Professional Documents
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Hibernia Study (Flare)
Hibernia Study (Flare)
TECHNICAL NOTE
DOCUMENT NO : 8266-HIB-TN-C-0001
REVISION : B
RELIANCE NOTICE
This report is issued pursuant to an Agreement between Granherne (Holdings) Limited and/or its
subsidiary or affiliate companies (“Granherne”) and HIBERNIA MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY LTD which agreement sets forth the entire rights, obligations and liabilities of those parties
with respect to the content and use of the report.
Reliance by any other party on the contents of the report shall be at its own risk. Granherne makes no
warranty or representation, expressed or implied, to any other party with respect to the accuracy,
completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this report and assumes no liabilities with
respect to any other party’s use of or damages resulting from such use of any information, conclusions or
recommendations disclosed in this report.
Title: QA Verified:
FLARE SYSTEM REVALIDATION STUDY
FRONT PAGE
DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD
CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS
HOLDS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
4.0 APPROACH
4.1 General
4.2 Calculation Audit
4.3 Challenge Process
4.4 Risk Management in Relation to Flaring Events and Wind Condition
10.0 REFERENCES
The key Hibernia flare system design documents have remained unaltered since the
design phase. In certain areas, the key assumptions are now considered worthy of
review particularly to incorporate as-built system details and to assess the potential to
remove the Injection Compressor stagger. It has therefore been decided to revalidate
the key flare system design documents (principally the Relief and Blowdown Study
Report and the Flare System Calculation Volumes). Following from a series of
meetings during the period 9–10 May 2000, a scope of work for performing a staged
revalidation of the flare system was prepared.
Based on the results of Stage 1 update the key flare system design documentation.
2.1 Introduction
The key design documents relating to the flare system design have not been reviewed
for some time. In the intervening period codes of practice have changed, as-built
documentation and better analytical tools have become available and future
equipment, foreseen at the time of design, is no longer certain to be installed. This
report addresses these issues in order to revalidate the flare system design.
The results of the report are summarised in the following main sections:
• Challenge process
The technical audit of the design calculations was undertaken primarily to identify
assumptions which were linked to the relief and blowdown system design basis and
because of some concern in HMDC that the calculations did not fully reflect the
design. In the event very few important assumptions were contained in design
calculations but it was clear that the calculations were not up to date and there were
some inconsistencies between the various flare system design documents. Also
design methods have improved which indicate certain assumptions are no longer
sufficiently conservative (for instance in the low temperature material selection
calculations).
Otherwise, as would be expected, some of the design bases on which the system was
founded have changed since the design phase and an exercise such as this is the
ideal way of capturing these changes (for instance the changes relating to the
maximum well rate).
One last aspect uncovered in the technical audit related to missing work (for instance
the LP flare network model which should have been run to calculate the back pressure
on relief valves which may be part of a coincident relief).
All these types of issue will require the design calculations to be revised and corrected.
A summary of the calculations that require revision can be found in Section 2.6.
The challenge process showed the problem of applying, often ambiguous, codes of
practice retrospectively. The process also showed that Hibernia has in general used a
conservative design basis which has resulted in a robust design when considering new
code requirements and current industry design approaches. Generally, this is
because newer approaches tend to interpret the codes without incorporating
unnecessary features, which reflects efforts to achieve low cost facilities. Only in one
area did we believe the design had not been sufficiently conservative and this area
was the use of compressor stagger to limit the LP flare system flowrate during
blowdown. However, to remove the stagger could present a considerable design
challenge because of the problem of increasing the pressure (and inventory) in the LP
separator when the blowdown valves opened. This is particularly undesirable if the
cause of the blowdown is a fire around the LP separator. The higher pressure and,
therefore, higher stress will increase the risk of premature failure. Consequently a
brief safety analysis which looked at the ability of the A train injection compressor
components (the equipment whose blowdown is delayed) to survive an adverse fire
was undertaken. The results demonstrated the equipment is unlikely to fail and,
therefore, the staggered system is safe in this situation.
Similarly, the challenge process also considered jet fire on lower pressure equipment.
Here it was found that thin walled vessels should be considered outside of the API
guidance (as suggested explicitly in the API recommended practices). In this case
applying modern practices relating to jet fire to this vessel suggests that as long as the
insulation remained intact the insulation will ensure the vessel survives a jet fire.
One other area, which would have been unknown to the original designers, are the
changes which have occurred to the recommended practices; here the only important
change relates to new API sizing method for calculating two-phase relief which will
need to be applied to the existing system.
The removal of the allowances contained in the design for future equipment ‘frees-up’
approximately 30% of the HP flare capacity in the blowdown case. However there is
no impact at all on the LP flare capacity for this case as no future equipment was
planned to be connected to this system.
We had expected to find some useful work regarding this aspect in the industry but
found none. Generally a picture emerged that the industry has no standard approach
to windspeed or the operational measures undertaken on a platform during high wind.
The outcome of such considerations is therefore undertaken on a case by case basis
relying mainly on the judgement of the asset owner. By applying a consistent
approach to the selection of design windspeed and the presence of personnel the
result changed the design case relatively little. The impact of the design windspeed
change, if pursued, is summarised in Section 2.6.
One aspect where consideration of wind condition would potentially have a beneficial
effect is related to continuous case flaring. In this case, because of the lower
allowable radiation levels, wind has a significant effect on what can be produced when
the compressors are unavailable. This suggests an allowable flare radiation envelope
should be developed such that the production rate can be set (maximised) dependent
on the measured (or expected) wind speed and direction.
2.6.1 Introduction
• Where analysis suggests that some aspects of the design are conservative
compared to the application of recommended and best practices, then this implies
some apparent spare capacity in the system. The use of such capacity is optional
dependent on future plans for the facility and economic benefit.
• However, where analysis suggests that some aspects of the design are
less conservative than in the recommended or best practices, then this implies that
the system capacity is insufficient or marginal in these cases. In this case prudent
ownership requires that these issues are addressed and solutions provided.
The flare system revalidation analysis has identified a number of areas where a
capacity opportunity is available. Where the capacity opportunity is positive (i.e. the
apparent capacity, or capacity available in the flare system appears to rise) then
HMDC have the choice of adopting the new philosophy which can be used to allow
future platform modifications.
However, where the capacity opportunity is negative (i.e. the apparent capacity, or
capacity available in the flare system appears to fall) then HMDC should undertake
remedial measures to remove the possibility of exceeding the platform flare system
capacity.
• The new API method for calculating two-phase relief should be applied to
the relevant cases. At the same time, a new maximum design well rate together
with the number of wells which fail to shut in that need to be designed for will need
to become an explicit part of the RABS update. If the existing relief valves are to
be retained this may require some method for limiting the maximum well rate to an
acceptable value.
• The missed design case of a failed open separation train spillover valve
should be calculated and measures sought to limit the peak rate experienced to
within the capacity of the flare system.
• Increase the end pressure for blowdown for the thick walled vessels. The
API recommended practice has never required blowdown to 690 kPag for thick
walled vessels. Our calculations of vessel heat up confirm these conclusions.
Therefore blowdown to 690 kPag is excessive in this case. The end pressure
should be 50% of the design pressure unless there are good reasons otherwise.
One such situation is the inapplicability of this end pressure for the gas turbine
driven HP gas compressors. The blowdown end pressure for equipment in these
systems is determined by the requirements of the HP compressors seal oil system
and the requirement to be at or near atmospheric prior to the oil running out.
• The effects of insulation. If the insulation is the right type and properly
attached its effects can properly be considered in the design calculations.
The detailed analysis which forms the basis for the above can be found in sections
5.0, 6.0 and 9.0.
The following table summarises the changes that should be made to the design
calculations to improve their integrity and make them consistent and traceable.
The tables avoid repetition of the major issues which affect the capacity of the flare
system (see Section 2.6.2) and single issues that affect more than one item. The full
version of the tables can be found in sections 5.2.1 and 5.3.1.
Some minor changes which generally affect consistency are identified in Section 9.4.
It is difficult to be precise regarding the activities required in the longer term future as
these depend on the outcome of the recalculation work and the decisions made
therein. However, it is possible to summarise in general terms the shorter term
requirements of Stage 2:
Document Changes
• Design Calculations
For each change prepare a calculation revision which revs up the existing
calculation (in other words building on the existing work). This would include:
Implementation Projects
In this section there are some projects mentioned which will in all likelihood require
hardware changes to be made (resulting from the above there may be more).
In discussion with HMDC a detailed scope of work to undertake the above has been
developed. This is attached in Appendix 2.
3.1 Introduction
The review focuses on those aspects and hazards that are directly relevant to the flare
system design. In particular these are flare radiation, jet and pool fire and, to a lesser
extent, explosion. This naturally excludes issues relating to blowout and iceberg
collisions as well as environmental issues.
However, before going into the main parts of the analysis, it is worth recapping the
safety basis and methodology followed by HMDC now and during the design phase.
This will need to be followed should any changes be made to design philosophies.
As was convention at the time, the safety design progressed along two parallel routes.
The first was the use of probabilistic analysis to identify the acceptability of various
risks. The second was the deterministic design of the various safety systems
according to recognised codes and practices. Occasionally there was an interface
between the two processes when a risk was considered unacceptable. Where this
was apparent the design would be adjusted to mitigate the unacceptable risk.
These two processes are described in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 below.
The problem of parallel processes is that some information can be lost across the
interface. More recently this has led to a concept called risk based design where the
key safety issues are resolved during the early conceptual design stages rather than
be left for implementation after the conceptual design is complete.
By the time the FRA was commenced the HMDC Damage / Impairment Criteria had
been formalised. These were:
There must be no overall loss of integrity of the platform for at least 2 hours after the
initial event. Loss of integrity included:
• Structural collapse of more than 50% of the platform topsides, or total collapse of
Module M30.
The 2 hours is judgementally used for a maximum time to evacuate by lifeboats (i.e.
time to respond to emergency, attempt to control, organise evacuation and abandon
platform)
The TSR (i.e. living quarters) should remain a safe refuge for personnel for at least 2
hours. Loss of integrity may be due to:
Escape routes from all parts of the platform to the TSR or other safe refuge should
remain passable for at least 30 minutes from the start of the incident. An escape route
may be made impassable by:
• Thermal radiation over 12.5 kW/m2 to the outside of the escape route if protected
by cladding;
• All routes from any one part of the platform to the TSR being impassable.
Since there is more than one escape route from any point, an incident must
completely involve the total module to violate the criterion.
The evacuation systems must remain effective for long enough to evacuate all
personnel. This requires at least one of the following to be true:
• Helideck operable for at least 2 hours. Inoperability may result from one of the
following:
• blast damage
• Evacuation systems must be operable with at least 10% spare capacity (to allow
for launching partly loaded) and with passable escape routes, from TSR to
evacuation system, for at least 2 hours. Inoperability may result from:
The Damage / Impairment Criteria set out above, give basic criteria which should not
be exceeded. It is not possible to ensure that no incidents will exceed the criteria.
The intent is that every reasonable and practical precaution is taken to ensure those
incidents that exceed the criteria are so unlikely that they can be considered as an
acceptable risk because the risk is negligible. These incidents are termed Residual
Accidental Events.
For any single incident that might affect the key safety systems (more accurately
safety functions from the above), the risk level for the three-tiers are:
Whilst it is inconceivable that any of the impairment criteria would change as a result
of the considerations in this report, change may affect the QRA upon which these
impairment criteria stand. Any changes considered, therefore, will require to be
confirmed through QRA.
A number of the final requirements for the design would stem from the above. This is
not surprising as some of the aspects of the impairment criteria actually have their
roots in the recognised international codes and practices, e.g.
Escape Ways
• Not over 12.5 kW/m2 to the outside of the escape route if protected by cladding;
Helideck
The remaining requirements are part of the various design guides and codes of
practice. These are described in detail in Section 6
4.1 General
The flare revalidation process is summarised in the flowscheme overleaf. The stage
consisting of this report is Stage 1. The results of Stage 1 will form the basis for future
Stage 2 studies. The flowscheme indicates the potential range of projects this could
encompass.
Start
Stage 2
Major impact Minor impact Varies according
Impact on to outcome of
the design? Stage 1
End
43. (1) Every operator shall…submit to the Chief a concept safety analysis…that
considers all components and all activities associated with each phase in the life of the
production installation, including the construction, installation, operation and removal
phases…
(5)…
…(g) a definition of the situations and conditions and of the changes that would
necessitate an update of the concept safety analysis.
(8) The operator shall maintain and update the concept safety analysis referred to in
subsection (1) in accordance with the definition of situations, conditions and changes
referred to in paragraph (5)(g) to reflect operational experience, changes in activity or
advances in technology.
HMDC have met these requirements, initially through the preparation of the Concept
Safety Evaluation which has, over time, evolved into the Operational Plan which will be
issued in the near future.
The above very much parallels the type of approach the UK HSE require:
11. The employer…needs to review the risk assessment if there are developments
that suggest that it may no longer be valid (or that it can be improved). In most cases,
it is prudent to plan to review the risk assessments at regular intervals - the time
between reviews being dependent on the nature of the risks and the degree of change
likely in the work activity. Such reviews should form part of standard management
practice.
Where a particular design code is used its requirements are mandatory, e.g. the
requirements of ASME VIII for a vessel stamped accordingly. Recommended
practices are different in that their requirements are not mandatory in law unless they
are stated in the regulations; this is the case with Canadian requirements. For those
practices not in the regulations, common industry practice and deviation from those
would normally require Certifying Authority approval. In dispute, the applicability of the
use of the practice would be left to the courts to decide.
The recommended practices are sometimes (some would say often) ambiguous in
their requirements and a study such as this tends demonstrate the problem. Therefore
interpretations of the practice’s actual intent often have to be made. This is one of the
designer’s challenges and a particular challenge of this report.
In the past, presumably to avoid the need for interpretation, owners of facilities have
removed the ambiguities by being prescriptive with their requirements. Thus, industry
practices, which often have little connection with the original design code intent, have
sometimes been established for expediency. The goal today is to apply the codes as
intended without unnecessary features that increase cost.
The methodology used in this study therefore lies in this latter approach to the
application of practices, to apply them as intended. Where there are differences
between the various methods of applying practices this will be highlighted in the
narrative.
The calculation technical audit’s primary aim is to identify key assumptions or queries
contained outside the Relief and Blowdown Study Report. A secondary aspect is the
high level numerical and methodological check of the existing relief case calculations
to ensure their suitability to use as the basis for the revalidated Flare Design
Philosophy. This process will identify any areas that require detailed review to be
undertaken in future stages of the revalidation study.
The audit will use a tabular approach (compiled by calculation volume) to highlight the
assumptions or issues which require to be addressed during the challenge and risk
mitigation review processes in subsequent sections of the study.
The challenge process is a sequential review of individual design parameters that had
an effect on the way the flare system was dimensioned.
♦ API RP 520
♦ API RP 521
♦ API RP 14C
This issue stems from the technique used occasionally where the capacity of a flare
system has been increased when it has been realised that at the design windspeed no
personnel would be present on deck, thereby allowing higher incident radiation rates
on deck during these events. This would only be the case if a very high wind speed
were considered during design. A more pragmatic approach to design windspeed
selection would ensure that the coincident conditions were considered, i.e. a
realistically high windspeed.
Emergency flaring
The methodology used to generate the results of the activity are based on multipliers
applied to the flowrates considered in the original flare boom length defining design
case, i.e. combined HP and LP blowdown. It should be appreciated that these
resultant rates cannot actually occur until the platform is actually modified to
incorporate the necessary inventory, in this case, in the same ratio (HP/LP) as design.
This is unlikely. The real effects, or real envelope, will therefore depend on the actual
modification made. The actual effect should be considered in detail during the
particular modification project’s design phase.
Continuous flaring
Continuous flaring differs from emergency flaring in that the acceptable radiation levels
are very much lower than for emergency events. Proportionally, the lower radiation
isopleths are more sensitive to wind than the high flow cases.
The methodology used in this study has taken a simulation from the recent
debottlenecking project (Case 3, a case which included Avalon production) and used
this to generate current normal operating input data to generate a new set of profiles.
The input data is adjusted up or down using simple multipliers to generate the
expected envelope.
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Results of the Technical Audit – Relief and Blowdown System Calculations
In Appendix I the full results of the audit are given. The detailed tables that follow
identify a number of issues to be dealt with, either in Section 6, because they can be
challenged, or in this section if they are issues which concern the accuracy or
soundness of the design conclusions. For completeness, however, both sets of issues
are summarised below.
Calculation Issue
Number Title Rev Date Number Description
34- 34-
005 / A Blowdown Section Inventory Calc 06 18-May-93 005/2 Jet fire scenario not taken into account for
(Provides input to blowdown the design of the blowdown system
simulations)
005/4 Were fire areas used for total blowdown
rate?
006 / A Blowdown Summary 05 19-May-93 006/2 Correct isentropic efficiency used?
Calculation Issue
Number Title Rev Date Number Description
34- 34-
005 / A Blowdown Section Inventory Calc 06 18-May-93 005/1 Are the blowdown volumes used sufficiently
(Provides input to blowdown accurate?
simulations)
005/3 Were the real settle out pressures ever
used?
005/5 Are vessel weights used reasonable?
006 / A Blowdown Summary 05 19-May-93 006/1 HP Blowdown calculation higher than
vendor aware of. Radiation level for case is
underestimated.
006/4 Is constant rate blowdown a valid design
method, i.e. not according to API?
006/5 'As Built' settleout pressure
010 / A Calculation of allowed cooldown 02 23-Mar-92 010/1 Was the calculation methodology sufficiently
before hydrate formation & minimum robust?
temperatures achieved in flare gas
from critical blowdown sections
010/2 Should 'troubleshooting' methanol injection
points be incorporated?
011 / A Review of HP flare KO Drum size 02 06-Feb-92 011/1 A note on the front of calc 34-064 states that
Rev 7 of Design Basis gives max well flow
of 20,000 bpd + average well of 10,000 bpd,
i.e. 30,000 bpd total. The individual well
design rate has changed. What are the
implications for the platform?
012 / A Review of LP flare KO Drum size 03 10-Mar-92 See 34-011/1
015 / A Calc to review options for reducing HP 01 14-Aug-91 015/1 Relief & Blowdown Study Report Rev C1
to MP Separator and MP to LP non-concurrent maximum allowable LP and
Separator Blowby Cases HP Flare loads are 110,874 kg/h and
244,897 kg/h respectively. Rates used in
these calculations exceed design.
015/2 Is considering only one control valve fails
open for gas blowby case when 2 installed
in parallel realistic / allowable even with
provision of independent transmitters and
controllers?
060 / B Indicative Injection Compressor 01 29-May-92 See 34-010/1 and 34-010/2
Cooldown Calculation
061 / B Simplistic Steady State Preliminary 01 10-Sep-92 061/1 This case had the potential to be the
Review of the Annulus Rupture Relief defining case for the HP flare system
Flowrate (depending on installed choke valve CV)
What happened subsequently?
022 / C HP Flare Network Sizing (HP 02 22-Mar-93 022/1 Calculated maximum pressure at PSV
Separator - Max Relief Case) discharge exceeds value on PSV datasheet
Rev C1
022/2 Effect of increased production / production
fluid GOR
Calculation Issue
Number Title Rev Date Number Description
34- 34-
042 / F Total LP Blowdown - Initial Conditions 02 18-Mar-93 042/1 Total blowdown rate (initial rate) used in calc
- Network Analysis less than that in Relief & Blowdown Study
Report ( 89,601 kg/h)
033 / G Coalescer & LP Separator Heaters 01 01-Feb-93 033/1 Assumption that the header is at zero
Simultaneous Fire Relief - Network pressure (I.e. that this is a singular event not
Analysis coincident with any other releases)
036 / G Injection Stage Suction Scrubber PSV 01 10-Feb-93 036/1 Inconsistency on datasheet between
- Network Analysis accumulation and 'Max Relieving Pressure'
(should be 10%)
037 / G HM & CM Expansion Drums 02 01-Feb-93 037/1 Calculated back pressure (for 0152A/B)
Simultaneous Fire Relief Case - greater than specified on datasheet - calc
Network Analysis considers this OK as less than 10% of set
pressure
See also 34-033/1
046 / G Fuel Gas Cooler / Heater tube rupture 01 02-Mar-93 046/1 ''As Built' P&IDs show bursting discs in this
relief line size check service (calc considers PSVs) therefore calc
is no longer valid
050 / G 3rd Stage Suction Scrubber A (D- 01 02-Mar-93 050/1 Rev C2 PSV datasheet states set pressure
3303A) PSV Discharge Line Size = 8200 kPa(g), 'As Built' P&ID shows set
Confirmation pressure = 7000 kPa(g)
052 / G E-3301 Shell Side PSV Discharge 01 02-Mar-93 See 34-033/1
Line Size Confirmation
053 / G E-3303B Shell Side PSV Discharge 01 02-Mar-93 See 34-046/1
Line Size Confirmation
054 / G HP Manifold Relief - Network Analysis 01 02-Mar-93 054/1 Rev C2 PSV datasheet states set pressure
= 34,400 kPa(g), 'As Built' P&ID shows set
pressure = 34,100 kPa(g)
055 / G Simultaneous Fire Relief Case from Z- 01 10-Feb-93 See 34-033/1
3701 A/B, Z-3702 A/B & Z6202 A/B
(pig launchers and fuel gas package)
057 / G E-3701 Shell & Tube Side 01 12-Feb-93 057/1 Calculated back pressure exceeds that
Simultaneous Fire Relief Case - Line specified on datasheet for both PSVs
Size Confirmation See also 34-033/1
058 / G E-6201A/B Tube Side Fire Relief 01 10-Feb-93 See also 34-033/1
Case
059 / G Comparative Program check of 01 23-Apr-93 059/1 Accuracy of calculations using ESI instead
INPLANT Single Phase Simulation vs of INPLANT
ESI
The following describes the technical audit issues identified in Table 5.4. However,
first the general issues relating to the audit are described.
• Flare network calculations - Whilst the flare network calculations were performed,
the results of the calculations were never carried over to the discipline (instrument)
data sheets (through which the equipment was purchased). In other words, the
control valves and relief valves were all sized with the wrong back pressure. In
most cases this has no effect because the relief valves are balanced and the
difference in back pressure is low or, for similar reasons, because we know the
control valves appear to be doing their respective duties (albeit probably a little
more open than planned). Where there is an effect this is noted as an issue below.
• Fire zones were used in the calculations but Granherne, so far, have not had
access to documents describing them.
• Vendor data didn’t make it through to the final calculations. This particularly
affected the settleout pressures for the compressors and the calculations of realistic
volumes in the system. Because of the aggregate nature of these changes we
suspect, but cannot be sure, there would be no material effect on the flare system
design.
The majority of the blowdown volume data is summarised and unchanged from an
earlier revision of the calculation that used the best available information at the time for
piping volumes. The separation train major vessel dimensions appear unchanged
from those used for the calculations however the ‘As Built’ dimensions of the E & W
Test Separators are greater and these vessels contribute a significant proportion of the
HP flare blowdown load. Any increase in HP flare blowdown load from this source can
be mitigated against the load incorporated for future equipment that remains
uninstalled.
Blowdown section weights stated in the calculation are based on vendor data for
vessels. Weight of pipework associated with major vessels appears to have been
estimated only. For systems that contain only pipework (e.g. manifold systems) major
pipework weight is calculated from the best available information at the time. It is
considered that a more accurate calculation of system weights would be unlikely to
have a significant effect on the blowdown loads (because of aggregate effects).
Revision 06 of this calculation identified a HP flare blowdown load 5.8% greater than
the load used by the vendor for the flare radiation calculations. This increase is not a
concern at present because, as stated above, there is a significant allowance included
in the total HP flare blowdown load for future equipment. However, the increased HP
flare blowdown load should be incorporated into the updated RABS.
Issue 34-006/4 - Is constant rate blowdown a valid design method, i.e. not
according to API?
A constant blowdown rate (i.e. not reducing with time) was used for two items of low
pressure equipment, the LP separator and the LP fuel gas KO drum. Though not
normally valid, as they operate at low pressure and thus will not contribute a significant
proportion of the total LP flare blowdown load the calculation is considered acceptable
(see also Section 6.3.5).
This calculation identified the minimum allowable temperatures that the process plant
could fall to during a process shutdown before potential problems could arise on
blowdown. The resulting cool-down temperatures were:
Hydrate Formation
The simulations used to generate these numbers were checked and they revealed that
the resultant blowdown temperatures were calculated using adiabatic flashes and not
using a blowdown model. The adiabatic flash assumes isenthalpic expansion, i.e. the
isentropic coefficient is 0, and results in higher downstream temperatures.
A blowdown model was run for the ‘Min Design Temp (-45 oC) Occurs in Flare’ case,
depressurising from the same settle out pressure and a temperature of 50 oC and gave
the following results:
The results show that the temperature of the equipment must not be allowed to fall to
the level as originally calculated (50 oC) and more realistically blowdown should be
initiated at around 70 oC.
Cooldown temp at wh
Hold time for cooldow
Current platform design philosophy is to depressurise after 1-2 hours. Given this large
spread the difference on calculation of the minimum allowable cooldown may not have
a significant effect on the delay allowed before blowdown is initiated. As no firm
conclusions were made in this calculation and given the problems in the input data this
whole issue should be revisited and re-evaluated using ‘As Built’ / operating equipment
and environmental data due to the possible adverse effects on the platform should the
minimum temperatures defined above be achieved. Once the new calculations had
been completed alarms could be added to the affected equipment (e.g. the gas
injection manifold) which would warn that blowdown was necessary. Allowing the
temperature to fall below this point would lead to excessively low temperatures and the
potential for flare pipework failure through embrittlement.
Cooldown temp at wh
Hold time for cooldow
8266-HIB-TN-C-0001 Page33of 135 Revision: B
/opt/scribd/conversion/tmp/scratch2682/37533791.doc October 2000
Issue 34-011/1 – The individual well design rate has changed. What are the
implications for the platform?
The individual well rates have changed since design rendering the related calculations
obsolete. The new well rates need to be included in the RABS revision. Two aspects
will need to be addressed:
• A final decision regarding the number of wells which fail to shut in, based
on the lower expected number of more prolific wells, which need to be designed
for.
To follow from the above will require a modified procedure to be developed which
caters for the reduced time period available before the HP flare KO drum overfills
(which will happen in less than 10 minutes should relief occur at the higher well rates).
The maximum allowable independent LP and HP flare loads used in these calculations
to determine maximum allowable control valve CV for the blowby cases are greater
than the quoted figures in the Relief & Blowdown Study Report Rev C1 (i.e. 119,324
kg/h (LP) and 274,878 kg/h (HP) respectively). However the actual installed control
valve CVs are less than the calculated maximum. Therefore the system design rates
(244,897 and 110,874 kg/h) should not be exceeded. For consistency, the MP and LP
Separators relief valves should be checked against the installed control valve CVs.
Issue 34-015/2 - Is considering only one control valve fails open for the gas
blowby case when 2 are installed in parallel realistic / allowable
even with the provision of independent transmitters and
controllers?
This issue relates to the ability of only one of the LCVs to fail open. The level control
systems in question have independent transmitters and the equivalence in DCS terms
of duplicated controllers. This has been confirmed by HMDC studies. No further
action is required.
The RABS states that gas lift to Hibernia wells is no longer required. If it becomes
necessary in the future then it will be provided by a method which will eliminate the
need to design for annulus rupture.
The situation with the Avalon wells is less clear. The RABS states that confirmation
was required during detailed design of the subsea facilities that annulus rupture need
not be considered as a relief case.
The need, or lack of, for design of the relief systems for annulus relief in both Hibernia
and Avalon wells should be confirmed.
Results of this calculation were taken into account on ‘As-Built’ PSV datasheet,
therefore no concern.
The maximum associated gas capacity of the platform is governed by the capacity of
the compressors. This effectively set the required size of the HP separator relief
valves. Therefore even though the production GOR changes the relief valve should
have sufficient capacity whilst the compressors are able to take the gas. This link
should be made clear in the updated RABS.
Elsewhere in the system GOR has very little effect on the defining relief cases as
these are set by physical characteristics of installed valves, i.e. the gas blowby cases.
Should the physical characteristics of either of the above change, i.e. through
rewheeling a compressor stage, or through the use of larger control valve trims, the
calculations should be revisited.
The difference in calculated and datasheet valve discharge pressure is small (146
kPa) and is insufficient to affect sizing. Furthermore, the installed CV is greater than
that required for the maximum flow (500 compared to 376 calculated for design
flowrate). Therefore the valve should be able to do its design duty.
It appears this case was not considered (or, at least, not in the calculations we have
seen). This comment appears to be true for all the spillover valve cases. The
consequences of failed open spillover valves should form a section in the updated
RABS.
Returning to this particular case, the normal operation of this valve directs
245,000 kg/h to the HP flare (when the compressors shut down). This is the same
flowrate as the design maximum for the HP flare. The calculated valve CV for this flow
is 376 and the control valve installed CV is 500 therefore if the valve were to be sent
wide open, for any reason, there would be an instantaneous flowrate of around
326,000 kg/h directed to the HP flare, which is well above the HP flare design figure.
We are also aware that this valve trim has recently been replaced with a 550 CV trim
making the potential overshoot worse. The consequences of this relief case, such as
thermal radiation impingement on the platform, together with remedial measures to
limit the peak should be investigated further.
Results of this calculation taken into account on ‘As-Built’ PSV datasheet, therefore no
concern.
‘As-Built’ PSV datasheet retains original back pressure of 500 kPa(g) max. However
the PSV set pressure is 25,500 kPa(g) and the minor increase in back pressure will
have no effect on the PSV capacity.
We are aware of events which have caused relief valves to lift on both compressors
simultaneously. A modification project was included to avoid this occurrence. The
project should be reviewed for its capability to prevent this case and a description
should be included in the updated RABS.
‘As-Built’ PSV datasheet retains original back pressure of 500 kPa(g) max. However
as the minimum PSV set pressure is 45,500 kPa(g) the minor increase in back
pressure will have no effect on the PSV capacity.
The normal operation of this valve directs 94,500 kg/h to the HP flare. The calculated
valve CV for this flow is 522 and the control valve installed CV is 600 therefore if the
valve were to be sent wide open, for any reason, there would be an instantaneous
flowrate of somewhat less than 109,000 kg/h directed to the HP flare. This flowrate is
considerably lower than the HP flare design maximum so is tolerable. There may be
significant noise associated with this case.
Issue 34-028/1 – Is case where west test separator spillover valve fails fully open
considered?
The normal operation of this valve directs 58,800 kg/h to the HP flare. By inspection, if
the valve were to be sent wide open, for any reason, the instantaneous flow to the flare
would not exceed the HP flare design maximum so is tolerable. There may be
significant noise associated with this case.
Issue 34-030/1 – Is case where east test separator valve fails fully open
considered?
The normal operation of this valve directs 58,800 kg/h to the HP flare. By inspection, if
the valve were to be sent wide open, for any reason, the instantaneous flow to the flare
would not exceed the HP flare design maximum so is tolerable. There may be
significant noise associated with this case.
The difference in calculated and datasheet valve discharge pressure is small (50 kPa)
compared to the upstream pressure and the installed CV is greater than that required
for the maximum flow (320 compared to 231 calculated for design flowrate). The valve
will therefore easily pass the desired rate.
Issue 34-/2 – Is case where 1st stage compressor spillover valve fails fully open
considered?
The normal operation of this valve directs 59,800 kg/h to the HP flare. By inspection, if
the valve were to be sent wide open, for any reason, the instantaneous flow to the flare
would not exceed the HP flare design maximum rate. There may be significant noise
associated with this case.
The normal operation of this valve directs 60,200 kg/h to the LP flare. The calculated
valve CV for this flow is 3097 and the control valve installed CV is 4145 therefore if the
valve were to be sent wide open, for any reason, there would be an instantaneous
flowrate of somewhat less than 80,600 kg/h directed to the LP flare. This flow is
considerably less than the LP flare design maximum flowrate. The case would be of
short duration as the LP separator pressure would immediately begin to fall, lowering
the rate experienced.
The calculations for total HP blowdown were all done on an individual basis only to
check that the velocity criterion was not exceeded in the laterals (a check for
excessive pressure drop was also made). No network analysis for total blowdown was
done. This was a valid approach at the time as it could be assumed that all blowdown
valves would be operating at sonic velocities and back-pressures that could restrict
flow would never be reached in the system. Given that HMDC are considering
modifications to the platform, the construction of a network model of the HP flare
system would be a useful exercise to determine the effects of any modifications
proposed.
Issue 34-045/2 - Consistency error in the blowdown flowrate from the gas
injection flowlines.
This calculation identifies 8 blowdown valves each with an initial blowdown rate of
2250 kg/h (the blowdown simulation gives actual rate is 2233 kg/h). The total
blowdown rate for all GI lines given in calc 34-006/A is 8932 kg/h indicating that the
HP flare system is designed to accommodate four GI wells. If more than four GI wells
are installed in the future, calculation 006 should be revisited.
Issue 34-042/1 – Total blowdown rate (initial rate) used in calc less than that in
Relief & Blowdown Study Report (89,601 kg/h)
This calculation uses 86,709 kg/h for total LP blowdown initial rate, less than that
stated in Relief & Blowdown Study Report (89,601 kg/h). The lower blowdown load is
in fact a more up to date figure as stated in calculation 34-006 / A Rev 06. The
decreased LP flare blowdown load should be incorporated into an updated Relief &
Blowdown Study Report.
To calculate the PSV back pressure for these valves, it is assumed that the header the
lateral relieves to is at zero pressure. This will not be true for systems which do not
blowdown. During a local fire the affecting these systems the blowdown system will be
activated. A back pressure only slightly higher than that calculated will be greater than
10% of the PSV set pressure of 700 kPa(g). API RP520 only allows a maximum back
pressure of 10% of set pressure for this type of valve (conventional). The valve
selection therefore needs to be reviewed and resized as necessary. This will require a
flare network model to be constructed.
In a number of areas this same inconsistency exists and the valve selection should be
reviewed similarly.
Issue 34-037/1 – Calculated back pressure (for 0152A/B) greater than specified
on datasheet - calc considers this OK as less than 10% of set
pressure
The maximum calculated PSV back pressure is 84 kPa(g); higher than the ‘As Built’
datasheet, which shows 1-35 kPa(g), but less than 10% of the PSV set pressure of
1380 kPa(g). API RP520 allows a maximum back pressure of 10% of set pressure for
conventional valves therefore there is no concern.
Issue 34-046/1 – 'As Built' P&IDs show bursting discs installed in this service
(calc considers PSVs) therefore calc is no longer valid
There is no replacement calculation for the installed bursting discs. The bursting disk
calculations should be reviewed to identify implications for the flare system.
Issue 34-050/1 – Rev C2 PSV datasheet states set pressure = 8200 kPa(g), 'As
Built' P&ID shows set pressure = 7000 kPa(g)
‘As Built’ datasheet has 33-PSV-7200 set pressure of 8200 kPa(g). As the item of
equipment the PSV is protecting (D-3303A) has a design pressure of 8200 kPa(g) the
error is on the P&ID. The P&ID should be corrected at the next revision. This also
applies to 33-PSV-7226 protecting D-3303B.
The ‘As Built’ datasheet has 31-PSV-7042A/B set pressure of 34,100 kPa(g) therefore
the P&ID is probably correct and the design pressure revised downwards since the
Rev C2 PSV datasheet issued. No changes are therefore required.
The maximum calculated back pressure for each PSV exceeds that stated on the ‘As
Built’ datasheet, which shows 1-35 kPa(g). However the calculated back pressure is
still less than 10% of each PSV set pressure. API RP520 allows a maximum back
pressure of 10% of set pressure for conventional valves therefore there is no concern.
ESI has been used extensively in the flare calculations. This comparison calculation
between ESI and SIMSCI’s hydraulic simulator, INPLANT, showed that ESI gave
pressure drops 20% less than INPLANT. There appears that nothing was done to
recheck the calculations at the time. Assuming that INPLANT is more accurate (as it is
more rigorous) then a 20% difference on pressure drop calculation is significant. All
calculations using ESI should be revisited.
In Appendix I the full results of the audit are given. The detailed tables that follow
identify a number of issues to be dealt with which concern the accuracy or soundness
of the design conclusions.
Calculation Issue
Number Title Rev Date Number Description
31.35 Relief Valve Calculations - HP C1 Nov-91 31.35/1 Does 2 phase relief case become the
Separator governing case if the calculation new
calculation method given in API RP520,
Seventh Edition used?
31.35/2 Flare network analysis for 2 phase case
(Calc 34-064 / G) used total load = 252,372
kg/h (40,000 bpd).
31.35/3 Relief & Blowdown Study Report Rev C1
states HP Separator Blocked Outlet
(Vapour) relief load is 244,897 kg/h.
31.35/4 The two phase calculation feed vapour /
liquid split was abnormally low.
31.35/5 Methodological problem in calculation
(compared to API RP520 Sixth Edition).
The wrong effective pressure was for the
V/L split and property conditions.
31.36 Relief Valve Calculations - MP C1 Nov-91 31.36/1 Does 2 phase relief case become the
Separator governing case if the calculation new
calculation method given in API RP520,
Seventh Edition used?
31.36/2 Are 2 x 50% LCVs sufficiently independent?
31.36/3 Methodological problem in calculation
(compared to API RP520 Sixth Edition).
The wrong pressure was used to generate
the vapour amount and properties.
31.36/4 The two phase calculation feed vapour /
liquid split was abnormally low.
31.36/5 Calculation subsequently superseded but no
indication that calculation was subsequently
corrected.
31.36/6 The gas blowby cases are methodologically
flawed.
31.36/7 There is an error in the gas rate calculated
by the test separator gas blowby case.
Calculation Issue
Number Title Rev Date Number Description
31.37 Relief Valve Calculations - LP C0 27-Nov-91 31.37/1 Is it possible for the Test Separator manifold
Separator to be connected to the LP Separator when
operating in high pressure mode?
31.37/2 Are 2 x 50% LCVs sufficiently independent?
See also 31.36/6
31.38 Inlet Line Size Checking for Relief 05-Dec-91 31.38/1 Inlet line sizes should have been
Valves recalculated using 'Final' relief data and
isometrics.
31.42 HP/MP/LP Separators PSV Inlet Line 02-Jun-92 31.42/1 Pressure drop to HP Separator relief valves
Sizing has not been calculated using maximum
relieving capacity of valves
See also 31.43/1 & 31.43/2
31.43 Gas Blowby (Checking Capacity of 22-Nov-92 31.43/1 This calculation considers both upstream
Downstream System for Gas Blowby LCVs fail open simultaneously. This
from HP to MP Separator and MP to scenario is not considered in the Relief &
LP Separator) Blowdown Study Report Rev C1 (or in any
other calculations reviewed), nor is the
platform designed for its affects.
31.43/2 This calculation considers both upstream
LCVs fail open simultaneously. This
scenario is not considered in the Relief &
Blowdown Study Report Rev C1 (or in any
other calculations reviewed), nor is the
platform designed for its affects.
31.43/3 The calculation identifies the failure of the
spillover valve (open) could lead to a relief
rate which is higher than the current design.
The following describes the technical audit issues identified in Table 5.3. In this case
the issues are grouped by relief valve and then under broad issue headings.
A series of issues raised by the technical audit can be grouped together under this
issue, i.e.
Issue 31.35/1 - Does two phase relief case become the governing case if the
calculation new calculation method given in API RP520, Seventh
Edition used?
Issue 31.35/2 - Flare network analysis for 2 phase case (Calc 34-064 / G) used
total load = 252,372 kg/h (40,000 bpd).
Issue 31.35/4 - The two phase calculation feed vapour / liquid split was
abnormally low.
The calculation of the relief valve area for the two-phase case underestimates the area
required. There was a combination of inconsistency, probably incorrect simulation
compositions and a flaw in methodology (compared to API RP 520 Sixth Edition) which
together would underestimate the orifice area required. However, because of the new
sizing method we are obliged now to use (see Section 6.5) and because of well rate
considerations these problems will naturally be corrected in the new calculation that
will be required.
So returning to 31.35/1, the most important of these considerations; the relief valve
orifice area required for the original two phase relief case based on the new Leung
omega API RP520 calculation method is 8.21 in2. This compares with the originally
(incorrectly) calculated value of 3.19 in2 for the same relief scenario. Obviously the
new method of calculation has a significant effect on required orifice area for relieving
two phase flow. In this particular case, the governing case for the relief valve was
blocked outlet – vapour relief only, which required a minimum orifice area of 9.38 in2
whereas the actual installed orifice area is 11.05 in2. On the face of it, therefore, no
hardware modifications are required.
However, we are aware that the maximum single well rate is now well in excess of the
originally considered 40 kbopd case (which represented one large and one medium
well failing to shut in). Therefore the relief case must be rigorously recalculated.
Using the new sizing method the maximum safe well rate for a single well failing to
shut in is approximately 54 kbopd. Measures should be taken to limit the maximum
well rate to this value, and to less than this value if 2 wells failing to shut in becomes
the selected basis.
Issue 31.35/3 - Relief & Blowdown Study Report Rev C1 states HP Separator
Blocked Outlet (Vapour) relief load is 244,897 kg/h.
The rate used in the calculation and to purchase the relief valve was 227,649 kg/h.
This appears to be confused in the RABS with the normal maximum associated gas
rate when the spillover valve is open during a compressor shut down. This
inconsistency should be corrected in the updated RABS.
Issue 31.36/1 - Does two phase relief case become the governing case if the new
calculation method given in API RP520, Seventh Edition is used?
Issue 31.36/4 - The two phase calculation feed vapour / liquid split was
abnormally low.
The same description as above (Section I.1.1.1) is equally valid here (although the
orifice areas are different). This case must be calculated rigorously recalculated.
This issue relates to the ability of only one of the LCVs to fail open. The level control
systems in question have independent transmitters and the equivalence in DCS terms
of duplicated controllers. This has been confirmed by HMDC studies. No further
action is required. See also below.
The gas blowby rate was reduced in January 93 (because the valve CV was reduced
from 400 to 350). However the valve selection remained unchanged. The required
orifice area is therefore higher than it needed to be.
It is arguable that the gas blowby cases are methodologically flawed. The reasons for
this are given below:
• Should a LCV fail open during normal production then the blowby fluid is
both vapour and liquid (which will reduce the effective blowby volume rate) and
also the normal positions of the downstream control valves could be taken into
account thereby dramatically reducing the apparent relief rate.
The above assumes the QRA did not identify the possibility of both valves failing open
which we understand to be the case.
The net effect of the above is to suggest the relief rates designed for are higher than
they need be. A note could be added to the updated RABS to reflect this.
Issue 31.36/7 - There is an error in the gas rate calculated in the test separator
gas blowby case.
The calculation of the gas blowby rate from the test separators uses a subcritical
formula for the level control valve even though the calculation shows that the flow is
critical. By inspection, the error will not affect the sizing of the relief valve as relief rate
for this case is considerably less than for the governing case.
The test separators are able to operate in two modes, high pressure and low pressure.
When operating in HP mode they are connected to the MP Separator and when in LP
mode to the LP Separator. This calculation considers that the test separators are in
LP mode but the reliability of the installed precautions / interlocks preventing
connection of the test separators in HP mode to the LP Separator is not apparent. As
the test separators can operate at 4240 kpa the potential gas blowby rate to the LP
Separator, if incorrectly lined up, would be significant. This relief scenario should be
investigated further.
I.1.1.4 Miscellaneous
Issue 31.38/1 - Inlet line sizes should have been recalculated using 'Final' relief
data and isometrics.
This calculation was done with preliminary data and has obviously been revised as
many PSV inlet line sizes shown on the ‘As Built’ P&IDs are different to those
calculated here. The inlet line sizes should be checked against ‘As Built’ data and
isometrics.
Issue 31.42/1 - Pressure drop to HP Separator relief valves has not been
calculated using maximum relieving capacity of valves.
The relief valve inlet line size has been calculated using the calculated governing case
relief rate of 227,649 kg/h. API RP520 Part II states that the inlet line size should be
calculated using the ‘maximum rated capacity’ of the installed relief valve which in this
case is 262,161 kg/h. It is not expected that the inconsistency will have a significant
effect on the inlet line size as a margin of 20% was applied at the time. (See also
Issue 31.38/1 above).
Issue 31.43/1 and 2 - This calculation considers both upstream LCVs fail open
simultaneously. This scenario is not considered in the Relief &
Blowdown Study Report Rev C1 (or in any other calculations
reviewed), nor is the platform designed for its affects.
In view of the description in 31.36/6 this case does not appear feasible. The notes
attached to the calculations should have said so.
The calculation identifies that the LP Separator spillover valve, if it failed fully open,
could generate a flowrate of 121,035 kg/h in the LP flare. This is greater than the
current design LP flare capacity of 110,874 kg/h. The maximum flowrate which could
be sent to the LP flare system under this scenario should be investigated for the
current operation.
033 / G Coalescer & LP 033/1 Assumption that the header is at zero Construct a LP flare network model
Separator Heaters pressure (I.e. that this is a singular event to calculate the back pressure on
Simultaneous Fire not coincident with any other releases) relief valves when the system is
Relief - Network depressuring.
Analysis
036 / G Injection Stage 036/1 Inconsistency on datasheet between No further action required.
Suction Scrubber PSV accumulation and 'Max Relieving
- Network Analysis Pressure' (should be 10%)
037 / G HM & CM Expansion 037/1 Calculated back pressure (for 0152A/B) No further action required.
Drums Simultaneous greater than specified on datasheet -
Fire Relief Case - calc considers this OK as less than 10%
Network Analysis of set pressure
See also 34-033/1
044 / G Total LP Blowdown - See 34-042/2 See 34-042/2
After 3 mins (stagger
point) - Network
Analysis
046 / G Fuel Gas Cooler / 046/1 ''As Built' P&IDs show bursting discs in There is no replacement
Heater tube rupture this service (calc considers PSVs) calculation for the installed bursting
relief line size check therefore calc is no longer valid discs. The bursting disk
calculations should be reviewed to
identify implications for the flare
system.
050 / G 3rd Stage Suction 050/1 Rev C2 PSV datasheet states set P&ID set pressure error?
Scrubber A (D-3303A) pressure = 8200 kPa(g), 'As Built' P&ID
PSV Discharge Line shows set pressure = 7000 kPa(g)
Size Confirmation
052 / G E-3301 Shell Side See 34-033/1 See 34-033/1
PSV Discharge Line
Size Confirmation
053 / G E-3303B Shell Side See 34-046/1 See 34-046/1
PSV Discharge Line
Size Confirmation
6.1 Introduction
Before commencing the challenge process the key legislative aspects are introduced
The general requirements of HSW legislation are neatly summarised in the following
extract. Here we use an interpretation supplied by a representative of the relevant UK
government department. We believe the requirements of Canadian HSW legislation to
be very similar:
As a duty holder under HSW legislation, you have a continuing duty to ensure the H&S
of employees and other persons who may be affected by the way in which you
undertake your business. The legislative regime sets a goal for duty holders to do all
that is reasonably practicable. In some areas technological change is so fast that
standards of compliance which would have been acceptable 10 years ago, are no
longer satisfactory. However the advantage of goal setting is that it keeps pace with
technological change, but also allows you to develop solutions which are better
aligned with the risks in your workplace.
So you will always, and continuously, have to keep an eye on new codes, standards,
good industry practice, etc., to ensure you are doing enough to satisfy the law. Where
it is reasonably practicable to do so, changes should be made. Nevertheless HSE
would accept that for existing installations it may be less reasonably practicable to
make a change, than is the case for a new installation - it is a judgement call which the
law requires you to make (and be able to justify, if or when challenged).
This sets the general principles by which retrospective change can be considered on
Hibernia. This advice clearly states that new codes and practices should be applied to
the facility unless it can be shown to be unreasonable.
The relevant legislative regulations for Hibernia are those issued under the Canada -
Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act. The key regulations which have
relevance for the flare system are as follows:
During the design phase the relevant version of the regulations was the 1991 draft.
These were revised once again in draft form in 1993. The regulations were finally
registered on the 21 February, 1995.
During this time there was no substantive change to the documents in relation to
the design of the flare system.
The key extracts from the 1995 regulations are given below:
17. (1) In this section, “gas release system” means a system for releasing gas and
combustible liquid from an installation and includes a flare system, a pressure
relief system, a depressurizing system and a cold vent system.
(2) Every gas release system shall be designed and located, taking into account
the amounts of combustibles to be released, the prevailing winds, the location of
other equipment and facilities…, so that when the system is in operating it will not
damage the installation…, or injure any person.
(3) Every gas release system shall be designed and installed in accordance with
(a) American Petroleum Institute RP 520, Recommended Practice for the Design
and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Systems in Refineries;
(b) American Petroleum Institute RP 521, Guide for Pressure -Relieving and
Depressuring Systems;
(d) American Petroleum Institute Standard 527, Seat Tightness of Pressure Relief
Valves; and
(e) American Petroleum Institute Standard 2000, Venting Atmospheric and Low-
Pressure Storage Tanks.
(4) Every gas release system shall be designed and constructed to ensure that
oxygen cannot enter the system during normal operation.
(5)…
(7) With the exception of water, any liquid that cannot be safely and reliably burned
at the flare tip of a gas release system shall be removed from the gas before it
enters the flare…
(9) Every gas release system shall be designed and installed so that, taking into
account the prevailing wind conditions, the maximum radiation on areas where
personnel may be located , from the automatically ignited flame of a flare or vent,
will be
(a) 6.3 kW/m2, where the period of exposure will not be greater than one minute;
(b) 4.72 kW/m2, where the period of exposure will be greater than one minute but
not greater than one hour; and
(c) 1.9 kW/m2, where the period of exposure will be greater than one hour.
These regulations are referenced in the RABS. Their only influence on the flare
system design appears to be to ensure the sound levels are acceptable:
i.e.
etc.
The other regulations covering certificates of fitness, drilling, and diving have no
significant influence on the design of the flare system.
With the legislation in mind, the remainder of this section is organised to deal first with
the larger issues, which may affect a number of design characteristics of the flare
system. Subsequently the lesser aspects are dealt with sequentially as required.
6.2.1 Requirements of the relevant regulations, design codes and practices when
Hibernia was designed
This is a summary of how jet fire was handled in the design phase. The entire subject
of its consideration was based in the probabilistic safety related design path. Out of
necessity it is an abridged version as the component parts are numerously described
in the various project documentation. Here the aim is to capture the essence of the
process and its effect on the way Hibernia was designed.
Of key interest to the Flare Revalidation Study were the aspects identified regarding jet
fire.
• The study explicitly recognised the potential for vessel rupture caused by short
duration jet fires in Module M10.
The times given for failure from jet fire impingement on various thicknesses of steel
were:
Table 6.8 Failure Times for Structures Engulfed in Jet and Pool Fires
13mm Thickness Steel Tube Coated with Chartek Type III** >60
2
* Based on a jet fire radiation of 300 kW/m
+ Based on a pool fire radiation of 150 kW/m2
** Based on research and field trials by Shell Thornton
(CSE Table 6.1)
The CSE also recognised the Key Safety Functions defined as follows:
• the escape routes from the central parts of the platform to the Temporary Safe
Refuge
• the Temporary Safe Refuge (TSR), including the central control room
For any single incident that might affect the key safety systems (more accurately
functions from the above), the risk level for the three-tiers are:
The CSE went on then to assess the risk to the Key Safety Functions using
consequence analysis and event trees.
The CSE demonstrated to a reasonable extent that the effects of jet fire and explosion
did not jeopardise the structural integrity of the platform or the availability of the
evacuation systems. In this it is implicit in the CSE that jet fire was considered a RAE
and more of a risk to structural impairment than explosion.
The CSE also indicated that jet fire impingement may cause rapid failure of
unprotected structures even if deluge systems are operating. This might be because
the intense heating raises the surface temperature above 100°C, prior to application of
water, preventing the formation of a protective liquid film.
To confirm the above the CSE made various recommendations for future work which
included the requirement to conduct a Fire Risk Assessment to review the impact of
fire on structural integrity of the H120 walls and the flare boom and the potential for
escalation in Module M10.
Also outlined in the FRA were the details of the blowdown system. The system
considered was, in principle, the same as the system outlined in the Relief and
Blowdown Study Report and subsequently built (see Table 6.17 for more detail).
The FRA looked at the duration and flame lengths of jet fires with and without
blowdown. This is summarised below:
Table 6.9 HP Separator Jet Flame Length With and Without Blowdown
Hole Size Without Blowdown (m) With Blowdown (at the end of the 15
minutes) (m)
5 mm 9 5
50 mm 53 29
The analysis undertaken in the FRA identified the potential for escalation should a jet
fire impinge on a vessel, e.g.
“Fire water deluge will act to keep the equipment cool, but a jet fire impinging directly
on a vessel may cause localised heating and loss of wall strength…”
“A HP separator incident could escalate to the LP separator and vice versa. The
vessels will be provided with local deluge protection which will provide adequate
protection for incident thermal radiation…”
The emphasis is added to contrast against protection from jet flame impingement.
This was more clearly outlined in the team review (part of the consequence analysis):
This led to the recommendation to install kerbs to prevent spread of liquid spills or pool
fires.
Generally the problem of jet fire impingement on vessels was implicitly mentioned on a
number of levels in Module M10. Other jet fire consequence analyses identified the
problems of jet flame impingement on firewalls, the crude oil coolers, the flare boom
and the hydraulic panel on level 5.
“The FRA considered a number of potential fire scenarios. In each scenario, except
possibly a large blowout, the active systems (isolation, blowdown, F&G detection and
protection) will limit the consequences and should prevent escalation.
“The KO drums are provided with deluge. This may not provide complete protection
against jet flame impingement…, but the duration would be short and failure is
unlikely…”
“A jet flame from the gas scrubbers could impinge the MP separator, but it is unlikely
that it would be of sufficient duration to cause failure, provided the blowdown system
operates…”
A leak from either the HP or LP Separators could cause either a jet flame or a pool
fire…Escalation to the HP and LP Separator is unlikely provided that the deluge
operates and the vessels are blown down…”
A related aspect considered in the FRA Update was the use of PFP and particularly
Lloyds who stated no credit should be taken for any active fire systems when
considering the ability of PFP systems.
The study ended with the main FRA conclusions being considered valid.
The report also contained discussion of how the design was optimised so as to
prevent DAEs escalating into RAEs and impairing the main safety functions. The
document formalised the selection and differentiation between DAE and RAE. This is
shown below:
Hazard
Identification
Hazard
Analysis
Event Categorised
Can Design No as DAE
be Improved Event Categorised
to Prevent as RAE
Impairment?
Optimise Design if
Minimal Impact on Cost
and Schedule
Predict Risk of RAE
and compare with Risk
Yes
Acceptance Criteria
Implement Measures
No Is Risk Yes
that are Reasonable No Further Analysis
Acceptable/
and Practicable and Required
ALARP?
Reassess Hazards
• Otherwise, most fire hazards are DAEs. This includes jet fire impingement on
main structural members as this was mitigated against using PFP. Only in a few
cases is there potential for the fire scenarios to cause a RAE. These were
identified as:
• Spread of fire from one wellhead to the another exceeds the capability of
the fire protection systems.
• Smoke and heat effects could cause impairment of the Temporary Safe
Refuge (TSR) if the worst case circumstances occurred, e.g. the wind blows
towards the TSR, HVAC systems fails to detect smoke / gas or shutdown and
doors and penetrations are open.
All the above were subjected to further study and CBA (whose requirement that the
mitigation measure be undertaken if the cost was less than 10 times the yearly loss) to
show the risks were ALARP.
In the case of the failure of the safety systems the RAE was considered a DAE after
further study:
“Thus it is concluded that the basis for the selection of DAE and RAEs, and the
assumptions relating to the adequacy of emergency systems preventing DAEs into
RAEs, are valid.
DPRA page 42
The remainder of the report explains the other types of event which are RAE. These
are summarised in the table overleaf:
Explosion Hazards
-
• M10 1 x 10-6
-
• M20 1 x 10-6
-
Sub-total for Explosion Hazards - 2 x 10-6
Blowout 1 x 10-4 1.5 x 10-5
-4
Smoke 1.7 x 10 (in QRA of TSR
2.1 x 10-5
Integrity report)
Dropped Objects - -
Flooding of Utility Shaft - <1 x 10-6
External Events:
• Iceberg Collision 5 x 10-7 5 x 10-7
-7
• Ship Collision 5 x 10 5 x 10-7
• Helicopter Crash 1 x 10-6 Negligible (Note 1)
Notes
Note 1: Negligible risk of impairing main safety functions. Risk to occupants of helicopter could be 2.6 x 10-4 per year.
Individual risk will be lower (approximately half) because the same individual is not on every helicopter flight.
Note 2: Earthquake design return period is 2000 years (5 x 10-4 per year) but this does not lead to structural failure
nor pollution. Risk associated with hydrocarbon events caused by earthquake will be significantly less than
other causes.
Note 3: Risk of damaging one essential generator. Risk to main safety functions will be negligible.
It is relevant to mention the process areas in M10 where jet fire impingement was
explicitly considered and the mitigating reasons given:
• Flare system - It was identified that the LP and HP flare KO drums would
be susceptible to jet fire. However this hazard was considered mitigated against
by the use of deluge and because the system was open to the flare.
• Crude cooler - The loss of crude oil cooler inventory was identified and
protection provided using remedial means of isolation.
The remaining M10 areas were no longer mentioned in relation to jet fire.
I.1.1.7 Conclusions
Clearly, jet fire was considered extensively during the design. Indeed the platform is in
some respects designed to resist its effects, i.e. the PFP on the structural members
and the flare boom. Within this is the assumption that the jet fire can last significant
periods of time. Also implicit in the work is the ineffectiveness of deluge on protecting
the affected equipment against jet fire impingement. On the other hand, and of most
relevance to this report, there is no indication that jet fire was ever considered in the
blowdown system design.
In the event the issue seems to have been finally lost when the emergency systems
redundancy was deemed sufficient to perform the intended function, which was to
prevent escalation of a DAE to an RAE through loss of inventory (jet fire is not explicit
but appears to be the cause of the concern). The flaw in the argument is none of the
systems were actually included in the analysis of jet fire escalation or could be shown
to prevent escaltion (although all would be helpful in the situation).
This leaves the platform with the case where a jet fire impinges on a vessel
(particularly the LP separator) with no explicit protection to avoid escalation to at least
a DAE explosion event.
Because of the flaw mentioned above, the FRA did not look at the potential for jet fire
escalation to a RAE so no acceptability criteria were ever established. Potentially
therefore there was a missed RAE event in the analysis.
It would be wrong to read this description believing that Hibernia has some design
deficiency. Generally this was the case with all facilities at the time, as the design
codes contained no guidance on how to cope with the jet fire hazard. In fact Hibernia
is much better than most facilities in this regard as will become evident in the following
sections.
API’s position seems to be that jet fire is a low probability event whose effects are
analogous to explosion. These consequences are beyond the ability of a blowdown
system to contain. API were contacted to confirm whether this is the case. They have
responded the issue will be addressed once again during the API 521 revision planned
to commence during 2001. Granherne are pressing API to provide a response within
the timescale of this study.
Once a hazard is identified it does not really matter that the codes of practice are silent
on the requirements to mitigate the hazard and this is the situation the industry finds
itself in with regard to jet fires. We fully expect future versions of API 521 to consider
in more detail the effects of jet fire and we know of at least two other organisations
performing research on the subject (Shell and a Joint Industry Project).
Current industry practice is tending towards incorporating jet fire into the analysis of
new facilities. Granherne know of at least 3 recent projects that were designed with
the assumption of jet fire impingement on equipment was a design criteria.
However, in the absence of prescriptive methods, the way the available research is
used will vary by company although the key aspects are likely to be similar.
In terms of methodology the process follows early work by Gayton and Murphy
(Reference 11), who proposed the following methodology:
• For each item of equipment define the type of fire (pool, jet, partial
engulfment, total engulfment) likely to affect it.
Not all vessels will need fire protection. Current studies by Granherne use a more
sophisticated approach than the simple table presented in the QRA, but essentially they
confirm the reasonableness of the early work if only by default. If it can be shown that the
risk of escalation given blowdown is low, then fire protection may be shown not to be
necessary.
600.0
Liq. Temp
500.0 Gas Temp
Press. Bar
% Yield Stress 20C - Applied
% Yield Stress 20C- Strength 60.0
space (deg C)
400.0
300.0
40.0
200.0
20.0
100.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 1.3 2.5 3.8 5.0 6.3 7.5 8.8 10.0 11.3 12.5 13.8 15.0 16.3 17.5 18.8 20.0 21.3 22.5 23.8 25.0 26.3 27.5 28.8 30.0
time (min)
The industry is supporting more detailed analysis of fires offshore and performing
experiments to determine how fires behave in confined spaces. These have shown that
fires actually fill the upper space in a module. Also the heating fluxes are considerably
lower than the 300 kW/m2 originally used for analysis. This is because on a platform the
rate of burning is dependent on the ventilation whereas the original figures were from
research in the open air. Although there remains the potential for flame impingement and
engulfment, the implications are that the airflows around the vessel are not so severe,
and deluge systems will still be able to cool the skin. On the other hand, high level
pipework may be more at risk (although pipework is normally considered more robust).
One last aspect where change is evolving is in the benefit taken for insulation surrounding
a vessel. As long as it does not catch fire (which is normally the case), and is clad in
steel (rather than aluminium) and the fastening system is secure, the insulation is very
effective at protecting the vessel wall from flame impingement.
Figure 6.4 - Temperatures in a Half Filled Vessel Subject to Fire Load - from Heat
Up 3D
600-700
500-600
400-500
700
300-400
200-300
600
100-200
0-100
500
400
o
T empe ratureC
300
200
100
0
S 15
S 13
19
17
S11
15
S9
13
S7
11
9
S5
Lo ng itudinal Ele me nt Around
7
S1
3
1
Using this method, the link between the blowdown and other means of protection
would then be explicit in the quantified risk assessment (QRA). This does not appear
to be the case in the Hibernia QRA.
In this section the effect of applying best industry practise in relation to jet fire is
reviewed. As has been seen, the issue of jet fire causes 3 related aspects to be
considered:
• The analysis of jet fire impingement on Hibernia vessels, i.e. what are the
consequences of jet fire impingement on various vessels?
The heating of a vessel engulfed by flame was assessed using the package 3-D Heat
Up, a Granherne-developed heat transfer program. The program 3-D Heat Up treats a
source of heat as a flame as a set of discrete emitting “plates” and the receiver also as
a 3-D shape made up of a number of quadrilaterals. The program allows the user to
include details of any insulation on the surface of the vessel. The user can place the
receiving vessel anywhere with respect to the flame, and for the purpose of this study
the vessel was assumed to be engulfed entirely (which would only result from a very
large leak size), as this was the worst case. The diagram below shows a cross section
of the location of the flame.
70
60
Jet Flame
50
40
(m)
30
Vessel
20
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
(m)
The heat up was then calculated for each of the vessels for two cases, with and
without insulation. Each of the vessels was assumed to be oriented horizontally, but
the results have been checked against vessels oriented vertically (particularly for the
compressor scrubbers). The results of the analysis were charted. The temperatures
do not predict absolutely the potential for vessel failure, since a depressured vessel
will have reduced stresses.
Sample results for an insulated vessel are shown in the figure. These show the
temperatures in the vessel, depicting it as an “unpeeled” skin:
290
290-295
280 285-290
280-285
275-280
270-275
275 265-270
19
16
13
265
10
S16
S15
S14
S13
S12
7
S11
S10
S9
S8
S7
4
S6
S5
S4
S3
S2
S1
1
This plot distorts the vessel somewhat, as points at the end, which is dished, are
closer to each other physically than is represented. As can be seen, the temperatures
on the gas side of the vessel are higher than those on the liquid side. This is because
the liquid conducts heat better than the gas, and also because the liquid is a bigger
heat sink. The kink at the far dished end is due to the modelling of conduction through
skin between points that are close together.
For the compressor train components runs were performed only at the highest heat flux
(180 kW/m2).
It can be seen from the above that the temperatures of the MP and LP separators and
compressor components up to the 3rd stage suction cooler are well above 500oC if
there is no insulation around the vessels. The highest temperatures are recorded on
the gas side of the vessel, where there is no liquid to act as a heat sink.
600
remaining strength
500
Stresses (% of
500-600
400
400-500
300 300-400
200 200-300
100 100-200
0 S10 0-100
1
4
7
S1
10
13
16
19
Vessel Cell No
Once more the greatest effects are seen on the gas side, which is where temperatures
are highest. In the case above failure would occur as the stresses are 5 times the
remaining (residual) strength.
Information can be extracted from the stress results in several formats, such as time to
failure, highest stress and so on. The result format used below shows the ratio of the
applied stress and the percentage of residual strength remaining at time t = 15
minutes.
The results above show that the HP separator does not heat up significantly even
when the effects of the insulation are not included. Consequently the vessel stress as
a percentage of yield stress at the temperature is low. The integrity of the MP and LP
separators, however, is only guaranteed by the insulation. The heat input is much
lower in the insulated case, and given the modest temperature rises in such cases, it
can be said that there will be no threat to the vessels.
The results show that the lower pressure vessel’s integrity is only ensured by
insulation. The higher pressure equipment, on the other hand, has wall thicknesses
sufficient to survive a jet fire without insulation. By inspection, this suggests that the
current system where the A train injection compressor is blowdown 3 minutes after the
other systems is acceptable (i.e. the vessels should not fail) even if the A train injection
compressor components are engulfed in a jet fire.
Also implicit in the ability of the vessel to survive the fire is the necessity for the
staggering system to function as designed. Some concern has been expressed that
the reliability of the system (software, electronics, ESD/PSD and pneumatics) has not
been conclusively demonstrated. Of the failures that could occur, the failure of the
blowdown system to initiate at all is the most serious with the potential, during a fire, to
allow vessel failure and / or escalation through jet fire or explosion. Even outside a fire
situation, the potential for explosion is seriously increased once the contents of the
compressor system begins to vent into the module through the seals as the seal oil
runs out. Of much less concern would be the failure of the staggering system to pause
the A train injection compressor blowdown. In this case the worst event which would
be likely would be abnormally high radiation rates on the platform (dependent on the
wind condition). However, even this benign failure has the potential to escalate if the
initiating cause is an incident involving the LP separator. In this case the coincident
blowdown would add inventory to the area as the back pressure on the LP separator
would be abnormally high. There appears to be good reason, therefore, to perform a
reliability analysis to confirm the system’s ability to function as required.
The integrity of the insulation thus is a key issue for the protection of the lower
pressure equipment, namely:
• MP separator
• LP Separator
If the insulation remains intact on the vessel under conditions of jet flame engulfment,
and resists the physical impulse from the momentum of the gas jet, then it is likely that
the vessels will not fail. On the other hand, such integrity does not seem to have been
designed into the vessel, and so some upgrading of the protection may be necessary.
The above does not take credit for the presence of deluge. There is still some debate
in the industry on the ability of deluge to mitigate the effects of jet fire, which relate to
how quickly it is applied after the jet fire event has commenced. If the vessel is too
hot, the deluge has difficulty establishing a cooling skin. However, there are a number
of research projects underway which should eventually define the available credit to
take for deluge. For the moment it is sufficient to state that a system with deluge is
much improved over one without.
Vessels shall be depressured to 690 kPag (100 psig) or to 50% of the design
pressure, whichever is smaller. The maximum time allowed to depressure a system is
2 minutes per 3 mm (1/8 in) of vessel wall thickness. Depressuring time of less than
6 minutes need not be used regardless of vessel wall thickness. Depressuring time
shall not exceed 15 minutes, except with Mobil approval.
Vapour depressuring may not be practical when the vessel design pressure is less
than 690 kPag, as piping and valves may become unreasonably large, or when vapour
depressuring load governs the size of the pressure relief and flare headers. When
vapour depressuring is not practical, vessels may be insulated to reduce the vapour
depressuring load or may be protected by other means such as water sprays.
Start pressure for the blowdown was specified as the maximum operating pressure,
which presumably was equivalent to the pressure trip setting.
These latter forms of protection could also be used in lieu of depressuring if designed
according to Mobil guidelines.
These systems should have adequate venting capacity to permit reduction of the
vessel stress to a level at which stress rupture is not of immediate concern. For sizing
criteria this generally involves reducing the equipment pressure from initial conditions
to a level equivalent to 50% of the vessel’s design gauge pressure within
approximately 15 minutes. This criterion is based on the vessel wall temperature
versus stress to rupture and applies generally to vessels with wall thicknesses of
approximately 1 inch (25 millimeters) or more. The required percentage depressuring
rate depends on the metallurgy of the vessel, the thickness and initial temperature of
the vessel wall…
API allows the blowdown to commence with the start pressure at initial conditions.
Clearly the Mobil requirements were followed except in the case of the start pressure
for blowdown. Here the RABS suggests the blowdown commences at normal
pressure, whereas the Mobil requirement was from maximum operating pressure.
This issue is confused further by the fact that the calculations for the compressor
system appears to be based on the pressure trip settings suggesting the RABS
contains a typographic error and the design did indeed follow the Mobil guide.
In order to avoid gas escape along the compressor shaft, compressor sections are
to be depressurised from their initial settle-out conditions to a pressure less than
the static head exerted by the height of the seal oil rundown capacity. This
capacity is defined as the seal oil reservoir volume between the liquid level trip
switch and an empty reservoir. This volume will be sized to allow for an interval of
15 minutes to depressure all of the compressors to 110 kPa (abs).
In order to minimise the peak initial total LP Blowdown flowrate it was agreed that
a staggered compressor blowdown should be used….
The motor-driven gas compressor (K-33-1) is now to utilise a dry gas seal
arrangement instead of a seal oil system. However as the depressuring rate from
this section is low (less than 5% of the peak initial blowdown flowrate) the same
depressuring basis as defined above for the turbine-driven compressor blowdown
sections has been used for this blowdown section.
Due to the selection of the compressor seals, the atmospheric end pressure could not
be avoided unless the system was significantly modified. Otherwise the remaining gas
in the system would spill through the seals into the module when the seal oil ran out.
Of course, more blowdown isolation valves would have avoided the requirement to
depressure the entire compressor system to atmospheric.
3. For the production manifolds (HP, MP and test manifolds) and gas
injection manifold it has been agreed that a specific exception to the basis detailed
in 1) will be taken.
It was agreed that the application of the philosophy basis identified in 1) was not
intended for this type of high pressure blowdown section. API RP 521 advises that
for high pressure sections including vessels with wall thicknesses of 1 inch or
more, the depressuring basis can be to reduce the pressure from initial conditions
to 50% of the design pressure within approximately 15 minutes. API RP 521 also
notes that on certain high pressure/inventory blowdown sections the depressuring
basis may be reviewed more critically to provide both a practical and safe basis.
ii) As the initial pressure of the HP, MP and test manifolds is already below
50% of their design pressure they will be depressured to 50% of their
appropriate downstream separators design pressure within approximately
15 minutes.
iii) As the future gas lift manifold wall thickness will probably be less than 1
inch and the current peak blowdown flowrate from this section is not
excessive, this section will still be depressured in accordance with the
basis detailed in 1).
RABS pages 8 to 10
So, virtually every interpretation of API RP 521 that could have been taken made
eventually was. This probably resulted from the ambiguity the recommended practice
contained at the time. Notice also the start pressure of the manifold blowdown which
is again the normal pressure, further highlighting the inconsistency of approach.
Nonetheless, in our view, all of the above interpretations were acceptable as they are
generally conservative. Whether the approach could be described as consistent is
another matter. This issue is described further in Section 6.3.5.
The RABS would also have benefited from a mention of who agreed these issues and
the forum and documentation they were agreed in as the audit trail appears to go dead
after this time.
Note 1: The LP Separator operating pressure is already below the level which it should be depressured to. Therefore, only a nominal
blowdown capacity has been taken for this section.
Note 2: The Lift Gas Dehydrator and Gas Lift Manifold are future items.
Note 3: Injection Compressor “A” blowdown is staggered on a 3-minute time delay after other blowdown sections. Therefore, the
blowdown time for this section is only 12 minutes.
I.1.1.1 Mobil “Pressure Relief and Vapor Depressuring Systems” MP 70-P-06, July 1998
The practice refers to the API 521 method with regard to depressuring system sizing
for pool fire and the option of controlling the blowdown peak rate by using controlled
blowdown (i.e. reducing the peak rate by control). The remainder of the document in
relation to depressuring is linked to compositional effects that should be considered
during the unsteady state calculations.
Comparisons with the earlier versions of the Mobil practices suggest there has been
no change that would affect the design of the blowdown system.
1. The subtle change in the form of words regarding the relevant pressure
levels.
As time has passed the requirement of API 521 has hardened and now represents
the clearest idea of the API’s design intent. The practice’s intent can be read as
follows:
• Systems with design pressure below 1724 kPag need not be depressured.
However, if it is chosen to do so, the final pressure should be 690 kPag or 50%
of the design pressure, whichever is less.
Immediate concern in this instance is 15 minutes. However this hides the fact that
once the stress level in a vessel is reduced by half, the time taken in an API 521
pool fire to heat the (1 inch and over) steel to a temperature at which stress rupture
is likely of the order of hours. The remainder of the blowdown should have been
completed by the time the vessel fails (assuming sufficient fuel to keep the fire
going this long). Based on this scenario the depressuring requirement can be
seen to be very conservative as is evidenced by the fact that some facilities are
allowed to do without depressuring facilities.
Again the start pressure for the blowdown is referred to as initial conditions.
• Systems with design pressure below 1724 kPag need not be depressured.
However, if it is chosen to do so, the final pressure should be 690 kPag or 50%
of the design pressure, whichever is less.
The above approach would always lead to the minimum sized flare system, indeed it
has the effect of focussing on the most susceptible equipment, thereby applying a high
level of safety.
The start pressure we believe most logical to apply is from initial conditions in cases
where the blowdown is automatically initiated on fire. The probability of coincidence of
high pressure in the system (i.e. just below the PSHH) and fire can be shown to be
very low. The requirement to start at the maximum operating pressure stems from the
era when fire and gas detection systems were unreliable and, as a consequence, did
not initiate automatically. This meant that the fire had the possibility to heat the
system, raising the system’s pressure, prior to manual operator intervention.
Using this approach care would be needed to adjust the calculations should the
pressure profile in the system change significantly.
In passing it should also be noted that some companies adjust the blowdown time
period to remove the stress on all vessels so that they do not rupture in the event of jet
fire impingement. This would normally be required if the vessels were not protected.
This is a particularly expensive way of catering for the jet fire hazard.
Regarding the time to depressure the vessels. The 15 minutes is selected such that
the temperature reached when the stress is halved leaves the vessel not prone to
rupture. Once this satisfactory situation is reached, the vessel continues to
depressure and the period before escalation should lengthen. In other words, if the
initiation of blowdown is timely the period for evacuation should be significantly in
excess of 15 minutes (although it cannot be guaranteed).
Application of the above design practice requirement would significantly reduce the
load on the HP flare as the HP and MP separators could be depressured more slowly.
The target would instead move to ensuring the stress level in the LP separator fell as
quickly as possible as this is the most likely vessel to fail. The existing design case
includes only a nominal depressuring rate (at the time, the clause in the API regarding
thin walled vessels was less than clear). Satisfying the jet fire calculations in Section
6.2.5 should be the target of the revised calculations.
Prior to agreeing any of the above the permission of Mobil for a deviation to the MEP
would need to be sought.
The Mobil guide allowed the control of the depressuring rate so as not to exceed the
maximum allowable rate in the flare system, i.e.:
Vapor depressuring valves may restrict the initial depressuring to the capacity of the
closed pressure relief system and flare.
EGS 661-1985
Whilst not explicit this seems to indicate that the use of staggering to achieve this was
acceptable.
Because of the wet seal oil system the compressors were required to depressure to
the LP flare system. The end pressure was required to be atmospheric. This placed a
large load on the LP flare and by 1992 it was realised that LP flare system was unable
to cope with the peak rate (the radiation levels on the platform were too high). The A
train injection compressor stage blowdown was therefore delayed 3 minutes to reduce
the peak rate experienced.
(See Appendix I, calculation 34-006/A Rev 05 for the summary of the loads from the
various areas).
The material requirements of either the current Mobil guide or API 521 has not
changed regarding the acceptability of staggering.
The concept of staggering or sequentially depressuring plant has been around the
industry for many years. Whilst not explicitly allowed by the Mobil guide or API
recommended practice nor is it forbidden.
Used most carefully, staggered blowdown is usually reserved for situations where
plant is sufficiently independent that total plant blowdown is not desirable. A good
example of such a situation is a refinery where there are a number of self contained
plant areas, sufficiently independent, and sufficiently far apart that blowdown for a
plant fire in one area would only be desirable in that area.
This is the normal test for the acceptability for staggered blowdown:
We have seen these requirements in another Operator’s design guidelines the logic
being self-evident.
From the above there is clearly concern regarding the staggering of the A injection
compressor blowdown. The case where there is a jet fire around the A train injection
stage (including scrubbers etc.) causing a blowdown of the remaining plant, which is
not on fire is anomalous. In Section 7.2.3 the required blowdown rates required to
avoid stagger are described.
Pressure relief valves shall be sized in accordance with API RP and API STD 526.
Pressure relief valves handling vapour and liquid should be sized according to the two-
phase flowrate from the vessel. Refer to API RP 521 for guidance in determining
vapor and liquid loads from various types of equipment.
I.1.1.3 API
API RP 14C requires a pressure vessel to have a relief valve sized for full inflow. API
521 requires designers to size the relief valve for closed outlets. The codes are
ambiguous on how such an event will occur. Elsewhere, API 521 (vaguely) refers to
the following:
To protect a vessel or system from overpressure when all outlets are blocked, the
capacity of the relief device must be at least as great as the capacity of the sources of
pressure. If all outlets are not blocked the capacity of the unblocked outlets may
properly be considered.
API 520 also contained various methods for sizing relief valves including a method for
sizing for two-phase relief. The two-phase sizing method relied on calculating the
required orifice required for vapour relief and liquid relief and adding them together.
The API said the following of the method:
b) Calculate individually the orifice area required to pass the flashed vapor
component, using Equations 2-7 as appropriate, according to service, type of valve,
and whether the back pressure is greater or less than the critical downstream
pressure.
c) Calculate individually the orifice area required to pass the unflashed liquid
component using Equation 9. The pressure drop (P1-P2) is the inlet relieving pressure
minus the back pressure.
d) Add the individual areas calculated for the vapor and liquid components to obtain
the total orifice area, A, that is required.
e) Select a pressure relief valve that has an effective discharge area equal or greater
than the total calculated orifice area…
HP Separator
Combining the requirements described above (and effectively ignoring the full flow
requirement of API RP 14C) gave rise to the following relief valve sizing case.
The HP separator relief valve is dimensioned by the full associated gas rate at design
oil production rate. The most credible scenario that might lead to such a case would
be blockage of the HP separator vapour outlet. This could occur due to maloperation
of an isolation valve or the failure of the pressure control valve in the vapour outlet.
Once this occurred the pressure in the vessel would quickly rise and should cause an
ESD trip. However as is the case with all relief valve sizing cases this trip is assumed
to fail and the relief valve sized for the resulting case.
The HP flare KO vessel was sized to accommodate the resulting liquids from this case
for a 10 minute relief event.
Test Separator
The test separator relief valve follows the above except the sizing case is the two-
phase sizing case.
Pressure relief valves shall be sized in accordance with API RP 520 PT 1 or local
codes, whichever is the more stringent.
MP 70-P-06 page 20
The relevant edition of the API is the Sixth Edition Errata; 1994. This edition retains
the API additive calculation method.
Page 55
D.1.1 The method for two-phase sizing presented in this Appendix is one of
several techniques currently in use and newer methods are continuing to evolve as
time goes on. It is recommended that the particular method to be used for a two-
phase application be fully understood. It should be noted that the methods presented
in this Appendix have not been validated by test, nor is there any recognized
procedure for certifying the capacity of pressure relief valves in two-phase flow
service.
A series of equations based on the Leung omega method are presented. Finally an
alternative method is also mentioned:
Appendix D page 69
The issue of the new calculation method has caused concern in the industry. The
history of the change stems from some work prepared by DIERS. This group found
that the API method undersized relief valves in two-phase relief cases undergoing
froth reactions. This led to a certain amount of lobbying to have the DIERS method
incorporated in the API. Other groups (presumably aware the DIERS model would not
be appropriate for the oil and gas industry) began to work on models which had the
capacity to predict two-phase relief flows through orifices. These models have been
tested and appear to indicate the API method undersizes orifices in two-phase flow.
Granherne take a pragmatic view of this situation based around the following
arguments:
• The earlier API method defines an effective orifice area, which is used to
select the next larger orifice size for installation. The best evidence which
recommends this method is API do not know of a single overpressure failure event
to have occurred since the method was first incorporated into an API code in July
1990 (although the method has been around much longer than this). Usually a loss
event is the precursor to changing a recommended practice or design code.
• Leung omega and HEM methods size the (sharp edged) orifice required to
pass the flow. As valves are not available in all sizes (only the API STD 526
designations) a designer would have to select the next larger size. The valve is
implicitly oversized.
• The later Leung omega and HEM work are based around real orifices
rather than the API type of effective orifice area which contains a number of
correction factors which mean an API orifice is bigger than at first sight it seems.
However, Granherne recognise the valuable research undertaken to date and expect it
to become the basis of relief valve sizing in the future. We expect the sizing method to
adjust as the research is applied to API 526 relief valves when the comparisons will be
much clearer (maybe to the extent that the resulting valve selections are not so
different from the additive method which, for the moment, they are).
None of this, however, protects HMDC (or their advisors) from the difficulties
mentioned in Section 4.1.3 and the requirement to prove the new recommended
practice is not appropriate if it is proposed not to incorporate it. Clearly, it is feasible to
procure a larger relief valve if the calculation check suggests it is necessary. A QRA
will not, in this case, show any improvement in risk profile for the facility. Yet, by
inspection, a valve that is larger than the existing will cope better if the underlying
basis is true and thereby reduce risk in some unquantifiable manner.
Granherne will therefore apply the new requirements to new projects as a matter of
course.
Applying the Leung omega or HEM method has no effect on the sizing selection for
the HP separator. Based on the 40 kbopd original two-phase sizing cases, the full
associated vapour case is still the defining case. The Test separator, however, is a
different matter. It seems that to cater for the new sizing method the valve size should
increase.
The sizing will also depend on the final philosophy selected for the number of wells
which fail to shut-in. HMDC have performed some work on this aspect, including
taking account of the future number of wells and their corresponding rate, which will
need to be incorporated in the updated RABS.
This project can be undertaken when feasible. We also believe that no restrictions to
production need apply in the time it takes to procure the new valves, as it is arguable
that the system is safe by experience.
The 1985 version used a design windspeed equivalent to 93 km/h (57.8 mph or
84.8 fps or 25.8 m/s) if the discharge tip speed was 0.5 Mach. Otherwise MRDC Loss
Prevention Engineering were to be consulted.
Radiant heat intensities at a design reference point on the platform shall not exceed
the values in Table 2 with the wind in an adverse direction and at maximum
emergency discharge rates. The design wind speed for determining radiant heat
intensities shall be 12.4 km/h (Corrected to 32.2 km/h) (20 mph). The reference
point will be selected, subject to Mobil approval, as the nearest point on the platform
that cannot be readily shielded. Radiant heat intensities shall also be calculated at 67
percent and 133 percent of design wind speed and at other critical points on the
platform to determine what precautions must be taken for flaring during adverse wind
conditions.
• Design wind velocity is 20 mph (or 29.3 feet per second). (8.9 m/s)
• Normal average windspeed is 20 mph (29.3 feet per second) (8.9 m/s)
There is no suggestion (or otherwise) that these figures should be used for flare
system design.
The system was designed on the basis contained in the RABS and subsequent
documentation. This is summarised in the following:
a) Windspeed
From the Project Environmental Data Summary (PEDS) the maximum 1 hour
mean wind speed at 140 m above sea level (i.e. at the flare tip location) is
34.2 m/s based on a 1-year return period. The expected frequency shown in
PEDS, is however, less than 0.1% and only quantifiable in directions that would
not adversely affect flare radiation levels.
Therefore, for the purposes of the radiation calculations, a wind speed of 27 m/s
(60 mph), blowing directly towards the platform, will be considered as the worst
case in accordance with the agreed composite specification basis.
RABS page 22
I.1.1.1 Mobil “Pressure Relief and Vapor Depressuring Systems” MP 70-P-06, July 1998
The reference to design windspeed is lost in the new document. It may now be linked
to the GKN Birwelco software recommended for the flare sizing task.
The selection of design windspeed for flare design is usually prescriptively applied by
the Operators. This has arisen probably because there is so little guidance elsewhere
in the national or international codes. A quick survey of projects that Granherne have
been involved with indicates design windspeeds from 10 to 27 m/s (22 to 60 mph) for
offshore locations, none of which appear to have been set by using a constant
methodology.
In saying the above, Granherne would also have sympathy for any situation where a
less onerous windspeed were selected; the codes could be interpreted to allow it.
In the event, Granherne’s current best practice would have had a very minor effect on
the flare boom length or (as is the case now the platform is constructed) the design
rates allowable.
Most Adverse Windspeed in an 34.2 from NW (not analysed) 34.2 from NW (analysed and not
on platform direction as extreme as above)
The windspeeds are very similar to the RABS criteria. The effect of using these
windspeeds is demonstrated in Section 8.
I.1.1.1 Canada Oil and Gas Installations Regulations (January 1991, Draft)
Recapping the requirements:
(9) Every gas release system shall be designed and installed so that, taking into
account the prevailing wind conditions, the maximum radiation on areas where
personnel may be located, from the automatically ignited flame of a flare or vent,
will be
(a) 6.3 kW/m2, where the period of exposure will not be greater than one minute;
(b) 4.72 kW/m2, where the period of exposure will be greater than one minute but
not greater than one hour; and
(c) 1.9 kW/m2, where the period of exposure will be greater than one hour.
The 1985 version used the criteria given in Table 6.10 in the calculation of flare stack
height.
Table 6.19 Allowable Radiant Heat Intensities Excluding Solar Radiation (1985)
W/m2
6300 Open areas where refinery personnel can be exposed up to one minute
with appropriate clothing
9465 Areas where protection or shielding from the radiant heat is available to
refinery personnel in six seconds or less (except for control rooms or for
non-combustible equipment and facilities)
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By 1991 this was at the point of changing to:
The flare stack location shall be determined by allowable radiant heat intensities at
various critical points on offshore platforms or processing facilities. It shall be
calculated in accordance with API RP 521 and as modified by this guide.
The modifications to API RP 521 the 1991 guide refers to are given in Table 6.11
below.
W/m2
1580 For continuous flaring operations in areas where personnel must remain at
their work stations without shielding but with appropriate clothing
Notes
1. In areas where personnel can be exposed to higher radiation intensities, heat shielding must be
provided and also for equipment and structure as necessary.
2. In areas where personnel are not expected to wear appropriate clothing (i.e. coveralls, boots,
gloves, hard hats) allowable radiation levels have been reduced by a factor of two.
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API RP 521 (Third Edition, November 1990) recommends the following:
KW/m2
15.77 Heat intensity on structures and in areas where operators are not likely to be
performing duties and where shelter from radiant heat is available (for example,
behind equipment).
9.46 Value of K at design flare release to any location to which people have access (for
example, at grade below the flare or a service platform of a nearby tower);
exposure should be limited to a few seconds, sufficient for escape only.
6.31 Heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting up to 1 minute may be
required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing.
4.73 Heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting several minutes may be
required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing.
1.58 Value of K at design flare release to any location where personnel are continuously
exposed.
The design used the following radiation levels, derived from Draft Canadian
Legislation, as outlined by the RABS:
KW/m2
6.3 Heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting up to 1 minute may be
required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing.
4.72 Heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting up to several minutes may
be required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing.
1.9 Value of allowable radiation level at design flare release at any location where
personnel are continuously exposed, i.e. helideck
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In addition the following statement is included in the RABS:
In addition to the above radiation limitations HTPT advised that the maximum radiation
level experienced on the platform escape routes is not to exceed 1000 Btu/ft2 h (3.16
W/m2) for periods over 1 minute of exposure.
RABS page 22
The design calculations for the worst emergency flaring case (total platform blowdown)
and a flare boom length of 115m resulted in the following radiation levels:
I.1.1.1 Mobil “Pressure Relief and Vapor Depressuring Systems” MP 70-P-06, July 1998
The new document has the following recommendations on thermal radiation levels.
Table 6.23 Allowable Radiant Heat Intensities in W/m2 Excluding Solar Radiation
Emergency Releases
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I.1.1.2 API 521 (Fourth Edition, March 1997)
The recommendations on flare thermal radiation levels in the new addition of API
RP521 remain the same as the previous version.
We have mentioned earlier in this report that best practice is subjective to some
extent. Where issues are not subjective are in matters of law. Once a requirement
passes into law, as have the Canadian regulations, by meeting those requirements, an
owner has effectively discharged their responsibilities. As is also customary in matters
of precedence, national regulations always supercede recommended practices.
Normally there is actually little difference between the two requirements and this is
where we find ourselves in the Hibernia context. This is demonstrated in the following
table:
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Table 6.24 Summary of Flare Radiation Requirements for Hibernia
Canadian Impairment Equivalent Remarks
Regulations Criteria API RP521
Maximum radiation on areas where the 1.9 N/A 1.58 Apply Canadian regulations.
period of exposure will be greater than
one hour
Helideck operable for at least 2 hours. Silent 3.2 Not Not used as a normal radiation
Inoperability may result from…thermal specifically level.
radiation over 3.2 kW/m2 mentioned
(Impairment Criterion 4)
Maximum radiation on areas where the 4.72 N/A 4.73 Apply Canadian regulations.
period of exposure will be greater than
one minute but not greater than one
hour
Maximum radiation on areas where the 6.3 6.3 6.3 Apply Canadian regulations.
period of exposure will not be greater
than one minute
And,
Escape routes from all parts of the
platform to the TSR… to remain
passable for 30 minutes…An escape
route may be made impassable by:
Thermal radiation over 6.3 kW/m2
if unprotected:
(Impairment Criterion 3)
Maximum radiation on areas where the Silent N/A 9.5 Apply API requirements in
period of exposure will not be greater absence of Canadian regulation.
than a few seconds The actual wording of API 521 is:
(In this case the area in question is Value of K at design flare release
normally accessible) to any location to which people
have access (for example, at
grade below the flare or a service
platform of a nearby tower);
exposure should be limited to a
few seconds, sufficient for escape
only. (Note 1)
Escape routes from all parts of the Silent 12.5 Not Not used as a normal radiation
platform to the TSR… to remain specifically level.
passable for 30 minutes…An escape mentioned
route may be made impassable by:
Thermal radiation over
12.5 kW/m2 to the outside of the
escape route if protected by
cladding:
(Impairment Criterion 3)
Maximum radiation on areas where Silent N/A 15.8 Not used as a normal radiation
shelter is present. level.
(In this case the area in question is not The actual wording of API 521 is:
normally accessible) Heat intensity on structures and in
areas where operators are not
likely to be performing duties and
where shelter from radiant heat is
available (for example, behind
equipment). (Note 1)
Notes:
1_) On towers and elevated structures where rapid escape is not possible, ladders must be provided on
the side away from the flare, so the structure can provide some shielding when K is greater than …
6.3 kilowatts per square meter.
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The allowable radiation levels on Hibernia will have to be selected from within these
requirements.
The crown block falls into the category an area to personnel have access (i.e. a
service platform of a nearby tower); where exposure can be limited to a few seconds,
sufficient for escape only.
It could even be argued that a more extreme limit at this point could be used: The
Damage / Impairment criterion No. 3 indicates that a value of 12500 W/m2 may be
appropriate for the area under consideration. The criterion is specifically aimed at
escape routes protected by cladding but could equally be applied to the drilling derrick
which is partially enclosed and offers any operator working in the area the opportunity
to shelter behind a clad structure for the duration of the emergency. A reference for
the figure of 12500 W/m2 cannot be found in the guides and practices referenced
above although a somewhat worse value of 15800 W/m2 can be found in the API
which is allowed only in an area where shielding exists. These requirements are
included for information only.
The weather deck and monkey board falls into the category of an area where
emergency actions lasting up to one minute may be required by personnel without
shielding but with appropriate clothing. It is expected that personnel on the weather
deck would be appropriately clothed and in the event of an emergency blowdown
would be able to leave either leave the deck in a minute or less or alternatively find
shelter in the same time period.
In the original design, values of 3200 and 4720 kW/m2 respectively were applied to
these areas. The former resulted from the HTPT note attached to the table which
outlined the explicit design requirements and, from the above, is a radiation level
allowable for 2 hours in an emergency. The latter neither recognises the escape
ability from the monkey board nor the shielding. Both cases therefore appear
unnecessarily conservative.
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• Helideck 3200 W/m2
The helideck does not really fall into any specific category as defined in the guides and
practices reference above but it could be argued that it loosely falls into the category of
an area where personnel are continuously exposed during an emergency (for up to
two hours) and therefore the value of 3200 W/m2 is chosen. This corresponds with the
Damage / Impairment criterion No. 4 which indicates that a value of 3200 W/m2 is
appropriate for the helideck which is based on Canadian regulations.
Of the above, the most important radiation level is likely to be the continuous flaring
case as it will be the most persistent (occasionally). The other radiation levels are only
approached during a platform blowdown and therefore are short duration (only
seconds) and will only be felt if a coincident severe adverse wind occurs during the
event.
Using this radiation level and location as the design case ensures that the helideck will
experience very much lower radiant rates during continuous flaring.
The radiation levels used in the flare operating envelope calculations, described fully in
Section 8.0 below, have used the above thermal radiation limits to determine the
allowable maximum flaring capacity for the ‘As Built’ flare for two windspeeds.
The results of these calculations are discussed in detail in Section 8.0 but the principle
conclusion is that if the best practice radiation levels are applied as defined above then
the flare system capacity would be approximately 200% of the current design load in
terms of thermal radiation only. The effect on hydraulics in the system for this capacity
increase has not been studied at this time.
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6.8 Challenge Issues Resulting from the Technical Audit of the Design Calculations
Issue 34-005/2 - Jet fire scenario was not taken into account for in the design of
the blowdown system.
Issue 34-005/4 - Were fire areas used for total blowdown rate?
A simple approach to blowdown was used where the entire all equipment to be
depressured was assumed to be on fire. This is equivalent to the entire M10 module
being on fire, something which is very unlikely and if it occurs will be catastrophic.
More conventionally the platform is separated into fire areas. In this case the
blowdown valves are sized to cater for the fire case. However, the combined case is
not normally the sum of all the areas on fire and some effort is instead focussed at the
selection of a realistic worst case. The worst case is represented by the fire occurring
in the area which adds most to platform load coincident with the resultant rates from
the blowdown valves for the non-fire areas are added. These latter rates are less than
the rate that would be experienced in a fire case and the overall blowdown load is
more accurately represented. In this case we have been unable to locate fire area
drawings which forces the M10 fire case to remain the design case.
The isentropic efficiency specified when performing blowdown simulations affects both
the downstream blowdown temperature of gas and equipment but also the upstream
vessel wall temperature. An isentropic efficiency of 1 simulates perfectly isentropic
expansion of the gas and gives the worst case (i.e. lowest) temperatures. An
isentropic efficiency of 0 simulates perfectly isenthalpic expansion of the gas and gives
the best case (i.e. highest) temperatures. For blowdown of a vessel or system where
the feed to the vessel has been stopped the expansion of the gas is somewhere
between isentropic and isenthalpic. The selection of the isentropic efficiency is usually
based on project philosophy and experience.
The blowdown simulations performed for these calculations used an efficiency of 0.5.
There is no indication in the calculations or simulation outputs for the basis of this
selection. The selection of an efficiency of 1 is unrealistic, but a more usual figure to
use is 0.7 minimum which would lead to lower blowdown temperatures.
The impact of lower blowdown temperatures is twofold. The first concerns the
materials of construction of the flare system itself. The flare system appears from the
‘As Built’ P&IDs to constructed of LTCS with a minimum design temperature of -45oC.
The second impact is in areas of the process where hydrates can form.
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From the calculations reviewed problems of both hydrate formation and flare design
temperature only occur if blowdown is initiated after a delay with of the plant
maintained at pressure during the upset. Calculation 34-010 / A and 34-060 / B
address this problem but the calculations do not give any specific conclusions on the
allowable delay. Calculation 060 / B concludes that for the settleout pressures used
there is a huge spread of allowable delay periods depending upon environmental
conditions and whether insulation is installed. Current platform design philosophy is to
depressurise after 1-2 hours. If lower blowdown temperatures are expected then this
philosophy may have to be reviewed. See Issue 34-010/1 for further details.
Precautions against hydrate formation can be taken and these are discussed further
below.
For more discussion regarding this see the related discussion in Section I.1.1.2 item
34.010/1.
This concern relates to the high start pressure used for the blowdown calculations.
See Section 6.3 for the recommended solution.
6.9.1 Insulation
The presence of satisfactory insulation on the vessels will allow substantially reduced
depressuring rates compared to those used during design. This aspect should be
checked in detail when the insulation on the vessels is reviewed.
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7.0 AS-BUILDING THE FLARE SYSTEM
7.1 Introduction
The Hibernia platform was built incorporating features for future equipment; this
included future capacity built into the flare system. As some of these projects are no
longer foreseen this section looks to remove their effect from the currently installed
flaring cases. This, in effect, will result in a system whose design cases are “as-built”.
The difference between the design capacity and the “as-built” capacity is the capacity
available for future projects, including those that were originally foreseen.
The following table summarises the initial relieving capacity by area considered during
the design phase as well as the results of removing the requirements for future
equipment and potentially the 3 minute stagger on the injection compressor ‘A’
blowdown.
kg/h kg/h
The table below summarises the effect on thermal radiation impingement at various
points on the platform for the cases described in Table 7.1 with the original design
wind speed of 27 m/s blowing in a northerly direction.
The capacity of the flare system is essentially decided by the allowable thermal
radiation impingement on the platform. The different levels of thermal radiation and
their limitations on working and escape routes are discussed in Section 6.7. Based on
the original design radiation levels:
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• Crown Block 6300 W/m2
Then the following deductions can be made from the resulting thermal radiation
impingement on the platform for the 3 flare operating cases described in Table 7.1.
The results for this case indicate that the thermal radiation impingement at the crown
block is close to the limiting value of 6300 W/m2. This is what we would expect as the
flare stack lengths was effectively sized for this flaring scenario. The thermal radiation
impingement at the weather deck and helideck are within the limits stated above
The results for this case indicate, as expected, that removing the load assigned for
‘future’ equipment from the HP flare gives some margin for increased flare load
generated by future projects / platform modifications. The margin is available for
thermal radiation at all platform areas discussed but, by inspection, the limit is
expected to occur at the crown block. It should be noted that any projects which
generate extra coincident LP blowdown load on the flare will have a greater effect on
thermal radiation impingement than that for HP blowdown due to the nature of the flare
systems. Therefore capacity, in terms of mass flowrate, liberated from the HP flare is
not necessarily available in full for the LP flare system.
This case investigates the effect on the ‘As Built’ flare (i.e. with loads from ‘future’
equipment removed) of removing the 3 minute stagger between blowdown initialisation
and the blowdown of the Injection Compressor ‘A’ system. This is potentially a
modification that HMDC would consider making in the future. It can be seen from the
results, however, that though the thermal radiation levels at the weather deck and the
helideck are acceptable, the level at the crown block is greater than the current design
limit based on the criteria above. This would likely be acceptable if the shielding
around the drilling derrick structure was taken into account.
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8.0 RISK MANAGEMENT IN RELATION TO FLARING EVENTS AND
WIND CONDITION
8.1 Introduction
In Section 6.6 the issue of design windspeed was discussed. In this section we look at
the various windspeeds to show the effect it has on the radiation envelope on
Hibernia.
• The original design windspeed from the RABS. In this case the windspeed
= 27 m/s.
A basis for constructing an operating envelope for this study had to be developed with
no specific modification projects in mind. The task is complicated by the fact that there
are two flare systems, the LP flare and the HP flare. An increase in flare load has a
different consequence depending upon the particular flare affected, due to the different
nature of the flares. The HP flare utilises a sonic tip and therefore has a flame that
burns much more efficiently and is stiffer than the flame developed by the pipe flare tip
on the LP network.
Given the above, the only sensible approach to preparing an operating envelope was
to base it on multiples of the radiation case defining case, i.e. total platform blowdown
giving coincident LP and HP flare release as defined in the Relief and Blowdown Study
Report. The relieving loads on each flare for the design flare capacity case are given
as Case 1 in Table 7.1 above.
Flaresim calculations were performed for flare loads ranging from 50% to 500% of the
design case to enable an envelope to be defined. In reality, the systems would be
hydraulically limited long before these higher rates were achieved. The relief rate for
each flare was maintained in the same proportion as the design case and fluid
properties also remained constant for all capacities considered.
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8.2.2 Determination of Continuous Load Basis
The Relief and Blowdown Study Report identified that the worst case continuous
flaring occurs when there is a relief load on both the HP and LP flare systems. This
occurs either at start up or when the compression train is lost for any reason.
Flaresim calculations were performed for flare loads ranging from 30% to 100% of the
above determined rates to enable an envelope to be defined. In reality, the systems
would be hydraulically limited before these higher rates were achieved. The relief rate
for each flare was maintained in the same proportion as the 100% case and fluid
properties also remained constant for all capacities considered.
The flare capacity envelope for any area on the platform is very much dependent on
the maximum allowable thermal radiation impingement at that particular area. For this
study the following limiting thermal radiation impingement levels were used to
generate the operating envelopes:
* API suggests a lower figure (1580 kW/m2) is appropriate. In this case, because of Canadian regulations,
this is ignored.
For the areas with two thermal radiation levels given, the lower figure refers to the
‘Best Practice’ value as identified in Section 6.7.5 above and the upper figure is the
allowable thermal radiation level in accordance with the Impairment / Damage criteria
which is included for information. The reasoning behind the choice of limiting thermal
radiation levels and their effect on personnel and structures are discussed in detail in
section 6.7 above.
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8.2.4 Other Calculation Criteria
Relief gas compositions for the total platform blowdown design case were taken from
the Kaldair Design Data Dossier (Reference 13) and used to generate the fluid
properties used in the Flaresim simulations.
Windspeeds used for the calculations are 27 m/s (original design) and 24.5 m/s
(determined from environmental data). Both these wind are blowing in a Northerly
direction, i.e. directly back onto the platform from the direction of the flare boom. The
reasoning behind the choice of windspeeds is discussed in detail in section 6.6 above.
Also considered was the 34.2 m/s NW wind considered in the RABS. The results of
the analysis indicated very similar results as the 24.5 m/s windspeed.
8.3 Results
The results of the study are presented in graphical form in figures 8.1 to 8.10 below.
The curves on each graph represent the distance of the isopleth from the flare tip
varies with blowdown rate. The isopleth under consideration depends upon the area
of the platform under consideration as described above. The distance of isopleth to
flare tip is measured in the direction of the platform area under consideration. For
example, Figure 8.1 shows the distance of the 12500 W/m2 from the flare tip in the
direction of the crown block. The Horizontal line represents the actual distance of
crown block from the flare tip. Where the two intersect gives the blowdown rate, as a
percentage of design, which would result in thermal radiation of 12500 W/m2 impinging
on the crown block.
For information, although not applicable to emergency relief, the radiation distance to
the 1900 kW/m2 level is also given. This would be the type of figure that would be
considered allowable around the TSR.
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Figure 8.1 Envelope of Operability for Crown Block with Limiting
Thermal Radiation 12500 W/m2 with Northerly Wind 24.5 m/s
140.0
12500 W/m2 Isopleth Distance from Tip
120.0
Distance from Flare Tip
100.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600%
% Design Case Blow dow n Rate
160.0
9500 W/m2 Isopleth Distance from Tip
140.0
Distance from Flare Tip
120.0
100.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600%
% Design Case Blow dow n Rate
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Figure 8.3 Envelope of Operability for Weather Deck with Limiting
Thermal Radiation 6300 W/m2 with Northerly Wind 24.5 m/s
120.0
6300 W/m2 Isopleth Distance from Tip
100.0 Weather Deck Minimum Distance from Tip
Distance from Flare Tip
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600%
% Design Case Blow dow n Rate
200.0
3200 W/m2 Isopleth Distance from Tip
180.0 Helideck Minimum Distance from Tip
160.0
Distance from Flare Tip
140.0
120.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600%
% Design Case Blow dow n Rate
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Figure 8.5 Envelope of Operability for Helideck with Limiting Thermal
Radiation 1900 W/m2 with Northerly Wind 24.5 m/s
250.0
100.0
50.0
0.0
0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600%
% Design Case Blow dow n Rate
140.0
12500 W/m2 Isopleth Distance from Tip
120.0
Distance from Flare Tip
100.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600%
% Design Case Blow dow n Rate
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Figure 8.7 Envelope of Operability for Crown Block with Limiting
Thermal Radiation 9500 W/m2 with Northerly Wind 27.0 m/s
160.0
9500 W/m2 Isopleth Distance from Tip
140.0
Distance from Flare Tip
120.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600%
% Design Case Blow dow n Rate
100.0
Distance from Flare Tip
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600%
% Design Case Blow dow n Rate
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Figure 8.9 Envelope of Operability for Helideck with Limiting Thermal
Radiation 3200 W/m2 with Northerly Wind 27.0 m/s
160.0
Distance from Flare Tip
140.0
120.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600%
% Design Case Blow dow n Rate
250.0
100.0
50.0
0.0
0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600%
% Design Case Blow dow n Rate
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8.3.2 Continuous Relief
The results of the continuous flare relief study are presented in graphical form in
figures 8.11 and 8.12 below. The curves on each graph represent the distance of the
1900 W/m2 isopleth from the flare tip varying with continuous relief rate. The distance
of isopleth to flare tip is measured in the direction of the platform area under
consideration, in this case only the weather deck is considered. The horizontal line
represents the actual distance of weather deck from the flare tip. Where the two
intersect gives the continuous relief rate, as a percentage of design, which would
result in thermal radiation of 1900 W/m2 impinging on the weather deck.
The figures in parentheses on the x axis represent the combined LP and HP flare
mass flowrate under consideration e.g. the mass of gas flared if the platform is
operating at 100% capacity (considered to be 200 kbopd) is 409.6 Te/h with a pseudo
molecular weight of 22.8. Note that the mass flowrates stated become invalid if the
ratio of HP to LP flare load differs from that considered here (see Section 8.2.2 above
for further details).
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Figure 8.11 Envelope of Operability for Weather Deck with Limiting
Thermal Radiation 1900 W/m2 (Continuous)
with Northerly Wind 24.5 m/s
100.0
Distance from Flare Tip, m
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110%
(0) (41.0) (81.9) (122.9) (163.8) (204.8) (245.8) (286.7) (327.7) (368.7) (409.6) (450.6)
% Design Case Continuous Flaring Rate (Total Flare Mass Rate, Te/h)
100.0
Distance from Flare Tip, m
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110%
(0) (41.0) (81.9) (122.9) (163.8) (204.8) (245.8) (286.7) (327.7) (368.7) (409.6) (450.6)
% Design Case Continuous Flaring Rate (Total Flare Mass Rate, Te/h)
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8.4 Flare Envelope Conclusions
8.4.1 General
An immediate and obvious conclusion which can be drawn from the results of this
study is that a wind speed of 27 m/s gives higher thermal radiation levels on the
platform than the 24.5 m/s wind speed for the relief cases considered here.
However if we analyse the results given for the wind speed of 24.5 m/s, the Granherne
best practice wind speed as defined in Section 6.6, figures 8.1 to 8.5 and 8.11 above,
the following conclusions can be drawn for each flaring scenario:
For this case the thermal radiation on the crown block is the limiting factor. An initial
blowdown rate of approximately 150% of the design rate can be tolerated before the
limit of 9500 W/m2 is limit is exceeded in this area.
The other cases considered are less onerous, with the 3200 W/m2 isopleth impinging
on the Helideck at around 350% of the design blowdown rate and the 6300 W/m 2
isopleth impinging on the weather deck at around 370% of the design blowdown rate.
The above suggests considerable capacity is inherent in the system dependent on the
final basis selected. However, caution should be exercised as this apparent capacity
will change dependent on the detail of the project which actually utilises the apparent
capacity. In other words the absolute capacity will only be confirmed once the LP and
HP rates are fully defined and detailed calculations are performed for the modification
under consideration.
For this case the maximum allowable thermal radiation of 1900 W/m2 at the weather
deck is considered to be the limiting factor. For a northerly wind blowing at 24.5 m/s, a
platform production rate of 62% of the design rate (considered to be 200 kbopd) can
be tolerated before the limit of 1900 W/m2 is limit is exceeded in this area.
Here is an area where consideration of wind condition may provide useful economic
benefits. If the regulators allow it, which may depend on flare quota considerations,
the actual production rate when the compressors were unavailable could be set based
on the measured windspeed and direction for the period in question. In other words
when the windspeed was low or in a beneficial direction the flaring rate could be set at
100% of production. Should this prove attractive to HMDC a set of envelopes for a
range of wind speeds and directions could be prepared which could be used in an
operational procedure to select production rate dependent on wind condition.
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9.0 IMPLICATIONS FOR HIBERNIA
9.1 Introduction
In the foregoing sections the various aspects relating the RABS have been analysed.
The intent of this section is to combine the analysis into a form that can be used to
make decisions regarding potential capacity opportunities that exist in the flare system,
as well as identify the issues that will require resolution irrespective of the exercise of
any choices. Generally the potential changes fall into 3 categories:
Therefore this section is separated into three main sections; Firstly an outline of the
capacity opportunities is given including the apparent capacity effects the changes
would have; Secondly, a list and description of the important changes required to
ensure the integrity and traceability of the system design documentation is given;
Lastly, optional changes are described which will aid the future maintenance and
understanding of the design in future years.
Finally, a list of items that do not easily fall into the previous sections is included for
completeness.
The following summarises the capacity opportunities available in the flare system with
respect to new codes and best practices.
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Table 9.26 Effect of Changing Flare System Design Philosophy on the Apparent Design Capacity (Total Blowdown)
Issue Description / Case Meets current Safety Cost Failure potential Flare system Recommendation
concern code req's? capacity*
Jet Fire Described in Section Design Codes do not N/A Rapid escalation. None Adopt best practice.
6.2. Are vessels require Ensure insulation
Safety analysis not carried
sufficiently protected measures to be integrity on lower
through to engineering.
from the effects of jet included for jet pressure systems during
fire? fire (API jet flame impulse
currently momentum.
Original design did not
purposefully include working to
mitigating measures change this)
Best practice Rapid escalation prevented
unless insulation fails.
Detailed 3D analysis and
prevention measures to
ensure vessel will not fail in
a jet fire
Reducing Described in Section Design Exceeds code + N/A N/A No effect on HP flare. HMDC have declined
blowdown 6.3. Compressors requirement this change for now,
LP flare capacity
start blowdown from PSHH preferring the more
Best practice In the unlikely event that there available is increased
pressure setting. Rest of conservative design
was a fire coincident with a shut by ~ 17,000 kg/h
system depressures As blowdown initiates approach (which avoids
in situation (that was not caused compared to the
from normal pressure. automatically, design changes to blowdown
by trip) the blowdown rate would original blowdown case
system with normal start calculations should
be higher than anticipated and if 89,601 kg/h
pressure compressor operating
the wind were adverse could
conditions change
lead to higher than planned
significantly). The
radiation levels on the platform.
capacity opportunity will
be described in an
appendix in the updated
RABS.
Reducing Described in Section Design Exceeds RP 521 N/A N/A No significant effect on Best practice would
the 6.3 Certain vessels requirements in LP flare because the require all blowdown
Various components are
blowdown (i.e. with wall some instances. HP compressor seal oil calculations to be re-run
depressured to either
Design Described in Section Design = 27 m/s from North No code N/A If windspeed is higher and HP and LP flare Best practice declined.
windspeed 6.6. The design requirements. design release is occurring the apparent capacity is For continuous flaring
and direction windspeed is higher
radiation levels on the platform increased by case a risk mitigation
than absolutely will be exceeded. approximately 7% (i.e. procedure could be
necessary. by 9,000 kg/h and developed to increase
Best practice = 24.5 m/s No code If windspeed is higher and
6,000 kg/h the flaring rate when the
from North requirements design release is occurring, the
radiation levels for emergency
respectively). compressors were down
34.2 m/s from North West dependent on the
on the platform will be exceeded
measured wind
somewhat. It is highly unlikely
condition.
that anyone would be on deck
without the necessary protection
in such a case.
Acceptable Described in Section Design Over N/A N/A HP and LP flare Adopt and describe best
flare 6.7. The requirements 6.3 kW/m2 at crown block conservative capacity is increased practice in flare
radiation in the RABS are over
and 3.2 kW/m2 at escape by approximately 50% documentation. The
ways before new radiation practice will remove
levels conservative. levels are approached inconsistency compared
during blowdown (i.e. to Canadian regulations
Best practice - Radiation (and meets N/A
levels raised to:
by 60,000 kg/h and and international
Canadian 45,000 kg/h for the HP standards. Hydraulic
9.5 kW/m2 at crown block and LP flares considerations may not
(shielded) regulations)
respectively). allow the full use of new
6.3 kW/m2 at any escape capacity.
way (no shielding)
3.2 kW/m2 at the helideck
1.9 kW/m2 continuous at the
weather deck
Incorporate Described in Section Design Over N/A N/A HP and LP flare Best practice would
the effects of 6.9.1. No credit taken for conservative capacity is increased require all blowdown
vessel
insulation on vessels in by approximately 5% calculations to be re-run.
blowdown calculations during blowdown case For the moment best
insulation on (i.e. by 6,000 kg/h and practice is declined. A
Best practice N/A
the vapour 4,000 kg/h for the HP note will be incorporated
Credit taken for insulation
rates and LP flares in the revised flare
respectively). documents to note the
For the relief cases other than blowdown, two out of three of the capacity opportunities
(i.e. relief cases which were overestimated during design) are negative. The worst of
the problems relates to the spillover valve failure cases as these have the potential to
significantly exceed the HP flare system design rate. This is shown on Table 9.27.
which follows.
Issue Description / Case Meets current Safety Cos Failure potential Flare system capacity* Recommendation
concern code req’s? t
Two-phase New sizing Design - Old additive API method No longer N/A If the design case is the The design rate which can Adopt best practice.
relief (See method sizing case the vessel can be accommodated in the This issue requires the
Section 5.3 increases valve be overpressured. existing valves reduces maximum well rate and
and 6.5) size required for dramatically. For maximum number of
Best practice - New API method Valve size may be to high
this case comparison max single well wells to be redefined as
and valve will chatter.
rate for HP separator is ~ they are likely to
54 kbopd. compromise the RV size
on the HP separator.
The test separator RVs
are being replaced.
Missed relief Failure of Design - missed a valid relief case No. N/A If valve fails open the flare Flare system capacity was Adopt best practice and
cases (See spillover valves system design rate is not dimensioned for the use measures to limit
Section 5.2) (open) exceeds significantly exceeded. dimensioning case. peak load.
flare system
Best practice - Design for any single N/A
capacity.
valve failure.
Blowby Blowby cases Design - Over conservative case N/A Valve is likely to chatter if As there will be no desire to Add note to RABS
cases are over assumed. faced with the blowby change the existing valve, update to describe the
methodology conservative.
case. there will be a latent capacity spare capacity.
flawed (See This would in the system which can be
Best practice: N/A A valve, properly sized for
Section prevent the used for future upgrades.
the case in question, will
5.3.1) installation of • Use settleout pressure for not chatter when faced
The capacity change
larger LCVs if shutdown case available (which would
with the design case.
this proved translate to an increase in
• Take account of downstream
necessary. separator LCV size) is
control valve positions and fluid
approximately 20%.
properties in production case.
= acceptable - + = most acceptable
= least expensive - = most expensive
* by making change to best practice
The outcome of the technical audit indicates the following aspects of the design will
need to be revisited / revised. The table is a significantly shortened version of the
table presented in Section 5.4 and represents the most important changes that should
be considered. Repetitive items (including those in tables 9.1 and 9.2) and issues
requiring simple comment in the RABS update are omitted. The table should be read
in this light.
The following changes could be considered to increase the integrity and traceability of
the design work.
050 / G 3rd Stage Suction 050/1 Rev C2 PSV datasheet states set P&ID set pressure error?
Scrubber A (D-3303A) pressure = 8200 kPa(g), 'As Built' P&ID
PSV Discharge Line shows set pressure = 7000 kPa(g)
Size Confirmation
059 / G Comparative Program 059/1 Accuracy of calculations using ESI Revisit ESI calculations and
check of INPLANT instead of INPLANT replace as necessary
Single Phase
Simulation vs ESI
The other area that could be improved is the overall level of as built of the design
calculations. Generally the calculations were never revised for key design data late in
the project. This included the calculation of inventory and the use of vendor supplied
settleout pressures. The latter item becomes more important if the changes above are
pursued. When the relief valve and control valve data sheets were prepared
superseded design data was also used. Our initial analysis of these combined effects
suggests that they are benign. For example we expect, but cannot be sure, that the
inventory assumptions will actually be conservative; Our analysis of the valve
calculations shows that in some cases the valves may have ended up being slightly
smaller than desired but if this were a problem it would have shown up by now.
This type of inconsistency is relatively common; there is never the perfect design
project. HMDC will need to decide whether they can accept the inconsistencies.
The above changes generally point to a requirement to rerun some of the key flare
system design calculations. Whether or not this uncovers areas where hardware
changes will need to be made will have to be seen; nevertheless there will still be the
requirement to update the design volumes and make the calculation changes
traceable. This will be in addition to making the new calculated information obvious in
the updated RABS.
• Design Calculations
For each change prepare a calculation revision which revs up the existing
calculation (in other words building on the existing work). This would include:
In this section there are some projects mentioned which will in all likelihood require
hardware changes to be made (resulting from the above there may be more).
9. Deleted.
10. Deleted.
11. Gayton P.W. and Murphy, S.N. (1995) Depressurisation System Design,
IChemE workshop, “The Safe Disposal of Unwanted Hydrocarbons”, Aberdeen
1995.
12. Deleted.
Issues
None
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Appendix I
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Calculation Desc
Number /
Calculation
Book
34-055 / G Simulta
Calculation Desc
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Calculation Descr
Number
31.35 Relief V
Key Assumptions
MP Separator PSVs orif
MP Separator spill off va
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Appendix I
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APPENDIX II
STAGE 2 PROPOSAL