Sorialwisiensdafliches Jahrbuch fr Politik Band 4 besurpgeben Yon Roda? Wildeomann 382 Sets, gebunden DM 96,— Inbal Bicgiua Nedelnana Handlangroum poixcher Orgeisatonen Eniwurf ines tort Betoguahmens ur Analyse von Pati utc Rodney P. Stebold lites and Elections in a Fragmented Polat Sytem rane Usher / Wale Web Individuen, PesSnlihket and System Das Vermitdanpproblen sytamanalydate Foredwng nar polihen Sonido Gerald G, Wation Recrsment and Representation: Soco-polticl Seton of Bandesas Mombors The Pedra Republic of Germany 1959-1969 Rodolf Wildeamans Towirds « Soiopolitcal Model of the German Fedral Republic Bernard Grofman Formal Model of Election Sytem: A Review of Recent Revards Redakion discs Saad: Rownare Wideman, Manin 195 by Gna Olog rag Gn. Dt Mande 22 ted bee Dros Pata Weil OG, Ma Win Bbdaltecide Verthtngs fe Older. Nwen Eatanestwurs Rowrad Wade, Minden Beanaxo Gromuan A Review of Macro Election Systems*) Acknowledgements My inert in his aren was Sse silted alton a decade ago by Duncan Blad’sclasie work, The Theory of Cammmitter and Elections ‘A major source for this review i Doog Rae's The Political Comeguence of Electoral Laws andthe work done by Rac and members of the Usi- ‘erty of Ese. Tim indebted to Steven Bran for making avalble ne a prepblication copy of his book, Game and Polity, and to Wiliam {eas for providing me a copy of his review monograph on weighted voting. Fam these two works my trestnent of cumulative voting and ‘weighted voting has largely buen adapted. To the members of the 1975 ECPR "Workshop on arse” my thanks fr «simulating dcuion aud 2 numberof hepfalsagesons for revisions in my pape, with special thanks wo Profeior Giovanni Sartori, who bat ally called to: my ‘tenton the inporance of variables such as dist size, party cohesive ney and easterly of ver alloiances to an uodersanding of the loog-ram dynamice of pacy proliferation and decay. Finally. (dike to ssnowledge my deep indetednes to Rada Wildcmana fr having made possible my appointment at the University of Mannheim and the cll borate erossalual reseed whic ha cme aout se seule of 1. Introduction (Our sim inthis paper isthe quit ited one of surveying resent work ‘on mathematical models of macro eetion syst, Dyan election system (oting sche) we shall mean 2 ade for expreing vter preferences, in teins of ballot (or Ballas) and for tanforming the se of Yer 1) Depa foe Dalvry st the Amst Meaiog of he Europese Conor for Pact Reedy Lind, pe 7710 8 Revd Bis aly 3 9S 303Bernard Grofman A Review of Macro Election Systems references 40 ebsined into an election outcome). (Se Figures 1 and 2) ‘We shall mot desl hore with other aspects of eleral syste sch at balloformae), candidacy and salfragerequirenene?), or greymanderig®); or shall we'discuss forms of representation basod om groupings ether than territorial ones); nor all we asterpt review of the vart namber ‘of enpirical suds on partes and eerons. We shal few our atenton 5. Maliple Ballo 2) the expeted similarity of outcomes under ariou voting schemes 1) the relationship beewoon sats and voter for various election sytem im particular the conjectured esbe-law relationship between sete sad woter in two-party single member disrce plerality decdons, and thresholds of exclusion and representation in tukiparty contexs 1-4 function of district tne and of diacibuton of pary strength ‘ero elation dares; lace of power and srsteic considerations in weighed voting and cumulative voting systems, Te isnot ut am inthis paper to try to rehash (ch less resolve) the normative and empiial ines concerning the dvrabiliey of ltrnative ‘voting siemes, but we shall provide some dicuson of some of the ways in which recent formal work has sed new light on some rather old ‘questions. We shall confiae our attention to those vosing shemes (of the ‘ones enumerated in Figures 1 and 2) whch have been wid for lgiative tlecvons. Ths, we shall not ery to dal with voring procedures incernal to legslaeares of other small groupe The reader interened in formal ‘Absolue Majosty, 1, Second Ballo of ind 3. SAP. 47D 2 Non-ordered Ballot (Ordered Nether By Vote: Noe By Pary) 9 | 4 Single Ballot 4. Plual ted 3. Unig 1. Sigle Member Dist: 1 3 Ordered By Selle he me etn on and vt heme een Camel 2 a fund x roi fhe US. ben te pe 2G Soars ote ty ons la gs ae ‘Teale SARE Sill‘ re to pre figs Shea We tes ates She Sie i et fw tn eet ok EU RDe Fs in hin 1971 Keli, al, 1967 fave shown ara jptot reg fe let ebro dali wtean nnte On dy sd SSRI G3! hte gig rin yb fd a SE "Occapational reprexmttion was offered alter the Fire World War 2h fase ie i fl mn a 5h Shin pte ony Sts (ee Lape HN pe tay ST OS sel ee rouiy bn cee (tea eng oa Toney ch etd st ps oath be ered ik pital ae Ga Goa 70" . Ra eet Ge Sie alain with arm he ener Sooping way hc cele nes aed” Both ary ‘nd Vorst Figure 1 ‘Types of Election Sytoms — Single Member Diaries — Single Ter None 1. Ordered Ballot (Ordered Either By Voter or By Parry ot By Both) 2 Ordered By Pary Only ? é ! i j 1. Ordered By Vorer Only 1. Borda Count, md g 304“A Review of Macro Election Stems Bernard Grojman teseardh into this area might, for an introduction to the Yoluminout fecene literature, consult Blak, 1958; Buchanan and Tl, 1962, Murakami, 1968; Grofman, 1965; Farqoharon, 1970; Nigni ond. Wei, berg, 1972: Sen, 1971; Pavenaih, 19715 Riker and Ordeshoky 1973: Fishburn, 1971, 1973, 1974; Sheps, 1973; Grofmany 1973b; sed the relreces ited therein, | sn 1 Typologie of Election Systems 2, Non-ordered Ballot (Ordered Neiher By Voter Nor By Pary) oe Peas peny henry nuh fee Se eae sera Ba eta ee pean sd ani, ie pare eee eee nal Senne ort med yee te so ote ea a ene ae bak Sees aces pene mem ih io Paige mentary perenne pred + se ele tom pipet See 3 Seatac ei ei ememnn re il [a | 4, Single Ballor 2, Molkimenber Dstees 3 Ordered By the label may rihtfally Be ated (egy shames like the cumulative vote and the limited ow ae sometimes treated a8 propottional and sometimes are putin an in-beeweenextegory (ee Lakers, 197% p. 176) J. FS. Row proposed to reserve the term proportions repression ‘ot for any particular set of voting scheme, bat rather forthe principle that the dinribution of sexs among partie should correspond with the Alsribution of voes among them. Both Parse ‘bos Vor igus 2 ype Elen Stems — Malimember Dries ~ Single Ter 1. Ordered Ballor (oedreh Ether By or By Pary o By Bos) 2. Ondeed By Pay Onty (Gove) Hing “Ut esion yom how tne of snip Neve he oaeks SFr fa ors po tad ca ta to ; Pay Snir Ue a dee se eof pons é porters gets a larger measure of success than does the party with Ho SENShe Se piei Sern 4 ‘ecsble Vo Gare Sym) 3. Gumslaive Vere Yoree Oaly the extent and the cliahilty @f the proviion they take for the correspondence between seat and vote (Rony, $953, p. 59) 4, Cros (Open) 1 Suit 1. Ordered By Lie 2 Single Trane 07 306emand Grofman We sal follow Rows advice and eather than talking about PR and on: systems we abil disinguish berween majontarian and now Imaortarian systens (where that diction can be made quite prec) tnd then age to evalace foreach ofthe various voting scheme (Whether Imsjritarian or non-majorecian) the conditions undet whid parislie ‘elaooahips cae between porentge sents obtained and percentage oter sivsined ‘OF the election sysent Hite in Fgute 2, the various forms of panty it sytem the sop tatsferble vor, the cumulative vos, the Borda sane and the liniwed vore are all nom-majoriarian sees, where by a Imuiritarion scheme we snply mean a voting, where which has the property that there always existe some coalition coming of only a bare Inajrity of the vores which ean be actazed of obtaining al of the seas Iie coordinate member? ballot dae), ‘Within majritarian schemes, somes requiring able majo (.g alternative vot) nay be dtingushed from those reqiing only elaive Imsjrites (cg Sespart-the-por simple plurality). With lit spsems the ‘mote important distinctions are between the various forms of quotas and ‘eocient) (oe Figre 3). 0 se ny tos dvd in 0 amy fuse tr cg 2, ies ania ori at De enema ey lta fpr teen lal ay a ‘Soy he focayciny Wetman ds it RE tale Pa ek oe He sc edo Rises a Hine Pit ot Ke to Tes tl oa Sree en rn ah ee Emi oY hr en bt sos Fa eer Gs, re as deer of mat Lge suber al poten bey zene, aking Sian a geo RC ad pe ya foe lye ema fag een ht pat saat delta area Rm oe ave Aa ee ee snares Secon heel or CoP aa at ma ek =A Fe ae rr rn and aenmaaian shes je Ob ec) el St cn tay vl ot oe SWAG yn oh pid thea of vou ene 2p dr Pa id bh ar el fa ‘Slt man cap, Wee Sn fhe nce eo Sees me Re 08 1 mroponina letra yt Ie Bean tin ene thn has tot A Review of Macro Elction Sytems Ripere 3 Quotient and Quote for Various Typet of Lis PR Sytem DHonde Highest total votes for party Average Formule ara TBM Ae 2. Se Lague Highert, ‘Average Forsula tor votes for pay i geocienss = 3. Grete Remainder : Foemala ena 4 Moied Se Lague | sot woe for ae Highen Avena pains = 1 ote for pay rene 1435 Tovcn del 5. npr, Greve spa for = _tt vse Renainder Forela rey i eral sus (i a given dni) This wise Rae veers toa the "Lagu formula acces oeig ene Sanimog Sascha aaa SORE cova nae ta i ao 09bernard Grofman “The typology we propoe in Figues 1 and 2 involves 2 four put eloicaton spent") Te disingsthe tween sinple-member and ma member dace bot noe between majortaran and non maoritaran theme"), Tatead it diinguiher breween ordered. and. nowardered Tallow, « discon very similar to Rae’ dicincion between ordinal and citgoical ballots but allowing wr to make etraa adionl ‘Isinctions ‘Thus within ordered ballots we diingush according to ‘nether the ballot is ordered by voter only, party only, or by both and Yithinnon-orered balls we ditinguah berween single ballot and Irntple ballot procedures Out third coercing clasieation type 3 the balloting and tabolating proeduse tue « gy sonordered ballots in snp member dic may be aed in four quite diferent balloting ‘themes {ihe socond ballot runoff ademe sed in France since 1984 the low man out score (LCOR) common in U.S. private organizations filiogin she blanks, rather oure voting theme decibel in Raber ales of Order (se Grofnan, 1969); and sandaed amendment procedre, the squenal pairwise elimination procedore wed inthe U.S. abd Britain foe dealing with mowally excive amendments t0 «main motion). nally we shall draw 2 forth disineson berween singlesiored and Inolctered systns at we shall sot deat with other tha singleeed ‘eter in sir pape), 1 iy Sng ib me ih il 2d ent ote Shain tin me, er ch et mbes pre eae tet tape ae ae Fe abi ee ie teas ey Wl Ry ap Fs ae ee ce, Gea, el isis Re AG NS rpc fo rae 1 digeon for Ger prosar purpone, Aw encelet simpliied weatawat of bit nies Cod eet it Serre ree BE ci tne os ad pt BUR teeth cin Sey UT ee SFoaer eee artsy Staaten wales ee need aa ual pg Sa dey pagans Sane naaaed | ES a Fe Se a eA rite me Se aan ee iba eh of atte a ee SGP ge ees eg) Wat ene yt tr: corlecneso on of wd hs rp Be revs So eee a i rindi a abe Siacore ee oy Rearastace! ea ih cage Su ee rae RUE Sg sis dae Se 10 A Review of Macro Election Systeme 1M, Ves Sno Seats Much of the dicusion abou the vteset eaionhip fr vais ctesion sc has made eof rather Und dy se aed ot mate? oleic poi (1, «Laken, 1974, The Bs (and a ina onan} empties Ro “The votes clatonhip may be appronded bath a «descrpive and soslnie problem. For purpose of analy of te oes popes oi een spt tre indie and one gop! vedgue have reenly teen proposed. The ides ar he nde of mania Soon (Louse snore nd Hanby, 1971), the thread a representation (Kalan: 196, fie Hasby and Looe, 1971) and the tveld of eacluon (Rae, anby.ad Lomore 1971 th index of nonespreencaon Bla 1957, she papi enige i he (axinan/ninin) severe eae (Dah tose: Grofman, 1978) "To exh of the analyte capeson or the ‘hort lintng cus there eouspondson the on hand (rn rn 1 Tea) bere valve or selacomhips dcied from acl dt ‘endo he td hl ened a aed Sarton trom tain, 7 “MPA Smt See babar The tesa of representation isthe minimum suport neesacy cam prey i ft putamen set, This analyse pov, fri ands 0 the conditions of sts ind pi gaan er es ord {aries are eblping eno no a form alee agin a0 ene {ary aad even go far aso viet vows 9 bor advanone Tati ira wll face that prsn can ely ota We eee recited by thee thrabold fuedns yr as fa foc aaa ‘praeation” (ie, Hanby, and Lacrnorg 97h pp. 79-499) ‘The thshld of extn, onthe other and is the maxoum support hid can be ained by a puty whi never, fas to win eves ‘oe vat The tld epemmaon poids «nce Condon for racamenary represen, the trctold of exclusion povides 4 suet condition for. The analy of the theholdof ein it siptl by the fat 1S Des Nol Cm ing hy er es espe Sas eee raat ay, Soe (re es nd Tullock, 1962; Miller, 1971), a Neer Be aa waka tee new pe That deny ptctton vo pin iB ss Sl cn of anBernard Grofnen (4) soall pany’ opponcas have no bene zategy than ether 1 a) ise one of cher amber stand alone against the party in exh dist, ce) form a wholele estore alliance oppose ie in cack ‘Grice --- Than, we are to suppase that». oo” party with vote share V faces «single adrerary with 2 vote proportion of 1 — Vi" (Rae, Losemore, and Hanby, 1971, p80) im = number of members beng elected from a given district, 1 = umber of party contting the eloion ia some given dtrce = mumber of sat nthe legilare “Ty = dhebold of repreatcon ‘Th = threshold of excoion su = vote share for party tin a given dice Y; = tou naional vue share for party We sal et repodce she ali of Rar Lenore, and Hasty (7h) wit an ped by. aie Roan (96) bot shal sity show ee eae (wT We hve alt he foe ste ey Trap hal air for tv eer yen! theme oes Selina woe wih tw cK (oe in Japan th K~ 1) 1 odie Se Lys te oe wiih wa iia oof ‘hip cee sor pa, wee ore ha held cf seinaton lower an he tld of ean for all seven ‘leten sptoe, We so we tay whet one dopo of Ty “duns ota teens bs x geval fo yh) Te el “topemton lowe for de Se age yams ge fr ay “hell of scion ight fr ay and love under Sige aod Ceca Render rin The plat of hi Tevet of iris ar nat, Bowe ite ht the) ig wt Ftc toh Wem end oo ast te ear holt For singly, ae an cme leila body dvd aw iis of m meno eh. The ain veld af epreenaton for eh fone ving wens sing Tf) we compare Tor 1 a Fe pty (= E) ot tr tid (2 op) i So. Mee lg exh nisin were ln icing 5 oF ecu Tor oa "sled ofa, and KT values wil be Snes fr a A Review of Macro Election Systems realy show by simple alabra (Rae, 1971, . 158) dat the ehrahold for plurality is lays lower than thot for D'Hondt. Ths impli than, when minors ate geographically concentrated, 9 plurality sytem may be more favorable to at least ial minority repeemion than the snow common "PR" eytem. A sinter surprising result hols when we compare national thresholds of epreentation for pleaity and te linied ‘vow On the ether band, plralitys national thesbold of representation ithe same a chat of Se Lague tnd is sometimes higher and me lower than that forthe remaining sheer lated in Tae te iin 7 am tn? woe ie th Tete ™ Tete ge hE eT FA) Gn LRT) ree ta CREE aerate ae BBte ea aoe ee cc cee jee ae are mere eae Jas Sa ee fTFigure 4 plpturality) = 1/2 ag(m) = 1/4081) mg(P8) = avetminet) pipluraliey) = 1/(a0) ‘marechold Proportions of National Yote, Displayed on Logarythnie Seale, 001 ae 30S 3 vs fer Donde Compl wth Parl Theol one i eT ia et Sa geri, 198 a A Review of Macro Election Stems 1, naw, we tum to exclusion thresholds for the nation as 4 whole, we fn ha for lay eis 4 anf wea nn aon of pareysength acrom disce, for an inurgent party confronted with 4 song exablbed parsy (although not cecesrly whe sine ome) in ooh sisi iis ler (CK. Rae, 1971, pp. 162-16) thatthe other oaons ‘holds of exclason also remain a given in Tablet Fige densa to Rac, 197, Figure 10.2, p. 160) showy the comparion of Tp and yp for ploraliey andthe Difone ele "The fet of (the D'Hondt Role) is to rae the for and lower the eeling” a8 Ty increases wich m and Ty declines vntl = inthe case = they met, and the portance of mata dinsbrion appears As districts grow larger, she sationship between = party's vote and its chance for repexnation becomes inreaagly deta rminate” (Rae, 1974, p. 164) ‘Avalgowsasercon (t least with respecte T) can be made in eae ring plerlty with exh of our other voting semes, The Eve eden ‘me have deal with make i ardee eo completely exclode minority parce from the national legislature chan dos the ise pase pre syste ‘A common spprond othe seats-votes lationship has ben the examia- ation of the “dinartion” caused by particular voting hemes freaks ‘extent which electoral grouping are undevovertepecentel, i teams of wats in proportion vo thi vote percenages A dee indication of this dorm is given by the hers isthe seats for party 4, she bars indicate we are to lok at stots re adh lie awl ope hdr ‘whch ranges from 0 I. (Lootmore and Hany, 1971, pp. 468-469) Rac (1967, pp. 8185) has looked ata clovely relate inden, aveoge dein deed #2, whe fl ot per Ear sletions, an average deviation of only 2.39%. Rae (1967, p. 87) in omparing tht Sgure wih average itereestion shifts in popular vot, stra thatthe eee of election sytem upon the eompedtivepesons of political pais is "orginal in comparin to the eect of decton patcomos’. As we would expect: Ree finds that average deviation ty Bigher for cline ander play at compared with thor ander party line syems (ee Rae, 1967, Chap. 5) asbernard Grofman Looremore and Hany (1971) have elated the maximum vals of 1 forfour ection sysens at futon of and n. We have extended ‘hee amass to inclade comolaive yous and the Timid vote, Ret: bre shown in Table 2 ‘Table 2 ‘The Index of Distortion D, ar a Fancion of District Sie and Number of Peres Canteing the Election il Source; Lomanete and Hasby (171, Tale 4 9. 79 PrgGh Sity Stadt ale vous egualy Se if ead ee hn Sve she tame Index of tortion ss Paral. Loosemore and Hanky (1971, p. 478) found tha the system with dhe lene datortion was the largest temainder seme ("Under largot te tmsinde any consioeney with + large number of sents Gy 10) is Tuiranced weary perfec peoporsonaliy’; the next lowes is D'odt, nd the gromere doin index apily approaching ove as mires) ‘ecu under plurality. We would add to those findings chat the cu fave vor is ental ini fndex of dinortion tothe D'Honde sd, thar the modied Se. Lagu i imermediate in dsorton betwen D'Hondt Ind Se Lape, and thr the Fnited vote sould be placed intereliat in tnortion beercen plural and D'Hondt (for K'= 1, she Inder of Dis- tortion for the lied vote ienieal to that of D'Honds, for K> 1 ieis invariably higher, a some simple algebra wil quickly revel). Tooremore and Faby (1971) provide ables whidh show values of D for garious wales of mand forthe four sees they consider but we thall on teprodece them here since they add Tile shat an’ be sen ‘ety From inspetin ofthe enti in Table 2 ‘One farter empreal point. Basiag their conciion on data drawe foam Rae (1967), Loosemore and Hanby (1971, p. 477) are that pay Tie yes exhibit an actual dcortion hid in only about 20% of thei potential maximums distortion. A Review of Macro Election Sytem me ecg pectin to Ta eee eee are seer Figue 5 ‘Peeportione of the WoReT=) Proportions of Whe WaT omy ce orettae pay Pepin of she Vo ate cient eae ney em al mae mG ee ar? ra ee “pe A a rg cc ert ee Seip feerd tera woe ert ses een 37erat Grofman te eget, Th bean by Sa ro care ean be hgh of SSGEUR TF Dian ano 10 he Gin nde for Loree cree har) Cnc of Dierion woe i omy nad Leommone (1971) Ind of Doron ce apo pea ac uae of te shen Tink ere Figwe 6 wu sap of Pca Matin Monin Vote Pree i Pali tl ‘Election with m= 2 plurality elections, the Coane exey 10 se dat fortwo pay of Distortion is 5. Antlgoot Sues could be ‘constrvered for our other coil she cares fe = oo. ele of wou noice ‘peters eel rake ale role epee. To ese ‘foam the mina representation ne we solve the eget fee sole) + late shen say Expaing sa percent we have aa A Review of Macro Elkton Systems roting scenes. Ie Figure 7 we show the gragh of theorsca maximum’ Ininimum vote percentages for a D'Hondt dcce elon with a= 2, m= 9m), We may show thatthe Coefficient of Distortion in ths ase isonly 07%, Figue 7 Graph of Theoretical Maxis! Minimum Vote Percentages in « Distriet ‘lection sith n= 2, = 9 Dtlond Rae Another sealyc tol for undercanding the eatevote relationship for varioar voung sdemer it postolate some probaly dirbuton o sy stegth across dates and then calelate the expected diotion Note form = 2 for he Hands seme Th aad Te at dnt. [eahce pwilig wo une sours, we ott eft Gafieer st Ban bed oe Sas lowe tte (itaan o-3 (at +3 oe eel aNd w= 23 (oars) if ae bee Ma Botta apg tld eps othe Diet Ra the Cece ~ eter a9Perna Grohe cr misepresmation which ach « dasbtion would ingly: Lew Carol (Ge mallonaal aulor of ice tr Wonderland) ij at alex SConury ao (1886) forthe linked wore and loc vot, bot Bi work ‘cosine wnoown tr minded vn oly few Jean ago when tie ecmont Donan Bad, wo alo an shorty on Cael reated Cnt spumens sd clans na later form Bak 167F) ‘Carll sumed 2 aed tht ec patsy Had ice norman stot is pote vot spor fon the "openua” number of and ac anda enh prey able to evel divide i vote ang i ‘odie Br exemple n'a ax rte dint i oe party as ton than 0 pent thuld von wo candi ft has more than (2 pera it sbuld run 3,'Wih ovr 60 perenofthe were # Ban tot dr ar ase, win al ens, With 30 + w 60m pret Of he woe prey mnt in 2 et if i cones 2 seat. i cams Sisal win ony tae the ober prey conten to seas With fort to 50 porn of the vote, party shoud come 2 nes bot Soweto in a tba them Inch +c fhe oer pry ems nl rut aoe tao. Ks opium member of candida, suming se Shea candte wl pid op an ean seat and He ca’ ver bore Wih ica ta 40 perc of te vote save hart 10 rm ? candidate, even though ule youre mivninated, de eatin i hopes) ‘Crall hen fon toaster tat he vote dation ean, icc all divson of te vot ae ely Uhly Hen for ample in the 3 at Powe ce dare a 40 pen probably tae te Ye percentage for pasty 1 wil be inthe @—10 pocet rang, #10 percent Problty hae iil be ithe 40-80 perce range, a 10 percent otabiiy shri ll bein sh $060 pene ranger and» 40 pent Frobaiiny that wil be in the 60100 pent rage Thon thre Sh expected dination D) of roughly {a0 — 1+ 10-190) 4+ (45-— 391+ 155 — 4 ss — ae Fas 9904 {tao tony t20—epaya = 169 2) cf, adh (197, p90) wid 2 lad (1967, 17) nt over wi SRT Sia ethene ote adder the fafocmation aun ‘oneal a opaak my wyto eaeleyrertly fem, [eS Pm ar the marina @ Tor whith your exposed vow percentage, ¥, suc thar “A > SDE for m= 82 hy oF sh tha m= eck Trak Stn for which ee Hunde yup no Bhai lel anette vow pecs te acura pei x0 Dine fe wale ae sified your ston i hople! A Review of Macro Eletion Synems Corl, bore, wean Index of Nowropeostton whichis ifs from D. Cal ads the sam oral ares of tke eee value ofthe deviation between the vote necessary to guarantee the winning, 1S ses (or ome pcr volgen) tad te nel no hak ‘vt ince 8 eas cog won Ti for cumple ina se 3a nied was worry dv eecin, i nae 43 Cals Ino laoeprnation weld be 10 (= 148 Atl #135 50, ae pore of the vote would have btn sfc to pants fe naa ven by she psy with 4 pene ad 80 percent wold are bee percntge needed to pastes the two sear won by te ang ath 55'percene ofthe vu). Under te suman of ree de bai th exile of Caray Inc 8 Nonpoint en rte Sporty an (Goer 130 soa + 45 — 40+ 155 — son. 2 U55— SOFAS cand + nom 5 120-an enc, he expected proportion of votes sepreted it 6). Call they alae the athena extn te penny distorts reromnied for 1 m6 Reet we Table 3) (Ne the fore lined yore if Km 1, we have nae plan Fe 82:1, we fave the Boe vot. Tha ply and he ey ve en eth of scl fons af he iid vote) We em Tbe 3 te retonrepeseation seca for Keats ate dienes See porig values of K Snes m ince Carl steed ‘he spe norateable vor, br ao was raed ee ‘in the question of optimam distri size. ° aes 4f the Eee Reprod fort Lined Vat Whe toe Vote and Plrity'Undr imma Of Ree Binnie wa 1S CES me mos foe HW 6 oe 8 FW 2 Fw Sie: Blak (1967, Fg tp. 2, 5B for this cae woud be 12 (| 48 — 33] +1 38 — 4 °) Fy alate and mish more lant fre fa dering ise er Carols ides Bak (7 08 ah pone Fer eights‘ ar easy Popova in ie rand no ey Cals inde willbe roughly egal once Dont ananton of vote attBernard Grafnen he dun ee ns sone he Feng Sm wo. gomember di only ange he Nee (igen Tt co, The eonlon thatthe important Pe or fe singe ember and een at few Zmenbet Fre Py bw tay when we have goa 0 tr di si ME anes exh i dl were g eet” Ca ahs ype 2, cd i Dinky 1987, p16 600 cig) uaiy gees he reas of Table 3 than th crunuln (the nema pas eles 8 Dorion sh than Cres Ide aero king eal ns, eve, pre hoe es rte oye now urn vo one of che most a eae a can phe ake law a conjured one 70 Ya sie et emscinaaned Medes (grap ied by. Bee ort 190, se “Lae at JE yom ii #, Sae el no Suny rly scion wth single meer Si é ape st would twos were divided berwenn the parties in the ratio ys Clery, we cou, in principle, lyr locking 3 distebations ober shes if 8 is the eae proportion won pia i tavee Sy : a a ‘the cube law is by pany 1 and V i is national vote proportion Ss-itv 0 wos7i-v os Some simple ashes reveals char expression (1) can Besa ‘ o So er fs famous Lae "ebcore, Jos 382 “the ce law is mich Hhe Fermat's fam co eT of tar fen) energy bas eon ite cla prot Me ben pet ee ay mcm) te et # a en of er ede of he abe aw Te fore ied wy the Ines ered (ten ad PET >t evn eu, q 1 sehen decreases in m at a de- oki ims vie Indes of iri forthe Hind vote in aie ‘ ecing ue, Rec al dat Ta for he Hime ote ar en ao m A Review of Macro Elston Stems law wae redicovered, and an attempt made to roate it wo stitial conierations about the ditrbution of vote srngth arom contac: Ins now sane arice by Kendall nd Stoart (1950, Kendall ad Sent (2980) point oot the dissibaion fnction defied by the abel salons ‘ental tothe disribution function of a normal distribution vi mean 5 and. vatiance 0187. Further natiicalconieraions were inteduced iy March (195758), and Calman (196), Both sought to acount for the fact that the observed variance in vote proportion: in Brita and US. maton legislative cones war math lower then what would be expected were party stengeh normally diributd acon clecion dics wih x ese vase of p and variance = p!SP . noth Mand (1957) and Coleman (1964) hypotbized group prenre models which mighe Grex lopsided majors forthe dominant partyin some discs, bat ‘nly Coleman offers an actual model which he wee (with considerable succes) 10 fi data from U.S. wade whion elestione "Enpirieal work on she Sof the cube law to Bish, U.S, and Cx ‘aan ceson data hasbeen done by a number of authors (Secs © Kendall and Seaar, 1952; Dahl 1956; Butler, 1953; Quilter, 1968) Spafford, 1973), Maré (198788) ha shows that he cabe law in the ‘ange 40 —.60 can be approximated by the sraigh ine § = 2808V— 904 Leas square edges of varying dees of sail ophsicaion ave been sed to Bnd the be Siting aight line for series of plurality sloions, For five Bris elections, Marth (1957—S8) fouad & tepreion line with equation $= 277V —37. Using U.S. Congresional cletions (1928-1984) and U.S. Senza desions (1928-1952) Dahl (1956 py. 8148) found equation of S=25V— 70. and’ $= 3.02V-- 95 rpecvely. We show Dahl res and the cube lw relationship io Figure # (eprodaced from Benson, 1972, p. 77). Tho cereion som te sugges 2 good fi for cube law predictions inthe observed range Following Thal (1963, 1970), Tufte (1973) we a lope model ofthe teow ° 1 By =0 and By = 3, this i dential to the eabe aw, Thos, fing 1 and By provides a dace wt ofthe eae lw. Moreover, the ofits 1B and By have clear emplscal import. The feet mesure of Biss the xtc to which one party must gris more chan 5O percent ofthe votes, {0 gut $0 perce of the sens the sovnd is'a meseie of the “sving ratio", the proportion of teats “earned” by each perent increment 9 aroeal vote. Tufts i clearly the most comprabemve empirical ody wsemard Groin Figure 8 ; = 38 Senate y=3.02% ~ syed ea) sits tet to (8 pemoerae) 1 atts egress for he US. Cone Recs GACT HC om a saw dad ru emg He dt 4 we fer ts 4 i ny Ont Brin aprsinag Secon inte sine apna calc Gasca We toe redid abe Tee ae 4) Tuan tin US. Congres cos wR Sete tao appease daily ening, with vale of nl ‘71 im the period 1966—1970 with 4 very: EY Pe (7.9%) in, ‘the Democt 1 fable 6, us, a vote increment Be ame ae a nn ie oad be epee Yel of the be mm A Resiew of Macro Election Syms Table 4 Ting the Predictions of th Cube Lane (and Simatancosly Estimating the Logit Model). he Now Zend 2 ges ‘eine Und ey, 68199099 askew He Upted State, 18001970 2 oo oe NS Medien 2 he fe Newey in bob Bos Source: Tue (1973), Table 2, p54 an increase in wats gained equal only wo $ percent of ihe sat bing ‘oateted) fn tome instructive histograms, Tae (1973, Figre 7, p. 353) ‘as demonseate bow in the U.S. Congcets the dibuion of patty suength across discs has dramatically changed from a nealy nora! Aisribvion centred around 50 (bot plat » huge Southern Denoerais ull” of virally uncontaxed diaries) to + bimodal doxebuton, i hh compete’ district (hose im the yore range 40-—60) are be fomingsciteor and sacer (and wich dininihing br sil ue large Southern Democratic tail), Tate has shown that, for certain plasible ary sengih diseibuion atsimption, the "nate sniform slectoral ‘ngs are across the nation, the greater wll be the swing vat (Tufte, 1973, p. 547). In other wordy the more sil in popular vote hinge on rational athe da Ioel ioe, she renter wil beth swing ratio, Tole Te 0p 40a af hae ri aaa eaten ral ae esgic ae eee ee a ee oe Ae ee (inka i, Narain Ren apr hee Set a Sie te et Bas a 4 ‘Thus for the gume vot ei, the Democrats qaned ere eat Wo Sd oe Caesars Snot ei hn ceri blah Wrage cet a Siig ea le et eel ae he Sifter and ies rms A say msRenard Grofmen hon Iypotbosizes that we would expect ritin, with a tighter naionl ‘istyotganizatin than the U.S, t0 have s higher swing ratio than the U.S, which we inded find to be the cas (ee Table 4). While T Gd this hypoth plus, ie eos toe that af more dic relevance" the owing ratio ie the variance of the distribution of pany sreng secon clesoral discs, Tufte is clearly ule semitive to the point (, “Tale, 1973, pp. 547554, ep. 547) bur Tell do noe tink Be gives i the imporeane it deserves For sample, Tufte (1973, p. 547) ars that "in U.S, Congressional elections the sing ratio will be greater in on-year leony With he Presdenal contest on the ballot than in f-year Sleeions when nao! forces ae somewhat diminished and nde that “those expectations se bone out in both cases”. Tufte aeibate thir t greater ational ani focmity in shifts in paey alliance in presidental yearn bt we bine ‘cam beter be understood in terme of the slaonthip between tare and the skewedoes of invice pary vote scenghs, whee low turnout (ofa ection isasciated With high stewednes (See out comments in note 27) Although T difer somewhat with Tufte at to cate of the anges in swing ratio and bias, Trgard i reatent ofthe data a both thorough and ingenious. For example, he bar cleverly used U.S. Cow resional election date, in the period 19821970, and some. simple Algebra to show thar "In order to regain ite seas lo i the previous ones election, he cout pate meade = ile alow one fourth (24) gresir than the fe in yous which originally won thove sets for the Present party For example ifn an omyear election the Presidents party gained four percentage poines in vote over is previous ‘innings --- thea the aueparty would seed 2 vote tife of 124X4%— 30 10 regain the Toe sete” (Toft, 1973, p. 48) Clearly, the swing ratio and sym bie of any porltyaytem varies, with the ditbuton of pareystengls acres dries. Lee ut look at rome casa: If we had two purely wcional parte (e.g. 50 dies tnd 50 discs of 208/ 200%) the bas By would be exo ad the swing ratio, By aute low (at manomn > and probably more ike 3). On the oto hand if one party were move scinal than the other (6g 25 dstice of $0%/ — 200% and 75 disiets of 10% — 60%) then the more sectional pany would be azongly biased again, (= —25) and the cabe law would again be inapplicable. I per steongh were soemally diibued acru disct, then the ving rio vould be very large since a paty that won even lightly more than ball 6 A Review of Macro Election Sytems sented the notions of ewig rata sel tae ao eae tio and bias to other than play ‘ystems and, inpired by Tell (1969, 1970, hax peopl ere frrzation of he een," "7 Be opr a nig ‘The (1969) har shown thay, if Beep Vi where Sa (Va) is the seat percentage (vote percent fo 2 4 it simply some unknown exponent. ian “Tengepera (1973) has proposed the folowing serail et ‘thw for non-biased electioas™) er mS 8 ees ram tf hey nS a a tr a Sas et getinitemme eh he, east si Smeg eee el Sy, ete hh he Ba fiom ie Ar een an A Review of Macro Election Systems Bagshot’ view (choed by Fide, 1968, pp. 290—292) was that thee eirable fears of che single eranafeable ote were ces utwelghed by wha in his view waits inevitable dvilizing impact upon pari ienary goverment, "(Upon the plan suggested, the Howe would be made up by party polieians selected by a pary commit and pledged. wo. party violence and of characterise and therefore inmoverate represents. vs for every “sm” in England, Instead of a deliberste sony of moderate and judicious mea, we shold have vatens compound ofall sor of violence" (Bagshot, cited in Fredeidh 1968, p 209) John Sonar Mil saw the Hate sytem at 4 dick on the ascendancy te nme mai Ca Fie 9h po te he hand, asserts that : aaa "Why should the problem of what is jut to a minority be given precedence over what i just the msjoriy? Admit the majority wane action. Such action i, trough. proportional reprsmttion, ling delayed of altogether prevented. What the ace of that™ Cleary, there ae conicting democratic norms here and i i not the pups of this pper wt wo balnelve theme far awe ae are the only fecent work on the mathematical property afthe Hae sysem has been done by Duncan Black (1969) and it's not of nate 1 be ely summarized” Let um therefor, simply note that forthe Hare A symem in dace with m sats Ty = T= (= 1 Droop quot), while to expeion for Th, purely in terme’ of fet hallo preferences, seems rouble). Tn lange pare beau of the efforts of the Bi Elecorl Reform Seciety, there ns, however, beans very clove empire scratny of the outomer of STV elections, purticaary 4 compared 0 tow wing simple platy. (See g, Rosh 1959; Lakeman, 1974, and ioues of Representation, the jovroal of the Electoral Reform Society) ‘The Akernatve Vote (aI aheuive vte (od nA) is nin fra 2 form of peoprtinal represtaon, Tas is wmewhar mice, te scrm of ce tena/vons relat, he secon Ye 9 mejoreran %) Foe « mona kepiaure of + eaally sed connivance of eat eh, ‘Sessional ttl of excason go ove, singly = 7 wrir oyBernard Grofmen spon and snl Bave mh the plein, xr at for 023 Sy tw ta gen crim plunible aurpions, minor "ii pied ould be mae often sepezemed by te aepatve vote than by ora ‘Canes « thee pany sytem with single menber diss, Asine sia pars ae vn by el sera aged on 2 fright esgic SPS Gc hres general rorgh aseoment (0 ex posion on evens and tat cod ves preferences for ead ofthe pats ee srainind ty te dance bers the voter’ postin in the ideo iia mace aod’ nt ofthe party. The, for esas if the piv’ 2b Sith ga the midpoint prey alpen on ne pe wer es Stat bands of 25 te wu nn een weld tae RS cLES crag abe vou in he sent gweld Bae pe Pee oa de segment wold have preference: bes, and cr i pment mon have pefecces ei. Set p= 1 fe re ee eer dibtons cin 2 ply sites with sine mag JSpwsag ade : eos assume dat vg>m9 oF Ye>v9 and dat 4 ov Tes snume oo pty bas fll able ary In ea D will go unrepresented, despite che fact thee i pg dow iy ‘system, poy eo mamd ge 48> pap then pary b could recrve an abate eae wing ee he wm “ein” in ge ciel, Oy 9 sat et ay nl acim eigen re So Bice ecg of orl). eh POSE So ate eo “ete sere im aed oe Besete te. SIS Ee Jor clay ts pms tony apn) Profaiy HG Zadents om th paper (Gero commriatn) ta pied ex Soon in ce efor sional wats i gan one ihe alk of 2 tant tania feat Ege, Seat ee em Ce a ee ace to hea ea ee i'ter rion of extremist parties parties om sides of i oP tn bee zine Sein, A mcd meen eo hy ce sme at ee ake igre Sheil tect el) oi mg se a ol ne Pe SY eR ner ofthe sas i ‘ RTE che Sct se prepued wake he ll oe liga soe i i ely Tn he cn Be ears rin Ke ei areund ih may ee be ec SCE org Pee tek Mead em econ! compen, oud be iis 1 ce eos Sees t aunt ae men ee? fa anaenanting of mal ane Fares dabraana af tse Stn (979) A Review of Macro Eleton Systems ins paved plraity competion apsinu ether of the other partes alone, and this condition (under ur astumptont) mutt alvuye be mee. Some Simple ages is ficient to show that if ge'>O, then pay b will recive a majvity in pated contat afsnst each of the other parte Move generally, for any. number of parc, if preference sbedeles ase dermined by the partys location in esgic space relive to tht ofthe vor’ ideal point, then there always exis a “enti”. pay ‘hich can recive majority aunt each ofthe othe pte ia pareic ‘ompaion, but which may nooethles, be deied representation it 2 plorality sytem because af is Tad of fie ballot support). On the other hand, withthe alsernative vous, for prey b to go uneepeentedy i must be the ease that both vg wy and ne > wy If party b survives © the second sage ofthe balloting, i will native a majority. "We may extend this analysis by looking st thresols of representation and exchsion. "The theakold of exclusion for pany b in the pray tram dr, ter he hl fx a © i pon ing hear vi ly (Ge boas out a Hes ‘one oiber party on the Set round), Moreover, the dheshold of rcp sentation for party b under the plaralty astm is 7, bye wader dhe “ 3 slerotie vote it is only + (he mae prey get S0-percent, the second ary ee 25peccen) Tn general for an -paey single member dni sytem, the “contri pany (ves the party whove candidate can tctive © majaity in pred ones aginst the candidates of each of the other parte Cay eccve representation if i hat as isle as Tay PE ofthe Bt die Tallow (as compared wth 1 percent for the plurality cas, The Aheetold of exctuion in che mcpcty eve i always, Tham the ale 3 tera inte inde aren meme bee Seema ge tee lan gen Ce fcc of Ea ied plane ae Sais s fa y sere sige ne Settee yt he, IE lca ch am ets eld usemerd Grofman ative te dos ot guarantee shat the “ere majrsy dice (ey chat nde. o am ce smarty impaired comest ast eid and SENT Sale) wit be lc, befor m2, th 8 cane Sir enc under ie esicve conion (8 1 dtibton of wary eng ian anne vote smd aye than io = pry ind sme ye Teh, p. 19119) soe alihough wo wig his micas) cin hr hae em nas arena the par race» Candoret oe Su ve ben ciated athe reap of the alsin Bu 10 re Teen ele pey hs deine co conte he deo, haowng that YTURE Some the vitor ould be the candidate of be party lest wie is eee the Cndorcet oie wuld wot gamer aliens reese vue fo candi were sho tthe cet siphon ot Ceeraucs Seay ftom sc while ie candidae would lo inthe sond red con agin ue palatae opponent. I ou terme seas acy ar say would hove the moxiaion t engage i ei Meine Iepg tage art ss while pg hgh t w> a se eas Hboccer, to pnt eo at repr of hs dori wna af the aerate vote t simple pray, in practice the EE BSS as opened in Autti, cooly according one sere jt well have been pai for all he diffrence made. TE oda 0 pins ou aon the average she ped 137 — ates pos of eens wee decided by an abc it tllot eopuny Sad ely 5H yilded rou dileent frm dat which would Meaney Bes the rae She fcr ae Teas nt thas "uber no evidence that prefect voting ite Ce eel uber of eanidats or pase aan (ee apy. of the ene ithe prod eve, vo party con tna beatdown besweca adm pry cones vied ee kim fom Ryden dae he exes #0 whi he remit soe dung eves ine cone wire more thin £0 seeped. Mp very spatve faa of her data pens tot rey hal the comstonce whic are contested by mace than vo co eed by abate moj on the fs allo. Ths, of the Pag id he akenatve vor cold make» diferne, rughly 1 wece decided difecently by the alternative yore than 34a, aboot é they would have been by simple pleralisy). ctr ann ace sec anal neh xe dn ig He wy yer ae ar th i ea en apg sh sale paleo Please wre Howe. iat bs ami ete ee ty be ad yi) Elona era 7 dso tel 7 ECPR pein 36 A Review of Macro Elston Sytem Vi. Commas We lat ee how Theale of Reprmn she adr of Dt for econ eng she, We sos eek snd mn ie th edb int Say matte Le bo tay nee ny po ey ps omelet ati ‘expected number of its candidates selected. : Wow bok mde car rh ho my 0m at ob eras iy pee es as a oir eee 10 realize this and to apply game theoretic notions to "came S Sone war Clee 9) I os py sw mins parathion of ¢ drs independent of how many ‘candidates So my eer vp de bear a oa oe ae tes Une fa Ridge nda ata AE a a has ei, prea 7 vion wat a9 ee © In other words, the first party should choose the maximum : sve oii nnd nea a ak aly the fonda Mane We cet ae om re aes pce eee aon rae ot mt aes ee ci St ly Sori ce smi “mp eae see a " ele ee Hence, for the comalative vote, the threshold of omen rt pate & apy Sa Hel ft comlatve vee T= coder wo cect € candidate party muse ave greter thie ) Cleely i «pay wks more epee ton than ci nde 6, it may be penal fori Dy in Sed “a sho te wa emrion Wher 2 he amis cans more cnpl. Th inne aay scl makes sense as 2 prada one and is opi of one opponents tte ang in eoneer However if ons opponents are vided ed tor run oaly mt =f candidtn, che minimax wes mayo fe Ann, Uy fo die icy tm i Seen a ara a tee 7Bernard Grofoan um rorematon ite ie epi Teck Wale Mong cami al dhe det of ce ne aa woo oh es kes “oom in Sih ta “Ren eo enon i is a SESE CPS saa tr dn Br Sa Pe ae pen re) pos sac nite a re Feed id maybe exc i of of [seats] each Faction can win with their respective axinimax sete ee me ofa ee lh we ae a opr ci en cnt wi tre coe ae A, ‘est ct etn wih ve te eal f+ set tangs i ian soy eek bw one ne an veel pre the pins fre xe al a ee aa es Be a werent we my ta oP Day one tt ‘atone Glaser, 1959, p 156; ae and Ri, 1987; Bram 1975) i Ei tenia? ay 1a at Gy ttn hw dono osng eee ewe cere comune te ih # 0975, a aeidte more tan the nomber cared BY on vee comiderations, This sxategy of running £11 saditen [oii Seen TM reo a et poe Brame 007 ceo Rafa 195) bs tn pose rane ere i (eM or nds bese (097,91) ro Sa spy inl rl pe on soon pant for fo wick ta se SY iam MP i Sl es scene meet mes es alas oe toy ‘ewe ae ee eet oe i He ttl fs oa a el Sfapardiae he guaranteed misimom this a safe strategy enti ae A Review of Macro Election Sytem CComuatve voting is in common we inthe U.S. for sections of cor porate boards of directors (ee Glare, 1959 and eferencs ce teri) rams (1975, p. 116, derived feem Glaser, 195, pp. 154-158) provides, an example ofthe Itzards of s majority group’ doing a rsky sestegy ‘hid we God insracive enough to cite in full. concerts» Bght for Sontrol atthe 1883 meeing of che bourd of dieiors of the Sharpie Klliond Conpsoy, whe sx sas wee a wake andthe ouing ws by "The majority group, with $3 percent of the vous, ove 2 sratery of dividing its vues equally among fll sate of sx candidat, and the minority group, with 47 percent of the sharey chow 2 strategy of dividing its voter among 4 late of four, The mivoriy troup exly captred the four diestcsige i contested with exh of is candidates geting UL percent of the vote to the 88 percent for exch ofthe majority group's candidacen In fat, ifthe mney troup had pursed the bolder sersegy of contig ive diectorshipy, it could have won all by giving 94 percent of ll yes to each of ia candidere ‘The minimax strategic, on the othr hand, ate forthe majority group to parse the dominant rates ofconeing four drcorthipn, the minoiy group 10 pursue the safe sre of contesting three Adoption of these strategies by cath group rele in each gross ‘inning three dirctorhip. Thus, even the minor group took « hance in contesting four direcorhipy becnue ifthe majority group Ind followed their dominant (isis) seategy, they could have ‘won four ofthe sx dteorshipeagrne tht nooptinal strate of he minority group . ‘Why id the factions behave so foolishly inthe election? Alihough ie it hatd to underand what mativaed the ‘majority faction ‘peead is vote thinly acrostall the dicetrhips — and thereby in fect hand majority contol of the board tothe einray faction — the motivations of the minority faction ate somevhat clearer: 1 sppareny had a peisi knowledge tha the majority faction would act ati dd. Dept ie knowledge, however, didnot flly exploit this intligence, as we have indieatod although i did caprre ‘contol of the board of dizctors, which may bave bon it goal" (Beams, 1975, p. 116) principle, is pouible for a pany eo chore an expected ity maiming strategy by subjectively anigaing probabilities tothe mumber of candidates iz expects its opponents to run and the vote share it Uatiever is epponents command, bet we shall noe pur this mater 39ernand Grofman farther hee. (See Loe and Raila, 19875 Brams, 1975, p. 112, nore 14 tad ee ed ea) " acs te US iy, ed conte van fr ter soa he in Gece Anon cred by Sayer sod Mekse Cie p37) . re repens ae ded fom dh diy and nh “Serf tert shih my dt 3-2, 2, TLE ete tnd ah pry ny te fo rol clon os vo te cada dion aw tow many cdo w mime & mde iw lean preety ssw the pve of te ot tat har fry wil scene (forall practic porpona, Mini i rworpaty {Soy ad often thogh nit always of te monberef excane tat the othr party will nominate, We may show (Beas, 1973, p. 117) that ter thee cieomstanees optimal srateir 26 in the 020 25 range con 1 (expec to see sone elected) inthe 25 + 10 40-— range an (expect to see one cect’) inthe 40 + 10 $0— range rum 2 (cxpect to ser one cated) inthe 50-+ 10 60— eange ron 2 (expect to see two elected) inthe 60+ 10 75-— range rn 3 (expece to ace two dled) in the 75-4 io 106 eange cin 3 (expect tose thee lected) rye ant Macs (192, al I, 34) have kel eee cowie rege Br (97% Tae 33, 1s) weabelion ot a Sort) xn only 9 pe of al Sasa dbs pars dop inne moog I 2) ARBITER cre manne en 3 SSSR 0 i ay gue a net BS ae nee Mans BE p18 gue) pt ‘he Lotti it abla seed fo cmpentefor hee ete Mo A Review of Macro Election Sytem ‘ec optinl for both partis whatever the oscone of hectare 1973,» 116 emplass in ocgnal) Only i te conpetnne a ha imsjrity of the campers tmeltaenly ake aot of te oad (con 2irn 2) sey. The may plays worse ee caus mice the orioy party reed over €O% of the sae sere it could oot hurt for iw have fon 3 anion ya se of the tine only two candidates wee rn. "OF thee flue oe ee {ide of comers sth rane of 12 ofall eer ea hen, teen changed (cats gained forthe may) if oe party hal ane i setgy io that of ts mininae ertgy™ Cran pa ‘As posible explaation for ths praianly buf cecal onvior gn, the part af the marty pry Sayer and MacRae (10 ne oe, 545) sages that tiprian agremen may be reded chcn aec sede one sat in ech dict fo the mitonty parry. We mop me na in conpaiive drs, no such arene are meal Gane Pena ‘egy pst fr both partes (run en 2) lends ts an ooo ioe the minoriy sl ge one sat. We se ge denon fe opted seay doce inthe convert af two poi Piss tives ieee formacon a to vote seen, sone pts who are tarot wen 2 faving pusaed“ihoptina” stngy may have fe seca ‘esa whch athe kite ain she ge of thr valle frome arreared optimal, Seonly, pola may be nel soar of sot f, then we have 2 ? ion alld enuiement of sme special majority needed to pas leislations 4 {i gunta ofthe ames (6 = hy ananinity is eguced before the grouP can at) Three ge poe of voting sin wid mei TREE Belo of vores ec es ore allo han oes Soe aed oine guar ae food i poemanal bodes SALTO" Eon! Cotep fr yng by wel yo argo se oe elas when aly cpned pola pare vote 9 sing bee (eva, 1974 8) eis amis ped ht by ning ih in nied vig shee, equals esuking from euch things a8 constucncy sites ean 12 Competed for. However, the pris crt of rc formal work fn welgeed voting adem has Been to show that che dsibuton ol ower. the lity wo ian th tomes of « pro's desion) shin. troup wsing weighted voting bears no simple reaishp to 0 Ive weigh nigel wo she grows members. ower in» ros i ot Simly a diet fonction of onc stengh a measured by cube of ove ths Tor example, giving cepremneaives weighs sata eo the Teive sats of the contienis docs not (at we may sbow) give overseen repretaton "Simple addtine or dvsin argument ace Tov niet more complicated elations are necesry to ndersa (he real disibuton of power” (Lucas, 1974, p. 2) oe A Review of Macro Election Systems Let os deine 2 coalion in a weighted votes situation 9s minimal wining when the deesion of any member of it rests in the colon 20 longer being. winning. The Natsu Covnty: (New. York) Bosed of Supervors fas, for some sine, sted a weighted ring adkone with sr ‘representatives asigned weights proprtoal tothe vive ofthe coniucn, jes which they represen. fn 19S, cis reraed in Weights of 3,3, 73,1 and 1, cepectively Banakaf, 1965). Ie ney to ee thatthe Int thee representatives Jn selity, have ao power, they can never be monies of minimal wining oalont), Moreovers the thd epsssmnng, although ealy having 7 vows, in realy it a powerfal at the repress, tatives with 9 votes since a coalion of any 2 of there 3 represses ‘An even moce graphic example can be constucted. Conder a group of thee reprsecativs with weights 9, 49, and 1. The reproeatatre with « weight of 1 is 36 powecal a the other tepreseneuvs ns he single votes 2 sufcen eo san non-vinnng (cngle-mebes) colon ito 4 wionng one as ae the 49 votes of eer af the other repretaivn 1 is clear from shot examples that voring power expreed in fone formal oe functional sense is aot dzetly proprtonal othe names of Xotes one cist Soars in dis area have Been eoncerned with developing minder whic elses “the importance of the individ ia caning the deciding vote which will gurantee chat sme ie wil ary. It should compare all the opportunities whidh each voter has to be a sore of coeal ‘wingman in easing 3 dared outcome, This index should Sep upon the number of player involved, on one's faton af the Tort weight, and pon how the remainder of the weight in diatbutede® (aca, 1974, p10) i The two indies, proposed to meet chee daderata which hae recived ‘he most theoretical attention at well at application wo real-world stony (ccapporonmens disput) are the Shapley Shubik Index aod the Banshal Inder (See Riker, 1964) Shapley and Shubik (1954) imvodaced an index whidh is a special spolicacon of « more general value conp introduced by Shapley (1959). ‘A voter's Stapley-Shuik vale isthe pio! chance last member added to tara losing colton into a wining one, where calito are stsned 10 be equiprobable, The Shipley Shubik Inder for player {in given by one Sa Om o In ae tern parlance wih repesectver ae eld dae, eyBerard Grojmen x sh sec he anata, ont all wining cso 8 $a lg hee $e mb f mere eno wa ee enter ment th re “he ah tat de of woe poe wooded by Banca (0 Boat i eye and muh of i otk hs ape ia si td nnd ee mew an tone fo se Ser ance var pl preclng v,Boca int LE SER Vin Stans Sept ints et TAPAS Joon ofteng she dango oome 57 Sethe Sevres 74 TS) A sapere ig rf» Gen expen of por sen te Sut ocean oo Sit or vi veo Ho lens Ryerss inh svg psn ‘nb Bea te rate adr oe eee Weal or le {ope etn of th Bsa Ine Br Lea 6 fe tame 7p esr) wet, Noves tte se petty lhe Spey Sb Tle we nyo played concerned ithe rer which wining Stan etn he Recat Unesco nd Sono ake dnl ere ine ing eo we tome “ee nc an be wed provide sve power aon fo com ln tag sncee For etme “ie UN ety Co ie i anc mete (ee pew ee al om See membership rotates take rine vot the “ig ve plow a ese ay ae” “~ ‘sequel co wep af 7 for de pemanns mene ant forthe oting member with a quot of 9 (we Loca 1974 20) in 8 and A ving member can be il wig nly i 3 contin exacly nine countries including the fe permanent members. There ates 21 aah diferent $ which contain i and the Coepng een Shap hi fol for i 1 porn ga» 2 (B= th pat of 9 me tne oe ide y= 20mg el 1 be fo he ig as iader n= =D wn Loess, 1974, p20) ho ne A Resiew of Macro Election Syms ‘This means chit permanent members ia the ULI haves in Shapley- Shab terms, 105 times the “power” of non-permanent nenbers (Cf Barrett and Newcombe, 1968; Coleman, 196; Sdhwodiauer 196 the Inwer two dicused in Bram 1975 pp. 182190) ‘Let now consider sdemes which sign weight dicey proportion ‘wo conmiueney sie. It is posible to show that, inter of the Dasabat Index, this wil involve overweghting the more populous sexe by factor proportional to the aguare fot af the vote weghtsuigne Tous if connituney with 400000 inbabitants were given tect the wage of one with 1009000 inhabitane, the inhabitants neath comic ‘an be shown to have roughly identical Banzhaf inices We wall no temp to prove here this palpably nonattive bet noncthss mothon tally sound ren. (Se Hanah, 19665 Lact, pp. 32-34 82-54) ‘The Elcsoral Coles can be viewed a 2 51-perion weighted moloity tame between the sates (plus the Dinrit of Columbia) Each sate recive numberof electoral voter equ tothe numberof ts ropes tives im the House and Senate, Thom since all starr get two cleo ots ata om we migh think chat she small tats were overweight, In ems of the Shapley Shbik Index, thi ors oot motto be oo Cale lations for the 1972 election (Lues, 1974, p62) show that, scully, o the large sates are somewhat overweighted > towel, however, the resus ae remarkably cove to proportionality, ie the eatio © ‘aries only from .9706 38 minimum (Wyoming) to L0888 at maine (Califor. Am analogous analysis for she Banchaf lade. with much the sme revs i given in Banzha? (1968). Note, however, that we are hore using "sats" at our acto. If we look at what Lucas (1974, 9. 68) call the "combined game in whidh we view Individanl Yous Sethe scioes and seek fo inate thee power in the electoral cllge a2 the ‘product of she power of thee sate and ther power wiin the tae, ‘ther diferet conclsons emerge. For example in this combined fae (Gee Lucas, 1974, p 64) we find sah intring rele as that votes fo New Yook ate thre tines as infueadal as voters in the smal Dist ef Coluntia. Ts general, inthe combined gai, the "power" of big se ident wll be enhanced. (So also Maan and Shapley, 1964 and inh and Ordeshook, 1974 whose sophisticated analyse offer sme inpectant caveat tothe practical relevance of earlier findings) ‘There has been much recent fervor inthe U3, to either abolish dhe Hlectral Callege or to modify ie wth smieting oer than 2 raeby, state, winoewtakeall sytem. (See Longley and Baum, 1972, and sce ces cited thertin) Calalatons a othe impact of seeal no proposed MsPemard Grolman changes te provided in Baha (96), (Sesh Hint snd Orda, on eye ew gover nas we ve ded fil oe al ct wht sono matt by power (Ch Be, 36, nono, Shy ea provide vac nigh the sob ane Se inhi pede of many way slosh common (Cl. Beas Tos p00 wh as gle sts ube foe taps th fee Ilya wanders) Tie pover nes maya provide inh inte apc of elector yn Tor camp, ams sed Da (97) have tow, gee thn sgn spon dats U8. Prednalcanie wing CO marine Lapel oct wets shud alone he empign ‘teues wea ss in proyorion woe 0% power of the mer cowl wo of the Say hey soa dafopricaiy ie Shee sata fre paps Brome Dit C274 pa tan ave chad fod soil spp fr hi Pere the tow mon ste U.S: Pia ley gh hey Sind ve ise of apn ned oy el se Te hunting ti cim be, howto, hor deg (Cano {ve and Olea, 175 Beams Davi 1979) Conclusion “The cental thre of reent formal work on election systems is that lite it considerably more complicated than single datnctins between "PR and. "non-PR™ ayseme would ever sigpst. The proportionality © and the die of the seatvoteselaonship vais La with», m, ine of pany stenghe acrom consituenie (and ia a gute complex ‘mani nt simply a funtion of ayitem type. Moreover, progotona ‘neigh do not aecesarily rele in proporonal power. ‘We hope > Inve demonstrated tha recent fonal work can contbute to our unde scxnding of how given election systems ave likly te operate onde dieting ‘ondions. ‘As Cal Frid (1968, p30) has poimed out te is dificult to price... che exact effect of any paricslar In 1958, Frances reurn to singlemember constituency ng slerntive bot rated anlaof power ina cally eat Fre G05 pe ey Me A Review of Macro Election Systems ‘ith dovbleballoc was expected to favor established plicians with strong lea following and hinder the teatvly unknown candidates from the New Gaol purty. But the cele was a Gals landide™ {Cesny, hs example sugges considerable room for improve in sur prediive scracy with eps to th pre ones of an propo manipulation of nations electra ws). Becton reas fave ingot dies indepnent fen for cumple ae (6) nd tha re Earopan pox WWI single pryparkamertary naj i wee aul rcs fe sense: Hower weet look a elation Stems in Holston Fm pevngpascew of sol sol ideal ela Oe, ton yee (re vn tha ‘hey shape) the prevailing pac of peiy competion aad Cesvage tod thie eft i amor vays oawsghed in importance by she ‘Soe pen pS erm a! th nie ccnp? ead fn moe eat afta af dae B95 ow mS References fe ee os ct Ma ea i tect a i a Nata SUS Si Stet” 1 vam onus Sela in a ah a in lant i tg pet ce tc, VaR aaa Nama os ay as a ont ropa a oa Oe ‘eto, Pace Research Rei, Vol. 2 (Ape 160.8 eed ee acc oS bc rl ‘in Lens Cres The Principle of Ps mv Now Maret Deion Maing, Wale me urBernard Grafs nuns Cale Thay of Gan inp, Us of NOE come Yo: An Hci, Ee Dt nt i Bab tt a en oe i ec el Be fa mn Mo cma oe, Sp ly Bee Aes a ‘ena i erat Sal eS iy ae late np Soe ed Pe 1 ch “The Wao « Pra lS Fate i ok ty et? Rd Pat ae Tse ta pac oe Senin” Hie de Ti arts ee a hs New Yoh, Main 1975 SE an rc eet Sane iy Roi 5 ‘al Goma ae By Remmi Mal in at Cabeining opienn for Dense Repeat” doa oh ee at Goncte Bot Pig 12 hn rsdn Camping Aner, 5 Rs, a Greens Campa, Rete Allocation Under th Eleoral Calle: cera a SG, ati el ee Cnet, lr See a lc dion es sainn, Whey Dean "Leer to the Ete Anrcan Pele cece Resco, SEED Ws eee ci ea a ae bal Dy The Etna Sem in Bin 1918-195, Lando: Oxford Univer pat K Betton and D, Ske, “The Stee of the Liberals Unde ‘Bite lel Syncs Pothamentry Aa, Wa 22 (Wiis 196860) et, Ane, "Reet Development i Srey Stal of Poi! Bean. er Renin Rnaey (Ed) sae the Beha Soy of Pola, Ua Unter ofa et 10, pp- 3H cody Cock "Pons Comenaion, Unversy of Manni, 173 rete, Thomas W. and Wiliam D. Morty "The Cube Law and Roll Call ete recede Beal Mesag of the Pale Coe Soi, Maat Eo ws. les ea, "Changing she Ral Change he Game: Pry Refo 2 he rip Clea Began ode Demers Nasal Convention” American Pull Stee Restn Wl 8 ar 197), pt " cent ees redaction Yo MatbematieSclgy, New Yorks Fe aT Sontol of Calleivites and the Power of a Colley wo Act" tn ok eran {6 Scel Che New Yok: Garon sd Bros 197, a8 A Review of Macro Election Systems Clos, Cade B Tame tse a nce lhe le do Gee Sa Ieee ea (oat Decisions Render a la Plaralte des Voix. Pars: 1875, Ue Probe aetna man 1986 Dall, Robert and Edward Tuts, Sir and Democracy, Stanford: Stanford Usivr- er at “he nef Her ym on Pil if ner te Soe Bae Bt YS Se ag a hiatus tage Fieworl Reform Lonan tal Ror Soe, es” CM ua a Thy 9 Wa No Hs Con Ye ety ni st, Conn, Sin isn Dain Selmer Chace Condast tnd he Campin eB ‘etn af esene 2 Sigh ep Be Mea” Bord Se il Cae reain” SUAM Ras, YL 1 (97%, “Single yuo “oy Rat Bd ane a a whi ene 1. Ordahoot "Campaign for Reider" dees sa ten Clap ‘inner, Gull, "Game Theory td Canlaive Vang for Corpor Dine "an Mareen Scr, Was Gon 5 pp. 4 ‘nan, err he Cent Joy haan sede Gx Lv” Wak in Tov Br of Pal Somer Bae Uv New Yo a Sony "Some Newson Voting Stee snd the Wil ofthe Major” Pale Chie itt —!"A Rote on Almon Codec Chic Pale Chee, 1972 =, Monee of Bien ad Sane Fone Rec Ther of ‘eprnmitin snd eum and indice of Blur: Bede pepe ‘Defeel Pail Scie, Sue Univer of New York Sey Beak. —PINot Nec Taeve and" Now Necnarly Usssmoe Conroe, ‘gata nd Hong fry Ras Pocton af Gupte and Groop Det ibn Hal" Paper perued for Snr atte Cefn on Pryde ean Lol Proce, Bele Sete Reward Gay Je Bet = Denarey re Oar Swe lope 9 he Cano Jory Thor ‘en Unpblbed mans Dep of Poa Scien Se Une of ew Yor a Sy Brook 175. ronnie Le Foie Oni Real, Pri, 1971 ep 38~ Hecmin, V. and Mitel Taylor, "Pary.Spem and Govramen Sai Mar Po Ses Ren. Val. 68 (99), pp Bo Nini Malin and Pe. Ordock, "The lego College: A Spatial ‘Reais Pelitd Metodloy, Vay Numb 3 (Sm 1970p Po Hang Clarence G. and Georg He fe, Psprdana eptionsion, ‘New York Mocrlln, 193, Repiated New Yak Mac, 199 weBerd Grofnan en Ml So te ay ii Peto Hi “a BF aie : ware SeeCrte and Pay Ving, An Ani of an te oem a Pla Geary (97 Pe eer tpg a one ating a Pa “ia Bens Ren Val C6 fA LATE BV Sy eal Sem hE "Sad fe nd aber ape Te Ren of nr ye Eaton Sym Ween ial chine YL 6 Gay 5 mn Ie tae Sere ann et The Polite of Bla Coleg Re iBcNe Hem eey es, “ ent tal ar Heat “Te Ths iy of Mana SS hac Exeeon for Herel Sytem Br Poe Pee WaToeaker LEZ Moye Scie One Ya tendo: Ua Ca Ao “te BN ga ava om Bc Parl Roe Ss) Le Da ad Hoel Ra Gm and Drone New Yrs Wy, lle Nas Re, "Propo the Orde of Voting” anplied mane Hct, Dept of Poliieal Scince, University of Maryland, Baltimore Couwry, iano " EO hear, wie Pome in Wed Vain Sens Tea “Root NOTA eg oF Skis Reva Eto Eoin Neh Utne tan fe Woe Seen 7 ery nie ergs» Fin of hin Re sits in pms Quang Warn Wa weet ree See Satay a Sie Contin for Sle “Majority Rule" Econometrica, Vol, 20 (1952) Ee Compl Indegedencr of the Candis for Sngle Ma ly ben! etal (95) ieee Sant an Raate Gernot todo, 86 pra ple Babe er ree ey Cat Reng, Mam: Addn Wee, 12 Nee ted Chee Yo ee thea a ecg en bie of ate ie cao, Oey 972 ae iene cre te ef Voin nd Sol Cho, Now Yo “amin Ute He : Nam eee RED epprinmet nb 170 Ble, Urey ater eee ‘ee Anion oft Cats tat he Co a, Bicol Syne” Conadion Js) Pela See, Vl. C68). an Doogie, Vitor Hay sd Jo Locomre, "Thre of Repression 1 Peele of Excooat An hose Now on, East Sywuna Comper Pla! Sade, Wok 3 Gaus 1970, 9.479488. ae, Dowgs We, The Pall Comeaene of, Electoral Law. New Haven: “Zak Unrest Prost Eon 1967, 2nd Eig 197. ea Tin ee lsat int Noxon of Paver” Americon Poli ‘line Renu, Val 88 (980 pp. 31-38. 350 A Review of Macro Election Sytem ky, Willm nd Lld shpley, “We Ving A Masai Ane fo funnemawal Jenn sad Chops Fran Mae Nw Yo (dC? ig A; 37 Blin md corso: read Spink 185, ‘Si tm no Pa at = it Abend of Reemave Deny Cambie, Bowe ad ewe eam Be Ee elo Ape the fap Conrion on El Sy Ud glo, Reo. ‘CA 5163/1910, Tenimoay Cé $352/1910, esp. p 8. a icine fA Compute Annan Sch Chie Fncon” Unpbiel 7, bieraton Uae of Rete, Bs hey ly "Vinton he Se Pec” Anrian aa ‘iat tr si Sy eee Sym toh nrtinEnolpdia "ft Social Scenes New Yorks Cvwe Caller, Macnsn ake ‘iden, om, "Copan a Pla Te Dita ats of Aue Te vets NCR, Samora aaa Vr ee oven Hovard "Gane Thcoreie Models of Blc-Voting Under Proporins! ‘ena Rely Sphinn apn Po kr Hae Pe ESSE Vek Sumer ope tse poor fl Nevo Ge Thy. hen Arbor: Uv of Mi ig lin ad Bee Onl, Poitine Ped Thy. Eero Settle “Te Sing Rao ad Gate They Ancien Political Science Review, Vol. 6 (1972) “ “ Sica Gira el Orpen ad Fal ain. Pe ‘Sartor, Giovanni, "Spatal Models of Pasty Compan”. Paper deli TAC ECRE Wor on he mat py pe Teel seyret Jeb od tan Mutae J "Gene Yh acl ioe Veo Tt dete ea ee RW 36 Bat see i te Nl man (See der Wal seein, Ged Cll of it Foe Din he il infra Sraranian NS Vn ff Hen ‘Studien, July 1968 ‘ Sen'AR Casie Chie ad Seid Wel Son Fi: Hollen Dey shel 55 Vale Nn Gaeta. al and AW Tae ELE anton he Try of Cons Vk Pas Mt Js Pes 40n Universi¢y Press, 1953, p, 307—317. aa split Sat Mai Sah 2 aa ring he iin es i Come Syten” Ane el Sm Re {Sepeembue 1934), pp. 787792. te stipe eh “Thor of Calacne Ci in C. Co eal (En) Tl me mal a saan Ba sseound Grolman ‘Shing, Alan M. Jeu°A Nowe on Voter Reparation and Tarot in ert: 180— Pay Ve 33 (owner 197) pp. 1201. "Seat and Vor io Ply Eto when More Than o> Parst Con Delvacd tthe Anal Meg of te Plc Coie So ‘ys Mah 173 ‘iapepra Ren, "The Sie of Nainal Asm” Soca Since Resac, Var tira) “Tage, Ren “Seu and Votes A Generalization ofthe Gate Law of Ble ‘on Sot Scece Resear, Vol 2 (Supe 1979), p27 “ig dae “raphe Apo he Thay of Sx Chie Tali Che, Vl ring 168) pp. 3817 ‘al Hy "The ose for Poll Earp)” Sere Pll Sine Revie, i 96 the Ce Law Revie Jaf Amr Stat As: Vl 65 (1970) 123 ‘Whos "The Reap Beton Sn ad own Toe Bay See “tin Pol St Review, Val? (99) post walovty, Aurea by “A Matodlogn! Cg of Deere’ Pllc! Parti Towra of Pair Va (ay 159), pp SEW Young HP he, Malan ef te Bors ale |. Economic Theory, Vals sr, In dem wind Artal werden Abies ther mathmatishe Walon Moltke ed west Por de hale terete gms te Watlyuomen oli der Aner wet Inn ond ie grape ng er {Er der der masimlen Versereg’ de Sve or shane” wd det (eacinomiminimim ave carve). Die werden bent, ume emai Nice der Ereise und mide Venerugen ttc yriedene Wale stems (Code Sie sete qet Mabry Mander Repel St {ewe Syren ud mediflerem Se tague Sytem hurbrn, tae ete ond ‘ehdraaer Sama) 0 Shepton Grote Aufchuomie wid dom Bee “hers vision Sass ad Stienen id vendindnen Wakiyamen pew ‘pet bo imtsondere dr sopnanten yale ls” evinen Siz end Stim fr Shion mit set aren tnd satader Mkt in em Wabi Eb werdon Madleihgewise wd ‘sesteicheOberzongen Tir reve ond Tamcteende Simms ‘ngechnen und wedi selen Bie ‘an senainen Wables ed due HlareSprem dk. Ze der Une Stcng die Eerang der Betrgy den ture formule ond mathemati Mbit Sr Lang der dee Lieu See vereonde Reiranpcee tad Pen afgevorenn sein alten” Fagen lies habe, asschaftliches Jahrbuch fir Politik beragegsben vo8 Ruootr Wnosraaves in Verbindang mit Maxnn nus, Mx Kasse, Manso Ramen Lares, awnt K, Soncuce, Uve Somme uno Kans Senwant Band 4 Ginter Olzog Verlag Minchen — Wien Sozialwissen-