VI. DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No.
S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at
Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424 (1987)
*MAGSALIN*
Phil. Agila Satellite v. Lichauco, G.R. No. 134887, July 27, 2006
*MAGSALIN*
Sayson vs. Singson, 54 SCRA 282 (1973)
*MAGSALIN*
Republic vs. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470 (1977)
*MAGSALIN*
Meritt vs Government, 34 Phil. 311 (1916)
*MAGSALIN*
PNB vs. CIR, 81 SCRA 314 (1978)
*MAGSALIN*
SSS vs. CA. 120, SCRA 707 (1983)
*MAGSALIN*
Rayo v. CFI, 110 SCRA 450 (1981)
*MAGSALIN*
GAUDENCIO RAYO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN G.R.
No. L-55273-83 December 19, 1981
FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent
opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam which
resulted in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of said
floodgates several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for
damages against the respondent corporation.
Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case
and contended that the respondent corporation is merely performing a
propriety functions and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be
sued in court.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with respect to
the management and operation of the Angat Dam.
W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic
charter includes the power to be sued for tort.
HELD: The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it
and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter.
As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its
own, distinct and separate from that of the government. Moreover, the
charter provision that it can sue and be sued in any court.
Farolan v. CTA, 217 SCRA 298 (1993)
Facts:
the Port ofManila carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to
Baging BuhayTrading (Baging Buhay). The import was classified under Tariff
Heading no. 39.06-B of theTariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem.
Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of
P11,350.00.The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination
of the shipment upon hearing the information that the shipment consisted of
mosquito net made of nylon under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and
Customs Code. Upon re-examination, it turns out that the shipment was
undervalued in quantity and value as previously declared. Thus the Collector
of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the government.Private
respondent filed a petition on August 20, 1976 for the release of the
questionedgoods which the Court denied. On June 2,1986, 64 bales out of
the 80 bales werereleased to Bagong Buhay after several motion. The
sixteen remaining bales weremissing. The respondent claims that of the
143,454 yards released, only 116,950 yardswere in good condition and the
rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents demandsthat the Bureau of
Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards itactually lost.
Issue:
Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050
yardsactually lost by the private respondent.
Held:
Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private
respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to
permit private r e s p o n d e n t ' s c l a i m t o p r o s p e r
w o u l d v i o l a t e t h e d o c t r i n e o f s o v e re i g n
immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered
to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall
on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted
technically into a suit against the state.
On this point, the political doctrine that state may not be sued without its
consent,
categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any
separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys
immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested
with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely taxation. As an agency, the
Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting
revenues which is defined not a proprietary function. Thus private
respondents claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must
fails.
RP vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85384, Feb. 28, 1990
***
Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Phil. 905 (1954)
*MAGSALIN*
Lim vs. Brownell, 107 Phil. 344 (1960)
***
Malong v. PNR, 138 SCRA 63 (19850
***
Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486 (1991)
FONTANILLA V. MALIAMAN
G.R. No. L-55963, February 27, 1991
Petitioners: Spouses Jose Fontanilla and Virginia Fontanilla
Respondents: Hon. Inocencio D. Maliaman and National Irrigation
Administration (NIA)
FACTS
On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National
Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency performing proprietary
functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable for the injuries,
resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and
Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIAs driver
employee Hugo Garcia; and NIA was ordered to pay the petitioners the
amounts of P 12,000 for the death of the victim; P3,389 for hospitalization
and burial expenses; P30,000 as moral damages; P8,000 as exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees of 20% of the total award.
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains, however, that it does
not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of
the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not
liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special agent.
For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 1990.
NIA believes this bases this on:
PD 552 amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created the
NIA)
The case of Angat River Irrigation - System v. Angat River Workers Union
Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System,
like the NIA, exercised a governmental function because the nature of its
powers and functions does not show that it was intended to bring to the
Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit, a strong
dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government entity
exercising proprietary functions.
The Angat dissenting opinion:
Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued
that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate
on July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the
usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five
years, he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be
removed except for valid cause.
The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of
the Philippines had not yet been promulgated, which came into effect some
3 years after the perfection of the contract.
ISSUE
Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government, thereby opening it up to the
possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver,
who was not its special agent.
HELD
YES
Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into
governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former
involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the
latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus
considered as optional.
The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local
government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service
agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public
welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a
"government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of
"constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national
irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump
irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are
largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are
only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of
lands.
NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate
and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides:
Sec. 1. Name and Domicile A body corporate is hereby created which shall
be known as the National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be
organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its
principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have
representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business.
(Emphasis for emphasis).
Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:
(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all
irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration, such fees or
administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation,
maintenance and insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a
reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy;
to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or
rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a
special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first,
upon the land benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens
shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land, and
such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration
charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National
Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .
The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court.
It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be
exercised by a Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection (f):
. . . and to transact such business, as are directly or indirectly necessary,
incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and
objectives, including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in
general, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation
Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
DISPOSITION: The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration
is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a
corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held
liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not
its special agent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 1990 is
DENIED WITH FINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R.
No. 61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Amigable v Cuenca [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]
Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of
her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of
the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot
for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958,
Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines,
requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the
Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a
quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca,
in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action
was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor
General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any
amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its
consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the
defendants.
Issue:
Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue
the government.
Held:
In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that
when the government takes away property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against
the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in
favour of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and
plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot
to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then
bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action
is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes,
the only relief left is for the government to make due compensationprice
or value of the lot at the time of the taking.
Torio vs. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 99 (1978)
G.R. No. L-29993; 85 SCRA 399October 23, 1978
Facts:
The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159
to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration The 1959
Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee was created, which, in turn,
organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage.A zarzuela troupe,
of which Vicente Fontanilla was a member, arrived for their performance on
January 22. During the zarzuela, the stage collapsed and Fontanilla was
pinned underneath. He was immediately hospitalized, but died the following
day.Fontanillas heirs filed a complaint to recover damages against the
Municipality of Malasiqui, its Municipal Council and all the Councils
individual members.The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as a
legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions
and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental
functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of
any of its agents.The councilors maintained that they merely acted as the
municipalitys agents in carrying out the municipal ordinance and as such
they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for
profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in
implementing the municipal ordinance.After trial, the RTC dismisses the
complaint, concluding that the Executive Committee had exercised due
diligence and care in selecting a competent man for the construction of the
stage, and the collapse was due to forces beyond the control of the
committee. Consequently, the defendants were not liable for the death of
Vicente Fontanilla. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
courts decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of P12,000.00 by way of
moral and actual damages:P1200.00 its attorneys fees; and the costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable.
Held:
Yes. Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political bodies endowed with
the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their
respective municipal governments in conformity with law, and in their proper
corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be
contracted with.The powers of a municipality are two-fold in character:
public, governmental or political on the one hand; and corporate, private, or
proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised by the
corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the
public welfare. These include the legislative, judicial public, and political.
Municipal powers, on the other hand, are exercised for the special benefit
and advantage of the community. These include those which are ministerial,
private and corporate.This distinction of powers are necessary in
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which
result in injury to third persons.If the injury is caused in the course of the
performance of a governmental function/duty, no recovery can be had from
the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from
its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith
or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.With respect to proprietary
functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable
to third persons ex contract or ex delicto. They may also be subject to suit
upon contracts and its tort.
The Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., December 17, 1994
G.R. No. 101949238 SCRA 524, December 1, 1994
Petitioner: The Holy See
Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding
Judge ofRTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises,
Inc.
FACTS:
Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered
under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the
name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the
Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See,
who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his
residence.Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who
assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.When
the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two
parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the
squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists
that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent
corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this,
Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest
money. The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation.Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for
annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr.
Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.
The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion
on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by
entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari
was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.
HELD:
The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its
non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally
accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus
shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our
admission in the society of nations.It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be
granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving
state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy
See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the
Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the
immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this
Court. Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the
petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate
business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure
gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and
subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it
acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature
in the Philippines. The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of
selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired
through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial
purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its
subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-
proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather
because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property. In view
of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were
dismissed accordingly.
U.S.A. vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985)
US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS
and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of
Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO.,
INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos
Facts:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base
in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair
typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation,
submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the letters received
from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating
that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair
contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in
Subic Bay.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E.
Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the
Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the
defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in
the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the
defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into
contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the
complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the
complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given
her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in
the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which
included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The company opposed the motion.
The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved
twice to reconsider but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
trial court.
Issue/s:
WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental
functions to be able to invoke state immunity
Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the
respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against
the private respondent.
Ratio:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in
the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a
necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts).
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign,
its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may
be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral
part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United
States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.
Correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act.
U.S.A. vs. Guinto, G.R. No. 76609, Feb. 26, 1990
US vs. Guinto
En BancCruz, February 26,1990
Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the state - Failure to raise immunity as
defense
Facts:
In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the
ground that they are in effect suits against it which it has not consented.
On the first suit: US V GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area
Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through
its contracting officer James F. Shaw. Among those who submitted their bids
were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and
Pablo C. del PilarBidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the
private respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities,
including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation
to bid. The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives
petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private
respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil Engineering concession had
not been awarded to Dizon. But Dizon was alreayd operating this
concession, then known as the NCO club concession. On June 30, 1986, the
private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and
the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a
rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private
respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the
concessions pending litigation. Respondent court directed the individual
petitioners to maintain the status quo. On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed
a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction
on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not
waived its non-suability. On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction. On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the
petitioners' motion to dismiss.
On the second suit: US V RODRIGO (GR No 79470)
Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony
Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal
as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in
Baguio CityIt had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the
soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customersHis
dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball,
Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force
BaseGenove filed a complaint in the RTC of BaguioThe defendants, joined by
the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that
Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US Air Force was immune from
suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued that the suit
was in effect against USA, which had not given its consent to be suedMotion
was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their official
capacities, the defendants went beyond what their functions called for; this
brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may
have had in the beginning
On the third suit: US V ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258)
Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an
extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by the individual petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and
Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air
Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)Bautista was dismissed from his
employment as a result of the filing of the chargeHe then filed a complaint
for damages against the individual petitioners, claiming that it was because
of their acts that he was removedDefendants alleged that they had only
done their duty in the enforcement of laws of the Philippines inside the
American bases, pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement The
counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their
official capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the US
without its consentMotion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under
the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases;
moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when
they submitted their answer
On the fourth suit: US V ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258)
Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the
petitioners (except USA)According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat
them up, handcuffed the, and unleashed dogs on themDefendants deny this
and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by dogs
because they were struggling and resisting arrestUSA and the defendants
argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States which had
not given its consent to be sued; that they were also immune from suit
under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of
their official functionsMotion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the
acts cannot be considered Acts of State, if they were ever admitted by the
defendantsIssue:Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against
United States of America without its consentIn relation, whether or not the
defendants are also immune from suit for acting within their official
functions.
Holding and Ratio:
1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises
operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces.
Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Case should be remanded to the lower
court.
2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity.
The restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into the
employment contract with Genove, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are only suable, not
liable.)
3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of
their official functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they
cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable to their principal, which
has not given its consent to be sued.
4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry
must first be made by the lower court. Only after can it be known in what
capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.
Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003
KHOSROW MINUCHER v. CA and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. 142396)
Date: February 11, 2003
Ponente: J. Vitug
Facts:
Minucher is an Iranian national who came to study in UP in 1974 and was
appointed Labor Attache for the Iranian Embasies inTokyo and Manila; he
continued to stay in the Philippines when the Shah of Iran was deposed by
Khomeini, he became a refugee of the UN and he headed the Iranian
National Resistance Movement in the Philippines.On the other hand, Scalzo
was a special agent of the US Drugs Enforcement Agency. He conducts
surveillance operations onsuspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed
to be the source of prohibited drugs shipped to the US and make the actual
arrest.Minucher and one Abbas Torabian was charged for a violation of Act.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) before the PasigRTC, such criminal
charge was followed by a buy-bust operation conducted by the Philippine
police narcotic agents to which Scalzowas a witness for the prosecution.
They were acquitted.Later on, Minucher filed a complaint for damages
against Scalzo. It was said that Minucher and Scalzo came to know of
eachother thru Jose Iigo; they conducted some business i.e. the former sold
to the latter some caviar and Persian carpets. Scalzo thenrepresented
himself as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, DOJ of
US.Minucher expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for him and his
Abbass wife. Scalzo told him that he could help him for a$2,000 fee per
visa. After a series of business transactions between the two, when Scalzo
came to deliver the visas to Minuchershouse, he told the latter that he
would be leaving the Philippines soon and requested him to come out of the
house so he can introducehim to his cousin waiting in the cab. To his
surprise, 30-40 armed Filipino soldiers came to arrest him.In his complaint
for damages, he said that some of his properties were missing like Persian
carpets, a painting together withhis TV and betamax sets. There was nothing
left in his house. He averred that his arrest as a heroine trafficker was well
publicized andthat when we got arrested, he was not given any food or
water for 3 days.In his defense, Scalzo asserted his diplomatic immunity as
evidenced by a Diplomatic Note. He contended that it wasrecognized by the
US Government pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
and the Philippine government itself thruits Executive Department and
DFA.The courts ruled in favor of Scalzo on the ground that as a special agent
of the US Drug Enforcement Administration, he wasentitled to diplomatic
immunity. Hence, the present recourse of Minucher.
Issue:
WON Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity.
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include
(a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to theheads of state, (b) envoys,
ministers or internunciosaccredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d'
affairs accredited to theministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the "staff of
the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff
and thetechnical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as
members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of
theadministrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded
diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention onDiplomatic Relations
provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so,
nevertheless, with an understanding thatthe same be restrictively
applied.The main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat
entitled to immunity is thedetermination of whether or not he performs
duties of diplomatic nature.Scalzo was an Assistant Attach of the US
diplomatic mission. An attach belongs to a category of officers in the
diplomaticestablishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press,
administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of
attachesbelonging to certain ministries or departments of the government,
other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed bytheir
respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as the
military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science,and customs
attaches, or the like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are
administratively under him, but their main function is to observe, analyze
and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host
country andsubmit reports to their own ministries or departments in the
home government. These officials are not generally regarded asmembers of
the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having
diplomatic rank.Vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative
of the executive branch of the government.Thegovernment of the United
States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its
standards for recognition of a diplomaticagent. The State Department policy
is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an
acknowledged diplomatic titleand "performs duties of diplomatic
nature." Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a
valid diplomatic passportor, from States which do not issue such passports,
a diplomatic note formally representing the intention to assign the person
todiplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-
one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on anessentially full-
time basis. Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate
and descriptive job title to that whichcurrently applies to the duties
performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each individual to
the appropriate functionalcategory.
Rep. of Indonesia v. Vinzon, G.R. 154705, June 26, 2003
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R. No. 154705. June
26, 2003]
FACTS:
Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent.
The maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipments: air
conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and
water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.The new
Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services
unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the
Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent.
The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion
to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has
sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have
waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the
Maintenance Agreement.
HELD:
The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri
imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no
dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii.
The state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the
premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of
Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a
contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into
by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions.
It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
WHO vs Aquino Case Digest
G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972
Facts:
Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as
Acting Assistant Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained
in twelve (12) crates, were allowed free entry from duties
and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the
crates contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods beyond the official
needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino
issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects
of Verstuyft.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr.
Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal
baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the
Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended. The
Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search
warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the
quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and
seizure under the diplomatic immunity.
Held:
Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that
Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the
Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the
Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal
law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's
right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search
warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of
separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer
acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by
seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search
warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner
Verstuyft. (World Health Organization vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131,
November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 243)
DFA v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113191, September 18, 1997
DFA vs NLRC Case Digest
Diplomatic Immunity, Suits against International Agencies
Facts:
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal
case against Asian Development Bank. Two summonses were served, one
sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign
Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as
well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal
process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant
to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of
the Agreement Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines
Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that
the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered
a decision in favor Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead,
on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its
referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA
failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for
certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether ADB is immune from suit
2. Whether by entering into service contracts with different private
companies, ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a
commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit
3. Whether the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition
4. Whether the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this case
Held:
1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys
immunity from legal process of every form, except in the specified cases of
borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and
underwriting of securities. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity
in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter
and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges
are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government which must be respected.
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic
status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law. "One of the basic
immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued
by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this
is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local
courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government
may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction
would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities
impartially on behalf of its member-states."
2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a
commercial transaction, which should have constituted a waiver of its
immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with different private
companies. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each
widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute
theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in
the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard
to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private
act or acts jure gestionis.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a
private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start
of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in
the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not
engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign
activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when
it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been
intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a
waiver of immunity would not attach.
3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the
determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities,
a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the
court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign
relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or
advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine
government before the international community. When international
agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise
accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly
regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the
highest executive department with the competence and authority to so act
in this aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this
Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:
"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to
plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the
Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said
defendant is entitled to immunity.
"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,'
where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an
American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as
to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the
defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to
submit to the court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity.
"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the
international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its
claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign
Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic
Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be
sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization
vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the
trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the
U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor
General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval
Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge. The
Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and
memorandum as amicus curiae.
"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office
of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side
of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum
in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to
the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels. In cases
where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire
into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts
and transactions involved."
4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the
Court has, under special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a
petition when (a) the questioned order or decision is issued in excess of or
without jurisdiction, or (b) where the order or decision is a patent nullity,
which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain in the present
case. When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before him,
his action that assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter,
dated 31 August 1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID. (DFA vs
NLRC, G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996)
Animas v. PVAO, 174 SCRA 214 (1989)
****
U.S.A. vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 79233, March 1, 1993
****
Lansang vs. Court of Appeals
Amado J. Lansang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, General Assembly of the
Blind, Inc., and Jose Iglesias, respondents.
February 23, 2000
Quisumbing, J:
Facts:
Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly
awarded a verbal contract of lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC). However, this verbal contract
accommodation was unclear because there was no document or instrument
involved.
With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner
Amado J. Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and terminated the said
verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that they vacate the area.
The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose
Iglesias, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents but later on
claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice.
On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and
injunction in the RTC against the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that
the complaint was actually directed against the state which could not be
sued without its consent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
ruled that a government official being sued in his official capacity is not
enough to protest such official from liability for acts done without or in
excess of his authority.
Issues:
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang,
as Chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be
sued without its consent.
Whether or not petitioner Lansang abused his authority in ordering the
ejectment of private respondents from Rizal Park.
Held:
No, the complaint is not a suit against the state.
No, Lansang did not abuse his authority.
Ratio:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against
public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is
that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of
the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself
to perform a positive act.
Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal
capacity. It is evident from the complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly
for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal
Park.
There was no evidence of abuse of authority.
Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713 (1990)
Shauf v. CA
Loida Q. Shauf & Jacob Shauf, petitioners v. Hon. CA, Don E. Detwiler &
Anthony Persi, respondents
Second Division
Doctrine: official v. personal capacity
Keywords: void for overbreadth
Date: November 27, 1990
Ponente: Justice Regalado
Facts:
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a
member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance
Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is
eminently qualified.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an
equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don
Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director),
for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex.
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education
Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she
will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs
after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future
vacancy if shes available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs.
Mary Abalateos was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateos
appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said
position. She claims that the Abalateos stay was extended indefinitely to
deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed
against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of
the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.
Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil
Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court,
etc.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual
damages + 20% of such amount as attorneys fees + P100k as moral &
exemplary damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the
damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand,
continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts
done/statements made by them in performance of their official
governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of
1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the
case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court.
They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision.
According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity
thus this is not a suit against the US government which would require
consent.
Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that
the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal &
unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of
international law.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether private respondents are immune from suit being officers of
the US Armed Forces
Held:
No they are not immune.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Private respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay
petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as and
for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
Ratio:
They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may
not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded
the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are
sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the
public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his
act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority
or jurisdiction Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs.
Aligaen Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the
State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have
been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not
a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In
the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity
against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground
that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal
and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the
State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of
state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any
arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge
in ruling that private respondents committed acts of discrimination for which
they should be held personally liable.
There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q.
Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants
on account of her sex, color and origin.
She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas,
Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology?
guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science. She has also
completed all course work in human behavior and counselling psychology for
a doctoral degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important, she had
functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9
level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same
position in 1976.
In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not
even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the
vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible
to the position.
Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall
afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the
1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race,
or creed..
There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing
the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right
of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral
aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be held accountable
Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of
her remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of
opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other
remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a foreign court and
under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled
as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise
proscribed, which will best advance and protect her interests. There is, thus,
nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which should
not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive representations
of private respondents on that score.
 Republic v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 48607, March 19, 1993
Facts:
The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola
massacre (background: Wiki), together with those injured (Caylao
group), instituted the petition, seeking the reversal and setting aside
of the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug 8,
1988) in "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al."
which dismissed the case against the Republic of the Philippines
May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are
being charged in their personal and official capacity, holding
them liable, if at all, would not result in financial
responsibility of the government
Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for
reconsideration
In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their
demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform"
The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo,
presented their problems and demands such as:
giving lands for free to farmers
zero retention of lands by landlords
stop amortizations of land payments
Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform
(MAR) began on January 15, 1987
On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez
Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter
to the attention of then President Cory Aquino during the January 21
Cabinet meeting
Tension mounted the next day
The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR
premises and prevented the employees from going inside their
offices
On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez
and Tadeo, Tadeo's group decided to march to Malacanang to air
their demands
On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of
Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang
Lungsod (KPML)
Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was
heavily infliltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and that an insurrection
was impending
Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola
The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm
From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue
took place; "pandemonium broke loose"
After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13
according to Tadeo)
39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all
belonging to the group of marchers
Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20
suffered minor physical injuries
The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the
incident on February 27, 1987 as follows
The march did not have any permit
The police and military were armed with handguns
prohibited by law
The security men assigned to protect the government units
were in civilian attire (prohibited by law)
There was unnecessary firing by the police and military
The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law
It is not clear who started the firing
The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective
use to disperse the crowd; the water cannons and fire trucks
were not put into operation because:
there was no order to use them
they were incorrectly prepositioned
they were out of range of the marchers
The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four
unidentified, uniformed individuals shown either on tape or in
pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers
The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned
officers of both the Western Police District (WPD) and Integrated
National Police (INP) who were armed be prosecuted for violation of
par. 4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of 1985
Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended
It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding
the rally without permit and for inciting sedition
Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following
officers for their failure to make effective use of their skill and
experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola:
Gen. Ramon E. Montao
Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim
Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres
Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz
Col. Cezar Nazareno
Maj. Filemon Gasmin
Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and
wounded victims to be compensated by the government
It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in
their claim for damages from the government
 No concrete form of compensation was received by the
victims
On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages
against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military
officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident
Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
State cannot be sued without its consent
Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit
Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no
such waiver
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied
Issues:
1. Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e.
Whether or not this is a suit against the State with its consent)
Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the
Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and
victims, and by public addresses made by President Aquino,
the State has consented to be sued
2. Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State
Holding:
1. No.
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
2. No.
Ratio:
1. Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued
without its consent
The recommendations by the Commission does not in any
way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State
The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings
shall serve only as cause of action for litigation; it does not
bind the State immediately
President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the
State; they are not tantamount to a waiver by the State
2. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:
When the Republic is sued by name;
When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the
case is such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the
government
Although the military officers and personnel were
discharging their official functions during the incident, their
functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded
their authority
There was lack of justification by the government forces in
the use of firearms.
Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and
order, but they fired at the crowd instead
No reversible error by the respondent Judge found. Petitions dismissed.
PNB vs. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595 (1978)
83 SCRA 595 Political Law Constitutional Law Immunity of the State
from Suit
On December 17, 1970, Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution
followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment on the funds of Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) in the sum of P12,724.66 deposited
with the Philippine National Bank in La Union. PNB La Union filed an
administrative complaint against Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion,
alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of
public character and therefore may not be garnished, attached, nor may be
levied upon. The PNB La Union Branch invoked the doctrine of non suability,
putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB may be sued.
HELD: Yes. Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued are not
exempt from garnishment. PVTA is also a public corporation with the same
attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The government has entered with
them into a commercial business hence it has abandoned its sovereign
capacity and has stepped down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is
subject to rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued.
Therefore, the petition of PNB La Union is denied.
Municipality of Makati vs. CA. 190 SCRA 206 (1990)
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned
by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After
proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which
the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to
P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of
funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order
was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending
that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon
execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds
without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of
Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which
was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and
petitioner now filed this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from
garnishment and levy upon execution.
Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC
judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds
garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are
public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this
jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy
and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues
derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended
primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.
Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an
ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in
their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected.
However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been
in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to
settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already
enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within
the bounds of fair play and justice.
Nessia vs. Fermin (for further verification)
[GR 102918, 30 March 1993]
First Division, Bellosillo (J): 3 concur
Facts: Jose V. Nessia filed a complaint against Jesus M. Fermin and the
Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental for recovery of damages and
reimbursement of expenses incurred in the performance of his official duties
as the then Deputy Municipal Assessor of Victorias. The complaint theorized
that Fermin deliberately ignored and caused the non-payment of the
vouchers in question because Nessia defied the former's request to all
municipal officials to register and vote in Victorias in the 1980 local
elections. In his answer with counterclaim, Fermin disputed the allegations in
the complaint and countered that the claims of Nessia could not be
approved because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations therefor. On
its part, Victorias concurred with the arguments of Fermin, and added that
Nessia was blamable for his predicament because he neither gave Fermin
the justification for drawing funds in excess of the budgetary appropriations
nor amended his vouchers to conform thereto. Issues having been joined,
the parties presented their evidence, except for Victorias which was declared
in default for non-appearance at the pre-trial conference. On 24 April 1987,
judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of Nessia. On the basis of
the evidence, the trial court found that Fermin maliciously refused to act on
Nessia's vouchers, bolstered by his inaction on Nessia's follow-up letters
inquiring on the status thereof. Both Nessia and Fermin elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals, Nessia praying for an increase in the award of moral
and exemplary damages, and Fermin seeking exoneration from liability. The
Municipality of Victorias did not appeal. On 19 July 1991, the appellate court
dismissed Nessia's complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
because the complaint itself as well as Nessia's own testimony admitted that
Fermin acted on the vouchers as may be drawn from the allegations that
Fermin denied/refused the claims. Nessia appealed.
Issue: Whether the approval of certain vouchers, which are not supported
by appropriations, may be compelled by mandamus.
Held: In Baldivia v. Lota, the Supreme Court dismissed on appeal the
petition to compel by mandamus approval of certain vouchers, even though
the disapproval was politically motivated, on the basis that respondent
Mayor was bound to disapprove vouchers not supported by appropriations.
In the penultimate paragraph, We made the following pronouncement,
"Indeed, respondent could have, and should have, either included the claim
of petitioners herein in the general budget he is bound to submit, pursuant
to section 2295 of the Revised Administrative Code, or prepared a special
budget for said claim, and urged the municipal council to appropriate the
sum necessary therefor. In any event, if the municipal mayor fails or refuses
to make the necessary appropriation, petitioners may bring an action
against the municipality for the recovery of what is due them and after
securing a judgment therefor, seek a writ of mandamus against the
municipal council and the municipal mayor to compel the enactment and
approval of the appropriation ordinance necessary therefor." Herein, this is
precisely what Nessia did; he filed a collection case to establish his claim
against Fermin and the Municipality of Victorias, which Nessia satisfactorily
proved.
City of Caloocan vs. Allarde
[GR 107271, 10 September 2003]
Third Division, Corona (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: Sometime in 1972, Marcial Samson, City Mayor of Caloocan City,
through Ordinance 1749, abolished the position of Assistant City
Administrator and 17 other positions from the plantilla of the local
government of Caloocan. Then Assistant City Administrator Delfina
Hernandez Santiago and the 17 affected employees of the City Government
assailed the legality of the abolition before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Caloocan City, Branch 33. In 1973, the CFI declared the abolition
illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the
payment of their back salaries and other emoluments. The City Government
of Caloocan appealed to the Court of Appeals. Santiago and her co-parties
moved for the dismissal of the appeal for being dilatory and frivolous but the
appellate court denied their motion. Thus, they elevated the case on
certiorari before the Supreme Court (GR L-39288-89, Heirs of Abelardo
Palomique, et al. vs. Marcial Samson, et al.) In the Supreme Court's
Resolution dated 31 January 1985, it held that the appellate court "erred in
not dismissing the appeal," and "that the appeal of the City Government of
Caloocan was frivolous and dilatory." In due time, the resolution lapsed into
finality and entry of judgment was made on 27 February 1985.
In 1986, the City Government of Caloocan paid Santiago P75,083.37 in
partial payment of her backwages, thereby leaving a balance of
P530,761.91. Her co-parties were paid in full. In 1987, the City of Caloocan
appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries. This was included in
Supplemental Budget 3 for the fiscal year 1987. Surprisingly, however, the
City later refused to release the money to Santiago. Santiago exerted effort
for the execution of the remainder of the money judgment but she met stiff
opposition from the City Government of Caloocan. On 12 February 1991,
Judge Mauro T. Allarde, RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 123, issued a writ of
execution for the payment of the remainder of Santiagos back salaries and
other emoluments. For the second time, the City Government of Caloocan
went up to the Court of Appeals and filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction to stop the trial court from enforcing the writ of execution.
The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the order of issuance of the writ
of execution. One of the issues raised and resolved therein was the extent to
which back salaries and emoluments were due to respondent Santiago. The
appellate court held that she was entitled to her salaries from October, 1983
to December, 1986. For the second time, the City Government of Caloocan
appealed to the Supreme Court (GR 98366, City Government of Caloocan vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.) The petition was dismissed, through its Resolution of
16 May 1991, for having been filed late and for failure to show any reversible
error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The resolution subsequently
attained finality and the corresponding entry of judgment was made on 29
July 1991.
On motion of Santiago, Judge Mauro T. Allarde ordered the issuance of an
alias writ of execution on 3 March 1992. The City Government of Caloocan
moved to reconsider the order, insisting in the main that Santiago was not
entitled to backwages from 1983 to 1986. The lower court denied the motion
and forthwith issued the alias writ of execution. Unfazed, the City
Government of Caloocan filed a motion to quash the writ, maintaining that
the money judgment sought to be enforced should not have included
salaries and allowances for the years 1983-1986. The trial court likewise
denied the motion. On 27 July 1992, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo levied and
sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government of
Caloocan (SBH-165) for P100,000. The proceeds of the sale were turned over
to Santiago in partial satisfaction of her claim, thereby leaving a balance of
P439,377.14, inclusive of interest. The City of Caloocan and Norma M.
Abracia filed a motion questioning the validity of the auction sale of the
vehicle with plate SBH-165, and a supplemental motion maintaining that the
properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. In his Order
dated 1 October 1992, Judge Allarde denied both motions and directed the
sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction three more vehicles of the City
of Caloocan. All the vehicles, including that previously sold in the auction
sale, were owned by the City and assigned for the use of Norma Abracia,
Division Superintendent of Caloocan City, and other officials of the Division
of City Schools.
Meanwhile, the City Government of Caloocan sought clarification from the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) on whether Santiago was considered to have
rendered services from 1983-1986 as to be entitled to backwages for that
period. In its Resolution 91-1124, the CSC ruled in the negative. On 22
November 1991, Santiago challenged the CSC resolution before the
Supreme Court (GR 102625, Santiago vs. Sto. Tomas, et al.) On 8 July 1993,
the Supreme Court initially dismissed the petition for lack of merit; however,
it reconsidered the dismissal of the petition in its Resolution dated 1 August
1995, this time ruling in favor of Santiago, holding that CSC Resolution 91-
1124 could not set aside what had been judicially decided with finality.
On 5 October 1992, the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance 0134,
Series of 1992, which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by
respondent Santiago as back salaries, plus interest. Pursuant to the subject
ordinance, Judge Allarde issued an order dated 10 November 1992,
decreeing that the City Treasurer (of Caloocan), Norberto Azarcon be ordered
to deliver to the Court within 5 days from receipt, (a) managers check
covering the amount of P439,378.00 representing the back salaries of
Delfina H. Santiago in accordance with Ordinance 0134 S. 1992 and
pursuant to the final and executory decision in these cases. Then Caloocan
Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., however, refused to sign the check intended as
payment for Santiagos claims. This, despite the fact that he was one of the
signatories of the ordinance authorizing such payment. On 29 April 1993,
Judge Allarde issued another order directing the Acting City Mayor of
Caloocan, Reynaldo O. Malonzo, to sign the check which had been pending
before the Office of the Mayor since 11 December 1992. Acting City Mayor
Malonzo informed the trial court that "he could not comply with the order
since the subject check was not formally turned over to him by the City
Mayor" who went on official leave of absence on 15 April 1993, and that "he
doubted whether he had authority to sign the same." Thus, in an order dated
7 May 1993, Judge Allarde ordered Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo to immediately
garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the
claim of Santiago. On the same day, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo served a copy
of the Notice of Garnishment on the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
Sangandaan Branch, Caloocan City. When PNB immediately notified the City
of Caloocan of the Notice of Garnishment, the City Treasurer sent a letter-
advice informing PNB that the order of garnishment was "illegal," with a
warning that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused
by the withholding of the funds of the city. PNB opted to comply with the
order of Judge Allarde and released to the Sheriff a managers check
amounting to P439,378. After 21 long years, the claim of Santiago was
finally settled in full.
On 4 June 1993, however, while the present petition was pending, the City
Government of Caloocan filed yet another motion with the Supreme Court, a
Motion to Declare in Contempt of Court; to Set Aside the Garnishment and
Administrative Complaint against Judge Allarde, Santiago and PNB.
Subsequently, the City Government of Caloocan filed a Supplemental
Petition formally impleading PNB as a party-respondent in this case. The
petition for certiorari is directed this time against the validity of the
garnishment of the funds of the City of Caloocan, as well as the validity of
the levy and sale of the motor vehicles belonging to the City of Caloocan.
Issue: Whether the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e.
exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiagos claim.
Held: Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which
the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the
hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to
the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds
deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine
Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general
or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to
garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as
required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is
relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered.
Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is
at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and
execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do
not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and
only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment
as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. The rule is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-
defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as
required by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds
from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be
levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the
satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such a case,
the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes.
Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance
0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for Santiagos
back salaries plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception.
For all intents and purposes, Ordinance 0134, Series of 1992, was the
"corresponding appropriation as required by law." The sum indicated in the
ordinance for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated from the
other budgetary allocations of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for
the Citys monetary obligation to her. The judgment of the trial court could
then be validly enforced against such funds.
VII. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
Pablo Ocampo v. HRET, G.R. No. 158466. June 15, 2004
In May 2001, Mario Crespo, also known as Mark Jimenez, was declared as the
elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. Pablo Ocampo was the
rival candidate who filed an electoral protest in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) alleging that Crespos win was due to election fraud
and vote buying. In March 2003, Crespo was declared by the HRET as
ineligible for office due to lack of residence in the said district of Manila. Due
to such declaration, Ocampo then requested the HRET to declare him as the
winner of the election done in 2001 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6646 which
provides that Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted Ocampo argued that the votes for Crespo should then be
considered as stray votes. And that being the fact that Ocampo received the
second highest number of vote (next to Crespo, with just a margin of 768
votes), he should be declared as the winner of the said election. The HRET
denied Ocampos petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ocampo should be declared as the winner.
HELD: No. Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second
placer cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified
candidates in the event that the highest earner of votes is disqualified. The
fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily give the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the elective
office. Further, Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus
Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a
disqualified candidate to be considered stray. Hence, when a candidate
has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the Election Day and
was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so
would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting
for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the
election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to
misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was
then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of
the powers of government.
Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 (1919)
Facts
Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the
deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to
preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the prostitutes
were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo.
The
prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year
before
being boarded, at the dead of night, in two boats bound for Davao. The
women
were under the assumption that they were being transported to another
police
station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women
being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes.
The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban,
Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of
Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the
respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were
deported
to Mindanao against their will.
During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without
their consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most
of
all, there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170
prostitutes.
Issue
Whether we are a government of laws or a government of men.
Held
We are clearly a government of laws. Lukban committed a grave abuse of
discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will.
There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a
law incorporation, the
punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who Philippines in its constitution adops the generally accepted principles of
compels any person to change his residence. international law as
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to part of the law of Nations. Also, the Philippines has joined the United Nations
the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. in its Resolution
Their entitled Universal Declaration of Human Rights in proclaiming that life and
choice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make liberty and all
some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to other fundamental rights shall be applied to all human beings. The
compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human contention that he remains a
race. threat of to the security of the country is unfounded as Japan and the US or
These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao the Phils are no
without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, longer at war.
worse,
without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban
et Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979)
al must be severely punished
Facts
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter
Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1952) of Instruction No. 229,
issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users
Facts or drivers to procure early
Boris Mejoff, a Russian, was captured as a Japanese spy by the US Army warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it
Counter Intelligence stalls or is disabled. In
Corps on March 18, 1948. He was turned over to the Phil Commonwealth compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land
Government for Transportation Office issued
appropriate disposition. His case was decided on by the Board of Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.
Commissioners of Immigration This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent
who declared him as an illegal alien. The Board ordered his immediate administrative order are unlawful
deportation. In the and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal
meantime, we was placed in prison awaiting the ship that will take him back protection of the law and undue
home to Russia. delegation of police power.
Two Russian boats have been requested to bring him back to Russia but the
masters refused as Issue
they had no authority to do so. Two years passed and Mejoff is still under Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent
detention awaiting Administrative Order issued is
the ship that will take him home. unconstitutional
This case is a petition for habeas corpus. However, the respondent held that
the Mejoff should Ruling
stay in temporary detention as it is a necessary step in the process of The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in
exclusion or expulsion of question are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the
undesirable aliens. It further states that is has the right to do so for a exercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare
reasonable length of time. and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the
Issue constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of
Whether or not Mejoff should be released from prison awaiting his international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction
deportation. mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna
Ruling Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety
by the United Nations - that
The Supreme Court decided that Mejoff be released from custody but be such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road
placed under accidents due to stalled or parked
reasonable surveillance of the immigration authorities to insure that he keep vehicles on the streets and highways.
peace and be
available when the Government is ready to deport him. In the doctrine of
Digest #2
AGUSTIN vs EDU
88 SCRA 195
FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for
prohibition.Petitioner was an owner of a
volkswagen beetle car,model 13035 already properly equipped when it came
out from the assembly
lines with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device in
case of the emergencies
mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended, as well as the
Implementing rules and
regulations in Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land transportation
Commission.Respondent Land
Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum circular no 32
pursuant to Letter of
Instructions No.229,as amended. It required the use of early Warning
Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles.
Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as well as the implementing
rules and regulations
were unlawful and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction were considered valid and
constitutiona
HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended
as well as the
implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid
measure of police power.
The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the United Nations
Organization was ratified by
the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and
devices.It cannot be
disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution
possesses relevance,between
the International law and municipal law in applying the rule municipal law
prevails.
Petition is DISMISSED.
Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115 (1957)
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions
of Republic Act. No. 1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, filed to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of
the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100%
Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section
8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of
the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of
law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
(2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation
enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary
or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the
matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the
questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly
related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be
no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there
can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So
the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is
due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must
exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has
been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be
plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the
law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and
has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and
that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the
police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
In Re Garcia; 2 SCRA 984 (1961)
Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his
verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in
Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain
the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and
qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for
admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished
the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was
allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the
provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession
between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the
Philippines without submitting to the required
bar examinations.
Issue:
Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the
Philippine Bar?
Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition.
Ratio Decidendi:
The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession
between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty
was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession
in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the
Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in
the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is
not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals
desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty
invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and
regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to
exercise the legal profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not
have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission
to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive
Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being
reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
People vs. Lagman and Zosa, 66 Phil. 13 (1938)
Facts:
In these two cases, the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo De Sosa
are
charged with a violation of Sec 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 11 known as
the National
Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and
having
reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to
register in
the military service, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to
do so.
Evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the
corresponding
authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for
military
service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants inspite of these
notices
have not registered up to date of filing of the information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they
have not
registered in the military service because Primitivo De Sosa is fatherless and
has a
mother and a brother eight years old to support and Tranquilino Lagman also
has a
father to support and has no military leaning and does not wish to kill or be
killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one
month
and one day of imprisonment with the costs.
Issue:
Whether or not appellants failure to register in the Military service in
violation of Sec 60
of Commonwealth Act Nr. 1 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Sec 4 Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:
Sec. 4The prime duty of the government is to serve ad protect the people.
The
government may call upon the people to defend the State and in fulfillment
thereof, all
citizen may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal military or
civil service.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military
services does
not go against this Constitutional provision, but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance
therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the state cannot be
performed except
through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the
citizen would be the benefit of
to make the duty of the government excusable should there be no sufficient marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a
men who member of
volunteer to enlist therein. the religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses, and having executed a
The right of the government to require compulsory military service is a Declaration of
consequence of Pledging Faithfulness (which allows members of the congregation who have
it duty to defend the state and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, been
liberty and abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with
property of the citizen. Quilapo after ten
In Jacobson and Massachussets, it was said that a person may be compelled years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her
by force, religious
if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interest and against his beliefs and has the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting
religious or disgraceful
political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country and immoral conduct.
and risk the Issue: Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and
chance of being shot down in its defense. immoral
The circumstances that the appellant have dependent families to support conduct.
does not Ruling: Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the
excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance benevolent
Board neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious
because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in exercises as
complying with their required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend
duty and at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to compelling state
attend to those interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least
responsibilities. intrusive
Judgment Affirmed. means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more
than
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003 necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no
iota of
Facts: In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show
Judge that the state
Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing
Escritor, to prove this
court interpreter of Las Pias, is living with a man not her husband. Judge element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot
Caoibes be
referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that there is no truth as to the penalized.
veracity of the The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases
allegation and challenged Estrada, to appear in the open and prove his involving
allegation in criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances,
the proper court. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor such
move for conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption
inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the conference, from the law
Estrada based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of
confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for disgraceful and immoral religious exercise as
conduct under the a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than
Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the the state.
Hall of
Justice in Las Pias learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his FACTS :
husband. On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged
Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a a military bases
widow since agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the
1998. She admitted that shes been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without Philippine territory by
the US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
relationship, the concurred in and
Philippines and the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the
1951. Under the people in a national
treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senate
territory, armed forces, by the other
public vessels and aircraft. contracting state.
In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international
military exercises agreements in general
between the two countries were held in abeyance. However, the defence with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and international
and security agreements entered into by the
relationship continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 18, Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular designation
1997 RP and US requires the
exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible elements concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
of the Visiting In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve
Forces Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by both panels on VFA led to a presence of foreign
consolitdated draft text military bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional
and a series of conferences. Eventually, President Fidel V. Ramos approved provisions share some
the VFA. common ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate
On October 5, 1998 President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA thru under Sec. 21 Art.
respondent Secretary of VII, and that Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision is
Foreign Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting thru Executive immaterial.
Secretary Zamora Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with treaties
officially transmitted to the Senate, the Instrument of Ratification, letter of involving foreign military
the President and the bases and troops should apply in the instant case. Hence, for VFA to be
VFA for approval. It was approved by the Senate by a 2/3 vote of its constitutional it must
members. On June 1, 1999, sufficiently meet the following requisites :
the VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes between a) it must be under a treaty
Secretary Siazon and US b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when so required
Ambassador Hubbard. by Congress, ratified
The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum
conditions under c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State
which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites. The third
Philippines. Hence this requisite implies that the
petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.
VFA and imputing grave Moreover, it is
abuse of discretion to respondents in ratifying the agreement. inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under
ISSUE : Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional. international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. They are
equally binding
RULING : obligations upon nations. Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with
Petition is dismissed. the mandate of the
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the constitution.
concurrence of the Senate The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent the executivedepartment as to their power to ratify the VFA.
invokes, reads: No
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least 2/3 of Bayan v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : After the
expiration in 1991 of the THE FACTS
Agreement between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops
 The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The
agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was
ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting
the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and
further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the
matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation
and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
II. THE ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the
petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the
constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in
the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . .
the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress
has not required it.
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a
treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the
VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution,
is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the
Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in
common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the
VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA
possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
xxx xxx xxx
The records reveal that the United States Government, through
Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States
government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as
long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a
treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the
treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution.
Lim v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002
FACTS :
Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States
started arriving in Mindanao, to take part,
in conjunction with the Philippine military, in Balikatan 02
-1
. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military
maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense
agreement entered into by the Philippines
and the United States in 1951.
On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying
that respondents be restrained from
proceeding with the so-
called Balikatan 02
-1
, and that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered
issuing a permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition against the
deployment of US troops in Basilan and
Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.
Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty
to provide mutual military assistance
in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country onl
y in the case of a armed attack by an external
aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them. They further
argued that it cannot be said that the Abu
Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military
assistance in accordance with MDT of
1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize
American soldiers to engage in combat
operations in Philippine territory.
ISSUE :
Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1activities are covered by the VFA.
RULING :
Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an
impermanent basis, in activities, the
exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on
its definition is couched in the negative,in that the US personnel must abs
tain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in
particular, from any political activity.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan
exercises. It is only logical to assume that
Balikatan 02-1
a mutual anti terrorism advising assisting and training exercise falls under
the umbrella of
sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the
history and intent of the Mutual
Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related
activities
as opposed to combat itself
such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political
party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court
claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those
who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by
political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since
he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he
possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in
other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a
right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is
nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust
or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal
access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the
provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard
of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact
positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into
public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if
it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret
the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective
means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of
claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-
ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and
"public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to
inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be
subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege
to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to
everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause
is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered
by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any
person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to
run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure
that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this
end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation
of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an
election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into
the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention
the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note
joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every
step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these
nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the
State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both
legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this
Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is
in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further
evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao
Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Calalang vs. Williams
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Petitioner: Maximo CalalangRespondents: A.D. Williams, Et
al.Ponente: Laurel,
J:
Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila
filed apetition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.It is alleged in
the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17,
1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles
be prohibited from passingalong Rosario Street extending from Plaza
Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and
from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from therailroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period
of one yearfrom the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.The
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended
to theDirector of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works the adoption of themeasure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No.
548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from theSecretary of
the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations
toregulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.On August 2,
1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of
therecommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission withmodifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940.The Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and causedto be enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are notallowed
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issue:
1.
Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondentspursuant
to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitutean unlawful
inference with legitimate business or trade and abridgedthe right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion?2. Whether the rules and regulations
complained of infringe upon theconstitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice toinsure the well-being and economic security of
all the people?
Held:
1.
No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoidobstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the
public. Inenacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relievecongestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.
Public welfare liesat the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state inorder to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personalliberty, with property, and with business and occupations
. Persons andproperty may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens
in order to securethe general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To
this fundamentalaims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated.
Liberty isa blessing
which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall
into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The paradox lies in the factthat the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2.
No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people,
theadoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance
of a propereconomic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of thecommunity, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable,or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existenceof all governments on the time-honored
principles of
salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of
theprotection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as
acombined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamentaland paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to
the greatest number.
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
APCD v. PCA, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998
The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by Presidential Decree
No. 232 as an independent public corporation to promote the rapid
integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil
industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct
participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a
regulatory scheme set up by law.
PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant
operators. In March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93
which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to
apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose
of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations
and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat
competition among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling,
smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The Association
of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for mandamus
to compel PCA to revoke B.R. No. 018-93.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD: Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have
repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present
Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to
the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the
general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of
protective regulations for the benefit of the general public. This is so
because under Art. 12, Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government
reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare and when the public interest so requires.
PLDT v. NTC, 190 SCRA 717 (1990)
190 SCRA 717 Business Organization Corporation Law Corporate Fiction
Franchise Right of Succession
In 1958, Felix Alberto & Co., Inc (FACI) was granted by Congress a franchise
to build radio stations (later construed as to include telephony). FACI later
changed its name to Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI). In 1987,
ETCI was granted by the National Telecommunications Commission a
provisional authority to build a telephone system in some parts of Manila.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) opposed the said grant as it
avers, among others, that ETCI is not qualified because its franchise has
already been invalidated when it failed to exercise it within 10 years from
1958; that in 1987, the Albertos, owners of more than 40% of ETCIs shares
of stocks, transferred said stocks to the new stockholders (Cellcom, Inc.?
not specified in the case); that such transfer involving more than 40% shares
of stocks amounted to a transfer of franchise which is void because the
authorization of Congress was not obtained. The NTC denied PLDT. PLDT
then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the NTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not PLDTs petition should prosper.
HELD: No.
1. PLDT cannot attack ETCIs franchise in a petition for certiorari. It
cannot be collaterally attacked. It should be directly attacked
through a petition for quo warranto which is the correct procedure. A
franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited
without due process of law. The determination of the right to the
exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege
has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the
prerogative writ of quo warranto. Further, for any violation of the
franchise, it should be the government who should be filing a quo
warranto proceeding because it was the government who granted it
in the first place.
2. The transfer of more than 40% of the shares of stocks is not
tantamount to a transfer of franchise. There is a distinction here.
There is no need to obtain authorization of Congress for the mere
transfer of shares of stocks. Shareholders can transfer their shares
to anyone. The only limitation is that if the transfer involves more
than 40% of the corporations stocks, it should be approved by the
NTC. The transfer in this case was shown to have been approved by
the NTC. What requires authorization from Congress is the transfer of
franchise; and the person who shall obtain the authorization is the
grantee (ETCI). A distinction should be made between shares of
stock, which are owned by stockholders, the sale of which requires
only NTC approval, and the franchise itself which is owned by the
corporation as the grantee thereof, the sale or transfer of which
requires Congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the shares
of stock, they may dispose of the same as they see fit. They may
not, however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation, like its
franchise. In other words, even if the original stockholders had
transferred their shares to another group of shareholders, the
franchise granted to the corporation subsists as long as the
corporation, as an entity, continues to exist. The franchise is not
thereby invalidated by the transfer of the shares. A corporation has a
personality separate and distinct from that of each stockholder. It
has the right of continuity or perpetual succession.

Maquera v. Borja, G.R. No. L-24761, September 7, 1965
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Upon consideration of case G.R. No. L-24761, "Leon G. Maquera vs. Juan
Borra, et al.," and case G.R. No. L-24828, "Felipe N. Aurea and Melecio
Malabanan vs. Commission on Elections," and it appearing:
1. That Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national,
provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond equivalent to
the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a
candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national,
provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate,
except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes
cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate of candidacy, there
being not more than four (4) candidates for the same office;"
2. That, in compliance with said Republic Act No. 4421, the Commission
on Elections had, on July 20, 1965, decided to require all candidates for
President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives to file a surety bond, by a bonding company of good
reputation, acceptable to the Commission, in the sums of P60,000.00
and P40,000.00, for President and Vice-President, respectively, and
P32,000.00 for Senator and Member of the House of Representatives;
3. That, in consequence of said Republic Act No. 4421 and the
aforementioned action of the Commission on Elections, every candidate
has to pay the premium charged by bonding companies, and, to offer
thereto, either his own properties, worth, at least, the amount of the
surety bond, or properties of the same worth, belonging to other persons
willing to accommodate him, by way of counter-bond in favor of said
bonding companies;
4. That the effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is, therefore, to prevent
or disqualify from running for President, Vice-President, Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives those persons who, although
having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution therefore,
cannot file the surety bond aforementioned, owing to failure to pay the
premium charged by the bonding company and/or lack of the property
necessary for said counter-bond;
5. That said Republic Act No. 4421 has, likewise, the effect of
disqualifying for provincial, city or municipal elective offices, persons
who, although possessing the qualifications prescribed by law therefor,
cannot pay said premium and/or do not have the property essential for
the aforementioned counter-bond;
6. That said Republic Act No. 4421 has, accordingly, the effect of
imposing property qualifications in order that a person could run for a
public office and that the people could validly vote for him;
7. That said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and
essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the
principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is
premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies
necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be
dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social
justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and
that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the
chance to be elected to public office; and
8. That the bond required in Republic Act No. 4421 and the confiscation
of said bond are not predicated upon the necessity of defraying certain
expenses or of compensating services given in connection with
elections, and is, therefore, arbitrary and oppressive.
The Court RESOLVED, without prejudice to rendering an extended decision,
to declare that said Republic Act No. 4421 is unconstitutional and hence null
and void, and, hence, to enjoin respondents herein, as well as their
representatives and agents, from enforcing and/or implementing said
constitutional enactment.
Simon v. CHR, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
CHRs power to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only
toviolations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedureessential to carry out its investigatorial powers
A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by CarlosQuimpo (one of
the petitioners) in his capacity as anExecutive Officer of the Quezon City
Integrated HawkersManagement Council under the Office of the City Mayor,
wassent to, and received by, the private respondents (being theofficers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,Incorporated). In said
notice, the respondents were given agrace-period of three (3) days (up to 12
July 1990) withinwhich to vacate the questioned premises of North
EDSA.Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the privaterespondents
were informed by petitioner Quimpo that theirstalls should be removed to
give way to the "People's Park".On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
President RoqueFermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang
SinumpaangSalaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking thelate
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter tobe addressed to then
Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of QuezonCity to stop the demolition of the private
respondents' stalls,sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA.
Thecomplaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 23 July1990, the
CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "todesist from demolishing
the stalls and shanties at North EDSApending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaintbefore the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners toappear before the CHR. In an Order, dated 25 September1990,
the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carryingout the demolition of
the stalls, sari-sari stores andcarinderia despite the "order to desist", and it
imposed a fineof P500.00 on each of them.Issue: Whether or not the CHR
has jurisdiction:a)to investigate the alleged violations of the "businessrights"
of the private respondents whose stalls weredemolished by the petitioners
at the instance andauthority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b)
to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitionersfor contempt;Held: a)
Recalling the deliberations of the ConstitutionalCommission, aforequoted, it
is readily apparent that thedelegates envisioned a Commission on Human
Rights thatwould focus its attention to the more severe cases of
humanrights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentionedsuch areas
as the "(1) protection of rights of politicaldetainees, (2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases
of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) othercrimes
committed against the religious." While theenumeration has not likely been
meant to have anypreclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement
of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set.In any event,
the delegates did not apparently take comfortin peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR'sscope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They
have thus seen itfit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for
othercases of violations of human rights that should fall within theauthority
of the Commission, taking into account itsrecommendation." In the particular
case at hand, there is nocavil that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls,sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,erected
by private respondents on a land which is planned tobe developed into a
"People's Park". More than that, the landadjoins the North EDSA of Quezon
City which, this Court cantake judicial notice of, is a busy national highway.
Theconsequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewisesimply
ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which isclaimed to have been
violated is one that cannot, in the firstplace, even be invoked, if it is, in fact,
extant. Be that as itmay, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed
vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are notprepared to
conclude that the order for the demolition of thestalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia of the privaterespondents can fall within the compartment of
"humanrights violations involving civil and political rights" intendedby the
Constitution.b) No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is
constitutionallyauthorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof inaccordance with the
Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHRacted within its authority in providing in
its revised rules, itspower "to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirectcontempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties inaccordance
with the procedure and sanctions provided for inthe Rules of Court." That
power to cite for contempt,however, should be understood to apply only to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedureessential to carry out its investigatorial powers. Toexemplify, the
power to cite for contempt could be exercisedagainst persons who refuse to
cooperate with the said body,or who unduly withhold relevant information,
or who declineto honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigativework. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for
arestraining order) in the instance before us, however, is notinvestigatorial
in character but prescinds from anadjudicative power that it does not
possess.
PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.
(Labor Standards, Police Power defined)
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It
challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE
entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of
Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills,
and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid
exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of
the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the
validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State
and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban
in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines
and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the
welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of
police power.
RULING:
[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable
of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No.
1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality
before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that
(1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions;
and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female
workers rests on substantial distinctions.
Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 370 (1987)
Ponente: Feliciano
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- 1959: RA 2382, or the Medical Act of 1959 was enacted. This was later
amended by RAs 4224 and 5946.
~ Sec. 1 Objectives This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of
the practice of medicine in the Philippines.
~ RA 2382, as amended by RA 5946, created a Board of Medical Education,
comprising of:
1. Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or duly authorized
representative
Chairman
2. Secretary of Health or duly authorized representative
3. Director of Higher Education or duly authorized representative
4. Chairman of Medical Board or duly authorized representative
5. A representative of the Philippine Medical Association
6. The Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines
7. A representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools
8. A representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges
~ Functions of the board are in Section 5 (as emphasized in the case): (a) To
determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized
college of medicine
xxx
(f) To accept applicants for certification for admission to a medical school
and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said
applicants the amount of twenty- five pesos each which shall accrue to the
operating fund of the Board of Medical Education
xxx
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and
regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions.
~ Section 7 prescribes minimum requirements for applicants to medical
schools: - not convicted of any crime of moral turpitude, and submits the
following
1. Record of completion of BA/BS degree
2. Certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from BME
3. Certificate of good moral character, by 2 former professors
4. Birth certificate
- 1985: Minister of Education, Culture and Sports issues MECS Order No. 52,
establishing the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a standardized
test for admission into medical schools. No applicant would be issued a
Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA) without having taken and passed
the NMAT.
- March 5, 1987: Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory judgment and
prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction, to stop the enforcement of MECS Order No. 52 requiring the
NMAT for admission into medical colleges
- April 20, 1987: Judge Gutierrez dismissed the petition, and the NMAT was
conducted as scheduled on April 27, 1987
- Petitioners elevated the issue to the SC, raised the issue of whether or not
a preliminary injunction may be issued to stop the conduction of the NMAT
pending the case. SC said that the
case of unconstitutionality must be strong enough for the court to issue such
an injunction.
ISSUES
1. Are Sec. 5 (a) and (f), together with MECS Order No. 52, unconstitutional?
2. Are Sec. 5 (a) and (f), together with MECS Order No. 52, and undue
delegation of legislative
power?
3. Is the NMAT an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable admission
requirement?
4. Is the MECS Order No. 52 a violation of equal protection?
RATIO 1: To prove the unconstitutionality of an order or statute, a petitioner
must demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the assailed order or
statute collides with the Constitutional provisions.
- Petitioner invokes Sec. 11, 13, and 17 of Art II (State Policies) and Sec. 3
and 5 (3) of Art XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and
Sports), but the Court held that the petitioners did not present even a prima
facie case for Sec. 11, 13 and 17.
- The Court also held that Sec. 3 and Sec. 5 (3) of Art. XIV, in the context of
professional education, should be to say that the State should take
appropriate steps to make quality education accessible to all who qualify
under fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.
RATIO 2: The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power must
be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes that deal with subjects
that are complex and technical.
- Citing the decision in Pangasinan Transport Co., Inc. v. The Public Service
Commission penned by Justice Laurel, the Court held that there was a
constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of legislative power due
to the growing complexities of modern society, and that there was an
accompanying trend of acceptance by the courts.
- Citing Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta, the Court also held that the
standards set for subordinate legislation may be explicit or implied. In the
case of an implied standard, it can be deduced from the policy and purpose
of the act considered as a whole. In the case of the Medical Act, the
standards are set by the Acts objectives, considering Sec. 5 (a) and Sec. 7
of the same Act, and taking into consideration the body of the Act itself.
RATIO 3a: The Supreme Court cannot rule on the desirability or wisdom of a
piece of legislation or administrative regulation.
- The Court held that they cannot rule on the petitioners argument that the
NMAT is an nnecessary requirement for admission into medical schools on
top of all of the other existing requirements. This is a question of the wisdom
of having the NMAT as such an additional requirement, which is outside the
jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
RATIO 3b: The valid exercise of police power shall include the regulation of
access to medical
schools.
- The Court held that the important State interest in limiting access to
medical schools is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance in medical practitioners. The NMAT,
as an additional requirement for admission, is a tool to help upgrade the
selection process of those seeking to enter medical schools.
RATIO 4: Administrative measures may remain flexible to meet
circumstances as they change.
- The Court held that the portion of the MECS order allowing the Board of
Medical Education to determine the NMAT cutoff score every year is not a
violation of equal protection. Far from being arbitrary and capricious,
different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by the
changing circumstances and conditions surrounding the medical industry.
Thus, the clause allows the Board of Medical Education some flexibility
needed to meet such changing circumstances.
PRC vs. De Guzman, G. R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004
Constitutional Law: Police Power
Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine,
Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure
Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board).
Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their
names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine
successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects
in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and
Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven
Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne,
another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-
Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima
got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower
than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other
schools was made.The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high
ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a ecord-breaking
phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.
For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima
examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that
the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.
The Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging
respondents with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in
connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended
that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. Trial courts
judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners and
intervenors to take the physicians oath and to register them as physicians
without prejudice to any administrative disciplinary action which may be
taken against any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner
provided by law and consistent with the requirements of the Constitution as
any other professionals.
Issue: Whether or not the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 known as The Medical
Act of 1959 a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
Yes. It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every
citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable,
and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals,
peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus,
persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific
or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes
particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who
would practice medicine.
It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of
a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or
its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body
that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both
forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such
conditions may not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as
a condition to acquiring the license.
U.P. BOR v. C.A., G.R. No. 134629, August 31, 1999
This is a petition to review Court of Appeals decision of issuing Writ of
Mandamus to the petitioner to restore PRs (Private Respondent) college
degree.
FACTS:
Private respondent Arokiasamy William was enrolled in a Doctoral Program in
Anthropology of the UP Diliman College of Social Sciences and Philosophy.
An oral defense by the PR was held on February 5, 1993. After going over
the dissertations, the panel pointed out after it has been looked into that
some portion of it were lifted from other sources without proper
acknowledgement, hence requesting her to revise the dissertation which PR
failed to do so resulting to her not obtaining approval from 2 of the panels of
the Oral Defense.
When questioned by Dean Paz, PR sent a letter on April 17, 1993 explaining
the reasons why the signature of Dr. Medina (one of the panels) wasnt
affixed and advised that she relied on Dean Pazs remark dated March 5,
1993 when the former stated that a majority vote of the panel members was
sufficient for a student to pass, notwithstanding the failure to obtain the
consent of the Deans representative. She also expressed her
disappointment over the CSSP administration for maliciously working or the
disapproval of her dissertation, and further warned Dean Paz against
encouraging perfidious acts against her.
On April 21, 1992, Dean Paz sent a letter to the Vice Chancellor for Academic
Affairs requesting the name of the PR to be excluded in the list of candidates
for graduation which failed to reach the recipient on time, hence, the PR was
able to graduate on April 24, 1993.
In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, Dr. Medina formally charged private
respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to
her be withdrawn which the PR was informed of dated June 7, 1993.
An ad hoc committee was formed and after thorough investigation, it was
reported that they found at least 90 instances or portions in the thesis which
were lifted from sources without due acknowledgement.
Further investigations and interviews with the PR were held to reinvestigate
her case which involved the Board of Regents until it has been established
that PR is guilty of the allegation of Plagiarism which was actually admitted
by the PR herself to the special committee.
A letter from the Board of Regents addressed to the PR was sent informing
the latter that it has been concluded by the committee that her doctorate
degree will be withdrawn.
A petition has been filed to the Chairman of the board of regents for
reinvestigation which was hereby denied, hence, PR filed a petition for
mandamus to restore her degree which includes payment for moral and
exemplary damages which was also denied by branch 227 trial court.
On August 6, 1996, PR appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on
December 16, 1997 reversed the lower courts decision and ordered
petitioner to restore PRs degree.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the doctoral
degree given by UP cannot be recalled without violating her right to
enjoyment of intellectual property to justice and equity.
2. Whether or not the Private Respondent was deprived of her right to
substantive due process.
HELD:
1. Yes. The court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to
institutions of higher learning by Art XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
This freedom includes deciding whom a university will confer
degrees on. If the degree is procured by error or fraud then the
Board of Regents, subject to due process being followed, may cancel
that degree.
Art. XIV, Section 5 par. 2 of the Constitution provides that academic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
It is a freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus
given a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of
students. If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who
cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the
honor and distinction of being its graduates.
2. NO. The court held that in administrative proceedings, the essence
of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side of a
controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present
his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.
In the case at bar, the PR was informed in writing of the charges
against her and afforded opportunities to refute them. Due process
in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in the courts of justice.It is noteworthy that the U.P.
Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are
included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.
Camacho v. Coresis, G.R. No. 134372, August 22, 2002
Subject of the present petition for certiorari is the Resolution dated June 3,
1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, hereafter simply the Office,
which dismissed the administrative and criminal complaints against
respondents Sixto O. Daleon, Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba, Norma Tecson and
the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines (USP),
Davao City, for violation of Section 3 [a], [e] and [j] of Republic Act 3019 also
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.[1] Also sought to be
nullified is the Order of the Office dated September 10, 1997, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts as culled from
the records are as follows:
Petitioner is the Dean of the College of Education of said university, since
January 1994 to the present. He has served the university as faculty member
and as administrator for almost 13 years.[2]
Respondent, Dr. Sixto O. Daleon, is a Professor 6 and officer-in-charge of the
Graduate School of USP, with a salary grade of CS 29. The other
respondents, Agulo, Tecson and Alaba, are faculty members of said
university. They enrolled under Dr. Daleon in the subject Ed.D. 317, which is
a Seminar in Curriculum Development, during the first semester of 1994-
1995. At the end of the semester, Dr. Daleon gave the three final passing
grades of 1.0, 1.25 and 1.5, respectively.[3] They were graded without
requiring them to attend regular classes. Instead, Dr. Daleon gave them a
special program of self-study with reading materials, once a week tutorial
meetings, quizzes, and term papers.
Sometime in June 1995, several doctoral students complained to petitioner
that during the first semester of school year 1994-1995, there were ghost
students in the Ed.D. 317 class of Dr. Daleon. According to them, these
ghost students, namely Agulo, Alaba and Tecson were given passing
grades despite their failure to attend classes.[4]
On June 13, 1995, petitioner informed Dr. Daleon of the complaint. Petitioner
requested the latter to furnish him with photocopies of exams, term papers,
and record of attendance of the students involved. Dr. Daleon ignored the
request.[5]
On July 28, 1995, the matter was raised in a university council meeting
where it was agreed that the University President, Dr. Edmundo Prantilla,
would create a committee to investigate the complaint.
In a letter dated August 10, 1995, Dr. Daleon apologized for the delay in
responding to petitioners letter-request dated June 15, 1995. Dr. Daleon
admitted that he made special arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson
regarding their course without petitioners approval.
Thereafter, petitioner wrote Dr. Prantilla recommending that Agulo, Tecson
and Alaba be required to attend regular classes in school year 1995-1996
and comply with the course requirements in Ed.D. 317. Dr. Prantilla
approved the recommendations. However, on December 1, 1995, Dr.
Prantilla entertained the appeal of Agulo for the validation of the grades
given by Dr. Daleon to the three of them. On December 23, 1995, the Board
of Regents passed its Resolution No. 2432 Series of 1995, upholding the
grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Daleon before
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The complaint for gross
incompetence, insubordination and violation of R.A. 6770[6] was docketed
as OMB-ADM-3-96-0132.
On May 28, 1996, petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Prayer, with a
Supplement to Complaint-Affidavit for Violation of R.A. 3019 and/or such
other penal laws against Dr. Daleon, Agulo, Alaba, Tecson and members of
the USP Board of Regents,[7] including Dr. Prantilla. On July 24, 1996, the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order directing respondent
members of the Board of Regents and the committee created to hear
Administrative Case No. 96-602 to desist from conducting further
proceedings thereon and to have the entire records of said criminal
complaint forwarded to the Office for possible consolidation with the
administrative complaint.
On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., graft
investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, dismissing the
administrative and criminal complaints against respondents. Approved by
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, the resolution in its dispositive portion reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding insufficient evidence to hold respondent Dr. Daleon
liable for the administrative charges of incompetence, insubordination and
favoritism or unjust discrimination, or of any other laws, let the instant case
be ordered DISMISSED.
Likewise, finding no prima facie case of violation of Section 3(a), (e) and (j),
the criminal complaint filed by Dr. Camacho against Professor Daleon, Mr.
Desiderio Alaba, Misses Aida Agulo, Norma Tecson, and the Members of the
Board of Regents of USP is hereby DISMISSED outright for want of palpable
merit.
AS RESOLVED.[8]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of
merit in an Order dated September 10, 1997.
Before us, petitioner now anchors the present petition on the following
grounds:
1. THE SAID QUESTIONED DISPOSITIONS FAILED TO FIND THE ACTS OF
RESPONDENTS DALEON AND HIS RESPONDENTS-STUDENTS-AGULO, ALABA
AND TECSON TO BE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY THE UNIVERSITY CODE, PARTICULARLY THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 128, 140, 141, 152 (LAST PARAGRAPH) THEREIN;
AND OF THE ACTS OF RESPONDENT BOARD OF REGENTS AS ULTRA VIRES
AND CONTRARY TO THE SAID LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY WHEN IT PASSED
BOARD OF REGENTS (BOR) RESOLUTIONS NO. 2432 S. OF 1995 ON
DECEMBER 23, 1995 AND NO. 2449 S. 1996, RESPECTIVELY;
2. THERE WAS OBVIOUS ABUSE AND GRAVE ERROR IN MISAPPLYING THE
PRINCIPLE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM" TO ABSOLVE RESPONDENT DALEON OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT; AND THE RESPONDENTS-STUDENTS AND
THE BOARD OF REGENTS (ALONG WITH SAID RESPONDENT DALEON) OF THE
ANTI-GRAFT CHARGES;
3. THE SAID RESOLUTION AND ORDER OF RESPONDENT GRAFT
INVESTIGATION OFFICER AND/OR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-
MINDANAO WERE ATTENDED BY PATENT DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS AS
THEIR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS EMANATED FROM SELF-SERVING,
INCREDIBLE AND HEARSAY PROFFERS; AND DID NOT CONSIDER THE
EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER.[9]
In issue is whether or not public respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in exonerating Dr. Daleon from
administrative as well as criminal liability arising from his giving passing
grades to Agulo, Tecson and Alaba without requiring them to attend classes.
Petitioner avers that public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,
committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the impugned BOR
resolution as it is contrary to the University Code, violates due process and is
based on self-serving hearsays. He argues that the BOR resolution is based
on a wrong interpretation of the constitutional provision on ACADEMIC
FREEDOM.
In its Comment, the Office of Solicitor General posits a contrary view. The
OSG argues that public respondent did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.[10] According to the OSG, there is no provision in the University
Code of USP which prohibits a professor or teacher from giving a special
program or arrangement tailored to meet the requirements of a particular
course.[11]
We are in agreement with the position taken by the respondents through the
OSG. The petition lacks merit and ought to dismissed.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an
extraordinary remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the
Courts power of judicial review under this Rule, it must first be shown that
respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi- judicial
functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and
that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[12] Conversely, absent a showing of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents may not be subjected to our review
under Rule 65.
From the records, we find no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold that the
respondent Office had gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed
Resolution dated June 3, 1997. We note that the conclusions in said
resolution are based on substantial evidence easily verifiable from the
records. Well established is the principle that factual findings of
administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by
this Court, provided such findings are supported by substantial evidence,[13]
as in this case. Graft Investigation Officer I Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., of said Office
gave weight to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Daleon[14] as corroborated by the
affidavit of Prof. Concesa P. Lagare,[15] Professor 2 of the College of
Education, USP. These affidavits averred that during the graduate school
orientation program sometime in July 1995, the universitys Vice President
for academic Affairs, Dr. Luz D. Ancheta, declared that special arrangements
between a professor and a graduate student may be allowed on a case-to-
case basis. Dr. Ancheta made this statement in reply to Dr. Daleons query
on the policy of USP on attendance of graduate school students and whether
Dr. Daleon could give grades to students who do not attend classes. In her
reply to Dr. Daleons query, the VPAA even cited her experience when she
pursued her doctoral course at UP Los Baos. According to Dr. Ancheta, she
was given a special arrangement by one of her professors. She added that
she, too, had allowed the same special arrangement for her students at the
USP Graduate School.
As applied to the case at bar, academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the
widest latitude to innovate and experiment on the method of teaching which
is most fitting to his students (graduate students at that), subject only to the
rules and policies of the university. Considering that the Board of Regents,
whose task is to lay down school rules and policies of the University of
Southeastern Philippines, has validated his teaching style, we see no reason
for petitioner to complain before us simply because he holds a contrary
opinion on the matter.
In our view, petitioner failed to establish that Dr. Daleon and the Board of
Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines acted in evident bad
faith or with manifest partiality in the performance of their official duties.
Hence, there is no basis to hold that the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
committed any grave abuse of discretion in exonerating respondents below
from both administrative and criminal charges. The resolution of that Office
is in order for it accords with the facts and the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Resolution dated June 3, 1997, of the Office of the Ombudsman- Mindanao is
AFFIRMED.
Mandaluyong v. Francisco, G.R. 137152, January 29, 2001
**no digest**
SSS Employ. Assn. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686 (1989)
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the
unions demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed
before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a
temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for
preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the
courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that
the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter
since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one
hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and
regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or
DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue:
Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social
Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and
conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section
14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which
states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt.
employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated
as government
employees and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but
instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not
granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within
its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the
issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate
Prov. Of Rizal v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 129546, Dec. 13, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San
Mateo, and various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying, for lack of cause of action, the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the
legality and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.
At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs,
parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of
the President [President Ramos], through Proclamation No. 635, for use as a
sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications.
The petioners opposed the implementation of said order since the
creation of dump site under the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the
health of their constutents. Moreso, the the dump site is to be constructed in
Watershed reservation.
Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of
Rizal and Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However,
during the term of President Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened.
A temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not
raised the question that the project was not consulted and approved by their
appropriate Sanggunian, the court take it into consideration since a mere
MOA does not guarantee the dump sites permanent closure.
Issue:
Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and
municipality of San Mateo is needed before the implementation of the
project..
Ruling:
The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the
living."
Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the
respondents, Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is
subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved
four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.
Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to
require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation
with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's
organization, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdiction." Likewise
Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be
implemented by government authorities ans the prior approval of the
Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Pao, Section 2
(c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government units,
should apply to national government projects affecting the environmental or
ecological balance of the particular community implementing the project.
Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the
temporary restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste
Management Task Force declared before the Court of Appeals that they had
conducted the required consultations. However, the ambivalence of his
reply was brought to the fore when at the height of the protest rally and
barricade made by the residents of petitioners to stop dump trucks from
reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly
declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they
would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and
functions of the municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to,
among other things, enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant
to Section 16 of th(e) Code. These include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of
natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna,
slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance;
[Section 447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within
the jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan
for the municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction of the city,
subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning
ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or
zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating the construction,
repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in
accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]
(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective
delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17
of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, providing for
the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal
forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar
forest development projects .and, subject to existing laws, establishing
and providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient
waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the
source of the water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance, repair
and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity
and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose,
extending the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within
the drainage area of said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters
of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed
used in connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption,
use or wastage of water.[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]

Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be
met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological
balance of local communities can be implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects
implementation is illegal.
Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113
Summary of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147
(1973).
Facts
Roe (P), a pregnant single woman, brought a class action suit challenging
the constitutionality of the Texas abortion laws. These laws made it a crime
to obtain or attempt an abortion except on medical advice to save the life of
the mother.
Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor who faced criminal
prosecution for violating the state abortion laws; and the Does, a married
couple with no children, who sought an injunction against enforcement of
the laws on the grounds that they were unconstitutional. The defendant was
county District Attorney Wade (D).
A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that Roe
and Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies,
and that declaratory relief was warranted. The court also ruled however that
injunctive relief was not warranted and that the Does complaint was not
justiciable.
Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The district court held that the
Texas abortion statutes were void as vague and for overbroadly infringing
the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost,
however, because the district court ruled that injunctive relief against
enforcement of the laws was not warranted.
The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States and
Wade cross-appealed the district courts judgment in favor of Roe and
Hallford.
Issues
1. Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except those required
on medical advice to save the life of the mother, violate the
Constitution of the United States?
2. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution protect the right to privacy, including the
right to obtain an abortion?
3. Are there any circumstances where a state may enact laws
prohibiting abortion?
4. Did the fact that Roes pregnancy had already terminated naturally
before this case was decided by the Supreme Court render her
lawsuit moot?
5. Was the district court correct in denying injunctive relief?
Holding and Rule (Blackmun)
1. Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only
life-saving procedures on the mothers behalf, and that do not take
into consideration the stage of pregnancy and other interests, are
unconstitutional for violating the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the right to privacy, including a
womans right to terminate her pregnancy, against state action.
3. Yes. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman the right to
terminate her pregnancy, it has legitimate interests in protecting
both the pregnant womans health and the potentiality of human life
at various stages of pregnancy.
4. No. The natural termination of Roes pregnancy did not render her
suit moot.
5. Yes. The district court was correct in denying injunctive relief.
The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first trimester, the
decision must be left to the judgment of the pregnant womans doctor. In
regard to second trimester pregnancies, states may promote their interests
in the mothers health by regulating abortion procedures related to the
health of the mother. Regarding third trimester pregnancies, states may
promote their interests in the potentiality of human life by regulating or even
prohibiting abortion, except when necessary to preserve the life or health of
the mother.
The Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is
capable of repetition, yet evading review, is an exception to the general
rule that an actual controversy must exist at each stage of judicial review,
and not merely when the action is initiated.
The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. 1253 does not authorize a party
seeking only declaratory relief to appeal directly to the Supreme Court,
review is not foreclosed when the case is brought on appeal from specific
denial of injunctive relief and the arguments on the issues of both injunctive
and declaratory relief are necessarily identical.
The Does complaint seeking injunctive relief was based on contingencies
which might or might not occur and was therefore too speculative to present
an actual case or controversy. It was unnecessary for the Court to decide
Hallfords case for injunctive relief because once the Court found the laws
unconstitutional, the Texas authorities were prohibited from enforcing them.
Disposition
Roe wins the district court judgment is affirmed.
Hallford loses the district court judgment is reversed.
The Does lose the district court judgment is affirmed.
 Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 US 390
The early nineteen twenties marked the height of the American dream. The
population, in particular the middle class, made their dreams of a house with
a white picket fence, a reality. The economy was flourishing as a direct
result of the stock market boom. The resent economic upturn created
national stability and most peoples trust in the United States governing in
terms of finical stability; however, World War Two had just concluded which
made some people skeptical of foreigners. The sense of nationalism was
also at a high. The nation possessed gilded age Supreme Court justices. In
the year 1923 the court was head by Chief Justice, William Howard Taft.
On May 25, 1920 Robert T. Meyer, an instructor (teacher) at Zion
Parochial School taught Raymond Parpart, a ten year old boy, how to read in
the language of German. This violated a State of Nebraska law that had
been on the books since April 9, 1919. This law stated,
"Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private,
denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person
in any language than the English language.
Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as
languages only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the
eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of graduation issued by the
county superintendent of the county in which the child resides.
Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a
fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred
dollars ($100), or be confined in the county jail for any period not exceeding
thirty days for each offense.
Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and
after its passage and approval.[i]
Meyer had unlawfully instructed a student, in a language other than English
(German), who had not yet, attained and successfully passed the eighth
grade.[ii] Since this law was on was in effect, and the events took place in
the State of Nebraska the plaintiff, Meyer was tried and then convicted in
Hamilton County, Nebraskas district court.
Meyer appealed the decision of the district court of Hamilton County,
Nebraska to the supreme court. The question at hand being, Does the
Nebraska statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
clause?[iii] The Due Process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment in
question states, No stateshall deprive any person of life liberty or
property without due process of law.[iv] This was an argument never
before presented to the Supreme Court.
The case identified the justification upon creating the legislation. The State
of Nebraska created this piece of legislation because the lawmakers of
Nebraska had witnessed, baneful effects of permitting foreigners, who had
taken residence in this country, to rear and educate their children in the
language of their native land. The result of that condition was found to be
inimical to our own safety.[v] The state felt it was safer to restrict any
teaching to foreigners children by not allowing the learning of any langue
other than English until such time (after the completion of eighth grade)
that, it became a part of them.[vi] This is part of the argument that the
Supreme court of Nebraska vocalized to conclude the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment unbroken and concluded it was rather a valid
exercise in police power.
An additional aspect of this law that the plaintiffs side used in the argument
was that the legislation excluded the teachings of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew
because they are, the so-called ancient or dead languages' and therefore
are not 'within the spirit or the purpose of the act. However, German,
French, Spanish, Italian, and every other alien speech are within the
ban.[vii]
It could not be concluded that the knowledge of German couldnt be
considered harmful. The Court also vocalized, It is suggested that the law
is an unwarranted restriction, in that it applies to all citizens of the state and
arbitrarily interferes with the rights of citizens who are not of foreign
ancestry, and prevents them, without reason, from having their children
taught foreign languages in school. That argument is not well taken, for it
assumes that every citizen finds himself restrained by the statute.[viii]
The Supreme court identified that they had not attempted to clarify the
precise independences guarantee in the word liberty stated in the
Fourteenth amendment but did take several into account. These several
rights defined in the meaning included, it denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.8 In implying the meaning of the liberty included
in the Fourteenth amendment the Supreme Court pronounced the ability of
the lawmakers of Nebraska to decide, what constitutes proper exercise of
police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the
courts... It was decided that proper state objectives were not related to
state regulations of liberty in an adequate manor. For these reasons the
Supreme Court ruled the law unconstitutional and stated, The judgment of
the court belo must be reversed and the cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.[ix] In conclusion the law
was reversed.
This Supreme Court decisions was immensely important, for it set
the precedent for foreign languages taught in a school setting. This
determination also created a foundation for foreign language controversy
and requirements in years to follow.
This decision was well justified by the way the Due Process clause of
the Fourteen amendments articulates. Also specifically by the way the
supreme court interpreted by the word liberty. This argument and law
created and enforced by the state of Nebraska also has little justification
when you acknowledge the United States of America is inhabited by
immigrants or ancestors who were immigrants.
Pierce vs Society of Sisters, 262 US 510
Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to
establish and maintain academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military
Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college
preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining
orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education
Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between 8
and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the
preliminary restraining orders.
Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control?
Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a
proper education, the 14th Amendment provides parents and guardians with
a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which their children are
educated.
Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with
protected liberty interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose
within the competency of the state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would
be destruction of the appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate
all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the
appropriate preparation for their children.
Angeles vs Judge Sison, 112 SCRA 26 (1982)
ANGELES vs JUDGE SISON
112 SCRA 26
FACTS:
The petitioner was mauled by two of his students in FEU outside of the
school campus, specifically in Oak Barrel Restaurant, prompting his filing of
criminal complaint for assault which was dismissed on the basis of an
affidavit of desistance submitted by the petitioner.
The administrative complaint filed before the Dean, however, was acted on
by the creation of a committee to conduct administrative investigation,
headed by the Dean himself.
Over the opposition of the offending parties, the respondent Judge issued an
order denying their motion against the conduct of administrative
investigation, hence this appeal before the Court.
ISSUE:
Does the school, through its authorized representative, have jurisdiction to
investigate over an alleged misconduct committed outside the school
premises and beyond school hours?
DECISION:
YES. A college or any school for that matter has a dual responsibility to its
students. One is to provide opportunities for learning and the other is to help
them grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy
citizens of the community. Discipline is one of the means to carry out the
second responsibility.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational
institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of
an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational
environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally
necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property. The
power of school officials to investigate, an adjunct of its power to suspend or
expel, is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of such rules and
regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational
environment conducive to learning.
Common sense dictates that the school retains its power to compel its
students in or off-campus to a norm of conduct compatible with their
standing as members of the academic community. Hence, when as in the
case at bar, the conduct complained of directly affects the suitability of the
alleged violators as students, there is no reason why the school cannot
impose the same disciplinary action as when the act took place inside the
campus.
Tanada vs. Angara, G.R. 118295, May 2, 1997
Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence
of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the
said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in
the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market
espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits,
restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power.
That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it
gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its
concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be
considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations
among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it
consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty
as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to
determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the
realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is
not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should
this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a
limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure
for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic
self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected
officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
nothing short of a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity (CPCN), basic differences exist. The issuance of CPCN is still
subject to the exclusive prerogative of the NTC after full evaluation of
the application.
(2) YES. The NTC construed the technical term in R.A. No.
2090 radiotelephony liberally as to include the operation of a cellular
mobile telephone system. The construction given by an administrative
agency deserves great weight and respect. To otherwise question the
validity or applicability of R.A. No. 2090 is a collateral attack on the
statute which is not allowed. A franchise is a property right and cannot
be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The determination of
the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy
such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the
subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto.
(3) NO. The PLDT cannot justifiably refuse to interconnect. The
interconnection which has been required of PLDT is a form of
intervention with property rights dictated by the encompassing
objective for the common good. The NTC, as the regulatory agency of
the State, merely exercised its delegated authority to regulate the use of
telecommunications networks when it decreed interconnection.
Legaspi vs CSC, 150 SCRA 530 (1987)

Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on

PLDT v. NTC, G.R. No. 88404, October 18, 1990
FACTS
Private respondent Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI) obtained
from Congress Republic Act No. 2090 a franchise to establish radio
stations for domestic and transoceanic telecommunications. Petitioner
PLDT invoked the prior operator or protection of investment doctrine
in its opposition to ETCIs subsequent application for Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN). The National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) granted provisional authority to ETCI subject to the
condition that it shall enter into interconnection agreement with PLDT.
PLDT elevated the case to the Supreme Court pointing out ETCIs
defective legislative franchise to operate telecommunications system,
among others. ETCI contends that PLDTs special civil action must deal
only on issues whether the NTC acted without jurisdiction of with grave
abuse of discretion in granting ETCI the assailed provisional authority.
ISSUES
Whether or not:
(1) ETCI is entitled of provisional authority;
(2) R.A. No 2090 partakes ETCIs valid legislative franchise;
(3) PLDT may refuse NTC Order to enter into
interconnection agreement with ETCI;
RULING
(1) YES. The provisional authority is granted in a very limited sense: for a
period of 18 months which may be revoked or revised by NTC, and
applicable only in Metro Manila. Contrary to PLDTs contention that it is
matters of public concern in a special civil action for mandamus against the
CSC pertaining to the information of civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The
standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being
devoid of legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities
of government employees for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest
to secure the information sought.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to
information in the case at bar.
Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Constitution
provides the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of
examining the public records by the government agency in custody thereof.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern
is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records,
papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III,
Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.
The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the
petitioner is of public interest. All appointments in the Civil Service
Commission are made according to merit and fitness while a public office is
a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people
even as to their eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court
also noted that the information on the result of the
CSC eligibility examination is released to the public therefore the request of
petitioner is one that is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through
any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person
occupying governmentpositions.
Valmonte vs Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be
directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able
to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b)
to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing
their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having
yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System
(GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now
considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the
premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to
inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady
Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege
of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His
position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary
does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and
not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues
are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of
the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned
borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right
to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the
loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because
of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most
especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more
limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions
being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I
suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a
contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the
framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned
and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-
controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of
the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the
right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians
of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their
desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
De Jesus vs. COA, G.R. 109023, August 12, 1998
Facts:
Petitioners were receiving honoraria as designated officials of LWUA,
prior to the effectivity of the Republic Act No. 6758 which provides for
the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into
standardized salary rates except for certain additional compensations.
DBM issued DBM CC No. 10, discontinuing without qualification all
allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary effective
November 1, 1989 in order to implement R.A. 6758,.
Respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post
audit, the payment of honoraria to petitioners.
Petitioners appealed to the COA questioning the validity and
enforceability of DBM CCC No. 10.
the validity and effectivity of the circular was upheld on the COA
decision dated January 29, 1993.
Issue:
Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of
publication in the Official Gazette
Held:
The DBM CCC No. 1 is more than a mere interpretative or internal
regulation as it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances
and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul
together.
The Supreme Court ruled that the DBM CCC No. 1 is ineffective due to
its non publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country and that the other issue at bar is unnecessary.
The respondents are ordered to pass on audit the honoraria of
petitioners.
Chavez v. PEA & Amari, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to
reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development
Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D.
1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were
transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite
Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an
agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and
owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands
to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312)
by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a
Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with
another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later
transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda
assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain
(famously known as the mother of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a
writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands
by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events,
under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended
JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the
amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such classification and declaration
only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these
lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void
for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can
classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare
them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view
of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
VIII. SEPARATION OF POWERS
In Re: Laureta and Maravilla, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)
Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa,
Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all
members of the First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous language claimed
that members of the court rendered unjust decision on the case GR 68635:
Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that
the Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from
participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty
Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the
history of the case and found no reason to take action, stating that Justice
Yap inhibited himself from the case and was only designated as Chairman of
First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of dismissal was issued on
14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera
and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to another forum of justice, to
which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan
(Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly
circulated copies of the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed
petitioners Complaint.
Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty.
Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct and is
suspended from the practice of law until further Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or
division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and
are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of
conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the
Supreme Courts judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle
of separation of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of
government such that the three co-equal branches of government are each
supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one
can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.
Demetria vs Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987)
FACTS: Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan
Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from
disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph
1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated
for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the
Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations
Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister,
the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the
privilege granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act
or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not
the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from
which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does
not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law,
thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise
goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render
the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one
item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to
another here.
Mantruste System vs CA, 179 SCRA 136 (1989)
FACTS:
MSI entered into an 4 interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview
Plaza Hotel, where it would operate the hotel for a minimum of 3 months or
until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other 3rd parties
by DBP.
The Bayview Hotel was subsequently identified for privatization under
Proclamation No. 50 and was consequently transferred from DBP to Asset
Privatization Trust for disposition. The DBP notified MSI that it was
terminating the interim lease agreement to effect the disposition of the
property. The APT granted the President of MSI's condition an extension of
30 days within which to effect the delivery of the Bayview Hotel to APT.
However, MSI sent a letter to APT stating that in their opinion, having leased
the property for more than 1 year the agreement is long term in character
and MSI have acquired preference in buying the property, while emphasizing
that MSI has a legal lien on the property because of its advances for the
hotel operations and repairs which amounted to P12 Million.
APT answered MSI saying that there was no agreement to that effect. The
bidding took place but MSI did not participate. Makati-Agro Trading and La
Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation were awarded the property as the highest
bidder for P85 Million. MSI filed a complaint with injunction on awarding and
transfer of the property to the winning bidders. Trial court granted, but the
CA reversed the trial court ruling for being violative to Sec 1 of Proclamation
No. 50: "No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order
or injunction against the trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or
disposition of assets transferred to it. Nor shall such order or injunction be
issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such
purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him."
The CA rejected the TC's opinion that said proclamation is unconstitutional,
rather it up held that it continues to be operative after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution by virtue of Section 3 Art.XVIII. It also noted that MSI has
not been deprived of its property rights since those rights are non-existent
and its only property right was the alleged reimbursable advances made to
DBP, which it may sue to collect in a separate action. It further held that the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the lower court against APT may
not be justified as a valid exercise of judicial power for MSI does not have a
legally demandable and enforceable right of retention over the said property.
ISSUE:
WoN the CA erred in not declaring unconstitutional Sec. 31 of Proclamation
No. 50, prohibiting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by the TC.
RULING:
Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the
Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of courts to settle actual
controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government". (Sec 1 Art. VIII). The power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the
legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Courts may not substitute their judgement for that of the APT, nor block, by
an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its
decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets
transferred to it.
There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an
administrative agency, except when it violates a citizen's constitutional
rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or
without jurisdiction.
Categories: 179 SCRA 136, Constitutional Law 1, G.R. No. 86540-41
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
An immigration law passed by Congress holds that the attorney general can
suspend the deportation of an illegal immigrant if the immigrant would
sustain severe hardship as a result. Additionally, if either the Senate or
House of Representatives voted by majority to veto the attorney generals
decision regarding deportation. Chadha was a student who had remained in
the US with an expired Visa. The attorney general held that he should
remain in the US due to hardship. The House of Representatives vetoed the
decision to grant amnesty, thereby sustaining the deportation order.
Chadha brought this litigation after the legislative veto.
ISSUE
Whether a single house can vote to override an executive decision such that
it violates the principle of separation of powers.
HOLDING
Yes, Act invalidated. The court recognize the argument of efficiency
regarding a single house vote. Efficiency is achieved by this measure
because the attorney general may frequently override deportation and
calling both houses of the legislature to vote for each instance would be time
consuming and burdensome. However, the constitution is very clear that
legislative decisions are to be bicameral. There are reasons relating to fair
representation of states that maintain this justification as paramount,
particularly when weighed against arguments of efficiency. The act of
overriding an executive veto is inherently legislative and therefore requires
bicameral, legislative support.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Chadha
462 US 919 (1983)
Facts:
Respondent Jagdish Rai Chadha was born in The British Empire's colony in
Kenya to Indian parents. He held a Britishpassport and traveled to Ohio as a
foreign exchange student. After Kenya's declaration of independence from
Britain in 1963 he was not recognised as a legitimate citizen or resident of
Kenya (as his parents were Indian) or of the United Kingdom or India (as he
was born in Kenya). After his non-immigrant student visa expired, none of
the three countries would accept him onto their territory, effectively making
him a stateless person.
The INS initiated deportation proceedings against Chadha. Chadha sought to
suspend his deportation, and the INS accommodated his request according
to 244(a)(1), and transmitted a report of the suspension to Congress
according to 244(c)(2). The House of Representatives vetoed the
suspension of Chadha's deportation, and the INS resumed deportation
proceedings. Chadha raised constitutional objections to 244(c)(2), but the
immigration judge found he lacked any authority to rule on such claims and
ordered Chadha deported. Chadha then appealed to the Board of
Immigration Appeals, which also found it lacked any authority to consider
constitutional objections to 244(c)(2). Chadha appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review of the deportation order, and the INS
supported his challenge to the constitutionality of 244(c)(2). The Ninth
Circuit found 244(c)(2) unconstitutional and ordered the Attorney
General to suspend deportation proceedings. INS appealed the Ninth
Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court in order to obtain a final judgment on
the constitutionality of 244(c)(2).
Congress argued that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the resolution of
the House of Representatives vetoing the Attorney General's determination
was constitutionally invalid. It asked the United States Supreme Court to
reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision.
Congress argued that:
(1) Chadha lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of 244(c)
(2) because that section is not severable from 244(a)(1). Therefore, if
Chadha were to succeed in invalidating 244(c)(2), his means of remedy
in 244(a)(1) would also be destroyed, and there would be no relief
possible;
(2) The Court does not have jurisdiction over the issue because the
Attorney General and INS enforced the challenged statute and thereby
effectively waived their right to challenge it;
(3) The action was not a genuine case or controversy, as both the original
plaintiff and defendant challenge the statute without real opposition;
(4) The action is a non-justiciable political question.
Issue:
Was the part of the Act authorizing a one House veto constitutional?
Held:
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment. It held that the
resolution of the House of Representatives vetoing the Attorney General's
determination is constitutionally invalid, unenforceable, and not binding.
Congress may not promulgate a statute granting to itself a legislative
veto over actions of the executive branch inconsistent with
thebicameralism principle and Presentment Clause of the United States
Constitution.
The Court rebutted Congress's assertions as follows:
(1) 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is severable from
the rest of the act pursuant to the express severability clause 406. The
legislative history of 244 supports the proposition that Congress,
frustrated with the process of passing private laws to provide relief for
deportable individuals, would likely not have been willing to retain the
private law mechanism rather than ceding all power to the Attorney
General.
(2) The Attorney General and INS did not waive their right to challenge
the constitutionality of the statute by enforcing the statute.
(3) The action is a genuine case with adequate representation in favor of
sustaining the act provided by the houses of Congress asamici curiae.
(4) The case is a judicable question, not exempted by the political
question doctrine; the constitutionality of a statute is a question for the
courts.
The Court then presented its affirmative reasoning:
(5) When the Constitution provides express procedures, such procedures
must be strictly observed. Two such provisions are bicameralism and
presentment in the enactment of law.
(6) The presentment processespecially the President's veto powerwas
intended by the Framers to provide a mechanism by which the executive
branch could defend itself against legislative encroachment and could
prevent ill-conceived policies.
(7) Similarly, the bicameralism requirement was formulated in order to
hinder congressional action and thereby prevent legislative
encroachment.
(8) The action of the House of Representatives is legislative in nature
because (a) it modifies rights and duties of individuals outside the
legislative branch; (b) the enactment would otherwise have required a
private law, which is a legislative function; and (c) the nature of the
action is inherently legislative.
(9) When the Framers intended to authorize Congress to exercise power
outside of the bicameral and presentment principles, it provided
alternate procedures explicitly; other procedures cannot be admitted.
(10) Because the action of the House of Representatives was legislative,
but did not conform to the mode of action specifically stated by the
Constitution for legislative action; it is therefore invalid, unenforceable,
and not binding.
La Bugal-BLaan v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882. Dec. 1, 2004
LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS,
Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO
RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); RUBEN
TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.)
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a
exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against
their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995.
Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed
a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a
corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos
issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR
Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA
between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground
that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit,
explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article
XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration
company - sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which
is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an
Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the
FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The
latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the
DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving
wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate
recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with
the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the
FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which
provides for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully
foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service
contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the
Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for
permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural
resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine
which states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same
section also states that, the exploration and development and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973
Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases
for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural
resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public
domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the
1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity
investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within
a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the
concessionaire over the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive
and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or
other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now
allows only technical and financial assistance. The management and the
operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature
of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987
Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an
exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA
7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although
the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in
accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat
these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in
a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all
the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed
beneficial ownership over the nations mineral resources to these
contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a
circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization
requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation,
development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as
conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as
to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if
some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent,
conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations
are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for
large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-
products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the
same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken
together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that
properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens.
These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely
the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to
suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck
down.
Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil 358 (1955)
Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950
DECISION
(En Banc)
OZAETA, J.:
I. THE FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of
land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question
that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the
governments payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen,
of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates
that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited
anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible
for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject
transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its
hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused
to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed
to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he
answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus
directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for
a term beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had
to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner
was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the
validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special
Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of
the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is
pertinent to that determination it is in fact the very thing sought to be
determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the
subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any
proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for
the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is
material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is
that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of
legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness
called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by
the committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for
a term beyond its period of legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish
for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last
session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative
body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or
obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed
during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed
legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-
preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the
Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the
periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the
Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he
gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the
latters verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim
that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no
conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the
determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say
that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability.
The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the
court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from
his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus
developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct
answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of
a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to
entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and
punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by
reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger,
or to secure immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and
circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to
answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own
declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial
judge to decide that question.
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)
Summary of Goldwater v. Carter
S. Ct. 1979
Facts: President Carter terminated a defense treaty with Taiwan. Neither the
Senate nor the House have taken action to prevent or contest the action.
Several members brought this claim alleging the President has deprived
them of their Constitutional role.
Issue: Whether the President, in terminating at treaty with another country,
needs the approval of Congress, and if so does it involve a political question?
Holding: The issue involves a political question.
Procedure: Ct. of App. judgment is vacated and the case remanded to D. Ct.
for dismissal.
Rule: The President is authorized to make treaties with the advise and
consent of the Senate. Treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the
land.
Judicial action is barred where there is an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made. Issues affecting allocation of
power are unreviewable. Constitutional text which grants exclusive
responsibility to a particular governmental function to one of the branches,
and thereby eliminating the courts interference in the business of those
other branches.
Ct. Rationale: If Congress had challenged the Presidents authority to
terminate, then the court would have justiciable issue to decide. Without a
challenge the issue only involves a political question.
Neither the Senate nor the House have taken any action, thereby rendering
the case unripe for decision. There is no specific language preventing the
President from terminating treaties without approval. There is no showing
that Congress has rejected the Presidents claim. It is Congress choice to
challenge the President not the Courts.
Where the Constitution is silent this case is controlled by political standards.
Congress has terminated treaties without Presidential approval.
PL A: The Constitution makes specific mention that the President needs the
approval and consent of the Senate to make a treaty, therefor the contra
positive is true: President cannot terminate a treaty without approval and
consent of the Senate. If so, a constitutional case and controversy are
ripened for decision. Whether the decision making authority is
Constitutionally valid is a determination left to the courts.
Def A: The issue is a political question where the PL is asking the court to
issue an advisory opinion on whether the President can or cannot terminate
a treaty.
IX. DELEGATION OF POWERS
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 (1992)
211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No.
438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges
imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional
duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the
board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products
imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty
to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5%
duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at
9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and
478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue
bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-
generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within
the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to
be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the
President subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may
impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or
imposts . . . . In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized
the President ot issue the said EOs.
Jaworski v. Pagcor, G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004
G.R. No. 144463 - January 14, 2004
FACTS:
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a
government owned and controlled corporation existing under PD No. 1869
issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos.
On March 31, 1998, PAGCORs board of directors approved an instrument
denominated as Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of
Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, which granted Sports and Games and
Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the authority to operate and maintain
Sports Betting station in PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet Gaming
facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the
satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are
established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games. On September
1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia LI. Reyes, and SAGE,
represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President,
Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document. Pursuant to the
authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commended its operations by
conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid
cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza
outlets.
Petitioner Senator Robert Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate
and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports,
filed the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in
favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that
PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, PD No. 1869, to
operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree
could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of
its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling
activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the
internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily
transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to
SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation of
PAGCORs franchise, under Section 14 of PD No. 1869 which provides:
Place. The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or
games of chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Republic of the Philippines. x x x.
Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any
of the categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under
Section 10 of PD No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the right, privilege and
authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other
recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. He contends that internet
gambling could not have been included within the commonly accepted
definition of gambling casinos, clubs or other recreation or amusement
places as these terms refer to a physical structure in real-space where
people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance authorized
by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to contract any of its franchise to another
entity such as SAGE.
RULING:
No.
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to
corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at
will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and
administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under
such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in
the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on
which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting
the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the
business, the charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the
duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost
always defined in clear and unequivocal language.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or
management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to
relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to
another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view of
the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as
there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized
to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that since ADC has no
franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if
it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the
City of Manila. By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative
franchise and not ride on PAGCORs franchise if it were to legally operate
on-line Internet gambling.
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922)
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding
of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances,
authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this
Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was
published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice
should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta
of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount
was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the
6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the
said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that
there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he
committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex
post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a
violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the
law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it
could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect
to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The
law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the
judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which
may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of
any prescribed fact or event.
Conference v. POEA, 243 SCRA 666 (1995)
Facts: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an
incorporated association of licensedFilipino manning agencies, and its
co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire andrecruit
Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign ship-owner-
principals, urge us toannul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of
the Governing Board" of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular
No. 05. Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power and
authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's
compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only
Congress can. Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing
Board resolves to amend and increase the compensation and other benefits
as specified under Part II, Section. C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs
1 and 2 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers
Issue/Held: WON the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of
legislative power. Yes. Ratio: The constitutional challenge of the
rule-making power of the POEA-based on impermissible delegation of
legislative power had been, as correctly contented by the public
respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs.
POEA .o The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).o To many of the
problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious not to
say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned
to them. While the making of laws is a non-delegable power
that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may
constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason
that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate
situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required
is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the
standards prescribed by the law. (Principle of Subordinate Legislation)
That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which
merely further amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02,
strictly conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable
employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed.
Pelaez vs Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965)
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any
municipality and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special
civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be
appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly
repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act
of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot
even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only
barrios were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are
exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has
delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios
to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate
to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case,
Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is
the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public
welfare may require which would mean that the President may exercise
such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will not
replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first
place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the
text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the
President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of
government may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is
essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not
executive).
People vs. Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Facts:
On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A.
Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria, public school officials from Leyte were charged
before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for violating Republic Act No.
4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded not
guilty and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with preliminary injuction
before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due to
the correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of
R.A. No. 4670) prescribed for the offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of
imprisonment is unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the
penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if
the latter were the legislative department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV where the
respondent Judge, Judge Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and
constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts.
Issue:
Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the
case.
Held:
Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.
Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative power by vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing a
duration on the punishment of imprisonment, as if the courts were the
legislative department of the government.
Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers
crimes punishable by fine of not more than Php 3,000.00 fall under the
original jurisdiction of municipal courts.
Decision:
The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against
private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the
Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
ADDITIONAL CASES:
DUAL CITIZENSHIP
MERCADO VS. MANZANO
Facts:
Petitioners filed for respondents disqualification for election alleging that
respondent is a dual citizen, and under the Local Government Code, dual
citizens cannot run for public office.
Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was born in the U.S which follows
the principle of jus soli, hence, considered an American citizen as well.
COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he was considered natural-born
because of the vrtue that he is a son of both Filipino citizens but petitioners
assail this.
Issue: Is respondent Manzano a dual citizen and cannot run for public
office?
Ruling: The Court first defined dual citizenship and compared it to dual
allegiance.
Dual citizenship arises when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
that follows jus saguinis and was born in a state that follows jus soli, hence,
resulting to a concurrent application of different two laws or more.
On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation whre a person
simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states.
In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy tantamount to his election of Phil. citizenship meaning he
forswears allegiance to the other country and thereby terminating their
status as dual.
The Court stressed that participating in the election is an express
renunciation of American citizenship.
SOBEJANA VS. COMELEC
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino
parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a
naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and the
petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration
and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order
dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007
elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May
10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the
highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She
took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P.
Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters
of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the
petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the
petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that
she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September
27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in
Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her
act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian
citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified
and ineligible to hold office of vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her
proclamation as the winning candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was
dismissed y the second division and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on
September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a
Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the
2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens
seeking elective office does not apply to her.
Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to
failure to renounce her Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of
R.A 9225
Ruling:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship 18 by taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant
therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public
office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra,
Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the
exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship
was invalid due to it was not oath before any public officer authorized to
administer it rendering the act of Condon void.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the
Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE).
Rebaldo Vs. Comelec
RA9225
CALILONG VS. DATUMANONG
FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine
Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purposes.
Petitioner avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual
allegiance.
RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and is
not self-executing provision.
What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country. In its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance.
CONCEPT OF DERIVATIVE CITIZENSHIP
Republic Vs. Sagun
REPUBLIC VS SAGUN
FACTS:
Respondent is the legitimate child of father, aChinese national, and mother,
a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio Cityand did not
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. At the age of
33, she executed an Oath of Allegianceto the Republic of the Philippines. The
document was notarized but was not recorded and registered with the Local
Civil Registrar of Baguio City. In 2005, she applied for a Philippine passport
but was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine
citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election
of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio
City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.
ISSUE/s:
1.) Whether respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship is authorized by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; and
2.) Whether the respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
RULING:
1.) Yes. But it should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or
procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for
declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts.
Respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court
to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to
validly elect Philippine citizenship.
2.) No. Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to
comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective
election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the
exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the
law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship
by election.All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of
election of Philippinecitizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing
requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be
denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for judicial declaration of
election of Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
Asnar Vs. Comelec
AZNAR VS. COMELEC
FACTS:

Respondent Emilio Lito Osmena filed his certificate of candidacy before the
COMELEC as the Governor of Cebu Province. Aznar, herein petitioner, as the
representative of the Cebu PDP- Provincial council and as the incumbent
Chairman of such, filed a petition against the respondent before the
Comelec contending that he should be disqualified because he is not a
Filipino citizen, instead an American citizen. Petitioner filed a Formal
Manifestation showing a Certificate issued by the Immigration and
Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago that the respondent as
an American Citizen is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence. The Comelec en banc ordered the Board
of Canvassers to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation upon
the filing the motion of herein respondent for the Temporary Restraining
Order to the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulation and
proclamation of the respondent until the resolution of said petition.
Private respondent alleged that he is a Filipino Citizen that he is the
legitimate son of Dr. Emilio D. Osmena, the latter being the son of the late
President Sergio Osmena.He also claimed that he has been continuously
residing in the Philippines since birth and he has not gone out of the country
for more than six months. Furthermore, he contended that he is a registered
voter of the Philippines since 1965.
COMELEC (FirstDivision) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private
respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Emilio Lito Osmena has lost his Filipino
Citizenship and thus be disqualified as a candidate for the Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province.
HELD:
NO. The respondent did not lose his Filipino Citizenship and thereby qualified
as a candidate for the Provincial Governor of Cebu Province. The petitioner
failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino
Citizenship by any of the modes provided under C.A. No. 63 namely: (1) By
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By express renunciation of
Citizenship; and (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Thus, it is clear that private
respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the
three mentioned herein above or by any other mode of losing Philippine
Citizenship.
MAQUILING VS COMELEC
The use of a foreign passport after taking the oath of allegiance and
executing an affidavit of renunciation under Republic Act No. 9225, or
the"Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003," is a
positive act showing the applicant's continued possession of a foreign
citizenship. While it does not divest him of his reacquired Filipino citizenship,
it negates his qualification to run for an elective post or be appointed to a
government position. This, in a nutshell, is the ruling in the 2013 case
of Maquiling vs. Comelec, et. al. (G.R. No. 195649), penned by Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno.
In the Maquiling case, it has been established that private
respondent Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. Subsequently,
however, he was naturalized as a US citizen, thereby losing his Filipino
citizenship. In July 2008, with the intention for repatriation, he took his oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. His application was
approved. In April 2009, he again took an oath of allegiance and executed an
affidavit of renunciation of his US citizenship. In November 2009, he filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in a certain town in Mindanao.
In April 2010, another mayoralty candidate (and also private
respondent), Linog Balua, sought the disqualification and/or the cancellation
of Arnados cerficate of candidacy. Apparently, Arnado used his US passport
in entering and leaving the Philippines between the period April 2009 and
June 2009, July 2009 and November 2009, January 2010 and March 2010.
Balua presented as evidence a computer-generated travel record and a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID).
In so declaring that Arnado is disqualified from holding public office
and even from being a candidate during the 2010 elections, C.J. Sereno
explained:
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his
US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect
declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an
American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the
United States of America.
xxx
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss
of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very
oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen
of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven
days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of
Renunciation that he absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance
and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and that he divest(s)
[him]self of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of
the United States of America.
 We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was
acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American
citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
passport.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC (1996)
With that, C.J. Sereno passionately said:
G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can
FACTS:
simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee
an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country
Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a
which granted the citizenship.
Philippine citizen.
xxx
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled
based on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship,
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity
and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as
that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to
the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.
its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance
to ones flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice
ISSUE:
are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to
Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation was valid.
public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be
deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and
HELD:
undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the
curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted
to the date ofthe filing of his application to run for governor. The steps to
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No.
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]
725 are: (1) filing theapplication; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking
of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only upon taking
the oath of allegiance that theapplicant is deemed ipso jure to have
FACTS:
reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and
to retroact to the date of the filing of theapplication, then it should not have
assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the
explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was
governor of Sorsogon.
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself
against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being
an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid

repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he