Socialism and Democracy

ISSN: 0885-4300 (Print) 1745-2635 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/csad20

The Nordic Radical Left

Teppo Eskelinen

To cite this article: Teppo Eskelinen (2015) The Nordic Radical Left, Socialism and Democracy,
29:3, 115-125, DOI: 10.1080/08854300.2015.1077577

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08854300.2015.1077577

Published online: 08 Dec 2015.

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 Socialism and Democracy, 2015
Vol. 29, No. 3, 115 125, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08854300.2015.1077577

The Nordic Radical Left

Teppo Eskelinen
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Nordics, historical and present1

The Nordic cases2 are interesting for the political left globally,
because of the welfare state tradition characterized by a relatively
equal income distribution, high-quality universal services, and very
unionized workforce. Indeed, for many, the Nordics stand as some-
thing of a symbol for the best compromise with capitalism known to
history. Yet currently, the welfare state is increasingly becoming
an object of nostalgia rather than living political reality.3 The
broad left has been in retreat, both in the sense of traditional social
democracy losing its grip on government, and the radical left gradu-
ally losing its social support. In all Nordic countries, there has been a
visible right-turn in politics, made especially alarming by the sky-
high support of nationalist right-wing populist parties,4 but most
concretely manifested, so far, in traditional right-wing economic
policies.
The Nordic countries have been quick to liberalize their economies
in the midst of the neoliberal tide deregulate finance, privatize key
government enterprises and welfare systems, etc. The growth of
income disparities has been high by global standards since the 1990s.
Under the latest right-wing government in Sweden, the income of

1. The analysis benefited from comments by Stefan Lindborg (Left Party Sweden) and
Ingrid Wergeland (Manifest Analyse).
2. Nordics refers to the four major Nordic countries Sweden, Finland, Denmark
and Norway. Iceland and Greenland would merit a separate article, addressing Ice-
lands miraculous post-crisis recovery and Greenlands independence dilemmas.
3. See Asbjorn Wahls excellent study, The Rise and Fall of the Welfare State (London:
Pluto Press, 2011).
4. All Nordic countries have fairly similar right-wing populist parties focused mostly
on anti-immgration and social conservatism, with occasional fascist tones. The
results for these parties in the latest national elections were 12.9 percent (Sweden),
16.3 percent (Norway), 17.7 percent (Finland), and 21.1 percent (Denmark). As
recently as a decade ago, these parties had no more than 0 3 parliamentary seats
in Sweden and Finland. Their growth in Denmark has also been significant.

# 2015 The Research Group on Socialism and Democracy

 116 Socialism and Democracy

the bottom 90 percent decreased despite a growing economy.5 The par-

ticular attacks on the welfare system vary by country. Sweden is infa-
mous for creating a semi-privatized schooling system, Finland for
producing horrific results in unequal access to healthcare, and
Denmark for its flexible labour markets, while Norway is doing
somewhat better thanks to its massive oil revenues.
What is noteworthy, though, is that these recent political and econ-
omic developments cannot be attributed to the financial crisis/eurocri-
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sis to the same extent as similar trends in Central and Southern Europe.
All Nordic countries survived the crisis with relatively little damage.
Although there was some increase in unemployment rates between
2008 and 2014 (up from 6.4 percent to 8.7 percent in Finland with the
worst unemployment, and from 2.6 percent to 3.6 percent in Norway
with the best situation),6 it was never on a scale comparable to the
Eurozones Southern periphery. Nor, except for some banks misad-
ventures in the Baltics, was there a financial-capital bubble like the
one that hit Anglo-America.7
In foreign relations, the Nordics do not appear as a uniform
entity, as the institutional setting dictating economic and foreign
policy differs from country to country, in terms of whether or not
the country belongs to EU/NATO/eurozone. Finland is the only
eurozone member country, and clearly is suffering from that position.
EU-members Sweden and Denmark, as well as non-member Norway,
have been resistant to the common currency. Nordic governments
have been perceived for decades as something of a moral
compass within the Western bloc, with high ambitions in peace,
development, global governance, etc. but they have become increas-
ingly conservative, and no longer see saving the world as some-
thing worth the input.
The Nordics have typically had high voter turnout, Finland being
the sole exception. In the latest parliamentary elections, voter turnout
was highest in Denmark (87.7 percent) and Sweden (85.8 percent),
with Norway not far behind at 78.2 percent. The figure for Finland is
66.9 percent; the country stands out as having the most cynical attitude

5. Pavlina Tschernevas data on the rapid turn to increasing income disprarities in

Sweden appears in several articles, for example Jordan Weissmann, How the rich
conquered the economy, in one chart, Slate Magazine [Online], September 29, 2014.
6. OECD data on annual harmonized unemployment rates. OECD, Statistics on harmo-
nised unemployment rates by country. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=
36324# (2015).
7. Again, the noteworthy exception is Iceland, which underwent a full-scale financial
collapse, to become the people-before-profits model for post-crisis survival.
 Teppo Eskelinen 117

toward politics in general.8 The political systems are also very parlia-
ment-centered, in the sense that referenda have been few and
without a clear mobilizing right-left dimension; indeed, the only
issues subjected to referenda in the Nordics since 1989 have been
EU-related.9
Yet, it would be hasty to believe that Nordic people are happy with
politics in general. Experts I interviewed believe, for instance, that the
rise of the green parties in Norway and Denmark is a sign of anti-pol-
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itical sentiment, as is the spectacular rise of the populist right. Except

for the Unity List in Denmark, the left parties have largely failed to
present themselves as alternatives outside the traditional party
system. It also needs to be noted, as a positive detail, that in Sweden,
support for the Left Party is bigger among those who say that they
have low or very low trust in politicians.

The Nordic radical left parties

Generally, the Nordic radical left parties come with a similar kind
of background. These parties are middle-sized; that is, relatively small
but not insignificant. They are not averse to participating in govern-
ments. Generally, the Nordics have had, from early on, a very party-
politicized radical left, meaning both that the radical left has had an
influence in shaping the policies of these countries or at least in
pushing the social democrats to the left and that the focus on party
politics has partly de-radicalized the left, drawing its activity away
from mass demonstations, labour militancy, etc. and toward formal
politics. The Nordic approach is likely to appear reformist, when
looking from the perspective of the street-protest-oriented radicals of
central and southern Europe.
Looking at left parties after 1989, a few general observations can be
made, despite country-to-country differences. First, left parties tend to
be continuations of varieties of communist parties, renamed in the
early 1990s in order to abandon the communist label and possibly
formed in a process of rival communist parties merging together. By
implication, the Nordics have not seen a Podemos-style new and

8. Data on voter turnout are compiled by the International Institute for Democracy and
Electorial Assistance. IDEA. Statistics on voter turnout by country. http://www.idea.
int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=-1 (2015).
9. EU membership referenda: Sweden accepted 1994, Finland accepted 1994, Norway
rejected 1994. Eurozone: Sweden rejected 2003, Denmark rejected 2000. Denmark
also held two referenda on the Maastricht treaty in 199293, rejecting the treaty at
first but approving it later.
 118 Socialism and Democracy

movement-based left political force. Second, there has been a vague but
steady and general decline in support for the left, although with
election-specific exceptions.
In Finland, the Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto VAS)10 is a merger of
left forces, established in 1990. The party has drawn steady albeit
declining support, around and below 10 percent. The latest parliamen-
tary election in 2015 gave the party 7.1 percent of the national vote, a
decline from the 1995 high of 11.3 percent. Other recent elections
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show somewhat better support: 9.3 percent in the European Parliment

elections in 2014, causing a return to the European Parliment, and 8
percent in municipal elections in 2012.
In Sweden, the Left Party (Vansterpartiet, V)11 is a traditional com-
munist party renamed in 1990. The re-identification gave the party a
momentary increase in support. Generally hovering around 4 percent
to 5 percent in parliamentary elections, the 1990s saw the partys
support go up to 12 percent, dropping back to 5.7 percent in the 2014
elections. Similarly, the party has attracted around 6 percent of the
vote in European Parliment elections, securing one MEP.
In Norway, the Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti, SV)12
dates from the 1970s, when it was formed as an electoral coalition.
As in Sweden, and unlike Finland, its support has been fluctuating,
with a peak at the turn of the millennium, but a decline since. The
record election for the party was 2001 when its support was 12.5
percent, which collapsed down to 4.1 percent by the 2013 election.
Similarly, the latest municipal elections have given the party around
4 percent. Yet, as noted, there is no straightforward declining trend:
the partys electoral success was lower also in the 1990s, quite like
the Left Party in Sweden.
In Denmark, the Socialist Peoples Party (Sosialistisk Folkeparti, SF)13
has been the most obvious equivalent to the other Nordic left parties,
with similar levels of support, 4 percent to 13 percent in the post-
1989 era. Having been at its peak in the late 1980s, its support crumbled
in the 2015 election to 4.2 percent, which is the lowest in almost 40
years. Yet, the difference from the other Nordic countries has been
that there is a strong radical left competitor, the Unity List, Enhedlisten
(O),14 originally a fractional-communist electoral alliance combining

10. http://www.vasemmistoliitto.fi/
11. http://www.vansterpartiet.se/
12. https://www.sv.no/
13. http://sf.dk/
14. https://enhedslisten.dk/
 Teppo Eskelinen 119

three parties. The collapse of the SF party is thus also a reflection of the
support moving to its radical left rival, not so much a sign of withering
support of the radical left generally. After a history of getting barely
over 1 percent of the vote in the post-1989 era, the Unity List drew
7.8 percent support in the latest parliamentary election (2015), thus
becoming the major radical left party in the country.
In addition to these traditional and more institutional parties, there
are a number of smaller parties, deriving their raison detre from
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hardline identity, a general idea of not giving in to capitalism. Most sig-

nificant of these is the Norwegian 2007-formed Red party (Rodt), which
got very close to wining a seat in Oslo after gaining 1 percent of the
popular vote. In Finland, the Finnish Communist party (Suomen
kommunistinen puolue) manages regularly to win some municipal
council seats. More marginal parties in the communist fringe, with a
national vote in hundreds rather than thousands, tend to be character-
ized by constant splits and electoral coalition formations.

Ideologies
The radical left parties have been the last line of defence of the
welfare state institutions, such as public universal services, progressive
taxation, and a large public sector, and are trusted for doing exactly
this. The key debates within the radical left parties concern the ideo-
logical linkage to the welfare state: is it the political agenda the
very purpose of the left, to defend a political model which, despite
all its inspiring elements, is still only a temporary compromise
between capital and labour? Are not better compromises achieved
others ask by more radical labour politics, rather than simply
aiming to uphold an institutional model? Yet other activists see the
purpose of the radical left as promoting wider political ideals
beyond the existing models.
Typically, the ideologies of the radical left parties in the Nordics
are combinations of several political ideas, which are not self-evidently
part of a uniform policy package. The left parties have generally built
their political identity on the ideological currents of the New Left,
that is, internationalist and identity-political sensibilities, attached to
the more traditional issues of economic egalitarianism and the
welfare state.
A common point of identification within the identity-political
field for these parties has been feminism, which all these parties
more or less formally and vocally endorse, the Swedish Left Party
most explicitly declaring itself a feminist party. Also,
 120 Socialism and Democracy

environmentalism is a key part of the ideology. Often classifying

themselves as red-green or ecosocialist, they claim to be the
true promoters of sustainable politics, with competition coming
from more right-wing-liberal green parties in each country.15
Indeed, the label red-green is the most common self-identification,
also present in party symbols and flags. Often, environmentalism is a
combination of global issues (such as campaigning for binding emis-
sions reductions) and local issues (such as opposition to oil drilling
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on the Lofoten islands in Norway).

Furthermore, as the Nordics have seen a similar kind of right-
wing-populist sentiment to the rest of Europe, the radical left parties
have taken the position of true defenders of the virtue of global solidar-
ity, and the politics of free migration. While having a history of endorsing
such values, this has increasingly become the distinctive feature of the
Nordic radical left parties, as even the traditional social democrat
parties more often flirt with right-wing rhetoric as a panic response
to their declining support.
Interestingly, the radical left parties in several Nordic countries are
strongholds of not only open migration policy, but also euroscepticism.
Vocal opposition to EU membership/eurozone membership are indeed often
platforms that have guaranteed left parties more popular support.16
The Norwegian Socialist Left Party and the Danish Unity List have
been especially close to the No EU campaigns, mainly building
their argument in defence of the welfare state, seen as being under
attack from neoliberal EU institutions. The biggest exception is the
Finnish Left Alliance, which has never taken an anti-EU position but
has rather seen the EU as an arena open to change through political
struggle, although it has also always included a vocal but marginal
No EU fraction. In all Nordic countries, the opposition campaigns
around EU/eurozone parliament votes/referenda have nevetheless
been visible and intense.17

15. This competition has tightened with new green parties entering the political arena in
Norway and Denmark in the 2010s with good electoral success by beginners
standards.
16. See, for example, Norwegian Socialist chairman Audun Lysbakkens strong pre-
election stance against the EU, Nei til EU og EOS, http://www.audunlysbakken.
no/2-nei-til-eu-og-eos/ (August 27, 2013).
17. A more detailed discussion on the strategies of Nordic left parties in relation to the
EU can be found in the analysis by Michael Brie and Cornelia Hildebrandt in their
edited volume, Parties of the Radical Left in Europe: Analysis and Perspectives (Berlin:
Karl Dietz Verlag, 2005), 132 93.
 Teppo Eskelinen 121

Voter base and relations to movements

As in almost all of the advanced countries, the left has been seeking
its identity in the post-industrializing world. What seems obvious is
that there is no given, class-based support to the extent that there
once was (in the sense of self-conscious class for itself). Instead,
support will have to be fought for in an intense struggle over political
hegemony. Yet, some general observations regarding the political base
of the radical left can be made:
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First, as already noted, the ideological support for the radical left
appears to be moving from class-conscious fight for bread-and-butter
issues, to support for leftist cultures or values, especially environ-
mentalism, feminism, and global solidarity. This might of course reflect
simply the fact that the Nordics have until recently been spared from
the most devastating effects of austerity. Should this change, there
will very likely be a return to material issues. Currently, as the
Finnish government is most aggressively slashing the welfare func-
tions, anti-austerity sentiment is bound to become the lefts driving
force again. Indeed, this year, Helsinki has already witnessed
massive (by Finnish standards) marches against cuts in education
and social services.18
Second, the radical left has regained its position as a youth move-
ment. While the radical left was seen by some pundits as an aging relic
after the 1989 turmoil, the Nordics have also seen in this Millennium a
new radicalization of students and youth in general. In turn, a key
dynamic in the radical left parties and wider movements relates to
the political and organizational differences between the student rad-
icals and the blue-collar base: the internal contradictions and the
future prospects are largely determined by whether these two
groups with very different political cultures can find enough
common ground to unite in struggle.
Third, Nordic politics also are inevitably influenced by the dis-
persed nature of the populations of the area. While in central
Europe, the radical left struggles are those of a metropolitan workforce,
the Nordics are (with the exception of Denmark) large land masses
with relatively small populations; this means that spatial issues have
an inevitable influence on the political landscape. Framing politics in
the capital is notoriously different from framing politics in the large

18. There has for now been a shortage of coverage in English. For a Finnish story on the
2015 protests, see Pontus Purokurus article in Finlands Left weekly Kansan Uutiset,
Hallituksen vastaisia mielenosoituksia tulossa iso lista, Kansan Uutiset [Online],
(June 4, 2015).
 122 Socialism and Democracy

peripheries. Also, a strong part of the lefts traditional base is the per-
ipheral working force, with the perceived hegemony of the metropole
and the related inequality being always a significant mobilizing factor.
A real issue for the radical left parties, especially in Finland and
Norway, has been how to keep this base as the parties and movements
become increasingly urban. Indeed, the Left Party organizers almost
invariably cite building a stronger network of local organizations
throughout the countries as a key issue and challenges in doing
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this as a significant explanation for declining support.

Generally, the identities of the parties are quite largely shaped by
the extent to which new movements have chosen to function on party
platforms. As mentioned, in the political climate of the Nordics, acti-
vists are inclined to become party members. During the last decade,
offshoots of the anti-globalization movement created in the Nordics
such institutions as local materializations of the World Social Forum,
Attac chapters, movements directly focused on protecting the
welfare state, and movements with a single focus such as opposing pri-
vatizations. Environmental radicals have often had the greatest diffi-
culty deciding whether to accept the left parties platforms. Another
significant movement is the anti-racist movement: ever more people
take anti-racism to heart in response to the rise of the far-right, and
the uncompromisingly anti-racist radical left parties have become the
political platforms for many of the activists of these movements.
Also, the radical left party youth organizations tend to be large,
mobilizing and inspiring, providing links between party politics and
popular movements. They have served as recruitment vehicles for
youth to the radical left, from movement activists to party politics;
and, they are also active radical left organizations in their own right
with their own campaigning around social themes.
Interestingly enough, the Nordics have not seen any major new
wave of union radicalism. Rather, the unions tend to be conservative
and anti-confrontational, controlled by the social democrats. There
are some unions with a radical left leadership, however, as well as
some fields with traditions of strike activity (such as dock workers),
but even these unions are not hotbeds for new labour radicalism. As
an interesting single case, though, the Norwegian labour movement
has been funding radical left groups as part of a wider hegemonic
struggle. This created a wide coalition of left forces, which influenced
the course of the country for most of the last decade. It also caused a
partial return of the social democrats to form an alliance with more
radical left-oriented unionists. Finland, which is currently undergoing
a historic attack on the welfare state, is a case to follow in the future:
 Teppo Eskelinen 123

will the unions be able to find new waves of radicalism and under-
standing of the need for new alliances, when under severe political
threat?

In and out of political power

As the Nordic welfare state is a brainchild of the social democrats
and generally associated with the left, a significant identity issue for the
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radical left is to distance itself from the social democrat parties. Above,
I have discussed the ideological aspect of this (radicalism, relations to
movements, intransigence on racism, focus on environment, etc.). But
in practical politics, an even more significant issue appears to be the
relation to government power. All radical left parties have had to
face the decision, to what extent they are willing to become supporters
of social democrat governments and crucially, on what conditions.
Looking at the post-1989 era, radical left parties have been sitting in
social democrat-led cabinets in Norway (2005 13), Denmark (2011 15)
(SF), and Finland (1995 2003). In Finland, the experience of the radical
left in government involved sitting in bizarre rainbow coalitions,
with parties from left and right in a single cabinet, the latest of which
even had a conservative prime minister (2011 14). These political
experiences have self-evidently not happened without tensions, even
splits within parties, as some have opposed what they have seen as
using the party as a tool of justification for existing policies. Signifi-
cantly, the experiences of the radical left in government in both
Denmark and Finland ended with the party eventually resigning in
protest of government policies.
Further, other parties have chosen to act as supporting parties to
social democratic governments, meaning a promise to vote for the gov-
ernment in parliament in return for some political concessions (yet
without ministerial posts). This has been the case of the Left Party in
Sweden and recently the Unity List in Denmark. Thus, there is no
major radical left party in the Nordics that has not had some kind of
government involvement.
The radical left parties have seen participation in cabinets strategi-
cally19: it has enabled them to use their critical position in forming a
majority government to push for left policies (such as a significant
increase in social security benefits in Finland in 2011), or to control a

19. Very much in line with the findings in T. Bale and R. Dunphy, In from the cold?
Left parties and government involvement since 1989, Comparative European Politics
9 (2011), 269 91.
 124 Socialism and Democracy

key ministry (such as the ministry of education in Norway [2005 13]).

Yet, the outcome of these misadventures in power has invariably been
considerable electoral defeats: clearly, the supporters prefer seeing
radical left forces pushing their policies as a parliamentary opposition.
The collapse of the SF in Denmark (and the parallel rise of the Unity
List especially in the 2015 elections), Left Alliance in Finland, and
especially the Socialist Left Party in Norway after eight years in
cabinet are all reflections of this same tendency.20
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What is certain, after these experiences, is that the radical left

parties will be wary of memberships in cabinets in the near future;
rather, they are likely to reposition themselves as radical voices of
opposition. Naturally, a reason behind these events has been the
shift of the social democrats to the right and a blurring of social demo-
crat/radical left identities as parts of a common governmental power,
which has hindered people from seeing the radical left as presenting a
true political alternative. Often, the radical left parties have dragged
the social democrats closer to their left roots, but this kind of effect is
difficult to demonstate to the public. Also, especially in Finland and
Norway, the mainstream media have gained maximun mileage out
of the radical left selling out, highlighting with considerable bias all
its concessions.21
In the good years for the radical left (in Norway and Sweden), it grew
as people turned away from the ever more capital-friendly approach
taken by the social democrats. This has taught the radical left that its pol-
itical prospects depend on showing a clear distance from the social demo-
crats. Indeed, despite their history, the social democrats have typically
been the ones to establish the neoliberal order and push the countries
into the market-oriented EU institutions (although whenever social
democrats enter opposition, their rhetoric leans left, which also easily
exhausts the political space of the radical left).

Conclusion
All in all, the situation of the left in the Nordics is largely shaped by
its institutional nature. Radical left parties are serious parliamentary

20. More detailed discussions on Nordic left parties in government can be found in
J. Olsen, M. Koss, and D. Hough, Left Parties in National Governments (New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2010).
21. It needs to be noted, though, that the Nordic countries, with the exception of
Finland, have explicit or de facto electoral bloc systems, in which parties associate
themselves to a given government formation already before the elections. This
makes radical left parties necessarily part of the social democrat bloc.
 Teppo Eskelinen 125

forces. This pushes the societies somewhat to the left, but also deradi-
calizes potential street protest, drawing activists to formal politics.
New movement activists have often found their way to the radical
left parties, but there has also been a lack of new left political forces,
as the existing parties tend to have a long history.
The left is generally struggling with two main issues: first, distan-
cing themselves from social democracy, and second, finding a compro-
mise between the material and the cultural aspects of left policy. It
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is likely that with the decline of the welfare state, and with poverty
again becoming a serious issue, there will be an increasing focus on
material issues, but framing the matter as defending the welfare
state looks unwise. An interesting aspect of this reorientation is that
some parts of the currently conservative unions might get radicalized
and align with the radical left.
In any case, in the face of steadily declining support, it seems that
the Nordic radical left parties have to reinvent themselves in the near
future; in what manner, remains to be seen.