Three Princesses

Hypatia, Inc.
The Three Princesses

Author(s): Beatrice H. Zedler
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 4, No. 1, The History of Women in Philosophy (Spring, 1989), pp. 28-
63
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The Three Princesses
BEATRICE H. ZEDLER
This article introduces three princesses: Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia

1680); her sister, Princess Sophie who became the Electress of Hanover
1714); and Sophie's daughter, Sophie Charlotte, who became the first Q
Prussia (1668-1705). After summarizing their common family background
ticle presents, for each in turn, her biography and a discussion of her relatio
losophy. In each case their philosophical involvement stems from their frien
with the leading philosophers of their day; Princess Elizabeth was a friend
cartes while the Electress Sophie and Sophie Charlotte were friends of Leib
article concludes that anyone who has made the acquaintance of the three pr
and has studied their interaction with their philosopher-friends will always s
as part of the history of modern philosophy.
Histories of modem philosophy devote whole chapters to Descarte

Leibniz, but they seldom include any major discussion of the women w
fluenced, and were influenced by, these men. This article introduces t
those women who shared a common bond by being members of the sam
ily and by having a serious interest in the philosophers of their time
sents the story of three princesses: Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (
1680); her sister, Princess Sophie, who became Electress of Hanover
1714); and Sophie's daughter, Sophie Charlotte, who became the first
of Prussia (1668-1705). Princess Elizabeth was a friend of Descart
Electress Sophie and her daughter, Sophie Charlotte, were friends of L
To understand both the personal and philosophical interests of
women, we must first look at their family background.
FAMILY BACKGROUND
Elizabeth and Sophie were daughters of the Elector Palatine and K

Bohemia, Frederick V, and Elizabeth Stuart, daughter of King James I
land. After living in Frederick's family castle at Heidelberg during the f
years of their marriage, Frederick and Elizabeth moved in 1619 to P
when Frederick, as a leading Protestant prince, accepted an invitation
come king of Bohemia. A prophecy that Frederick would be "but a
King and go with the melting snows" proved to be true (Chapman 1
98). 1 In November 1620, at the battle of White Mountain near Prag
Hypatia vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1989) ? by Beatrice H. Zedler
Beatrice H. Zedler 29
forces were defeated by the army of Ferdinand II, the-Austrian who was the
Holy Roman Emperor. And even worse than Frederick's loss of the throne of
Bohemia was the loss of the Palatinate, his own land, which was overrun by
Spanish troops. After their own capital of Heidelberg was taken, Frederick
and Elizabeth sought refuge first in Germany and then in Holland. Prince
Maurice and later Prince Frederick-Henry, head of the family of Orange-Nas-
sau, provided them with a large house in The Hague and a country house at
Rhenen. In the hope of improving his family's fortunes, Frederick later joined
King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden when he was fighting in Germany, but
the Swedish king was killed in the battle of Lutzen on November 16, 1632,
and less than two weeks later, Frederick himself died of an illness at Mainz.
Elizabeth, "the winter queen," stayed on at The Hague, supported for the
next seventeen years by pensions from the English and Dutch governments,
but always in debt. In May of 1661, she left The Hague for England where her
nephew, King Charles II, eventually granted her a pension. She died in Feb-
ruary of 1662 and was buried in Westminster Abbey.
She and Frederick had thirteen children. In addition to two children who
died in infancy and a boy who died at the age of nine, there were: Frederick
Henry, who drowned in 1629; Charles Louis, the Elector Palatine, who re-
covered part of his father's lands after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648;
Rupert and Maurice, who fought for the cause of their uncle, Charles I; Ed-
ward, who married Anne of Gonzaga; Philip, who fled from Holland after at-
tacking a Frenchman who had made advances to his mother; Louise, a tal-
ented painter, who became a Catholic abbess at the Abbey of Maubuisson;
Henrietta Marie, who married a Hungarian prince, but died about three
months after her wedding; Elizabeth, who was the oldest of the girls; and So-
phie, who was the youngest of the girls.
As we look more closely first at Elizabeth and then at Sophie, we shall see
how the fortunes and misfortunes of their family affected their lives and their
thought.
I. PRINCESS ELIZABETH
A. BIOGRAPHY
Elizabeth was the third child of Frederick and Elizabeth. She was born at
Heidelberg on December 26, 1618, the year before her father became king o
Bohemia. Before her second birthday he had lost the throne and his Palatin
lands and possessions, and the family was dependent on others for support.
In her early years she lived in Silesia with her grandmother and her father's
sister, Elizabeth-Charlotte, who was married to the Elector of Brandenburg
George-William. At about the age of nine she rejoined her parents in Hol-
land, and with the other children she was tutored at the Prinsenhof in Leide
30 Hypatia
in court etiquette, Scripture, mathematics, history, the sciences, jurispru-

dence, French, English, German, Dutch, Latin, and Greek. Elizabeth was
nicknamed "La Grecque" for her impressive knowledge of classical languages
(Kroll 1973, 28-29). Her sister Sophie was to say of Elizabeth that she knew
every language and science (Gorst-Williams 1977, 124).
In 1642, Elizabeth read in Latin the Meditations on First Philosophy by Rene
Descartes. When a friend of her family, Alphonse de Pollot (or Palotti), in-
formed Descartes of this fact, the philosopher, who was then living in Hol-
land, said that he had already heard of the marvels of the excellent mind of
the princess of Bohemia and that he had a higher opinion of her judgment
than he had of that of the doctors who take as the rule of truth the opinions
of Aristotle rather than the evidence of reason. He expressed a desire to meet
her. They probably first met at her mother's court. When on another trip to
The Hague he was unable to see her, Elizabeth wrote on May 6, 1643, to ex-
press her regret and to raise a philosophical question (Petit 1969, 57-58).
This was the beginning of a correspondence that would last until the death of
Descartes in 1650. Though they met many times, more often they wrote to
each other. In her letters Elizabeth tells him about her family problems,
health problems, and philosophical problems, and he did his best to help her.
Though Elizabeth was more interested in the intellectual life than in what
seemed to her to be the empty diversions of court life, as a princess she had
duties that she could not avoid. She complains in one letter to Descartes that
she was interrupted more than seven times by inconvenient visits (Sep. 30,
1645, Adam and Milhaud 1956, 6: 311). 2 On other occasions her answer to
him had to be postponed while she cared for sick members of her family
(Aug. 16, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 284; Feb. 21, 1647, Adam 1960, 7: 268).
There were the inevitable efforts on the part of her family to find her a hus-
band. The Catholic king of Poland, Wladislav V, had wanted to marry her,
but she was unwilling to become a Catholic and his people would not accept
a Protestant queen. As a Protestant and a poor Palatine princess without a
country of her own, her prospects for a suitable marriage were not good, and
by the age of eighteen she had given up all thought of marrying. This did not
distress her since she was more interested in the life of study than in marriage.
The troubles of her family did distress her. Her oldest brother had drowned
when she was eleven; her father had died when she was thirteen. Her brother
Edward had shocked the family in 1645 by renouncing his Protestant faith to
become a Catholic and marry Anne of Gonzaga. In her letter of November
30, 1645 (Adam 1956, 6: 384-385) Elizabeth is so upset that she momentarily
forgets that Descartes is himself Catholic. In his reply, he tries to give her a
more objective view by pointing out that some might find her brother's ac-
tion a good step and that God uses different means to draw souls to himself
(Jan. 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 1-2).
Another family problem led to Elizabeth's departure from The Hague. In

1646, her brother Philip in broad daylight and in a public marketplace had
stabbed to death a Monsieur L'Espinay, who had been boasting about flirting
with Philip's mother, the queen, and his sister, Louise. Philip had to flee the
country at once. He joined the Spanish army and was killed in battle four
years later. Elizabeth, while not condoning murder, was sympathetic to
Philip's intention of upholding the family honor, but her mother was dis-
pleased by Elizabeth's defense of Philip and decided that it would be best for
Elizabeth to leave The Hague for at least several months and go to Germany
to stay at the home of her aunt, the wife of the Elector of Brandenburg. Des-
cartes had visited Elizabeth in Holland after the latest family misfortune, and
it was arranged that while she was in Germany her sister, Sophie, then six-
teen, would forward his letters to Elizabeth and Elizabeth's letters to him.
Some of these letters concerned another family misfortune: the beheading
of King Charles I, who was Elizabeth's uncle. Descartes tried to console her
by saying (in a letter of February 22, 1649, Adam 1963, 8: 142-143) that her
uncle's suffering was short, and that death from a long, lingering illness might
be worse than death from the swift blow of an axe.
Despite her family troubles she was happy in Berlin and felt she was among
loving relatives. She tutored her young cousin, Hedwig. She tried to interest
the Duke of Brunswick and some German professors in Descartes' works. She
also tried to arrange to visit Sweden. At that time Queen Christina's mother,
Marie-Eleanore of Brandenburg, was in Germany, and Elizabeth hoped to ac-
company her to Sweden to ask the queen to support her brother's claim to the
Palatinate lands. Queen Christina chose not to invite Elizabeth to come, but
she did invite Descartes.
One of the reasons why Descartes accepted the queen's invitation to come
to what he called "the land of bears between rocks and ice" was to see
whether he could obtain some help for Elizabeth's family (Mar. 31, 1649,
Adam 1963, 8: 196-197; Foucher de Careil 1909, 104).3 Since he seldom
saw the queen during the few months in Sweden before his untimely death in
February of 1650, he was not able to accomplish that goal. But after the
Peace of Westphalia, he did try to help Elizabeth view her family's situation
realistically. Elizabeth was unhappy because her oldest living brother,
Charles Louis, was not given back all of his country, but Descartes tells her to
be glad that under the circumstances even some of the Palatinate was re-
turned. He adds that even the smallest part of the Palatinate is worth more
than all the empire of the Tartars or Muscovites (Feb. 22, 1649, Adam 1963,
8: 144-145).
In the summer of 1651 Elizabeth visited her brother Charles Louis, but
stayed with his first wife, Charlotte, at Cassel rather than at Heidelberg
where Charles Louis lived with his second wife, Louise von Degenfeld. This
was the first time that some of her relatives had seen Elizabeth since the death
32 Hypatia
of her friend, Descartes. Sophie reports that their brother Edward thought
Elizabeth had lost her liveliness of spirit (Petit 1969, 234).
Some years later, in 1667, Elizabeth entered a Protestant convent at
Herford in Westphalia. She served first as coadjutrix, assisting the abbess
with administration; then as abbess, with the title, "Princess and Prelatess of
the Holy Roman Empire." She not only ruled over a large household of noble
ladies but had jurisdiction over a territory of some seven thousand people and
had to transact business concerning farms, vineyards, mills, and factories
(Godfrey 1909, 301-302). She also had to supervise good works among the
poor and serve as a judge, hearing and determining cases that the people of
her principality brought before her. Though she had been a princess without
a country for most of her life, she now, as a friend said, "had a small territory
which she governed so well that she showed herself fit for a greater" (Penn,
quoted in Godfrey 1909, 331).
Among her good deeds as abbess was her offer of refuge to some whose reli-
gious beliefs were quite different from the Calvinism she had learned as a
child. Anne Marie Schurmann, the learned "Dutch Minerva" whom Eliza-
beth had known in Holland, had become a follower of Jean de LaBadie, a re-
ligious reformer who first left the Catholic Church for the reformed religion
and then left the reformed religion to lead a new reform which stressed an in-
terior regeneration. When he and his followers were banished from Amster-
dam, Elizabeth, in 1670, invited Anne Marie and the Labadist community to
come to Herford. This was a generous gesture considering that LaBadie was
an enemy of Cartesian philosophy and Mademoiselle Schurmann herself not
only had disliked Descartes but, in 1644 had written to Elizabeth to war her
against this "new philosophy" (Foucher 1862, 11; Foucher 1909, 150-153).4
Despite Elizabeth's assurances that the Labadists said they subscribed to the
Institutes of Calvin and the Heidelberg Catechism, the people of Herford dis-
liked them. After two years, the Labadists left and settled in Altona.
Later she welcomed into her abbey William Penn, Robert Barclay, and
other Quakers. After Penn's visits in 1676 and 1677, they exchanged some
letters with a religious content. At this stage in her life she had a deepened
interest in religious experience.
Her last illness was long and painful. Her brother Charles Louis sent his
physician, but nothing helped her. Her sister Sophie, who came to visit her,
described her in this way: "My sister was in bed, all her body, legs, arms, and
throat like a skeleton, only her stomach frightfully swollen with dropsy"
(Quoted in Godfrey 1909, 344). Yet Elizabeth calmly ordered her coffin,
made her will, and wrote a letter to her sister Louise, Abbess at Maubuisson,
in which she said:
I am still living, my dear sister, but it is to prepare myself for

death. .... Adieu, my dear sister, I hope that we shall see
each other again in the next world, and that God will prepare
us so well in this transitory life that we shall eternally see his
face in the future. (Oct. 31, 1679, in Foucher 1879 and 1909,
213-214; Neel 1946, 132-133)
She died on February 8, 1680.
B. ELIZABETH AMD PHILOSOPHY
As we turn our attention to Elizabeth's relation to philosophy we shall be

relying mainly on her correspondence with Descartes. This correspondence
began when she was 24 and he was 47 and continued for seven years, until
Descartes' death in February of 1650. Chanut, Descartes' friend, entrusted
Descartes' papers to Clerselier for publication, but could not obtain Eliza-
beth's permission to have her letters published with those of Descartes. Her
side of the correspondence remained unpublished until more than two hund-
red years later when, in 1879, Foucher de Careil edited and published copies
of her letters which had been discovered in the library of a chateau
(Rosendal) near Amheim, Holland. From her 26 extant letters to Descartes
and his 33 letters to her we shall consider the main philosophical questions
that they discussed, that is: the soul-body problem and the sovereign good
and how to attain it.
In the first letter she wrote to him (May 6, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 287-288)
she raises the crucial question of how the soul which in his context is only a
thinking substance, can determine the body to do voluntary actions. For one
thing to move another implies contact and extension. How then, she won-
dered, can a non-extended immaterial soul move the body?
In reply to her request for a more particular definition of soul than the one
he has given, Descartes re-states his notion of body as extended and of soul
with its attribute of thought and refers to an argument given in an earlier
work (May 21, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 289-291). But this did not answer her
question, and she says that it would be easier for her to allow matter and ex-
tension to soul than to concede to an immaterial being the capacity of mov-
ing and being moved by a body (June 10, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 316).
Descartes (June 28, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 322-323) then distinguishes
three simple notions: soul, which can be conceived only through pure under-
standing; body, res extensa, which can be known by pure understanding aided
by imagination; and the union of soul and body, which is known only ob-
scurely by understanding, but very clearly by the senses. To those who do not
philosophize but rely on sense experience, the union of soul and body is clear.
Descartes tells the princess, perhaps with some exaggeration, that he himself
has always spent just a few hours a year on thoughts that occupy only the un-
derstanding and that he has devoted the rest of his time to relaxation of the
34 Hypatia
senses and repose of the mind (Adam 1951, 5: 323-324). This was his way of
advising Elizabeth to spend less time meditating on the abstract problem of
how soul and body can be really distinct and yet at the same time substan-
tially united. He seems to concede that in his context this problem cannot be
solved on a metaphysical plane when he says: "It does not seem to me that
the human mind is capable of conceiving very distinctly, and at the same
time, both the distinction between the soul and body, and also their union;
because to do so it is necessary to conceive them as just one thing, and at the
same time to conceive them as two, which is self-contradictory" (June 28,
1643, Adam 1951, 5: 324). Since he can't really answer the question she had
asked, he advises her instead to rely on "something that each one always ex-
periences within himself without philosophizing" (Adam 1951, 5: 324), that
is, the union of soul and body. He recommends that in this matter she trust
the experience of her senses.
In her answer of July 1, 1643, (Adam 1956, 6: 1) Elizabeth acknowledges
that she, too, finds that the senses show her that the soul moves the body,
but neither they nor the understanding show just how the soul does this. She
wonders whether there might not be some properties of the soul that are un-
known to us that could perhaps upset what Descartes' metaphysical medita-
tions have persuaded her with good reasons concerning the non-extension of
the soul. She added: "I would despair of finding certitude in the things of the
world, if you did not give it to me, you who alone have prevented me from
being a sceptic, to which my first reasoning inclined me" (Adam 1956, 6:2).
The next letter of Descartes to Elizabeth, dated November 1643, makes no
mention of her question and treats of mathematics (Adam 1956, 6: 70-73).
Perhaps some letters are lost, but he later dealt with some of her questions in
the Treatise on the Passions of the Soul, which he wrote for her, showed her in
manuscript form in 1646, and published in 1649. This was the treatise in
which he said that the body moves the soul and the soul moves the body
through the intermediary of the pineal gland which is found in the middle of
the brain. Through this gland the soul "exercises its functions more particu-
larly than in the other parts of the body" (Haldane and Ross tr. 1955, 1: 345-
350). He suggested (Collins 1954, 188) that when an object impinges upon a
sense organ, it arouses an impulse that is carried by the nerves to the animal
spirits, the minute parts of the blood, thus affecting the cavity in which the
pineal gland is situated. Since different objects agitate the pineal gland in dif-
ferent ways, the mind will have different perceptions. And when the soul
wills something, its command is communicated to the animal spirits and from
them to nerves and muscles.
As one writer has appropriately remarked, "Descartes shifted the problem
of the human composite from the metaphysical to the physical plane" (Col-
lins 1954, 189). Though the princess did not comment explicitly on the
pineal gland, she did say, after seeing the manuscript of the Treatise on the
Passions: "I do not see how one can know the different movements of the
blood that cause the five primitive passions" (April 25, 1646, Adam 1960, 7:
55), and she probably also found it hard to see how providing a physical point
of contact between body and soul answered her original question on how the
immaterial thinking substance could touch or move the body. 5
But though Descartes did not really explain man's unity, he asserted that
man is "a single whole," and that through feelings, images and passions he
knows he has a body to which he is closely united (Meditations 1941, 6.94).
Moreover, Descartes' letters to Elizabeth assume that unity as an underlying
premise. This is particularly evident in the letters in which he is giving her
some medical advice.
When Elizabeth tells him about some stomach trouble, he answers that
though he approves of a special diet and exercise, he thinks the best remedies
are "those of the soul, which doubtless has great force over the body, as
shown by the large changes that anger, fear, and the other passions excite in
it" (July 1647, Blom 1978, 226). He does not mean that the soul can directly
will the body to be well, but rather that it can help by thinking more benefi-
cial thoughts. An especially suitable thought for conserving health is the
strong persuasion and firm belief that the structure of our body is so good that
once one is healthy one cannot easily fall sick.
In a previous letter (May 18, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 225) he had suggested
that the cause of Elizabeth's fever and cough might be sadness. She admits
that Descartes from a distance gave a better diagnosis than her doctors (May
24, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 230). For another illness for which the doctors had
recommended the waters of the Spa, he advised her to also deliver her mind
entirely from all sorts of sad thoughts, and even from all serious meditations
regarding the sciences. He suggested that she look at the greenness of a
woods, the colors of a flower, the flight of a bird. "To do so," he said, "is not
to waste time but to employ it well; for in the meantime one can satisfy one-
self by the hope that by this means one will recover perfect health, which is
the foundation of all the other goods one can have in this life" (May or June
1645, Adam 1956, 6: 238). He is suggesting to her a remedy that he himself
had found helpful. He said that he had inherited a dry cough from his
mother, who died of lung disease a few days after his birth. All the medical
doctors who saw him when he was young condemned him to an early death.
He adds:
But I believe the inclination I have always had to regard what-

ever happened from the point of view that could render it
more agreeable, and to arrange it so that my principal content-
ment depended on me alone, explains why this indisposition,
which was natural to me, has little by little entirely passed.
(May or June 1645, Adam 6: 239)
If cheerful, optimistic thoughts can have a beneficial effect on one's

health, soul and body must be intimately united. In his attempts to help Eliz-
36 Hypatia
abeth with her health problems Descartes repeatedly accepts as a fact of expe-
rience what he cannot explain metaphysically. The rationalist who had mis-
trusted experience and relied on clear and distinct ideas, now has modified
his p6sition or at least shifted his emphasis in his letters to the princess.
Though Elizabeth's first questions were occasioned by theoretical problems
that arose from his writings, many subsequent questions came from the prac-
tical problem of coping with troubles in her life. She had once called Des-
cartes the best doctor for her soul (May 6, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 288) and had
told him later not only that his letters always served her "as an antidote
against melancholy" but that he was the person to whose counsel she could
commit the conduct of her life (June 22, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 248). He re-
plied that he wished to see her happy and content and that he would discuss
with her "the means concerning which philosophy instructs us for acquiring
that sovereign happiness, which common souls await in vain from fortune,
but which we shall be able to have only from ourselves" (July 21, 1645,
Adam 1956, 6: 267-268). The discussions in their letters on "the sovereign
good" were therefore not motivated by the love of abstract theorizing but by
Elizabeth's personal need to find happiness.
Descartes suggests they begin by examining what the ancients, like
Seneca, have written about happiness and then add what is needed to make
that teaching their own. He gives a chapter by chapter account of what
Seneca actually treats in the De vita beata (July 21, 1645, Adam 1956, 6:
268). But of greater interest for understanding Descartes' and Elizabeth's
views is Descartes' account of how the blessed life ought to have been treated
by a philosopher like Seneca "who, not having been illuminated by faith, had
only natural reason as a guide" (Aug. 4, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 279). Des-
cartes had not written the systematic treatise on ethics that he intended as
the crown of his philosophy, but here in his effort to help Elizabeth he pre-
sents a sketch of a natural ethics that she can use for the conduct of her life.
After acknowledging that Seneca begins well when he says that "everyone
wants to live blessedly," Descartes explains that blessedness consists in a per-
fect contentment of the mind and in interior satisfaction. The things that
bring about this contentment of the mind are of two kinds: those that depend
on us, like virtue and wisdom, and those that do not depend on us (at least
not entirely), like honors, riches, and health. Descartes will consider only
the kind of contentment that is within our power (Aug. 4, 1645, Adam
1956, 6: 279-280).
To achieve this contentment one should, he tells Elizabeth, observe the
three rules that he had given in his Discourse on Method. These rules stress
"the right use of reason" (Adam 1956, 6: 282).
The first (in which Descartes substitutes knowledge for the provisional
maxim of the Discourse) is that one should always try to make the best possi-
ble use of one's mind to know what one ought or ought not to do in all the oc-
currences of life.
The second is that one should have a firm and constant resolution to carry
out all that reason counsels one to do, without letting one's passions or appe-
tites turn one aside from this, and it is in this firmness of resolution that Des-
cartes thinks virtue consists.
The third is that while so conducting oneself as much as one can according
to reason, one should consider that all the goods that one does not possess are
entirely outside one's power, and in this way one accustoms oneself to not de-
sire them (Aug. 4, 1645, Adams 1956, 6: 280-281).
According to Descartes, knowing the good and willing to adhere to it are
the keys to achieving the happiness that lies within our power. He said:
.. to have a contentment that is solid, it is necessary to fol-

low virtue, that is to say, to have a will that is firm and con-
stant in carrying out all the things we judge to be the best, em-
ploying the entire force of our understanding to judge them
well. (Aug. 18, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 289)
Elizabeth asks Descartes to instruct her "about the means of strengthening

the understanding so that it will judge what is best in all the actions of life"
(Aug. 18, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 291).
Descartes answers that there are "two things required for anyone always to
be disposed to judge well: knowledge of the truth and the habit of remember-
ing and acquiescing in this knowledge every time the occasion requires it"
(Sep. 15, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 300). Since, unlike God, we cannot know
everything, Descartes lists the truths that he regards as most important for a
theory of morality: the existence of an infinitely perfect God of immense
power and infallible decrees; the immortality of the human soul; the vast ex-
tent of the universe; and the recognition that as part of a family, state, and
society, each of us should, though with discretion, prefer the interests of the
whole to the interests of his own person (Adam 1956, 6: 300-303).
In reply Elizabeth says she would like Descartes to explain the usefulness of
knowing the truths he has proposed. She has problems with each of them.
Descartes' reflections on the fact that we are part of a whole raises ques-
tions for her about how we can have enough accurate and impartial knowl-
edge to determine when it is better to prefer the public good to our private
good (Sep. 30, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 310). Descartes admits that it is difficult
to measure exactly how far reason orders us to interest ourselves in the public
good, but says we should satisfy our conscience (Oct. 6, 1645, Adam 1956, 6:
319-320).
Descartes' view of the vast extent of the universe seems to Elizabeth to be
incompatible with the doctrine of a particular providence, which is the foun-
dation of theology (Adam 1956, 6: 310). Descartes responds that God's
38 Hypatia
power is not like a finite power which can be exhausted. Since God's power is
infinite, it extends not only to great effects but to all the particular actions of
men (Adam 1956, 6: 319).
As for the immortality of the soul, that doctrine, Elizabeth thinks, could
make us seek death to escape the illnesses and passions of the body. She is
astonished that those who say they accept this doctrine would prefer a painful
life to an advantageous death (Adam 1956, 6: 309-310). Descartes replies
that natural reason can give probable arguments for immortality and happi-
ness in an afterlife, but not any assurance (Adams 1956, 6: 318-319). He
adds that the same natural reason teaches us that we have more goods than
evils in this life (though this is something that Elizabeth, with all her troub-
les, was not always convinced of). He advises us not to leave the certain for
the uncertain. Though we should not fear death, we ought never to seek it
(Nov. 3, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 332).
The truth regarding the existence of God and his attributes raised the most
difficulty for Elizabeth. Descartes seemed to be saying: If I know there is a
God of immense power and infallible decrees, I can accept all that happens to
me since it is expressly sent by God. Elizabeth concedes that this consoles us
for evils caused by nature, but she thinks it does not console us for evils im-
posed by men who seem to have free wills, since only faith could persuade us
that God regulates wills (Sep. 30, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 309).
While granting the role of faith, Descartes tries to show Elizabeth from
natural philosophy alone that God's omnipotence is compatible with man's
free choice. He sees God as "the first and immutable cause" of all the effects
that depend on men's free choice as well as the cause of the effects that do not
depend on it. It would be contradictory to say that God created a being that
does not depend on him (Oct. 6, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 318; Nov. 3, 1645,
Adam 1956, 6: 331). Neither the inclinations of our will nor the least
thought that enters our mind would be there unless God willed it, but Des-
cartes thinks that our dependence on God does not deprive us of our willing.
Though Elizabeth is convinced that we have free will "since we feel we
have it" (Oct. 28, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 323), it seems contradictory to her
to believe that free choice is dependent upon God. She thinks it is impossible
for the will to be at the same time free and also attached to the decrees of
providence (Nov. 30, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 335). Descartes' best efforts did
not really resolve her problems on this topic. Descartes himself had already
said in the Principles of Philosophy that this was one of the "great difficulties,"
but he maintained that it is evident that we possess free will and also certain
that God has fore-ordained all things. We know each of these truths sepa-
rately. Even if our limited understanding cannot reconcile them, he thought
we still ought to affirm what we do not comprehend (Principles 1941, 149-
151).
Though Elizabeth had problems with each of the four "truths" that Des-
cartes regarded as useful for morality, she agreed with his view of the place of
the passions in the moral life. Descartes regarded the topic of the passions of
the soul as a particular question of moral theory (June 15, 1646, Adam 1960,
7: 83), since he thought one must know the passions to obtain the sovereign
good he described (Nov. 20, 1647, Adam 1960, 7: 366). Elizabeth had asked
him to define the passions (Sep. 13, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 298), to explain
how they are formed and how they affect reasoning (Oct. 28, 1645, Adam
1956, 6: 323).
He defined the passions as "all the thoughts excited in the soul without the
concurrence of the will" (Oct. 6, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 316), but noted that
"ordinarily one restricts the name to thoughts caused by some particular agi-
tation of the spirits."6 To answer Elizabeth's questions more fully he wrote
the Treatise on the Passions of the Soul, which, as we have seen, acknowledges
the influence of soul on body and of body on soul that Elizabeth had accepted
as a fact of experience. Though Elizabeth thought the physiological explana-
tions in the treatise could be clearer, she praised "the order, definition and
distinctions" Descartes gave to the passions and "all of the moral part of the
treatise." These parts, she said, "surpass everything that has ever been said on
the subject" (April 25, 1646, Adam 1960 7: 55).
In his letters, Descartes had maintained that while one ought not to scorn
the passions, they should be subject to reason (Sep. 1, 1645, Adam 1956, 6:
296). 7 He reiterates this theme in the moral part of the Treatise on the Pas-
sions, where he says that even those with the feeblest souls can acquire an ab-
solute dominion over their passions, and that the principal use of prudence or
self-control is that it teaches us to be masters of our passions. Since control of
the passions is required to judge the best course of action and effectively will
to follow that judgment, it is an indispensable means to the sovereign good
(Haldane and Ross tr. 1955, 1: 356, 427).
Elizabeth then shifts the discussion from the topic of personal ethics to the
ethics of civil society, saying: "Since you have already said what the princi-
ples are as regards private life, I would be satisfied to know also your maxims
regarding civil life" (Apr. 25, 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 56-57). She adds,
however, that so far she has found herself doing better by using experience
rather than reason in such matters.
Descartes answers by saying that it would be impertinent of him to write
the maxims one ought to observe in civil life since he leads so retired a life,
remote from the management of affairs. He agrees with Elizabeth that it is
better to regulate oneself in such matters by experience rather than by reason
(May 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 61-62). But he does grant her request to discuss
The Prince by Machiavelli. Without going into the details of the discussion of
The Prince, we might note that Elizabeth agrees with Machiavelli that a pri-
vate person is in a good position to teach princes how they should govern,
40 Hypatia
whereas Descartes thinks that a prince is in a better position to understand

the office of a prince (Sep. 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 167-168; Oct. 10, 1646,
Adam 1960, 7: 189). Elizabeth concludes her comments by saying she hopes
never to be put in the position of following Machiavelli's precepts since vio-
lence and suspicion are things contrary to her nature (Nov. 29, 1646, Adam
1960, 7: 230).
As we look back at the correspondence between Descartes and Elizabeth
we might briefly consider what Elizabeth did for Descartes and what Descartes
did for Elizabeth. We have mentioned some of the doubts and difficulties that
Elizabeth raised, but even when the questions were sharply critical, Descartes
could accept them. He took them seriously because he knew they came from
one who had read and understood and reflected on what he had written. Ad-
dressing Elizabeth, he had said:
... I have never yet met anyone who understood so generally

and so well as yourself all that is contained in my writings. For
there are several, even among men of the highest intellect and
learning, who find them very obscure. (Principles 1941, 128-
129)
Her questions led him to try to clarify and develop what he had left unclear
and incomplete, for example, his position on the relation of soul and body,
and his view of the sovereign good and the theory of the passions. Though he
was later to comment further on these last two topics for Queen Christina,
the work he had done on them for Elizabeth served as the basis for his re-
marks.
In responding to Elizabeth's questions he knew he was not confronting an
adversary who wanted to prove him wrong, but a friend who was frankly tell-
ing him-where she needed help to understand and accept what he said. Her
letters reflected her respect and appreciation of his work. She introduced his
work to others, for example, to the German scholars she met when she lived
in Berlin. She was grateful to him for correcting flaws in her own reasoning
and for shedding more light on the subject of beatitude than anything she had
ever read (June 10, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 314; August 1645, Adam 1956, 6:
290). Her letters always closed with the phrase: "Your very affectionate friend
to serve you."
Descartes, in turn, served Elizabeth. He gave public evidence of his appre-
ciation by dedicating to her his Principles of Philosophy. This dedication, in
the form of a letter addressed to the princess, was not a conventional expres-
sion of flattery to a royal patron, but an honest statement of his judgment. He
says that usually those who are good metaphysicians are not geometricians,
and usually the cultivators of geometry have no ability for the investigations
of First Philosophy, but he adds:
I can say with truth that I have encountered but one mind,
and that is your own, to which both studies are equally easy,
and as a result, I have good reason for esteeming it as incompa-

rable. But what most of all enhances my admiration is that so
accurate and varied an acquaintance with the whole circle of
the sciences is not found in some aged doctor who has spent
many years in contemplation, but in a princess still young, and
whose countenance and years would more fitly represent one
of the Graces than a Muse or the sage Minerva. (Principles
1941, 129)
Descartes signs himself: "Of your most Serene Highness, the most devoted
servant, Descartes."
Though Elizabeth was modest about her learning and sometimes spoke of
her "ignorance" and "stupidity" when she had trouble in understanding
something, it must have been gratifying to her that the eminent Monsieur
Descartes always treated her as a serious thinker and praised her "clear
thoughts" and "firm reasonings" (June 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 251; Nov. 3,
1645, Adam 1956, 6: 330). His intellectual companionship was a welcome
relief from the social duties of her life as a princess. She complains "of the dis-
tractions of those who do not know what to do with themselves" and of being
"constrained . . . to accede to impertinent laws of civility" (Sep. 30, 1645,
Adam 1956, 6: 310), but she says that the truths that Descartes' letters teach
her will always contribute to the contentment of her life (Oct. 10, 1646,
Adam 1960, 7: 187). Descartes was the age that her father would have been if
he had lived. Whether or not he played the role of a "father-figure," he was
the person to whom she confided her health problems, family problems, and
her philosophical problems. What Descartes did for her is perhaps best sum-
marized in this remark in one of her letters:
I have always been in a condition that rendered my life very

useless to persons I love; but I seek to conserve it with very
much more care since I have had the happiness of knowing
you, because you have showed me the means of living more
happily than I did. (Oct. 28, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 325)
If we ask: "What was Elizabeth's own philosophy?" there is no one text to

which we can turn for an answer. She has been called "the first Cartesian"
but as we have seen, this does not mean that she was a passive, unques-
tioning, uncritical disciple of Descartes. She had read and understood his
works, had difficulty with his physical theories, was not satisfied with his an-
swer to the problem of God's foreknowledge and man's free will or to the
problem of how an immaterial soul and extended body could be two sub-
stances and yet act as one. She accepted from experience both the union of
soul and body and man's free will, and she also accepted the existence of a
perfect infinite God and a doctrine of a particular providence. She agreed
42 Hypatia
with Descartes that to achieve the sovereign good one must both know what
is right and have a firm and constant resolution to do what is right. Her stead-
fast adherence to her duties as a princess and later as an abbess suggest that
she lived in accordance with her convictions.
Elizabeth's seven-year correspondence with Descartes was certainly one of
the most important experiences of her life, and it is that for which she is best
remembered. But she lived for thirty more years after the death of Descartes
and during that time she encountered other thinkers and other ideas.
Some scholars have wondered whether Elizabeth abandoned philosophy

for mysticism in her later years. It is true that she offered a refuge for the
Labadists and Quakers. She could sympathize with those who had no perma-
nent home and she respected those who had sincere religious beliefs. She was
interested in hearing of the doctrine of the "inner light." We are told that she
withdrew her favor from Jean de LaBadie and his followers since "they did not
walk according to their pretenses" (Penn 1881, 1: 440).
She preferred the Quakers, welcomed William Penn and his friends to
Herford, and allowed them to talk to her and her community for many hours
each day of their visit (Neel 1946, 131-132; Penn 1981, 440-445, 485-488).
She was deeply moved by some of the things Penn said and invited him to re-
tur for another visit, but neither he nor his Scottish friend Robert Barclay
converted her to Quakerism. Barclay has reproached her for being too occu-
pied with the duties of her calling and urged her to the practice of "quietism,"
but Elizabeth replied:
The silent waiting is no more in my power than flying through

the air since my calling gives me some diversions. I scarce
have one hour of the day to myself; the night is my best time,
in which I endeavor to practise your lessons but cannot brag of
much progress. (Oct. 6, 1676, in Godfrey 1909, 324)
And later she added: "I must not do anything upon persuasion of others, nor
out of my own opinion until I have the light of faith for my conduct" (Quoted
in Godfrey 1909, 325).
Just as her admiration for Descartes had not led her to surrender her own
critical judgment, so her admiration for Penn and the Quakers did not turn
her aside from the course that seemed right to her: fulfilling her duties as ab-
bess. The tone and content of her letters to Penn and Barclay suggests a
greater concentration on religious experience than in her earlier years, but
this does not mean she had rejected philosophy.
During her last few years, she still kept in touch with philosophers. She
wrote to Malebranche by way of her sister Louise, Abbess of Maubuisson, say-
ing she was so pleased with Malebranche's Recherche de la verite that she
would like to know the author. Her enthusiasm diminished when she realized
that Malebranche hoped to convert her to Catholicism. She told him politely
that though she agreed with him in essential things and was obliged to him
for his concern for her soul, she could not hope to live long enough to exam-
ine all the controversies and would continue to hold to what she believed
(Malebranche 1961, 18: 130-133).
This firm response to Malebranche did not, however, prevent her from lik-
ing his next work so much that she provided a copy for Leibniz. Leibniz says,
in a letter to Malebranche:
Through the favor of her highness, the Princess Elizabeth,

who is as famous for her learning as for her birth, I have been
able to see your Christian Conversations. Her judgment on it is
very favorable . . .. (Malebranche 1961, 18: 142-143)8
In a letter to Elizabeth's sister Sophie, Leibniz later refers to Jacob Boehme,

who was "quite esteemed by Madame the Princess Elizabeth during her last
years" (Klopp 1874, 3: 426-427).
From what we know of Elizabeth's years as Abbess of Herford and from the
hints we can glean from Leibniz's statements, it seems reasonable to conclude
that Elizabeth did not abandon the intellectual life. Rather, while retaining
her balanced and critical spirit, in her later years she gave greater attention to
religious philosophy, whether tinged with the inner light doctrine of the
Quakers, the speculative mysticism of Boehme, or the Christian Cartesi-
anism of Malebranche.
The inscription on Elizabeth's tomb correctly describes this "Most Serene
Princess and Abbess of Herford, born of Palatine Electors and Kings of Great
Britain" as unconquered in all fortune, constant, prudent, virtuous, of admi-
rable learning, celebrated beyond the condition of her sex, and friend of
learned men (Godfrey 1909, 350).
II. PRINCESS SOPHIE
A. BIOGRAPHY
Sophie, the youngest sister of Princess Elizabeth, was born on Octob

1630, at The Hague. As the twelfth child of King Frederick and Quee
beth of Bohemia, she says, "I can well believe that my birth caused th
little satisfaction." At the age of three months she was taken to Leiden
the queen had her children brought up by others, "preferring," says
"the sight of her monkeys and dogs to that of her children" (Sophie 1
34). After being taught by her father's governess at Leiden, she retu
her mother's court at The Hague at the age of 9 or 10. Because she h
cheerful disposition, she was able to say, "Our family misfortunes
44 Hypatia
power to depress my spirits, though we ... often had nothing at our court
but pearls and diamonds to eat." But she adds, "The merchants furnished all
that I required, and the care of payment I left to Providence" (Sophie 1879,
43).
As a young woman Sophie moved to Heidelberg to live at the home of her
brother Charles Louis, the Elector Palatine. Though she was fond of her
brother who was almost like a father to her, his quarrels with his wife, Char-
lotte of Hesse-Cassel, and subsequent morganatic marriage to Louise von
Degenfeld made her feel the need of having a household of her own. Among
the proposals of marriage that she received, that of Duke George William of
Brunswick-Luneburg seemed best, but when George William suddenly de-
cided that he did not want to marry at all and suggested that his younger
brother Ernst August marry Sophie instead, she agreed. As part of the ar-
rangement George William promised to increase his younger brother's allow-
ance and never to marry, so as to give Ernst August's children the right to in-
herit the family estates (Sophie 1879, 44-61).9 Taking a very practical,
unsentimental attitude towards the substitution of bridegrooms, Sophie said
to her brother,"I care only for a good establishment, and if I find it with the
younger brother, then I shall have no difficulty in relinquishing the one for
the other" (Sophie 1879, 59).
Wearing a dress of white silver brocade and a crown of the family dia-
monds, Sophie was married to Duke Ernst August at Heidelberg in Septem-
ber of 1658 and later was welcomed to her new home at Hanover with addi-
tional festivities (Sophie 1879, 61-64).
Her husband, Erst August, became the secular bishop of Osnabruck in
1661, Duke of Hanover in 1679, and Elector of Hanover in 1692. Though
Sophie was correspondingly addressed as Madame d'Osnabruck, Duchess of
Hanover, and Electress of Hanover, she is most often referred to by the last
title. She and Ernst August had seven children: six boys and one girl. Three
of her sons, Frederick August, Charles Philip, and Christian died in battle.
Her two most famous children were the oldest son, George Louis, who was to
succeed his father as Elector of Hanover and become King George I of Eng-
land, and her daughter, Sophie Charlotte, who was to become the first queen
of Prussia. '
As Electress of Hanover Sophie had a busy life. She was in charge of a
court employing hundreds of people. She planned entertainment for many
festivities. She served as hostess for all the visiting foreign dignitaries, includ-
ing Peter the Great on his first trip to the West (Kroll 1973, 191-194).
One of the tasks that occupied much of her time, especially after the death
of her husband in 1698, was the project of the English succession. Though
Sophie was content to remain the Electress of Hanover, Leibniz had urged
her to pursue a claim to the English crown on behalf of her family. Because
the British Parliament had passed a bill which limited succession to the
throne to Protestants and because Queen Anne had no surviving children,

Sophie, as the granddaughter of King James I of England, had a good chance
of being designated as Anne's successor. But after much delicate diplomatic
maneuvering, just when the succession had supposedly been secured for So-
phie and her descendants, the arrangement seemed in danger of collapsing.
Queen Anne suddenly felt that her own rights as sovereign were threatened
and wrote a harsh letter to Sophie on May 19, 1714, which, some say, may
have led to Sophie's death (Klopp 1874, 3: 454-455). 1
On June 8, 1714, as Sophie was taking her usual late afternoon walk in the
gardens of her country palace of Herrenhausen, she suddenly became very ill
and within several minutes was dead. She was 83 years old. She died as she
had wished to die, with neither parson nor physician to attend her. Her fu-
neral was held at Hanover, and she was laid to rest in the royal chapel at
Hanover.
Queen Anne died a few weeks later on August 1, 1714. Though Sophie did
not live quite long enough to become Queen of England, she earned a place
in English history. The work she had done on the project of the English suc-
cession was not in vain after all, since her son, George Louis, the Elector of
Hanover, succeeded Queen Anne and became George I of Great Britain. 12
Sophie was eulogized by many of her contemporaries, and a medal was
struck to honor her memory (Baily 1936, 247-253). Leibniz praised her vir-
tues and her achievements in a poem, and he also wrote in a letter to the wife
of her grandson:
It is not she, it is Hanover, it is England, it is the world, it is

myself who has lost. .. . But let us not think too much about
her death; let us rather think of her happy and glorious life.
(July 7, 1714, in Klopp 1874, 3: 462-465)
B. SOPHIE AND PHILOSOPHY
One aspect of that "glorious life" was Sophie's relation to Leibniz and
losophy, as is evident in the three hundred letters that Sophie and Leibn
changed between 1684 and 1714.
Trained as a philosopher, mathematician, and lawyer, Leibniz had f
worked for the Elector of Mainz and then entered the service of Duke
Frederick of Brunswick-Luneburg in 1673. This marked the beginnin
what was to be more than forty years of service to the Brunswick family
of his main tasks was to research and write the history of that family. Th
he often traveled, his official residence was at Hanover, where he wa
charge of the library. When Duke John Frederick died in 1680, and So
husband, Ernst August, became Duke of Hanover, Leibniz continu
46 Hypatia
service under the new duke and became an almost indispensable friend of So-
phie, the Duchess and later the Electress of Hanover.
In addition to the work he did for her and her family to help establish their
right to the British crown, he performed many smaller services as well.
Whenever he traveled, he made a point of reporting to her any political or
personal news that would interest her. He often gave her an eye-witness ac-
count of any wedding celebrations or operas or plays she could not attend. He
discussed new medical treatments he had heard of. His royal friend was inter-
ested in almost everything and he responded, as promptly and as thoroughly
as he could, to every question she asked. Of special importance for her intel-
lectual life was the fact that he kept her informed about the books and ideas
of the principal thinkers of their time. The letters of Leibniz and Sophie are
therefore on a wide range of topics, including religion and philosophy.
On the subject of religion it is interesting to note that one of the special
concerns of both Leibniz and Sophie was the reunion of the churches.
Though Sophie had been raised as a Calvinist, she was undogmatic in her re-
ligious belief. Regarded as "loose in her religious opinions" by some of her
more orthodox contemporaries, she enjoyed hearing discussions between ex-
ponents of opposing beliefs (Chapman 1966, 171). She approved and en-
couraged Leibniz's work for the reunion of Catholic and Protestant churches,
and said in one of her letters to him, "As Christianity came into the world
through a woman, I should be proud if its unification were due to me"
(Quoted in Kroll 1973, 156).
Sophie's reliance on reason provided a philosophical basis for this early ec-
umenical project. She had said in a letter to her brother: "There are so many
things in religion contrary to good sense that it needs much faith to submit
to .... One can only judge by the reason one has received from nature"
(Quoted in Godfrey 1909, 335). She agreed with Leibniz that reason should
be the guide and norm of religion, and he praised her religion as being "very
sound" (May 6, 1713, Klopp 1874, 3: 301-302; Apr. 30, 1709, Klopp 1874,
3: 308). 13
Sophie's philosophical questions often arose from her reading of books and
letters or from conversations she had with learned men who visited her court.
She would ask Leibniz's opinion about them and then sometimes send his let-
ters on to her niece Liselotte, the Duchess of Orleans, or her sister Louise,
the Abbess of Maubuisson. Among the philosophers mentioned in the letters
are, in addition to Leibniz himself: Molanus, Van Helmont, John Toland,
John Locke, Pierre Bayle, Anthony Collins, Bossuet. 14 Many topics are
mentioned, but the main philosophical topic discussed in the letters is, as one
might expect, Leibniz's theory of monads. Let us first see how Leibniz pre-
sented his philosophy to Sophie in his letters and then note her reactions to
his views.
He began with the notion of substance as a unit of force, a dynamic center

of activity (Sep. 3, 1694, Klopp 1874, 1: 303; Nov. 4, 1696, Klopp 1874, 2:
15). He distinguished between indivisible simple substances, which are true
unities or souls, and aggregates or multitudes, which are bodies. Since a mul-
titude can be dissolved into the parts of which it is composed, bodies can per-
ish, but souls are imperishable (Oct. 31, 1705, Klopp 1874, 3: 145-146, 154-
155).
He described each unity or monad as having not only activity or force but
also perception (June 12, 1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 174), that is, as representing
the things outside itself, as though mirroring the universe from its own point
of view. But since not all monads mirror the universe with equal clarity and
distinctness, there is a hierarchy of monads. Some monads have only a mini-
mum of perception; some monads or souls have a confused representation, as
in sense perceptions; but some, the spirits or rational souls, have acts of self-
reflection and a knowledge of necessary truths and immaterial things (Nov.
4, 1696, Klopp 1874, 2: 15-16, 18).
To help Sophie see that each substance is unique, Leibniz reminded her, in
his letter of October 31, 1705 (Klopp 1874, 3: 152), that in her garden at
Herrenhausen she had never seen two leaves that perfectly resembled each
other.
He stated further that each substance is independent of everything else ex-
cept God. One substance never acts on another nor is acted upon by another,
but changes and develops in accordance with principles immanent in its own
being (Mar. 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 173), yet each mirrors the whole world and
functions as though interacting with others.
To account for the appearance of interaction of these independent sub-
stances Leibniz offered his doctrine of pre-established harmony. By that he
meant a divine arrangement by virtue of which monads have from the begin-
ning been so adapted to one another that changes of one monad, although
immanent, correspond to the changes in every other monad. He gave the ex-
ample (with reference to the relation of spirit and matter) of the "excellent
workman who made two clocks of different construction, which, however,
were in perfect agreement with each other, each by virtue of its own laws"
(Mar. 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 174). He had no doubt that it lies within the
power and wisdom of the Author of all things to establish the harmonious
working of all substances.
He was sure of the existence of such a supreme Being. Relying on one of his
favorite principles, that nothing happens without a sufficient reason, he
asked: "Why is there something? [That is, why does anything exist?] There
would be no reason for the existence of anything if there were not a final Rea-
son who needs nothing but has the reason for existence in itself." This same
God who "causes something to exist rather than nothing, also causes many
rather than few things to exist" (Mar. 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 172-173). In-
48 Hypatia
deed, one could say that in creating the universe, God has chosen the best
possible plan, in which there is the greatest variety together with the greatest
order. Leibniz often referred to the wisdom and goodness of the Author of
things (Sep. 3, 1694, Klopp 1874, 1: 305; Feb. 7, 1706, in Foucher 1876,
161-162).
Leibniz's letters to Sophie, therefore, presented to her his main philosophi-
cal themes. She was interested in all that he said, but she did not have the
time to write long comments on all of these themes. Her written response was
in the form of brief remarks, mainly on two points that she found hard to un-
derstand: the multiplicity of the monads and the immateriality of thought of
the rational soul or spirit-monad.
Sophie wondered how there could be many monads. Leibniz suggested she
would find them intelligible if she would consider that all that is corporeal is a
multitude, and that every multitude is composed of an assemblage of unities,
as a flock is composed of individual sheep and a pond of drops of water and
fish (Nov. 19, 1701, Klopp 1874, 2: 310; Sep. 1696, Klopp 1874, 2: 9). But,
still puzzled by the notion that there are many ones or monads, she said:
One can give whatever name one wishes to things, but in a

language which is not that of philosophers, it seems to me that
one is not plural, and that one ought not to call them unities
when there are several of them. ... I have little compre-
hended what these unities are. (Nov. 21, 1701, Klopp 1874,
2: 313)
She seemed to think that one could apply properly just to God or perhaps to a
universal soul.
Leibniz replied that she had "all the reasons in the world for saying that the
one is not several." But he again pointed out that multitudes exist, and a
multitude is composed of unities. He added that if there were only one unity,
that is God, there would be no multitude in nature and God would be alone
(Nov. 30, 1701, Klopp 1874, 2: 314-315). 15
On one occasion, when Sophie attributed to him a belief he did not hold,
namely that the one is worth more than a thousand (June 16, 1700, Klopp
1874, 2: 178), he concluded his letter to her with this uncharacteristically
impatient remark:
The apparent obscurity occurs only when one scarcely takes

the trouble to reason about abstract things with the attention
that they require. (June 1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 181-182)16
Sophie also raised a question about the immateriality of thought and of the
soul. She told Leibniz that her son the Elector (George Louis) had engaged in
a dispute with Molanus, the Abbot of Loccum, on the nature of thought. Her
son held that thought is material, "inasmuch as it is composed of things that
enter into us by the senses, and . .. one cannot think of anything without
making for oneself an idea of things that one has seen, heard, or tasted, like a
blind man who, when asked how he imagined God, said, 'Like sugar.' " She
asked Leibniz to meditate on the dispute but warned him: "I am of the opin-
ion of my son" (June 2, 1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 163-164).
Molanus wrote Leibniz to give his own side of the story. He said that the
Duchess (that is, Sophie) had provoked him to a dispute, asked him to send
her his thoughts in writing, but then attacked his paper not by responding to
his arguments "but by multiplying, as is the habit of people who are strangers
to these matters, questions which have no relation to the subject." He said
that she ended by saying she would send the paper to Leibniz and have Leib-
niz serve as the arbiter of their differences. He hoped that Leibniz would agree
with him that the soul is a thinking thing and really distinct from an ex-
tended thing (Foucher 1876, 53).
Leibniz agreed with Molanus that thought and the soul are immaterial, but
since he had long found some difficulties in the Cartesian position, he chose
to take a different route to establish the point. He says that we think not only
of what comes from sense, but also of what does not come from sense. There
are ideas that accompany our notions of material things that are not corpo-
real, as for example the notions of force, of action, change, time, and even of
the one, the true, the good. And as to the material that enters the brain by
the sense, this is not the same material that enters into the soul, but rather its
idea or representation which is not a body (June 12, 1700, Klopp, 1874, 2:
173-174). Thus Leibniz tried to show Sophie that thought and souls cannot
be material, but Sophie will later say that she does not understand what is
meant by "thought" and by "immaterial," adding, "I confess that surpasses
me, perhaps because I do not comprehend the terms well enough ... to be
able to penetrate to the truth" (Nov. 27, 1702, Klopp 1874, 2: 402).17
Unlike her sister Elizabeth who carefully studied Descartes' position before
asking questions, Sophie sometimes wrote critical comments without making
a serious study of Leibniz's views. Though as a working administrator she was
busy with other concerns, she still enjoyed conversation and letters on the
philosophical topics that Leibniz discussed.
As we look at the correspondence between Sophie and Leibniz, we might
summarize what Sophie did for Leibniz and what Leibniz did for Sophie. She
provided some intellectual companionship for Leibniz at Hanover. By ques-
tioning his theory of monads and by asking his opinion on every new notion
she met, she encouraged him to clarify both his own views and his reactions
to the ideas of his contemporaries. By sending his letters to her influential rel-
atives in France, her sister, the Abbess of Maubuisson and her niece
Liselotte, the Duchess of Orleans, she helped to foster his international repu-
tation. She repeatedly protected him from her son George Louis, the Elector
of Hanover, who was angry when Leibniz, though usually on business for the
50 Hypatia
House of Hanover, would set off on a trip to Italy or France or Vienna or Ber-
lin without asking permission. The Elector complained: "At least he ought to
tell me where he's going when he goes away. I never know where to find him"
(Quoted in Foucher 1876, 118; Mar. 25, 1711, Klopp 1874, 3: 328). She was
a steadfast friend to Leibniz for more than thirty years, interested in all his ac-
tivities, concerned about his health, and always happy to have him at her
palace at Herrenhausen. In her many letters to him she consistently ex-
pressed her esteem for him. For example, in a letter of May 12, 1688 (Klopp
1874, 1: 14) she said, "I hope to see you again ... and find occasions of giv-
ing you proofs of my esteem and my friendship," and on April 27, 1713
(Klopp 1874, 3: 39): "I am always an admirer of your merit."18
Leibniz appreciated her friendship and often concluded his letters, "I am
with devotion, Leibniz." Needless to say, he in turn did much for his royal
friend. We have already noted the variety of practical services he performed
for her, not the least of which was helping to secure the right of succession to
the English throne for Sophie and her heirs. In addition, he answered all her
questions on a wide range of subjects. Whether at home or abroad, he served
as her eyes and ears, reporting anything that would interest or amuse her. He
kept her informed of the work and ideas of scholars of the time, including two
women philosophers who were defenders of Locke: Lady Damaris Masham
and Catherine Trotter Cockbum (May 26, 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 218-219;
July 6, 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 223-224).19 It was in part due to Leibniz that
throughout her long life Sophie was always in touch with current philosophi-
cal thought.
What can be said of Sophie as a philosopher? She acknowledged the exist-
ence of a God who is knowable through reason, but as a busy princess with a
strong commitment to the duties of her state of life, she had little time for
prolonged speculation. Moreover, abstract systems of thought were of less in-
terest to her than practical philosophy. Her everyday working philosophy was
reflected in a calm acceptance of change20 and a firm resolution not to worry
about accidents that could, but might not happen since such worry could ruin
one's health (Nov. 21, 1701, Klopp 1874, 2: 314). She did admit: "I am not
so much a philosopher at heart as I am in words" (Nov. 10, 1701, Klopp
1874, 2: 306). But later, at the age of 82, in speaking of the loss of four of her
seven children, she wrote: "I believe that I remain so long in this world be-
cause I keep my spirit calm" (April 27, 1713, Klopp 1874, 3: 394). In a letter
of April 7, 1714, Leibniz wrote:
Your Royal Highness and I ... regard things as a spectacle. It

is the means of being always in good humor, as much as possi-
ble, for example in considering the greatest princes and their
ministers as people engaged in giving us an opera. That pre-
serves health. As your Electoral Highness practices this
method marvelously, I predict for her still very many years.

(Klopp 1874, 3: 438)
Since Sophie died two months later, Leibniz's prediction was mistaken, but
no doubt her calm and cheerful disposition helped her to survive as long as
she did.
Looking at Sophie as a philosopher in the formal, as distinguished from the
popular sense of the term, Leibniz thought she just did not take the time or
make the effort to reason about abstract things. She would not, for example,
have wanted him to go into detailed proof from physics and mathematics of
the wisdom of God in nature (Feb. 27, 1702, Klopp 1874, 2: 333). But refer-
ring to Descartes' praise of her sister Elizabeth for being the only person who
understood both his metaphysical meditations and his geometry, Leibniz said
that if her Serene Highness, Sophie, would have judged it appropriate to take
the trouble of understanding Descartes' treatises, she would have understood
them just as well, though (like Leibniz himself) she might not have approved
them (1691, Klopp 1874 1: 158). He implied that she could be a fine philoso-
pher if she wanted to, particularly because she is "entirely for reason."21
The letters imply that Sophie did not fully develop her potential as a phi-
losopher. They might further suggest that her principal role in the history of
modem philosophy was that of a learned friend and protector of Leibniz. But
to complete the picture of Sophie, we should also note the reaction of an
Irishman who had spent several weeks at her court. John Toland praised So-
phie not only for her knowledge of languages and history, for her vast reading
of many books, for her deep insight into affairs of state, and for her wise and
witty sayings, but also for her knowledge of the principal controversies in reli-
gion and philosophy and for having a mind that was "irradiated by philoso-
phy."22
III. PRINCESS SOPHIE CHARLOTTE
A. BIOGRAPHY
Sophie Charlotte or "Figuelotte" was the fourth child and only daughter of
Sophie and Erst August, the Electress and Elector of Hanover. She was born
on October 29, 1668, at the castle of Iburg. She studied under a governess,
and her curriculum included Latin, French, Italian, English, the sciences,
and music (Foucher 1876, 74).23 At the age of eleven, she traveled with her
mother to France where she met her Aunt Louise, Abbess of Maubuisson,
visited with her cousin Liselotte, who by then was Duchess of Orleans, an
was introduced to King Louis XIV, who thought she was a beautiful child. A
few years later Sophie and Ernst August arranged for her to marry Frederick of
Brandenburg, a widower who had a spinal deformity as the result of a fall and
52 Hypatia
was fond of elaborate clothing, pomp, and ceremony. But Sophie said that
her daughter did not look to externals (Quoted in Baily 1936, 242) and Emst
August, for political reasons, sought a closer relationship with Brandenburg.
The wedding was held in October of 1684, when Figuelotte was 16 and Fred-
erick was 27. Following a week of ballets, plays, operas, and fireworks, and a
quiet stay at Herrenhausen for the bride and groom, Sophie Charlotte moved
to Berlin. She and Frederick had three sons, but the first two died in infancy.
Only Frederick William survived. He was born in 1688, the year that his fa-
ther became Elector of Brandenburg.
On January 18, 1701, Frederick became the first king and Sophie Char-
lotte the first queen of Prussia. An elaborate coronation ceremony was held
at Konigsberg. Frederick was dressed in scarlet embroidered with gold and
wore a crimson mantle with ermine lining. Sophie Charlotte was dressed in
gold brocade and adored with pearls and diamonds (Frey 1984, 60-62).
Sophie Charlotte disliked the intrigue at her husband's court.24 She also
disliked the pomp and formality of court life at Berlin, but she found two
means of escape: visiting her mother at Hanover and spending time at her
own palace of Lutzenburg. Lutzenburg was for her what Herrenhausen had
been to her mother Sophie. It was situated near the town of Lutzen, between
Berlin and Spandau, landscaped with trees, small lakes, and gardens in the
French style. Sophie loved to visit her daughter there and in one of her letters
suggested re-naming it "Lustenburg," that is, palace of pleasures (Aug. 4,
1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 204). Here Sophie Charlotte could pursue her own in-
terests. She played the clavichord and composed some music. Here ballets,
plays, and operas were performed. For many years the music was under the di-
rection of a gifted Italian musician, Attilio. At Lutzenburg musicians, artists,
and scholars were always welcome. Sophie Charlotte enjoyed long conversa-
tions with her learned visitors, but sometimes they found life at Lutzenburg
rather strenuous. Leibniz, a frequent visitor who in 1700 spent four months
there, gently complained in his letters to Sophie of feeling tired since he
sometimes could not get to bed before one or two o'clock in the morning
(May 22, 1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 152).
King Frederick, a hard-working administrator, often started his day before
his wife went to bed, yet she helped his regime in her own way. Though So-
phie Charlotte had little interest in politics, she agreed with Leibniz that a
closer relationship between her husband's house of Brandenburg and her par-
ents' house of Hanover would benefit both houses. She was happy to have
Leibniz serve as a diplomatic liaison between the two houses. But her main
contributions to her husband's house were cultural and intellectual. She had
the reputation of being one of the most learned women in Europe and, like
her mother, was always interested in hearing the ideas of the scholars of her
time. It was she who made it possible for Leibniz to fulfill his dream of estab-
lishing an Academy of Sciences, which was to be devoted to scientific inquiry
and equipped with an observatory and a laboratory. Sophie convinced her

husband that such an academy, a society of the learned similar to those al-
ready established in France and England, would enhance his reign. On July
11, 1700, the Berlin Academy of Sciences was founded, with Leibniz as its
first president.25
The Queen loved philosophical and theological controversy and at one
time had a Catholic theologian battling successively against three other theo-
logians (Foucher 1876, 143). John Toland, a freethinker, who later dedi-
cated a book to her, was also a visitor at her court. Conversations on the
views of another unorthodox thinker were to prompt Leibniz to write his
Theodicy. She especially enjoyed conversing with Leibniz and wrote in a let-
ter to him (Quoted in Foucher 1876, 80): "Do not believe that I prefer the
grandeurs and crowns of which people make so much here to the charm of the
philosophical conversations that we have had at Lutzenburg."26
In January of 1705, Sophie Charlotte suddenly became critically ill with
pneumonia. When she realized that she could not recover, she assured the
preacher that she was on good terms with her Maker and said that she was
giving her husband a new opportunity to show his magnificence by providing
a fine funeral (Kroll 1973, 212). She died on February 1, 1705, at the age of
36. She was indeed given a magnificent funeral and was interred in a splendid
sculptured sarcophagus in the cathedral at Berlin. Lutzenburg, which she had
loved, was renamed Charlottenburg in her honor (Frey 1984, 69, 107).
Leibniz wrote a eulogy in which he praised her beauty, virtue, and intel-
lect, and tried to achieve a philosophical perspective on the sad event by
thinking of his monads. He recalled that each soul is a perpetual living mirror
of the universe and that rational souls or spirits are assured of eternal citizen-
ship in the City of God (Hankins 1973, 83-100; Aiton 1985, 264-265). He
later found consolation in the thought that she died with a serene spirit, tran-
quillity of soul, and resignation to the orders of supreme providence (Mar.
18, 1705, Klopp 1874, 3: 117).
B. SOPHIE CHARLOTTE AND PHILOSOPHY
Sophie Charlotte's philosophical life, like that of her mother, owed m

to their mutual friend, Leibniz. Like her mother, she was curious about
thought of her contemporaries, especially John Toland, John Locke, Pi
Bayle, and, of course, Leibniz himself. But unlike her mother she had a
interest in abstract metaphysical topics. Leibniz shared with her, as h
with her mother, an account of his own philosophical system.27 She not
understood what he said, but wanted deeper explanations than he gave
wrote to a good friend:
My dear Poellnitz, here is a letter from Leibniz that I am send-

ing you. I love this man, but I am inclined to get angry be-
cause he treats everything so superficially with me . . . he
54 Hypatia
rarely answers me with precision on subjects I raise for discus-

sion. (Quoted in Foucher 1876, 16)
It may well be that at one time Leibniz underestimated the capabilities of

Sophie Charlotte. Speaking of the taste of the "Electresses," that is, Sophie
Charlotte and her mother, he once wrote:
They need something which might be at the same time spirit-

ual and diverting, . . . curious and pleasing stories, beautiful
productions, writings on matters of religion which are not
prejudiced.... For myself who am more accustomed to what
gives me the task of deepening matters, I prefer what gives me
new opportunities to advance in knowledge and make others
advance in it. (Quoted in Foucher 1876, 78-79)
In spite of what he said here, Leibniz did help his royal patrons to advance in
knowledge and understanding, especially of philosophical and theological
ideas. Sophie Charlotte had read Locke (Dec. 4, 1703, Foucher 1876, 127);
she knew both John Toland and Pierre Bayle, and she was eager to have
Leibniz's comments on their views.
In 1702, she sent to Leibniz an anonymous letter on which she asked him
to comment. Some of Leibniz's reply (Loemker 1969, 547-553) is believed to
have been aimed at Locke, whose essay he was criticizing, and at John
Toland, the English Deist and freethinker, who had come to Hanover with
the delegation of the English ambassador and who often talked with Sophie
and Sophie Charlotte.
The letter, according to Leibniz, had raised two questions: (1) whether
there is something in our thoughts which does not come from senses; and (2)
whether there is something in nature which is not material. Leibniz gives an
affirmative answer to both questions. On the first he says that we use our ex-
ternal senses as a blind man uses a stick; they help us to know their particular
objects, which are colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and tactual qualities, but
they do not help us to know what these sensible qualities are, nor do they ac-
count for objects of understanding alone, such as the thought of oneself, of
substance in general, of being, of truth, of necessary truths (Loemker 1969,
547-550). Such objects we know by a natural light and not by sense experi-
ences. Leibniz distinguished his position from that of Locke in this famous
line: ". . . there is nothing in the understanding which has not come from
the senses, except the understanding itself, or the one who understands"
(Loemker 1969, 549).28
On the second question, he reaffirms his position that there is something
immaterial in all created beings and, further, that God, "the universal deter-
mining cause which makes things be, and makes them be as they are rather
than otherwise, must of necessity be free of matter" (Loemker 1969, 552).
Sophie Charlotte showed Leibniz's letter to Toland (Aiton 1985, 262),

who then tried to prove against Leibniz what he never denied, that is, that
we need sense organs to have thought. But Leibniz went on to re-emphasize
that there are necessary truths that are prior to experience (Quoted in
Foucher 1876, 91-98).
Toland's sympathy for a materialist position had been evident on a previ-
ous occasion when he read to the Queen a discourse on the soul which was
close to the teaching of Lucretius. On that occasion, Leibniz criticized
Toland for not explaining why matter had motion and order (Sep. 9, 1702,
Klopp 1874, 2: 362-363).
Though not sharing Toland's views, Sophie Charlotte found it interesting
to talk to him. He was later to write three letters which he claimed were an-
swers to questions which she had asked about the origin of prejudice, about
the origin of idolatry, and about the history of the doctrine of the immortality
of the soul among the heathens. These letters were included in a book he
dedicated to her entitled Letters to Serena. Though Toland had responded to
her intellectual interests, she continued to turn to Leibniz for help in under-
standing theological and philosophical issues. Her questions about Bayle's
philosophy were to provide the occasion for the writing of the only philo-
sophical book that Leibniz published during his lifetime, his Theodicy.
Pierre Bayle, who had been a Calvinist before gaining the reputation of be-
ing a sceptic, was the author of the famous Dictionnaire historique et critique. In
both the first and second editions of that work he had included, in the article
"Rorarius," some objections to Leibniz's philosophy, and both times Leibniz
published replies to those objections (Loemker 1969, 492-497; 574-585).
Since Sophie Charlotte had heard much about Bayle, had met him in Hol-
land in October of 1700, and had discussed with Leibniz the questions Bayle
raised, she asked Leibniz to put his answers in writing for further reflection.
In a letter to Thomas Burnet of October 30, 1710 (Jalabert 1962, 10),
Leibniz described the origin of the book in this way:
The largest part of the work was composed piece by piece,

when I was at the late Queen of Prussia's where these matters
were often discussed, on the occasion of the Dictionary and
other works of Bayle which were being widely read. In our
conversations I usually answered the objections raised by Bayle
and made the Queen see that they were not so strong as cer-
tain people who are not well disposed to religion would have
us believe. Her Majesty frequently commanded me to put my
answers in writing, so that one could consider them with at-
tention. After the death of this great princess I gathered the
pieces together, at the urging of friends who had heard about
56 Hypatia
them, and with some additions, produced the book of which I

have just spoken.
In the preface to the book Leibniz also says that the book originated in the
conversations about Bayle's views with "one of the greatest and most accom-
plished of princesses," who exhorted and urged him to publish his reflections
on these matters. Though "the incomparable Queen" died before he could do
so, he was now carrying out her wish (Theodicy, Huggard tr. 1952, 62-63).
Sophie Charlotte has left no philosophical treatise, but we can become
aware of what was on her mind if we briefly summarize the main content of
the Theodicy, which presents the substance of Leibniz's discussions with her
and was written at her command.
The title of the work refers to the justification of God, that is, to the prob-
lem: If a good God exists, how can one account for evil? The subtitle, Essays
on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, reveals the
scope of the work. The main discussion is preceded by an essay on the con-
formity of faith with reason in which, contrary to Bayle, Leibniz held that
truths of revealed religion and truths reached by reason cannot contradict
each other. "The light of reason," he said, "is no less a gift of God than that
of revelation" (Theodicy, Huggard tr. 1952, 91). Mysteries, like the Trinity,
are beyond, but not against reason.
In Part One, he considered what the light of reason and the light of revela-
tion teach us of God and of man in relation to evil. After recalling the proof
for the existence of God from the contingency of the world, he re-stated one
of his favorite themes: that God chose to create the best of possible worlds.
But the best possible world involved permitting some evil. Leibniz distin-
guished three kinds of evil: metaphysical evil, which simply refers to the pri-
vation or limitations that all creatures have; physical evil or suffering; and
moral evil or sin (Theodicy, Huggard tr. 1952, 127-130, 140-141).29
The possibility of doing a morally evil act presumes that we have free
choice, but this does not mean that our will has "the indifference of equi-
poise," as though it were equally inclined to two different courses of action.
Whether we are aware of it or not, there is always some cause or reason in-
clining us towards the course taken, but the will is never bound by necessity
to adopt it (Theodicy, Huggard tr. 1952, 143; 147-148).
To the question of how our choices can really be free if God has certain
foreknowledge of them, Leibniz answered that the certainty of God's knowl-
edge does not predetermine those choices. While God can foresee all future
contingent events, they occur only by a hypothetical or conditional neces-
sity. They do not happen by absolute necessity (that is, that whose opposite
would imply a contradiction). We have the two conditions which, according
to Aristotle, are required for freedom: intelligence and spontaneity. That is,
we can know what we are doing, and the source of the act is within us
(Theodicy, Huggard tr. 1952, 143-150, 153, 309-310, 382). To deny our free-
dom and take refuge in fatalism would be what he called a "lazy sophism."
In Part Two, Leibniz examined nineteen philosophical maxims that Bayle
had opposed to his views (Theodicy, Huggard tr. 1952, 187-207). Bayle had
especially criticized the view that God had to create the best possible world
since he thought this would imply that God is not free. Leibniz assured Bayle
that God's decree to create is free and that there are no bounds to God's
power or goodness, but that unless God had chosen the best of the possible
worlds, there would have been no sufficient reason for his choice (Theodicy,
Huggard tr., 1952, 267-270, 386-388).
In Part Three, the last part, Leibniz returned to some topics he had previ-
ously mentioned, among them physical evil. Again he maintained that suf-
ferings, monstrosities, and other apparent defects are a part of the order of the
world considered as a whole (Theodicy, Huggard tr. 1952, 276-281).
Loosely structured to answer the long list of Bayle's objections, the book
reflects the discussions that Leibniz and the Queen had at Lutzenburg. Had it
not been for the Queen, it is quite likely that Leibniz would never have writ-
ten or published his Theodicy.
We should note, however, that the Theodicy was not Leibniz's first re-
sponse to Sophie Charlotte's interest in the problem of evil. When she was
still Electress of Brandenburg, he had written to tell her that he was sending a
new printing of the German version of Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy.
After summarizing Boethius' view on the perfection of order in the universe,
which was similar to his own view, he tried to suggest how such perfection
was compatible with evil by giving an example. He reminded Sophie Char-
lotte, a musician, that musical chords sometimes sound unpleasant if one
hears them alone, but when they are joined with other chords, they make the
whole harmony more beautiful. He concluded his letter by saying, "But there
is no need to speak further of these things that Boethius explains much better
and that your noble mind conceives still better than Boethius could express"
(May 9, 1697, Klopp 1874, 2: 29-30).
Sophie Charlotte had first known Leibniz as the friend of her mother, but
lie also became her friend and teacher. In a letter of September 1, 1699, she
told him that he could henceforth regard her as his disciple and as one who
appreciated his merit (Cited in Aiton 1985, 255). In summarizing what she
did for him and what he did for her, we might mention first the achievement
that was of benefit to both: the founding of the Berlin Academy of Sciences.
The establishment of this scholarly society that was conceived by Leibniz
brought prestige to the court of Queen Sophie Charlotte and her husband,
King Frederick I, but it was through the Queen's influence that Leibniz was
able to realize his dream and become the founder and first president of the
Academy. The historiographer of Brandenburg, addressing the Academy in
58 Hypatia
1795 and in 1799, refers to both Leibniz and Sophie Charlotte as founders of
the Royal Academy (Erman 1801, 3, 193).
Sophie Charlotte also helped him by stimulating his philosophical think-
ing. Like her mother, she habitually asked his reaction to the many ideas she
encountered in letters, books, and conversations with scholars. She was seri-
ously interested in questions relating to theory of knowledge, metaphysics,
natural theology, and religion. She will always be remembered as the person
who motivated Leibniz to write his Theodicy.
Like her mother, she, too, was a steadfast friend to Leibniz. Many years
later, her grandson, known to history as Frederick the Great, was to say, after
praising her genius and knowledge:
She believed that it was not unworthy of a queen to esteem a

philosopher ... .this philosopher ... was Leibniz; and as
those who have received privileged souls from heaven are the
equals of kings, she bestowed her friendship on Leibniz (Fred-
erick 1859, 230).
Though Leibniz sometimes found life at her palace exhausting as he grew

older, he was always welcome at Lutzenburg. Her unexpected death at the
age of 36 was a heavy blow to him, and when her mother died nine years
later, he lost his influence at court. George Louis, Sophie's son and Sophie
Charlotte's brother, who became King George I of Great Britain, continued
to employ him as the family historian, but he did not allow Leibniz to come
to England nor did he send a representative to his funeral.
In reviewing what Leibniz did for Sophie Charlotte, we might note first
that politically he tried to achieve a closer relationship between her hus-
band's court at Berlin and her mother's and brother's court at Hanover, but
his efforts were not always appreciated. George Louis of Hanover resented
Leibniz's trips to Berlin and the courtiers at Berlin sometimes thought of him
as a spy. Leibniz also served as a kind of unofficial cultural minister at the
court of Berlin, a supervisor of arts and sciences. But his greatest contribution
to Sophie Charlotte was to foster her intellectual life. He kept her informed
of new books and ideas. He participated in discussions with other scholars in
her presence. He provided a reasoned and balanced response to the views of
the free thinkers of the time. He tried to answer all the questions she raised in
theology and philosophy. He was her philosophy teacher and friend.
What can be said of Sophie Charlotte as a philosopher? Her contemporar-
ies were impressed by her wide range of interests. John Toland, for example,
described her as "one of the most curious persons you ever knew, and mistress
of a vast compass of knowledge" (Letters to Serena 1964 reprint of 1704 ed.,
preface #9). Leibniz, too, speaks of "her curiosity and her eagerness to be in-
structed" (Quoted in Erman 1801, 194). Her grandson tells us that her curi-
osity led her to desire to grasp the first principles of things (Frederick 1859,
112). Since she chose Leibniz as her teacher, she often encountered his main
ideas as they were expressed in his letters to her or in essays written at her
command. Among these ideas are the following: that there is something in
our mind that does not come from the senses; that there is a Creator-God;
that the truths of reason and the truths of revelation cannot contradict each
other; that though God is omniscient, we do have free choice; and that de-
spite evil and suffering in the world, everything is ordered for the best. But at
times she wanted a deeper explanation of things than Leibniz was able to pro-
vide. It was said that she wanted to know the why of the why (pourquoi de
pourquoi) (Frederick 1859, 112).
Sophie Charlotte's last words were of Leibniz and philosophy. To one of
her weeping ladies of honor, she said: "Do not feel sorry for me, for now I am
going to satisfy my curiosity about the principles of things that Leibniz has
never been able to explain to me: about space, the infinite, being, and noth-
ingness" (Frederick 1859, 112).
One who has made the acquaintance of Sophie Charlotte, her mother So-
phie, and her Aunt Elizabeth, and has studied their interaction with their
philosopher-friends, will always see these three princesses as part of the his-
tory of modem philosophy.
NOTES
Notes on Introduction and Part I
1. In addition to Chapman, sources on the family background include Gorst-Williams 1977,

Hatton 1978, and the Baker ed. of The letters of Elizabeth, queen of Bohemia 1953.
2. This book will hereafter be referred to as Adam.
3. This reference is to Foucher de Careil's book, Descartes, la princesse Elisabeth et la reine
Christine. Other works by this author have also been used in this paper.
4. The first reference is to Foucher de Careil's Descartes et la princesse palatine; the second ref-
erence is to his Descartes, la princesse Elisabeth et la reine Christine.
5. In May 1647 (Adam 1960, 7: 343) after having read a discussion on how soul is united to
body that was written by Descartes' friend Hogelande, Elizabeth said it still did not satisfy her.
6. In a letter to Chanut (Feb. 1, 1647, Adam 1960, 7: 255) he defined passion as "a con-
fused thought excited in the soul by some movement of the nerves."
7. See also letters of May 18, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 225, and Sep. 15, 1645, Adam 1956, 6:
303.
8. Several years later, in writing to Hessen-Rheinfels, Leibniz said: "The late Madame Prin-
cess Elizabeth, Abbess of Herford, has in the past given evidence to me that she had a high re-
gard for the Christian Conversations of this Father [i.e. Malebranche], but it was at a time that she
was beginning not to scorn the writings of Jacob Boehme." Malebranche, Robinet ed. 1961, 18:
373.
Notes on Part II
9. George William later broke this promise and married his mistress, Eleonore d'Olbreuse, to
legitimize the birth of their daughter, Sophie Dorothea. In response, Ernst August and Sophie
arranged for their oldest son, George Louis to marry Sophie Dorothea to insure that George Wil-
liam's dukedom of Celle would be united with their lands, as originally promised. Though this
60 Hypatia
marriage of convenience resulted in the birth of two children, it was an unhappy marriage which
ended in divorce when Sophie Dorothea's affair with Count Philip von Konigsmarck (who was
mysteriously assassinated) was discovered. (Sophie 1879, 89-94, 101-111; Kroll 1973, 109-112,
128-131, 180-188)
10. A niece, Elizabeth Charlotte, known as "Liselotte," the daughter of Sophie's brother
Charles Louis of Heidelberg, lived in Sophie's household for four years and was like a daughter to
her. The many letters that Liselotte wrote to Sophie after her marriage to Philip the Duke of Or-
leans, brother of King Louis XIV, are a lively record of the social history of the time. See Letters
from Liselotte, tr. Kroll 1971. On Sophie's life, in addition to her memoirs, see Chapman 1966,
Kroll 1973, Baily 1936.
11. On the cause of Sophie's death, see letter from Schulenberg to Leibniz (June 13, 1714,
Klopp 1874, 3: 483). More details about Sophie's death are given in the letter of the Countess of
Buckebourg to Louise, the daughter of Sophie's brother Charles Louis and Louise von Degenfeld.
(July 12, 1714, Klopp 1874, 3: 457-462)
12. To see what Sophie started, it is interesting to note that for 123 years, from the time of
George I through the reign of William IV, the ruler of Hanover was also the king of England, but
because by the law of Hanover a woman could not be the sovereign of Hanover, the crowns of
Britain and Hanover were separated when Victoria became Queen of England in 1837. Victoria
was, however, a great great great grand-daughter of Sophie, and the present queen of England,
Elizabeth II (a great great grand-daughter of Victoria) also ultimately owes her crown to her
ancestress, Sophie of Hanover. (Encyclopedia Britannica 1929, 14th ed., 11: 160)
13. In letters to Sophie, Leibniz had written: "I am persuaded that religion should have noth-
ing that is contrary to reason," and "God ... has engraved the religion of reason in our hearts."
(April 1709, Klopp 1874, 3: 300-302)
14. Bossuet, the French orator and writer, had discussed with Fenelon the question of
whether love is egoistic or altruistic. Leibniz in one of his letters to Sophie tries to resolve the
opposition between self-centered love and disinterested love by saying: "To love is to find pleas-
ure in the good, the perfection, the happiness of another." (Klopp 1874, 2: 60)
Anthony Collins was an English Deist whose work on religion Sophie called to the attention
of Leibniz. (Klopp 1874, 3: 395)
Baron Francois Mercure van Helmont, metaphysician and author of two books that Sophie
had sent to Leibniz, spent several months in Hanover at Sophie's request and discussed his views,
especially on the transmigration of souls, with both of them. Later Leibniz wrote a report of the
conversations which Sophie sent to her niece, Liselotte, the Duchess of Orleans. (Aiton 1985,
201-202; Klopp 1874, 2: 8-11)
15. In another letter (Mar. 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 174) Leibniz grants that God is incompara-
bly more a unity than we are and that he alone is unity in every way. This does not, however,
mean that God is the only unity.
16. In a letter of Oct. 31, 1705 (Klopp 1874, 3: 145-148), in what sounds like an effort to
answer Sophie's question about the multiplicity of monads by appealing to a distinguished per-
son, Leibniz informed her that the Duke of Bourgogne, a friend of her niece, the Duchess of Or-
leans, had come to accept the existence of unities.
17. Sophie also forwarded to Leibniz an objection raised by her sister Louise, the Abbess of
Maubuisson. Leibniz's theory of monads had implied that animal souls are immortal and Louise
found this a dangerous idea. But Leibniz in a letter to Sophie asks: "What evil would there be if
the souls of beasts were always to subsist?" Since according to his philosophy souls are simple sub-
stances with force and perception, they cannot be subject to dissolution. The doctrine might be
dangerous only if one did not distinguish animal souls from human souls. But Leibniz holds that
animal souls lack the power of reason, self-reflection, and self-memory that human souls have.
Our souls will not lose their knowledge through death. They will continue to be citizens of the
city of God. (Nov. 29, 1707, Klopp 1874, 3: 287-288). Sophie left no written comment on this
letter, but she probably sent it on to her sister Louise.
18. See also letters of June 17, 1688 (Klopp 1:38); Sep. 9, 1695 (Klopp 2: 3); Nov. 5, 1701
(Klopp 2: 295).
19. George Bumet of Kemnay in a letter to Catherine Trotter Cockbum said (after a visit to
Sophie's court): "I find the Electoress likes rather those points of wit, lively thoughts, and odd
stories than subjects of much thought, and deep reasoning. One must concenter much sense into
a point, or say all in a word (which is very hard to do) otherwise she will not consider it." But in
her reply, Catherine Trotter Cockbum defended Sophie, saying: "The accounts you give me of
the Electoress' taste in conversation shew me that she very well understands the nature of it ...
The most solid subjects should not, in my opinion, be treated of in conversation, as one would
write of them. There is a certain short and lively manner of speaking on them, which is not only
more agreeable and insinuating, but often detects error, and finds out truth better than a long
train of reasonings . . ." (The Works of Catherine Cockbum 1751, 185, 188) I am indebted to
Dr. Mary Ellen Waithe for a photocopy of part of this book.
20. (May 4, 1691, Klopp 1874, 1: 109). Speaking of people dying, Sophie wrote: "If some did
not replace others, the world would be too crowded .... Everything passes, and there is only
God who subsists always, and we endure less well than inanimate things."
21. In a context in which he was explaining her political views to an Englishman, Leibniz
said: "Madame the Electress is entirely for reason, and consequently all the measures which can
serve to cause kings and peoples to follow reason, will be to her taste." (July 1701, Klopp 1874,
2: 267)
22. John Toland, "The Elogy and Character of the late Princess Sophia," in Baily 1936, 247-
250; and Letters to Serena, 1964 reprint of 1704 ed., preface #7.
Notes to Part III
23. In addition to Foucher 1876, sources on the life of Sophie Charlotte include Frey 1984,
Kroll 1973, and Sophie's Mnmoires, Kocher ed. 1879.
24. Sophie Charlotte had some differences of opinion with Eberhard Danckelman, the influ-
ential adviser who also had been her husband's tutor. He thought she favored Hanoverian inter-
ests over those of Prussia. Eventually he was dismissed.
25. References on the founding of the Berlin Academy of Sciences include Foucher de Careil
Leibniz et les academies in Leibniz, oeuvres 1969 reprint of 1875 ed., 7; Leibniz's letters to Sophie of
Nov. 1697, Klopp 1874, 2: 48, and June 19, 1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 188-190; Aiton 1985; Frey
1984. Leibniz also had plans to establish similar academies in Dresden, Vienna, and St. Peter-
sburg.
26. On a later occasion in 1704, when Leibniz sought the post of chancellor to George Louis
the Elector of Hanover, Sophie Charlotte's brother, Leibniz asked Sophie Charlotte to write a
letter of recommendation for him. In doing so she was acting against her own interest since she
did not want to lose him, but she added: "I believe, as a good friend, I ought to put your interest
before my own" (Aug. 31, 1704, Klopp 1874, 3: 95-96). Fortunately for her, Leibniz did not get
the position and from that time on he tried to spend more time in Berlin.
27. Leibniz had sent to Sophie Charlotte a revision of an exposition of his philosophy that he
had written for Lady Masham. See his letter to Sophie Charlotte of May 8, 1704, included in
Foucher 1876, 130-135.
28. See his comment in a letter to Thomas Bumet (May 26, 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 219):
"Locke has not sufficiently well probed the origin of necessary truths which do not depend on
senses or experiences or facts, but on the consideration of the nature of our soul ... ."
29. According to Leibniz, God never wills physical evil or suffering absolutely, but he permits
it to prevent greater evils or to obtain greater good. Moral evil or sin God never wills at all,
though he sometimes permits it if it is for the best. Leibniz cites the example, from the Easter Eve
liturgy, of referring to the fall of Adam as felix culpa, a happy fault, since it led to the incarnation
of Christ (Theodicy, Huggard tr. 1952, 129, 137-138, 378).
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Hypatia, Inc.

The Three Princesses

This article introduces three princesses: Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia

Histories of modem philosophy devote whole chapters to Descarte

Elizabeth and Sophie were daughters of the Elector Palatine and K

Hypatia vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1989) ? by Beatrice H. Zedler

in court etiquette, Scripture, mathematics, history, the sciences, jurispru-

Another family problem led to Elizabeth's departure from The Hague. In

I am still living, my dear sister, but it is to prepare myself for

She died on February 8, 1680.

B. ELIZABETH AMD PHILOSOPHY

As we turn our attention to Elizabeth's relation to philosophy we shall be

But I believe the inclination I have always had to regard what-

If cheerful, optimistic thoughts can have a beneficial effect on one's

.. to have a contentment that is solid, it is necessary to fol-

Elizabeth asks Descartes to instruct her "about the means of strengthening

whereas Descartes thinks that a prince is in a better position to understand

... I have never yet met anyone who understood so generally

and as a result, I have good reason for esteeming it as incompa-

I have always been in a condition that rendered my life very

If we ask: "What was Elizabeth's own philosophy?" there is no one text to

Some scholars have wondered whether Elizabeth abandoned philosophy

The silent waiting is no more in my power than flying through

Through the favor of her highness, the Princess Elizabeth,

In a letter to Elizabeth's sister Sophie, Leibniz later refers to Jacob Boehme,

II. PRINCESS SOPHIE

Sophie, the youngest sister of Princess Elizabeth, was born on Octob

throne to Protestants and because Queen Anne had no surviving children,

It is not she, it is Hanover, it is England, it is the world, it is

B. SOPHIE AND PHILOSOPHY

He began with the notion of substance as a unit of force, a dynamic center

One can give whatever name one wishes to things, but in a

The apparent obscurity occurs only when one scarcely takes

Your Royal Highness and I ... regard things as a spectacle. It

method marvelously, I predict for her still very many years.

III. PRINCESS SOPHIE CHARLOTTE

and equipped with an observatory and a laboratory. Sophie convinced her

B. SOPHIE CHARLOTTE AND PHILOSOPHY

Sophie Charlotte's philosophical life, like that of her mother, owed m

My dear Poellnitz, here is a letter from Leibniz that I am send-

rarely answers me with precision on subjects I raise for discus-

It may well be that at one time Leibniz underestimated the capabilities of

They need something which might be at the same time spirit-

Sophie Charlotte showed Leibniz's letter to Toland (Aiton 1985, 262),

The largest part of the work was composed piece by piece,

them, and with some additions, produced the book of which I

She believed that it was not unworthy of a queen to esteem a

Though Leibniz sometimes found life at her palace exhausting as he grew

Notes on Introduction and Part I

1. In addition to Chapman, sources on the family background include Gorst-Williams 1977,

Notes to Part III

Adam, Charles. 1917. Descartes, ses amities feminines. Paris: Boivin.

. 1973. Sophie: Electress of Hanover: A personal portrait. London: Victor

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