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Federal Judge Says Students Have The Right To Record at School Unless Officials Can Show It's Disruptive
Federal Judge Says Students Have The Right To Record at School Unless Officials Can Show It's Disruptive
,Plaintiffs,
v.
REGIONALSCHOOLUNIT75,etal.,Defendants.
No.2:13cv109NT.
UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,D.Maine.
April28,2017.
MATTHEWPOLLACK,Plaintiff,ProSe.
JANEQUIRION,Plaintiff,representedbyRACHELW.SEARS,MURRAYPLUMB&MURRAY,RICHARDL.O'MEARA,MURRAY
PLUMB&MURRAY&ZACHARYL.HEIDEN,AMERICANCIVILLIBERTIESUNIONOFMAINEFOUNDATION.
REGIONALSCHOOLUNITNO75,Defendant,representedbyDANIELA.NUZZI,BRANN&ISAACSON,MATTHEWP.
SCHAEFER,BRANN&ISAACSON,NATHANIELA.BESSEY,BRANN&ISAACSON&STACYO.STITHAM,BRANN&
ISAACSON.
BRADLEYVSMITH,Defendant,representedbyDANIELA.NUZZI,BRANN&ISAACSON,MATTHEWP.SCHAEFER,BRANN&
ISAACSON,NATHANIELA.BESSEY,BRANN&ISAACSON&STACYO.STITHAM,BRANN&ISAACSON.
REGIONALSCHOOLUNITNO75,CounterClaimant,representedbyDANIELA.NUZZI,BRANN&ISAACSON,MATTHEWP.
SCHAEFER,BRANN&ISAACSON&NATHANIELA.BESSEY,BRANN&ISAACSON.
MATTHEWPOLLACK,CounterDefendant,ProSe.
JANEQUIRION,CounterDefendant,ProSe.
JANEQUIRION,CounterDefendant,representedbyRICHARDL.O'MEARA,MURRAYPLUMB&MURRAY&ZACHARYL.
HEIDEN,AMERICANCIVILLIBERTIESUNIONOFMAINEFOUNDATION.
ORDERONPARTIES'CROSSMOTIONSFORSUMMARYJUDGMENT
NANCYTORRESEN,ChiefDistrictJudge.
BeforemearethePlaintiffs'motionforpartialsummaryjudgment,theDefendant'smotionforsummaryjudgment,andthe
Defendant'ssupplementalmotionforsummaryjudgmentpursuanttoFederalRuleofCivilProcedure56.(ECFNos.158,160,
258).Forthereasonsstatedbelow,thePlaintiffs'motionisDENIEDandtheDistrict'smotionsareGRANTEDINPARTand
DENIEDINPART.
LEGALSTANDARD
Summaryjudgmentisappropriatewhenthereisnogenuinedisputeofmaterialfactandthemovingpartyisentitledtojudgment
asamatteroflaw.SeeFed.R.Civ.P.56(a).Oncrossmotionsforsummaryjudgment,courts"vieweachmotionseparatelyand
drawallreasonableinferencesinfavoroftherespectivenonmovingparty."RomanCatholicBishopofSpringfieldv.Cityof
Springfield,724F.3d78,89(1stCir.2013).Facedwithcrossmotions,courtsmust"decide`whethereitherofthepartiesdeserves
judgmentasamatteroflawonthefactsthatarenotdisputed.'"Fid.CoopBankv.NovaCas.Co.,726F.3d31,36(1stCir.2013)
(quotingBarnesv.FleetNat'lBank,N.A.,370F.3d164,170(1stCir.2004)).
BACKGROUND
ThePlaintiffsinthiscaseareMatthewPollackandJaneQuirion(the"Parents"),astheparentsandnextfriendsoftheireighteen
yearoldsonB.P.UnifiedStatementofFactsSubmissionsforDefs.'Mot.forSumm.J.withCitationstoJointSumm.J.R.3
("DSF")(ECFNo.213).TheremainingDefendantisRegionalSchoolUnit75("RSU75"orthe"District"),whichhasbeenB.P.'s
schooldistrictsincekindergarten.DSF5.
B.P.isdiagnosedwithautismandalanguagedisorderthatisavariantofLandauKleffnerSyndrome.DSF3.Heisnonverbal
andhasverylimitedexpressivecommunicationskills.DSF3.B.P.ishappy,lovesschool,andhasmadesomeprogresstoward
hiseducationalgoals.DSF5.BythetimeB.P.beganattendingMt.AraratMiddleSchool,however,therelationshipbetweenhis
ParentsandDistrictofficialshadgrowntense.DSF21.
AlthoughtheParentsandDistrictofficialshavebuttedheadsnumeroustimesovertheyears,anincidentthatoccurredin
Februaryof2012isofparticularrelevanceforpurposesofthismotion.OnthemorningofFebruary10,2012,Pollackmetwith
PatrickMoore,RSU75'sdirectorofspecialeducation,andKellyAllen,B.P.'scasemanager.DSF711,40.Duringthemeeting:
PollackwasinformedthatQuirionhadbeen"spying"onacommunityfieldtriptoapubliclibrary.Pollackcalled
Quirionimmediatelywhoinsistedthatshehadsimplygottencaughtbehindtheschoolbusonherwaytothe
grocerystore.Laterthatmorning,QuirionemailedMooreandAllenascannedcopyofhertimestampedgrocery
receipttorefutetheaccusation.
DSF40.Moorelaterapologizedforthemisunderstanding.DSF41.
WhenQuirionpickedupB.P.attheendofschoolthatday,heacteduncharacteristicallyupsetandcriedforapproximatelyan
hourandahalf.DSF42.PollackandQuirionsoughtanexplanationforB.P.'saberrantbehavior,buttheschoolwasunableto
provideone.DSF4344,4748.NoneofthestaffmemberswhoworkedwithB.P.thatdayreportednoticinganythingunusual.
DSF47.Quirioncametosuspecttheremightbeaconnectionbetweentheaccusationthatshehadbeen"spying"onthefield
tripandB.P.'scryingspell.[1]DSF49.
InMarchof2012,QuirionfirstwrotealettertoschoolofficialsinformingthemthatsheplannedtosendB.P.toschoolwithan
audiorecordingdevicesoshecould"haveasemblanceofpeacethatheissafe."DSF78.AnRSU75attorneysentQuiriona
letterthefollowingdayinformingherthattheDistrictwouldnotallowB.P.toattendschoolwitharecordingdevice.DSF81.The
letterstatedthatpermittingB.P.torecordatschoolwouldviolatetheDistrict'spersonalelectronicspolicies,astatewiretap
statute,otherstudents'personalprivacyrights,andtheschool'scollectivebargainingagreementwithitsteachers.[2]DSF81.
OnJune12,2012,QuirionwrotealettertoBillZima,Mt.AraratMiddleSchool'sprincipal,againrequestingthatB.P.beallowedto
weararecordingdevicetoschool"asanaccommodationundertheADA."DSF83.QuirionspecificallyaskedthattheDistrict
"provideareasonableaccommodationfor[B.P.]'scommunicationdisabilitybyallowinghimtocarryanduseavoicerecording
devicesothat[she]canreviewitdailyforannouncementsandotherinformationthatthestudentsareexpectedtoconveytotheir
parents,aswellasfor[B.P.]tobeableto`tell'[her]abouthisdayatschool."DSF344."OnJuly13,2012,PatrickMoore
acknowledgedQuirion'sJune12,2012,letter,`assuringherthathewouldreviewherADArequestandscheduleatimetomeet.'"
DSF84.Quirionwrotebackthenextdaytosayshewouldbewillingtoattendsuchameetingbutwantedtoknowtheagenda
aheadoftime.DSF84."Ifthepointofameetingistoaskmetowithdrawmyrequest,Iwillnotwithdrawit,"shewrote.DSF84.
OnAugust30,2012,withanewschoolyearabouttostart,QuirionemailedMooreandZimatotellthemthatshewouldinterpret
theirfailuretorespondasanimplicitapprovalofherrequest.DSF85.MoorewrotebackimmediatelytorequestthatQuirionnot
sendB.P.toschoolwitharecordingdevice.DSF86.Moorealsowrote:
IwouldliketheIEPteamtoreviewthisaccommodationrequestandhaveanIEPdeterminationpriortoanyaction
onyourpart.IftheIEPteamdecidesthattheaccommodationisnecessaryandreasonable,requestapproved.If
not,youhavetheopportunityforallyourdueprocesssafeguards.
DSF347.QuiriondeclinedtheofferofanIEPmeeting.SummaryJudgmentRecord("SJR")6415(ECFNo.1997).ToQuirion,
therequestfortherecordingdeviceasanADAaccommodationwasdifferentfromaneducationalaccommodationunderthe
IDEA.DSF348.Sheexplainedthat"[w]hether[B.P.]isentitledtousethedeviceasanaccommodationforhisdisabilitythat
preventshimfromtellinguswhathappenedinschoolisaseparatequestionfromwhetherthedeviceisnecessarytofurtherhis
education."DSF348.
OnSeptember1,2012,MooresentQuirionaletterreiteratingtheDistrict'searlierobjections,asoutlinedintheMarch6,2012
letterfromDistrictcounsel.DSF87.Moore'sletterconcludedbystatingthattheDistrict"didnotgivepermissionforB.P.toattend
schoolwitharecordingdevice....IfB.P.comestoschoolwithsuchadevicewewillaskyoutoremovethedevice,andifyouare
notwillingtoremovethedevice,youwillneedtotakeB.P.home."SJR6418(ECFNo.1997)DSF351.
Twoyearslater,inSeptemberof2014,Pollackmade"anotherADArequesttoequipB.P.witharecordingdeviceorbodycamera
tobeabletotellPlaintiffswhathappenstohiminschool."DSF91.TheDistrictrespondedby"requestingadditionalinformation,
andremindingPlaintiffsoftheconcernstheDistricthasexpressedabouttheimpactontheeducationalenvironment,andthe
problemstheDistrictfacesinprotectingtherightsandconfidentialityofotherstudentsandemployeesandrequestedproposals
foraddressingthoseconcerns."DSF92.
InNovemberof2014,PollackprovidedSuperintendentSmithwithinformationregardingthebodycameraandrecordingdevice
anddisputedtheDistrict's"viewsconcerningtheimpactontheeducationalenvironment,andconfidentialityofstaffandother
students."DSF93.SmithrespondedinJanuaryof2015,writingthat"hedisagreedwithPollack'sassertionthatthepresenceof
audioandvideorecordingdevicesonB.P.wouldhavenoimpactontheeducationalenvironment,oftheconcernsaboutthe
impactthatsuchdeviceshavehadandwillhaveontheeducatorsintheschool,andindicatedhiswillingnesstomeetwith
Pollackinearly2015todiscussPollack'srequest."DSF94.SmithdidnotreceivearesponsefromtheParentsregardinghis
invitationtomeet.DSF95.
IndenyingtheParents'requestsforB.P.toweararecordingdevice,theDistricthasconsistentlyrelieduponitswrittenpolicy
coveringemployeeandstudentuseofcellulartelephonesandotherprivatelyownedelectronicdevices.SJR6151(ECFNo.
1996)DSF332.Thepolicyprovides:
4.Allstudentsareprohibitedfromusingprivatelyownedelectronicdevices,includingbutnotlimitedtocellular
telephones,Blackberries,IPhones,handheldcomputers,MP3playersandelectronicgamesduringclasses,study
halls,assembliesandotherschoolactivities.
a.Duringclassesandschoolactivities,allsuchdevicesmustbeturnedoff.
b.Theonlyexceptiontothisruleiswhenateacherorstaffmemberspecificallyauthorizesstudentstousea
personalelectronicdeviceforaspecificschoolpurpose(suchasenteringanassignmentinaPDA).
c.Ifthisruleisviolated,theteachermayreferthestudenttoadministration,orimmediatelyconfiscatethedevice
fortheremainderoftheschoolday,orboth.Disciplinemaybeimposedasprovidedbelow.
SJR6151(ECFNo.1996).TheDistricthasdisciplinedstudentsforunauthorizeduseofelectronicdevices.DSF104.[3]The
DistricthasnotpermittedB.P.tousearecordingdevicebecauseitdeterminedtherecordingwasnotforaninstructionalbenefit
and"thepurposeofthepolicyistosupporttheteachingandlearningenvironment."DSF101.[4]TheDistrictalsohad"concerns
abouttheeducationalefficacyandnecessity"oftherecordingdeviceanditsimpactonstaffandotherstudents.DSF102.[5]
Students,however,havebeenpermittedtomakerecordingsforeducationalpurposes,suchasrecordingspecificlessonswith
thepermissionoftheirteacherssothattheycanrefertotheaudioafterclass.DSF103,339.Atleastonestudent'sIEP
permittedandencouragedtheuseofarecordingdeviceinclassesduringschoolasanaccommodation.DSF341.B.P.,too,
waspermittedtousetwoelectronicdevicesatschool.DSF338.Formanyyears,B.P.usedanelectronicexpressive
communicationdevice("Vantage").DSF333.TheVantageisusedtoassistB.P.todevelopandutilizecommunicationabilities.
DSF335.B.P.usedthedeviceoftenduringhisschoolday,andseveralofhisIEPgoalsreferencedhisuseoftheVantage.DSF
33435.B.P.alsocarriedapersonallyownedAmberAlertGPSdevicemostdaysatschoolduringthe20132014schoolyear.
DSF336.
TheParentswantB.P.toweartherecordingdevicesothattheycanlearnabouthisday,thusfacilitatingtheirabilitytoadvocate
onhisbehalf,andto"discoverandidentifyanymistreatmentorabusebyschoolpersonnelorotherstudents."DSF35557.
Parentsdonotintendtolistentoalloftherecordingseveryday,butratherplantostoretherecordings.Theystatetheymight
listentothemtotrytodecipherwhathappenedatschoolifandwhentheyneedtoadvocateforB.P.andhiseducationor
randomlytoseewhatB.P.'sdayislike.DSF109.
PROCEDURALHISTORY
ThePlaintiffsfiledtwosuitsinthisCourt,thefirstinMarchof2013andthesecondinMayof2014.Thecaseswereconsolidated
onOctober23,2014.Afterabarrageofearlymotionpractice,thepartiesfiledcrossmotionsforsummaryjudgmentinSeptember
of2015onthePlaintiffs'claimsthattheDistrictviolatedtheAmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(the"ADA"),Section504ofthe
RehabilitationAct("Section504"or"theRehabilitationAct"),andtheFirstAmendmentbyrefusingtoallowB.P.towearanaudio
recordingdevicethroughouthisschoolday.IgrantedtheDistrict'smotiononJanuary27,2016,holdingthatthePlaintiffsfailedto
exhausttheIndividualswithDisabilitiesEducationAct("IDEA")administrativeprocessasrequiredby20U.S.C.1415(1).ECF
No.217.ThePlaintiffsfiledanoticeofappealinAprilof2016.
OnJanuary5,2016,beforeIruledontheparties'crossmotions,PollackfiledanewdueprocesscomplaintwiththeMaine
DepartmentofEducation.Inthehearingrequest,PollackallegedthattheDistrictfailedtopermitB.P.tocarryarecordingdevice
atschoolandsoughtanorderrequiringtheDistricttoallowB.P.tocarryandusearecordingdeviceforhisentireschoolday.
Def.'sSupp.StatementofFacts34("DSSF")(ECFNo.271).PollackclaimedthattheDistrictwasrequiredundertheIDEA,the
RehabilitationAct,theADA,andtheFirstAmendmenttoprovideareasonableaccommodationofallowingB.P.tousea
recordingdevice.DSSF56.
InMarchof2016,athreedayspecialeducationdueprocesshearingwasheld.DSSF13.Atthehearing,theMaine
DepartmentofEducationHearingOfficer("DPHO")statedthattheissue"withrespecttotherecordingdevicewas`whether
[B.P.'s]IEPshouldincludetheuseofsupplementaryaidstoproperlyprotecthimatschoolandallowhimtoeffectively
communicateandadvocateforhimself.'"DSSF14.[6]Elevenwitnessestestifiedunderoathatthehearing,includingPollack
andQuirion.DSSF18.Pollack"introducedevidence,testified,questionedwitnesses,andmadelegalargumentswithrespectto
therecordingdeviceclaim."DSSF1517.Inhiswrittenclosingargument,Pollackstatedthattherecordingdevicewas
necessarybecauseB.P."mustbeabletogatherandcommunicateto[hisparents]hisowninformationaboutwhathappensto
himatschool"andthat,becauseofB.P.'s"communicationdisabilitiesandhisinabilitytoanswerquestionsabouteventsthat
havehappenedtohim,theonlymechanismthat[B.P.]hastoprotecthimselfandadvocateforhimselfistorecordhisdayat
schoolsothathecan`tell'uswhathappened."DSSF2021.
TheDPHOissuedherdecisiononMay31,2016.DSSF23.SheheldthatB.P.wasreceivingFAPE.Underlyingthisconclusion
wereherfindingsthatB.P.hadbeengoingtoschoolfor12yearsintheDistrict"withoutarecordingdevice,andthroughouthis
entireeducationalcareer,hehasbeenhappy,haslovedschool,andhasmadecontinuousandsignificantprogress."DPHODec.
41(ECFNo.2541).SheobservedthattheDistricthadprovidedtheParentswiththehighestlevelofdetailaboutastudent'sday
thatshehadseenin14yearspresidingoverdueprocessdisputes.DPHODec.41.Notingthattherehadonlybeen"ahandfulof
incidentsofconcerntotheParents"andthattheParentsstatedunderoaththattheyfeltB.P.wassafeatschool,shedetermined
thattherecordingdevicewasnotneededforB.P.'ssafety.DPHODec.41.
Furthermore,theDPHOfoundthattherecordingdevicewasnotneededforB.P.tobenefiteducationally.Tothecontrary,she
notedthat"[t]hereisawealthofevidencefrombotheducatorsandtheparentofanotherchildwithautism...thattherecording
deviceactuallywouldbedisruptiveanddetrimentaltotheeducationof[B.P.]andwouldinterferewiththelearningprocess."
DPHODec.42.Basedontheevidenceputforthatthehearing,shefoundthatpermittingB.P.toweararecordingdeviceat
schoolwould"interferewithhisabilitytoreceiveFAPE."DPHODec.42.ShenotedthatPollackwas"unabletostatehowor
whethertheParentswouldusetherecordings."DPHODec.42.Thus,shefoundthattherewas"nodemonstrablebenefit"tothe
recordingdevice,and"thereisthepotentialforharm."DPHODec.42.ThePlaintiffsdidnotappealtheDPHO'sdecision.DSSF
26.
InSeptemberof2016,theDistrictnotifiedtheCourtofAppealsfortheFirstCircuitoftheDPHO'sdecision.Accordingly,theFirst
Circuitdismissedtheappealasmoot,vacatedtheportionofmyordergrantingtheDistrictsummaryjudgmentforfailingto
exhaustontheADA,Section504,andFirstAmendmentclaims,andremandedthecasetomefordeterminationoftheseclaims
onthemerits.Pollackv.Reg'lSch.Unit75,660F.App'x1,3(1stCir.2016).
DISCUSSION
I.ADAandSection504oftheRehabilitationAct
ThePlaintiffsclaimthattheDistrict'srefusaltoallowB.P.toweartherecordingdeviceviolatedtheADAandSection504ofthe
RehabilitationAct.TheDistrictcontendsthattheseclaimsarebarredbyresjudicata.
A.OverviewoftheLaw
TitleIIoftheADA,whichappliestopublicschools,providesthat"noqualifiedindividualwithadisabilityshall,byreasonofsuch
disability,beexcludedfromparticipationinorbedeniedthebenefitsoftheservices,programs,oractivitiesofapublicentity,or
besubjectedtodiscriminationbyanysuchentity."42U.S.C.12132.Similarly,504oftheRehabilitationActprovidesthat"[n]o
otherwisequalifiedindividualwithadisability...shall,solelybyreasonofherorhisdisability,beexcludedfromtheparticipation
in,bedeniedthebenefitsof,orbesubjectedtodiscriminationunderanyprogramoractivityreceivingFederalfinancial
assistance."29U.S.C.794.AlthoughtherearedifferencesbetweenTitleIIand504,thetwostatutesareinterpreted
consistently.SeeTheriaultv.Flynn,162F.3d46,48n.3(1stCir.1998).Thus,liketheparties,Ianalyzethestatutesintandem.
ThePlaintiffsassertafailuretomodifytheoryofliability.ToestablishafailuretomodifyclaimunderTitleII,aplaintiffmustshow:
(1)thatheisaqualifiedindividualwithadisability(2)thathewasexcludedfromparticipatingin,ordeniedthe
benefitsofapublicentity'sservices,programs,oractivitiesorwasotherwisediscriminatedagainstand(3)that
suchexclusion,denialofbenefits,ordiscriminationwasbyreasonofhisdisability.
Kimanv.N.H.Dep'tofCorrs.,451F.3d274,283(1stCir.2006)(quotingParkerv.UniversidaddeP.R.,225F.3d1,5(1stCir.
2000))."Anentitydiscriminatesagainstadisabledindividualwhenitfailstomakereasonablemodificationsforthatperson."
Darianv.Univ.ofMass.Boston,980F.Supp.77,84(D.Mass.1997)."TorecovercompensatorydamagesundereitherTitleIIor
Section504,aplaintiffmustdemonstratethatthe[publicentity]intentionallydiscriminatedagainstherandcausedhereconomic
harm."Kelleyv.Mayhew,973F.Supp.2d31,36(D.Me.2013)(citingNievesMrquezv.PuertoRico,353F.3d108,126(1stCir.
2003)).
ThedutiesofapublicentityareoutlinedintheregulationspromulgatedbytheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeunder42U.S.C.
12134(a).Theregulationsprovidethat:
Apublicentity,inprovidinganyaid,benefit,orservice,maynot...[a]ffordaqualifiedindividualwithadisabilityan
opportunitytoparticipateinorbenefitfromtheaid,benefit,orservicethatisnotequaltothataffordedothers...
[or][p]rovideaqualifiedindividualwithadisabilitywithanaid,benefit,orservicethatisnotaseffectiveinaffording
equalopportunitytoobtainthesameresult.
28C.F.R.35.130(b)(1)(ii)(iii).[7]Furthermore,apublicentitymust"makereasonablemodificationsinpolicies,practices,or
procedureswhenthemodificationsarenecessarytoavoiddiscriminationonthebasisofdisability,unlessthepublicentitycan
demonstratethatmakingthemodificationswouldfundamentallyalterthenatureoftheservice,program,oractivity."28C.F.R.
35.130(b)(7)(i).
1.ModificationsNecessaryforMeaningfulAccess
"TheprotectionaffordedbytheADAischaracterizedasaguaranteeof`meaningfulaccess'togovernmentbenefitsand
programs."Theriault,162F.3dat48(quotingAlexanderv.Choate,469U.S.287,301(1985)."Meaningfulaccess"meansan
equalopportunitytogainanequalbenefit,notequalresults.Choate,469U.S.at72122seealsoTheriault,162F.3dat48.
Inafailuretoaccommodatecase,aplaintiffmustshowthattherequestedaccommodation"wasneededtoprovide`meaningful
accesstoapublicservice.'"[8]Nunes,766F.3dat145(quotingHenriettaD.v.Bloomberg,331F.3d261,27376(2dCir.2003)).
"Itnaturallyfollowsthatwhenanindividualalreadyhas`meaningfulaccess'toabenefittowhichheorsheisentitled,no
additionalaccommodation,`reasonable'ornot,needbeprovidedbythegrantee."A.M.exrel.J.M.v.NYCDep'tofEduc.,840F.
Supp.2d660,680(E.D.N.Y.2012),aff'd,513F.App'x95(2dCir.2013)seealsoPGATour,Inc.v.Martin,532U.S.661,682
(2001)(explainingindictainaTitleIII[9]casethatsometimes"anaccommodationmightbereasonablebutnotnecessary").
Thus,"anyrequestedaccommodationmustfirstbedeemednecessarytoensureanindividualwithdisabilitieshas`meaningful
access'tothebenefitinquestion."A.M.exrel.J.M.,840F.Supp.2dat680(citingSe.Cmty.Coll.v.Davis,442U.S.397,410
(1979)).
2.ReasonableAccommodation
Inordertoensuremeaningfulaccess,apublicentitymayneedtomakereasonableaccommodations."Reasonableness
`dependsontheindividualcircumstancesofeachcase,andrequiresafactspecific,individualizedanalysisofthedisabled
individual'scircumstancesandtheaccommodationsthatmightallowhimto[enjoymeaningfulaccesstotheprogram.]"MarkH.v.
Hamamoto,620F.3d1090,1098(9thCir.2010)(quotingVinsonv.Thomas,288F.3d1145,1154(9thCir.2002))(alterationin
original).Anaccommodationisnotreasonableifitimposesanundueburdenonthepublicentityorrequiresittosubstantially
alteritsprogram.28C.F.R.35.130(b)(7)(i).Theplaintiffbearstheinitialburdenofdemonstratingthattherequested
accommodationisreasonable,i.e.feasibleonitsfaceunderthecircumstances.Reedv.LePageBakeries,Inc.,244F.3d254,
259(1stCir.2001)(TitleIemploymentcase).Theburdenthenshiftstothedefendanttoshowthattheaccommodationwould
imposeanunduehardshiporrequireafundamentalalterationofitsprograms.Id.
TheADAisintentionallybroadinscope,butitdoesnotrequirepublicentitiestoprovideeveryrequestedaccommodation.A
plaintiffisentitledonly"toreasonableaccommodations,nottooptimalonesfinelytunedtohispreferences."Nunes,766F.3dat
146."Otherwise,arequestedservicewouldautomaticallybetransformedintoa`necessary'servicemerelybythefactthatitwas
requested."Martinv.HalifaxHealthcareSys.,Inc.,621F.App'x594,602(11thCir.2015).
3.EffectiveCommunicationsRegulation
Theinquiryinto"meaningfulaccess"is"guidedbytherelevantregulationsinterpretingTitleII."K.M.exrel.Brightv.TustinUnified
SchoolDistrict,725F.3d1088,1102(9thCir.2013).Atissueinthiscaseisthesocalledeffectivecommunicationsregulation.28
C.F.R.35.160.[10]Theeffectivecommunicationsregulationhastwocomponents.First,apublicentitymust"takeappropriate
stepstoensurethatcommunicationswithapplicants,participants,membersofthepublic,andcompanionswithdisabilitiesareas
effectiveascommunicationswithothers."28C.F.R.35.160(a)(1).Second,apublicentitymust"furnishappropriateauxiliary
aidsandserviceswherenecessarytoaffordindividualswithdisabilities,includingapplicants,participants,companions,and
membersofthepublic,anequalopportunitytoparticipatein,andenjoythebenefitsof,aservice,program,oractivityofapublic
entity."28C.F.R.35.160(b)(1)."Thetypeofauxiliaryaidorservicenecessarytoensureeffectivecommunicationwillvaryin
accordancewiththemethodofcommunicationusedbytheindividualthenature,length,andcomplexityofthecommunication
involvedandthecontextinwhichthecommunicationistakingplace."28C.F.R.35.160(b)(2).And"[i]ndeterminingwhattype
ofauxiliaryaidandserviceisnecessary,apublicentityshallgiveprimaryconsiderationtotherequestsoftheindividualwith
disabilities."28C.F.R.35.160(b)(2).However,apublicentityneednot"takeanyactionthatitcandemonstratewouldresultina
fundamentalalterationinthenatureofaservice,program,oractivityorinunduefinancialandadministrativeburdens."28C.F.R.
35.164.
B.ApplicationoftheLawtotheFacts
1.ApplicabilityoftheEffectiveCommunicationRegulation
TheDistrictcontendsthatthePlaintiffs'relianceontheeffectivecommunicationsregulationismisplaced.Itarguesthat,"the
regulationrequiresthatapublicentityensurethatthepublicentity'scommunicationswithindividualswithdisabilitiesare
effective."Defs.'Opp'ntoPls.'Mot.forSumm.J.6(ECFNo.166).ThereisnoauthoritysupportingthePlaintiffs'position,the
Districtargues,"thattheregulationrequiresapublicentitytoprovideauxiliaryaidsandservicestofacilitateeffective
communicationsbetweenastudentwithadisabilityandthatstudent'sparents,occurringinprivateandoutsideofschool,after
theschooldayisdone."Defs.'Opp'ntoPls.'Mot.forSumm.J.6.
Onitsface,theregulationestablishesaframeworktoensurethatadisabledindividualcaneffectivelycommunicatewith,receive
informationfrom,andconveyinformationto,apublicentity.Theregulationrequires"[a]publicentity"to"ensurethat
communicationswith...participants...withdisabilitiesareaseffectiveascommunicationswithothers."28C.F.R.35.160(a)
(1).Further,"[a]publicentity"must"furnishappropriateauxiliaryaidsandserviceswherenecessarytoaffordindividualswith
disabilities...anequalopportunitytoparticipatein,andenjoythebenefitsof,aservice,program,oractivityofapublicentity."
35.160(b)(1).
Theregulationalsoappliesto"companions,"butitisreferringtocompanionswithdisabilities.35.160(a)(1).Theregulations
interpretiveguidanceexplainsthatapublicentitywouldhaveadutytoprovideeffectivecommunicationtocompanionswith
disabilitiesinthefollowingsettings:
[S]ituationsincludebacktoschoolnightsorparentteacherconferencesatapublicschool.Ifthefacultywriteson
theboardorotherwisedisplaysinformationinavisualcontextduringabacktoschoolnight,thisinformationmust
becommunicatedeffectivelytoparentsorguardianswhoareblindorhavelowvision....Itmakesnodifference
thatthechildwhoattendstheschooldoesnothaveadisability.
28C.F.R.Pt.35,App.A.Astheseexamplesdemonstrate,theregulationrequiresapublicentitytoprovideappropriateauxiliary
aidsandservicestoensurethatitscommunicationswithcompanionswithdisabilitiesareaseffectiveascommunicationswith
others.
ThePlaintiffsreadtheregulationasrequiringtheDistricttoensurethatB.P.'scommunicationwithhisparentsabouthisschool
dayisaseffectiveasnondisabledstudents.Pls.'Opp'ntoDefs.'Mot.forSumm.J.7("Pls.'Opp'n")(ECFNo.164).Butthisreading
oftheregulationextendsitsreachbeyondtheschoolhousedoorstocommunicationsbetweenparentandchildoutsideofthe
schoolsetting.ThePlaintiffshavenotcited,andIhavenotfound,anyauthoritysupportingsuchanexpansivereadingofthe
regulation.
ThePlaintiffsmarshalseveralargumentsastowhytheregulationappliestothefactsofthiscase,butnonearepersuasive.The
Plaintiffs'primaryargumentreliesonregulatoryguidanceforthepropositionthattheregulation"appliesnotjustto
communicationsoccurringwithintheschool,butalsotoastudent'sschoolrelatedcommunicationswithhisorherparents."Pls.'
Mot.forSumm.J.5(citingU.S.Depts.ofEduc.&Justice,FrequentlyAskedQuestionsonEffectiveCommunicationsforStudents
withHearing,Vision,orSpeechDisabilitiesinPublicelementaryandSecondary,at4(Nov.2014)("FAQ")).BytakingtheFAQout
ofcontext,thePlaintiffshavemischaracterizedtheagencies'guidance.TheFAQexplainsthattheregulation's
requirementsapplytoallofastudent'sschoolrelatedcommunications,notjustthosewithteachersorschool
personnel.Therefore,giventheongoingexchangesstudentsexperiencewithteachers,students,coaches,and
schoolofficials,anystudentwhorequiresasignlanguageinterpreterinordertoreceiveeffectivecommunication
inanacademicclasswouldlikelyneedinterpreterservicesthroughoutthedayandmayalsoneedthemto
participateinschoolsponsoredextracurricularactivities.
FAQ4.Inthesesettings,theregulationisnotlimitedtocommunicationswithteachersorpersonnel.Readincontext,the
"schoolrelatedcommunications"discussedintheFAQrelatetoaccommodationsneededforcommunicationstakingplace
duringtheschooldayoratschoolsponsoredextracurricularactivities.ThePlaintiffs'readingextends"schoolrelated
communications"wellbeyondtheregulatoryguidance.Inmyview,thePlaintiffsstretchtoofarintryingtobringthiscasewithin
theeffectivecommunicationregulation.
2.ResJudicata
ThePlaintiffsmaintainthattheDistrictviolatedtheADAbecauseitsrefusaltoallowB.P.toweararecordingdevice"hasdeprived
B.P.oftheopportunitytocommunicatewithhisparentsabouthappeningsatschoolaseffectivelyashispeerswithoutdisabilities
throughitsfailureeithertomodifyitspolicyprohibitingtheuseof`privatelyowned'electronicdevicesortoprovideanauxiliary
aidintheformofapersonalvoicerecorder."Pls.'Opp'n12.Theycontendthat:
ThisdeprivationpreventsB.P.'sparentsfrombeingascapableasparentsofnondisabledstudentstoadvocateon
hisbehalf,therebydeprivinghimofanequallyeffectiveopportunitytoparticipateintheDistrict'sbenefitsor
services,toobtainthesameresultfromthoseservices,togainthesamebenefitsfromthoseservices,ortoenjoya
"privilege,advantage,oropportunity"theabilitytocommunicatewithparentsanyproblemsorconcerns
experiencedatschoolandthereforetohavehisparentsadvocateforhim"enjoyedbyothersreceivingthe...
benefitorservice."
Pls.'Opp'n12.Accordingly,thePlaintiffs'argumentisthattherecordingdeviceisneededtoprovideB.P.withequallyeffective
parentaladvocacysothathecanenjoythesamequalityofpublicschoolservicesashisnondisabledpeers.
TheDistrictarguesthatthisclaimisforeclosedbytheDPHO'sdecisionunderprinciplesofresjudicata."[T]heSupremeCourt
hasinstructedthat`federalcourtsmustgivethe[state]agency'sfactfindingthesamepreclusiveeffecttowhichitwouldbeentitled
intheState'scourts.'"BathIronWorksCorp.v.Dir.,OfficeofWorkers'Comp.Programs,125F.3d18,21(1stCir.1997)(quoting
Univ.ofTenn.v.Elliott,478U.S.788,799(1986)).ThepriordecisionatissuewasrenderedbyaMaineadministrativeagency,so
Mainelawgovernsthepreclusionanalysis.InMaine,"decisionsofstateandmunicipaladministrativeagenciesare...accorded
thesamefinalitythatattachestojudicialjudgments."HebronAcad.,Inc.v.TownofHebron,60A.3d774,783(Me.2013)see
alsoTownofBoothbayv.Jenness,822A.2d1169,1175(Me.2003)."Thedoctrineofresjudicataliterally,`thingadjudged'is
acourtmadecollectionofrulesdesignedtoensurethatthesamematterwillnotbelitigatedmorethanonce."Beeganv.Schmidt,
451A.2d642,64344(Me.1982).Thedoctrineiscomprisedoftwocomponents:issuepreclusionandclaimpreclusion.[11]
Macomberv.MacQuinnTweedie,834A.2d131,138(Me.2003).Issuepreclusionisthecomponentatissueinthiscase.
Sometimesreferredtoascollateralestoppel,issuepreclusionisbasedon"thefundamentalprinciplethatcourtsshouldnot
revisitfactualmattersthatapartypreviouslylitigatedandanothercourtactuallydecided."Millerv.Nichols,586F.3d53,60(1st
Cir.2009).Issuepreclusion"applieswhen(1)theidenticalfactualissuewasdecidedbyapriorfinaljudgment,and(2)theparty
tobeestoppedhadanopportunityandanincentivetolitigatetheissueatthepriorproceeding."Statev.Hughes,863A.2d266,
268(Me.2004)."Thedoctrineprecludescourtsfromrevisitingfactualmattersthatmeetthistest,evenwhenasecondaction
seeksadifferentremedythantheinitiallitigation."Miller,586F.3dat60.Thepartyassertingissuepreclusion"hastheburdenof
demonstratingthatthespecificissuewasactuallydecidedintheearlierproceeding."Macomber,834A.2dat140.
TheDPHOheldthattheDistrict'sactionsinnotpermittingB.P.toweararecordingdevicewhileatschooldidnotdeprivehimofa
FAPE.DPHODec.42,46.ThefactualfindingsunderlyingthisholdingwerethattherecordingdevicewouldinterferewithB.P.'s
abilitytoreceiveaFAPE,wasnotneededforhissafety,andwasnotnecessaryforhimtobenefiteducationally.DPHODec.41
42.AndalthoughtheDPHOacknowledgedPollack'sargumentthattherecordingdevicewasneededsothatB.P.couldgather
andcommunicateinformationtohisParentsaboutwhathappensatschoolsotheycan"fullyadvocate"forhim,shefoundthat
thedeviceprovidednodemonstrablebenefittoB.P.,andconcludedthatthedevicewouldbedisruptiveanddetrimentaltohis
education.DPHODec.42.
TheDPHO'sdecisionispreclusiveherebecausethefactualissuesinthiscaseareidenticaltotheissuesdecidedbytheDPHO.
ThethrustofthePlaintiffs'claimatboththedueprocesshearingandhereisthattheDistrictwasrequiredtoallowB.P.tousea
recordingdevicesothathecouldmeaningfullyaccessandbenefitfromtheDistrict'sprogramsandservices.Bothbeforethe
DPHOandhere,thePlaintiffs'theoryhasbeenthatB.P.needsthedevicetocommunicatehisdaytohisParentssothattheycan
effectivelyadvocatetotheDistrictonhisbehalf.ComparePollack'sclosingargumentatthedueprocesshearing,DSSF21
("Givenhiscommunicationdisabilities,andhisinabilitytoanswerquestionsabouteventsthathavehappenedtohim,theonly
mechanismthat[B.P.]hastoprotecthimselfandadvocateforhimselfistorecordhisdayatschoolsothathecan`tell'uswhat
happened."),withPls.'Opp'n1011("B.P.cannottellhisparentsanythingaboutwhathappensduringhisdayatschool.Forhim
tohavethebenefitofparentaladvocacyforhiseducationequaltothatofstudentswithoutsuchacommunicationdisability...
[theParents]mustnotbeforcedtorelyoninformationprovidedbytheDistrict.").
ThePlaintiffsmustestablishthattherequestedaccommodationisreasonableandnecessarytogiveB.P.anequalopportunityto
participateinandbenefitfromtheschool'sprograms.GiventheDPHO'sfindingsthattherecordingdevicewouldnegatively
impactB.P.'seducation,IseenowaythatthePlaintiffscanmeettheirburdenofestablishingthatthedeviceisreasonableor
necessaryundertheADAandSection504.[12]
Inarguingtothecontrary,thePlaintiffsmakethreepoints.First,theyarguethatissuepreclusiondoesnotapply"becausethe
burdenhasshiftedfromthePlaintiffsintheadministrativehearingtotheDistrictinthisaction."Pls.'Resp.toDef.'sSupp.Mot.for
Summ.J.3("Pls.'Supp.Opp'n")(ECFNo.266).ThePlaintiffscorrectlypointoutthatissuepreclusionmaynotapplywherethere
hasbeenashiftintheburdenofproof.SeeCrawfordv.AlliedContainerCorp.,561A.2d1027,1028(Me.1989).Theburdenof
proof,however,hasnotshiftedonthisissue.AlthoughtheDistrictwouldhavetheburdenofprovingthattherequested
accommodationwouldresultinanundueburdenorafundamentalalteration,see28C.F.R.35.164,itisthePlaintiffs'burdento
showthattheaccommodationisnecessaryandreasonable.28C.F.R.35.130(b)(7)(i)seealsoNunes,766F.3dat145Dudley
v.HannafordBros.Co.,333F.3d299,307(1stCir.2003)(TitleIII).
Second,thePlaintiffsnotethatunderMainelaw,"issuepreclusionappliesonlyto`suchfactswithoutproofofwhichtheprior
decisioncouldnothavebeenrendered.'"Pls.'Supp.Opp'n7(quotingSewallv.Taylor,672F.Supp.542,544(D.Me.1987).
Giventhis,thePlaintiffscontendthatthefactsrelieduponbytheDistrictwere"unnecessarytothehearingofficer'sultimate
conclusionregardingFAPE"andarethereforenotpreclusive.Pls.'Supp.Opp'n8.Forinstance,thePlaintiffscontendthatthe
findingthatthedevicewouldbe"disruptiveordetrimentalarelogicallybeyondthehearingofficer'sdeterminationofwhetherB.P.
wasreceivingFAPEwithouttherecordingdevice."Pls.'Supp.Opp'n8.Idisagree.Giventheargumentsadvancedbythe
PlaintiffsatthedueprocesshearingastowhytherecordingdevicewasnecessaryforFAPE,theDPHO'sfactualfindingthatthe
devicewouldactuallyinterferewithB.P.'sabilitytoreceiveFAPEwasessentialtoherconclusion.[13]
Third,althoughthePlaintiffsacknowledgethat"ordinaryprinciplesofissueandclaimprecision"canapply"incasesraisingboth
IDEAandTitleIIclaimswheretheIDEAadministrativeappealsprocesshasfunctionallyadjudicatedsomeorallquestions
relevanttoaTitleIIclaiminawaythatprecludeslitigation,"theyarguethattheDPHO"couldnotandhasnotconsideredanyof
Plaintiffs'ADA/504arguments."Pls.'Supp.Opp'n5n.5(citingTustin,725F.3dat1101).Thisargumentmisconstruesthenatureof
issuepreclusionandignoreswhathappenedatthedueprocesshearing.UnderMainelaw,issuepreclusiondoesnotdepend
onthelegalclaimsassertedintheprioractionit"concernsfactualissues,andappliesevenwhenthetwoproceedingsoffer
differenttypesofremedies."PortlandWaterDist.v.TownofStandish,940A.2d1097,1100(Me.2008)seealsoMiller,586F.3d
at60.Thus,althoughtheDPHOdidnothavejurisdictiontoactonthePlaintiffs'disabilitydiscriminationclaims,thefacts
establishedinthepriorproceedingcanstillbepreclusivehere.See,e.g.,Siegemundv.Shapland,247F.Supp.2d1,5(D.Me.
2003)(explainingthatissuepreclusionmaystillbeavailableastofactsestablishedinthepriorproceedingeventhoughtheprior
courtdidnothavejurisdictiontoheartheclaimsatissue).
ThesecondprongofissuepreclusionaskswhetherthePlaintiffshadafairopportunityandincentivetolitigatetheissueinthe
priorproceeding."Apartyhasafairopportunitytolitigateanissueifthatpartyeithercontrolsthelitigation,substantially
participatesinthatlitigation,orcouldhaveparticipatedinthelitigationhadtheychosentodoso."Hughes,863A.2dat269.
GiventheextentoftheParents'involvementatthedueprocesshearing,thisprongisalsosatisfied.Cf.Miller,586F.3dat63("Itis
clearthatsinceplaintiffsactuallylitigatedtheissuesinstatecourt,theyhadbothincentiveandopportunitytopresentthe
claims.").
BecausetheDPHO'sfindingsprecludethePlaintiffsfromestablishingessentialelementsoftheirclaim,theDistrictisentitledto
summaryjudgmentonthePlaintiffs'claimsunderTitleIIoftheADAandSection504oftheRehabilitationAct.[14]
II.TheFirstAmendment
ThePlaintiffscontendthatB.P.hasaFirstAmendmentrighttorecordinschoolsothathecanprovidehisparentswiththe
informationnecessarytoallowthemtoadvocateonhisbehalf.TheDefendantsrespondthatthereisnoconstitutionallyprotected
righttorecordallday,everydayatschool.
A.TheGeneralFirstAmendmentFramework
ClaimsundertheFirstAmendmentareanalyzedinthreesteps.SeeCorneliusv.NAACPLegalDef.&Educ.Fund,473U.S.788,
797(1985).TheplaintiffmustfirstdemonstratethattheactivityatissueisprotectedbytheFirstAmendment.Clarkv.Cmty.for
CreativeNonViolence,468U.S.288,293n.5(1984).Second,iftheactivityatissueisprotected,thecontextoftheactivityis
analyzedinordertodeterminewhichFirstAmendmentstandardorstandardsapply.Cornelius,473U.S.at797.Andthird,the
Government'sjustificationforrestrictingtheactivityisexaminedtoensurethatitmeetstheapplicablestandard.Id.
B.ApplicationoftheGeneralFrameworktotheFactsoftheCase
1.StepOneIstheActivityProtected?
TheprotectionsaffordedbytheFirstAmendmentarenotlimitedtowrittenorspokenwords.Hurleyv.IrishAm.Gay,Lesbian&
BisexualGrp.ofBoston,515U.S.557,569(1995).TheFirstAmendmentalso"prohibit[s]governmentfromlimitingthestockof
informationfromwhichmembersofthepublicmaydraw."FirstNat'lBankofBostonv.Bellotti,435U.S.765,783(1978).Toguard
the"stockofinformation"fromwhichthepublicmaydraw,theFirstAmendmentalso"encompassesarangeofconductrelatedto
thegatheringanddisseminationofinformation."Glikv.Cunniffe,655F.3d78,82(1stCir.2011).
GatheringinformationthroughaudiorecordingisgenerallyprotectedbytheFirstAmendment.SeeAm.CivilLibertiesUnionofIll.
v.Alvarez,679F.3d583,595(7thCir.2012)seealsoMartinv.Evans,No.1611362PBS,2017WL1015000,at*7(D.Mass.
Mar.13,2017).And"[g]atheringinformationaboutgovernmentofficialsinaformthatcanreadilybedisseminatedtoothers
servesacardinalFirstAmendmentinterestinprotectingandpromoting`thefreediscussionofgovernmentalaffairs.'"Glik,655
F.3dat82(quotingMillsv.Alabama,384U.S.214,218(1966)).
InGlik,theFirstCircuitfoundthattheFirstAmendmentencompassesarighttomakeaudiovisualrecordingsofgovernment
officialsworkinginpublicplaces,subjecttoreasonabletime,place,andmannerrestrictionsnormallyallowedinpublicforums.
655F.3dat84.Thecourtheldthattheplaintiff,amemberofthepublicbutnotthepress,hadarighttofilmanarrestintheBoston
Commonwhichhethoughtwasexcessivelyforceful.Id.
ThePlaintiffsarguethattherightofB.P.toaudiorecordhisentireschoolday"isprotectedFirstAmendmentactivitybecauseitis
informationgatheringwithapotentialexpressiveuse."Pls.'Reply2(ECFNo.268).The"potentialexpressiveuse"isthe
subsequentdisseminationofinformationobtainedfromtherecordingbytheParentsasB.P.'snextfriend.ThePlaintiffscontend
thattheprimarypurposeoftherecordingistoidentifyandexposewrongdoinginB.P.'sclassroom.Pls.'Opp'n26.
TheDistrictmakesanargumentthattheParentshavenoFirstAmendmentprotectionbecausetheyhavenorightofaccesstothe
classroom.[15]AsforB.P.,theDistrictacknowledgesthathehasarighttobeintheclassroom,butitargueswithoutanalysisthat
B.P.'srightofaccessdoesnotincludearighttorecord.TheDistrictalsoclaimsthatbecausetheParents"havenoplansregularly
tolistento,letalonedisseminate,"therecordings,therecordingactivityispurelypersonalandenjoysnoFirstAmendment
protection.Defs.'Mot.forSumm.J.24.[16]
ContrarytotheDistrict'sargument,therearefactsintherecordwhichsupportthePlaintiffs'claimthattheyintendtoreviewand
disseminatetherecordingsiftheyfindthatB.P.isactingdifferentlyorhasanybruising,ashasoccurredontwopastoccasions.If
theyfoundthattherecordingssupportedtheirsuspicionsofmisconduct,theywoulddisseminatetherecordingsfurtherto
advocateagainsttheDistrict.SeeSJR530204(ECFNo.1991).
AtthemotiontodismissstageIsaidthat:
GlikseemstoanswertheDefendants'argumentthatthePlaintiffs'claimdoesnotimplicatetheFirstAmendmentat
all.WhileGlikmaybedistinguishablebecauseittookplaceinatraditionallypublicforumandonlyinvolvedthe
videotapingofasingleactofofficialabuse,thesedifferencesgotowhichFirstAmendmentstandardapplies,not
whethertheFirstAmendmentappliesatall.Ataminimum,Glikstandsfortheprinciplethatproducingarecording
withaplantoshareitwithotherscanbeacommunicativeactandcarriesatleastsomeFirstAmendment
protection.
Pollackv.RegionalSchoolUnit75,12F.Supp.3d173,199(D.Me.2014).TheDistricthasnotpointedtoanyconvincing
authoritycallingthisconclusionintoquestion.[17]Ibelieveitmakessensetotreattherighttorecordasanactivityprotectedby
theFirstAmendmentatthefirststepoftheanalysis.BecauseIconcludethatthePlaintiffshaveestablishedthattherequested
activitycanbeconductprotectedbytheFirstAmendment,Iproceedtothesecondstepoftheanalysis.
2.StepTwoWhatistheAppropriateStandard?
Atthesecondstep,Imustanalyzethecontextinwhichtheactivityoccurredinordertodeterminetheappropriatestandardto
apply.Therelevantcontexthereisapublicschool.TheSupremeCourthasinstructedthatalthoughstudentsdonot"shedtheir
constitutionalrights...attheschoolhousegate,"Tinkerv.DesMoinesIndependentCommunitySchoolDistrict,393U.S.503,
506(1969),theFirstAmendmentmustbe"appliedinlightofthespecialcharacteristicsoftheschoolenvironment,"andthus
students'FirstAmendmentrights"arenotautomaticallycoextensivewiththerightsofadultsinothersettings."Morsev.Frederick,
551U.S.393,39697(2007).Reconcilingtheseprinciplesisnoeasytask.
ThepartiesarguefortheapplicationofdiverseFirstAmendmentstandards.ThePlaintiffs,citingGlik,contendthattheDistrictcan
restrictB.P.'srighttorecordinschoolonlyiftheDistrict'spolicyisareasonabletime,place,andmannerrestriction.Becausethey
believethattheDistrict'spolicyiscontentbasedandthatitisbeingappliedagainstthePlaintiffsbasedontheirviewpoint,the
Plaintiffscontendthatthepolicymust(butdoesnot)withstandstrictscrutiny.Alternatively,thePlaintiffsarguethatTinkersetsthe
standard.See393U.S.503.TinkerwasastudentspeechcasethatstandsforthepropositionthatschoolsmusthonortheFirst
Amendmentrightsofstudentsunlesstherewouldbesubstantialdisruptionormaterialinterferencewithschoolactivities.
PlaintiffscontendthattheDistricthasnotshownthattherecordingdevicewouldsubstantiallydisruptormateriallyinterferewith
schoolactivitiesunderTinker.Pls.'Mot.forPartialSumm.J.18.
Foritspart,theDistrictcontendsthatGlikisnotapplicablebecauseitislimitedtopublicforums.TheDistrictalsorejectsTinker,
characterizingitasan"expression"case,andarguesthatthiscaseisabout"rightofaccess"principles.TheDistrictreliesheavily
on"rightofaccess"casesassettingtheapplicablestandard.ItplacessignificantemphasisonS.H.A.R.K.v.MetroParksServing
SummitCounty,499F.3d553(6thCir.2007),whichappliedaformofrationalbasisreview.[18]TheDistrictadditionallyargues
thatitsregulationisneithercontentnorviewpointbasedandshouldbeupheldbecauseitisreasonableinlightofthepurposes
servedbytheforum.Finally,theDistrictarguesthatevenifTinkerdoesapply,itstillshouldprevailbecausetherecordingdevice
wouldsubstantiallydisruptschoolactivitiesandwouldimpingeonotherstudents'privacyrights.Def.'sOpp'ntoPls.'Suppl.Br.7
9(ECFNo.263).
a.ForumAnalysisandGlik
TheSupremeCourt'sdecisions"reflect,eitherimplicitlyorexplicitly,a`forumbased'approachforassessingrestrictionsthatthe
governmentseekstoplaceontheuseofitsproperty."Int'lSoc.forKrishnaConsciousness,Inc.v.Lee,505U.S.672,678(1992)
seealsoBernerv.Delahanty,129F.3d20,25n.4(1stCir.1997)("Generallyspeaking,thenatureoftheforuminwhichthe
speechisrestricteddictatesthelevelofscrutinyrequired.")."NothingintheConstitutionrequirestheGovernmentfreelytogrant
accesstoallwhowishtoexercisetheirrighttofreespeechoneverytypeofGovernmentpropertywithoutregardtothenatureof
thepropertyortothedisruptionthatmightbecausedbythespeaker'sactivities."Cornelius,473U.S.at799800.Instead,"[t]he
adequacyofthegovernment'sjustification"forcurtailingspeech"ismeasuredonaslidingscale."Berner,129F.3dat25n.4.
TheSupremeCourthasrecognizeddifferenttypesofforums."Atoneendofthespectrumarestreetsandparkswhichhave
immemoriallybeenheldintrustfortheuseofthepublic,and,timeoutofmind,havebeenusedforpurposesofassembly,
communicatingthoughtsbetweencitizens,anddiscussingpublicquestions."PerryEduc.Ass'nv.PerryLocalEducators'Ass'n,
460U.S.37,45(1983)(internalquotationsomitted).Inpublicforums,contentbasedrestrictions[19]mustsatisfystrictscrutiny,
andviewpointbasedrestrictions[20]areprohibited.WatchtowerBible&TractSoc'yofN.Y.,Inc.v.SagardiaDeJesus,634F.3d3,
11(1stCir.2011).Additionally,thestateisallowedto"enforceregulationsofthetime,place,andmannerofexpressionwhichare
contentneutral,arenarrowlytailoredtoserveasignificantgovernmentinterest,andleaveopenamplealternativechannelsof
communication."PerryEduc.Ass'n,460U.S.at45.
Attheotherendofthespectrumis"[p]ublicpropertywhichisnotbytraditionordesignationaforumforpubliccommunication."Id.
at46.Inthesenonpublicforums,thestatehasfargreaterleewaytolimitexpressiveactivity."Inadditiontotime,place,and
mannerregulations,thestatemayreservetheforumforitsintendedpurposes,communicativeorotherwise,aslongasthe
regulationonspeechisreasonableandnotanefforttosuppressexpressionmerelybecausepublicofficialsopposethe
speaker'sview."Id.Arestrictiononspeechinanonpublicforumcanbecontentbasedbutmuststillbeviewpointneutral.Seeid.
at49seealsoHotelEmployees&Rest.EmployeesUnion,Local100ofN.Y.,N.Y.&Vicinity,AFLCIOv.CityofN.Y.Dep'tof
Parks&Recreation,311F.3d534,553(2dCir.2002).
ThequestionpresentedinGlikwas"fairlynarrow:isthereaconstitutionallyprotectedrighttovideotapepolicecarryingouttheir
dutiesinpublic?"655F.3dat82.Thepublicnatureofthevenue"theoldestcityparkintheUnitedStatesandtheapotheosisof
apublicforum"wasreiteratedthroughouttheopinion.Id.at84."Insuchtraditionalpublicspaces,therightsofthestatetolimit
theexerciseofFirstAmendmentactivityare`sharplycircumscribed.'"Glik,655F.3dat84(quotingPerryEduc.Ass'n,460U.S.at
45(emphasisadded)).Glikdidnotapplyaspecialconstitutionalstandardbecausetheactivityatissuewasrecordingratherthan
speech.Instead,Glikusedtraditionalprinciplesofforumanalysis,andtheoutcomewasdependentonthenatureoftheforum.
[21]
TheDistricturgesmetorejectGlikandapplyrationalbasisreviewonthegroundthattheschoolisanonpublicforum.Public
schoolsarenotconsideredpublicforums,andthey"maybedeemedtobepublicforumsonlyifschoolauthoritieshave`bypolicy
orbypractice'openedthosefacilities`forindiscriminateusebythegeneralpublic,'orbysomesegmentofthepublic,suchas
studentorganizations."HazelwoodSch.Dist.v.Kuhlmeier,484U.S.260,267(1988)(quotingPerry,460U.S.at46,47n.7
(1983))."Ifthefacilitieshaveinsteadbeenreservedforotherintendedpurposes,`communicativeorotherwise,'thennopublic
forumhasbeencreated,andschoolofficialsmayimposereasonablerestrictionsonthespeechofstudents,teachers,andother
membersoftheschoolcommunity."Id.(quotingPerry,460U.S.at46n.7).Here,thereisnothingintherecordindicatingthat
B.P.'sschoolhasbeenopenedforusebythepublic,sotheschoolconstitutesanonpublicforum.SeeWardv.Hickey,996F.2d
448,453(1stCir.1993)(holdinginaFirstAmendmentemploymentretaliationcasethat"theclassroomisnotapublicforum,and
thereforeissubjecttoreasonablespeechregulation").
Atbottom,theDistricturgesmetoupholdtheschool'selectronicpolicybecauseitisrationallyrelatedtoalegitimategoalof
preservingtheeducationalenvironmentandprotectingtheprivacyconcernsofothersintheschool.Butthisargumentglosses
overthefactthattheSupremeCourthasdevelopedalineofschoolspecificcasesthatmustalsobeconsidered.
b.TinkerandOtherSchoolSpecificCases
TheSupremeCourthasrepeatedlyrecognizedthatstudents'FirstAmendmentrightsdonotparalleltherightsofadultsinother
settingsbecauseofthespecialcharacteristicsoftheschoolenvironment.SeeMorse,551U.S.at39697.InTinker,publicschool
officialsenactedapolicyprohibitingthewearingofanarmbandtoschoolafterlearningthatstudentsplannedtowearthe
armbandsasaprotestagainsttheVietnamWar.393U.S.at504.Thestudentsweresenthomeandsuspendedforviolatingthe
policy.Id.Inholdingthatthepolicyviolatedthestudents'FirstAmendmentrights,theSupremeCourtobserved:
FirstAmendmentrights,appliedinlightofthespecialcharacteristicsoftheschoolenvironment,areavailableto
teachersandstudents.Itcanhardlybearguedthateitherstudentsorteachersshedtheirconstitutionalrightsto
freedomofspeechorexpressionattheschoolhousegate.
....
Ontheotherhand,theCourthasrepeatedlyemphasizedtheneedforaffirmingthecomprehensiveauthorityofthe
Statesandofschoolofficials,consistentwithfundamentalconstitutionalsafeguards,toprescribeandcontrol
conductintheschools.OurproblemliesintheareawherestudentsintheexerciseofFirstAmendmentrights
collidewiththerulesoftheschoolauthorities.
Id.at50607(citationomitted).TheCourtcharacterizedtheschool'sactionasaregulationof"purespeech,"asdistinguished
fromregulationsthatrestrictedstudentconduct.See393U.S.at50708("Theproblemposedbythepresentcasedoesnotrelate
toregulationofthelengthofskirtsorthetypeofclothing,tohairstyle,ordeportment.").Andinanalyzingtherestriction,theCourt
founditparticularlyimportantthattheschool'spolicy"didnotpurporttoprohibitthewearingofallsymbolsofpoliticalor
controversialsignificance,"butrathersingledoutaparticularsymbol.Id.at738.
TheCourtfoundthatthewearingofthearmbands"wasentirelydivorcedfromactuallyorpotentiallydisruptiveconduct,"id.at
505,andheldthattheschoolcouldnotbanthearmbandsbecausetherewas"noevidencewhateverof[plaintiffs']interference,
actualornascent,withtheschools'workorofcollisionwiththerightsofotherstudentstobesecureandtobeletalone."Id.at
508.An"undifferentiatedfearorapprehensionofdisturbanceisnotenoughtoovercometherighttofreedomofexpression."Id.
Thus,inTinker,theschoolcouldnotdenythestudents'formofexpressionunlesstherewere"factswhichmightreasonablyhave
ledschoolauthoritiestoforecastsubstantialdisruptionoformaterialinterferencewithschoolactivities"orwhere"disturbancesor
disordersontheschoolpremisesinfactoccurred."Id.at514.Wheresuchfactsexist,Tinkernotablybreakswithforumanalysis
andallowsschoolstoregulatespeechbasedonviewpoint.See,e.g.,Morganv.Swanson,659F.3d359,379(5thCir.2011)(en
banc)B.W.A.v.FarmingtonR7Sch.Dist.,554F.3d734,740(8thCir.2009)Harperv.PowayUnifiedSch.Dist.,445F.3d1166,
118485(9thCir.2006)cert.granted,judgmentvacatedasmootsubnom.Harperexrel.Harperv.PowayUnifiedSch.Dist.,549
U.S.1262(2007).
TheDistrictcontendsthatTinkerdoesnotapplybecausetheprivatelyownedelectronicdevicepolicyiscontentneutral,and
Tinkerislimitedtocasesinvolvingcontentandviewpointbasedrestrictionsonspeech.Def.'sOpp'ntoPls.'Suppl.Br.4(ECFNo.
263)(citingcases).ThePlaintiffscounterbypointingoutthatthepolicyallows"recordingwithan`educationalpurpose,'but
prohibitsrecordingforanyotherpurpose,"andisthuscontentbased.Pls.'Reply3(ECFNo.268)(relyingonReedv.Townof
Gilbert,135S.Ct.2218,2227(2015)).
EvenifIboughttheDistrict'sargumentthatthepolicyiscontentneutral,thePlaintiffshavealsoallegedthattheDistricthas
applieditspolicytoB.P.inaviewpointbasedmanner.TheycontendthatamajorreasontheDistrictobjectstoB.P.'srecording
andnottorecordingbyotherstudentsisthatthePlaintiffs'purposeistomonitorandscrutinizeschoolofficials.SeeDSF358
seealsoDSSF81(permittingvideorecordingofaparticularlessonsolongastheParentsagreednottoarguethatan
employeeshouldbe"dismissedordisciplinedorsanctioned"butpermittingpraise).Also,thereisevidenceintherecord
suggestingthattheDistricthasnotalwaysapplieditspolicyevenly.Forexample,theDistricthasnotobjectedtoB.P.'suseofa
personallyownedAmberAlertGPSdeviceduringschoolbecausethedevicedoesnotrecordnor"causethesameconcernsthe
DistricthasaboutPlaintiffs'requestedrecording."DSF337.Thereisthusagenuinedisputeofmaterialfactastowhetherthe
DistricthasapplieditspolicytoB.P.inaviewpointbasedmanner.SeeMorganv.PlanoIndep.Sch.Dist.,589F.3d740,745(5th
Cir.2009).
Finally,theDistrictattemptstodistinguishTinkeronthegroundthatitisan"expression"case.Defs.'Mot.forSumm.J.2021.But
thePlaintiffshaveassertedanexpressivepurposetodisseminateinformationobtainedfromtherecordingsintheeventthatthey
uncoverabuseorotherwrongdoing.Pls.'Reply2(ECFNo.268).IfinditrelevantthattheFirstCircuitinGlikdidnotdrawa
distinctionbetweengatheringinformationand"expression"eventhoughtheactivitythererecordinginanticipationof
disseminationwasnotpure"expression."Iviewrecordingactivityasapointonthecontinuumofexpressionitisthepredicate
actthatultimatelyfacilitiesexpression.
TheDistrict'srefusaltoallowB.P.torecordhisdaydoesnotneatlyfitthefactsofTinkernoranyoftheotherschoolcasescitedby
theparties.[22]ButalthoughTinkerisnottheperfectfit,itistheclosestfit.[23]Ittakesintoaccounttheuniquefeaturesofthe
schoolenvironmentanditallowsschoolstorestrictexpressionevenbasedonviewpointwheretheschoolscanforecast
substantialdisruptionoformaterialinterferencewithschoolactivitiesorcollisionwiththerightsofotherstudents.
3.StepThreeAssessingWhethertheDistrict'sJustificationforRestrictingthe
ActivitySatisfiestheTinkerStandard
UnderTinker,schoolofficialscanrestrictspeech"intwobroadsetsofcircumstances:ifthespeech`mightreasonablyleadschool
authoritiestoforecastsubstantialdisruptionoformaterialinterferencewithschoolactivities,'or,alternatively,ifthespeech
`collideswiththerightsofotherstudentstobesecureandtobeletalone.'"C.R.v.EugeneSch.Dist.4J,835F.3d1142,1152(9th
Cir.2016)(quotingWynarv.DouglasCty.Sch.Dist.,728F.3d1062,1070(9thCir.2013))."Foraschool'sforecasttobe
reasonable,courtsgenerallyrequirethatitbebasedona`concretethreat'ofsubstantialdisruption."Taylorv.RoswellIndep.Sch.
Dist.,713F.3d25,37(10thCir.2013).ItistheDistrict'sburdentoshowthattherestrictiononB.P.'sspeechactivityis
constitutionalunderTinker.B.H.exrel.Hawkv.EastonAreaSch.Dist.,725F.3d293,321(3dCir.2013).
Here,theDistricthasnotmetitsburdenbecauseithasnotattemptedtoapplytheTinkerstandardtothefactsofthiscase.
Indeed,theDistrictdoesnotevenraiseTinkerinitsoriginalmotionforsummaryjudgment,choosinginsteadtorelyonits
argumentthatthiscaseisgovernedby"rightofaccess"principles.[24]Giventheabsenceofanydevelopedanalysisontheissue
bytheDistrict,itsmotionforsummaryjudgmentontheFirstAmendmentclaimisdenied.
ThePlaintiffs'motionforsummaryjudgmentdoesnotfareanybetter.Thereisampleevidenceintherecordsuggestingthatthe
DistrictcouldhavereasonablyforecastasubstantialdisruptionifB.P.woretherecordingdevicetoschool.Thereisalsoevidence
suggestingthatDistrictofficialscouldreasonablyexpectthatallowingB.P.toweararecordingdeviceatschoolwoulddeprive
othersstudentsoftheirrighttobesecure.See,e.g.,C.R.,835F.3dat1152.Thus,viewedinthelightmostfavorabletotheDistrict,
ajurycouldreasonablyfindthattheDistrictwasjustifiedinrefusingtoallowB.P.toweararecordingdeviceunderTinker.
CONCLUSION
Forthereasonsstatedabove,theDistrict'smotionsareGRANTEDINPARTandDENIEDINPART,andthePlaintiffs'motionis
DENIED.
SOORDERED.
[1]TheParentshavesuspectedthattheDistrictwithheldimportantinformationfromthemaboutB.P.'streatmentatschoolonotheroccasions.On
April29,2013,QuirionnoticedbruisesonB.P.'sarmsafterschool.DSF129.TheDistricthiredanattorneytoinvestigatethematter,buthedid
notuncoverthesourceofB.P.'sbruising.DSF138.TheParentsalsobelievetheywerenotgivensufficientinformationinB.P.'sdailyreports
aboutwhythemainschooldoorstothemiddleschoolwerelockedaspartofafiredrillthatoccurredinAprilof2013.DSF149.Additionally,on
September4,2013,PollackemailedanumberofDistrictemployeestoaskwhytheshadesweredrawninB.P.'sclassroomthatday.DSF143.
AndonSeptember12,2013,B.P.'ssistertoldtheParentsthatshehadseenB.P.sittingonahallwayfloorwiththreeorfourotherstudentsata
timewhenhisdailyreportindicatedhewasinhisclassroomreceivinginstruction.DSF147.
[2]Theletteralso"suggestedthattheDistrictwouldscheduleanIEPmeetingtodiscussQuirion'sconcernsaboutB.P.'ssafety."DSF81.Bye
mail,PollackdeclinedtheDistrict'sofferofanIEPmeeting.SummaryJudgmentRecord("SJR)634748(ECFNo.1996).
[3]ThePlaintiffs'requesttostrikebasedon"lackofpersonalknowledge"isdenied.Inresponsetobeingasked"haveyoueverheardofanystudent
beingdisciplinedforusingarecordingdevice,"SuperintendentSmithtestified"Ihave."Hethenwentontoexplainthathereceivedatelephonecall
fromaparentofastudentwhohadbeendisciplinedforviolatingthepolicybyusingarecordingdevicetotakeapictureofanassignment.SJR
571214(ECFNo.1991).
[4]ThePlaintiffs'requesttostrikeisdenied.TestimonyfromDistrictofficials,includingfromSuperintendentSmithandSpecialEducational
CoordinatorMoore,thatthepurposeoftheDistrict'spolicyistosupporttheteachingandlearningenvironmentisnotexperttestimony.
[5]ThePlaintiffs'requesttostrikeisdenied.
[6]Inherwrittendecision,theDPHOframedtheissueasfollows:"DidtheDistrict'sactionsinnotpermitting[B.P.]toweararecordingdevicewhile
atschooldeprivetheParentofhisrighttoparticipateintheIDEAdecisionmakingprocesstotheextentthatitdeprived[B.P.]ofafreeappropriate
publiceducation(FAPE)inviolationofstateorfederalspecialeducationlaw?"DPHODec.38.Thisappearstobeamisstatementoftheissue.A
thoroughreviewoftheadministrativerecordrevealsthattheissueactuallyraisedanddecidedbytheDPHOwaswhethertherecordingdevicewas
necessaryforB.P.toreceiveaFAPE.SeeSJR7398,7466,7560,7569,7582,7587,7592(ECFNo.2541).
[7]TheregulationsundertheRehabilitationActcontainsimilarrequirements.See45C.F.R.84.4(b)(1)(ii)(iii).
[8]"TheregulationsundertherelevantportionoftheADAreferto`reasonablemodification,'28C.F.R.35.130(b)(7),whilethecoordinating
regulationsundertheRehabilitationActusetheterm`reasonableaccommodation,'28C.F.R.41.53,butthereisnomaterialdifferencebetween
theterms."Nunesv.Mass.Dep'tofCorrection,766F.3d136,145(1stCir.2014).
[9]TheFirstCircuithasheldthat"reasonableaccommodation"casesbroughtunderTitleIoftheADA,whichprotectsagainstdiscriminationby
privateandstateandlocalgovernmentemployers,arepersuasiveauthorityinTitleII"reasonablemodification"cases.Kimanv.N.H.Dep'tof
Corrs.,451F.3d274,283n.9(1stCir.2006).Thelogicofthatholdingapplieswithequalforceto"reasonablemodification"casesbroughtunder
TitleIIIoftheADA,whichprotectsagainstdiscriminationinplacesofpublicaccommodation.Compare42U.S.C.12111,12112(applicable
provisionsofTitleI)with42U.S.C.12181,12182(applicableprovisionsofTitleIII).
[10]"InsofarastheTitleIIeffectivecommunicationsregulationhasaSection504analog,itis...theSection504communicationsregulationat28
C.F.R.39.160."Tustin,725F.3dat1099100.Thisregulationprovides,interalia,thatcoveredentitiesmust"furnishappropriateauxiliaryaids
wherenecessarytoaffordahandicappedpersonanequalopportunitytoparticipatein,andenjoythebenefitsof,aprogramoractivity."28C.F.R.
39.160(a)(1).
[11]TotheextentthattheDistrictcontendsthatclaimpreclusionbarsthePlaintiffs'disabilitydiscriminationclaims,thatargumentfailsbecausethe
hearingofficerlackedjurisdictiontoactontheseclaims.SeeMr.Iv.MaineSch.Admin.Dist.55,416F.Supp.2d147,175(D.Me.2006)seealso
18CharlesA.Wright,ArthurR.Miller&EdwardH.Cooper,FederalPracticeandProcedure4412,at285(2ded.2002)("Claimpreclusionis
readilydeniedwhentheremediessoughtinthesecondactioncouldnothavebeensoughtinthefirstaction.").
[12]AlthoughIdonotbelievethattheeffectivecommunicationregulationappliesonthesefacts,evenifitdidapply,thePlaintiffswouldnotbeable
toestablishthatthedevicewas"necessarytoensureeffectivecommunication"giventheDPHO'sfindingthatthedevicewouldnegativelyimpact
B.P.'seducation.28C.F.R.35.160(b)(2).
[13]ThePlaintiffalsomakeastructuralargument:anyfindingsappearingaftertheDPHO'sconclusionthatB.P."isreceivingFAPE"are
unnecessarybecausetheDPHO"couldhavestoppedthere."Pls.'Supp.Opp'n8.AstheDistrictpointsout,thisargumentisunreasonableunder
thePlaintiffs'theory,anycourtdecisionthatstatesitsholdingupfront"wouldrenderanyfurtherelaborationordiscussionofunderlyingfindingsmere
surplusage."Defs.'Supp.Reply5(ECFNo.270).
[14]ThePlaintiffsalsocontendthatissuepreclusionisunavailablebecause"[e]videncethatwasnotbeforetheIDEAhearingofficerisnowbefore
theCourt"andthatthisevidencecreatesadisputeofmaterialfactontheissueofpretext.Pls.'Supp.Opp'n910(citingWynnev.TuftsUniv.Sch.
ofMed.,976F.2d791,796(1stCir.1992)).Totheextent,ifany,thatthisnewevidenceisrelevanttoB.P.'sADAandSection504claims,itdoesnot
altermyconclusion.
[15]Initssupplementalbriefing,theDistrictpointsoutthattheFirstAmendmentclaimisnowmade"solelyinB.P.'snameastheParents'First
Amendment[c]laimshavebeendismissed."Def.'sSuppl.Mot.forSumm.J.15n.12(ECFNo.258).ThePlaintiffshavenotarguedotherwisein
theirsupplementalbriefing.TotheextentthattheParentsseektopresstheirownFirstAmendmentrights,thatclaimfailsbecausetheParents
havenorightofaccesstotheschool.Cf.Houchinsv.KQED,Inc.,438U.S.1,9(1978)("Thepublicimportanceofconditionsinpenalfacilitiesand
themedia'sroleofprovidinginformationaffordnobasisforreadingintotheConstitutionarightofthepublicorthemediatoentertheseinstitutions,
withcameraequipment,andtakemovingandstillpicturesofinmatesforbroadcastpurposes.").
[16]GiventheDPHO'sfindingthatPollack"wasunabletostatehoworwhethertheParentswouldusetherecordings,"DPHODec.42,theDistrict
contendsthatthePlaintiffscannotestablishthatrecordingisprotectedactivityundertheFirstAmendmentbecauseitconcernsapurelyprivate
matter.Def.'sSupp.Mot.forSumm.J.12(ECFNo.258).ButtheDPHO'sfindingsonthispointarenotentirelyclear.TheDPHOalsonotedthat
Pollackwouldprobablyjuststoretherecordings"andlistentothemiftherewassomeconcern."DPHODec.20.Giventhisambiguity,Icannotsay
thatthisissuewasessentialtotheDPHO'sdecision,and,accordingly,itdoesnothavepreclusiveeffect.
[17]Myownresearchhasuncoveredasplitofopiniononthetopic.Somecourtshaveheldthattherighttorecordinanonpublicforumgetspast
steponeoftheFirstAmendmentanalysis.See,e.g.,Leibovitzv.Barry,No.15CV1722,2016WL5107064,at*7(E.D.N.Y.Sept.20,2016)
(recordinginacourthouse)McDonoughv.FernandezRundle,No.1520038CV,(S.D.Fla.Sept.17,2015)(recordinginsideapolicestation).
Andsomecourtshaveheldotherwise.See,e.g.,Surlockv.DelaneyNo.5:11CV1121,2016WL3200273,at*39(N.D.N.Y.June8,2016)
(distinguishingcaseslikeGlikandnotingthat"[n]othinginthesecasessupportsthepropositionthattheFirstAmendmentprotectsaparent'srightto
placeahiddencamerainthebedroomoftheirchildwhoresidesinastaterunhomeforseverelyhandicappedindividuals").
[18]IfindS.H.A.R.K.v.MetroParksServingSummitCountyparticularlyopaque.499F.3d553(6thCir.2007).S.H.A.R.K.involvedplaintiffswho
plantedcamerasinamunicipalparkduringdaytimeparkhoursinordertorecordthecullingofadeerherdthatoccurredaftertheparkhadclosed.
The"overarchingquestion"asdescribedbytheSixthCircuitwas"whethertheplaintiffshadalawfulrightofaccesstotheinformation."Id.at560.
AlthoughS.H.A.R.K.mighthavebeenhelpfultotheDistrictinanalyzingtheParents'claimedrighttoaccesstheschool,itdoesnotprovidemuch
insightintohowtoanalyzeB.P.'srights,ashealreadyhasaccesstotheinformationthatheseekstorecord.
[19]InReedv.TownofGilbert,theSupremeCourtexplained:
Governmentregulationofspeechiscontentbasedifalawappliestoparticularspeechbecauseofthetopicdiscussedortheideaormessage
expressed.Thiscommonsensemeaningofthephrase"contentbased"requiresacourttoconsiderwhetheraregulationofspeech"onitsface"
drawsdistinctionsbasedonthemessageaspeakerconveys.Somefacialdistinctionsbasedonamessageareobvious,definingregulatedspeech
byparticularsubjectmatter,andothersaremoresubtle,definingregulatedspeechbyitsfunctionorpurpose.Botharedistinctionsdrawnbasedon
themessageaspeakerconveys,and,therefore,aresubjecttostrictscrutiny.
135S.Ct.2218,2227(2015)(internalcitationsomitted).
[20]Viewpointbasedrestrictionsonspeechare"anegregiousformofcontentdiscrimination"becausethey"targetnotsubjectmatter,butparticular
viewstakenbyspeakersonasubject."Rosenbergerv.Rector&VisitorsoftheUniv.ofVa.,515U.S.819,829(1995).
[21]ThePlaintiffs'citeRideoutv.Gardner,838F.3d65(1stCir.2016),insupportoftheirargument"that,atleastintheFirstCircuit,courtscannot
usetherecording'sforuminanalyzingwhethertherestrictionimposedonrecordingisvalid."Pls.'Suppl.Mot.forSumm.J.7(ECFNo.256)
(citing).InRideout,theFirstCircuitstruckdownastatelawprohibiting"ballotselfies"i.e.,sharingaphotographofavoter'smarkedballot.Seeid.
at68.Rideoutwasnotacaseabouttherighttorecordpublicofficials.RideoutdoesnotsupportthePlaintiffs'sweepingargumentthattheFirst
Circuithasabandonedforumanalysisinrecordingcases.WhilethePlaintiffsmaybecorrectthattheinteriorofapollingplaceisanonpublicforum,
theballotselfielawwasnotlimitedtotheinteriorofapollingplace.Instead,itregulated"theuseofimageryofmarkedballots,regardlessofwhere,
when,andhowthatimagery[was]publicized."Rideout,838F.3dat73.Giventhatthelaw'sreachextendedwellbeyondanyparticularproperty,it
isnotsurprisingthatthecourtdidnotengageinatraditionalforumanalysis.
[22]SinceTinker,theSupremeCourthasdecidedanumberofothercasesinvolvingstudentspeechandhasexplainedthat"themodeofanalysis
setforthinTinkerisnotabsolute."Morsev.Frederick,551U.S.393,405(2007).Forexample,inBethelSchoolDistrictNo.403v.Fraser,the
Courtheldthatschoolscanregulatevulgar,lewd,obscene,andplainlyoffensivespeech.478U.S.675,683(1986).InHazelwoodSchoolDistrictv.
Kuhlmeier,theCourtheldthatschoolscanlimitstudents'schoolsponsoredspeechtolegitimateeducationalconcerns.484U.S.260,266(1988).
AndinMorse,theCourtheldthatschoolscanrestrictspeechatschooleventswhenthespeechisreasonablyviewedaspromotingillegaldruguse.
551U.S.at403.StudentspeechfallingoutsidethenarrowexceptionsarticulatedinFraser,Hazelwood,andMorse,however,areanalyzedunder
theTinkerstandard.Pls.'Suppl.Mot.2(citingcases)butseeMullerv.JeffersonLighthouseSch.,98F.3d1530(7thCir.1996)(applyingforum
analysistoaschoolspeechchallenge).
[23]TheDistrictconsistentlyreliesonHazelwoodforthepropositionthatitcanrestrictB.P.'s"FirstAmendmentrelatedconduct`inanyreasonable
manner.'"Defs.'Opp'ntoPls.'Mot.forPartialSumm.J.27(ECFNo.166(quotingHazelwood,484U.S.at270).ButHazelwood's"reasonably
relatedtolegitimatepedagogicalconcerns"testislimitedtoschoolsponsoredspeech.SeeHazelwood,484U.S.at27171.TheDistricthasnot
attemptedtoarticulatehowB.P.'srecordingcouldbeconsideredschoolsponsoredspeech.
[24]Initssupplementalmotionforsummaryjudgment,theDistrictcontendsthattheDPHO'sdecisionprecludesthePlaintiffs'claimunderTinker
becauseshefoundthatthedevicewouldbedisruptiveanddetrimentalandwouldinterferewiththelearningprocess.Def.'sSuppl.Mot.forSumm.
J.1415.ButasthePlaintiffspointout,issuepreclusionisinapplicableherebecauseitistheDistrict'sburdentojustifyitsrestrictionundertheFirst
Amendment,whereasitwasthePlaintiffs'burdentoestablishthattherecordingdevicewasnecessarytoensureaFAPEatthedueprocess
hearing.SeeCrawfordv.AlliedContainerCorp.,561A.2d1027,1028(Me.1989).
SavetreesreadcourtopinionsonlineonGoogleScholar.