PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) v.
COA, Ruling:
G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012 (Per Diem; Good Faith)
Facts:
The PEZA Board of Directors is composed of 13 members which include
the Undersecretaries of the Department of Finance, the Department of
Labor and Employment, the Department of the Interior and Local
Government, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Public Works and
Highways, the Department of Science and Technology and the
Department of Energy. Said Undersecretaries serve in ex officio capacity
and were granted per diems by PEZA for every attendance in a board
meeting.
On September 13, 2007, the PEZA Auditor Corazon V. Espao issued
Notice of Disallowance Nos. 2006-001-101 (02-06) to 2006-021-101
(01-03) on the payments of per diems to ex officio members of the PEZA
Board for the period 2001-2006
The disallowance was based on this Courts April 4, 2006 En Banc
Resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari in Cyril del Callar, et al.,
Members of the Board of Directors, Philippine Economic Zone Authority
v. COA and Guillermo N. Carague, Chairman, COA which assailed COA
Decision No. 2006-009 dated January 31, 2006 affirming the March 29,
2002 decision of the Director, then Corporate Audit Office II,
disallowing the payment of per diems of ex officio members of the PEZA
Board of Directors. Said disallowance was based on COA Memorandum
No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee
Report No. 509 and this Courts ruling in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary.
Issue:
Does the PEZA have legal basis in granting per diems to the ex
officio members of its Board? And if there is no legal basis, was there
good faith in PEZAs grant and the ex officio members receipt of the per
diems?
The lack of legal basis to grant per diems to ex officio members of the
PEZA Board, including their representatives, has already been settled by
no less than the Court En Banc in the case of Bitonio, Jr.where we held
that the amendatory law, R.A. No. 8748, purposely deleted the last
paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7916 that authorized the grant of per
diems to PEZA Board members as it was in conflict with the proscription
laid down in the 1987 Constitution. We held in Bitonio, Jr.:
The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law
which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to
cure such defect. In particular, Section 11 of R.A. No. 7916 was
amended to read:
SECTION 11. The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)
Board. There is hereby created a body corporate to be known as the
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) attached to the Department
of Trade and Industry. The Board shall have a director general with the
rank of department undersecretary who shall be appointed by the
President. The director general shall be at least forty (40) years of age,
of proven probity and integrity, and a degree holder in any of the
following fields: economics, business, public administration, law,
management or their equivalent, and with at least ten (10) years relevant
working experience preferably in the field of management or public
administration.
The director general shall be assisted by three (3) deputy directors
general each for policy and planning, administration and operations, who
shall be appointed by the PEZA Board, upon the recommendation of the
director general. The deputy directors general shall be at least thirty-five
(35) years old, with proven probity and integrity and a degree holder in
any of the following fields: economics, business, public administration,
law, management or their equivalent.
The Board shall be composed of thirteen (13) members as
follows: the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry as
Chairman, the Director General of the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority as Vice-chairman, the undersecretaries of the Department of
Finance, the Department of Labor and Employment, the Department of
[the] Interior and Local Government, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of
Public Works and Highways, the Department of Science and Technology, and emphasized that a public official holding an ex officio position as
the Department of Energy, the Deputy Director General of the National provided by law has no right to receive additional compensation for
Economic and Development Authority, one (1) representative from the the ex officio position.
labor sector, and one (1) representative from the investors/business sector
It bears stressing that the Civil Liberties Union case was promulgated in
in the ECOZONE. In case of the unavailability of the Secretary of the
1991, or a decade before the subject disallowed payments of per
Department of Trade and Industry to attend a particular board meeting,
diems for the period starting 2001 were made by PEZA. Thus, even
the Director General of PEZA shall act as Chairman.
if the Bitonio case was only promulgated in 2004 when part of the
As can be gleaned from above, the members of the Board of Directors disallowed payments have already been made, PEZA should have been
was increased from 8 to 13, specifying therein that it is the guided by the Civil Liberties Union case and acted with caution. It
undersecretaries of the different Departments who should sit as board would have been more prudent for PEZA, if it honestly believed that
members of the PEZA. The option of designating his representative to there is a clear legal basis for the per diems and there was a chance that
the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the this Court might rule in their favor while the Bitoniocase was pending, to
last paragraph as to the payment of per diems to the members of the withhold payment of the per diem instead of paying them. PEZAs actual
Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation knowledge that the disbursements are being questioned by virtue of the
was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution. notices of disallowance issued to them by the COA and knowledge of the
pronouncements of the Court in the Civil Liberties Union case and in
Prescinding from the above, the petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to other cases where ex officio members in several government agencies
receive a per diem for his attendance at board meetings during his tenure were prohibited from receiving additional compensation, militate against
as member of the Board of Directors of the PEZA. its claim of good faith.
PEZAs insistence that there is legal basis in its grant of per diems to The petition is DISMISSED. The assailed COA Decision No. 2009-081
the ex officio members of its Board does not hold water. The dated September 15, 2009 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
constitutional prohibition explained in Civil Liberties Union case still
stands and this Court finds no reason to revisit the doctrine laid down
therein as said interpretation, to this Courts mind, is in consonance with
what our Constitution provides.
Neither can this Court give credence to PEZAs claim of good faith.
In common usage, the term good faith is ordinarily used to describe
that state of mind denoting honesty of intention, and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with
absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which
render transaction unconscientious.
Definitely, PEZA cannot claim that it was not aware of circumstances
pointing to the possible illegality of the disbursements of per diems to
the ex officio members of the Board. In Civil Liberties Union, this Court
clarified the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution
DIMAGIBA V ESPARTERO
FACTS
Petitioners Hilarion Dimagiba (Dimagiba), Irma Mendoza (Mendoza),
and Ellen Rasco (Rasco) were employees of The Livelihood Corporation
(LIVECOR), a government-owned and controlled corporation created
under Executive Order No. 866. Petitioner Dimagiba was the Group
Manager, Petitioners Hilarion Dimagiba (Dimagiba), Irma Mendoza
(Mendoza), and Ellen Rasco (Rasco) were employees of The Livelihood
Corporation (LIVECOR), a government-owned and controlled
corporation created under Executive Order No. 866. Petitioner Dimagiba
was the Group Manager, LIVECOR and the Human Settlement
Development Corporation (HSDC), now known as Strategic Investment
and Development Corporation (SIDCOR), also a government-owned and
controlled corporation, created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1396,
entered into a Trust Agreement3 whereby the former would undertake the
task of managing, administering, disposing and liquidating the corporate
assets, projects and accounts of HSDC. In HSDC Board Resolution No.
3- 26-A4 dated March 26, 1990, it was provided that in order to carry out
the trust agreement, LIVECOR personnel must be designated
concurrently to operate certain basic HSDC/SIDCOR functions, thus,
LIVECOR personnel, namely, petitioners Dimagiba and Mendoza were
designated as Assistant General Manager for Operations and Head, Inter-
Agency Committee on Assets Disposal and as Treasurer and Controller,
respectively. The same resolution provided for the designees' monthly
honoraria and commutable reimbursable representation allowances
(CRRA).
In a letter6 dated November 14, 1997, the Department of Budget and
Management informed LIVECOR of the approval of its
organization/staffing pattern modifications which resulted in the
abolition of petitioners' positions. As a result, petitioners were separated
from the service which entitled them to separation pay which includes
granting gratuity pay
In a Memorandum dated July 17, 1998 issued by LIVECOR
Administrator Manuel Portes (Portes), it was stated that any payment of
gratuities by the HSDC/SIDCOR to LIVECOR officers concurrently
performing HSDC functions shall not be processed without prior
clearance from him as the same shall be first cleared with the COA and
OGCC to avoid any legal problem. Portes then sought the opinion of
LIVECORs Resident COA Auditor, Alejandro Fumar, regarding
petitioners' claim for additional gratuity, who opined that such gratuity
payment would amount to double compensation.
ISSUE
W/N the gratuities granted to petitioners dimagiba, mendoza and rasco
by hsdc constitute double compensation prohibited under article ix (b),
section 8 of the 1987 constitution
RULING
YES The additional grant of gratuity pay to petitioners amounted to
additional compensation prohibited by the Constitution. Clearly, the only
exception for an employee to receive additional, double and indirect
compensation is where the law allows him to receive extra compensation
for services rendered in another position which is an extension or is
connected with his basic work. The prohibition against additional or
double compensation, except when specifically authorized by law, is
considered a constitutional curb on the spending power of the
government.
In Peralta v. Mathay, 41 we stated the purpose of the prohibition, to wit:
x x x This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that
a public office is a public trust. It is expected of a government official or
employee that he keeps uppermost in mind the demands of public
welfare. He is there to render public service. He is of course entitled to
be rewarded for the performance of the functions entrusted to him, but
that should not be the overriding consideration. The intrusion of the
thought of private gain should be unwelcome. The temptation to further
personal ends, public employment as a means for the acquisition of
wealth, is to be resisted. That at least is the ideal. There is then to be
awareness on the part of an officer or employee of the government that
he is to receive only such compensation as may be fixed by law. With
such a realization, he is expected not to avail himself of devious or
circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to his position.42
xxx
The gratuity pay being given to petitioners by the HSDC Board was by
reason of the satisfactory performance of their work under the trust
agreement. It is considered a bonus and by its very nature, a bonus
partakes of an additional remuneration or compensation.43 It bears
stressing that when petitioners were separated from LIVECOR, they
were given separation pay which also included gratuity pay for all the
years they worked thereat and concurrently in HSDC/SIDCOR. Granting
them another gratuity pay for the works done in HSDC under the trust
agreement would be indirectly giving them additional compensation for
services rendered in another position which is an extension or is
connected with his basic work which is prohibited. This can only be
allowed if there is a law which specifically authorizes them to receive an
additional payment of gratuity. The HSDC Board Resolution No. 05-19-
A granting petitioners gratuity pay is not a law which would exempt
them from the Constitutional proscription against additional, double or
indirect compensation. Neither does the HSDC law under P.D. 1396
contain a provision allowing the grant of such gratuity pay to petitioners.
The second paragraph of Section 8, Article IX specifically adds that
"pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or
indirect compensation." This has reference to compensation already
earned, for instance by a retiree. A retiree receiving pensions or gratuities
after retirement can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if
he accepts another government position to which another compensation
is attached. The grant to designees Dimagiba et al. of another gratuity
from HSDC would not fall under the exception in the second paragraph
as the same had not been primarily earned, but rather being granted for
service simultaneously rendered to LIVECOR and HSDC. Hence, to
allow the release of the second gratuity from HSDC would run afoul over
the wellsettled rule that "in the absence of an express legal exception,
pension or gratuity laws should be construed as to preclude any person
from receiving double compensation. 44
BLAQUERA V ALACALA
FACTS
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government
departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year
1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292[1] (EO 292), otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V[2]of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President
Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) issued Administrative Order No.
29 (AO 29) authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for
the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00[3] and reiterating the
prohibition[4] under Section 7[5]of Administrative Order No. 268 (AO
268), enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior
approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed [a]ll departments,
offices and agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity
Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1
hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately cause the return/refund of the
excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after
the issuance of this Order. In compliance therewith, the heads of the
departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the
herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners salaries or
allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. To
prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their
salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come before this Court to
seek relief.
ISSUE
Constitutionality of AOs
RULING
The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant
of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontentment,
dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by
committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of
incentives and awards. The President was only exercising his power of
control by modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive
benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office
of the President, thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of
government resources. In the view of the President, respondents did a
mistake which had to be corrected. In so acting, the President exercised a
constitutionally-protected prerogative --
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too,
is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department
heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his,
too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls
and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm,
modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this
context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the
correctness of a decision of a department secretary. (Lacson-Magallanes
Co., Inc. v. Pao, 21 SCRA 898)
Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of
the Commission on Civil Service to grant benefits to government
personnel. AO 29 and AO 268 did not revoke the privilege of employees
to receive incentive benefits. The same merely regulated the grant and
amount thereof.
Sound management and effective utilization of financial resources of
government are basically executive functions, [34] not the
Commissions. Implicit is this recognition in EO 292, which states:
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. - There
shall be established a government-wide employee suggestions and
incentive awards system which shall be administered under such rules,
regulations, and standards as maybe promulgated by the Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the
Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is
authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the
honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the
government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior
accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency,
economy, or other improvement of government operations, or who
perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest
in connection with, or in relation to, their official employment.(Chapter
5, Subtitle A, Book V) (underscoring ours)
Conformably, it is the President or the head of each department or
agency who is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in the
honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the
government. It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the amount of the autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
incentives. Such function belongs to the President or his duly empowered Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
alter ego. independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of
our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and
Anent petitioners contention that the forcible refund of incentive benefits
cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the
is an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation, suffice it to Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant
state that [n]ot all contracts entered into by the government will operate reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy
as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its should cease to be a meaningless provision.
sovereign and proprietary acts (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136
SCRA 487).[35] The acts involved in this case are governmental. Besides, Untenable is petitioners contention that the herein respondents be held
the Court is in agreement with the Solicitor General that the incentive personally liable for the refund in question. Absent a showing of bad
pay or benefit is in the nature of a bonus which is not a demandable or faith or malice, public officers are not personally liable for damages
enforceable obligation. resulting from the performance of official duties. [36]
It is understood that the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the
Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, and Office of the discharge of official duties.[37] Absent any showing of bad faith or malice,
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy, are not covered by the there is likewise a presumption of regularity in the performance of
amount fixed by the President. As explained in Bengzon vs. Drilon (208 official duties.[38]
SCRA 133):
In upholding the constitutionality of AO 268 and AO 29, the Court
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the reiterates the well-entrenched doctrine that in interpreting statutes, that
Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the which will avoid a finding of unconstitutionality is to be preferred. [39]
Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received.Indeed,
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and
rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law
circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed
for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and
such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were
disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in
due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude,
the course of the discharge of their functions.
confident that they richly deserve such benefits.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and
Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10
112056 are hereby DISMISSED, and as above ratiocinated, further
typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even
deductions from the salaries and allowances of petitioners are hereby
informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty
ENJOINED.
and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of
their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints
on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize
the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
OCA V ENRIQUEZ
FACTS
In a letter dated 19 January 1987, one Eliodoro C. Cruz of Compania
Maritima, Inc. informed this Court that the company's lawyer filed with
the Tanodbayan on 12 December 1986 a complaint for falsification of a
public document, use of falsified documents, robbery and the violation of
R.A. No. 3019 against herein respondent Ramon G. Enriquez, Deputy
Sheriff of Branch XXXI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
and others. The said company lawyer requested that an investigation be
conducted on the administrative aspect of the case.
In his 20 January 1987 letter to Mr. Cruz, then Court Administrator Leo
D. Medialdea, who later became a member of this Court, informed the
latter that as a matter of policy, the administrative aspect of the case "will
be undertaken by this Office upon the filing of a corresponding
information by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan."
Consequently, an Information for falsification of a public document was
filed against the respondent with the Sandiganbayan on 6 October 1988.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 12987 and was assigned to
the Second Division. A copy of the Information was furnished the Office
of the Court Administrator on 17 October 1988.
On 1 February 1989, then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro,
pursuant to this Court's en banc resolution of 12 March 1981 and on the
basis of the Information filed with the Sandiganbayan, administratively
charged the herein respondent with the crime of falsification of a public
document and with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
committed in the manner alleged in the said Information
Instead of filing the answer/explanation as ordered, the respondent
forwarded to the Court Administrator a letter on 20 February 1989
informing the latter that Criminal Case No. 12987 was still pending
resolution before the Sandiganbayan and that therefore, he (respondent)
should not be held administratively liable.
On 15 May 1989, the Sandiganbayan, acting on a demurrer to evidence,
promulgated a Resolution granting the same and dismissing the case
against the respondent "for insufficiency of evidence."
On 10 April 1991, respondent filed a Manifestation informing this Court
of the promulgation of the above resolution and praying that "by virtue
of the dismissal of the Criminal Case filed against the respondent before
the Sandiganbayan, the Administrative Case . . . be likewise dismissed."
ISSUE
W/N dismissal of criminal action forecloses institution of administrative
action
RULING
Be that as it may, its dismissal of the criminal case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence was never meant, as respondent doggedly
believed and arrogantly asserted, to foreclose administrative action
against him or to give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The
Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was simply saying that the
prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond
reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction 2 because of
the presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantee an
accused. 3 Lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of
evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of
evidence. 4 Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in
administrative proceedings which merely requires in these cases such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. 5
Going back to Our findings, there is no doubt in Our minds that the
respondent (a) falsified the Minutes of Sale and the Sheriff's Certificate
of Sale; (b) violated Sections 22 and 25, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court by
not conducting another bidding assuming one was held on 12 May
1986 after the alleged highest bidder, Patriarca, failed to pay the bid
price, by executing in the latter's favor a certificate of Sheriff's Sale and
by delivering the auctioned vessels despite the failure to pay: (c) illegally
sold the vessels to Cailian on 23 May 1986 without a public bidding; and
(d) maliciously connived and conspired with Patriarca, Cailian and others
to cover up such illegal acts by making it appear, by means of an
antedated deed of sale, that Patriarca sold the vessels to Cailian.
Respondent is therefore guilty of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He not only
deliberately violated the integrity of official acts of an employee of the
court, but also undermined the faith and trust of the public in the
Judiciary. He has transgressed the constitutional command that as a
public office is a public trust, all public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice and lead modest lives. 6 In Jereos vs. Reblando, 7 We laid down
the rule that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, such as the court of which
the herein respondent is the assigned sheriff, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must
not only be characterized with propriety and decorum, but above all else
must be beyond suspicion.
While it is but proper that the respondent should not be kept a minute
longer in the Judiciary, his dismissal from the service should not end this
case. In the light of the above findings of conspiracy with other parties,
including a certain Judge Luz who prepared the alleged deed of sale in
favor of Cailian, there is a need to dig deeper, in a manner of speaking, in
this case. This could open the door to the secret chambers of a rumored
syndicate which is in the business of fixing attachments and execution
sales.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS from the service,
effective immediately, respondent RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ, for gross
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except the monetary value
of his leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to his re-employment in
any branch or service of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.
Doctrine: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and
exemplary damages and for attorneys fees for acts done in the
performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these
officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public
officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated
the plaintiffs constitutional rights.
Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. filed a Petition for Review under Rule
45 of the ROC seeking to set aside CAs decision, after it reversed a
favorable decision of the RTC that ordered the private respondents to pay
him moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of the suit,
and denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman owned several racehorses
which he entered in sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the
races on various dates, and won prizes together with the 30% due for
trainer/grooms. He sent letters of demand for the collection of the prizes
due him but private respondents PCSO and its then chairman Fernando
Carrascoso Jr. consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being
withheld on advice of PCGG. Consequently, Cojuangco filed this case
before the Manila RTC but before the receipt summons, PCGG advised
private respondents that it poses no more objection to its remittance of
the prized winnings. This was immediately communicated to
petitioners counsel Estelito Mendoza by Carrascoso but the former
refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had
already been brought to court.
Issue:
W/N the award for moral and exemplary damages against respondent
Carrascoso is warranted by evidence the law
Held:
NO. Petitioner is only entitled to nominal damages.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or
interest of ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. There is sufficient
evidence on record to support Respondent Courts conclusion that
Carrascoso did not act in bad faith. His letters to PCGG indicated his
uncertainties as to the extent of the sequestration against the properties of
the plaintiff. There is also denying that plaintiff is a very close political
and business associate of the former President Marcos. Sequestration was
also a novel remedy. Under these equivocalities, Carrascoso could not be
faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, on what to do and
more so, to obey the instructions given. Besides, EO2 has just been
issued by President Aquino, freezing all assets and properties in the
Philippines (of) former President Marcos and/or his wifetheir close
friends, subordinates, business associates
The extant rule is that public officers shall not be liable by way of moral
and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official
duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
negligence. Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed
either, in the absence of clear showing of any of the grounds provided
therefor under the Civil Code. The trial courts award of these kinds of
damages must perforce be deleted.
Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that
Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer
acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of ones duties.
We hold that petitioners right to the use of his property was unduly
impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the
PCGGs instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal
basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that
there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the
racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any
such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration
order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the
requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of
petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a
violation of his property rights without due process of law.
Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to
a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for
the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered.
JOROLAN V ACUZAR
FACTS
On May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed Administrative
Case No. 2000-01[4] against petitioner before the PLEB charging the
latter of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship
with respondents minor daughter.
On May 11, 2000, respondent also instituted a criminal case against
petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court of New Corella, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1712, for Violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act.
On May 15, 2000, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit [5] before the
PLEB vehemently denying all the accusations leveled against him. In
support thereof, petitioner attached the affidavit of complainants
daughter, Rigma A. Jorolan, who denied having any relationship with the
petitioner or having kissed him despite knowing him to be a married
person.
On July 24, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings
before the PLEB pending resolution of the criminal case filed before the
regular court. The PLEB denied his motion for lack of merit and a
hearing of the case was conducted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds the respondent,
SPO1 Leonito Acuzar, PNP New Corella, Davao del Norte Police Station
GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT (Child Abuse) which is punishable
by DISMISSAL effective immediately.
ISSUE
W/N PLEB had no jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until
petitioner is convicted before the regular court
RULING
A careful perusal of respondents affidavit-complaint against petitioner
would show that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for
engaging in an illicit affair with respondents minor daughter, he being a
married man, and not for violation of law, as petitioner would like to
convince this Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose.[10] It usually refers to transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, where no discretion is left except what necessity
may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal
intention but implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of
judgment.[11] On the other hand, violation of law presupposes final
conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised
Penal Code or any special law or ordinance. [12] The settled rule is that
criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each
other.[13] In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed
whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is
required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of
criminal proceedings.[14] The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary
body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP, has
jurisdiction over the case.
It is apparent from the foregoing provision that the remedy of appeal
from the decision of the PLEB to the Regional Appellate Board was
available to petitioner. Since appeal was available, filing a petition
for certiorari was inapt. The existence and availability of the right of
appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of
certiorari.[16] Corollarily, the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention
of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means
of administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available
within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency, then
this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to the
courts. This is to enable such body to review and correct any mistakes
without the intervention of the court.
TECSON V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
Petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the offense charged in
the Information, the Municipal Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
Private complainant before the Sandiganbayan, Mrs. Salvacion Luzana,
is a resident of Poblacion, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. She is a neighbor
of the petitioner.
Upon the offer of Tecson, he and Mrs. Luzana agreed to engage in an
investment business. They would sell tickets at P100.00 each which after
30 days would earn P200.00 or more. She would buy appliances and
cosmetics at a discount, with the use of the proceeds of the sales of
tickets, and resell them. No other details were disclosed on how the
business would operate, and Tecson does not appear to have contributed
any monetary consideration to the capital. On September 27, 1989, they
began selling tickets.
Tecson also acted as agent selling tickets. He got on that day early in the
morning two booklets of tickets, for which he signed the covers of the
booklets to acknowledge receipt. Before noon of the same day he
returned after having already sold 40 tickets in the amount of P4,000.00,
bringing with him a Mayors Permit in the name of Mrs. Luzana for their
business called LD Assurance Privileges. He asked for a cash advance of
P4,000.00 which he would use during the fiesta on September 29, 1989,
and he would not release the Mayors Permit unless the cash advance was
given him. Mrs. Luzana reluctantly acceded, saying that it was not the
due date yet, so he was getting the cash advances on his share. Tecson
signed for the cash advance.
On October 3, 1989, Mrs. Luzana secured a Business Permit in
accordance with the instructions of Tecson. The permit was in her name
but the same was for the operation of Prosperidad Investment and Sub-
Dealership, the new name of the business. In the session of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur on October 17, 1989
presided over by Tecson, Resolution No. 100 was passed revoking the
business permit at the instance of the Provincial Director of the
Department of Trade and Industry.[3]
With the revocation of her business permit, private complainant below
filed an administrative case against petitioner, for violation of Section 3
[c], R.A. No. 3019 and Section 60 of B.P. Blg. 337 (then Local
Government Code) with the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG). The complaint was docketed as Adm. Case No. SP-
90-01 and referred to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur
for appropriate action.
Not content with having instituted administrative proceedings, private
complainant below also filed a civil case against petitioner for damages
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of Prosperidad, Agusan del
Sur. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. 716.
A complaint was likewise filed with the Ombudsman for violation of
R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. This complaint was docketed as OMB Case No. 3-8-02919. It was
subsequently referred to the Sandiganbayan, which took jurisdiction.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur dismissed the
administrative case.
Sandiganbayan, First Division rendered the assailed decision convicting
appellant of violating R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE
Whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
exonerating the accused serves as a bar by prior judgment to the decision
of the Sandiganbayan;
RULING
NO First, it must be pointed out that res judicata is a doctrine of civil
law.[7] It thus has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. Second, it is a basic principle of the law on public
officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold
responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or
omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if
such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the
public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If
the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be
punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension,
removal from office, or otheradministrative sanctions. This
administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil
liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case does not
necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar
acts, which were the subject of the administrative complaint. [8] We
conclude, therefore, that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Agusan del Sur exonerating petitioner in Administrative Case No. SP
90-01 is no bar to the criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan.
As to the amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 716 with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 6, of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, it is settled that a
complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance against a public
officer or employee cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the
complainant. This is because there is a need to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and
instrumentalities.[9] The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the
order of the trial court dismissing Civil Case No. 716 did not bar the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
OCAMPO V OMBUDSMAN as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
[18]
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well
FACTS as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and
Jesus Ocampo is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, a administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should
subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration. not necessarily be binding on the other.

The Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) requested

NIACONSULT for training of small-scale community irrigation
development, and Ocampo attended to the request.
NIACONSULT demanded Ocampo to turn-over the total training fee
paid by ADBN which Ocampo personally received, but failed to remit
the amount.
This prompted NIACONSULT to file an administrative case before the
OMBUDSMAN.
While the case is pending, a criminal complaint for estafa and
falsification was filed against Ocampo based on the same facts or
incidents. The Regional Trial Court DISMISSED the case.
OCAMPOS CONTENTION: RTCs dismissal of the criminal case
serves as a bar to the administrative case that can no longer stand on its
own and therefore should be dismissed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal case affect the validity of
the administrative cases resolution?
RULING
NO. The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative
action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all
respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint,
was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for
conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another
class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of
evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in
administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence
OCA V MACUSI
FACTS
Criselda M. Paligan (Paligan) was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 429-06,
entitled Ms. Criselda M. Paligan v. Spouses Cornelio and Lermila
Tabanganay, an action for collection of sum of money with damages,
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tabuk City,
Kalinga. In A letter dated July 23, 2009, 1 addressed to the Presiding
Judge, MTCC,2 Tahuk City, Kalinga, Paligan inquired as to the status of
the writ of execution issued on September 10, 2008 by the MTCC in
Civil Case No. 4'29-06, since she had not received any report or
information whether the said writ had already been served. Paligan also
furnished the Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court
Judge Dalanao pointed out before the OCA that the Sheriff 7 was
inconsistent: making reports in some cases, although some of said reports
were late, and making no reports at all in other cases. Judge Dalanao
further noted that five years has already lapsed without execution in
several cases. He has also yet to receive the Sheriffs estimate of
expenses for approval. Judge Dalanao lastly averred that after receiving
complaints from parties, he already verbally brought up the matter with
the Executive Judge, and even personally talked to the Sheriff several
times to remind the Sheriff of his duties and responsibilities.
The OCA, finding that Macusi violated Rule 39, Section 14 and Rule141,
Section 9 of the Rules of Court, sent the latter a letter dated December 2,
200911 directing him to show cause why no disciplinary action should
betaken against him.
In a Resolution dated February 6, 2013, 18 the Court re-docketed the
administrative complaint against Macusi as a regular administrative
matter and required Macusi to manifest within 10 days from notice if he
was willing to submit the matter for decision/resolution based on the
records/pleadings filed.
Macusi19 submitted his Manifestation and Motion dated May 30,2013,
informing the Court that he was deemed resigned from government
service by operation of law when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of City Councilor in Tabuk City, Kalinga for the 2010
Local Elections. He prayed that the Court dismiss the administrative case
against him for being moot and academic.
ISSUE
W/N Resignation of respondent will relieve him from administrative
liability
RULING
The raison d etre behind the requirement of periodic reports under Rule
39, Section 14 of the Rules of Court is to update the court on the status of
the execution and to take necessary steps to ensure the speedy execution
of decisions.20 Macusi did not deny that he failed to file periodic reports
on the Writ of Execution dated September 10, 2008 in Civil Case No.
429-06,as well as on the writs of execution in the other cases in Judge
Dalanaos inventory. In his defense, however, he asserted that the
prevailing party in the cases, including Paligan, failed to coordinate or
refused to cooperate with him in the implementation of their respective
writs of execution; and that the writs of execution were not properly
turned over to him when he was appointed Sheriff in April 2005.
Macusis excuses cannot exonerate him.
In Marias v. Florendo,21 the Court stressed that:
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as
agents of the law, high standards are expected of them. They are duty-
bound to know and to comply with the very basic rules relative to the
implementation of writs of execution.
Macusis prayer for dismissal of the present case for being moot is
baseless. Macusis constructive resignation from service through filing of
his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2010 Local Elections does not render
the case against him moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade
administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative
sanction.27 As the Court held in Baquerfo v. Sanchez28:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither
warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him
while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative
case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Courts at the
time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the
mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during
the pendency of his case. Respondents resignation does not preclude the
finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be
answerable.(Citations omitted.)
Considering the grave responsibilities imposed on him, Macusi had been
careless and imprudent in discharging his duties. Neither neglect nor
delay should be allowed to stall the expeditious disposition of cases. As
such, he is indeed guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is the failure of
an employee to give proper attention to a required task. Simple neglect of
duty signifies "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference."29
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, (simple) neglect of duty is punishable by suspension of one
month and one day to six months for the first offense. However, under
Sec.19, Rule XIV of the same Rules, the penalty of fine (instead of
suspension) may also be imposed in the alternative. 30Following the
Courts ruling in several cases involving (simple) neglect of duty, this
Court finds the penalty of a fine in the amount of P4,000.00, as
recommended by Judge Wacas and the OCA, just and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., former Sheriff
IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga, GUILTY of
Simple Neglect of Duty and imposes upon him the penalty of a FINE in
the amount ofP4,000.00. Considering Macusi's resignation, the Court
directs the Office of Administrative Services to compute Macusi's
terminal leave credits and the Fiscal Management Office to compute the
monetary equivalent thereof, from which his fine of P-4,000.00 shall be
deducted.
LARIN V EXEC SEC
FACTS
On September 18, 1992, [1] a decision was rendered by the
Sandiganbayan convicting herein petitioner Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue
Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant Commisioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and his co-accused (except Justino E. Galban, Jr.) of
the crimes of violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal
Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 in Criminal Cases Nos.
14208-14209, entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Aquilino T.
Larin, Teodoro T. Pareno, Justino E. Galban, Jr. and Potenciana N.
Evangelista, Accused
The fact of petitioners conviction was reported to the President of the
Philippines by the then Acting Finance Secretary Leong through a
memorandum.
After a memo for investigation was implemented, the president, in the
assailed Administrative Order No. 101 dated December 2, 1993, found
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and
imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave
credits and retirement benefits including disqualification for
reappointment in the government service.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition on
December 13, 1993 to question basically his alleged unlawful removal
from office.
On April 17, 1996 and while the instant petition is pending, this Court set
aside the conviction of the petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and
14209.
ISSUE
W/N pet is removed from service due to a valid cause
RULING
Although the proceedings taken complied with the requirements of
procedural due process, this Court, however, considers that petitioner
was not dismissed for a valid cause.
It should be noted that what precipitated the creation of the investigative
committee to look into the administrative charge against petitioner is his
conviction by the Sandiganbayan in criminal Case Nos. 14208 and
14209. As admitted by the respondents, the administrative case against
petitioner is based on the Sandiganbayan Decision of September 18,
1992.
However, it must be stressed at this juncture that the conviction of
petitioner by the Sandiganbayan was set aside by this court in our
decision promulgated on April 17, 1996 in G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and
107119-20
We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are
independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission, the
dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charge does not foreclose the
institution of administrative action nor carry with it the relief from
administrative liability.[6] However, the circumstantial setting of the
instant case sets it miles apart from the foregoing rule and placed it well
within the exception. Corollarily, where the very basis of the
administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal
action which was later on set aside by this court upon a categorical and
clear findings that the acts for which he was administratively held liable
are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the
criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative
action against him, because in such a case, there is no basis nor
justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit.
RUBRICO V MACAPAGAL ARROYO
FACTS
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by
armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security
Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air
Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added,
her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo
were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also
armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo
be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing
any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for
kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the
offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to
produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying
the material inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed
the defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency.
ISSUE
W/N dismissal of the petition with respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir. Gen.
Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB is correct
RULING
As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were
included in the case on the theory that they, as commanders, were
responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their
subordinates against petitioners. To the appellate court, the privilege of
the writ of amparo must be denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir.
Gen. Razon for the simple reason that petitioners have not presented
evidence showing that those who allegedly abducted and illegally
detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family were, in fact,
members of the military or the police force. The two generals, the CAs
holding broadly hinted, would have been accountable for the abduction
and threats if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP or PNP.
As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded
because they allegedly had not exerted the required extraordinary
diligence in investigating and satisfactorily
resolving Lourdes disappearance or bringing to justice the actual
perpetrators of what amounted to a criminal act, albeit there were
allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of acts constituting threats against
Mary Joy.
While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as
against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed
against the backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed
decision vis--vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The
Court assumes the latter stance owing to the fact that command
responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under
international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in
the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr.
Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the
responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict.[14] In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,
[15]
foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal
liability, whereby the superior is made responsible forcrimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators[16] (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute [17] of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is
signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on
military commanders for crimes committed by forces under their
control. The country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms
and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to
extend concurrence in its ratification.[18]
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility,[19] there
is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that
doctrine.[20]
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these
to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at
enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court
constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises
in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. [21] Still, it to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,
would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability
command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to
criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other issuances, if there be any.
words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of
criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed
in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo),[22] the writ of
amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural
relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life,
liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however,
is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. [23] Of the same
tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is
what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or
extra-judicial killings].

xxxx

As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced

disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately
from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings
and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature
has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal
x x x are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the
power to enact.[24] x x x
RODRIGO V MACAPAGAL ARROYO
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State
under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. [2] He is a member
of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
In September 2009, an affiliate of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(KMP) was abducted by the military. Dressed in civilian clothing, the
military forced him into a car where he was held at gun point and beaten.
He was brought to a remote area where they held him captive in a camp
that belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. Here,
he was continously interrogated and tortured for twelve (12) days to
obtain a confession that he was a member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA). Torture included being beaten, starved, and electrocuted. He was
also threatened to be killed if he did not give the location of the NPA
camp.
Despite all this, he remained silent. During the latter part of his
detention, he was forced to sign different documents declaring that he
had surrendered to the military in an encounter, that he was never
maltreated or tortured, and that he was a military asset giving
information about different individuals who belonged to NPA and the
different NPA locations.
On the day of his release, he was given a shower, a new set of clothes,
and food which he ate alongside military officials. Throughout the days
activities, the military took pictures of him being well-treated. He was
repeatedly reminded not to disclose to the media his experience in the
camp and to say that he had surrendered. His family picked him up that
afternoon. Two (2) months after his release, however, he noticed that he
was constantly being followed so he applied for writs of amparo and
habeas data against the government to protect him from the violation of
his right to life, liberty and security. Among the respondents was
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA), based on the doctrine of
command responsibility. The Court of Appeals granted the writs but
found the doctrine of command responsibility inapplicable to amparo and
habeas data cases.
The Supreme Court (SC) disagreed and found the doctrine of command
responsibility applicable in amparo and habeas data cases since it now
constitutes a principle of international law in our jurisdiction. Citing
Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the responsibility
of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international
wars or domestic conflict. It clarified that the doctrine is applicable not
only in criminal cases but in civil cases for human rights abuses to
ascertain the governments responsibility and accountability in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances without making a
determination of criminal, civil, or administrative liabilities.
The SC also held that the president can be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances since
as commander-in-chief of all armed forces, he necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior. The following
elements must be present: (1) the existence of a superior-subordinate
relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the
crime as his subordinate; (2) the superior knew or had reason to know
that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and (3) the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators.
Nevertheless, the SC found that PGMA could not be held responsible for
the abduction as there was not enough proof offered to establish her
responsibility for the abduction, that she had any knowledge of the
violations of the right to life, liberty, or security, or that she failed to
investigate, punish or prevent it