Vietnam

An Approach for Analysing State-Society Relations in Vietnam
Author(s): Benedict J. Tria KERKVLIET

Source: Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No. 2, NEGOTIATING THE
STATE IN VIETNAM (October 2001), pp. 238-278
Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
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SOJOURNVol. 16, No. 2 (2001), pp. 238-78
An Approach forAnalysing
State-Society Relations in Vietnam
Benedict J. Tria KERKVLIET
Thisarticleexaminesfourarenas inVietnam'spoliticallifeinwhichstate-
societyrelationsare problematic:governinginstitutions and processes,
mass media,agricultural collectives,and corruption.Each has evidence
to supporttwo common interpretations, whichargue thatthe state and
itsvariousorganizationsinsocietyrunthe politicalshow inVietnam.Yet,
thereis also evidence fora thirdinterpretation, which highlightspoliti-
cal activitiesinsociety beyond the reach of the state and itsorganiza-
tions.The articlealso findsongoing deliberationsin each arena about
whatrelationsbetween the state and society should be.
Vietnam'sleaderssaythegovernment is "ofthepeople,forthepeople,
and by the people". Yet the country'spolitical systemhas only one
politicalparty,theCommunistParty.Electionstypically haveonlycan-
didatesapprovedbythatparty.Tightrestrictions makeverydifficultthe
formation of anyorganizationor theestablishment ofanypublication
thatcriticizesthe CommunistParty'sdominationof thepoliticalsys-
tem.In such a system,what is the relationshipbetweentherulersand
theruled,theauthorities and "thepeople"?Secondly,whatis beingsaid
and debatedin thecountryabout whatthoserelationships should be?
This articleoffersan approachto analysingsuch questions.It uses
threeinterpretations in thescholarly
literatureto examinespecificpoliti-
cal arenas.It findsthateach interpretation to an understand-
contributes
ingofthepoliticalsystembut is incomplete.This approachalso reveals
contendingnotionsin Vietnam about appropriaterelationsbetween
stateand society.
An Approach forAnalysingState-Society Relations in Vietnam 239
ConceptualizingRelationsbetween "State" and "Society"

Stateand society areimportant conceptsin everyday lifeas wellas in
politicalanalysis. But the concepts are elusive and hard todefine.One
of themostperplexing problemsis distinguishing betweenthetwo.
Wheredoesthestate"end"and society"begin",andviceversa?State
and society aredifferent, yettheyarenotentirely separate. Forexam-
ple,in a country likeAustralia or theUnitedStates,is a government-
fundeduniversity part of "the state" or is it partof"society"? People
working in sucha university areon thegovernment payroll; theyare
oftenpartofa stateemployee healthcare orretirement system; theyare
probablyboundbycertainrestrictions applicableto all government
workers. The highest governing of
body sucha university typicallyis
oftena boardorcouncilthatincludes representatives from the state.
Yet
mostpeopleina university wouldprobably notthinkofthemselves as
beingpart of the state. They would not see themselves as beingrespon-
sibletothegovernment's chiefexecutive orthestateagency "incharge"
ofhigher education. Students attheuniversity, eventhoseonstateschol-
arships,wouldnotlikelysaytheyarepartofthestate.Instead, students
andfaculty arelikely tothinkofthemselves as beingindependent schol-
ars,freeto pursuetheirowncourseofstudy,and teachand takethe
courses theywantwithin theboundsofuniversity-designed - notstate-
-
designed requirements. Periodically,issuesdo arisethathighlight the
of a
complexities university's For
position. instance, when a stateoffi-
cialor agencytriesto tella faculty memberhowor whatto teachor
threatens to withhold funding from a university or an academicpro-
gramme until itdoes as the government says or when faculty members
andstudents whocriticize thegovernment arethreatened withexpul-
sion,thendebatesarelikelytoeruptovertheroleoftheuniversity and
itsobligations to stateauthorities, to "thecommunity", and to schol-
arship.Boiled down, such discussions are about thestate in theaffairs
ofsociety, the
specifically, relations betweenthestateandtheuniver-
sity.
This is butone of manyexamplesin whichboundaries between
"state"and"society" aremurky andinwhichtrying tolocateanddraw
240 Benedict J. Tria KERKVLIET
themisimportant yethighly contentious. Thissituation istrueinmany

countries, including Vietnam.
It brings metoan important pointabouthowtoconceptualize and
talkaboutrelations betweenthestateand society. Ratherthantrying
to saythatone entityis partofthestateand anotherentity is partof
society, a more fruitfulapproach is to think ofarenas in which bounda-
ries,rights, jurisdictions, and powerdistribution betweenstateand
societalagenciesaredebated,contested, and resolved(at leasttempo-
rarily).1Thesearenascanbewithin physical institutions,including those
that,structurally speaking, clearly belongtothestate,forexample, gov-
ernment ministriesand militaries. Butthearenascan be otherinstitu-
tions,likea government-funded university,whoselocations in thestate
structure areambiguous. Arenascan be groupsand organizations not
partofa statestructure yetin one degreeoranother arepenetrated by
staterulesandregulations - forexample, families, and
villages, religious
groups. Arenas may also be problems and controversies thatare not
confined to a particular institution. An examplein theUnitedStates
todaywouldbe abortion, whichis swirling withquestionsaboutthe
proper role of stateagencies and individuals and organizations in soci-
ety.In Vietnam, a current contentious issueiscorruption,
state-society
whichI willexaminelaterin thisarticle.
"Society", as usedhere,is a summary termforpeoplein a country,
including their institutions and customs, whosharepoliticaland eco-
nomiccircumstances andenvironment.2 "State"refers to officials and
that
institutions make,implement, andenforce rulesthatareintended
toapplyacrosstheentire society and itsvariousparts.3 No society, how-
ever,is thoroughly uniform. Rarelydoesithavea singular setofinsti-
tutions, customs, and circumstances. Butto be a society, itmusthave
incommonsomesignificant features, certainpractices,orparticular con-
ditions.Rulesandregulations ofthestateareamongthecircumstances
peoplein a societyshareandwhichcontribute to influencing theway
they live and which theymay indeed shape in turn. In other words,a
society hasmanyorganizations, activities,andinstitutions. One ofthem
isthestate.The state,therefore, is insociety. Thestate,however, claims
to be,and in factmaybe, theultimate agencysetting and arbitrating
therulesandregulations thatframe whatotherinstitutions, groups, and

so forth,insociety how
do,including they interact with the In
state. this
sense,thestate,although in society, mayalsobe thechiefagentdefin-
ing and delimiting society. This conceptualization does notpresume,
however, complete, society-wide acceptance of the state or theformof
a particular A
state. society maywellhaveindividuals, groups, andcom-
munities struggling against the stateand rejecting the state's attempts
toconstrain orsetterms forhowandwheretheylive.Atthesametime,
societymay,and usuallydoes,havegroupsand otheractorsseeking
protection, support,and intervention fromthestate.Nor does this
conceptualization presume that the state is capableofrulingand regu-
latingall sectorsofsociety, or thatitactsaloneinattempting to do so.
Suchmatters and
requireinvestigation analysis in order to know how
peoplein society seethestateorhowablethestateis tosetparameters
forsociety.
"Society", I hastento add,is notthesameas "civilsociety". Not all
societiespossesscivilsociety'squalitiesor features. Civilsociety,as I
thinkofit,refers toindividuals andgroupson theirown- without the
state'sinstigation -
andmanipulation speaking, writing, teaching, act-
and
ing, organizing around variousinterests and issuesand doing in
so
publicplacesindependent ofthestate.4 It requires considerable civility
- thegiveand takeofcontending ideasand claimsbutwithcontrol-
ledpassionsandrestrained exuberance. It requires tolerating differences
inopinion,organization, and practices. It alsorequires thewillingness
toworkand interact withthestate.Resorting to killingone'spolitical
opponents or to violentrevolution the
against stateamountsto aban-
doningcivilsociety. Civilsociety alsorequires an accommodating state
- one thatnotonlytolerates differences and criticisms buthelpsto
maintain institutions,laws,andpractices thatmakepublicdebatepos-
siblewithoutviolentor silencing repercussions. Of course,thedegree
towhichcivilsociety existsvariesovertimewithinthesamesociety and
fromone societyto another.
Manyquestions canbe raisedaboutrelations between stateandso-
A
ciety. singlearticle cannotexplorethemall.I shallconcentrate on re-
lationsbetween government authoritiesand peopleliving within the ju-
risdiction ofthatgovernment. In particular,

twokindsofquestions will
be addressed. The first
concernshowthepolitical system works.How,
ifat all,doesthestatealloworencourage to be involved
citizens in the
of and
process setting implementing rulesand policiesofthecountry?
How, ifat all,do peoplein society affect
ortryto affect whatstateau-
thorities do; andtowhatextent do peopleabidebywhatauthorities say?
The secondarenormative questions.What should be therelationsbe-
tweenstateauthorities andpeopleinsociety? Whatinvolvement should
thestatehaveinpeople'seconomic, andpolitical
social,cultural, affairs;
andwhatinvolvement shouldgroupsandindividuals havein
insociety
stateaffairs?
Three Interpretations
ofthe PoliticalSystem
Tentative answers tosomeofthesequestions appearin thescholarship
on Vietnam'spoliticalsystem andstate-society Fewanalysts
relations.
wouldsaytheirfindings areadequate, andtoomuchremains unknown.
Researchis sparseand generalizations oftenreston slenderevidence.
Nevertheless, efforts
havebeenmadetoanalysehowthesystem works.
They can be synthesizedinto three interpretations.5
The first,
whichI callthe"dominating state"interpretation,saysthat
rulesandprogrammes governing Vietnam aredone by and within the
state,in whichtheCommunist Partyis themostpowerful and perva-
siveinstitution.
One suchformulation arguesthatVietnam isa "vastand
co-ordinated party-statewhich pre-empts alternativeand autonomous
societalorganizationsfromthenationalcentredownto thegrassroots
ofthevillageandtheworkplace" (Womack1992,p. 180). "Vietnam's
systemis mono-organizational socialism", writesCarlyleThayer,in
which"thereis littlescopefortheorganization ofactivityindependent
oftheparty-led commandstructures". ThoughtheCommunist Party
relaxeditsgripfollowing reforms in themid-1980s,Thayersays,its
controlwasreasserted after1988,hence"civilsociety[is]awaiting the
erosionof mono-organizational socialismbeforedeveloping further"
(Thayer1992,pp. 111-12).
Withregard topolicy-making andimplementation, according tothis
dominatingstateinterpretation, societyhas no significant

impact.
GarethPorteris clearest
on this:
The model of the bureaucraticpolity r,in whichmajordecisionsare
madeentirely withinthebureaucracy and areinfluenced
byitrather
thanbyextra-bureaucratic forcesin society- whether parliamentary
parties,interestgroups,or massmovements - aptlydescribeshow
theVietnamesepolicysystemworks.Not onlythedetermination of
majorpoliciesbut thepowerovertheselectionofpoliticaland gov-
ernmentalleadershipis confinedto a smallgroupof partyofficials.
(Porter1993, p. 101; emphasisin theoriginal)
Differences withinthestatedo arise.Scholarsanalyseinternal debates
and factions withinCommunistPartyand othercomponents of the
state.6Buttheonlyimportant influencesoutsidethestatethatthedomi-
nating stateinterpretationacknowledges areinternationalones.Forin-
stance,eventsin communist countries in EasternEuropeand Soviet
Unionin the 1980saresaidto havehad a profound impacton Viet-
nam'spoliticalleadership (Porter1993,p. 96; Kolko1997,pp. 29-30,
133-37).
A secondinterpretation modifies thefirstbysaying thatforces
inso-
ciety can influence policythroughorganizations thatthestateitself
dominates. Some analysts talk about this phenomenon as
"mobilizational authoritarianism"; otherscall it "statecorporatism".
Setting aside fine distinctionsbetween them,I willreferto bothas
"mobilizational corporatism". It drawsattention to theimportance of
variousorganizations, one
typically foreach major socialsector
that the
state,particularlytheparty, hasestablished andruns.Usingtheseorgani-
zations,thestatecan mobilizepeopleto supportitsprogrammes and
policies,maintain channels ofcommunication between authorities
and
each sectorof society,and managesocialand economicgroupsthat
otherwise mightbecomeunruly. WilliamTurleyarguesthatbecause
otherorganizations independent thestatearefew,indeedareusually
of
prohibited, and becausetheCommunist Partyretains considerablele-
"the
gitimacy, power elite
has been ableto invitepopularinvolvement
underitssupervision without muchfearthatthings willgetoutofcon-
trol...".At thesametime,people'sconcerns expressed throughthese
authorized channelscan influence policydebateamongnationallead-

ers.7This interaction betweenleadership and citizensthrough state-
instigated andstate-managed organizationsalsohelpstoperpetuate the
politicalsystem.
The first andsecondinterpretations focuson formal institutions of
politics.Bothalsoemphasize national-level politics,paying little atten-
tionto local politicaldynamics. They also concentrate primarily on
policyand policy-making; theysaylittleaboutdiscrepancies between
whatstateleadershavedecidedandwhatpeopleinsociety actually do.
According toa thirdinterpretation,theaboveconceptualizations at-
tribute too muchpowerto stateand too littleto society.In thefirst
place,due to insufficient resourcesand otherinadequacies, thestate's
capacity to co-ordinate and
programmes implement policiesis consid-
erablylessthanwhata dominating stateor mobilizing corporatist in-
terpretation would lead one to believe (Woodside1979; Thrift and
Forbes 1986, pp. 81-83, 101-4). The state,concludesMelanie
Beresford, haslongbeen"highly decentralized", makingitdifficult for
thecentralauthorities' policiesandprogrammes to actually be imple-
mentedandinvolving considerablenegotiation between andcen-
local
tralauthorities.8 Furthermore, socialgroupsand processes notunder
statecontrolhaveremainedafoot,shapingVietnam'seconomyand
societyas muchas or morethanstatepolicyandadministration. Such
factorsin societytogether withweakadministrative machinery helpto
explaindiscrepancies between what the state claims and what actually
occurs(Thrift and Forbes1986,pp. 82-83). Another partofthisin-
terpretation is thatsocialforces outsideofthestateandofficial organi-
zationshaveaffected nationalpolicies.Beresford, forinstance, indicates
thattheCommunist Partyhasbeenresponsive topressures frombelow
andrecognizes the"existence ofindependent sources ofpolitical power"
(Beresford 1989,pp. 116-18). Other analysts linkedsignificant
have
policychangesduetopressures from variousquarters ofsociety (Fforde
al.
1989,esp.pp. 203-205; Chu Van Lam et 1992,esp. pp. 78-79;
Kerkvliet 1995;White1985). The mainmessage running through stud-
ieshighlighting thesefeaturesofVietnam's politicalsystem is that there
canbe negotiation between variouscomponents ofthestateand inter-
estsinsociety.I summarize thisphenomenon, however as

imperfectly,
"dialogue"in the broad sense of theword, which commu-
incorporates
nicationofcontentious ideasandpreferences inwaysthat,inVietnam,
areoftenindirect and non-verbal.9
Withthesethreeinterpretations ofVietnam'spoliticalsystemin
mind, letus now lookat four arenasto thetwoquestions
investigate on
relations
state-society raised in theprevioussection.
GoverningInstitutions
and Processes
Thisarenaincludeshowthestatemakesand implements policiesand
rulesforsociety. Much thatwe knowabouthowVietnamis governed
fitswithinthedominating stateandmobilizational corporatist interpre-
tations.Notonlyis theCommunist Partytheonlypoliticalparty in the
country, butauthorities rejectanysuggestions ofa multi-party system
and squashanypotentialrivalpoliticalorganizations. Vietnam'sstate
isevenmorerigidin thisregard thanneighbouring Chinawhereatleast
a fewtinyopposition politicalparties areallowed.Vietnam'sCommu-
nistPartyhasabout2.1 millionmembers (Kolko1997,p. 72). Although
makingup onlyabout3 percentofthenation'stotalpopulation, party
members a of
compose largepercentage government officials, the
from
smallestunitofadministration, calledsub-districts(xa) inthecountry-
side(generally composed of two tofive and
villages) precincts {phuong)
in thecities,to thedistrict
andwards{huyen, quart)and the provinces,
andtothenational ministries,
courts, andNationalAssembly. Elections
areregularly heldto selecttherepresentatives to runall theselevelsof
government. The nomination system organized bylocalunitsoftheFa-
therlandFront{Mat TranTo Quoc),whichisdominated bytheCom-
munist Party, almost alwaysproduces candidates who meet theapproval
ofpartyleadersin thelocalityand,forhigheroffices, theapprovalof
theparty'sCentralCommittee(about150 people)and thePolitical
Bureau(morethana dozenmembers).10 Mostcandidates, especially for
and
provincial- national-level offices, arepartymembers, andtheover-
whelming majority of thoseelected are partymembers. In theNational
Assembly, forexample,about90 percentofthenearly400 delegates
the
during late1990sweremembers ofVietnam'sCommunist Party.
Most policiesand lawsare made in a processthatis hardto follow.

Much ofitseemsto occurwithintheCommunistPartyand government
officesbehindclosed doors.Rarelyare deliberationsopen to the pub-
lic.Accessto decision-makers at thenationaland provinciallevelsis very
restricted.Althoughtheaveragepersonprobablyknowsmoreabouthow
district and sub-districtauthorities makedecisions,eventheretheproc-
ess is rarelyaccessibleto mostcitizens.A nationalbureaucracy, charged
withimplementing policiesand enforcingrules,has branchesextend-
ingdown to districtand oftensub-district levels.It includesa national
police and domestic securitysystemwhose work monitor people
thoughtto be disenchantedwiththepoliticalsystemor engagedin ac-
tivitiespotentiallydamagingto theregime.Alongsidethenation-wide
bureaucracyis the CommunistParty'sown elaboratehierarchythat
extendsdown to villages.
Helping to generatesupportforthe stateand to channelcitizens'
concernsand criticisms in a non-threatening mannerto theleadersare
numerousorganizationsof the partyor otherinstitutions of the state.
Some twodozen areaffiliates oftheofficialoverarching association,the
FatherlandFront.The organizations are supposedto represent various
sectorsof Vietnamesesociety:forexample,the Peasants'Association
{Hoi NongDan) foragricultural producers,theGeneralConfederation
of Labor (TongLien Doan Lao Dong) forworkers,theWomen's Asso-
ciation(Hoi Phu Nu), and theHo Chi Minh CommunistYouthLeague
(Doan Thanh Nien CongSan Ho Chi Minh). One that has become
prominentin recentyearsis theChamberof Commerceand Industry
ofVietnam(PhongThuongMaiva CongNghiep),whichwas established
bytheMinistry ofForeignTrade.11CommunistPartyleadershead these
and
organizations typically occupykeypositionsin theirlocal branches.
Justas themobilizationalcorporatist interpretation says,authorities
use thesestateorganizations to carryout government programmes and
policies.In northVietnamduringthe 1950s, forexample,the official
peasantorganizationoftheday (thencalledNongHoi, a predecessorof
today'sPeasants'Association),helpedlocal officials and partyleadersto
carryout a sweeping land redistribution programmesand thento per-
suade,encourage,and coercevillagersto join agricultural collectives.In
recentyears,government and partyauthorities havecalledupon the

Women'sAssociation, Peasants' Association, Youth League,and Con-
federationofLabortodrumupsupport in neighbourhoods andvillages
fornationalcampaigns against and
illegaldrugs,prostitution, gambling,
andother"socialevils".Statements fromthePeasants' Association make
clearthattheorganization isa "prop[chodua]ofthe[Communist] Party
and State,a crucialforceofthepeasants'movement to implement the
policiesand undertakings ofthepartyand thestate..."12The largest
andlongestmobilizational roleofthesegroupsand thepartyitself was
keepingup citizens'determination tojoin thewarto fight theAmeri-
cansand reunite thecountry (1960-75). Many Vietnamese no doubt
wouldhavesacrificed a lotforthiscauseevenwithouttheseorganiza-
tionscirculating information, holding meetings, singing patrioticsongs,
andputting on performances depicting the heroicsof theircountrymen.
Nevertheless, thoseactivitieswereubiquitousandprobably helpedthe
wareffort significantly.13
Although oftenboosters forwhatever thegovernment andparty lead-
ership want, thesestate also
organizations promote their members' in-
terests.The ChamberofCommerce and Industry lobbiedon behalfof
businesses during debates and deliberations over investment lawsand
helpedto shapethe1994legislation. In nationalpolicy-making circles
during 1993-94, the Confederation of Labor pressed for minimum
wagelaws,therightto strike, and othermeasures supported bylarge
numbers ofworkers (Stromseth 1998,chap.4 and 6). Officers ofthe
Peasants' Association havefaulted stateauthorities formistreating peas-
ants.Theyhavealsourgedthestatetosubsidize farm-gate pricesforrice,
increase thevolumeoflow-interest loansforpeasants, andputin place
otherprogrammes beneficial to ruralpeople'sneeds.The Peasants'As-
sociationalsoclaimsto haveinfluenced, on behalfofitsmembers, the
contentof the1993 landlaw,especially sectionsallowingvillagers to
transfertheirlanduserights to others.14
Whathas beensaid thusfarsynthesizes a greatdeal aboutstate-
societyrelations in governing processes. But additional evidenceabout
howthegovernment works, whichdoesnotfitwithinthedominating
stateand mobilizational corporatist interpretations, also needsto be
takenintoconsideration.For one thing,manyactivitiesaffecting gov-

ernmentoperationsare unauthorizedor falloutsideofficialchannels.
Informalarrangements betweenofficials and ordinarycitizensconstitute
one clusterof such activities.Personalconnectionscan figurepromi-
nentlyin how decisionsare made and rulesare implemented.Family
ties,friendships,and relationships carryingoverfromwhenpeoplewere
classmatesor in the armytogetheror hailingfromthe same province
or villagecan influencehow officialsbehave. Having "connections"
makesit possible,at leastin some cases,fora citizento getfavourable
decisionfroma government officeevenifotherwisenotmeritedor have
thatofficeignorean infraction thatthepersonhas committed.
A second clusterof evidenceis the dispersed,unorganized,yetex-
tensiveactionsthatviolatewhatstateagenciesstipulate.Housingprac-
ticesis one areathathas been researched(Thriftand Forbes1986; Koh
2000, chap. 5). In the 1980s, tensof thousandsof urbanresidentsin
Vietnamignoredand sometimesblatantlydefiedstaterulesand regu-
lationsabout buildingand renovating dwellings.For a combinationof
reasons,amongthemlimitedresourcesforstatelaw enforcement in the
faceofwidespreadviolationsand manylocalofficials turning a blind eye
or actuallyhelpingpeople to skirtthe law, residentsfrequently did as
theywantedyetavoidedfinesand otherpunishments.15 At severaljunc-
turesduringthe 1980s and 1990s, thewidespreadviolationscompelled
nationalauthorities to makenewlawsthatweremorein linewithwhat
people were actuallydoing. In otherwords,unorganizedsocietalpres-
sureoutsideofficialchannelshad helpedto shape thestate'srules.This
conformsto thedialogicalinterpretation of government.
So does a thirdclusterofevidence:organizedactivitiesbeyondoffi-
cial channelsto voice citizens'concernsand demands.Workersin nu-
merousstate-ownedand privatecompanieswenton strikein theearly
1990s beforesuch actionswere legal. Besides seekingbetterpay and
workingconditions,thestrikers also oftendemanded"democracy in the
workplace".By 1994, these and other public demonstrations by work-
ershad pressured Confederation ofLaborleadersto championtheright
to strikeand contributedto theNationalAssembly'sdecisionto legal-
ize strikesthatconformedto certainguidelines(Greenfield1994, pp.
226-28; Kerkvliet 1995,pp. 17-19). Placard-holding citizens periodi-

callystep outside authorized channels to demonstrate in front ofgov-
ernment offices and in thestreets in orderto drawattention to their
grievances against golf coursesbeing built on theirrice fields,excessive
taxes,
government government confiscation of land, abusive authorities,
flawedelections, corruption, and otherconditions. In May 1998,for
instance,over500 angry surrounded
villagers theprovincial government
officesinNamDinhprovince; a yearlatera hundred peasantsstageda
silentdemonstration infrontoftheNationalAssembly inHanoi.Some-
times,suchas inpartsofThanhHoa province in 1989 andDong Nai
province in 1997, demonstrators become more aggressive, throwing
stonesthrough office windows, shouting abuses at and
officials, taking
policemenhostageuntiltheyextract someconcessions fromauthori-
ties.16
Government responsesaretypically a combination ofsendingin
thepolicetomakearrests andattending tosome oftheprotesters' com-
plaints.
Duringthe1990s,a coupleof dozenorganizations emergedthat
helpeddrug addicts, unemployed people, homeless street children,
minority groups, andothers. These"non-governmental organizations"
(NGOs) havealso launchedmodestcampaignsto drawattention to
socialandeconomic problems andsolicithelpfromgovernment andin-
ternational aid agencies(Beaulieu1994; Grey1997; Ljunggren 1994,
pp.27-33). Whiletheseorganizations havetocomply withcertain state
regulations,many have avoidedbecoming handmaidens of stateofficials.
AcrossVietnam, hundreds, probably thousands ofothersmallorgani-
zationshaveno legalstanding butareactivein furthering theirinter-
ests.Thereare,forexample,groupsofvegetable growers, associations
fortherepairandmaintenance ofreligious temples, andorganizations
among vendors and pedicab drivers.
Thereisonelargeorganization wholly outsidethestate.It istheUni-
fiedBuddhistChurchofVietnam(UBCV, Giao Hoi PhatGiao Viet
Nam Thong Nhat).Formedinthe1951insouthern Vietnam, itsspokes-
persons claim thatit the
represents majority of Buddhists in thecoun-
In the
try. 1981, statesoughtto bringall Buddhists undera singleor-
ganization,calledthe Buddhist Church of Vietnam {GiaoHoi PhatGiao
VietNam). Butmanymonksand layBuddhists refused to join.They

remained insteadin theUBCV, defying thestate.Fromtimeto time
leadingmonksin theUBCV demandthatthegovernment stopmed-
in
dling religious affairs.
Some have written scathing critiques of the
government's violationsofhumanrights and haveadvocateda multi-
partypoliticalsystem. Authorities' reactionshaveincludedclamping
downon UBCV activities, detainingseveralUBCV monksforsuch
offenses as causingpublicdisorderand undermining nationalunity,
sentencing prominent monks to in and
years prison, harassing UBCV
activists.
So farsuchreactions havenotexpunged theorganization. State
authorities haverefrained, however, fromlaunching a determined fron-
talassaultagainsttheorganization, probably forfearthatsucha exten-
siverepression wouldarousewidespread angerand unrest.17
Another aspectofgoverning processes pertinent to state-society re-
lationsis debateoverstate-society boundaries thatoccurswithinstate
institutions.In recentyearsan important dynamic withintheConfed-
erationofLabor,theonlyauthorized nationalorganization forwork-
ers,hasbeenan ongoingdiscussion, punctuated occasionally byheated
outbursts, about itspurpose.Many workers and local Confederation
leadershavecriticized theorganization forbehaving primarily ina top-
downmanner, conveying to workers what the Communist Partyand
government leaderswantratherthanpressuring stateauthorities to
addressworkers' needs(Greenfield 1994,pp. 220-23). In moregen-
eralterms, members haveinsisted on a distinction between whatthey
wantandwhatthestatewants.Elections havebeenanother siteofstrug-
gle for
a clearer between
distinction people'sinterests and the state's.
For
instance,twicein recentyears,votersin a sub-district on theoutskirts
ofHanoihavedumpedcandidates favoured byparty officialdom. To a
significantdegreethereasons camedowntomostvoters' conception of
a goodpublicofficial being at odds with what authorities were insist-
ingon (Malarney 1997). Equallysignificant, themajority ofvoters there
hadmanaged toturnelections theirway ratherthan leave them control-
ledbylocalrepresentatives of thestate.Letters to theeditorsofsome
newspapers and articles
by some have
journalists conveyed discontent
withtheelectoral system becauseit allowsvoterstoo littlechoiceand
hasbutonepoliticalparty.Someofthesewritings insinuate,contrary
to theofficial line,that the system is notdemocratic. In manyurban
electorates in Hanoi,officials countenance proxyvoting,eventhough
it is illegal,in partto assuagemanyresidents' discontentwithbeing
to
compelled go through the motions ofvoting when they theproc-
see
essas largely meaningless (Koh 2000, chap.3).
Butonedoesnotneedtolookat localpoliticsto finddebatewithin
stateinstitutions aboutwheretheboundaries between stateandsociety
shouldbe. Beginning at leastas earlyas themid-1970s,leadersin the
nationalgovernment and theCommunistPartyitselfwerearguing
aboutwhether, and ifso how,thestateshouldceasetrying toplanand
controlthecountry's economy.Gradually, thoseadvocating greater
scope for freemarkets, removing pricecontrols, allowingprivate enter-
prises,returning farmlandto individualhouseholds,and so forth,
brought about significantchanges.18 Debateson theseissuescontinue
to thisday,withsomeinthepartyarguing thatthestatehascededtoo
muchto freemarkets, domesticentrepreneurs, and foreigninvestors.
Buttheresult thusfar,officiallysummarized as "renovation"{dotmoi),
hasbeenmuchmorespacein theeconomy forindividuals,households,
private enterprises- in short,society - and farlessforthestate.De-
bateswithinnationaloffices aboutallowingmorespaceinthepolitical
system forautonomous organizations, possiblyevenotherpoliticalpar-
ties,havealsoflickered fromtimeto time,although withonlymodest
changesthusfar.
Media
Another arenaforobserving relations
state-society andcontestedviews
aboutwhattheboundaries shouldbe is themassmedia.Muchthatwe
knowabouthowitis organized and usedbythestateconforms to the
dominating stateand mobilizational
corporatist ofthe
interpretations
country's All
politicalsystem. television, and
radio, telephonesystems;
filmmaking; andInternet serviceprovidersareownedandoperated by
stateagencies.
All newspapers, publishinghouses,and presses
printing
areownedand operatedbygovernment theCommunist
ministries,
Party, andofficial Authorities

organizations. intheMinistry ofCulture
andInformation and theCommunist Party'sDepartment Culture
for
and Ideologyscrutinize and oftenintervene to determine thecontent
ofpublications and ofradioand television broadcasts. The stateuses
thesemediaoutletsnotonlyto inform andeducatecitizens butalsoto
inundate themwithofficial positionson a wide of
range domestic and
international issuesand to mobilizepeopleto do whatgovernment,
party, and mass organization leadersrequire.19
Individuals andgroupstrying topublishanddisseminate a publica-
tion,makea radioorTV broadcast, orproducea filmoutsidethestate's
system encounter insurmountable
virtually obstacles.Comparedwith
rulesregarding housing, andresidency
traffic, requirements, whichpeo-
in
ple manyparts of thecountry often ignore with nearimpunity, rules
against unauthorized outletsofmediaarerarely breached andwhenthey
are,thelawenforcement agenciesrespondquickly stoptheinfraction
to
andoftenpunishtheviolators.
Stateauthorities madetheirpositionclearinthemid-1950s. Atthat
stagetheCommunist Partygovernment wasstillyoung,and manyof
itspoliciesandruleswerestillbeingformed. Although thestateranthe
radiostations andtelegraph officesandproducednewspapers andother
publications, private publishinghousesandprinting alsoexisted.
presses
Butby 1958, thoseprivateoutletshad beenshutdownfollowing a
heatedstruggle overa rangeofissuesregarding theextent towhichthe
stateshouldcontrolwhatwriters, artists,scholars, and other people
couldsay,publish, andcreate.I shallsaymoreaboutthecontent ofthat
struggle in a minute. Since 1958 other effortsto produce and distrib-
utepublications outsidethestate'smedianetwork havebeenquickly
snuffed out.In early1989,forexample,severalmembers oftheClub
ofFormerResistance Fighters(Cau Lac Bo NhungNguoiKhangChien
Cu) in Ho Chi Minh Citymanagedto publisha magazineand some
lettersindefiance ofauthorities'prohibitions.Theirefforts tocontinue
doing so and in a
establish, effect,private publication,collapsedas na-
tionaland localauthorities blockedtheclubmembers' effortsto find
printing presses or use mimeograph machines to reproduce texts.
their
Byearly1990,policehaddetainedtheseclubmembers andplacedthe
mostprominent one, NguyenHo, underhousearrest(Heng 1999,

chap.7). That same yearauthorities arrested Doan VietHoat,a critic
oftheregime, forwriting andcirculating unauthorized material.Since
thenfewVietnamese havemanagedto distribute letters and shortes-
sayscritical ofparticular policiesorofthepolitical system beforebeing
arrested and,usually, imprisoned or putunderhousearrest.
Technological changes have made itsomewhat easierforpeoplewho
aredetermined to circulatecontraband publications andotherprinted
materials. Photocopy machines, previously as scarce as meatin a veg-
etarian restaurant, havebecomeubiquitous sincetheearly1990s.Con-
venientforpeopleofall kinds,thismachineis also a handytool for
criticswantingto producequicklycopiesof materials thatthestate
wouldnotapprove.Caughtpossessing suchforbidden material,how-
ever,canmeangraveconsequences, whichofcoursecontinues to make
people nervous and reluctant to keep it.Fax machines and theInternet
arenewwaystodistribute unauthorized materials. Despite stateauthori-
ties'efforts tomonitor whatiszippingelectronically intoandoutofthe
country, they have not yetfigured out how to all
stop communication
itdislikes.Previously, writings bysuchcritics as Ha Si Phu,DuongThu
Lu
Huong, Phuong, Nguyen and Thanh Giangthatcouldnotbe pub-
lishedinVietnam might eventually appearinnewspapers andmagazines
published in Paris, Toronto, San or
Jose,Melbourne, otherforeign
placeswithVietnamese communities. Sincethelate1990s,suchmate-
rialis instantaneously flashedtoe-maillistsaroundtheworld.Numer-
ous websites,mostofthemestablished byanti-communist Vietnam-
eseorganizations outsidethecountry, feature writings and statements
bypeopleinVietnamwhohavecriticized policiesortheparty-state it-
self.Sinceabout1996,a fewnewsletters and magazines saidto be by
peopleinVietnamandcrammed withunflattering accountsaboutthe
and
regime particular authorities,have also circulated viatheInternet.20
Although thestates gripon themassmediais firm, thereis an un-
dercurrent ofdebateaboutwhattheproperlineshouldbe between state
andsociety regarding media operations and content. This debate is not
only between authorities anddissidents butalsowithinthestate'sme-
dia system itself.
According to Vietnam'sconstitution, citizenshavethefreedom to

speak,publish, create, and form associations. In the mid-1950s, shortly
aftertheCommunist Party government was established in the northfol-
lowing the defeat of the French army and the division ofVietnam into
twoparts,numerous Vietnamese writers and scholarsin Hanoi began
toexercise theseconstitutional In
rights. independent publicationsthey
wroteshortstories, poems, and essays on a of
range topics,including
theimportance ofresearch, speech,writing, and publications separate
fromthestate.Articles alsocriticized efforts the
by party and otherstate
authorities tocontrol allmedia.Fewattacked theregime perse.Indeed,
many of these intellectuals had fought in the revolution againstFrench
colonialism on thesideoftheCommunist Party.Theysupported the
newgovernment. One lineofargument in theirpublications wasthat
opendebate,freefromstateprohibitions, was in theparty's ownbest
interest.Suchfreedom, writerssaid,wouldhelpto prevent authorities
frombecoming dogmatic andauthoritarian. Advocates ofan independ-
entmediaquicklycollidedwithnational authorities thatheldverydif-
ferent ideas.The clashbecameknownas theNhan Van-GiaiPham
affair,
referring to twooftheindependent journalspublishedin 1956
thatpromotedfreeexpression.21 Nationalauthorities arguedthatin
to
order pressahead with revolutionary change on all fronts- includ-
ingculture, technology, -
and education thestate,led bytheCom-
munistParty,musthavea firmhandon themassmedia.Intellectual
workunconnected toadvancing thesocialist revolution andpreserving
nationalindependence, officialsargued, wouldundermine theregime
andthenationandhelpto revive capitalism and all itsoppression. Ex-
cessivefreedom and "unconstructive criticism", theysaid,alsowould
playinto the hands of those in south Vietnam and theUnitedStates
whoopposedthesocialistregimeandthecountry's reunification.
Similar justificationsfor restrictionson what citizens cansay,do,and
publishpersisted intothe1990s.The expansion ofa market economy
andotherreforms sincethe1980shaveled to muchgreater varietyof
contentin mass media,includingfrequentaccountsof improper
behaviour amongofficials. Officialsrepeatedly emphasize, to
especially
foreigners,thatpeopleinVietnamhaveconsiderable freedom tosayand
do whattheylike.Buttheyalsoarguethatthestatehas a rightand a
dutyto guardthenationagainsthostiledomesticand international
forcesthathidebehinda pretense of"humanrights" and "democracy"
to threaten peace and order and thecountry's hard-won independence
and itssocialand economicimprovements.22 Drasticchangesin the
politicalsystem, theycontend, suchas allowing severalpoliticalparties
and independent mediaoutlets,willresultin chaos,similarto what
happenedto theSovietUnion.Numerouspeoplewithinthecountry
strenuously disagree.Theyadvocatefreedom to speak,assemble, and
organizeas wellas freedom fromstatedomination in themedia,arts,
andresearch. To supporttheirviews,theyofteninvokeVietnam's con-
stitution andotherofficial documents. SomeciteHo Chi Minh'swrit-
ingsdecadesago thatlambasted theFrenchfordepriving Vietnamese
oftheseveryfreedoms.23 LikeNhan Van-GiaiPhamcontributors and
publishers in the 1950s, such Vietnamese todayareessentially saying
thatthestate'sgripon theexpression andcirculation ofideasiswrong.
Citizensshouldbe abletospeakandpublishindependently ofthestate.
Sitesoftheseongoingdebatesandstruggles overhowmuchorhow
littlethestateshouldregulate themassmediaincludesomeofthestate's
owninstitutions, eventhosein chargeofmediaoutlets.24 In 1957,for
example, members inthestate-organized Vietnam Writers' Association
(VWA,Hoi Nha Van)producedthemagazineVan(Literature) that
resonated theconcerns ofthoseindependent publications in 1956 that
hadbeenbanned.Writers in Vanfrequently criticizedtheintensifying
pressure on artists to conform towhatofficials wantedsaid.Manypo-
emsandshortstories published thereflewinthefaceofthepartylead-
ership'sinsistence thatliterature shouldadhereto "socialistrealism".
Evenafterhigherofficials had forcedthepublication to close,many
writerswithintheassociation refusedtojointhestateleadership's cam-
paignagainst those who had produced andcontributed tothemagazine.
Otherstruggles haveeruptedovercensorship whennewspaper editors
and reporters try,sometimes successfully,to publishthingsthattheir
or
superiors party-state agencies the
regulating mediaobjectto.In 1986,
twonewspapers persisted,despite pressuresfrom regulatoryagencies and
high-ranking party to
officials, exposecorruption and other nefarious
ofthepartysecretary
activities andotherofficials inThanhHoa prov-
ince.Although a complicated a over
matter,struggle censorship wasa
centraldynamic inthisepisode.Another disputesurfacedin 1988.Tran
Do, headofparty's Commission on Culture andthe with
Arts,together
NguyenNgoc,editorofthestate'smainliterary magazine,VanNghe,
clashedwithsuperiors and mediaregulatory bodiesoverthepublica-
tion'scontent.Ultimately theylost their jobs. Theyhad wantedto
publishmorecreativeand livelywork,as wellas essaysthatdebated
important issuesoftheday.Likemanyotherintellectuals, TranDo and
NguyenNgocwerewearyofdoctrinaire articles
thatfillednewspapers
and magazines. Not thatthesemenand theirmanysupporters within
mediacircles
party-state werenecessarilypressing forliberaldemocracy
or completeseparation between stateand media;theirviewson these
issuesarenotclearfromthematerial athand.Whatisclearis thatthey
wantedjournalists andwriters
tohavea muchfreer handtopublishand
writeandgreater distancefromstateintervention andsupervision.25
Collectives
Agricultural
Beginning inthemid-1950s, theCommunist PartystateinnorthViet-
namestablished collectivized a
farming,centrepiece foritsradicalreor-
ganizationofagricultural production.26 werecrucialto the
Collectives
overall
stateleadership's programme tomake Vietnam a socialist
country
withstate-controlled markets, state-owned companies,an equitable
distributionof wealth,and otherfeaturesof a centrallyplanned
economy.Afterthecountry was reunified in 1975-76, thestateex-
tendedthisprogramme tothesouth.Collectivized agriculture required
farming householdsto pool their
lands, draught animals, and labourand
thenworktogether to raisecropsand livestock. Villagerswere organ-
izedintoteams.Severalteamsmadeup a collective, whichwasdirected
bya committee typicallyheadedbyCommunist Partymembers. Ini-
eachcollective
tially, encompassed onlyhouseholds in thesamevillage
butfairly
orpartofa village, quicklythesizegrewtoincorporate house-
holdsinseveral Collective
villages.27 members werepaid,usuallyin rice
and otherproduce,according to complicated formulas thattookinto
consideration how muchworkeach persondid,thequalityofthatwork,

the need to assureeveryoneenough to eat, and the imperativeto pre-
ventlargeinequalitiesin livingconditions.
National officialsused thestatebureaucracy, variousorganizations
undertheFatherlandFront,and theCommunistPartyto formand run
thecollectivefarms.Agenciesof thestateorganizedwave afterwave of
educational,training, and politicalcampaignsto getvillagersto join the
collectives,become modelcollectiveworkers,believein thesuperiority
ofcollectivefarming overindividualor householdfarming, and embrace
socialism.During thewaragainsttheUnited Statesand to reunitethe
country(1965-75), authorities fromcentralto local levelsstressedthat
the collectiveswerevitalforprovidingfood and othersuppliesto sol-
diersat the frontand to thosesoldiers'familiesback in the villages.
Indeed,one responsibility ofthecollectives'leaderswas to recruityoung
to
villagers join the army.
Officialsfrequently debatedvariousaspectsof how collectiveswere
organized and administered. In the earlyyears,some officialsargued
againstplansto increasethepace at whichcollectiveswerebeingestab-
lished.In the 1960s, officials debatedabout waysto improvethe effi-
ciency and productivityof collectivefarming.Some favouredsmaller
sizes;othersinsistedon largecollectives;somewantedto allowmorelati-
tude forhousehold-basedfarmingand otherproductionwhile others
disagreed.Some inputto suchdebateshad percolatedup throughmass
organizations of thestateand otherofficialchannels.During meetings
withlocal officials,forinstance,villagerscomplainedabout how work
points were counted,favouritism in workassignments, low pricesforthe
commoditiestheyproduced,and otherproblemswithhow collectives
operated.Periodically,a smallpercentageof memberseven requested
permissionto leave thecollectives.Such concernsdid reachthecentral
officesof the CommunistPartyand itsgovernment. Althoughcollec-
tivizedproductionremainedtheofficialpolicy,discussions,and debates
did resultin modificationsto specificrulesand regulationsregarding
how itwas supposedto be doneand how produceshouldbe distributed.
In themid-1970s,officials alsodisagreedoverhow rapidlyor extensively
collectivizedfarmingand otheraspectsof centrallyplannedeconomy
should be imposedon the south followingreunification. By the late

1970s, therewere deep divisionswithin the party and various govern-
mentministries abouthow to re-organize collectivesin orderto prevent
productionfromfallingfurtherand furtherbehind what the nation
needed.In 1979 suchdisagreements contributedto modestshiftsaway
fromcollectivizedproductiontowardsindividualhouseholdfarming.
The swingin thatdirectionbecamelargerduringthe 1980s,and bythe
early1990s nearlyall farming was done byindividualhouseholds.Col-
lectivizedfarming was no longertheofficialpolicy.
As synthesized thusfar,the evidenceregardingthe riseand demise
of collectivizedfarmingcorrespondswell to the dominatingstateand
mobilizational corporatist ofVietnam.But thereis more
interpretations
to thestory,whichcorresponds to thedialogicalschool.One significant
influenceon thedebatewithinofficialcircleswas whatwas happening
in thevillagesand fieldswherecollectivesweresupposedto be operat-
ing.Fromtheoutset,fewvillagers had beenenthusiastic aboutthestate's
collectivization policy.Most had joined reluctantly, realizingthat,be-
cause authorities weredeterminedto collectivizefarming, theyhad no
viablealternatives.Othersjoinedon theconditionthatlivingconditions
would improve,whichis whatauthorities had assuredthemwould hap-
life
pen. Initially did getbetter. But by theearly1960s, improvements
stalled,and bythemiddleofthatdecade throughthe 1970s livingcon-
ditionsdeteriorated fora largeproportionof villagers.The collectives
werenot the onlyreason.But manyvillagersbelievedthatthe collec-
tivesystemstoodin thewayofhavingmoreto eat,betterhousing,and
otherimprovements. For evidence,manysimplypointedto thefactthat
productivity was at least twiceas high on the tinyplots of land that
authoritiesallowedhouseholdsto farmindividuallythanon thecollec-
tivelyfarmedland.To manyvillagers,one basic problemwas thatcol-
lectivefarming did notrewarddiligentwork.Whetherone workedhard
or not,one stilldid not have enoughto eat. Moreover,individualsdo-
ingthesametaskreceivedvirtually thesameamountofpaymentregard-
lessofhowwellorpoorlyeachpersonhad laboured.Oftenvillagers were
also disgustedwithlocal leaderswho abusedtheirauthority and embez-
zled moneyand otherresourcesbelongingto thecollective.
Rarelydid villagersopenlydemonstrate againstcollectivization.

Knowncasesofsuchopposition werein southern Vietnamin thelate
1970swhenvillagers in severalareasmarchedto protest againstbeing
forced to turnovertheirlandsto thecollectives. Thereareseveralrea-
sonsforso littlepublicopposition. One isthatpeoplewereintimidated.
Becausecollectivization wasa majorpolicyofthestate,challenging it
meantchallenging thestate.A secondmajorreasonappliesto northern
Vietnam during thewar.Becauseofficials repeatedly emphasized theim-
portance ofcollectivefarming to defend the country, openopposition
to thecollective couldbe misinterpreted as beingopposedto thewar
andunpatriotic. Another aspectisthatmanyvillagers, despitetheirres-
ervations aboutandevendislikeforcollectivized farming, suppressed as
muchas possibletheirdiscontent forthegoodofthecountry and the
warfornationalreunification.
Although publicoppositionto collectivization outsideauthorized
channels wasrare,widespread discontent wasexpressed in subtle,non-
confrontational ways that continuously worriedlocaland centralau-
thorities. In manypartsofthecountry, villagerswentabouttheirdu-
tieson thecollectivized in
farms a half-hearted manner.Leadersof
production teams complained in the 1960s and 1970s thatmembers
worked showedup lateandmadeallkindsofexcusesto
lackadaisically,
go home and
early, "dragged theirfeet"{Iancong).Forinstance, trans-
planters, whoearnedworkpointsaccording to howmanybunchesof
seedlingstheyplanted, would make their bunches smallerthanwas
stipulated, thusgetting bywithlesswork.Harvesters often"worked as
thoughthey were playing", each
cutting stalk, by one one ratherthan
taking a handful ata time.Disinterest anddisgust towards collectivized
farming was so seriousin some areas thatland went unplanted. Bythe
late 1970s,at least150,000hectares ofthenation'scollectivized land
lay fallow because farmers were not "enthusiasticabout production".28
In manyplaces,families tookboldersteps.Theyencroached on col-
lectivelandto increasetheareaforprivatefarming, enlargetheirgar-
dens,andbuildtheirhouses.Suchencroachment duringthe1960sand
1970s,wroteone researcher, was"widespread and had beengoingon
formanyyears"(DinhThu Cue 1977,p. 40). In Ha Bac province, for
instance,the improperuse of collectiveland and especiallythe unau-

thorizedenlargement of privateplotsin manyvillagesangeredprovin-
cial leaderswho imploredlocal officials to recoverthoselandsand vigi-
lantly enforce the rules. By the middle or late 1970s, thepercentageof
land farmedas householdplotsmayactuallyhavebeen 7 to 13 percent
of the land nominallyunderthejurisdictionof co-operatives, signifi-
cantlygreater than the authorized5 per cent.
By the middleto late 1960s and throughthe 1970s, severalvillages
in northernand centralVietnamwerequietlytinkeringwithproduc-
tionarrangements, seeinghow muchtheycould getawaywithwithout
attracting unwantedattentionfromofficials, especiallybeyondthevil-
lage.These alternative arrangements wereoftencalled"sneakycontracts"
{khoanchui).In somevillageswherepig raisingwas supposedto be done
by co-operativeteams,it was insteadcontractedto households,who
wereallowedto keepa highpercentageofnetearnings(Hy Van Luong
1993, pp. 202-3). In others,land used in thewintermonthsforgrow-
ingvegetablesor land thatcould not be irrigated duringthedryseason
was allocatedto interested householdswho paid a certainamountto the
collectiveand could do as theypleasedwiththerestofwhattheygrew.
Encouragedbytheresultsof thesemodifications, some collectiveoffi-
cials in severalareasgave in to villagers'pressureto contractricepro-
ductionto individualhouseholds.Provincesin whichsuch"sneakycon-
tracts"intermittently occurredincludedHa Bac, Ha Nam Ninh, Ha
Son Binh, Hai Hung, Hai Phong, Nghe Tinh, Phu Tho, and Vinh
Phuc.29Authorities in some districtswith"sneakycontracts"turneda
blindeye. Othersevenencouragedthesemodifications so longas pro-
ductionimproved.Vinh Phuc provincialauthorities, knowingthatvil-
lagers were often disgusted with collective farming,began in 1966 to
supportlimitedcontractualarrangements so longas thespiritofcollec-
tivefarmingwas maintained.Soon, however,villagerswereexceeding
thoselimits.Theyfarmedfieldsas theirown, turningoveronlya frac-
tion of theirharveststo collectiveofficials.Some surrendered none of
theircrops.To preventfurther unravelling ofcollectivesystem, national
authoritiessteppedin, reprimandedthe provincialauthoritiesand in-
sistedthatthefamily contractsystemstop.That was effective fora while,
but gradually"sneaky"arrangements reappeared.

The persistentand extensiveproblemsofgettingvillagersto behave
as good collectivemembersgraduallyinfluencedofficials who werede-
liberatinghow to revivetheflagging economyin the 1970s.
agricultural
Wave afterwaveofcampaignsto improveproductivity, restructure
the
size and administration of collectiveorganizations,introducenew ag-
riculturaltechnologies,and convincevillagersto embracecollectivized
farminghad done littleto improvethe economyor make collectives
stronger.A Ministry ofAgriculture reportin 1984 summarizedthesitu-
ation in thelate 1970s:
whilesomeadvancedcooperatives stillmaintained
and protected pro-
ductionachievements, manycooperatives had come to a halt and
somehad fallenintoruins.The masseshad littleenthusiasm to labor
and produceenergetically.In manyplacesproduction was at a stand-
stilland deteriorating.This realitywas an obstacleforenhancing
agriculturaloutputand buildinga new socialistcountryside.(Bo
NongNghiep 1984, p. 14)
In effect,the realitywas bearing down on authorities.It was also
strengthening thosein officialcircleswho werequestioningthewisdom
ofcollectivizedproduction and contributed to policy-makers
significantly
discarding collectivized and
farming makingnew policiesthatauthor-
ized family-based farming.
Some analystshave suggestedthat,because agriculturalcollectives
weresupposedto be thelowestrungon stateapparatus,villagers'foot
dragging,sneakycontracts, and otherresistanceagainstthemwereall
withinthe state(Thaveeporn1999, pp. 166-67). The implicationis
thatsuch struggles had nothingto do withstate-society relations.But
whethercollectiveswerepartof thestateis unclear.Like publicuniver-
sitiesin NorthAmerica,theirlocationwas mixed.Certainly,theywere
creationsof thestate.And theywerepartof thestate'soveralleffort to
centrallycontrolthenation'seconomy.But did memberssee themselves
as partofthestate?Likestudentsand facultyin manyuniversities in the
exampleusedat thebeginning ofthischapter,fewvillagersprobablydid.
They were not on the state'spayroll.Not even collectiveofficialsre-
ceiveda salaryfromthestate;theywerepaid fromwhat the collective
produced on itsown.Meanwhile, collectives hadtopaythestatea cer-

tainportion oftheirproduce.30
Moreimportant forstate-society relations thandetermining whether
collectives
wereinsideoroutsidethestateis toquerywhatthestruggles
wereabout.One ofthemainissueswasthepreferred roleofthestate
in agriculturalproduction and other rural activities.Vietnam's state
authoritieshadsoughttocontrolfarming, thedistribution ofproduce,
andmanyotheraspectsofvillagesocietyin ordertosocializeagricul-
tureandvillagelife.Thismeantminimizing as faras possiblewhatin-
dividuals and households coulddo on theirown,especially regarding
production and distribution.Authorities expended enormous timeand
otherresources to bringaboutthesechanges.Although mostvillagers
in thenorthbytheearly1960shadjoinedthecollectives, fewshared
thesocialist visionofcollectivized farming. Mostpreferred insteadto
farm individually,as members ofhouseholds and families, as mem-
not
bersofcollectives. Later,afterthewarand thecountry had beenreu-
nited,many rural producers in the south indicated similarsentiments.
Forthemostpart,villagers expressed theirpreferences morethrough
whattheydid thanwhattheysaid.Throughtheiractions,theywere
engagedina extended dialoguewithstateauthorities abouthowmuch
agriculturalproduction and other facets of life
village shouldbe given
to stateinstitutions and howmuchto societalones.Eventually, those
Vietnamese for
pressing muchmorespace forsocietalones gained
ground while thoseinsistingon stateinstitutions lostit.
Seekingan end to collectivized farming did notmeanvillagers
wantedthestateto abandonentirely agriculture or thecountryside.
Sincetheendofcollectivized farming in thelate1980sandtherevival
ofhousehold-based farming, small rural producers haveaskedforstate
assistance.Manyvillagers havewantedthestateto protect landfrom
being accumulated by a fewat the expense of the majority(Scott2000,
pp. 77-78; Kerkvliet 1995, pp. 84-85). This was an important con-
cernin debates,manifested in variousforawithinandbeyondofficial
channels, leadingto a newlandlawin 1993.Villagers havefrequently
askedthestatetosubsidize prices for fertilizerand other inputs, provide
low-interest agriculturalloans, crack down on and
smuggling, protect
against
villages In short,
criminals. thestate, aresaying,
villagers hasroles
toplayinruralsociety
butoneofthemisnottocompelvillagerstofarm
collectively.
Corruption
One prominent claimin thethreearenasdiscussed so faris thatpeople
shouldhavemoreautonomy fromstateauthorities andthatthedistance
betweenthestateand societyshouldbe greaterthanit has been.A
prominent claimregarding corruption, however, is theopposite:less
autonomy fromthestatefororganizations, groups, andindividuals and
lessroomfornon-state activities.Corruption in Vietnam within the
Communist Party,government ministries,and otheragenciesof the
statehasmanyforms andmethods. Oftenitinvolves, as oneprominent
party leaderexplained, someoneinauthority taking advantage ofhisor
herposition forpersonal orfamily such
gainthrough activities as smug-
or
gling,accepting demanding bribes,embezzlement, and other forms
ofstealing,graft,and kickbacks.31 Another sideofcorruption iscitizens
whomanagetoobtain- through personalconnections, monetary en-
ticements, -
andillicitarrangements resources fromthestateorbe al-
lowedprivileges by state agenciesto which are
they notlegally entitled.
Thevariousforms boildownto individuals andgroupspersonally ben-
efiting,usuallymaterially (money, land,or other property), from illicit
usesofstateresources, authority, andprivileges. Corruption, therefore,
amountstoappropriating forthebenefit ofoneself orothersinsociety
thatwhichis supposedto remainin thepublicdomainor be usedby
stateagenciesin orderto govern.Preventing and stopping corruption
requiresmaintaining strict boundaries between what belongsto or
shouldbe protected by the statefor thepublicgood and whatpeople
in society,
as individuals and groups,can useas theirown.
Specifying thoseboundaries areanti-corruption lawsandregulations
inVietnam. Theserules,however, arenotwellmonitored andenforced.
But unlikethewidespread violationsof rulesand regulations about
housing, forwhich citizens seem onlyinfrequently to want strict en-
forcement, violations of lawsand regulations againstcorruption have
arousedpeople to demandbetterlaw enforcement - better

frequently
maintenanceof the separationbetweenwhat belongsto or should be
used bystateauthorities forpublicbenefitand whatindividualscan use
or appropriatefortheirown personalbenefit.
Corruptionhas beena problemfortheCommunistPartystatesince
at least the early1960s when it afflicted some agriculturalcollectives.
In thosedays,typicalincidentsinvolvedofficialstakingforthemselves
smallamountsof riceor moneythatbelongedto thestateor takingfor
theirown use cementor otherconstruction materialsthatweresupposed
to be used forpublicbuildings.Althoughserious,considering thatthose
years were times of the
greatscarcity, amounts were tinycomparedwith
whatoccurredin the 1990s when corruptionappearedto be farmore
widespreadand representedmuch more money.Figuresfrompolice
reportsshow that,on average,each knowncase of corruptionin 1999
amountedto about US$86,000 goingintoofficials'pockets.32
In waysconsistentwiththedominatingstateviewofVietnam'spo-
liticalsystem,partyand government officialshavedeliberatedthecor-
ruptionproblemmanytimesin recentyears.NationalAssemblysessions
and CommunistPartycongresses havepassedresolutions and expressed
concern.Rank-and-file partymembershave writtento higherleaders
detailingcorruptbehaviourofvariousofficials.33 Ministrieshave issued
instructions and injunctionsagainstcorruption.Police have arrested
officialsforcorruptionand associatedcrimes(forexample,smuggling
and sellingcontrabandproductslike heroin).Courts have convicted
many,includingsome prominentofficials.The formerMinisterfor
Energy,Vu Ngoc Hai, forexample,was firedfromhis post in 1992,
expelledfromthe CommunistPartyin 1994, and was triedand con-
victedthatsameyearformasterminding a scamduringtheconstruction
of thecountry'snorth-south electricalpowerlines,causinglosesto the
stateofnearlyUS$300,000.34The highestofficial to dateknownto have
been dismissedfromofficeforcorruptionis Ngo Xuan Loc. The Na-
tionalAssemblydismissedhim fromhispost as deputyprimeminister
in December 1999. Reportedly knownas "Mr. Cement"becauseofhis
leverage over construction projects,he had used hisvariousgovernment
positionsduringthe 1990s to become extremely wealthy.33
Thereisevidence, too,supporting themobilizational in-

corporatist
terpretation. The Peasants' Association, Confederation of Labor, Wom-
en'sAssociation, andotherstateorganizations havecampaigned against
corruption, urgedmembers to reportcases,and in otherwaysbeen
mobilizedbythestateto fightcorruption. Journalists oftheseorgani-
zations'official publications haveexposedcorrupt police,taxcollectors,
localgovernment andbureaucrats.36
officials, Average citizens haveused
officialchannelsto complainagainstauthorities thatusetheirgovern-
mentor partypositions to stealtaxrevenues, givelucrative favours to
relatives, and demandbribesforpublicservices. Each year,whenthe
NationalAssembly talliescitizens'written submissions regardingvari-
ous problems,corruption and relatedmisbehaviour generally rank
among the most common of
complaints.Allegations wrongdoing
reportedthroughtheseofficialchannelshave helped to prompt
authorities to investigate and enforce anti-corruption laws.
Butpressure on authorities alsocomesfrombeyondofficial channels
andthestate'smassorganizations. In 1988,angry peasantsmarchedin
Ho Chi MinhCityprotesting against "localmandarins" who abused
theirauthority andusedtheir positions tobenefit themselves. Thisevent
wasan earlywarning thatprompted centralauthorities topaymoreat-
tentiontocorruption (Thayer1992,p. 354). Sincethen,manymore
outbursts haveoccurred inthecountry, helping tomakecorruption and
otherunsavoury behaviour byofficials a crucialissueforthestate.For
instance, an analysisof120incidents of"majororevenfierce struggles"
inThanhHoa province between November1988andNovember1993
foundthatone principal causewasthat"someofthelocalleadershad
engagedin corruption, violating theownership rights ofthepeople",
making them "detested" a
by majority ofordinary residents and party
members. After to
failing getsatisfactory resultsfrom higher authorities
to whichvillagers had sentpetitionsand complaints, someresidents
resorted to publicdemonstrations and heatedconfrontations withof-
ficials(Nhi Le 1994,pp. 49-50).
In recent years,themostvividandinfluential expression ofordinary
people'sviewsaboutcorrupt officialswastheoutburst in Thai Binh,a
province at the southeastern end of the Red River Delta.37 Beginning
in 1994andincreasing during1995-96,villagers sentthrough normal

channels petitions and letterscomplaining about local authorities. The
statements allegedthattheseauthorities werepocketing proceedsfrom
sellingland that did not belong them,misallocating inwaysthat
to land
mademoneyforthemselves, usinglocaltaxrevenues fortheirownpri-
vatepurposes, claimingpublicexpenditures higherthantheyac-
were
tuallywere,thenkeepingthedifference forthemselves and theirfami-
in
lies,and misusingtheirauthority otherways orderto benefit
in
personally. Addinginsultto injury, theseauthorities flaunted theiril-
licitwealth.Theybuiltlargehouses,filledthehomeswithnicefurni-
tureandappliances, boughtexpensive motorcycles, andworefinecloth-
ing.The petitioners andletter writers wantedhigher authorities tostep
in,investigate, andpunishtheculprits. In effect,they wanted higher au-
thorities tomaintain theboundaries in thesematters betweenthestate
andsociety.
The petitioners received no oronlyperfunctory responses. Unsatis-
fiedand nowmoreangry, severalstepped outside the formal channels
andintothestreets tovoicepublicly theirdiscontent. Between late1996
and theearlymonthsof 1997,nearlyhalfoftheprovince's 260 sub-
districtshadpeasantdemonstrations; atleastforty moreoccurred inthe
provincial capital as well.In October for two
1996, instance, groups,
thefirstwith700 andthesecondwith1,500people,bothfromthesame
sub-district,wentin succession to theprovincial capitalto present pe-
titionsanddemandinvestigations intolocalofficials' improper ofuse
publiclandandfunds.Thesevariousdemonstrations producedno sat-
isfactory response.This was thesituation in May 1997 whenthousands
ofvillagersgathered indistricttownofQuynhPhuandthenmadetheir
way on foot and bicycle to theprovincial capital.As wordspread,vil-
lagersfromelsewhere alsoconverged on thecapital,bringing thetotal
to about10,000demonstrators.
Up to thispoint,all thedemonstrations in Thai Binhhad report-
edlybeenpeaceful,consisting of
mostly peoplesitting or walkingin
frontof government officespleadingforproperinvestigations into
the
abuses.But Mayprotest resulted in violence.How itstarted is not
clear.It includedpolicethrowing tear-gas canisters at thecrowdsand
clubbing andchasing protesters;meanwhile demonstrators threw bricks

andstones,smashedoffice windows, and wrecked a firetruck that had
beensentto thescene.Although thisclashsoonsubsided,itprovedto
be a turning point,leadingto more violent
clashesduring MayandJune
between villagersandauthorities inmanyplacesacrosstheprovince. In
someareas,villagers overwhelmed policemen, heldseveral ofthemhos-
tage, and set fire
to some local officials'homes (understandable targets
giventhevillagers' complaints), anddamagedotherproperty.
The scaleandnatureoftheunrest inThai Binhprovokednational
authorities to act.Theydid not,however, sendin thearmy.National
officials,
according to availableaccounts, used limitedforceto restore
order.Theirapproach emphasized insteaddialoguewiththedemonstra-
tors.Theyalsotookmeasures to minimize publicity andpresscoverage
abouttheunrest untilconditions hadbeenrestored to normal.Mean-
and
while,party government officialsin Hanoi organized investigations
intowhathadhappenedandwhy.Fromsuchstudiestheyreachedba-
sicallythreeconclusions: Manyofthevillagers' allegations ofcorruption
andotherabusesbylocalauthorities werewellfounded.Second,pro-
vincialand otherlocalauthorities werenegligent fornot responding
morepromptly andthoroughly whenvillagers' firstbeganto complain
abouttheproblems. Third,somevillagers wereprovocateurs whotook
advantage of the discontent to make mattersworse. As of September
1999,nearly 2,000officialsin province hadbeendisciplined.38 Among
themweretheprovincial secretary oftheCommunistPartyand the
chairperson oftheprovincial council(thetwohighest officials
in Thai
Binh), who were removed from office.Furtherdetailsaboutdisciplinary
measures arenotreported otherthantoindicatethataboutthirty offi-
cialswereimprisoned. At thesametime,someprotesters werealso
charged withcrimes havingto do with destructionof property, disturb-
the and
ing peace, provoking unrest. Between forty andsixty-two pro-
testerswereconvicted. Mostapparently weregivenshortorsuspended
prisonsentences. Some,however, werestillin prisonmorethantwo
yearsaftertheevent.
The ThaiBinhprotests senta strong message tonational leadersthat
is
corruptionpoliticaldynamite. Numerous and
party government of-
ficeshavebeenstudying whathappened anddrawing lessonsabouthow

to avoidsimilaror worsesituations in thefuture.The messagefrom
manytopleaders, suchas thenation'spresidentinFebruary 1998,isthat
more
firmer, persistent and determined measures must be takento de-
fusethesituationbycurbing corruptionand takingmoreseriously vil-
lagers'complaints about authorities.39
Whether state authoritiesare
capableofthisisdebatable.Critics withinVietnam, someofthemcur-
rentandformer partymembers, that
argue significant changeis impos-
sibleso longas thestate'sleadership to tolerate
refuses openand can-
did criticismand to permitotherpoliticalorganizations to rivalthe
Communist In
Party. any event,thedemonstrations in Thai Binhand
elsewhere areproofthatpoliticalstrugglesregarding rela-
state-society
tionsarenotconfined to official
channels andstate-dominated organi-
zations.
Summary
Thisarticlehassuggestedan approachforanalysing state-societyrela-
tionsinVietnamthateschews trying to distinguishbetween whatis in
thestateandwhatis in society. the
Instead, approachemphasizes are-
nasin whichrelationsbetween stateand societyareproblematic. The
arenascanbespecific but
places may alsoinclude organizations,groups,
and
policies, The
controversies. four arenas examined here are govern-
inginstitutions
andprocesses,massmedia,agricultural and
collectives,
corruption.Eachis analysedbyusingthreeprominent interpretations
in thescholarly
literature
regardingpoliticsand state-society relations
inVietnam andfocusing on twomatters: howthepolitical systemworks
anddiscussionsaboutappropriate state-societyrelations.
Each arenahas considerableevidenceto supportthe"dominating
state"interpretation
of Vietnam'spoliticalsystem. The Communist
Party,government ministries, and
police, other agenciesofthestatehave
tremendous powersnotonlyoverpolicy-making and implementation
butthemedia,religion,andorganizations forvarioussectorsofsociety.
Thereisalsoevidenceforthe"mobilizational corporatist"interpretation,
whichhighlights theroleofofficialorganizations in both mobilizing
supportforthestateand beinga channelthroughwhichpeople's con-

cernscan influencewhatstateagenciesdo. But individuals,groups,and
socialforcesoutsideofficialchannelscan also affectthepoliticalsystem.
This is whatthe"dialogical"interpretation is pointingout. Stateagen-
ciesdo notcompletely controlpolicy-makingand implementation. Peo-
ple can ignorethe state'sruleson some matters.They can also go be-
yondofficial channelsto maketheirviewsand concernsknown.Groups
and forcesin societybeyondthereachofthestatenotonlyexistbuttheir
activitiesfromtimeto timeinfluencewhatauthoritiesdecide.
In each arena,thisarticlealso findsongoingdeliberationsregarding
properrelationsbetweenthestateand therestofsociety.Discussionon
thesemattersoccursin manyformsand in numerousplaces,including
insidestateinstitutions themselves.
The tendencyduringthelasttwenty
years,resultingin partfromsocietalforcesand activities,has been to
reduceand changethescopeofwhatthestateshoulddo in theeconomy
and otheraspectsofsociety.The outcomethusfarhas been morespace
in whichpeople can live withoutdirectlyinteracting withagenciesof
thestate.At the same time,thestateremainsin controlof the media.
Stateinstitutions still,despitepressuresfromwithinand outsidethem,
allow citizensonlya littleroomto establishtheirown organizationsin
orderto speak and act publiclyon importantissues.Hence, Vietnam-
ese NGOs and othersignsof civilsocietyhave only recentlybegun to
emerge.
NOTES
Forcomments on an earlierversion,I amgrateful

toAdamFforde, AndrewHardy,
MelindaTriaKerkvliet, David Koh,DavidMarr,and KimNinh.I alsothankPham
Thu Thuyforassisting withtheresearch forthisstudyand Bev Fraserforhelping
to preparethemanuscript.
1. Helpingme to cometo thispositionareMigdal(1994, pp. 7-34) andMitchell
(1991). ForearlieranalysesofVietnamusinga similarapproach, seeFfordeand
Porter(1994, pp. 8-9, 27) and Kerkvliet
(1995a, pp. 40-43).
2. My discussionofsocietyandstatecorresponds broadlyto howthetwoareused
in Migdal(1994) and in Kohliand Shue(1994).
3. I amtrying toincludehereboththephysical andstructural aspectsofstate(build-

ings,offices,army, bureaucrats, government officials,
roadways, andso forth)and
theideological dimension andpsychological impact of a state.The stateincludes
agenciesthatkeepthewheelsofgovernment turning (issuepassports,policecit-
ies,createnew laws,punishes violators,mobilizes armies, collecttaxes,buildnew
buildings); but the also
state haspurposes, plans,objectives. How extensive and
elaboratethosearevariesovertimewithinsamestateand fromone stateto an-
other.
4. "Civilsociety", as severalwell-read scholars haveexplained, hasmeantmany,of-
tencontradictory, things in "Western" politicalthought andpractice.Myusage
drawson Keane(1988), Krygier (1996), and Kumar(1993).
5. In orderto elaborate andillustrate each,I willbe referring to somepublications
written in English.Byno meansdo thementioned onesexhausttheliterature.
A comprehensive synthesis ofpertinent literatureisanother Also,
projectentirely.
a reference to a particular scholar'sworkdoes notmeanthateverything that
personhaswritten aboutVietnamfitswithinone interpretation and one only.
Giventhatthisfieldofstudyis relatively youngand newinformation appears
frequently, an individual scholar cancometoonetentative conclusion atonestage
butarriveat a different one lateron.
6. See,forexample,Thai QuangTrung(1985) and Stern(1993). See also Kolko
(1997, pp. 119-25, 130-32). Whilearguingthatthepartyrunsthecountry,
Kolkosaysitis riddled byfactions competing over"wealth andpower",notideo-
logicalissues, and united only by the desire that thepartyretain"totalpower"
(pp. 125, 130).
7. Turley(1993,pp.269-70; 1993,pp.330-31). Forstatecorporatist arguments,
seeJeong(1997) and Stromseth (1998).
8. Beresford (1995, p. 10). Alsoseethefollowing studythathighlights disarrayin
theVietnamstate'sadministrative capacity and effortsby national in
authorities
themid-1990sto regaintheupperhandoverlocalofficials: Thaveeporn (1996).
9. Such usageappliedto Vietnamappearsin Post (1989, pp. 14, 212), Pelzer
(1993), Hy Van Luong(1994), and Kerkvliet (1999).
10. Forstudiesofelectionprocesses, see Thayer(1993), Koh (2000, chap.3), and
Porter(1993, pp. 153-57).
11. For detailsof the Chamber'sgrowthand its relationshipto the state,see
Stromseth (1998,chap.3 and4). Presumably theChamberis nowundertheFa-
therland Front,although Stromseth's discussion doesnotmakethatclear.
12. Hoi Nong Dan VietNam,Ban Chap Hanh TrungUong(1993, p. 12).
13.A shorthistory ofthePeasants'Association has pageslistingwar-related efforts
ofitspredecessor organizations in southand northVietnam(Ban Chap Hanh
TrungUong Hoi NongDan VietNam - VienLiehSu Dang, 1992). I thank
Jonathan Stromseth forproviding mea copyofthisunpublished report.

with
14. Interview Nguyen Van Chinh,President, VietnamPeasants'Association,
Hanoi,21 September 1995.Alsosee Kerkvliet (19956,pp. 87-88).
15. Localauthorities sometimes assistedresidentsoutofcompassion andempathy for
peoplewhohadno otheroptionsbuttoignorethebuilding codes.Atothertimes
theyhelpedbecausetheresidents wererelatives, or theygaveassistancein ex-
changeforpayments andotherremuneration. See Koh (2000, chap. 5).
16. Severalnewsreports aboutDong Nai appearin ReutersNewsServicebetween
November1997 and 15 January1998. Referencesforothercases include
Thaveeporn(1998, pp. 317-18), Deutsche-Presse-Agentur, 21 October1998,
ReutersNewsService, 20 May 1999,and Kerkvliet (1995, pp. 76-79).
17. For illustrativewriting and reportsaboutUBCV and itsencounters withViet-
nameseauthorities, seeDenny(1992, pp. 3-7) andAmor(1998). Forviewsof
a prominent UBCV leader,see ThichQuang Do (1995).
18. Foran extensive see Ffordeand Vylder(1996).
analysis,
19. Foran informative accountofhowthemediais organized inVietnamunderthe
CommunistParty, seeHeng (1998).
20. Examplesare"NguoiSai Gon: TiengNoi cua Nhan Dan ThemTu Do Ngon
Luan" [Saigoner: voiceofthepeoplecravingfreespeech],whichbeganin early
1996 (as of mid-1999, issuesappearedin thefollowing websitebut whenI
checkedagainin early2000, theywerenotthere:http://www.lmvntd.org/dos-
sier/ngsaigon); and "ThaoThuc: To Bao cua Gioi Tre VietNam trongNuoc"
[On alert: newspaper ofyoungVietnamese in thecountry], beginninginMarch
1998 (forseveralissues,seehttp://www.lmvntd.org/dossier/thaothuc).
21. Forrecentdiscussions ofthisepisode,seeNguyenHungQuoc (1991, chap.2),
KimNgoc Bao Ninh(1996,chap.4), Boudarel(1990, 1991),and Heng(1999,
chap.3).
22. See articlesin NhanDan, thedailynewspaper oftheCommunist Party(forex-
ample, a series
on human on
rights 2, 3, and 28 June1993; 1 and 16 May 1998)
andstatements tointernationalfora,suchas DeputyMinister ofJustice
Ha Hung
Cuong'smessage totheUnitedNationsCommission forHumanRights, Geneva,
on 28 March2000 (BBC Summary ofWorldBroadcasts, 3 April2000).
23. "Nha Van HoangTien PhanDoi Ha Noi Dan Ap Tu Do Ngon Luan" (1998,
p. 56). TiviTuanSan [TV weekly], publishedin Melbourne, frequentlycarries
articlesaboutandbypeoplein Vietnamwhocriticize thegovernment.
24. This paragraph drawson RussellHeng'sperceptive analysisof theprintmedia
(1999, chap.3, 5, and6).
25. Yearslater,afterretiring fromthemilitary, GeneralTranDo expressed hisviews
morefullyin letters addressed to thehighest partyofficials.
The lettersweresub-
sequently circulatedaroundtheworldthrough theInternet and foreign publi-
cations.Thesewritings, whichupsettopofficials so muchthattheyexpelled him

fromtheCommunist in
Party January 1999, have made him a well-known "dis-
sident"whoseeksa moreopenandcompetitive politicalsystem. TranDo, "Tinh
HinhDat Nuoc va Vai Tro cua Dang Cong San" [Thestateofthenationand
roleof theCommunistParty- an undated(circaDecember1997) letterto
Communist Partyleaders],serializedin TiviTuanSan (Melbourne),11, 18,25
February 1998. (AnEnglishtranslation wasputon theInternet inearlyJanuary
1998:http://www.fva.org/document/dissident/trando.htm.) Thislongletter was
followed in 1998 and 1999 byseveralmoremissives, whichalsoappearedinVi-
etnamese languagepublications outsidethecountry. His letters,so faras I am
aware,haveyetto be publishedin Vietnam.
26. Unlessotherwise noted,mydiscussion ofagricultural collectivesleanson Fforde
(1989), Vickerman(1986), Kerkvliet(May 1995), Kerkvliet(1998), and
Kerkvliet(1999).
27. Indicative is thattheaveragecollective in 1960 hadfifty-nine households, buta
decadelaterhad 156,and in 1980had387. See TongCue ThongKe (1973,pp.
557,559) andTongCue ThongKe va Bo NongNghiepva CNTP (1991,p. 73).
28. NhanDan, 25 April1984,quotedin QuangTruong(1987, p. 263).
29. TranDuc (1991, pp. 25, 29); "CungCo Hop Tac Xa San XuatNongNghiep,
Day Manh Cong Tac Khoan" [Reinforce agriculture producerco-operatives,
speedup contract work],1981,a Ministry ofAgriculture report, in Le Thanh
Nghi (1981, pp. 66-67).
30. Askedwhether thecollective waspartofthestate,a villager gavemea puzzled
faceas ifto say"Whatkindofquestionis that?"He thenanswered witha wry
smilethatifitwere,he shouldhavebeengetting a statesalary, and ifhehadthat
salary,hewouldnothavelivedso miserably as he did duringtheheightofcol-
lectivization (interviewconductedin NghiemXuyen,ThuongTin, Ha Tay,on
2 May 1996).
31. NguyenVan Linh,formerCommunistPartySecretary General(1986-91),
Reuters NewsService,10 May 1993.Similarusageappearsinmanypublications
in Vietnam.See, forinstance, Dao Tri Uc (1997, pp. 24-28). Uc wasthehead
oftheInstitute on Stateand Law.
32. The 1,115knowncasesof corruption in 1999 involved1.35 trillion donggo-
ingillicitly to authorities(KyodoNews,21 January 2000, through Reuters Lim-
At
ited). 14,000dongper U.S. the is
dollar, average US$86,482 per case. No
doubttheextentofactualcorruption is fargreater thanthenumberofknown
cases.
33. Foran example, see"HuyetTarnThu To Cao ThamNhungcua 11 Dang Vien
Dang CSVN" (1988).
34. AccountsbyReutersNewsService,17-23 February 1994.
35. Accounts byReuters NewsService,12 November1999,6 December1999,and

15 January 2000.
36. Forexamples, see Heng (1999, chap.5) and Sidel(1998).
37. Unlessotherwise indicated,thefollowing accountreliesprimarily on a report
commissioned bythePrimeMinister andwritten byTuongLai,headoftheSo-
ciologyInstituteoftheNationalCenterforSocialSciencesandHumanities, en-
titled"Bao Cao So Bo ve Cuoc KhaoSatXa Hoi taiThai BinhcuoiThangSau,
dau ThangBayNam 1997" [Preliminary reportof a sociologicalinvestigation
inThai BinhinlateJuneandearlyJuly1997],8 August1997;a serialized story
waspublished in TienPhongon 2, 4, 7, and 9 October1997; and an articlein
Dai Doan Keton 23 February 1998,p. 6.
38. Thisandthefollowing informationaboutpunishments comefromnewsreports
byAssociated Press,11 November1997;AgenceFrancePresse, 25 August1998;
Vietnam Economic News,23 September1999; SouthChinaMorningPost,25
September 1999;SanJoseMercury News,31 October1999.
39. PresidentTranDuc Luong'sFebruary 1998speechin Thai Binhappearsin Sai
GonGiaiPhong, 4 and 5 March1998,p. 5.
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search School of Pacific and Asian Studies, AustralianNational University,

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An Approach for Analysing State-Society Relations in Vietnam

Author(s): Benedict J. Tria KERKVLIET

Benedict J. Tria KERKVLIET

ConceptualizingRelationsbetween "State" and "Society"

themisimportant yethighly contentious. Thissituation istrueinmany

therulesandregulations thatframe whatotherinstitutions, groups, and

risdiction ofthatgovernment. In particular,

dominatingstateinterpretation, societyhas no significant

authorized channelscan influence policydebateamongnationallead-

estsinsociety.I summarize thisphenomenon, however as

Most policiesand lawsare made in a processthatis hardto follow.

recentyears,government and partyauthorities havecalledupon the

takenintoconsideration.For one thing,manyactivitiesaffecting gov-

226-28; Kerkvliet 1995,pp. 17-19). Placard-holding citizens periodi-

VietNam). Butmanymonksand layBuddhists refused to join.They

Party, andofficial Authorities

mostprominent one, NguyenHo, underhousearrest(Heng 1999,

According to Vietnam'sconstitution, citizenshavethefreedom to

consideration how muchworkeach persondid,thequalityofthatwork,

should be imposedon the south followingreunification. By the late

Rarelydid villagersopenlydemonstrate againstcollectivization.

instance,the improperuse of collectiveland and especiallythe unau-

but gradually"sneaky"arrangements reappeared.

produced on itsown.Meanwhile, collectives hadtopaythestatea cer-

arousedpeople to demandbetterlaw enforcement - better

Thereisevidence, too,supporting themobilizational in-

in 1994andincreasing during1995-96,villagers sentthrough normal

clubbing andchasing protesters;meanwhile demonstrators threw bricks

ficeshavebeenstudying whathappened anddrawing lessonsabouthow

supportforthestateand beinga channelthroughwhichpeople's con-

Forcomments on an earlierversion,I amgrateful

3. I amtrying toincludehereboththephysical andstructural aspectsofstate(build-

Jonathan Stromseth forproviding mea copyofthisunpublished report.

cations.Thesewritings, whichupsettopofficials so muchthattheyexpelled him

35. Accounts byReuters NewsService,12 November1999,6 December1999,and

Amor,Abdelfattah. CivilandPoliticalRights,Including theQuestion In-

ture,summary reporton agriculture in 1983 and thethreeyears1981-1983

Hoi NongDan VietNam,Ban Chap HanhTrungUong."Bao Cao cua Ban Chap

Migdal,AtulKohli,andVivienneShue,pp. 293-326.Cambridge: Cambridge

Scott,Steffanie."Changing RulesoftheGame:LocalResponses toDecollectivisation

Ben Kerkvlietis a facultymember in the Departmentof Politicaland Social Change, Re-

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