Napoleon: Legend and Propaganda

Author(s): M. K. Dziewanowski
Source: Military Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring, 1945), pp. 89-94
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1982835
Accessed: 06-11-2016 11:53 UTC

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 * * * * * * * *

NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

NAPOLEON: LEGEND AND PROPAGANDA

BY LIEUTENANT M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI
Napoleon's companion during his exile, his first biographer, Las
Casas, once asked the Emperor why in addition to the alarm-clock he
had not also taken Frederick II's sword from his bedroom at Sans-
Souci.
"Because I had mine," came the retort.
Napoleon added that the reply should be recorded.
"It will be useful as a contribution to characterize my attitude to-
ward the 'Great Fritz,'" he commented further.
Napoleon knew that in his military career he had surpassed his mas-
ter. He realized that both history and historical legend would proclaim
him superior. Of this he was convinced. Nevertheless, he wanted to
bequeath to history his complete consciousness of this superiority, his
own opinion of himself, a glimpse of himself from a historical perspec-
tive. Understanding how unalterable are the vicissitudes of life, he
realized the impossibility of influencing the course of events. Napoleon,
therefore, eagerly commenced to form the legend to be passed on to
posterity as complete as possible, and conforming to the pattern which
this virtuoso of propaganda had designed for himself and his dynasty.
Military science and techniques have changed remarkably, but
nevertheless all training of military students in schools over the world
is based on the campaigns of the "Little Corporal." In an interview
with Foch, Wickham Steed inquired:
"What would Napoleon have done, had he been the commander-in-
chief of the allied armed forcesr Would his genius have been capable
of embracing complicated contemporary warfare?"
Unhesitatingly, Foch expressed the opinion that Napoleon's genius
depended precisely on the exploitation of existing conditions by adjust-
ing himself to those circumstances which are unchangeable, and by
bending to his own will the flexible factors.
Having at his disposal technical facilities not much wealthier than
Caesar, Napoleon's achievements were incomparably greater than Cae-
sar's, especially when one considers that he had for opponents nations
89

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 90 MILITARY AFFAIRS SPRING

which were on the same plane of civilization as France.

Despite the harnessing into service of infinitely greater factors, Hit-
ler's conquests yield to Napoleon's. Bonaparte was in Cairo, Madrid,
and Moscow. His thrust from Wilno to Moscow was achieved merely
by help of cavalry and infantry, and took only 48 days.
Napoleon's career is spectacular. On the other hand, it is surprising
upon analyzing the power of influence and the charm of his legend, to
find upon taking off his mask of demi-god,. a rationalist, influenced by
XVIII century philosophy, of little appeal to the masses, a bibliophile
and a book-worm, devotee of the theater and an admirer of poetry,
reciting at any opportunity whole passages from Virgil, Racine, or
Corneille. Beyond that, he was not an orator, and at any rate, he was
incapable of swaying the masses. Having been for years an idol of the
crowds, he had before them an almost panicky fright, especially if the
crowd had not been carefully prepared with favorable propaganda or,
what was worse, when it was hostile. As the events of 18 brumaire
demonstrated, he did not know how to influence the masses. Even
during his life, his popularity was based more on awe than on affection.
The most frequently ignored aspect of the Napoleonic legend, with-
out which its permanence and scope are difficult to comprehend, is:
The versatility of this hero.
Paul Cambon said of Paderewski that he was a genius who also
played on the piano. It can be said of Napoleon that he was a genius
who among other things won sixty battles.
His military and political genius does not fully determine or explain
the success during his lifetime or his posthumous fame. Among the
-many aspects of his individuality, one is underestimated, which, when
considered, illumines, and clarifies many things. That is his propa-
ganda approach to himself and to his activities. Napoleon was, with-
out doubt, as an Englishman said, "propaganda conscious." He was a
past-master of propaganda.
The secret of the success of his propaganda method lay in the adroit
and concentric playing on the popular imagination with several media
simultaneously, and then directing the psychological reactions toward a
specific goal. Innate and acquired knowledge of mass psychology com-
bined with a pedantic planning of every problem submitted by Fouche
and Napoleon's personally organized intelligence provided him with
the indispensable elements for decision. Lacking any feeling or under-
standing of the technical progress or new inventions of his time, he
nevertheless always succeeded in utilizing the facilities at his disposal.
Asked during the campaign on 1814 what forces were available, he

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1945 DZIEWANOWSKI: NAPOLEON 91

answered unhesitatingly:
"Sixty thousand and I; together one hundred thousand."
That same attitude, that same understanding of his part as a propa-
gandist caused him, despite a well-organized system of agents and com-
mand of the best pens and minds of France, to rely above all on him-
self. He planned, wrote, produced, and organized. Hence, every
action of his has a vigorous, indelible personal stamp.
Realizing that he was not an impassioned orator, Napoleon avoided
unrehearsed, impromptu addresses. On the other hand, he could write.
Not only could he write well, but his words could arouse to battle.
"Soldeirs! " shouted General Bonaparte, taking command of a motley
group of ragamuffins and beggars, on whom he conferred immortality
under the name of the army of Italy, "soldiers, you are tattered, bare-
foot, and hungry. I shall lead you to the most fertile valley in the
world. Large cities, rich provinces will be in your power. There in
Italy you will find glory, fame and wealth. Follow me. .
From the very first moment, the 26-year old general managed to
inspire a revolutionary and rebellious army with faith in the new com-
mander, and in themselves. The first victories transformed this faith
into a fanatic idolization for the general, small and unimpressive, but
performing feats beyond their most daring fancies.
The Directorate joyfully welcomed Italian gold, Austrian banners
and classical sculpture. But accompanying the banners are chests full
of leaflets and engravings: "General Bonaparte at Lodi," "Bonaparte
arriving at Milan," "Bonaparte at Virgil's grave." Josephine and her
friends undertook to spread this printed matter. Bonaparte's popu-
larity increased, and this is one of the reasons why the Directorate,
wishing to dispose of the ambitious Corsican, sent him to almost in-
evitable ruin in Egypt.
Egypt was a new stage in Napoleon's career. For the expedition he
selected an ensemble of the finest scholars, writers, designers, and
painters. The majority of these men perished, but those who returned
enthusiastically aided in the preparation of the road to Consulship and
later Emperorship. There, in Egypt, Napoleon probably reached the
zenith of his writing artistry in the historic order: "Soldiers, forty cen-
turies look down upon you from these pyramids . . ."
His knowledge of the East had a decisive influence on his methods
of playing on the imagination of the masses by creating a suitable back-
ground for himself. As Emperor, he alone would design the uniforms
of his regiments so that their splendor reflected the austerity of his own
attire. From that time, he began to surround himself with Mamelukes.

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 92 MILITARY AFFAIRS SPRING

He took pains to establi

modesty. Then, aside from the coronation fashion, he would wear
only a green frock coat of the horse-guards, a grey cloak, and a three-
cornered hat.
The setting for the spectacle, in which he took part, and with which
he wished to charm the masses, was a specialty of this virtuoso of mass
psychology and popularity.
Nothing was left to chance. He restaged the coronation ceremony
with rehearsals, using appropriately costumed dolls. "Success lies in
the organization of details and in their meticulous arrangement." The
meeting with Czar Alexander after the signing of the peace-pact at
Tilsi was a typical example of his pageantry: the raft anchored on the
Niemenna with two Emperors, who only yesterday were leaders of
enemy armies, exchanging embraces and assurances of friendship. Al-
exander offered the order of the Legion of Honor, saying: "Sir, I have
been defeated!" "Yes," answered Bonaparte, "I know, but being de-
feated by Napoleon is almost equal to victory." On both banks of the
Niemenna, amphitheatrically-arranged, cheering and gazing on, were
the armies, thus completing an impressive and decorative tableau of this
historic occasion.
But there were days of darkness. There was the Russian campaign,
the retreat from Moscow.. Of the large army, only tatters remained.
How to present France with the story of defeat, and at the same time
prepare her for dedication to new achievements.
At his quarters in Warsaw in "English Hotel" he outlined the fa-
mous bulletin 29 which appeared in the Mon4tor on December 16,
1 812, two days before the arrival of the Emperor in Paris. It is truly
a masterpiece of prose. In words full of dignity and tragic pathos, the
commander of a non-existing army describes its superhuman struggle,
its final capitulation, not before the might of the enemy, but before
"nature, untamed by man."
As in a Sophoclean tragedy, we see the uncontrollable mounting per-
versities of fate. The words are selected with dexterity. The trans-
forming scenes add to the impression and blend completely into one
doleful frieze, where on the snow-covered plain of White Russia, we
see heaps of corpses-both human and animal, abandoned wagons, sol-
diers struggling under their heavy burdens, generals commanding
platoons, and colonels battling as mere privates. In these scenes, worthy
of the brush of Goya, surrounded by his retinue and the remnants of
his guard, stands the figure of the Emperor. The whole bulletin, de-

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194S I)'/,DIEWANOWSKI: NAPIOLEON 93

spite the tragic description, touches one with the tranquillity and
masterfulness of the man, who during the expedition to this icy hell,
did not lose control of himself even for a moment, but sought even
greater glory by rising above the unconquerable. The bulletin con-
cludes with the words, "The Emperor was never more happily blessed
with good health than at present."
Then followed the battle of Lipsk, the campaign of 1814, and
finally abdication.
In the farewell scene with his guards, the master of drama surpassed
even himself, furnishing the artist with an ideal painting which needs
only to be copied, reproduced by thousands, and finally hung on the
walls of French homes. Broken physically and morally, between hys-
terical attacks of despair and long hours of complete inertia, Napoleon
reflected how most dramatically to retire from the stage of history, how
he could mark this departure as a most heroic episode.
The court-yard at Fontainebleau palace, with the veterans, "Fed on
the blood of Europe, the Italian sun, scarred by battles," crying like
children, the shouts piercing with sobs, the Emperor-leader touching,
kissing the regimental banner.
What artist or what poet could resist such a scene?
"My comrades in battle," he called, fully conscious that he was de-
parting to become a legend, "If I decided to outlive myself, it is only
to further serve your cause. Now, I want to describe these great deeds
which we have performed together."
This gesture proved premature.
The sojourn in Elba restored tranquility, gave him time to deliberate
and reflect. Faith in his power and in his star returned.
"This is not an end worthy of me," he told his mother.
Letitia not only agreed, but encouraged flight.
After reviewing reports from his followers in France, Napoleon pro-
ceeded to edit and print at Porto Ferrajo pamphlets which were to be
disseminated upon disembarkationi. The leaflet brimmed with revolu-
tionary demagoguey, calling the populace to overthrow the Bourbon
yoke and to drive out the nobility and clergy. "The Emperor's eagles
will fly from tower to tower until they rest on Notre Dame."
Thiers termed Napoleon's return from Elba "An invasion performed
by one man." Contemporary witnesses contend that there was some-
thing supernatural, nearly miraculous, in Napoleon's triumphant re-
turn. This miracle, however, was carefully prepared by pamphlets,
agents, and what was of paramount importance in those days, whis-

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 94 MILITARY AFFAIRS SPRING

pered propaganda.
Napoleon met the first signs of resistance at Laffrey where in a
mountain-pass he was obstructed by the 5th regiment of infantry reg-
ulars.
"Soldiers," he shouted, "if there is one among you who would like
to fire at his Emperor, here I am! "
Two officers, sent the previous day to the barracks of the regiment,
prepared the terrain and brought back reports of definite anti-Bourbon
and pro-Napoleon sentiments. This episode, which has gone down in
history, was achieved with confidence and no danger existed.
Bloodless, and crowned with complete success, the invasion of France
took Napoleon twenty of the one hundred days. He landed at Antibes
on March 1. He reached Paris on the 20th. The alteration in
France's attitude was reflected in Figaro, in which the news of the
landing was headlined as "L'Antropophage debarqua 'a Antibes." The
5th of March, "L'usurpateur a Nice"; on the 8th, "Bonaparte a
Grenoble"; on the 14th, "Napoleon 'a Lyon"; on the 17th, "L'Em-
pereur a Fontainebleau"; on the 18th, "Sa Majeste Imperiale est
entree a Paris hier soir."
Napoleon spent more than one-fifth of his life on the isle of St.
Helena in exile. Deprived of any possible hope of further activity,
unable even to dream of flight, he concentrated his complete efforts
toward one goal: the greatest possible improvement in opinion toward
the 20-year reign of his dynasty.
"Only by martyrdom can I replace the crown of my dynasty," he
told himself on the ship carrying him to exile. Consequently, from
the moment of his arrival on the isle he did everything to make this
exile look like martyrdom, and above all so that tidings of this would
reach the outside world, composed and inspired others to do so in the
same spirit.
In the Commentaries this Prometheus succeeded in implanting in
history his version of his achievements and words. There, too, he
adopted the pose of "prophet of a new age," democrat and liberal, ini-
tiator of common reforms, builder of a new national consciousness, and
in this manner. acknowledged himself the father of new ideas and
changes, of which he was only the obstetrician.
Thanks to these efforts, he laid the groundwork for the existence of
the Second Empire. Napoleon III owed his career in a large measure
to the work of his uncle on the isle of St. Helena. The birth of the
Second Empire was the posthumous triumph of Napoleon I.

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