hauer'sonlyargument forpessimism.He also combines(D - P) with
thepsychologicalobservation
thatwe are susceptibleto boredom,and he
triesto obtainCP fromthosetwo points.Let us turnto thatargument
now.

5. The argumentfromboredom
In some passagesof The Worldas Will and Representation, Schopen-
hauerclaims,notthatsatisfying
all of our desiresis impossible,butthat
satisfyinganyof themwill eventually lead us to a certain'emptylong-
ing'thatis a formofsuffering,
namely,boredom:
Of itsnaturethedesireis pain;attainment
quicklybegetssatiety.The goal was onlyappar-
ent;possessiontakesaway itscharm.The desire,theneed, appears again on the scene
undera newform;ifitdoes not,thendreariness,emptinessand boredomfollow.16

We can summarize basicpointaboutboredomin thefol-

Schopenhauer's
lowing'satisfaction
yieldsboredom'
thesisor,to abbreviate,
'SB':

anyof our desiresultimately

(SB) Satisfying producesboredomin
us.

Schopenhauer's SB basicallyamountsto the empiricalobservation that

we aresusceptible to boredom.It is indeeda quitecompellingfolkpsy-
chologicalgeneralizationthat,once our desireforsome objecthas been
satisfiedand we havecometo acquireit, it is relativelyeasy forus to
takeitforgranted.Admittedly, some substantial qualificationsregarding
thedegreeofboredomthatwe mayreachineachcase and thetimethatit
will takeforus to reachit are needed.But SB does seem to enjoy a
strongintuitiveappeal.
Now, givenSchopenhauer's view thatdesiringis painful,his thesis
thatsatisfyingourdesiresultimately leads us to boredomhas theconse-
quencethat,as longas desireskeeparisingin us, we shall eitherexperi-
encethempainfully (whiletheyareunsatisfied) orwe shalleventually get
bored(whenwe satisfythem).17 Schopenhauer describesthis inescapable
cycleofpainandboredomthus:

16
WWR I 57, pp. 313-4.
Strictlyspeaking,our predicamentwouldbe a bit more complicatedaccordingto
Schopenhauer. An anonymousrefereeremindsme thatSchopenhauerconsidersthe
thatsatisfying
possibility our desires leads us to anxiety,as opposed to boredom.
Thus,a moreaccurate way to describethepredicament thatSchopenhauerhas in
mindwouldbe thefollowing:Eitherwe do notsatisfyour desiresor we do. In the
former case, we experiencethesufferingassociatedto therelevantneed. In the lat-
tercase, we experienceeitherboredomor anxiety.As bothexperiencesare meant
to be unpleasant,
theconclusionremainsthatsuffering is inescapableas longas we
have desires.

652 JORDIFERNANDEZ
The basisofall willing,however,is need,lack,and hencepain,andbyits verynatureand
destinedto pain. If, on theotherhand,it lacks objects of willing,
origin,it is therefore
becauseitis at once deprivedof themagainbytooeasy a satisfaction, a fearfulemptiness
and boredomcome over it; in otherwords,itsbeingand itsexistenceitselfbecome an
intolerable burdenforit. Hence itslifeswingslike a pendulumto and frobetweenpain
andboredom,and thesetwoarein factitsultimate constituents.

We may reconstructSchopenhauer'sargumentin the text above as fol-

lows:

(D - P) Having desires is painful.

(SB) Satisfyingany of our desires producesboredomin us.

Therefore,

(CP) As long as desires arise in us, sufferingis inescapable.

Let us call this 'the argumentfromboredom'. Several commentatorsfind

some versionof the argumentfromboredom in Schopenhauer's writings.
ChristopherJanawaycalls it 'the argumentfromthe ubiquity of suffering
withinthe structureof willing.'19Janawaypresentsit by means of a dia-
gram wherethe possible different outcomes of having a desire are repre-
sented.Satisfaction of a desire is representedas leading to boredom, and
the whole diagram is meant to illustratehow some formof sufferingis
always the ultimateoutcome of desiring. The argumentfromboredom is
also the second of fourargumentsforpessimism distinguishedby Julian
Young in Schopenhauer'swritings.20Magee refersto the argumentfrom
boredomas 'a further and devilishtwist' to the argumentfromthe lack of
satisfactionand he formulatesits conclusion, very much in the spirit of
Schopenhauer's writings,as the claim that 'human beings are caught
betweenthe Schylla of willing and the Charybdis of boredom.'21 Ivan
Soil also attributesthe argumentfromboredom to Schopenhauer. Inter-
estingly, he does not think that the argumentfrom boredom and the
argumentfromthe lack of satisfactionare independenteither.Comment-
ing on the latterargument,Soil quotes Schopenhaueras claiming that the
will is incapable of finalsatisfaction,and he correctlypoints out that this
alone will not give Schopenhauerthe intendedconclusion that suffering

18
WWRI57, p. 312.
19 See Janaway's(1999).
See Young's (1987), pp. 58-61. Youngthinksthattheclaimthatsatisfyingour desires
leads us to boredompresupposes the view thatpleasureis theabsence of suffering,
and he discussesSchopenhauer's reasonsforthatview. For the purposesof thisdis-
cussion,I am concedingthe view thatpleasureis theabsence of pain to Schopen-
hauer,so I shallnotbe discussingthosereasonshere.
21 In Magee's (1983), pp. 219-220.

SCHOPENHAUER'SPESSIMISM 653
is inescapablein life.Accordingto Soil,whatis requiredis a viewthatis
roughly entailedby(D - > P), namely,theview that'one does not really
attainany substantial satisfactionevenin whatwould normallybe con-
sidereda successfullifeof strivingforand achievinga seriesof goals.'
Soil thenproceedsto describetheargument fromboredomas Schopen-
hauer'sgroundsforthatview.22 Ittherefore seemsto havebeenclearto a
numberof commentators thatsome versionof the argument frombore-
domwas endorsedbySchopenhauer.
To recapitulate,we have distinguished two arguments forSchopen-
hauer'sviewthat,unlesswe can attainwill-lessness, is inescap-
suffering
able. The argument fromthe lack of satisfaction derivesCP from(D - >
P) and LS, whereastheargument fromboredomderivesCP from(D - >
P) and SB. As we have seen,(D - > P) is groundedon a certainmodelof
desire,accordingto whichdesiresare based on lacks or needs thatare
experienced as painful.But whatare SB and LS based on? What are
Schopenhauer's reasonsin supportof thosetwo views? I turnto this
issueinthenextsection.

6. Desire and aimlessness

In this section,I shall arguethata singlethesissupportsboth SB and
LS, namely,theviewthatdesireis aimless.Then,I shall pointout that
neither theargument fromthelack of satisfaction northeargument from
as
boredom, Schopenhauer seemsto have conceived them, are sound. For
theviewthatdesireis aimlessandtheneed-basedmodelof desireare,on
themostreasonablereadingof the latter,inconsistent. In the nexttwo
sections, I shall a of
propose way fixing this problem.Eventually,my
conclusionwillbe thatSchopenhauer is betteroffdroppingtheview that
desireis aimless.For thereis an alternative explanation of bothSB and
LS thatfitsespeciallywell withintheneed-based modelof desireand it
does notgenerate thetroublethatassumingdesireto be aimlessdoes.
WhatareSchopenhauer's groundsforLS? Perhapsthe idea is simply
that,as a matter of fact,we areconstituted in such a way thattoo many
desireshappento arisein us to be able to satisfythemall. Thus, only
one out of, say, ten of our desiresgets satisfied.23 Could this be the
thought behindLS? Schopenhauer's claimthatthereasonswhyhappiness
is impossible'lie deep intheverynatureof things'suggeststhathe had
morecomplexgroundsin supportof LS. More specifically,a good
measureof textualevidencesuggeststhatthe reasonwhy Schopenhauer
thought thatour desirescannotbe ultimately satisfiedis thatthewill is
actuallyaimless.Thereis no objectwhosepossessionwill come to stop
22
See Soil's (1988), pp. 110-111.
Many thanksto an anonymous refereeforraising this possibility.

654 JORDI FERNANDEZ

our willing because, quite simply, thereis no object of our willing. No
wonder, then, that our desires cannot be satisfied once and for all.
Schopenhauerexpresses this view several times. He claims, for instance
(my emphasis):

In fact,absenceofall aim,ofall limits,belongsto theessentialnatureof thewill in itself,

whichis an endlessstriving. thestriving
[...] Therefore, of mattercan always be impeded
only,neverfulfilledor satisfied.Butthisis preciselythecase withthestriving of all the
will's phenomena.

We clearlysaw how,at all gradesof itsphenomenon fromthe lowestto thehighest,the

willdispensesentirely aimandobject.It alwaysstrives,
withan ultimate becausestrivingis
to whichno attainedgoal can putan end. Such striving
itssole nature, is therefore
inca-
pableof finalsatisfaction.

All thattheseremarksare intendedto make clear, namelythe impossibilityof attaining

findsitsexplanationin whatis
andthenegativenatureof all happiness,
lastingsatisfaction
shownat theendofthesecondbook,namelythatthewill,whose objectification is human
lifelikeeveryphenomenon, without
is a striving aimorend.

Thus, it seems clear thatSchopenhauer's reason forLS lies in the follow-

ing 'aimlessness of desire' (or 'AD') claim:

(AD) Desire is aimless.

Now, thephenomenonthatSchopenhauer is pointing at in SB also calls

forexplanation.Why would securingthe object of our desires 'take away
its charm'? Schopenhauerdoes not provideus with a full-fledgedaccount
of boredom, but two sorts of claims that he makes about boredom can
help us reconstructwhathis account mighthave been.
Consider, firstof all, the claim that, when we achieve a goal and we
get bored,the goal 'was only apparent.' This claim suggests that, accord-
ing to Schopenhauer,the reason why securingthe object of our desires
takes away its appeal is thatthe object in question was not the real object
of our desire. In otherwords, if we get bored once we achieve what we
apparentlywant, it is simplybecause we did not reallywant it in the first
place. This would indeed explain why securingthe objects of our desires
eliminatestheirappeal and, as a result,we are unable to enjoy theirpos-
session. If we never really wanted a certainobject that we have pursued
and finallysecured,thenit is not surprisingthatwe are not able to enjoy
its possession.
This explanation of SB does not commit Schopenhauerto AD. It
allows forthe possibilitythatour desires do have objects, but we are very

24 wwr 1 29, p. 164.

a WWR I 56, p. 308.
26 WWR I 58, p. 321.

SCHOPENHAUER'SPESSIMISM 655
bad at identifyingthem. However, this does not seem to be what
Schopenhauerhad in mind. For he sometimes claims that, in boredom,
what is experiencedis a sort of pressurethat lacks any goal.27 This kind
of talk suggests that Schopenhauer'sgrounds forhis view that, in bore-
dom, we have achieved goals that are not our real goals ultimatelycome
down to the AD view: The goals of our desires are not meant to be 'only
apparent'in that we systematicallymisidentifythem. They are meant to
be only apparentin the sense that, strictlyspeaking, there is no such
thingas the goals of our desires.
A problematic picture of Schopenhauer's pessimism arises at this
point. Let us recall what the two argumentsfor Schopenhauer's pessi-
mism underconsiderationare:

(D - > P) Having desires is painful.

(LS) Satisfyingall of our desires is impossible.

Therefore,

(CP) As long as desires arise in us, sufferingis inescapable.

(D - > P) Having desires is painful.

(SB) Satisfyingany of our desiresproducesboredomin us.

Therefore,

(CP) As long as desires arise in us, sufferingis inescapable.

We have seen that(D - P) is supportedby (D -^ N) and (N -> P). And

we have just seen thatLS and SB seem to be groundedon AD. Now, con-
sider (D - > N). How plausible is theclaim thatdesires originatein needs?
Consider a paradigmaticexample of desire forSchopenhauer,namely,
thirst.28It is certainlyplausible that, when I am thirsty,the desire that I

Thus, Schopenhauer refers to boredom as a 'longing without a definite object' in

WWRI57, p. 312.
There is a certain difficultywith (D - > N) having to do with the distinctionbetween
motivatedand unmotivateddesires. Unmotivateddesires, such as thirst,are such that
the subject does not need to have a motive for having the desire even thougha causal
explanation of the fact that she has it will typically be available. Motivated desires,
such as the desire to take the bus when one wants to go to work and one thinksthat
the bus will take one there, are grounded on reasons and, therefore, they are sus-
ceptible of rational or motivationalexplanation. (See Thomas Nagel's (1970) for the
distinction.)Claim (D - > N) seems plausible enough for unmotivateddesires but it is
not as intuitivewhen it comes to motivated desires. However, the problem that 1 am
just about to raise in the text remains whether or not a case for (D - > N) can be
made when it comes to motivated desires. Thus, I shall sidestep the issue about the

656 JORDI FERNANDEZ

experience is beingproduced by thefactthatmy organismis in needof
water.Butconsiderwhythisis plausible:Whyshouldtheneedforwater
in my organismbringabouta certaindesire?Once we specifythatthe
desirein questionis thedesireto drink,thereis a perfectly good evolu-
tionary explanation forthiscausalrelation. The reasonwhymy organism
beingin needof watercauses me to havea certaindesireis thathaving
thatparticular desirewhilebeingin thatconditioncontributes to my sur-
vival. For, ceterisparibus,my havingthatdesiretendsto elicit action
thatresultsintheneedforwaterbeingfulfilled. This is whytheideathat
desiresarecausedbyneedsis intuitively appealing.In otherwords,thisis
-
why(D > N) seemsplausibleto us. Now, noticethatthefactthatthe
desirecausedbymyneedis thedesireto eliminatethatneed is essential
to thisexplanation of (D - N). In otherwords,ifwe read(D - > N) as the
claim thatour needsproducedesiresthatarenotaimedat theirelimina-
tion,thenthereasonwhy(D - > N) holdstruebecomesa mystery. Basi-
cally,theonlywayto makea case for(D - > N) is to assumethatthereis
a systematic connection betweenthoseneedsthatelicitdesiresand what
thosedesiresareaimed at.
The problemis nowthatAD is clearlyincompatible withthisreading
of(D - > N). Ifourdesiresareaimedattheelimination of thoseneedsthat
generate them,thenthereclearlyis a veryspecificaim foreach of them,
whichmakesAD false.The upshotis thatSchopenhauer needsto facea
seriousdilemma:Either(D - > N) is meantto be readas the claim that
desiresareaimedat theelimination of thoseneedsthatgenerate them,or
itis not.In theformer case, the premises of botharguments basedon
are
inconsistent -
assumptions.In the lattercase, (D > N) becomeshighly
implausible as a result,one premisein each argument
and, is leftunsup-
ported. In either case, both of Schopenhauer's arguments out to be
turn
unsound.

7. Specificdesiresversusthewill in itself
We maytryto defendSchopenhauer by drawinga distinction between
'The Will' (or 'thewill in itself)andspecificdesires,the lattersomehow
beingmanifestations orconcreteinstancesof theformer. The idea would
thenbe to readSchopenhauer as speakingof The Will whenhe claims
thatdesireis aimless,and to readhim as speakingof specificdesires
whenhe claimsthatthewill springsfromneed.29As a matterof fact,
Schopenhauer himselfmighthave triedto drawthisdistinction. His fol-
lowingclaim suggests it:

scope of (D - > N) and concentrate,

forthesake of simplicity,
on unmotivated
desires
suchas thirst.
Migottiproposesthismoveinhis(1995), p. 64.

SCHOPENHAUER'SPESSIMISM 657
Every individual act has a purpose or end; willing as a whole has no end in view.

Similarly,in the second book of The World as Will and Representation,

we can find Schopenhauerclaiming that 'every will is directedto some-
thing;it has an object, an aim of its willing' and that 'In fact,absence of
all aim, of all limits,belongs to the essential natureof the will in itself,
which is an endless striving'in two adjacent paragraphs.31 It is hard to
make sense of those two claims unless the will in itself is taken to be
different fromany particulardesire.
Tryingto defendSchopenhauerby separatingthe aimlessness of spe-
cific desires fromthe aimlessness of the will in itself is a problematic
move fortwo reasons. Fist of all, it is exegeticallyproblematicbecause,
despite the just-mentioned texts, there are several passages where
Schopenhauer himself does not seem to use the distinction between
specific desires and the will in itself for that purpose. Recall the three
examinedtextswhere Schopenhauerclaims thatdesire cannot be satisfied
because it has no object:

In fact,absence of all aim, of all limits,belongs to the essential nature of the will in itself,
which is an endless striving.[...] Therefore,the strivingof mattercan always be impeded
only, never fulfilledor satisfied. But this is precisely the case with the strivingof all the
will's phenomena.

We clearly saw how, at all grades of its phenomenon from the lowest to the highest,the
will dispenses entirelywithan ultimateaim and object. It always strives,because strivingis
its sole nature,to which no attained goal can put an end. Such strivingis therefore inca-
pable of final satisfaction.

All that these remarks are intended to make clear, namely the impossibilityof attaining
lasting satisfactionand the negative natureof all happiness, findsits explanation in what is
shown at the end of the second book, namely that the will, whose objectification is human
life like every phenomenon,is a strivingwithoutaim or end.

Notice that, in the firsttext, Schopenhaueraffirmsthat the strivingof

mattercannot be satisfiedand, he adds, this is the case with all of the
will's phenomena(including, presumably,human willing). Likewise, in
the second text,he claims thatstrivingis the whole natureof the will and
he explicitlyclaims thatthis is true'at all grades of its phenomenonfrom
the lowest to the highest.' Finally, in the thirdtext, Schopenhauerclaims
that the will is a strivingwithoutaim, and he specifies that the will's
objectification is human life like every phenomenon (which seems

30
In WWR I 29, p. 165.
Both claims can be found in WWR I 29, pp. 163-164.
~
WWR I 29, p. 164.
33
WWR I 56, d. 308.
34
WWR I 58, p. 321.

658 JORDI FERNANDEZ

pointlessto bringup unless he means to imply that what he is claiming
about the will in itselfis also trueof any specific human desire). So it is
quite difficultto reconcileSchopenhauer's claim that every individual act
has a purpose or end but willing as a whole has no end with his own
claims about the reason why the will is incapable of satisfaction.
Of course, thisonly shows thatthereis a choice thatwe need to make:
Either we dismiss Schopenhauer's remarksin the three texts above as
passing commentsor we rejecthis apparentdistinctionbetweenthe aim-
lessness of the will in itselfand the aimlessness of specific desires. So
why should we opt forthe latter?The reason has to do with a second
difficultyabout drawing the distinctionbetween The Will and specific
desires. Basically, we could argue that the will in itself is aimless
whereasspecific desires are not, but it would do no good to eitherof
Schopenhauer's arguments.Let me explain.
Let us suppose, forthe sake of the argument,that we take Schopen-
hauer's view regardingthe aimlessness of desire not to be AD, but the
following'aimlessness of The Will' (or 'AW') claim:

(AW) The Will is aimless.

This would allow us to save Schopenhauerfroma chargeof incoherence,

but we would do it at the cost of leaving SB and LS groundless. For
how could AW help Schopenhauerto argue that one cannot satisfyall of
one's desires once and forall? How could AW help him to argue that one
gets bored afterone satisfiesone's desires? The claim that The Will is
aimless seems irrelevantto both issues. The point in LS was meant to be
thatone cannotpermanently satisfyone's specificdesires. If we grantthat
those desires have goals, then it is difficultto see why the factthat The
Will is aimless should preventus frombeing able to achieve all of those
goals. Similarly,the susceptibilityto boredom described in SB concerns
our specific desires. And if we grantthat those desires have goals, then
AW does not shed any lighton why boredomoccurs. The Will may very
well be aimless but if my specific desires do have real objects, then why
do 1 get bored afterI come to possess them?
What we need is an alternativeto AD. That is, we need (1) a good rea-
son why one might naturallythinkthat it is impossible to permanently
satisfyall of our desires,and (2) an account of boredom. In the next three
sections,I shall presenta view thatcan play both roles. Unlike AD, this
view will have the virtueof being compatible with Schopenhauer's NB
model of desire and, although it introducesa hierarchyof desires, it
avoids the problematicontological commitmentto The Will as an entity
over and above our specificdesires.

SCHOPENHAUER'SPESSIMISM 659
 8. Boredomand the will to will
Let us beginbytryingto providean accountofboredom.I would like to
highlighttwocharacteristic
featuresofboredom.Firstof all, in boredom,
we do notwantto do anything. that
Secondof all, this is not something
we like.Simpleas theyare,thesetwo pointsprovideus withthekeyto
an explanationof boredomthatsquareswithSchopenhauer's NB model
ofdesireand itdoes notrequirean appealto AD.
Supposethatyou arebored.Suppose,too, thatI ask you whatyou
wouldliketo do. Youransweris boundto be 'nothing'.This is ambigu-
ous, though.Let us distinguishthefollowingtwo thingsthatyou may
mean:

(a) I desirethatthereis no action(psuchthatI (p.

(b) Thereis no actioncpsuchthatI desireto(p.

Intuitivelyenough,youranswering'nothing'to my questiondoes not

expressthekindof desirementioned in (a). Whathappenswhenyou are
boredis notthatyouwantto be in a situationwhereyou aredoingnoth-
ing. Rather,whathappensis thatthereis nothingyou particularly want
todo. Whatyouranswerexpressesis thesortof desirementioned in (b).
If, in orderto treatdesiresas propositional attitudes,we construethe
objectsof desiresas propositions,we can reformulate whata (sophisti-
cated) boredsubjectwould reportas:

(c) Thereis no proposition

p suchthatI desirethatp.35

Now, noticethatboredomis unpleasant.In otherwords,whenone is

bored,one would like notto be bored.Thus,whenyou are bored,not
onlyis (c) thecase, butitis also thecase thatyoudesire(c) notto be the
case. In otherwords,if you wereaskedaboutit whilebeingbored(and
you had theappropriate conceptualrepertoire, you werepayingattention
to yourinterlocutor and otherstandard conditionsobtained),you would
probablyclaimsomething alongthefollowinglines:

(d) I desirethatthereis a proposition

p suchthatI desirethatp.

In thespiritof Schopenhauer's
terminology, let us call the meta-desire
expressedby an utterance
of (d), a 'will to will'.36My proposalis basi-

For the purposes of thisdiscussion, propositionsare just meant to be abstract objects

thatcapture the satisfactionconditions fordesires. The discussion here is meant to be
neutralon the exact natureof propositions.
Naturally, (d) must be read as ruling out propositions about one's own desires.
Otherwise, the kind of desire thatone expresses by uttering(d) turnsout to be a self-

660 JORDI FERNANDEZ

cally to drop the AD claim and to show that the following thesis can do
the groundingworkthatAD does forSchopenhauer:

(WW) We have a will to will, thatis, a desire to have desires.

Unlike AD, WW is clearly compatible with the NB model of desire.

What we need to see is thatit can supportboth SB and LS.
How does the view thatwe have a will to will supportthe SB claim?
In orderto get WW to supportSB, I suggest to construeboredom as the
sortof sufferingthat accompanies the unsatisfiedwill to will. The basic
idea in WW is thatnot only do we want to achieve certaingoals that, so
to speak, involve objects 'out there', in the world. We also want chal-
lenges, we enjoy the struggleinvolved in desiringand, thus, we want to
want things. What this suggests is that we are disposed to experiencea
'lack' of desiringor, to put it differently,we have a psychological 'need'
to desire. We can thensee the will to will as the desire that, as Schopen-
hauer's (D - N) suggests, must originatefromsuch a need. What com-
pletes thispictureis the unpleasantnessthat,according to Schopenhauer's
(N - > P), should accompanythe experienceof any lack. The hypothesis
thatI wish to put forwardis thatboredom is preciselythe unpleasantness
thataccompanies our unfulfilledneed to will.
How does this suggestion account for boredom? It does in that it
makes intelligiblethe factthat, in boredom, the secured object of desire
loses its appeal. In order to appreciatethis point, we need to distinguish
the appeal that an object may have in virtue of its intrinsicproperties
fromthe appeal thatthe object may have in virtueof its relationalproper-
ties.37You may findan object appealing in virtueof its intrinsicproper-
ties, which will elicit a desire for it in you. Now, within the pictureof
boredomthatI am puttingforward,the factthat it elicits your desire is a
propertyof it thatmakes the object appealing to you as well. The idea is
that the object of a given desire does a kind of double duty within our
cognitive economies. The object is appealing in virtue of its intrinsic
properties,but it is also appealing in so faras desiring it satisfies a dif-
ferentdesire of ours, namely,our will to will.

fulfillingdesire. The claim thatwe have a will to will should be read as the claim that
we have the desire to have some first-orderdesire or other. I shall leave this restric-
tion implicitwhile referringto the will to will.
The following characterization of intrinsicand relational properties should suffice
forthe purposes of our discussion. For every object x and propertyP, if x has P, then:
P is an intrinsicpropertyof x if and only if there is a possible world where x has P
and no otherobject but x exists in thatworld. For every object y and propertyQ, if y
has Q, then:Q is a relational propertyof y if and only if there is no possible world
where y has Q and no otherobject but y exists in thatworld.

SCHOPENHAUER'S PESSIMISM 661

 Now,construing boredomas theunpleasantness thataccompaniesour
unsatisfied will to will explainsthe factthat,in boredom,the desired
objectsareunappealing uponbeingsecuredbyhighlighting thefactthatit
is the secondkindof appeal thatdisappears.Notice that this kind of
appealis totallyindependent fromtheintrinsicproperties of the object.
Whatwe findappealingabouttheobject,in the relationalsense, is the
factthatitis appealingto us, no matterwhatwe findappealingaboutit.
Thus, foranyobjectof desire,it is truethatonce it is securedand we
experience no morepressure to posses it, thereis somethingabout the
objectthatwe usedtofindappealingand it has now changed,namely,its
elicitinga strivingforit in us. This is whyall objectsof desirelose their
appeal once are
they secured.Thisis whySB holdstrue.

9. Lack of satisfactionand thewill to will

Not only does assumingWW help us to explain the fact that SB
describes.It also providesus withgood groundsforLS. Let us turnto
thatpointnow.
Ifwe assumethatthereis sucha thingas thewill to will in us, then
we can see howone couldbe ledto theview thatit is impossibleto sat-
isfyall of our desires.For it is impossibleto satisfythedesireto have
specificdesiresas wellas thosespecificdesires.The reasonis that,in so
faras one satisfiesone's desires,one's willto will is therebynotsatisfied
and, in so far as one satisfiesone's will to will, some of one's desires
willthereby notbe satisfied.Let meelaborate.
Considermywill to will.As we saw, thisis thedesirethatI am dis-
posedto expressbyuttering a sentenceofthefollowing form:

(d) I desirethatthereis a proposition

p suchthatI desirethatp.

Suppose thatall of my otherdesiresare satisfied.Then, thereis no

proposition p suchthatI desirethatp. But if thereis no propositionp
suchthatI desirethatp, thenmy will to will is not satisfied.(For my
willto will is preciselythewill forthereto be something thatI desire.)
Suppose,conversely, thatmy will to will is satisfied.Then,thereis a
proposition p suchthatI desirethatp. Thus,thereis somethingthatI
desireand, consequently, thereis some desireof minethatis not satis-
fied.It followsfromtheseconsiderations thatmywillto will is suchthat
itwill be satisfiedifandonlyifsomeotherdesireof mineis unsatisfied.
No wonder,then,thatLS holdsifWW is correct.
An additionalvirtueof the WW view is thatit is consistentwith
Schopenhauer's claim that'life is a pendulumbetweenboredomand
pain.' In fact,it explainswhyone mightthinkthatquitenaturally. The
relevant considerationshereareanalogousto thosejust producedin sup-

662 JORDI FERNANDEZ

portof LS. Ifa willto will is amongthedesiresthatwe needto satisfy,
thenwe are leftwithonlytwowaysto proceed:We can satisfyour 'first-
order'desires.We will thenavoid theexperience of thesortof suffering
thatis associatedto theneedsthatgenerate them.But thiswill be at the
costofkeepingourwill to will unsatisfied. Whichwill lead us to bore-
dom if the hypothesisabout the natureof boredomabove is correct.
Alternatively,we can keep acquiringdesires.We will then avoid the
experience of boredom. But this will lead us to experiencethe 4pain'
associatedto therelevantlacksor needswhereinthosedesiresoriginate.
Theresimplyis no wayto avoidbothunpleasant experiences.

10. Recapitulationand concludingremarks

Let me takestock.We havedistinguished two of Schopenhauer's argu-
mentsfortheviewthat,as longas desiresarisein us, we cannotattaina
stateofpermanent pleasure.We haveseenhow thefirstpremisesof both
arguments are based on a modelofdesireaccordingto whichdesiresarise
fromneeds,whichareexperienced as painful.We havealso seen how the
secondpremisesof thosearguments arebased on theview thatdesireis
aimless. And we have seen how this generatesa tensionbetweenthe
groundsofbothpremisesineachofthetwo arguments. In orderto solve
thisdifficulty,I haveproposedtheviewthatwe havea desireto desire.
As we have seen,theview thatwe havea desireto desirenot only
accountsforboredombut it also yieldstheconsequencethatwe cannot
satisfyall of ourdesires.Thus,thegeneralpositionI havedefended here
is essentiallythis:Whatis responsible forour beingsusceptibleto bore-
domand ournotbeingable to satisfyall of our desiresis no mysterious
aimlessnessof desire.Thereis no needto introduce an entityof a con-
troversial ontologicalstatus,such as the will in itself,either.What
explains factsdescribedby LS and SB is thatthe intentional
the objects
ofourdesiresrelateto eachotherin a certainway. In otherwords,what
explainsboredomandtheimpossibility all of our desiresis
of satisfying
notthatwe do notwantanything. It is a factabout the complexityof
whatwe want.The viewthatwe havea willto will is an alternative basis
forSB andLS thatSchopenhauer wouldhavebeenbetteroffsubscribing.
For,as we haveseen,theview thatwe havea will to will is compatible
withtheNB modelofdesire,whichis a virtuethatSchopenhauer cannot
claimfortheviewthatdesireis aimless.38

38
Thank you to an anonymous referee for this journal for helpful comments on an
earlier draftof this paper. Also, many thanksto Matthew Stuart and, especially, Ber-
nard Reginsterfor very helpfulcomments on other draftsas well as many discussions
on the topic of the paper.

SCHOPENHAUER'S PESSIMISM 663

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