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of Printed Pages : 11 MEC-001

MASTER OF ARTS
(ECONOMICS)
0 Term-End Examination
December, 2013

MEC-001 : MICRO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

'ime : 3 hours Maximum Marks : 100

Note : Attempt questions from each section as per instructions
given under each section.

SECTION - A

Answer any two questions from this section :

2x20=40
Consider the following pure exchange economy.
There are 2 consumers and 2 goods. Consumer 1
has an endowment of 7 units of good 1 and 3
units of good 2, (i.e, w1 = 7, 3), while consumer 2
has an endowment of 3 units of good 1 and 7
units, good 2 (w2 = 3, 7). The consumers utility
functions are given by : u1 = x11 + x12 and
u2 = minfx21, x22} where xil is consumption of
good 1 by consumer i.
(a) Find the set of pareto optimal allocations of
this economy.

(b) Find the walrasian equilibrium.

vIEC-001 1 P.T.O.
2. Consider an industry with two firms. Each firm
has a constant marginal cost c'(q) = O. Let the
market inverse demand function be
P(Q) =100 Q where Q = q1 + q2
Find :
(a) The competitive equilibrium level of
industry output.
(b) Compute optimal choice of output in
cournof equilibrium.

3. How economists utilise the concepts of efficiency

and equity to analyse choice issues ? Briefly
explain equity-efficiency trade off.

4. (a) What do you mean by hidden

information ? Suggest measures to mitigate
the problem of hidden information.
(b) Suppose that the market has 100 people
who want to buy a used car and 100 who
want to sell one. Further suppose that 50 of
the used cars on sale are lemons (bad) and
50 are plums (good). While the buyers know
that the market is selling good and bad cars,
they do not know which 50% are lemons
and which are plums. The reservation price
of cars are as follows :
(i) Seller of a plum : Rs.2000
(ii) Seller of a lemon : Rs.1000
(iii) Buyer of a plum : Rs. 2400
(iv) Buyer of a lemon : Rs.1200
(A) If a buyer doesnot know the
difference between cars, how
much he will be willing to pay ?
(B) Describe the equilibrium of the
market and identify how does
adverse selection happen.

MEC-001 2
 SECTION - B
Answer any five questions from this section : 5x12=60
5. The marginal productivity of labour in a firm is
given as MPL = A (400 L).
(a) If A = 0.2 and the real wage is Rs60/- how
many labour will the firm want to hire ?
What reason will you give for that result ?
(b) Suppose the wage is increased to Rs.75.
How many labour will be hired ?
(c) Keeping the real wage at Rs.60, how many
labour will the firm hire if A rises to 0.5 ?
Interpret your result.
6. Suppose utility function of the consumer is given
as u(X1, X2) = X10.5 X20.5
X1 = consumption in period 1
X2 = consumption in period 2.
The consumer lives for two periods. In period 1
her income is Rs.1000 and in period 2 she has no
income. If the market rate of interest is 50%, find
the optimum consumption in each period.
7. Suppose a farmer is deciding to use fertilizer or
not. But there is uncertainty about the rain, which
will also help the crops. Suppose that farmer's
choice consists of two lotteries
1 1
Fertilizer = (50, 10, 2)
2;
1 1
No Fertilizer = (30, 2 20, 2)
;
If the farmer is an expected utility maximiser and
has monotonic preference, what would he choose
if he were
(a) Risk lover
(b) Risk neutral and
(c) Risk averse ?

MEC-001 3 P.T.O.
8. (a) What is the meaning of inefficient provision
of public goods ? Explain how would you
relate this problem to market failure.
(b) Suppose that there are two goods fish (F)
and transport (T), one private and another
public. There are N people in the town who
use these and the utility function of the ith
person is given as tii = (fi)2T. If the
production possibility frontier is given as
F2 + 3T2 =1800, find the pareto-optimal
provision of T.

9. (a) Consider the matching pennies game : (4+8)

Plays 2
Heads Tails
Plays 1 Heads 1, 1 1, 1
Tails 1, 1 1, 1

Find the Nash equilibrium of the game.

(b) Consider the following game :

1
L R
2
2.5 L' R'

(0,0)
(6,4) (5,4) (1,1)

(i) Describe the game in its normal form.

(ii) Describe all the subgame perfect
equilibrium of this game.

MEC-001 4
[0. The utility function is given as u = x1/3 y2/3 where
x and y are two goods. If the prices of x and y are
px and py,and m is the income of the consumer
(a) Derive the expenditure function
E(px , py , u)
(b) Given px = 2, pv = 3 and m = 200 with the
above utility function, find the utility
maximising bundle of x and y.

1.1. Write short notes on the following :

(a) Producer's surplus
(b) Boumol's alternative theory of firm
(c) Hotelling lemma
(d) Second welfare theorem

MEC-001 5 P.T.O.
 7117. ( aT2/7mr )
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T: 3 "FP:4 agfw-T:i 34- :1(
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-
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1. Fc1F-14-11 3-T TTtf-{fay cf.)- I TM4 2
ZETINT t AT 2 t I TO. 31:riffWIT LIM
-411-1
-ff 7*M-TT Tit chl 3 7-*--r-i-Tir
[3-1.24-fu wl = (7, 3)]. 17:ft 31:134-4T :11:171 32M
1=q chi 3 3117 7it .1-1 7 7*-TiITT t 13T941-U w2 = (3, 7)
Tffa49i CiT ztrilfi-r Lbol :
u111+x12 34

ii2 = min {x21, x22} ,5-16 xi, `i ZTITIWET

ztt*IT c4 tI
(a) 31.2 1-4T-Q-11 11 'lta 3liT11Z -a7RI 3Tr4a7 711c1

(b) 332 -TT -TT a ic-ticilq 7474 gild c+ I

MEC-001 6
2. Via, 3EhTF t .r79-4. 7#1:Ifff c11,1cf c'(q)=0t1
fq---
d1-44. .19r) t : P(Q) = Q,

(2= ch c12.
flc-f c :
(a) 7-471- .WE dcLi q-i

(b) t91 T=1.--q7 14 dc41q.i T 3N9.1tq 711-1 '-c-1(

3. ci->1 7:11TT=E1P4 t c.bitJi 3l241Tt "WM' AT

t1HII m1 31-qqr-{-7311 fir f T r t?

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4. (a) 11:071 ii.1mit1 411 315.INP:r t? t. 01-)Ruf

TilTA7 Tq-Frr4 is i ur TTrzr TF-7

(b) 1,11-ff (411zi c) 1.) c11:311( 11 -Ft 100

t3 no cF-wt -s-TrtlI 91 T
-1:rr9-. 1- ,41,11t -4W k6I 50 c0 (-V101
4- qw4ti
3 503T- ciT3T1 c 4iitff
31-0- -a-{n'r 1,11 okiq .t dq 6)11
rch ch 1-09. Tft *I( tVlet t1 t419-11t 141
tq
Afkiff t:
(i) 3rd chR faclT : 2000
(ii) otici cblt rf ciT : 1000
(iii) 3T-4- chik : 2400
(iv) (.4t101 chlt 1-(Thej : 1200

MEC-001 7 P.T.O.
 (A) gig 4)(11 t 3T-4. AT ,A1 chlk ITT
Tim
rt~lflr?
(B) 011:71It "k #07oiit ii ch AT
f14-1*111 tle faR-17
mcblk t?

14TTI- 131'

lurr 1-+-t Ittw 3rR I 5x12=60

5. f*{# 4 IT 3114 1 1:111:1td 3c-41kcil t :

MPL =A (400 L).
(a) A=0.2 AT ciftclicich 4t 60/- t
fw-d-4 $3TW .1,(4 zfTTu9T ? 31-9-4
apt chRui

(b) q fq 1T 75/- t
1,11-1

(c) tirq alk-tiract, TT-q0- 60t AT A TIT9'

0.5 t \TI ct,(41 -Ert ?

6. -371.1)-WIT 1 644 ilcIf c1 f t :

u (X1, X2) = x9/ 3x'5 . X1 -ff21-1 X2 31.41:1 tatz1

3T-a-W 7criT'Fr aTaftrzrf c-t

MEC-001 8
 * I -5r2m 3Tafg 3A-*-1- 3Trzr T. 1000 2f T:t
3Tqfq zA--*-1- 3Trzr t 1 cilAR 1-;1
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ch I

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141 fwArff ATRT ATR:zrr a-1
zrl. TIT T -q-qTfzrT
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d4 Trzh = (50,- ;10
2 2

1 1
2 ; 20, 2
TE TAT -if (30,-

qrq -tAr 34q Pict'

qrM &fr-W1 t f iT ai-RpTrff 7-*-kvr t

q113ff trrr :
(a) 1--F-aTr
(b) 7)%14
(c) 71N14 44
-- arm

8. (a) --ii4s3iFlob 4q19-11 31-T77 111%.TT9. 31.0

t? aTrcr TFR:Err ail cilgIR chl rcV-11C1c11 A -f-*74
Nchlk \31)5 t?

MEC-001 9 P.T.O.
 (b) 4111 1-10{Clq1 (F) CWT (T)
Hqizi t -cr-6--r f-14?
t t*-1:ft -HR -517:1)7 4&sq N
t Z9* d1-14ThIcll 410-I u1 =(fi)2T gj Tqt
717 tl qrq 3c41q-1 T9.TT-497 ash F2 + 3T2 = 1800
t"cifTT-0 Wf aTifilsa 61411?

9. (a) #1-44 t Tfrizi WFT fq-q17 c:#) :

7:ru ii_qc-1111
trli 'i-
vril 1, -1 -1, 1
T -1, 1 1, -1

kcr Ti-rizEr 31fWr-

M7 c :

(b) kcf 1:17 fq-

47 ch :

1
L R
2
2.5 U
a cf.-)
l
(6,4) (5,4)(1,1) (0,0)

MEC-001 10
 (i) 31-9-4 thHI-ei Izt-Ftr -4 TRv -wr fa-a-Tur k I

(ii) 74 Sid *Rill- 10 1:1*7 31:1-*i oiksql

I

10. t 1341., x 3th y 717 3-TreTTftff dLiqlfrITT -T7

r
t :u = x1/3 y2/3 I 79-* 1
1c19114ikl: px * py t I

zErlilwfr --- aTrzf M t I

(a) dichi 04444 th

--"" E(px , py ,, u) Old ctA I

(b) '.11q Px = 234 py = 3 2TT M=200 t 371.1)7T - 1

aTfliwaTt ci I qio-i x, y -wr 7tzrR7 w fli ?

11. -4-9- ITT Tffk.Ttu re.,-411,14fffd :

(a) dc,liqer, .1 afaiwr

(b) " -T 1:514 'WE oh c-Lich .51falTiff

(c) 'len-i.41 Miq: - NAT

(d) taTzt P-)14 M4q

MEC-001 11