The Rise and Demise of the Iranian Green

Revolution: Collective Action Framing

in Social Media

David Drissel

1 Introduction

For several riveting weeks in the summer of 2009, the nascent Green Movement
(Jonbesh-esabz) posed the most serious grassroots challenge to the political status
quo of Iran since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Over a million relatively youthful
protesters marched defiantly through the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities in
the immediate aftermath of the June 12, 2009 presidential election.1 Claiming that
widespread voter fraud had irreparably tainted the election results, protesters
demanded the removal from office of the disputed victor, incumbent President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Adopting the traditional Islamic color of green as a
symbol of unity, street protesters rallied in support of the top opposition presidential
candidate, Mir-Hossein Mousavia renowned artist and former prime minister
who had campaigned on a reformist agenda.
During the most intense period of overt protest in the summer of 2009, activists
associated with the Green Movement frequently utilized Twitter, Facebook, YouTube,
and other Western-based social-media networks in an apparent attempt to mobilize
supporters and coordinate movement activities, thus leading many observers to dub this
revolt the Twitter Revolution (Khan 2013; Honari 2013). Indeed, the burgeoning
Green Revolution was touted as the first major world event broadcast worldwide
almost entirely via social media (Keller 2010, p. 12), with real-time updates posted
regularly by various activists and citizen-journalists in Iran. Nonetheless, several other
observers claimed that the idea of a Twitter Revolution was simply a hyperbolic

1
Estimates of the number of marchers at the initial Green Movement rallies vary from the
millions to hundreds of thousands (Cross 2010, p. 173).
D. Drissel (*)
Iowa Central Community College, Fort Dodge, IA, USA
e-mail: Drissel@iowacentral.edu

Springer International Publishing AG 2017 139

E. Arbatli, D. Rosenberg (eds.), Non-Western Social Movements and Participatory
Democracy, Societies and Political Orders in Transition,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-51454-3_9
140 D. Drissel

irresistible meme coined by the Western media (Esfandiari 2010). Such critics
asserted that the role of Twitter and other social media sites in organizing demonstra-
tions was relatively limited in scope (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010, p. 175). But
regardless of the impact of Twitter, most street protests and other forms of overt public
dissent associated with the Green Movement were largely stifled within a matter of
weeks by a series of severe government crackdowns and mass arrests; though relatively
isolated, infrequent protests continued for several months afterward.2
This chapter focuses on the role of social media in galvanizing support for the
Green Movement and examines how Iranian activists have framed relevant events,
ideas, issues, and symbols on Twitter, Facebook, and other websites. The political,
social, economic, and technological circumstances in Iran that triggered the Green
Revolution and eventually contributed to its apparent demise are investigated. In
particular, the chapter explores how movement activists have utilized social media
to contest the dominant frames of the regime, enunciate their demands, and mobilize
supportersboth within Iran and around the world. It also examines the counter-
demonstration tactics and discursive counter frames that were utilized by the regime
in response to the protest campaign.
This chapter postulates that green activists were seeking to mobilize support by
basing their movement on the historic and contemporary framework of Shia Iran,
and by adopting elements from selected political frameworks of analogous social
movements across the globe. In effect, activists sought to align their movements
frames with those of both indigenous (national) and global (transnational) symbols,
norms, values, and related discursive concepts. The discussion here is particularly
relevant given the fact that collective action frames have been applied by several
different authors to an analysis of social movements in Western democracies (Snow
et al. 1986), but have been rarely applied to the study of non-Western, Islamic, or
authoritarian political systems. Moreover, the utilization of framing theory in
analyzing a social movements revolutionary discourse in social media and related
contestations for political power is relatively unique in the social science literature,
though not unprecedented.3

2
By the end of June 2009, Green Movement protest marches and other demonstrations had begun
to diminish significantly in size and frequency. However, the first truly unsuccessful Green
demonstration took place in February 2010. As Honari (2013) explains, The Green Movements
plan to hijack the official rally, which was called the Trojan Horse tactic, did not work. They
could not reveal their signs during the pro-government mass rally because either they were
relatively few compared to pro-government participants or they were scared to expose their
green banners among a dense population of police and security agents. (p. 159).
3
See, for instance, Drissel (2011).
The Rise and Demise of the Iranian Green Revolution: Collective Action. . . 141

2 Methodology

In preparing to write this chapter, I retrieved and analyzed 532 English-language

tweets (micro-blogs), discussion threads, status updates, videos, memes, and photos,
which had been posted on social media sites, presumably by Green Movement
activists and supporters in Iran. I have endeavored to identify tweets and other online
posts that apparently emanated directly from current Iranian residents, rather than
other (non-Iranian, international) sources. All of the tweets and other social media
commentary examined in this research project were posted originally on various
green-related Twitter accounts, Facebook pages, and other websites during the period
of June 1330, 2012.
The subjective, symbolic meanings of the Green Movements online discourse
are examined qualitatively in this chapter based on particular coding frames, which
are identified and analyzed accordingly. The texts of specific thematic and narrative
collective action frames, retrieved from online materials, were carefully coded and
grouped into nominal variables based on frequently appearing keywords, names,
and concepts. Such variables were then grouped into three overarching (general)
discursive categoriesindigenous (national) frames, global (transnational) frames,
and intermediate (hybrid) frames. Indigenous frames, which relate primarily to
domestic aspects of Iranian society, include the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Islamic
martyrdom/victimhood, Islamic green symbolism, traditional Persian culture,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Ayatollah Khamenei, and former
Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. Transnational frames, which are
linked primarily to the norms and values of social justice and related (non-Iranian)
social movements, include universal human rights/civil rights, nonviolent resis-
tance/protests, Palestinian nationalism, Indian nationalism, Irish nationalism, and
the American civil rights movement. Intermediate (hybrid) frames, which have
longstanding Western origins but also relatively modern Iranian sources of reso-
nance, include votes/elections and election fraud, freedom/repression, and democ-
racy/dictatorship.4

3 Framing Social Movements in Social Media

Frames are a schemata of interpretations that enable individuals to locate,

perceive, identify, and label various events and occurrences within their own life
experiences (Buechler 2011, p. 146). In other words, a frame simplifies and
condenses the world out there by selectively punctuating and encoding objects,
situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within ones present or past
environment (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 137). Specific social phenomena do not
normally become meaningful to individuals until they have been framed; that is to

4
For more information, see Table 1.
142 D. Drissel

Table 1 Coding frames

Specific
frequencies
General frame and numerical Number of
totals (%) Specific frame appearances (%)
Indigenous (National) Frames: Islamic green symbolism 384 (21.955)
1001 (57.232) Islamic Revolution and related 322 (18.410)
slogans
Islamic martyrdom and victimhood 93 (5.317)
Mir-Hossein Mousavi 72 (4.116)
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 67 (3.830)
Persian culture 42 (2.401)
Ayatollah Khamenei 12 (0.686)
Mohammad Mossadeq 9 (0.514)
Global (Trans-national) Frames: Social justice and universal human 96 (5.488)
204 (11.320) rights/civil rights
Nonviolent resistance/protests 72 (4.116)
Palestinian nationalism 14 (0.800)
Indian nationalism 12 (0.686)
Irish nationalism 7 (0.400)
American civil rights 3 (0.171)
Intermediate (Hybrid) Frames: Votes/elections and election fraud 418 (23.899)
544 (31.103) Freedom/repression and democracy/ 126 (7.204)
dictatorship

say, socially and cognitively organized as part of a discourse (Snow et al. 1986,
p. 211). Thus, social movement activists and other political entrepreneurs who
oppose the status quo often seek to create frames that inspire others to protest
(Aday et al. 2010, p. 19). Such collective action frames are devised to mobilize
potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize
antagonists (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 614).
Over the past decade, social media websites increasingly have enabled like-
minded cohorts to connect with each other one-on-one, thereby forging expansive
social networks based on friendly consensus building. The relatively higher
levels of immediacy, intimacy, and communal interactivity found on social media
sites tend to enhance interpersonal contacts that largely transcend geographic
boundaries. Moreover, Twitter and other social media sites are shifting from a
broadcaster of cultural identities to a translator or even author of cultural
identities (Turner 2010, p. 3), particularly for young people. This is because of
the fact that Twitter allows users to maintain a public, asynchronous conversation
with their followers online. The confluence and accessibility of tweets posted by
various users are enhanced by the use of hashtagsa keyword or phrase that acts as
a searchable metadata tag for similar tweets. Twitter also enables users to retweet
content easily on their own page that was posted originally by another user. Thus,
The Rise and Demise of the Iranian Green Revolution: Collective Action. . . 143

Twitter and other social media enable activists to frame and circulate their ideas
with relative ease to geographically dispersed individuals who hold common
interests and concerns.
In particular, activists are increasingly utilizing specific collective action frames
on Twitter, Facebook, and other social media sites to recruit or mobilize social
movement participants. Activists frequently attempt to mobilize prospective sup-
porters for their causeboth online and offlineby linking particular collective
action frames with the social experiences, symbols, norms, values, beliefs, and
concerns of a sympathetic audience. Such frame alignments are essential com-
ponents in the micro-mobilization of social movement participants (Snow and
Benford 1988, p. 198). For frame alignments to be successful, the movement
must frame (or reframe) its ideology, activities, and goals as compatible and
complementary with conceptions widely held by particular sentiment pools in
society, or else devise another discursive means for linking the movement with
the public.5 On the other hand, regime sympathizers can also devise counter-frames
that are designed to rebut the revolutionary frames of movements, thereby effec-
tively reconciling citizens to the status quo (Aday et al. 2010, p. 19).

4 Emergence of the Green Movement

In order to understand the reasons for the emergence of the Green Movement, it is
important to briefly examine the contemporary political, economic, and social
environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The supreme religious leader (cur-
rently Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei), the Council of Guardians, and other
clerical institutions that dominate Iran politically have managed to quell overt
dissent in large measure since the 1979 Revolution (Hashemi and Postel 2010).
However, there is also a parallel system of semi-competitive, popular elections for
the presidency and the Majles (parliament) in Iran. Thus, Iran has a dual political
system that includes semi-democratic elements within the government, which often
features behind-the-scenes factional power struggles between so-called liberal
reformers and conservative hardliners. As Sreberny and Khiabany (2010) observe,
Iran enjoys a much wider political field of participation and expression than most
other regimes in the region. (p. 4).
Like several other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Iran has
experienced a major decline in its national standard of living in recent decades,6
thus fueling sentiments of relative deprivation and growing popular unrest.

5
In effect, movement activists are engaging in frame lifting, which involves shaping collective
action to match an institutionally embedded frame (Morris 2000). Put simply, movement leaders
recognize that there are important symbols, narratives, and channels already in existence that can
be lifted from one domain to facilitate collective action in another.
6
For instance, Iran has dropped from 45th place in life expectancy to 133rd place among all UN
member-states since the 1979 Revolution.
144 D. Drissel

Moreover, numerous social problems that disproportionately affect young people

have grown worse since the Islamic Revolution, including unemployment, poverty,
depression, prostitution, domestic violence, drug addiction, divorce, and sexual
repression by authorities (Taheri 2009, p. 319). Complicating matters, a youth
bulge (or increase in birth rates) in Iran has magnified the severity of social
problems over the past few decades. Young people between the ages of 1529
comprise approximately 35% of the population but account for an astounding 70%
of the unemployed (Dabashi 2010, p. 23).
After almost two decades of relative political quiescence among the masses in
Iran, numerous reform-oriented protests (especially among university students)
emerged periodically from 1997 to 2005. This was especially the case following
the election of reformist President Mohammad Khatami, who encountered resis-
tance from the more conservative establishment (Bayat 2010, pp. 4748). But such
youthful protests had been largely quelled by the time Ahmadinejad became
president in 2005.
Nonetheless, Ahmadinejads conservative economic policies gradually fueled
new unrest in the country. Poverty, inflation, and unemployment rates skyrocketed
to new levels under Ahmadinejad,7 disproportionately harming middle- and lower-
income Iranians, especially young adults. In addition, gas prices quadrupled over-
night in December 2009 as a result of Ahmadinejads reductions in energy subsidies
(Hernandez 2013, p. 2). Ahmadinejad also advocated a massive privatization
campaign that was allegedly designed to benefit his cronies in the Iranian Revolu-
tionary Guard Corps (Alizadeh 2010, p. 5).
The groups most directly affected by these policies, including college students,
middle-class professionals, trade unionists, intellectuals, and womens groups,
eventually provided the core of the nascent Green Movement. In fact, many
urban young people, in particular, had begun referring to themselves as the burnt
generation (nasle sookhteh) by the time of the June 2009 presidential election. In
turn, Ahmadinejad and his supporters drew their grassroots support mainly from
poorer, rural areas of the country, as well as the religiously pious and government
workers (Hashemi and Postel 2010). And although many veterans personally
opposed Ahmadinejad because of his inglorious war record, the military-security
apparatus remained largely supportive of the regime (Dabashi 2010, p. 24).

5 The Green Movement and Social Media

Typical of competitive-authoritarian regimes, the presidential election of June

12, 2009, had been ostensibly democratic; though the Council of Guardians had
first closely screened 475 potential candidates before the final four contenders were

7
There was a 13% increase in poverty during Ahmadinejads first term of office (Bayat 2010,
p. 50). Moreover, the unemployment and inflation rates rose to 30 and 25% respectively in the
same period (Abrahamian 2010, p. 63).
The Rise and Demise of the Iranian Green Revolution: Collective Action. . . 145

selected. In addition to Ahmadinejad and Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karoubi

(a reform-oriented, former parliament speaker) and Moshen Rezaie (a conservative
former head of the Revolutionary Guard), were allowed to compete and campaign
openly for votes in the general election.
In sharp contrast to previous elections, the Internet in general and social media,
in particular, played an important political role in the months leading up to the
disputed June 12th election. Indeed, the number of Internet users and cell phone
accounts in Iran had risen dramatically over the past decade.8 Moreover, Iranians
had recently developed one of the largest blogospheres in the developing world.9 In
the months leading up to the June 12th election, the campaigns of all four presi-
dential candidates had set up their own websites and established Facebook pages
and sympathetic Twitter and YouTube accounts.
Even the supporters of Ahmadinejad had used social media extensively during
the campaign, though anti-Ahmadinejad group sites also proliferated dramatically
on Facebook during the same period.10 Social media sites were particularly advan-
tageous for the two reformist candidates given the fact that their access to the state-
owned radio and television stations was severely limited by the regime. For
Mousavi in particular, Facebook proved to be a major boon for his campaign,11
as the number of pro-Mousavi Facebook pages grew exponentially. In contrast to
Ahmadinejads relatively stagnant Facebook page, Mousavis main page became
steadily more popular during the campaign, climbing to 43,000 supporters by early
September 2009 (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010).
According to reports, the June 12th election witnessed a record-setting 85%
voter turnout, which raised expectations for a major electoral upset.12 However, the
official Iranian Ministry of Interior election results placed Ahmadinejad with 63%
of the vote, followed by Mousavi with 34%. The other two candidates, Rezaee and
Karoubi, earned 2% and less than 1% respectively (Ehsani et al. 2010, pp. 3132).
Almost as soon as the official vote tally was announced, Ahmadinejad and his

8
In 2000, for instance, there were only 132,000 Iranians who had regular access to the Internet; but
that number swelled to an estimated 418,000 in 2001, 1,326,000 in 2002, 11 million in 2006, and
23 million in 2009. Moreover, approximately 30 million Iraniansor 44% of the population
owned a mobile phone by 2009, which represented a dramatic increase from the recent past
(Sreberny and Khiabany 2010, pp. 1113). Within the city of Tehran alone, there were 5.5 million
cell phone users out of a population of 7.8 million people. In particular, students and other young
adults reportedly comprised the overwhelming majority of cell phone users in Tehran and
throughout Iran (Bakhtavar 2009, p. 201).
9
By the time of the June election, there were an estimated 75,000 active bloggers in Iran. The
Iranian blogosphere likely exceeded the size of its entire Arab counterpart by June 2009; though
the Iranian Internet was heavily censored and lacked broadband access (Aday et al. 2010, p. 13).
10
Such pages included posts that called for the Presidents ouster and even compared him to Hitler.
11
Mousavis Facebook page first appeared in April 2009 and was initially utilized as a campaign
tool for the upcoming election (Cross 2010, p. 171).
12
As Alizadeh (2010) notes, The increase in turnout Irans elections has always benefited the
opposition and not the incumbent, because it is rational to assume that those who usually dont
vote, i.e., the silent majority, only come out when they want to change the status quo (p. 4).
146 D. Drissel

supporters were accused of utilizing surreptitious tactics and the machinery of the
state in order to rig the election results in their favor. Such accusations were based
on the inexplicably rapid announcement of the overall vote tally by officialdom
within 2 hours of the polls closingcoupled with the unexpectedly large margin of
victory for Ahmadinejad. In addition, Iranian critics noted that the results did not
vary significantly by region, which raised suspicions of a hastily contrived, fraud-
ulent vote count.13
Consequently, numerous large street demonstrations were held in Tehran and
other Iranian cities, with protesters rallying in support of the top opposition presi-
dential candidate, Mousavi. Adopting the traditional Islamic color of green as a
symbol of unity, hundreds of thousands of protesters marched through the streets
brandishing green ribbons, unfurling green flags, and wearing green scarves, ban-
danas, finger-bands, headbands, and armbands. The largest rally reportedly occurred
on June 16, which included over a million protesters in Tehran (Sreberny and
Khiabany 2010, p. 172). The nonviolent uprising was soon being touted as the
Green Movement, also known as the Green Wave, Green Tsunami, Sea of
Green, Green Path of Hope, and Persian Awakening (Khan 2013). The labeling
of the movement as green was based to some extent on the recent pattern of color
revolutions in several Eurasian states such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.
As was the case in previous color revolutions, protesters in Iran claimed that
widespread voter fraud had tainted the election count, thereby demanding that the
results be annulled and the dubious winner be removed from office immediately and
unceremoniously.
The Green Movement began as a protest campaign that was reformist in char-
acter but gradually evolved into a more revolutionary position (Hashemi and Postel
2010). In the first several days of the protest campaign, rallying cries of Stolen
election, Where is my vote? and We are countless, became common, and such
phrases were often seen on placards at demonstrations. But in preparation for a
violent crackdown on protesters, the regime expelled foreign journalists expedi-
tiously. As a result, social media and other information technologies quickly
became the primary nexus for disseminating information and mobilizing support
both domestically and internationally (Khan 2013).
In the weeks following the disputed election, visits to Mousavis Facebook page
increased dramatically, even though Facebook activity in Iran had declined overall
during the same period, due in part to renewed restrictions imposed by the regime
(Cross 2010, p. 171). Meanwhile, the number of Twitter users in Iran more than
doubled, rising from 8654 in the weeks before June 12th to 19,235 in the immediate
aftermath of the election (Bakhtavar 2009, p. 209). Thousands of Iranians soon
changed their profile picture on Twitter and Facebook into an eye-catching green
square featuring green ribbons and viral slogans such as, Where is my vote? In
addition, many movement supporters around the world transformed their own

13
At the time, critics also pointed to many specific absurdities in the election tally. For details,
see Alizadeh (2010, pp. 34).
The Rise and Demise of the Iranian Green Revolution: Collective Action. . . 147

profiles into an identical hue, adding the sympathetic phrase, Where is their vote?
Spurred on by social media, major pro-green rallies were held in at least 6 countries
and 100 cities around the world in the immediate post-election period.
Within hours of the disputed election results being announced on June 12, green
activists in Iran had launched several highly active, new Twitter pages and hash-
tags, which featured ongoing commentary posted in both English and Farsi.
Revealingly, the wording of opposition tweets changed dramatically in the after-
math of the election. In the weeks prior to the election, tweets focused mainly on the
importance of freedom and voting, but soon after the election the newer round
of tweets began to emphasize protest and Tehran (Bakhtavar 2009, p. 209).
Many such post-election tweets referred to allegations of electoral fraud, as the
following examples culled from Twitter illustrate: Give us our votes back and
They have stolen our votes and they are flaunting our stolen votes!
These tweets, authored by Iranian green activists, were not simply propaganda
posts contesting the election results, but also provided real-time updates on the
evolving situation in Tehran. Many such tweets included actual tactical information
to movement participants on the streets of Tehran and other cities in an attempt to
coordinate responses.14 Some tweets even provided recommendations on the best
ways to confuse pro-government forces that were being bused into Tehran by the
regime.15 Green activists on Twitter and other social media websites often relayed
precise instructions about upcoming protests, marches, and other events associated
with the movement.16 Moreover, many tweets disseminated updates about specific
rendezvous points for upcoming protests,17 and even provided information on
where to take wounded protesters for treatment, noting that the injured should be
brought to specific embassies rather than hospitals.18

14
For instance, one tweet observed, Basiji are breaking into homes! Gather in large neighborhood
groups. Offering important advice, many tweets made cautionary statements to Green Movement
protesters, such as the following: Due to overnight Basij attack to peoples home make sure to
remove all markings from your doors.
15
For example, one tweet encouraged protesters to remove all street signs, so shipped-in forces
will lose orientation.
16
Examples included, Tomorrow 4 p.m. Green Wave march is not canceled, and Mousavi &
Karoubi ask supporters not to attend Friday prayers (which is being delivered by supreme leader
Ayatollah Khamenei).
17
For instance: Mousavis supporters will take part in peaceful demonstrations today at Imam
Khomeini Sq. in Tehran, and Please join Mousavi, Khatami and Karoubi tomorrow at
4 p.m. from Enghelab Sq. to Arzadi Sq. in Tehran for a crucial green protest.
18
Tweets explained, for example, that the Italian embassy was not accepting wounded protesters,
in contrast to the Portuguese and Mexican embassies that were openly receiving and treating the
injured.
148 D. Drissel

6 Indigenous Frames of the Green Movement

Approximately 57% of the Green Movement collective action frames observed on

Twitter and other social media are linked symbolically to the overarching, indige-
nous narrative of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 or related discursive domains of
traditional Shia Islamic/Iranian/Persian history and culture. In particular, online
activists attempted to frame the Green Movement as both authentically Islamic and
Iranian, thereby describing their opponents as deviating from Islamic principles and
related Iranian norms and values.19 In addition, activists sought to portray the
movement as highly popular and growing in strength, which they described sym-
bolically as a green wave of support for social change that had not been seen on
the streets of Tehran since the halcyon days of the 1979 Revolution.20
Thus, the narrative mythos of the new Green Movement drew directly on the
Iranian Revolution of 1979 for inspiration, including the Spring of Freedom that
immediately followed the toppling of the Shah, but had been effectively quashed
within months of Ayatollah Khomeini taking power (Bayat 2010, p. 42). Indeed,
activists sought to portray the Green Revolution as the logical extension of the 1979
revolution, featuring a New Spring of Freedom. Activists claimed that Ahmadinejad
and other regime insiders had effectively betrayed the democratic-republican values of
the 1979 Revolution. In effect, activists were asserting that Iran had experienced a
Thermidor, or counterrevolution, under Ahmadinejad. As one tweet intoned, Repres-
sion is not Islamic, fascism is fascism, no matter how you disguise it. Activists
were even calling on the military to abandon the regime and embrace the will of the
people.21
Ironically, Ahmadinejads own words were appropriated by green activists and
used against him in social media. In response to the uproar in the streets, Ahmadi-
nejad had invoked a contemptuous Persian metaphor, referring to protesters as dirt
and dust (khas o khashak in Farsi). Comparing protesters to soccer hooligans,
Ahmadinejad told a cheering throng of supporters in Tehran on June 14: The
nations huge river would not leave any opportunity for the expression of dirt and
dust. But rather than reject the epithet, green activists decided to effectively turn it
on its head; thereby embracing and reframing it as a badge of honor and pride. Most

19
One tweet stressing the Islamic character of the Green Movement, for instance, observed,
Today most protesters are carrying the holy Quran. And another tweet boldly asserted, Mousavi
has called for a general strike. Stay on the streets today. Keep your Holy Quran with you. It is a
shield.
20
As one tweet asserted ominously, If you dont hear us it doesnt mean we dont exist, Tsunami
on the way.
21
One tweet, for instance, queried, Will the army move in defense of the people? There are voices
in highest ranks calling for this.
The Rise and Demise of the Iranian Green Revolution: Collective Action. . . 149

notably, the slogan was utilized in several pro-green anthem-style music videos
posted on YouTube and linked to on various Twitter and Facebook pages.22
Furthermore, many of the tactics of the Green Movement were lifted directly
from the 1979 Revolution, including the practice of shouting the phrase Allah-u-
akbar (God is Great) anonymously from city rooftops at night. Notably, this
tactic was strongly encouraged by numerous posts on social media.23 As the Green
Movement grew bolder and more critical of the regime, placards at rallies and posts
on Twitter and Facebook became increasingly provocative and recalled the slogans
of the 1979 Revolution, including Dictatorship is finished! Neither Crown nor
Turban!24
Many tweets in June 2009 specifically emphasized the likely prospect of reli-
gious (Islamic) martyrdom by Green Movement supporters. Moreover, the tradi-
tional Shia culture of victimhood, which emphasizes the injuries incurred by
protesters at the hands of the authorities, permeated the Green Movement.25 In
particular, the agonizing death of a young female protester, Neda Agha-Soltan,
victim of a sniper attack on the streets of Tehran on June 20, became a potent
emblem. Bystanders had used their cell phones to videotape Neda as she lay dying
on the street. The video was uploaded to the web and quickly went viral on social
media, becoming a powerful symbol of the cruelty of the Iranian government
towards unarmed protesters (Kurzman 2010, pp. 1213). Activists depicted Neda
as the ultimate martyr for the Green Movement, asserting that her murder was
blatantly unjust and un-Islamic. Compellingly, the Persian word neda, means
voice or calling, which was cleverly re-contextualized by activists to describe
Neda as the voice of Iran. In the days and weeks that followed, countless Neda-
related tweets, songs, and music videos were posted on social media. Additionally,
a new hashtag, #Neda, was created by green activists to more effectively dis-
seminate her story.26

22
One popular chant, for instance, was directed to Ahmadinejad, as follows: Dirt and dust is you,
it is you who are the enemy of Iran. And a related slogan, often retweeted, asserted, We are not
dirt and dust, we are Irans nation.
23
As one tweet with the hashtag #IranElection reminded supporters: Tonight 10,11,12, Allah
Akbar from rooftops.
24
Although this slogan referred originally to the Shah, the Green Movement effectively lifted and
appropriated the frame by instead referring to Ahmadinejad and Khamenei (Gheytanchi 2010,
p. 255).
25
As one tweet observed in somber tones: Mousavi we will stand beside youwe will die beside
youAllah Akbarpeace be upon all man. Another tweet observed that the people are
prepared to die, our leaders must be prepared to lead. And one popular movement slogan, often
retweeted, connected martyrdom directly to the act of voting, as follows: Martyred brother, we
will get back your vote. Several tweets emphasized the public recognition of recent martyrs, as
follows: Honorable people of Iran, please pay your condolences to families of martyrs from
recent events by taking part in ceremonies at mosques on Thursday.
26
Examples of tweets focusing on Neda included, Let Nedas voice be heard, This is Neda!
Dont ever forget her, and Neda you will always remain in our hearts. In addition, comments by
150 D. Drissel

In response, the Iranian regime denied any involvement in the sniper attack,
alleging instead that green protesters, conspiring with the CIA or other foreign
saboteurs, were responsible for Nedas death. Nonetheless, Mousavi and Karroubi
defiantly called upon their fellow Iranians to commemorate the death of Neda, who
had suddenly become an iconic figure for the Green Movement.27 Reviving another
practice from the 1979 Revolution, based on customary Shia customs, Green
Movement protesters conducted a traditional mourning ceremony and rally for
Neda on the fortieth day (July 30) after her death, which was heavily promoted
on social media posts. Activists also timed an important demonstration on the same
day as Ashuraa major Shia religious festival, following in the footsteps of the
1979 Revolution. As a method of protest, fortieth-day mourning had all but
disappeared until the Green Movement revived it in the summer of 2009, Kurzman
(2010, pp. 1213) observes.
Another example of an attempted indigenous frame alignment involves Green
Movement protesters carrying signs and forwarding tweets featuring the former
Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. Depicted as a champion of democ-
racy, Mossadeq had been overthrown by a CIA-sponsored coup detat in 1953,
which reinstated the Shah. The display of Mossadeqs visage on posters at rallies
and in social media was an attempt to align the Green Movement with historic
democratic traditions in Iran and opposition to both domestic tyranny and foreign
interventionism (Kinzer 2010, p. 27). In effect, green activists on social media
sought to portray Ahmadinejad and Khamenei both individually and collectively as
the new Shah. In particular, green activists apparently sought to frame the 2009
election fiasco as similar to what had transpired in the 1953 coup detat. Activists
asserted that in both cases important Iranian political norms and values had been
violated by powerful elites with impunity.28

Roger Waters of Pink Floyd fame were retweeted frequently by green activists, which referred to
Neda as the one in fifty million who can help us to be freebecause she died on TV.
27
Announcing his appeal on Facebook, Karroubi asked protesters to assemble in Tehrans city
center at 4 p.m. on June 22. Green activists also promoted this event heavily on Twitter, thereby
apparently helping to mobilize a larger number of demonstrators.
28
As one tweet asserts euphemistically about the 2009 election, The Shahs sin was to insist that
whatever he says is right, not whatever the people say. In effect, such tweets were a strong
critique of the current Iranian government, framing it as inherently corrupt, fraudulent, and
dictatorial. One popular tweet, for instance, compared Ahmadinejad to the Shah, making light of
Ahmadinejads dubious claim that he has a doctorate in engineering: Down with the dictator,
whether a shah or a doctor.
The Rise and Demise of the Iranian Green Revolution: Collective Action. . . 151

7 Transnational Frames of the Green Movement

Besides framing the Green Movement symbolically as the legitimate successor to

the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and linking it discursively to various indigenous
collective action frames, green activists also frequently invoked an overarching
transnational frame of reference identified conceptually in this chapter as social
justice. By definition, social justice refers to the process by which society attains
a fair and equitable distribution of political, economic, and social resources. In
contrast to justice in a broad sense, social justice is a relatively more recent
construct that has its origins in the Western class-based struggles of the nineteenth
century, which arose largely in response to the Industrial Revolution. When, more
concretely, we attack some policy or some state of affairs as socially unjust, we are
claiming that a person, or more usually a category of persons, enjoys fewer advan-
tages than that person or groups of persons ought to enjoy (or bears more of the
burdens than they ought to bear), Miller (1999) explains. In the modern era, social
justice increasingly has included a broad spectrum of norms and values that have
been disseminated globally, including support for universal human rights, civil
rights, and national self-determination, along with nonviolent opposition to the
abuse of power by governments, corporations, and financial institutions.29
Approximately 11% of the tweets and online posts observed during the course of
this research project include transnational collective action frames related discur-
sively to social justice. In effect, green activists were endeavoring to frame the
Iranian regime as unjust and illegitimate due allegedly to its premeditative abuse of
power and related violations of universal human rights and other transnational
norms and values associated with social justice.30
More specifically, many online activists in the summer of 2009 effectively
sought to achieve a frame alignment between the Green Movement and other social
movements around the world that also claimed to be committed to the norms and
values of social justice. Such movements, invoked repeatedly by activists on social
media, include the Palestinian Nationalist Movement, the Indian Independence
Movement, and the American Civil Rights Movement. Green activists on Twitter
and Facebook, for instance, widely promoted an upcoming demonstration in Tehran
that was scheduled to coincide with Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), an annual
pro-Palestinian observance. In addition, activists adopted the well-known Palestin-
ian cartoon character, Naji al-Handala, as one of their new movement symbols.
Images of the iconic animated figure, dressed in an Iranian-reformist green scarf,

29
The related concept of global justice is described as an alternative globalism (or globalization
from below) that contests the power and prerogatives of the reputedly hegemonic, market-
oriented model of globalization that predominates in the world (Steger 2009).
30
Mousavi, for instance, asserted the following in a public statement, which was widely dissem-
inated on Facebook and Twitter in the aftermath of the June election: Justice is the most
significant indicator of wholesome governance . . . Authoritarianism will depart from the country
when no one is deprived of his or her rights by the personal command of the ruler for the sole
crime of criticizing and opposing his commands and actions.
152 D. Drissel

were uploaded to social media. In effect, activists were attempting to identify the
Palestinian cause with the Iranian opposition, not the Iranian regime (Kurzman
2010, p. 15).
Moreover, green activists on social media endeavored to lift many of the
collective action frames, narratives, and symbols associated with Mahatma Gandhi,
Martin Luther King Jr., and other historic social movement leaders from around the
world, thereby re-contextualizing their personas and agendas for the Green Move-
ment. Many activists in Iran evidently recognized that the ideas and strategies of
Gandhi,31 King,32 and other historic figures have continued to resonate with
contemporary supporters of social justice in countless global locales. Consequently,
various tweets authored by green activists observed in this research project some-
times quoted or paraphrased Gandhi and King; though additional words and phrases
written by Iranians were often added to such tweets in order to align the ideologies
of such iconic figures more directly to the Green Movement.33
Instructively, green activists generally framed their movement as inherently
peaceful but also as a righteous and powerful vehicle for progressive social change,
thus following in the footsteps of other movements from around the world that
have also extolled social justice and passive resistance. Framed by supporters on
Facebook and Twitter in glowing terms, the Green Movement was described with a
variety of striking metaphors as follows: Sea of Green, you are radiant face of Iran,
source of hope and revitalization of the human spirit for all people.34

31
The celebrated Iranian filmmaker, Mohsen Makhmalbaf, for instance, explained that the Green
Revolution was akin to a new civil rights movement committed to non-violent resistancea
transformative event not only for Iran, but also for Mousavi. As he observed about Mousavi in June
2009, which was posted on Facebook and other social media sites: Previously, he was revolu-
tionary, because everyone inside the system was a revolutionary. But now hes a reformer. Now he
knows Gandhibefore he knew only Che Guevara. If we gain power through aggression we
would have to keep it through aggression. That is why were having a Green Revolution, defined
by peace and democracy.
32
For a discussion of Martin Luther King and the Green Movement, see Ahmari (2010). As he
observes, Iran today is arguably the most vital proving ground for Dr. Kings ideas. The Iranian
Green Movement has consciously transposed to its setting the techniques once used by African
Americans to face down vicious white deputies and their attack dogs. In Iran the role of the
southern deputies is taken up by the baton-wielding Basijis, who mercilessly veer their motorcy-
cles into crowds and indiscriminately beat protestor and bystander alike (pp. 173174).
33
As one tweet from June 2009 notes, for instance: Truth never damages a cause that is just, and
First they ignore you, then they ridicule you, then they fight you, then you win. ~ Mahatma
Gandhi #IranElection #Gr88 This is our story. And a Facebook post from the same month
combines synergistically Dr. Kings warning that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere with a stanza written by the famous thirteenth century Persian poet, Saadi Shirazi,
transliterated into English as follows: Human beings are members of a whole, in creation of one
essence and soul. If one member is afflicted with pain, other members uneasy will remain. If you
have no sympathy for human pain, the name of human you cannot retain.
34
Various cautionary notes were also sounded, as one tweet intones: Do not pick up a gun.
Mousavi calls on Sea of Green not to be violent . . . do not sink to the regimes level that is how we
win. Warning protesters against engaging in violent action, one tweet asserts, The more there are
riots, the more repressive action will take place, the more we face the danger of a . . . fascist
The Rise and Demise of the Iranian Green Revolution: Collective Action. . . 153

In an apparent attempt to connect the nonviolent tactics of the Green Movement

with the past struggle for civil rights in the United States, Northern Ireland, and
other countries, activists linked their #IranElection twitter feed to a video posted on
YouTube featuring the U2 song, Sunday, Bloody, Sunday. In the video, words
from the 800-year-old Persian poem, Song of the Reed Flute, appeared on screen.
Thus, the song was re-contextualized for both Iranian and Western audiences,
thereby reflecting a prospective frame alignment between the Green Movement
and related defining moments of harsh repression (bloody Sundays) in the
Westfrom Selma, Alabama to Londonderry, Northern Ireland. In a similar form
of cultural hybridity, posts on Twitters Green Movement pages and hashtags were
linked to a new version of the classic American civil rights anthem, We Shall
Overcome. Performed by Joan Baez and posted on YouTube, the song included
lyrics in both English and Farsi. Links posted on Twitter noted that the song was
dedicated to the Iranian people during their time of struggle against oppression.
On the one hand, activists sought to counter the Iranian regimes allegation that
the Green Movement was a foreign plot by emphasizing its authentically Shia-
Islamic origins and ideological connections to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and
other symbols and narratives that stand in opposition to all forms of injustice
including Western imperialism. The green frame of Mossadeq, for instance,
stressed that he had been overthrown by a CIA-sponsored coup detat in 1953.
Many frames also emphasized how civil rights had been violated previously in the
West; thus portraying Western political elites in an often-negative light. But on the
other hand, several tweets posted by activists around the world sought to connect
the Green Movement to contemporary Western political framesincluding the
critical assessment of Ahmadinejad issued by U.S. President Barrack Obama: I
would suggest that Mr. Ahmadinejad think carefully about the obligations he owes
to his own people. Not coincidentally, the mainstream Western media sometimes
portrayed Mousavi as the Obama of Iran, who symbolized revolutionary change
from a corrupt status quo (Khan 2013, p. 12). Problematically, such depictions
inadvertently fanned rumors of Western intervention in contemporary Iranian
political affairs and covert support for the Green Movement.

8 Failure of the Green Revolution

There are several important reasons why the Green Revolution initially caught fire
within Iran, but ultimately failed. First and foremost, the Iranian regime has
maintained many popular state-sponsored economic arrangements for decades

society. Attempting to seize the moral high ground, another tweet notes, There is a point where
condemning atrocity is a moral obligation. Massacres reach that point. A related tweet utilizes the
injustice frame of oppression, noting, It is long after midnight and across the nation the cries of
the oppressed ascend to the heavens.
154 D. Drissel

that have dampened support for subversive movements. In particular, Irans huge
oil reserves, combined with an authoritarian political system, have turned the
country into a de facto rentier state (Hashemi and Postel 2010). Significantly, oil
revenues provide approximately 45% of the total Iranian governmental budget,
while tax revenues provide only 30% (Cross 2010, p. 185). In effect, the Iranian
rentier state is able to buy the allegiance of people whose livelihood is tied to the
survival of the regime (Hashemi and Postel 2010). Moreover, oil revenues tend to
fuel the repression effect, thereby limiting the prospects of democratization by
enabling governments to boost their funding for internal security (Ross 2001, p. 328).
Thus, Irans rentier state likely galvanized opposition to the Green Movement
and restricted its expansion into many demographic groups that are directly or
indirectly dependent on oil revenues. Such revenues also enabled the regime to
tacitly bribe counter-protesters to come to Tehran and other cities in support of the
regime. The government remained relatively strong in the face of adversity by
retaining control of key institutions of the state and related patronage networks. The
regime utilized its extensive networks to transport busloads of regime loyalists
into Tehran by enticing them with either free food or the fear of losing their
government jobs or subsidies (Hashemi and Postel 2010). In particular, most
members of the traditional Iranian middle classthe bazarrislargely supported
Ahmadinejad because of their dependency on government-subsidized commodities
and services (Dabashi 2010, p. 24). Even the vast religious sector (e.g., mosques,
shrines, cultural associations, schools, seminaries) was dependent on proceeds from
oil income (Bayat 2010, p. 51).
In theory, indiscriminatebut not overwhelmingstate violence against mobilized
groups and oppositional political figures can facilitate the growth of powerful revolu-
tionary movements (Goodwin 2001). And certainly, the Iranian police/paramilitary
apparatus repeatedly engaged in indiscriminate violence against protesters, which
initially emboldened the Green Movement and prompted higher levels of participation
for a time. However, at some point the regime began to use overwhelming state
violence against the demonstrators; thus seriously weakening the movements popular
underpinnings. As the movement approached a crescendo of massive direct action, the
regime went on a vicious counterattack. Consequently, dozens of protesters were
killed, hundreds were injured, and thousands were arrested. Virtually every leader of
the movement was arrested, jailed, executed, or assassinated, as were many sympa-
thetic journalists and activists. Reformist mainstream media outlets were mostly closed
down by the regime.35 In effect, Iran evolved from an authoritarian to a neo-totalitarian
state in response to the movement. Consequently, Stalinist-style show trials were
conducted, and Iran witnessed a full-blown reign of terror that was utilized to squash
the prospective revolution (Hashemi and Postel 2010).

35
According to Reporters Without Borders, more than 100 Iranian journalists were arrested, and at
least 50 others were deported, during the 6-month period following the June 2009 presidential
election (Honari 2013, p. 152).
The Rise and Demise of the Iranian Green Revolution: Collective Action. . . 155

Simply put, the states escalation of violence has made the streets a site of
confrontation rather than mobilization (Ehsani et al. 2010, p. 36). And in spite of
other apparent weaknesses, the Iranian government continues to maintain a rela-
tively strong policing system which includes a physically powerful military-
security apparatus. The IRGC,36 in particular, is a very strong paramilitary organi-
zation that provided Ahmadinejad and his supporters with crucial political support
during the Green Revolution.37 Operating as Irans biggest holding company and
controlling hundreds of businesses including the Iranian armament industry and its
fledgling nuclear program, the IRGC has become the dominant force within the
ruling establishment in Tehran (Taheri 2009, p. 244). Thus, the IRGC was
instrumental in galvanizing and channeling support for Ahmadinejad and opposi-
tion to the Green Movement. In particular, the IRGC and their paramilitary com-
patriots in the Basij effectively crushed the protests and created a climate of fear
(Halliday 2010, p. 53).
Moreover, the fact that Khamenei decided to throw his personal clout behind
Ahmadinejad in the immediate aftermath of the election was unprecedented, given
the fact that the Supreme Leader normally is expected to remain neutral in electoral
politics. Though some experts believe that Khamenei may have undermined his
own authority in the long run by taking such a step (Ehsani et al. 2010, p. 35), he
managed to present a united front within the regime, effectively helping to bridge
the factional gap between old-guard principalists and neo-principalists.
Even the Twitter Revolution eventually backfired on the Green Movement,
though social media posts apparently were very helpful at first in sparking demon-
strations and mobilizing participation on the streets of Tehran, and eliciting support
for the movement worldwide. Indeed, tweets, videos, and other social media posts
uploaded by activists initially increased the incentives of participation by demon-
strating that a significant number of fellow citizens were taking part in the protests
(Honari 2013, p. 156). But soon after the protests began, regime supporters began
using both mass media and social media sites to defend the integrity and legiti-
macy of Ahmadinejads electoral victory (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010, p. 172),
thereby seeking to counter-frame the Green Movement as unpatriotic and backed
surreptitiously by the United States and Israel (Aday et al. 2010, p. 19). Tellingly,
the regime effectively dubbed the new movement, the Green Sedition. In addi-
tion, the authorities officially shut down the entire countrys cell phone network and

36
Officially responsible for exporting the Islamic revolution to other parts of the world, the IRGC
provides financing and material support to numerous branches of Hezbollah, along with other
militant groups. The IRGC even has its own air, naval, and ground forces, and thus represents a
powerful parallel counterweight to the official Iranian armed forces, as well as the Council of
Guardians and other theocratic organs dominated by Shiite clergy (Taheri 2009, p. 244).
37
As a vast patronage network, the IRGC serves as a fast track for achieving political, economic,
and social success in Iran. It is noteworthy that Ahmadinejad and more than half of his cabinet
were IRGC members. In addition, IRGC members controlled approximately one-third of the seats
in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), as of 2008.
156 D. Drissel

short message service (text message) networks, thereby making electronic commu-
nication between movement participants much more difficult (Alizadeh 2010, p. 4).
Even so, many demonstrators found circuitous ways to access social media and
continued to flood threads with cries of support for protesters. But ironically, such
steps increasingly rendered Twitter mostly useless as a valid source of information
for the movement. In particular, green activists inadvertently jammed Twitter with
rapid-fire one-sided pointless tweets that often lacked clarity and confused pro-
testers (Malek 2010, p. 282). In addition, many tweets and postings contained
erroneous rumors about events and incidents occurring on the streets of Tehran.38
Such phenomena apparently had the unintended effect of limiting the informational
and motivational power of the Green Movements cyber-network.
Furthermore, videos of green protests uploaded to YouTube, Facebook, and
other sites had the unanticipated effect of exposing mainstream movement sup-
porters and potential participants to many extremely gritty and uncensored
images of beatings and deaths of their fellow protesters. Although such images
further radicalized a minority of participants, most protesters had been relatively
moderate in their demands and tactics and were thus encouraged to retreat from the
streets after seeing such online displays of overwhelming state violence (Fathi
2009; Malek 2010). The Iranian regimes security apparatus also utilized the
Internet expeditiously to identify and arrest pro-green protesters. Most ominously,
the regime developed a crowdsourcing website that was used to post photos of
protesters, often copied from Twitter and other social media sites. The authorities
offered rewards online to anyone who could identify the culprits, which led
reportedly to the arrest and detention of numerous protesters (Verderosa 2009).

9 Conclusion

In the immediate aftermath of the June 12, 2009 presidential election, the Green
Movement was sparked by widespread charges of electoral fraud and grew expo-
nentially in both size and influence. Activists were generally defiant though opti-
mistic in their overall demeanor and emboldened by their collective effervescence.
Over a million urban young adultsthe so-called burnt generationwere
inspired to take to the streets after their hopes had been dashed by the official
results of the presidential election.
Certainly, participation in this nascent movement was incentivized for a time by
the proliferation of relevant tweets and other social media postings that were being
disseminated to both a domestic and global audience. Social media played an

38
For instance, a series of pro-green tweets relayed the erroneous story of a young woman who had
been raped, tortured, and murdered by police, after being arrested for chanting Allah Akbar on
her rooftop. This report was revealed to be a hoax, but only after being disseminated extensively on
Twitter and other social media (Esfandiari 2010).
The Rise and Demise of the Iranian Green Revolution: Collective Action. . . 157

important informational role for a time, especially given the growing censorship of
mainstream Iranian media outlets coupled with the temporary expulsion of foreign
journalists by the Iranian regime. But even if Iran did not undergo a full-fledged
Twitter Revolution, Twitter certainly became a highly visible tool for movement
activists and organizersespecially in the initial post-election period. In particular,
social media were very effective in circulating information about the allegedly
fraudulent election results and the time and location of protest marches. In addition,
many tweets offered various tactical recommendations on how to interact with the
oppressive security apparatus and violent-prone militias of the regime.
Most importantly, the framing of the Green Movement on Twitter and other
social media sites contributed significantly to the social construction of a new
collective identity and oppositional consciousness among youthful protesters and
other regime critics in Iran. To a large extent, this micro-mobilization process was
facilitated by the construction of an innovative online discourse that endeavored to
link the Green Movement primarily to indigenous frames of Iranian-Islamic history
and culture, but also to global justice frames of universal human rights and other
transnational concerns. Such a dual-discursive strategy appears to have been suc-
cessful initially in eliciting greater levels of popular support for the movement both
inside and outside of Iran. In effect, green activists managed to lift relevant frames
of reference not only from the 1979 Iranian Revolution and traditional Shia Iranian
culture, but also from the Palestinian Nationalist Movement, the Indian Indepen-
dence Movement, the American Civil Rights Movement, and other comparable
collective struggles. Put simply, movement activists sought to shape their collective
action by aligning the frames of the Green Movement with preexisting, embedded
frames in Iran and around the world.
However, the Green Movement ultimately failed to achieve its main political
objectives because it was unable to seriously threaten the main pillars of power
in Iranthe regimes oil income and related patronage network, government-
subsidized clerical establishment, powerful economic institutions, and the armed
forces and the paramilitaries (Kurzman 2010, pp. 1315). In each of these power
centers, Ahmadinejad and his supporters maintained a virtual monopoly of power,
which proved to be sufficient for protecting and immunizing the regime from
revolution while effectively counteracting the Green Movement. The rentier state-
system and its subsidy-largess, coupled with Ahmadinejads network ties to the
Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, strengthened the regime sufficiently to with-
stand and eventually repress the Green Revolution. Put simply, Ahmadinejad con-
trolled the highly organized military-clerical-commercial complex (Abrahamian
2010, p. 61), which gave a decisive advantage to the regime over the loosely
connected, semi-organized movement.
Moreover, the sheer magnitude of Iranian state violence and intimidation over-
whelmed the protesters, thereby generating a climate of fear. Given the deeply
authoritarian, patriarchal, and fervently ideological political culture of Iran (Bayat
2010, p. 47), the Green Movement was unprepared for the united onslaught of a
regime in mass-repression mode. Even the use of social media eventually proved to
be insufficient and counterproductive in mobilizing supporters after the first few
158 D. Drissel

weeks of the rebellion, given the persistent problems of information overload and
unsubstantiated rumors disseminated online. Paradoxically, the online dissemina-
tion of viral videos depicting excessive state violence against protesters almost
certainly fueled more fear than resolve among Green Movement supporters, par-
ticularly as the regime escalated its crackdown in late June. The regimes use of
highly effective counter-frames to rebut the greens ideational framework, coupled
with the technological manipulation of social media to locate and arrest protesters,
apparently served as the coup de gr^ ace for repressing the movement.
Far from enjoying unanimous support in Iranian society, the Green Movement
was weakened by pro-regime forces, which includes a significant percentage of the
populace whose livelihoods or positions are directly dependent upon the state. What
seemed to be conspicuously lacking from the Green Movements discourseboth
online and offlinewas a comprehensive economic framework for political
change, which likely proved to be a major strategic weakness. Tellingly, surveys
conducted during the Green Revolution revealed that Iranian political sympathies
were almost evenly divided between the regime and the protesters (Alizadeh 2010,
p. 16). To a large extent, the regime succeeded by convincing much of the Iranian
public that the protesters were simply pawns of adversarial foreign powers.
Effectively utilizing counter-frames in mass media outlets and social media venues,
regime sympathizers apparently helped to instill perceptions of the Green Move-
ment as toxic within large swathes of Iranian society (Aday et al. 2010, p. 19).
Thus, Twitter and other social media outlets ultimately became an ironic vector for
state repression of the Green Movement.

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