The CIA and Double Demonology*

Calling the Sino-Soviet Split

Harold P. Ford

Sino-Soviet relations in critical Mao had

are a
I~se-tungs regime rn

phase just short ofan acknowledged umph~d in China and then allied itself
with the Soviet Union. Com
and definitive split. There is no longer formal~y
much ofaflindamental resolution of munist North Korea had invaded the

d~ffirences. In our view, the chances Repub1lic of Korea. Communist China

that such a split can be avoided in had in~ervened massively in that war.
1962 better than The 1.~SSR had provided its Commu
are no even.
nist allies with military assistance,
NIE 11-5-62, February 1962 including Soviet-piloted MiGs. The
trouble was, among US policymakers
Ambassador George Kennan:] In such of
sum
a~i image Sino-Soviet solidarity
after the Moscow
Once it was widely believed
ma?y, it seems to me that Chinese- persist~d long
Soviet relations bid fair to receive, in Beijing relationship had in fact begun
that the USSR and the to ftay~ badly.
coming months, a certain ease

Communist China were

ment.... An environment ofcontinued
sharp, militaiy bipolarity will leave the Furthermore, that image persisted
firm allies acting in concert two partners little choice but to repress long a~er officers from various CIA
theirdij55rences and cariy on. Ambas units l~iad begun to alert consumers
spread Communist
to
sador Charles (Chzp) Bohlen:] Jam that a Sino-Soviet break was definitely
I. 4
influence everywhere they developing. Not all CIA officers
inclined agree with there were
to George. . .

the of onet mind: some remained reluctant

could in the world. In the is not slightest sign that any adjust
there
ments of the basic elements of that to
cha~ige their long-held view of
early 1950s, was
dispute have been or are in process. Comr~iunist bloc solidarity. All in all,

much to support that howe~er, the dominant voice of CIA

Comments on NIE 11-5-62, was out in front of the rest of
analysts
image. May 19622 the Intelligence Community (IC) in
trying~ to alert policymaking consum

9 The Soviet party is opportunist and ers th4t the United States might

face a significantly changed

revisionist; it lacks any deep knowledge some4ay
ofMa rxism; its ideas about disarma strategic situation.
ment are absurd; peaceJiil coexistence
could nothing, except as a tactical
mean This 4rticle
treats the highlights of

deceive
to the enemy; the Soviet that Sino-Soviet story: the judgments
weapon
idea of a division of labor among the CIA ~fficers made in the years up to

of the socialist camp is wrong;

countries 1963, by which time estrangement

and China must go her own way. betw4n Moscow and Beijing had
these
becoi~e publicly evident; why
Deng Xiaoping, November 196O~ CIA officers came to hold those par

ticula1 views; what they up were

Once it was widely believed that the

again~t in trying promote their
to

Harold P. Ford held senior USSR and Communist China were heresy amidst many policymakers
firm allies acting in concert to spread who remained true believers; and the
positions in both the National
Intelligence Council and the
Communist influence everywhere they impacjt these CIA officers judgments
could in the world. In the early 1950s,
Directorate of Operations. hadfor did haveon not

there was much to support that image. policymakers.

*
Double demonology is the authors phrase for the efforts by analysts of Soviet and Chinese affairs in th~ 1 950s and early 1 960s to

explore and highlight the deepening split between the two Communist powers, or demons. 57
Sino-Soviet

The Sino-Sovietheresy in
CIA ranks began as early as
1952. . . .
In 1953, CIAs
Judgments at CIA dons, for whatever cause, may quite
Foreign Documents
probably be
signalized first in diver
the diff~rences between Peiping Division] published the gent assertions regarding theoretical
and Moscow are so basic and are so matters.9
first major analytic study
much product ofthe different sit
a

uations and problems in the two alerting readers to Sino These first appearances of any
countries that any genuine resolu thought of significant differences
Soviet differences.
tion ofthefiindamental differences possibly developing between Mos
is unlikely.

NIE 13-60, December 196O~

9, cow and Beijing were no clarion
calls, but their messages were none

theless heretical at a time when the

dominant view was definitely one of
From the outset of Stalins 1950 alli
Sino-Soviet Relations. That study Sino-Soviet
ance with Mao Tse-tung, and solidarity, voiced by
for the better part of a
briefly identified two chief areas of some at the time as, If youve seen
continuing differing Soviet and Chinese propa one Commie, youve seen them all.
decade, those analysts who were con ganda: Soviet aid to Chinas war
vinced that bitter differences
effort in Korea, and Chinas status in
The notch in Sino-Soviet propa
underlay the Sino-Soviet relationship the Communist orbit.6
next

faced tough hurdles. One involved ganda differences identified by FDD

the outward appearance of Russian- and FBIS officers followed the death
Chinese cooperation and a wide In 1953, FDD published the first of Stalin. In May 1954, in a study

major analytic study alerting readers titled Some Aspects of Sino-Soviet

spread belief that the West was
under attack, worldwide, by a mono to Sino-Soviet differences, Chinese
lithic Red bloc. Another hurdle was and Soviet Views on Mao
Americas domestic fixation on Com ist Theorist and on the
munism. For years, most senior US of the Chinese Revolution for the
Kremlinologists and policymakers Asian Revolutionary Movement, by
Relations Following Stalins Death,
as a Marx they pointed out that Beijing was sys
Significance tematically building up Maos
international doctrinal stature, a
which attested to the political
move

remained hesitant to accept intelli Philip Bridgham, Arthur Cohen, strength and liberty of the Chinese
Jaffe.7 It stressed Communist Party. In the authors
gence judgments that Sino-Soviet and Leonard two

discord was growing. Central to such Chinese claims, voiced in June 1951 view, this indicated that Beijing had
hesitance was the fact that, until on the occasion of the 30th anniver
assumed the right to devise Commu
nist programs and strategies in
about 1960, there was little hard evi sary of the founding of the Chinese
dence to back judgments that Southeast Asia, an area which for
Communist Party: that Mao had
seemed to many to be based heavily made a new contribution to Marxist- decades had been the exclusive
on tea-leaf interpretations of what Leninist theory in his ideological authority of Moscow.10
Soviet and Chinese media were writings on the Chinese revolution,
saying. and that Maos theory, generalizing The word conflict in Sino-Soviet
the experiences of the Chinese revo relations first appeared in November
The Sino-Soviet heresy in CIA ranks lution, was applicable to the colonial 1954 in an FBIS study, Points of
began as early as 1952, at a time revolutionary movement as a Sino-Soviet Conflict on Far Eastern
when the United States was fighting whole.8 After pointing out how the Policy. This piece identified two

Communist bloc forces in Korea.
One of the earliest CIA publications
mentioning differences between Mos
cow and Beijing was published
jointly by the Foreign Documents
Division (FDD) and the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS), on 30 April
Propaganda Evidence
Soviet response had been remarkably
cool to these claims, the authors con
cluded that, Differences in
viewpoint on these questions
represent latent, but nonetheless
vital, tensions in the relations
between Soviet and Chinese
1952, titled Communist leaders. In fact, a
Concerning deterioration in Sino-Soviet rela
areas in which Soviet and Chinese
propaganda persuasively suggest
longstanding and still not entirely
may resolved divergences on policy in the
Far East. The two principal such
issues: the rate at which the Chinese
economy should be industrialized
and socialized (and thus become
independent of the USSR); and the

58
 Sino-Soviet

InApril 1956. after . .

attacking the USSRs cult

of the individual, a]
degree which Moscow should sup
to already ruled
by Communist parties;
Chinese Peoples Daily]
port China in opposing the West in what the
relationships should be
Asia.11 article showed no among Communist parties; and how
best to exert Communist pressures
embarrassment in hailing
Thereafter, FBIS authors, under the against the West. We now know

direction of Paul McPherson, contin Mao as our

great leader that, b~y that year, Sino-Soviet
ued to alert readers to siowiy discord behind the scenes had
and lauding his all-out
growing signs of Sino-Soviet discord.
defense of the theories of
becon1e bitter.
minutes of
For example, Maos
By 1956, these had become much a conversation he had
more apparent. In April 1956, FBIS with ~ugosIav Communists in Sep
Marxism-Leninism.
alerted its readers to a Beijing Peo tembe~ 1956 are replete with
ples Daily article that attacked the critici~ms of Stalin for having seri
USSRs cult of the individual and ~9 ously~njured the Chinese
the years.
certain important mistakes Stalin Comrpunist Party over

had made: an excess of zeal in elimi in the 1920s, Mao,

Special Studies Group
Beginping wrote

nating counterrevolutionaries, lack Thes~ mistakesoriginated in Sta

of vigilance before World War II,
failure to develop agriculture suffi
mistreatment of Yugoslavias
ciently,
apostasyand, most notably,
crudely applying his directives con
cerning China. Then, after attacking
the cult of the individual, this
In 1956, meanwhile, following Chi
nese media criticism of the USSRs
squashing of uprisings in Poland
and Hungary, CIA made its first for
mal organizational attack on the
Sino-Soviet question. This was the
establishment within the Office of
lin, a~nd in the course of signing the
Sino-Soviet alliance pact in February
1950 ff1 became even more disgusted
with Stalin]; I quarreled a lot with
him in Moscow.15
Togei~het with studies other ques
on

Chinese article showed no embarrass tions,~the SSSGs officers created a

ment in hailing Mao as our

Current Intelligence (0 CI) of a
great special series of major examinations
leader and lauding his all-out Sino-Soviet Studies Group (SSSG), of Sit~o-Soviet discord. Titled Esau
defense of the theories of Marxism- commissioned to examine Chinese
studies, the group chose that name

Leninism. leadership questions and Sino-Soviet reflect the younger

relations. That
expli~itly to
same year, the SSSG brothers undercutting of the older
FBISs published its first major study on
broth~rs birthright. In mid-1959,
By 1958, analysts were high
Sino-Soviet differences: The Chinese
lighting Moscows cool reception of the first Esau study, The Soviet Atti
Chinas commune and Great Leap View oflnterbioc Relations.3 Organi tude Toward Communes, chiefly
Forward programs; by 1959, FBIS zationally, the SSSG drew in examined Moscows attitude toward
Chinese and Soviet experts from
was also focusing on East European the USSRs own experience with
and North Vietnamese praise of the OCI, FDD, FBIS, and the Office of comncunes.16 The SSSG produced
Great Leap Forward. This unprece Economic] Research and Reports five mote Esau studies in 1959. All
dented Soviet satellite independence (ORR). SSSGs specialists included focus~d on Chinas launching of its
Walter P. (Bud) Southard, Philip
was unacceptable to Moscow. By own (ill-fated) commune program.
September 1960, FBIS was pointing Bridgham, Arthur Cohen, Harry And all emphasized Moscows igno
to some specific Soviet intensive
Gelman, Set Matdirosian, and rance~ of that programs inception, its
Donald Zagoria.4
pressures on China: the first warn shar~ critiques of Chinas com
ings that China might face exclusion munes, and the fact that the Soviet
from the Communist bloc; demands The Deputy Director for Intelligence and (Chinese parties by 1957 had
that bloc members subordinate their (DDI) was perceptive inestablishing begu~i making diametrically oppo
national interests; increasingly this group. With the advantage of site
~ntetpretations of supposed
explicit charges that dogmatists hindsight, numerous scholars now international Communist Declara
were engaging in divisive activities date the beginnings of Sino-Soviet tionsl~ In 1959, the DDI also
that endangered world Communism; estrangement to differences that estab~ished special
a interoffice corn

and an implicit call that the Chinese developed in 1956 over how best to mittee, chaired by R. Jack Smith, a

Communist Party recant.12 build Communism in states member of the Office of National

59
Sino-Soviet

In the early 1960s, I argued

that deep-seated
differences over Chinas
Estimates (ONE), to survey the Chinese consider that the papacy
acquisition of nuclear
assets of DDI components for investi has moved to Avignon; they are in a

gating the question of the Sino weapons were central to the stage of development which needs a
Soviet relationship and to ascertain initiation and myth of infallibility; and they do not,
what is being done in terms of collec
aggravation feel themselves
moreover, implicated
tion, analysis, and production.8 of Sino-Soviet discord. in past Soviet mistakes.23

In 1960, the SSSG produced four 9 In 1959, I stressed interacting dis

more major Esau studies. Pointing out cord existing within both the
how Sino-Soviet discord had become
Chinese Communist Party and Sino
more acute during 1958-60, these and his SSSG colleagues had been
Soviet relations; the fact that Beijing
pieces emphasized how Soviet spokes doing for some time.19 is now very much on the make in
men were now severely criticizing
world politics at a time when Soviet
Chinas commune and Great Leap
Forward programs, how differences More CIA Heretics
leadership has apparently decided
had escalated concerning the best ways that there is much to be gained by

to build Communism at home and to

resort to seductive, less crude meth
Meanwhile, several members of
ods of conquest; and that
spread it abroad, and whether Chinas ONEs staff had begun to join the
differences Chinas acquisition
program should be a model
commune over
ranks of the heretics arguing Sino
for other societies in Asia. These stud of nuclear weapons were apparently
Soviet discord. These officers
ies also pointed up how Chinas becoming an increasing point of dis
included Chester Cooper, Richard
commune the disgust of cord both within China and in its
programto Shryock, James Billington, John
Moscowhad found warm reactions Whitman, Louis Sandine, and
relations with Moscow.24 In the
among certain of the USSRs satellite myself. The most senior, Cooper, early 1960s I argued that deep-
regimes. In addition, they noted that took role: seated differences over Chinas acqui
a leading as early as 1954,
Mao was insisting much greater risks sition of nuclear weapons were
he set of ONE and
up meetings
should be taken in pushing the West, SSSG officers to discuss Sino-Soviet central to the initiation and aggrava
now that the USSR had developed tion of Sino-Soviet
differences,20 and he was later instru discord, though
ICBM capabilities. By 1961, Esau mental in urging CIAs analysts to that discord was the
product as well
studies were able to detail how a flood of
focus more effort on the Sino-Soviet competing revolutionary strate
of Soviet and Chinese documents,
estrangement, and in particular on gies, theological pretension, struggle
clandestinely acquired in 1960, clearly how it might affect US interests.21 for supreme Communist authority,
established that Moscow and Beijing and fundamental disagreement over
were openly quarreling and acknowl Along the way, in a memorandum whether Stalin should be praised or
edging that their relationship had on The Big Commune Heresy, buried.25 Radio Moscow later con
become badly estranged.
written in November 1958, Shryock firmed that there had been serious
pointed out how Chinas leaders Sino-Soviet differences over nuclear
There was a much broader readership were trumpeting their commune pro weapons:
of SSSGs findings in 1962, when gram as a momentous event in world
Princeton University Press published history, whereas high-level Soviet offi
The Chinese leaders have been at
The Sino-Soviet Conflict, written by cials were completely ignoring it.
one of the SSSGs officers, Donald Shryock concluded that whether great pains to obtain possession of
nuclear weapons. They strenuously
Zagoria. This was a perceptive, unique deliberate or no, the Chinese have
work, widely accepted since that time started something too big to be long triedthis is no secretto get the
Soviet Union them the
as one of the first publications that ignored.22 Billington by
wrote that to give
atomic bomb. The CPSUand the
spelled out in unambiguous detail the 1959 the alleged common ideological
causes and character of the Sino-Soviet bond between Moscow and Beijing Soviet Government naturally
conflict. The books strength lay in the had become of minor importance in could notconsider this, since it
fact that in writing it, Zagoria had the relationship and is likely to mi~ht have led to the most serious
borrowed heavily from the work he become increasingly so, and that the consequences.26

60
 Sino-Soviet

ONE Director Sherman

Kent wrote in 1960,] The
Sino-Soviet dispute is
By 1960, ONEs front office had The final text of the next NIE on the
genuine, bitter, and covers
become supportive of the positions subjec~ (100-3-60) was much less
those ONE staff members had been broad range of
a firm at out a possible Sino-Soviet
taking. May 1960, ONEs Acting
In
fundamental policies. ,,
ruptur~ than many of CIAs analysts
Director Abbot Smith wrote DCI (ONE?s included) had been champi
Dulles that Soviet detente tactics
9, oning.~The
had been
NIE did state that there
increase in dis
toward the West had provoked the a sharp
bitterest and most fundamental Chi cord
~n the Sino-Soviet
and that it is
relationship
monolith.
nese Communist disagreement with not a But,
Soviet policy yet evidenced.27 Later after ji~kdging that that relationship
that year, ONE Director Sherman contai~ied elements of both cohe
Kent wrote, The Sino-Soviet dis common objectives and mutual sionaAd division, the Estimate
pute is genuine, bitter, and covers a
conch~ded that the cohesive forces
advantage, and Peipings continuing
broad
ran~e
of fundamental
dependence on Moscow, will serve will
r~main stronger than divisive
of
policies. to prevent any significant weakening
forces least
~t through the~eriod
of Sino-Soviet ties at least through this estimate five years] .~
1960.~ In 1957, the coordinating
Cautious NIEs
process kept the ICs judgments sim
A Different NIE Tune
ilarly cautious; NIE 13-57
CIA officers also played leading roles concluded that conflicts of interest
the
in producing the ICs authoritative would probably arise between the The
n~essage of the next NIE on

judgments on the state of relations subjec~ (13-60, 6 December 1960)

two powers, but that it would be
between Moscow and Beijing. The different, last
views of these coordinated National
highly unlikely that either side was
su~stantially
the view that the differ
at

would permit such conflicts to coming to

Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) con

impair Sino-Soviet solidarity.3 ences Beijing and Moscow
~erweenthat
cerning the degree of Russian- any resolution of
The following year, NIE 13-5 8
were
s~ great
Chinese discord lagged behind the the fundamental differences is
made similar judgments. By 1959,
judgments of the individual CIA
into the
obvious Sino-Soviet differences had unlike~y.34 Three explained
reasons

confident
officers. Up early 1960s, thischanged, much more
arisenconcerning Chinas commune
however, NIE views were definitely
and Great Leap Forward programs; judgn~ent. First, it known that
1960 Moscow had
was

ahead of the still-dominant image

Chinas instigation of the Quemoy
in
Jul~ suddenly
among policymakers of Sino-Soviet and ordered its experts in
unilaterally
Matsu offshore island crisis; and
solidarity. The IC had addressed the China1 to leave, within the month.
whether the USSRs acquisition of
Sino-Soviet relationship as early as Secon~1, it had become known that
nuclear weapons that greater,
meant
1952, at a time when most observers during the year Chinese and Soviet
or more cautious, risks should now
considered China to be a tool of the spoke~men had angrily confronted
be run against the West. In 1959,
Soviet Union, and concluded that one another in a series of interna
the IC admitted the presence of of
Beijing, unlike the USSRs East Euro tional Communist gatherings
numerous differences in the two
pean satellites, was not directly and unrivaled bitterness, climaxed by the
powers relationship, judging that
completely controlled by the Krem CPSqs 22nd Congress in Novem
the reconciliation of Sino-Soviet ber. Third, and
lin, and retained some capability most important, an

interests will probably become

for independent action and a capabil
increasingly difficult, particularly
unpre~edented breakthrough
occurred in clandestine collection
had
ity to exert an influence upon the
with respect to nuclear weapons,
shaping of Communist policy in the regar4ing those encounters: the for
Far East.29 attitudes and tactics toward the eign afid domestic intelligence
West, and patterns of economic and servics of the United States and of
social development. Yet that NIE
By 1956, the IC agreed that certain severa~ friendly countries obtained
still concluded that Moscow and
difficulties did exist between Mos copies1 of many of the angry letters
cow Beijing, but concluded,
and Beijing would find no feasible the Soviets and Chinese had distrib
Although potential conflicts of alternative maintaining their uted. this new evidence
to
~mong
interest exist, we believe that alliance. 32 docur~ienting Sino-Soviet bitterness

61
Sino-Soviet

Knowledge of Chinese-
Russian history was the

primary factor convincing

was adenunciation Khrushchev had Sources of Sino-Soviet Discord
made of the Chinese for being CIA] analysts that a break
Trotskyites and madmen who were was brewing. I will never forget that night in
seeking war.35 Nanking, when the Chinese
9~ Communistsliaison officer,
By 1963, when the Sino-Soviet Huang Hua, told me over and
over again how much he hated
estrangement had become widely evi
dent, the IC at last agreed that the the Russians guts.
basic issues behind that discord ideologicaland policy differences

were incompatible
national and
between the two countries.39 Walter P. (Bud) Southard43
party interests, and that the Chi
nese Communists show no signs of
In September 1960, DCI Dulles told With occasional exceptions, until the
the NSC that CIA had a great deal windfall of clandestine
relenting.36 focusing
In competon reporting
national interests as the basic of documentation on the Sino occurred in the 1960s, the principal
ing
source of Sino-Soviet discord, the IC
Soviet dispute, and that among this source materials demonstrating

at last validated what

evidence was an 84-page Soviet direc growing Sino-Soviet discord had
many CIA ana
had tive to all Communist parties been the many (unclassified) broad
lysts long been stressing.
informing them that China had bet casts, speeches, and articles that
ter shape up, or Soviet aid to it Beijing and Moscow had published
would be reduced or eliminated.40 over the years, haranguing one
CIAs 1960 NSC Briefings In October, Dulles told the NSC another indirectly by criticizing third
that the Soviets were apparently partiesor citing supposed historical

Meanwhile, by 1960, the much working confront the Chinese

to precedents. The analysts out front in
firmer evidence being received had with the unanimous condemnation appreciating this growing estrange
enabled senior CIA officers to keep of all the worlds Communist par ment were those officers who
the National Security Council ties.41 And, the close of 1960,
near immersed themselves in this vast

(NSC) well informed of the growing Dulles informed the NSC of what body of materials and were able to

discord in Moscows relationships CIA had learned concerning the just- decode the respective polemics.
with Beijing. As early as December completed 22nd Congress of the Some read these materials in the orig
1959, Deputy Director for Plans CPSU, stating that from their study inal Russian or Chinese; others relied
(DDP) Richard Bissell was assuring of the manifesto published by that on the excellent publishing by FBIS
the NSC that the IC is unanimous conference CIA experts have iso (and the British) of daily translations
that Sino-Soviet] strains are genuine lated 17 issues dividing Communist and occasional analyses.
and not a fabrication.37 In April China and the USSR; also, that the
1960, DCI Allen Dulles told the chief Chinese delegate to the confer But knowledge of Chinese-Russian
NSC that three questions principally ence Chou En-lai] was said to have history was the primary factor con
marked the Sino-Soviet dispute: made a four-hour speech attacking
vincing these analysts that a break
whether war was inevitable; whether Khrushchev personally. 42 was brewing: they recognized that
the West increasing preparations
was the Chinese Communists had come

for war; and whether peaceful coexist All in all, 1960 was a good Sino to power largely unaided by Moscow
ence was possible.38 When Acting Soviet year for CIA: the collection of and, at times, despite it. These offic
DCI Charles Cabell briefed the NSC evidence had been excellent; the ers conviction that China was a
in August 1960, reporting that heretical views long held by many of wholly unique phenomenon within
Khrushchev had said only madmen the Agencys analysts had at last the Communist world stemmed
and maniacs regard war as inevita begun to become canon; and the from their appreciation of the many
ble, Vice President Nixon asked DCI and other senior CIA officers clashes of interests that had marked
Cabell whether he was completely had become convinced of the extent Chinese-Russian relations over the
sure that there was a real difference and genuineness of Sino-Soviet dis years.
of view between the USSR and cord and had passed on those
China; General Cabell replied that conclusions to the governments top Continuing Chinese anger at Russia
in his opinion there real policymakers. for
were
having taken enormous territories

62
 Sino-Soviet

When Stalin walked into

the room in which Sino
Soviet talks were being
from China in years past was central artillery pieces.49 Stalin had been far
to Sino-Soviet controversy. CIAs her
held,] everyone seemed to more c~ncerned with the strategic
etics were aware that there had been stop breathing, to freeze. securit~ of Siberia than with broth
numerous border wars beginning as erly tie~ to the CCP. At Yalta, the
far back the 17th century; that tsa
as
He brought danger, Soviet union bound itself by formal
rist Russia had acquired over 500,000 an atmosphere of fear. treaty t~o Chiang Kai-sheks govern
and then continued its
square miles of territory claimed by N. T. Federenko ment,
China and that this had dismayed diplon~atic recognition of that gov
successive Chinese officialsimpe (Stalins interpreter) ernment until the Soviet treaty with
rial, Nationalist, and Communist Mao w~s signed in early 1950, four
who alike referred to the Russians dis 9, month~ after the Peoples Republic
of Chii~ia had been created.
dainfully as long noses; that after
Russias new Bolshevik government
had in 1919 disowned previous 1934-35 to 25,000, and the territory
unequal treaties, it had proceeded to which made up the (Communist) Bitter Negotiations
make Mongolia a Soviet satellite, a regions of China was reduced by 99
territory of more than 1 million percent.46 In addition to suborning Considerable friction had surrounded
square miles; and that at the close of Chinese Communist officers, Mos the cor~summation of the 1950
World War II the Soviet Union
had
not

it
cow had purged Soviet officials

believed to be too close to the Chi

Soviet-~hinese alliance. The negotia
only regained East Asian assets tions were and bitter; the
long
had lost to Japan in 1905 (Port nese. The USSR had lent the CCP Chines~e resisted some of Moscows
Arthur, Dairen, and railroad rights in some support over the years, but it deman~Js, and Stalin treated Mao
Manchuria), but also had then looted had given Chiang Kai-sheks Nation badly. January 1950, US Secretary
~n
Manchuria and heightened the alist Chinese far more military of State Dean Acheson told the
USSRs covert influence in Chinas assistance than it had provided to Natior~al Press Club that the USSR
northwestern province of Sinkiang.44 Maos forces. Chiangs Whampoa was trying to annex parts of China.50
Chinese anger on these scores was Military Academy had depended A few later Acheson noted pri
~jIays,
mirrored in 1954, when China pub heavily on Soviet advisers. And the vately chat in Moscow Mao was said
lished geography book showing
a operational leadership of Chiangs to be highly dissatisfied with
Mongolia as still part of China and subsequent triumphant northern attem~ted exactions China; that
on

picturing the huge areas Russia had expedition in the mid-1920s was it rumored that Chou En-lai had
was

wrested from China by unequal almost completely in the hands of told th~ Soviet delegation he would
treaties.45 Soviet] General Bleucher.47 resign rather than accede Russian to

demands; and that the Kremlin was

Another prime source of discord, By 1940, in Chinas with Japan,
war seekin~ to introduce Soviet advisers

known to those familiar with Rus thanks to military sup

active Soviet into China whose real aim would be
sianChinese history, the
was port of Chiang, Soviet pilots to
pen~trate theand
CCP and bring the
disdainful manner in which the destroyed 986 Japanese planes. Chin~se party government appa
under Stalinist
Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) According to Soviet author A. A. ratus

control.5
c~m~letely
had often treated the Chinese Com Martynov, more than 100 Soviet
munist Party (CCP) over the years. hero-pilots were killed in these
. . .

Trying to fashion the CCP in its battles.48 At the close of World Since that time, considerable testi
own image, the CPSU had pushed War II, the Soviets did turn over mony has verified the view that those
the fledgling Chinese Communists great quantities of former Japanese negoti~tionswere indeed bitter. N.

into disastrous urban rebellions in arms to the Chinese Communists, T. Federenko, Stalins interpreter,
the 1920s and early 1930s. Mao later but in 1945-46 Chinese Nationalist recall4l that The very room where
claimed that, as a result of those forces acquired far greater quantities the tal~cs were held was like a stage
disasters, the Chinese Red Army, of captured Japanese armstwice as where a demonic show was being
which in 1929 was comprised of many rifles, six times as many acted out. When Stalin walked in,
300,000 fighters, was reduced by machineguns, and 10 times as many everyo~e seemed to stop breathing,

63
Sino-Soviet

CIAs Young Turks found

themselves occasionally
frustrated by conservative
to freeze. He
brought danger, an Internal Disagreement
atmosphere of fear.52 And we now pressures within the
know Mao complained in 1956 to Agency. These usually] This taffOCIs SSSGJ compiled
P.F. Yudin, the USSRs Ambassador the data that permitted CIA to
took the form of senior
in Beijing, that for some time during lead the wayagainst fi~rious
his stay in Moscow in 1950: officers watering down opposition eI~ewherein charting
drafts. the strategic conflict between
Stalin refrainedfrom any meetings Soviet and Chinese styles ofdicta
torship and doctrine that was basic
with
an
me. From my side, there was
attempt to phone him in his
9, to the definitive split in 1960.

apartment, but they responded to

that Stalin is
not home. All
me . . .

Chinese
Ray S. Cline56
this offended me. andldecidedto
. .
knowledge; possible acquisi
undertake nothing Jl~rther and to tion of nuclear weapons;
Khrushchevs By contrast with those officers
wait it out at the acha. Then an beginning moves
toward better relations with the steeped in Chinese history, some
unpleasant conversation took place
other CIA officers maintained that
with I. VI Kovalev and IN TI United States; and, especially, Maos
the indirect indications of Sino
Federenko, who proposed that Igo boast that China could survive a
Soviet discord should not be overesti
on an excursion around the coun
nuclear war. In May 1958 Mao said:
mated. These officers tended to be
try. Isharply rejected this proposal either those steeped in the
study of
and responded thatlprefer to sleep Ifwar breaks out, it is unavoidable Communist theory and the USSR or
the clacha. ~ that people will die. We have seen
through it at certain senior generalists whose
wars kill people. Many times in
broad responsibilities prevented
China ~past ha If the population them from immersing themselves in
CIAs heretics had noted many signs
has been wiped out.. We have
of growing Sino-Soviet discord well . .

trying to decode Sino-Soviet polem

at present no experience with
before the receipt of excellent clan ics and who were reluctant to go out
atomic war. We do not know how
destine reporting in the 1960s. on a limb against what had long
many must die. It is better if one-
Following the death of Stalin in been conventional wisdom, includ
1953, Beijing published Maoist pre half are left, the second best is one ing the wisdom of some of the
third. After severalfive-year
tensions to ideological and policy . . .

countrys most respected senior

leadership of the Communist plans Chinal will then develop experts on Communist affairs.
and rise up. In place of the totally
world.54 In 1956, Chinese anger was
evident concerning Khrushchevs de destroyed capitalism we will ob CIAs Young Turks found them
tain perpetual peace. This will not
Stalinization and the USSRs suppres selves occasionally frustrated by
sion of Polish and Hungarian bea bad thing.55 conservative pressures within the
protests against Soviet rule. In 1957, Agency. In most cases in the late
one reason Maos Let a Hundred For US intelligence analysts, aware 1950s and early 1960s, these took
Flowers Bloom experiment proved ness of manifold Sino-Soviet the form of senior officers watering
so brief was that it
produced wide differences became much clearer in down drafts, leaving little in the way
spread, embarrassing criticisms of the 1960, when the USSR suddenly of sharp messages to consumers that
Soviets. It was likewise known that, pulled out all its advisers from Sino-Soviet discord was mounting.57
by 1958-59, numerous sharp differ China, and above the break
over Nor bureaucratic pressures
were

encesof view had arisen on a through in documented evidence of absent. The SSSGs Philip Bridgham
number of subjects: Beijings sharp discord. Thus, by the end of told the author of this article that on

commune and Great Leap Forward 1960, the long-held views of CIAs one occasion, a senior person in a
programs; Chinas shelling of the heretics had at last begun to be veri competing office had sought unsuc
Nationalist-held offshore islands, fied. The journey there had not been cessfully to have the SSSG
undertaken without Moscows prior an easy one. disbanded.58 According to another

64
 Sino-Soviet

For some years beyond

1963, a few CIA officers
still held that Sino-Soviet
interviewee, an analyst who refused Ambassador Marshall Green.65 For
discord was a fraud,
to recant his Sino-Soviet heresy was the
mo~t part, however, policymak
given a negative fitness report and deliberately orchestrated ers laggedseveral years behind them
left that office.59 and CIAs heretics. Here are a few
by Moscow and Beijing to of what the heretics in CIA
exampl1es
Nowhere in CIA
deceive the West. and St~te were long up against:
were opposing
views on Sino-Soviet relations more

Walt~Rostow, 1954: We see no

sharply exchanged, however, than
signs of incipient Titoism; we see
those between a small special group
much that makes it most unlikely
of senior analysts chosen by the DCI
in th~ foreseeable future.66
explicitly for their knowledge of
Communist theory and Soviet
As we all subsequently learned, in
1969 these supposedly nonantagonis
affairs, and a few heretics from OCI,
tic contradictions came to include
Assis~ant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson,
ONE, and other offices. In one such
meeting in 1960, the exchanges back
firefights and loss of life along
Chinas borders with the USSR.61
195~: Tse-tung and other
Mao
Chinese Communist leaders are
and forth across the table took the
dedicated to the cause of
following form.
few
who~ly
For some years beyond 1963, a international Communism under

The senior experts on Communism:

CIA officers still held that Sino
Soviet discord fraud, deliber
the l~adershipof Moscow. They
follow the twists and
was a
slavi~hly
ately orchestrated by Moscow and turns of Moscow-directed

You guys who think theres a lot of Beijing to deceive the West. Most of orth~doxy.67
growing Sino-Soviet discord simply those officers were members of CIAs
have 19th-century minds. Counterintelligence Staff, whose Vice~President Nixon, 1959: The
chief, James Angleton, had been con Vice~ President asked whether there
vinced of such by a Soviet
a view was ~ny dissenting opinion in the
The heretics:
defector, Anatoly Golitzyn. That IC on whether there was a real
view nonetheless remained a minor strai~ in the relations between the
What do you mean by that? within the
ity interpretation Agency. USSR and China. Was there, for

exan~iple,
any opinion that Khrush
build up
You think the matter between the
chev~ might be seeking to

Soviet Union and China is one largely External Resistance the of differences
~ppearance
ofclashing national interests. between the two countries?68
The most difficult hurdle for CIAs
double demonologists was outside President Eisenhower, 1960: Presi
Exactly. dent~ Chiang Kai-shek] said it is
the Agency: it was the proclivity of
Well, youre wrong. You dont app reci
many senior policymakers to brush imp~ssible for the Chinese
from the
off intelligence analyses of growing Con1imunists to split
ate the fact that in Communist theory
estrangement as being too theoreti He stated emphati
a differentiation is made between what
Sovi~t Russians.
cal, too inferential, and, for some cally that the Communist bloc
are considered antagonistic contradic
years,too contrary to continuing out works as a bloc, pursues a global
tions and nonantagonistic ward signs of cooperative Soviet and schehie, and no party to the bloc
contradictions. What we have in the
Chinese policies. There were notable can rake independent action.
present Sino-Soviet case are non-a ntag exceptions within the Department of Pres~dent Eisenhower rejoined that
onistic contradictions. Thats why you President
of whose officers argued he
guys with 19th-century minds are
State, some
f?und nothing in with
themes similar to those of CIAs ana Chiangs exposition which he
wrong. lysts. These State officials included diff~red. President Eisenhower
. . .

Allen S. Whiting, Counselor;62 Assis said~that during the past seven or

Well, at least thats better than having tant Secretary of State Roger eight months he had made several
60
13th-century minds. Hilsman;63 Herbert Levin;64 and trip~ and had talked with a num

65
Sino-Soviet

It was not until the late

1960s that top US
policymakers (President
ber of world leaders. He said that what greater impact among upper-
Nixon and Dr. Henry
that none of them sees a split being level CIA officials than we realized.
created between Soviet Russia and Kissinger) began taking
Communist China.69
major steps to exploit what By and large, midlevel Agency offic
had become ers were unaware that, by 1959-60,
Vice President Nixon and Defense
an open Sino DCI Dulles and other top CIA offic
Thomas Gates, 1960:
Secretary Soviet split. ers were not oniy alerting the NSC

The Vice President asked whether that Sino-Soviet discord was for real,
DDCI] General Cabell was com 9 but also were standing their
ground
pletely sure there was a real against lingering suspicions among
difference of view between the some senior US officers that Sino
USSR and Communist China. Sec DCI John McCone, 1963: Mr. Soviet discord was an orchestrated
McCone added that, although the
retary Gates wished to make the fraud. Some of CIAs heretics were
70 differences between the Russians and
same inquiry aware that, by the early 1960s, a few
the Chinese are very great, he did senior State officers had
Department
nor think they were very deep or become convinced of Sino-Soviet
John Chairman, Atomic
McCone that a final break between the two
estrangement. Some former State
Energy Commission], 1960: Mr. powers would occur.74 officers that
McCone] said that he took the
attestthey regularly read
and were influenced
by CIAs Sino
schism between the Chinese and
Soviet analyses and that they kept in
the Russians with a grain of salt.71
CIAs touch with the Agencys authors.76
Measuring Impact
In 1961, Roger Hilsman, at the time
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, Director of States Bureau of Intelli
The United States, in fact, owes
1962: Though I agree with the gence and Research, set up a special
the men and
women analysts] of
basic line of NIE 11-5-62, I
the CIA
studies,group on Sino-Soviet rela
believe it somewhat exaggerates the extraordinaiy debt.
an
tions.7~ Also in 1961, the Office of
See the SSSGsJ Har?y Ge/man,
likelihood of a Sino-Soviet break, the Secretary of Defense set up a sim
The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Sur
and I consider this borne out by ilar Sino-Soviet studies group and
events since the paper was written.
vey, in Problems of Communism, borrowed the SSSGs Philip
March-April 1963, Vol. XIII; and that units
Similarly, I believe it underesti Bridgham to serve as dep
the SSSG ~c] Donald Zagoria, The director.78 And in the of
mates the possibilities of at least uty spring
Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1 961,
temporary accommodation 1962, PresidentKennedy asked
Princeton, 1962, on both ofwhom
between the two parties.72 I have drawn heavily.
Ambassadors George Kennan, Chip
Bohlen, and Liewellyn Thompson to
comment on an NIE (11-5-62),
Cable from Ambassador George Former AssistantSecretaiy of which judged that Sino-Soviet rela
Kennan, Belgrade, 1963: Marshal
State Hilsman75 tions in a critical phase just
Tito] stressed tremendous impor Roger were

in his eyes of that

short of an acknowledged and defini
tance assuring tive split.79
international Communist Until about 1963, most of CIAs
movement should not come under double demonologists shared a gen
influence of Chinese whose posi eral conviction that they were Despite those
particular experts
tion on problem of war and breaking their lances and that no one doubts, by 1962 some policymakers

coexistence he described asliterally up the line was listening. But what I were giving thought to how American

insane. . . .
In general he professed and many of the other CIA heretics policy might at long last take advan
inability understand our underesti did not know was that our products, tage of the historic break in
mation of momentous importance plus growing signs of Sino-Soviet Communist ranks. Roger Hilsman
of Chinese-Russian rift . .
estrangement, were having a some- cites a record, written by James C.

66
 Sino-Soviet

In showing the way before

1963, CIAs heretics did
help stir the beginnings of
Thomson, of a Planning Meeting of who are reluctant to give up previous

the Secretary of State in January 1962:

policy movement in the assumptions and positions.
Department of State.
They: can be especially reluctant to
all the powers
of State ap
. .

peared to focus for the first time ~9 accept new images of reality on the
say-s~ of midlevel officers from
on the reality ofa permanent
across the Potomac.
Sino-Soviet split. The impact on
the minds around the table that If it took open hostilities between
the Soviet Union and China to help This
morning was dramatic, and you ~pplies particularly in situations
move a White House to make a radi
could hear the ice ofl2 years begin wher~ new intelligence judgments
cal change in US policy, what may are npt accompanied by hard evi
to snap and crackle as an intellec
be said of the impact, if any, that denc. In CIAs heretics
tual thaw set in. I kept carefid our case,
CIAs earlier Sino-Soviet
notes on that meeting and regard
had had? authors
Clearly, Agency
analyses hap~ened but it to be correct in their early
until firmer
it assomething ofa turning point.
had been in the field first, followed
anal~ses, was not

evidence surfaced in the early 1960s

One after another ofState ~c opera
tors and planners toyed with the
by State, then by certain authorities that ~ome impact began to be made;
from academia,~4 and finally by the and it was not until a decade later
new world ofpossibilities that

non-monolithic Communism military. Further, the causes and that ~rmed Sino-Soviet conflict con
the United States.80 depths of Sino-Soviet discord these vinc~d remaining doubtersall
might offer CIA authors had decodedespe those, that is, except for a few true
cially their insistence that the root belidvers.
And, by 1963, public speeches of cer issue was the clash of state interests
tain State Department officers were later confirmed by events, par
Intelligence analysis, the read
even
contained signals of a possible US ticularly Soviet-Chinese combat.
Those early CIA analyses cannot take
ing ~f tea leaves, cannonetheless
willingness to lessen the level of Sino
hav~ some influence up the line in
American hostility.8 credit for having killed the long-held
situations where staff officers have
certainty of so many officials that the don~ their homework sufficiently
United States confronted a united
Those early initiatives came to Communist bloc. In showing the well~
riors
to gain their
confidence and
intelligence supe
naught at the time, due in important backing.
way before 1963, however, CIAs her
measure to the advent in late 1963 of
etics did help stir the beginnings of
a new US President, Lyndon policy movement in the
Department Des~ite the great improvements of
Johnson, who quickly became over receht years in collection and ana
of State. And, at a minimum, they
whelmed by Vietnam. Before long, demonstrated the validity of patient lyti~methods, in situations where
moreover, it began to look to many firm data are not yet available, decod
analysis and the courage to contest
policymakers that China and the convential wisdom. Years later, CIA ing ~nd discerning new trends will
Soviet Union were cooperating in and other IC agencies were to make require officers steeped in knowledge
their support of Vietnams Commu direct
of~hat has gone before on the given
a more impact on decisionmak
nists. This perpetuated the image of questions.
ing through their all-source ability to
a monolithic bloc enemy and justi document the of Soviet and
buildups
fied a central rationale for the US
war effort: to stop Communism
Chinese forces. Per}~iaps
of
most important, the inter
play intelligence and
and so prevent an anticipated dom
Overall, the Sino-Soviet story illus dec~sionmaking often occurs in a

ino collapse of the of Southeast

rest
trates some facts of life ever-present
higl~ily charged setting of competing
Asia. It until the late 1960s
was not

that top US policymakers (Nixon

in the intelligence business: pol~cy demands and the politically
possible. In
our case, major changes

and Dr. Henry Kissinger) began in china policy did not occur until
taking major steps to exploit what Policymakers carry their own NIEs the once-overwhelming US commit
had become open Sino-Soviet around in their heads. These are
an
me~ic in Vietnam had begun to
split. experienced, often proud officers diminish, and a Republican White

67
Sino-Soviet

House could approach our former comments on the NIE. FR US, 10. 17 May 1954. On file in the
Chinese enemies more easily than p. 231. History Staff.
the Democratspolitically vulnera
ble for having lost China and been 14 November 11. On file in the History Staff.
3. From Deng speech,
soft on Communismcould have 1960, the Moscow conference of
at

done. 81 Communist parties. As cited in 12. In particular, see FBISs Radio Pro
CIAIOffice of Current Intelligence paganda Report, The Sino-Soviet
Special Report, The Men in the Argument: Moscow Intensifies Pres
Finally, our Sino-Soviet story has Sino-Soviet Confrontation, 5 July sure for Conformity; Peking Shows
meaning beyond that of filling in 1963, p. 2. On file in CIAs History No Retreat from Basic Positions,
of the historical record. Its Staff. 30 September 1960. On file in the
some

events may be a generation old and a

History Staff.
world apart from ours, but
they con 4. Notably the Foreign Documents
tinue speak
to to todays intelligence Division (FDD); the Analytic Divi 13. Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and
sion of the Broadcast Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential
problems. Since 1950, China has Foreign
Information Service (FBIS); the CIA (Washington, DC: Acropolis
passed from being an uneasy junior Sino-Soviet Studies Group of the Books, Ltd., 1976), pp. 149-15 1;
partner of the USSR, to an enemy of Office of Current Intelligence (later and Walter P. Southard, to author,
the USSR, to a burgeoning power the DDIs Special Research Stafl); 27 December 1996 and 12 May

cooperating with the new Russia in the staff of the Office of National 1997. Cline, the first chief of the
certain respects benefiting each sides Estimates (ONE); and, most impor SSSG, later became the CIAs Dep
interests. Their have DCIs and other senior Agency uty Director for Intelligence.
presidents
two tant,
Southard was the principal substan
officers who periodically briefed the
met cordially, at least outwardly;
NSC. In the late 1950s, the present tive officer of the SSSG and of its
they have jointly pledged to try to author, then a staff member of successor, the DDIs Special
reduce Americas influence in the Research Staff.
ONE, joined the efforts of other
world; and Russia now makes consid CIA officers who for some time had
erable modern weaponry available to been producing the heretical judg 14. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars, p.
China. These two powers are highly ment that the Soviet and Chinese 151. Also Southard, to author, 27
allies Communist Parties were out of sync. December 1996 and 12 May 1997;
unlikely to become formal
Gelman, to author, 17 December
again, but they remain the two great
1996; Bridgham, to author, 5 Octo
entities that in the future could seri 5. Communist China, 6 December
ber 1996 and 25 March 1997;
ously menace Americas security. 1960. FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX,
Cohen, to author, 26 December
in that Sino China, p. 740.
Hence, developments 1996; and Chester Cooper, to
Soviet future will continue to require author, 3 October 1996.
close, high-priority intelligence atten 6. On file in the History Staff. The
the courage, where author is indebted to Avis Boutell,
tion, plus 15. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan
Janet Gtefe, and Edith Ferrell for Secret Diplomatic Papers of Mao
applicable, to challenge any out
available of the FDD/
moded assumptions. making most
Zedong} (Beijing: The Central Press
FBIS materials cited in this article. of Historical Documents, 1933); as
reprinted in The Emerging Dis
7. 6 September 1953. Bridgham, to putes Between Beijing and Moscow,
NOTES author, 5 October 1996. On file in Ten Newly Available Chinese Docu
the History Staff. A revised version ments, 1956-1958. Cold War
of this study was published in The International History Project Bulle
1. Political Developments in the USSR tin, Issues 6-7, winter 1995-1996
China Quarterly (October-Decem
and the Communist World, 21 Febru
ber 1972), pp. 670-698, under the (Washington, DC: Smithsonian
ary 1962. Foreign Relations of the revised title, Maos Road and Sino Institutions Woodrow Wilson Inter
United States, 1961 -1963, Vol. national Center for Scholars),
Soviet Relations: A View from
XXII, No rtheast Asia, pp. 207-208.
Washington, 1953. p. 151. (Hereafter Wilson Center).
(Hereafter FRUS).
16. Esau 1959, OCI No. 2769/59, 12
8. The China Quarterly, p. 681.
2. FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XXII, June 1959. All the Esau studies this
NortheastAsia, pp. 231-232. Presi article cites are on file in the History
dent Kennedy had requested their 9. Ibid., p. 670. Staff.

68
 S/no-So v/el

17. Esausll-1959 through VI-1959, Relations (New York: Frederick A. 35. As charged in subsequent Beijing]
passim. Praeger, 1966), p. 90. P~oples Daily-Red Flag joint edito
rial of 6 September 1963, as cited in

18. Memorandum for DDI] R. A.

27. Smith, Sino-Soviet Discord on the
Hkriy Gelman, The Conflict: A

Amory, Jr., Meeting of DDI Ad Eve of the Summit,

Sdrvey, Problems of Communism,
10 May 1960. Vol. XIII (March-April, 1964), p. 9.
Hoc Committee on Sino-Soviet On file in the History Staff. Smith
Relations, December 1959. On
21 historic Jo~in Whitman recalled that during
was referring to Beijings 1960 excellent clandestine reports
file in the History Staff. That com Red Flag article, Long Live
mittee included representatives of
oi~ Sino-Soviet differences hit his
Leninism, of 15 April 1960. d~skin
the SSSG, ONE, FBIS, FDD, and ONE almost daily. Whit
Because that article criticized only
ORR. n~an, to author, 4 February 1997.
Yugoslavias Marshal Tito by name,
many observers at the time doubted I~1E
thereafter left CIA that the publishing of Long Live 36. 13-63, Problems and Prospects
19. Zagoria shortly
for a career in academia. Leninism meant that Sino-Soviet in Communist China, 1 May 1963.
relations had hit a new low. In his FRUS 1961 -1963, VoL XXII, North
east Asia, p. 366.
20. Philip Bridgham, to author, 5 Octo memoirs, published years later,
ber 1996. senior Chinese official Bo Yibo
states emphatically that the target of 37. Briefing of 10 December. FRUS,
the article was the USSR. Reprinted 1~958-1960, Vol. XIX, China, pp.
21. As part of his efforts,
early 1961
in
in Wilson Center, p. 230. 639-640.
Cooper arranged OCI and an
for an

ONE officer to accompany him on

temporary duty abroad to compare
CIAs Sino-Soviet Lindings with
those of the intelligence services of
two European countries. From the
authors experience as the ONE
officer who accompanied Cooper.
22. ONE Staff Memorandum No. 47-
58, 20 November 1958. On file in
the History Staff.
23. Memorandum for the Board, Sino
Soviet Relationship, 18 September
1959. On file in the History Staff.
24. Staff Memorandum No 45-59:
Chinese Communist Politics and
Sino-Soviet Relations, 13 October
1959. On file in the History Staff.
25. From manuscript, The Separation
28. Kent memorandum, The
Soviet Dispute, 9 November 1960.
On file in the History Staff.
29. NIE 58, 4 September 1952, Rela
tions Between the Chinese
Communist Regime and the USSR:
Their Present Character and Proba
ble Future Courses. On file in the
History Staff.
30. NIE 13-56, Chinese Communist
Capabilities and Probable Courses
Action Through 1960, 5 January
1956. FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. III,
China, p.232.
31. NIE 13-57, Communist China
Through 1961, 19 March 1957.
FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. III, China,
Sino
38. 1~riefingof 28 April. FRUS, 1958-
1960, Vol. XIX, China, p. 663.
39. Memorandum of Discussion at the
4~8th
Meeting of the NSC, 22 June
1960. FRUS, 1959-1960, Vol. XIX,
China, pp. 690-69 1.
40. 7 September 1960. FRUS, 1958-
1960, Vol. XIX, China, pp. 719-
~20. As we have seen, in July the
soviets had already begun to pull
t~seir support experts out of China.
of
41. 20 October 1960. FRUS, 1958-
1960, Vol. XIX, China, p. 730.
42. 8 December 1960. FRUS, 1958-
1969, Vol. XIX, China, p. 742.
43. Southard to author, 12 May 1997.

of Soviet and Chinese Societies, p. 498. Sourhard was a Naval Intelligence

prepared during a 1961-1962
sabbatical year at St. Antonys Col
lege, Oxford University. Part of that
study was later reprinted in Mod
ern Weapons and the Sino-Soviet
32. NIE 13-59, Communist China, 28
July 1959. FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.
XIX, China, pp. 579-580.
~fficer stationed in China, 1945-
1948. Years later, Huang Hua
became Chinas foreign minister
~md its Representative to the UN.

Estrangement, The China Quar 44. Because of Stalins pressure, the

1964. 33. NIE 100-3-60, Sino-Soviet Rela
terly, April-June, Northeast Manchuria] and
tions, 9 August 1960. FRUS,.1958-
1960, VoL XIX, China, p. 704.
Xinjiang became a Soviet] sphere
26. 10 July 1964, as cited in Raymond ~f influence, and four jointly owned
L. Garthoff, Sino-Soviet Military and operated enterprises were

Relations, 1945-66, chapter in 34. Communist China, FRUS, 1958- established. From Maos minutes
Garthoff (ed.), Sino-Soviet Military 1960, VoL XIX, China, p. 740. of conversation with Soviet

69
Sino-Soviet
Ambassador Yudin, 22July 1958, in
which Mao told Yudin that You
Russians] have never had faith in
the Chinese people, and Stalin was
among the worst. Stalin.
. . .
opposed our carrying out the revolu
tion. He made a huge mistake on
this issue. As reprinted in Wilson
Center, p., 155. Beijing later pub
licly accused the Soviet Union of
fomenting large-scale subversion
and sabotage in Sinkiang, and
warned the Soviets not to dare to
stretch out their evil hands to that
province. Hsinhua News Agency dis
patch, 28 April 1964; as cited in An
Tai Sung, The Sino-Soviet Territorial
Dispute (Philadelphia: The West
minster Press, 1973), pp. 78, 232.
45. Harrison Salisbury, War Between
Russia and China (New York:
Norton, 1969), p. 132.
46. From Soviet Ambassador P.F.
Yudin, record of conversation with
Mao, 31 March 1956, as cited in
Wilson Center, p. 164. Later in
1956, Mao made similar remarks
a Yugoslav Communist delegation,
claiming that this disastrous course
of the 1920s-early 1930s had in
large part been the result of the then-
dominance of the CCP by Wang
Ming, whose policies, Mao told the
Yugoslav officials, had originated
in Stalin. From minutes of Maos
conversation with those officials,
September 1956, as cited in Wilson
Center, p. 149. Wang Ming, known
also as Chen Shaoyu, ha~ spent con
siderable time in the USSR before
returning to China in 1930, where
he then became a leading member
of the CCP. Mao did not come to
dominate the Party until 1935.
47. James C. Bowden, Soviet Military
Aid to Nationalist China, 1923-
1941, chapter in Raymond L.
Garthoff, Sino-Soviet Military Rela
tions (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1966), p. 50.
48. Martynov, The Glorioius National
LiberationArmy of China. (Moscow,
70
1957), pp. 6-7, as cited in Bowden
pp. 54, 257.
49. Lt. Col. Robert Rigg, Red Chinas
Fighting Hordes (Harrisburg, PA.,
1952), p. 276.
50. TheNew York Times, 13 January
1950.
51. Cable to Ambassador David Bruce
in Paris, 11 February 1950. FRUS,
1950, Vol. VII, Korea, pp. 308-309.
See also C. L. Sulzberger, Vast
Issues Face Peiping, Moscow, The
New York Times, 14 January 1950.
52. The Stalin-Mao Summit in Mos
cow, Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow),
No. 2, 1989, pp. 135, 137, 140; as
W.W.
cited in Sergei N. Goncharov, John
W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain
Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the
Korean War (Stanford University
Press, 1993), p. 210.
53. From P. F. Yudin, record of conver
to
sation with Mao Tse-tung, 5 April
1956, as reprinted in Wilson Cen
ter, p. 165.
54. We have since learned that, accord
ing the memoirs of Khrushchev,
to
on from a trip to China in
returning
1954 he warned his colleagues that
conflict between us and China is
inevitable. From Memuary Nikity
Sergeyeicha Khrushcheva, Voprosy
istorii 11-12 (1992), p. 66, as cited
by William Taubman, Khrushchev
vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of
the Role of Personality in the Sino
Soviet Split. Wilson Center (Issues
8-9, Winter 1996/1997), p. 243.
55. Mao, Second Speech to Second
Session, Eighth Party Congress, 17
May 1958, as cited in Allen S. Whit
ing, The Sino-Soviet Split, in
Roderick Macfarquhar and John K.
Fairbank (eds.), The Cambridge His
tory of China, Vol. 14, The Peoples
Republic, Part I, The Emergence of
Revolutionary China 1949-1965
(New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), pp. 488-489.
56. Secrets, Spies, and Scholars, p. 151.
57. In late 1959, some of ONEs Board
members were reluctant to buy the
ONE staffs recommendation that
new difficulties in the Sino-Soviet
relationship warranted laying on an
NIE on that subject, and in the sub
sequent interagency coordinating
process insisted that the draft judg
ments of the Estimate (NIE 100-3-
60) be watered down. The author
was the initial drafter of that
Estimate.
58. Bridgham, to author, 5 October
1996 and 25 March 1997.
59. That officer, to author, 28 Decem
ber 1996. The officer transferred to
another part of the Agency, where
he was respected and given sensitive
senior responsibilities.
60. The author was a participant. It is
Chester Coopers view that the
above particular doubters had a
vested interest in holding the line on
the world Communist threat, and
for a long time the stand-patters
held that Sirio-Soviet discord was a
fraud. Cooper, to author, 9 October
1996.
61. Nine series of armed clashes
occurred, March to May 1969,
along the Manchuria-Siberia and
Sinkiang-Kazakhstan borders.
62. Whiting, to author, 19 October
1996.
63. Hilsmari, To Move a Nation: The
Politics ofForei~n Policy in the
Administration ofJohn F. Kennedy
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &
Co., mc, 1967), pp. 355-356.
64. Levin, to author, 25 October 1996.
65. Green, to author, 24 February
1997.
 Sino-Soviet

66. The Prospects for Communist China 1962. FRUS, 1961 -1963, Vol. 81. Amb. Marshall Green, to author,
(Published jointly by the Technol XXII, Northeast Asia, p. 231. 2~ February 1997. Roger Hilsman
ogy Press of MIT and John Wiley ~as a prominent actor in these
& Sons, Inc., New York: 1954), rspects; see his To Move a Nation,
73. Telegram 15 March 1963. FRUS,
p. 216. 1961 -1963, Vol. XVI, Yugoslavia, p~issim.
pp. 337, 338.
67. Robertson, Memorandum to Act 82. Asia After Vietnam, Foreign
ing Secretary of State Herter, 1 Affairs, Vol. XLVI (October 1967),
August 1958. FRUS, 1958-1860, 74. Summary Record of 516th meeting p. 121.
Vol. XIX, China, p. 36. of the NSC, 31 July 1963. FRUS,
1961 -1 963, Vol. XXII, China,
83. 400n afrer the 1969 firefights, both
p. 373. USSR and China produced pro
68. Editorial Note: From Memoran t~ie
films giving their respective
dum by Marion W. Boggs of the ~aganda
428th meeting of the NSC, 10 75. To Move a Nation, p. 357. versions of those hostilities. CIA

December 1959. FRUS, 1958-1960, o1btained copies of those fIlms. It

Vol. XIX, China, p. 640.
69. From Memorandum of Conversa
tion, Taipei, 18 June 1960. FRUS,
1958-1960, Vol. XIX, China,
p. 679.
70. From Memorandum of Discussion
the 448th of the NSC,
at meeting
22 June 1960. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Vol. XIX, China,p. 690.
71. Editorial Note of the 464th meet
ing of the NSC, 20 October 1960.
FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX,
China, p. 730. Chester Cooper
recalls that in the early I 960s, the
SSSGs Bud Southard, ONEs John
Whitman, and he briefed Ambassa
dors Llewellyn Thompson and Chip
Bohlen on the growing nature of
Sino-Soviet discord, but that these
distinguished experts response was
was difficult for even an American
76. Amb. Richard Solomon, to author,
~iewer (myself included) not to walk
11 October 1996; Amb. William
away from the Chinese version with
Gleysteen, to author, 24 February c~ut harboring an intense hatred of
1997; former State Department the Russians; conversely, the same
Counselor Allen S. Whiting, to
fpr the Russian versiondisturbing
author, 19 October 1996; Herbert onfirmation, for any latter-day
Levin, to author, 25 October 1996; doubters, of the reality and intensity
and Paul Kreisberg, to author, 26 of Sino-Soviet discord.
October 1996.
84. ~rominenr among these were
77. Allen S. Whiting, to author, 19 M.I.Ts William Griffith, the
October 1996. RAND Corporations Alice L.
Hsieh, and British authors G. F.
Hudson, Roderick MacFarquhar,
78. Bridgham, to author, 5 October ~ind Edward Crankshaw.
1996.Bridgham later returned to
CIA duty.
79. Earlier, according to Bud Southard,
a study prepared by his SSSG, The
State of Interbioc Relations, was on
President Kennedys desk the first
day of his presidency. Southard, to

that they were not convinced. author, 27 December 1996.

Cooper, to author, 6 December

1996. Former State Department

80.
Counselor Allen Whiting also attests
that Ambassador Bohlen was skepti
cal of significant Sino-Soviet
discord. Whiting, to author, 19
October 1996.
72. Editorial Note re Thompson tele
gram 3070 from Moscow, 26 May
To Movea Nation, p. 344. Accord
ing toformer State Department
official Herbert Levin, to State
Department China types like
myself, the ideas of a Sino-Soviet
monolith and full cooperation
between the USSR and the PRC
were ridiculous. Levin, to author,
25 October 1996.

71