Conclusion

This book sought to expose the negative effects of nuclear weapons acquisition
on conflict resolution. It made a causal connection between nuclear weapons
acquisition by two warring states and the indefinite intractability of a protracted
conflict. It defined protracted conflicts as high conflict situations without
termination points where crises are embedded and wars remain a probability largely
because territory is at stake. It maintained that each protracted conflict has a
life-cycle which encompasses several phases: beginning, escalation, de-escalation,
and cessation. Each is affected by the others and each phase has to be crossed
for the conflict to end. A conflict begins as a result of one or more triggers
and escalates in crises and wars. Escalation may be high, medium, or low
depending on the level of violence, whether war, crisis, or some other violent event.
De-escalation is a function of agreement, compromise, settlement, third-party
mediation, and leadership initiative. Cessation reflects the end of the conflict with
the establishment of peace. Unless a conflict reaches the cessation phase, it cannot
be said to have terminated.
The book has argued that in the absence of nuclear weapons, a conflict usually
reaches the cessation phase as a result of war, the traditional conflict termination
mechanism used by most belligerent states in the world. Wars decide winners and
losers and at the termination of a conflict the winning side dictates the terms of the
settlement to the loser. As states acquire nuclear weapons to deter war in a
protracted conflict setting and this is likely to involve conflict over territory
they can no longer manage crises through full-scale war for fear of escalation to
the nuclear level; thus a crisis management technique has become unusable.
Consequently, they tend to use other means of crisis management such as violent
clashes and lowmedium-intensity violence. Additionally, as escalation to war
becomes less likely, more crises are initiated by the weaker side to make small
territorial gains and change the status quo. Therefore, while the deterrent effect of
nuclear weapons creates a no-war situation, heated crises and lowmedium-
intensity violence may become more likely. The occurrence of frequent crises and
lowmedium-intensity violence functions of the absence of war changes the
nature of the protracted conflict, perhaps even keeping it alive indefinitely. Peace
initiatives may be taken by leaders during periods of calm but cannot be institutio-
nalized due to the eruption and recurrence of crises. Meanwhile, continuing

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low-intensity violence causes a general deterioration in the environment, precluding
the possibility of successful peace initiatives. In these conditions, the conflict is
indefinitely prolonged. This is a result not only of the adverse climate for peace
initiatives but also of the fact that the parties learn to live in an environment of
violence where they cooperate on less controversial issues, not addressing the root
cause of the conflict. Thus India and Pakistan have embarked on cooperation on
less controversial, positive-sum issues, and hesitate to address the root cause or the
tangible territorial issue, Kashmir. However, the book has argued that such
cooperation has the potential to produce positive results in conflict resolution if
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major powers, in particular the US, become involved and if leaders are prepared to
make bold, dramatic moves.
The book applied the theoretical framework to test its value and strength against
the IndiaPakistan protracted conflict case. The case study shows that the India
Pakistan rivalry, which began in 1947 and has lasted ever since, went through the
first two phases of the life of a protracted conflict beginning and escalation but
could not get beyond the second phase. Instead, it froze at this stage. It has also
been shown that this near-stagnation has been a result of the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by the warring parties after 1986. The conflict encompassed two periods
pre-nuclear and nuclear which have been different in terms of their crises and
the use of the crisis management strategy, war. The pre-nuclear period saw crises
which escalated to wars in 19478, 1965, and 1971, whereas the nuclear period
has seen more serious crises which never escalated, even though they all had the
potential to do so. The weaker party in the conflict, Pakistan, initiated all four
serious crises in the nuclear period, the Brasstacks crisis, the Kashmir crisis of
1990, the Kargil crisis, and the Parliament Attack crisis. Given the presence
of nuclear weapons, Pakistan knew these crises were unlikely to escalate and
hoped to make small territorial gains and internationalize the conflict by attracting
the attention of the US. It believed that Washington would be concerned about
possible nuclear escalation of a crisis in the IndiaPakistan conflict and become
diplomatically involved.
The study also established that peace talks were held by India and Pakistan
during periods of calm in the conflict despite its generally crisis-prone nature. The
evidence suggests that the recurrence of crises prevented all these peace initiatives
from being consolidated, for example the Lahore Peace Process and the Agra
Summit. Thus all efforts were futile. It also confirmed that constant low-intensity
violence has made it difficult for the parties to trust each other as hatred has
resurfaced with every new violent incident. Such a situation is not conducive to
undertaking peace initiatives and institutionalizing those already undertaken.
Although under US pressure the parties began a dialogue two years after the
Parliament Attack in 2004, they have discussed not the crisis-prone IndiaPakistan
conflict but less controversial issues where positive-sum results may be expected
such as trade, communications, and cultural affairs. The root cause of the conflict,
Kashmir, has not been addressed. The study has shown that the parties deliberately
decided to avoid discussion of the salient issue, which is zero-sum, because the
attempt would be doomed to failure, given the suspicion and hatred between the

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 156 Conclusion
two sides. The study also showed that any discussion of Kashmir would jeopardize
the actual and potential benefits of cooperation in other realms. Thus, it is in the
interest of both states to deal with non-controversial issues and let the overall
conflict drag on. The Kashmir issue is complicated not only because it is in dispute
between the two parties India and Pakistan but also because the Kashmiris
themselves have a legitimate role to play, an additional factor reducing yet further
the chances of resolution. The study reveals that according to the Indians, their
precondition that Pakistan should stop cross-border terrorism before substantive
dialogue on Kashmir and other important security issues has not been met. The
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Pakistanis feel they have done enough and anyway there is no point in dialogue
based on precondition. Consequently, a solution looks unlikely. The study also
shows that both India and Pakistan seem quite comfortable with the present
situation. They know resolution is a remote possibility under the circumstances
and have found ways of living with each other by cooperating on other levels in
the midst of violence.
To shed light on whether the conflict has any chance of being terminated, the
study made a comparative analysis of the thaw between India and Pakistan in 1999
and 2001 when the leaders of the two states made attempts to launch cooperation
which did not last as new and more serious crises arose in the conflict and the
new thaw which began in 2003 and has led to the dialogue process. It proved that
thaws and steps toward cooperation have been effective and enduring when the US
has taken a special interest in bringing the parties together to discuss disputed issues.
It highlighted the crucial role of US involvement. Under US pressure, India and
Pakistan have had no choice but to hold dialogue and improve their mutual
understanding. US pressure on Musharraf to crack down on terrorism, and the steps
he took towards this goal, have helped to change the Indians image of the
Pakistanis. This shows the importance of great power influence in bringing about
dramatic policy change in a country like Pakistan: change which is difficult for
political leader to make but which helps to promote peace. The lesson to be drawn
is that the great power does not have to be in the role of mediator a third-party
role which India has rejected ever since the beginning of the IndiaPakistan conflict
but can simply help to create a so propitious environment for conflict resolution
between the parties. While any conclusions would be premature, this substantiates
the point that situational attributes major power involvement, especially
facilitation may be instrumental in creating an atmosphere conducive to resolving
the IndiaPakistan conflict.
The value of actor attributes was also proven by the study: bold leaders like
Vajpayee can take positive steps toward resolving the conflict; likewise, Musharraf
took steps to uproot terrorism against strong domestic opposition and participated
in the dialogue process. The study also showed that leaders generally want to
initiate a peace process for domestic political and economic reasons. Whatever
inspires the leaders to work for peace, their individual roles are extremely
important, as shown by both Vajpayee and Musharraf. The study proved that the
future of the IndiaPakistan conflict resolution will to a large extent depend on
bold leadership and courageous initiatives.

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Theoretical implications
The study has major theoretical implications. It disproves the realist theoretical
paradigm that states are more secure when they build up their military capabilities. 1
The acquisition of nuclear weapons has not made India and Pakistan secure.
Although at the strategic level they avoided war, serious crises erupted more
frequently in nuclear period of the conflict, each of these could have escalated,
increasing insecurity. The constant low-intensity violence also challenges the
notion that overall security and stability in a conflict are enhanced by the acquisition
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of nuclear weapons. States are generally more insecure in a nuclear environment.

Although they acquire nuclear weapons for security enhancement, they may
thereby become more insecure in their long-term relations with protracted conflict
adversaries. Thus, realism, a major International Relations theory which holds that
the security of states is maximized through military capabilities, fails to explain
why states face insecurity for extended periods following the acquisition of the
most advanced weaponry, nuclear weapons.
Deterrence, a debated and complex paradigm, does prevent wars between
protracted conflict states which possess nuclear weapons. However, the study
establishes that by deterring wars and thereby generating more crises, nuclear
weapons acquisition jeopardizes comprehensive stability where two states are in
conflict. Additionally, nuclear weapons may help to maintain immediate deterrence
but not general deterrence.2 The eruption of a serious crisis that has the potential
to escalate goes against the basic notion of general deterrence. The non-escalation
of a crisis, however, demonstrates the success of immediate deterrence. Thus, the
idea that nuclear weapons acquisition is driven by the need for deterrence must be
reconsidered in the light of real world cases.
The case-study implies that peace theory should understand peace as absence of
war and absence of crisis. Stability cannot be attained where crises are embedded
and have become chronic. If stability equals peace and peace equals absence of
war and crisis, then nuclear weapons acquisition does not ensure peace or stability.
Crisis theorists need to redefine crisis between parties which have acquired
nuclear weapons. The definition of crisis as threat to basic values, time pressure
for response, and heightened probability of war should be changed in the case of
states that possess nuclear weapons: heightened probability of lowmedium
intensity violence should replace heightened probability of war. The definition,
as well as excluding war between nuclear states, should also make a clear
distinction between crisis between nuclear states and between non-nuclear states.
Conflict theorists should recognize that the concept of conflict transformation
may have a negative connotation as well as its usual positive connotation.
Transformation means a change in the relationship, which may be positive or
negative, and nuclear weapons acquisition transforms a conflict negatively. This
understanding is likely to generate new thinking and studies on conflict
transformation, broadening the horizon of knowledge in the field.

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 158 Conclusion
Policy implications
The study has substantial policy implications. It implies that acquiring nuclear
weapons may not be all that helpful for states faced with insecurity and threats.
States considering acquiring nuclear weapons for deterrence should rethink their
decisions and those that have already acquired them should consider rolling back
their capabilities. A state facing a revisionist opponent in a nuclear context may
be more insecure as a result of frequent provocation of crises by its opponent
seeking to change the status quo and attract third-party intervention. The
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IndiaPakistan case study shows why nuclear weapons acquisition is not a wise
option.
There are major policy implications for India and Pakistan. They need to end
their long-drawn-out conflict by finding ways to deal with the most important issue,
Kashmir. Whatever the benefits of their current cooperation, leaving the central
issue aside is not helping to resolve the conflict. They need to realize that they must
work to create an atmosphere propitious to starting a peace process. Bold leaders
are required who can ignore domestic opposition and come forward with new
peacemaking strategies, offering friendship and compromise. They also need to
believe in peace and get beyond the hatred and suspicion which plague the conflict.
For the individual states, the implications of the study are different. India should
raise the cost of crises and lowmedium-intensity violence for Pakistan, as policy-
makers proposed after the Parliament Attack. Pakistan must realize that it will not
be able to change the status quo by trying to grab territory and involve third parties
in the conflict by provoking crises. The lesson for Pakistan is that it should
comprehend that frequent crises will not resolve the central problem keeping the
conflict alive. If the conflict cannot be resolved because of the crisis-prone
environment created by Pakistan, its government will be pressured by the US to
make dramatic political changes and it will be compelled to abide by the rules set
by the hegemonic power which has already tilted toward India post-9/11, as
demonstrated by the projected US-India nuclear cooperation deal.
Lessons are also there for the international community, especially the US, which
tends to believe that democracy is the key to peace. Ultimately, peace is a function
of conflict resolution, and has little to do with democracy; conflict resolution is a
product of a peace process which can only be initiated in a peaceful environment,
which in turn is a product of absence of war and crisis between the contending
states. Contrary to western expectations, the military government of Musharraf
showed remarkable determination in cracking down on terrorism; only a military
leader could have had the power and authority to do so. This has helped to build
confidence between the two states. Thus, democracy may not be the solution to the
problems the world faces.
Finally, this study has major policy implications for the US. The IndiaPakistan
conflict and similar protracted conflicts in the world need the US as a facilitator
helping to create a congenial atmosphere for conflict resolution purposes. Unless
the US understands this fully and takes a special interest in South Asian affairs,
the conflict is unlikely to change from its present indefinite protraction.

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Potential for further studies
The study is expected to encourage new endeavors along similar lines. First, the
theoretical framework of this study can be tested against other protracted conflicts
to establish whether it can be generalized across similar cases. This would help to
strengthen or weaken the theory. Second, new studies on Pakistan could be
conducted into why its policy-makers do not understand the negative impacts of
crises on the overall IndiaPakistan conflict and what might change their crisis-
oriented policies. Third, more work needs to be done on the causal linkage between
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domestic politics and crisis initiation by the weaker revisionist state, Pakistan,
against the stronger opponent, India. Fourth, a case study could be conducted on
how far India is really ready to compromise on Kashmir if Pakistan creates a crisis-
free environment. Fifth, further studies are required to test the value of nuclear
weapons for conflict resolution. For example, studies could be conducted on
whether or not the present IndiaPakistan dialogue process, and the associated
hope for conflict resolution, could be a function of nuclear weapons acquisition.

2009 Saira Khan