Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Gender Bias Group Paper
Gender Bias Group Paper
Gender Bias Group Paper
that the decision of the prosecutors exhibited bias when it considered the 1) character of the
complainant, 2) standard of doubt required for the existence of probable cause, and 3) the
evidence in the complaint.
First, the decision dismissed the complainants allegation that force was used against her
due to her character as a lesbian stuntwoman. Considering the respondents very very tiny
penis and the complainants description as a lesbian who was physically fit, agile and strong,
of medium build and tall at around five feet six inches, the court did not believe she was forced
to do the act.1 The decision seemed to insinuate that since the complainant was not only
physically fit but also a lesbian, she was therefore more masculine and was more than capable of
defending herself against the respondents advances.
Moreover, the decision took a tone which insinuated disbelief when it examined the
complainants testimony. It used quotation marks on the words force and push during its
analysis of the complainants testimony in the first page of the case. This stylistic choice made it
seem as though the writer of the decision did not believe the complainant from the very start;
even before it discussed the evidence and the laws applicable to the case. Hence, the odds were
immediately stacked against the complainant.
Second, the standard of doubt that was applied by the prosecutor was in effect proof
beyond reasonable doubt instead of probable cause, as required by law in preliminary
investigations. In Navarra v. Office of the Ombudsman 2, probable cause was defined as "such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." Although the defendant
enjoyed the presumption of innocence, a prima facie examination of the elements of rape vis-a-
viz the evidence engendered a well founded belief that a crime was committed, which was in
essence the insertion of the male genitalia or any other object or instrument inside the genitalia,
anal orifice, or mouth of another person. With the said standard supported by jurisprudence, it
was alarming that the prosecutor was under the presumption that because vividness was wanting
in the complaint and that the complainant is bound to resist the consummation of rape. Such
presumption should be considered as a bias with the way a woman should act in rape cases.
These assumptions obscure the reality that fear, shock and power dynamics
influence the behaviour of survivors of sexual assault crimes in many different
ways and that coercion will often involve many forms of non-violent threats,
intimidation and duress.3
1 Maria Santos vs. Juan dela Cruz, XV-03-INV-14-D-04396 (2014) (unreported) at 1 and 2.
2 Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman, 607 SCRA 355, 363 (2009).
Hence, the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code should not be
construed as a mere attack against the person because the reality of its effects were different
compared to other crimes against persons. With this premise, the presumption of self-defense and
resistance would not hold. Therefore, considering all the affidavits and evidence and applying the
standard of probable cause, there was a prima facie case of rape against respondent Juan De La
Cruz.
3 International Commission of Jurist, Sexual Violence Against Women: Eradicating Harmful Gender
Stereotypes and Assumptions in Laws and Practice, (2015), 22.
4 Maria Santos vs. Juan dela Cruz, XV-03-INV-14-D-04396 (2014) at 1.