+e REPUBEIC OF CYPRUS. MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND WORKS DEPARTMENT OF MERCHANT SHIPPING LIMASSOL TEN 1/ Le a 2) September 1993 To all Owners Managers and Representatives Ofsbips under the Cyprus flag nd_Armed. Robby LPS Further to my circular under ref, no TEN 33, TEN 1/75 dated 08.08.1992, please find enclosed herewith a document recently circulated by the International Maritime Organization under the title "Guidance te shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships" Subject: Piracy Our Department highly recommends the implementation of the guidelines contained in the attached INO document LE Ae ger s._s.“sershiou Director Department of Merchant Shipping Maritime attaches the Republic of CyprusoO NSC/Cire.623 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 28 June 1993 4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT LONDON Set 78R) Teleprone: 071.735 7611 Telegrams: INTERMAR.LONDON SEY IMO Teen 23588 Telstar 071-887 3210: Ref. T1/13.01 PIRACY AND ABMED ROBBERY AGAINST satPs Guidance to shipowners and ship operators. shipmashers and Srems_on preventing aud guppressing acts of piracy and armed_cobbery against shipe 1 ihe Maritime Sefety Committee, at ite cixty-second session (24 to 25 May 1993). consicered the report of the Working Group oa the Malacca Strait Area (MSC 62/INF.3), which covered piracy an¢ armed robbery againet ships ic that atee and elsewhere in the world. am necessary, as vell as the sahanceneat of safety of navigation and consequentially protection of the marine environment through the Strait. port and, inter alia. decided that the imed at shipowners and ehip operators, shipmasters end crews be circulated to Member Governments requestine them to communicate it to those concerned and invited Governments and international organizations concerned to comment on the guidance werore tne nexe (sisty-third) seseion of the Committee in May 1994. so that MSC 63 can take account of their comments in reviewing the text before issuing # comprehensive IMO publication containing guidance on preventing and suppresting acts of Piracy and armed robbery. 2 The Committee approved the re; guidance contained in the report a. instruction, the guidance given at annex is ané organizations in recomended in 3 Pursuant to the Committee brought to the attention of Member Governments consultative status with IMO, inviting them to take action Paragraph 2 above. W/95190y wSCrcire.623 ANNES PROTECTION OF MERCHANT SHIPS AGAINST PIRATES AND ARMED ROBBERS Inkroduction 2 Tis circular sins at bringing to the attention of shipovners, aastere pnd crews the precautions to be taken to reduce the risks of piracy os the high sens and armed robbery against thipe at anchor, off porte or hes angensay throug! & coastel State's territoriai waters. It outises etepe that should be taker to reduce the riek of such attacks. poscible responses to then ead the vital aeed to report attacks, both successful and unsuccesc(al, to the authorities of the relevant coastal State aod to the ships’ own mat itine Arinistration. Such ceports are to be made as soon as postible, evez if such ects are only thought likely, to enable necessary action to be tekest 2 py nese Fecommendations have been culled from a ounber of sources. Where conflicting advice has been apparent, the reason for choosing the reccamended course has been stated. The pirates cbiective 2 The main targets of the South East Asian attacker appear to be cach in the ship's safe, crew possessions and any other portable ship's equiment. qvea including coits of rope. When there has bees evidence of tacpering vith containers, it hes been suggested that tha raiders may initially bave gained access when the ship was berthed in port and then gone over the side, sith watt they could carry. Thorough checking of sbips* conpartaents and securing before leaving ports ie therefore recomended. Reducing the temptation for piracy Cashin the ship's sate 4 bet. attracts attackers. substantial gums have been sto: necessary to meet operational needs and crew exchange control restrictions in sone States, it acts as a magnet for attackers and they will intimidate the macter or crew members until the Rocations heve been revealed. Shipowoers should consider ways of eliminating the need to carty large sums of cash on board ship. When this need arises because of exchange control restrictions imposed by States, the matter should be referred to the chip's maritime Administration to consider if representations should be made to encourage a more flexible approach as part of the international response to eliminate attacks by pirates and armed robbers. : fre aes.2 dm the mester’s sale Op several ozcasions this belief has been justified and while carrying cash may sometines be Tequirenents and to overcome the W95196uSC/Cire.623 ARNEK Page 2 Smaller crews 5 The smaller crew numbers now found on board ships also favour the attacker. A small crew engaged in enguring the safe navigation of their ship through congested or coafiaed waters vil! have the additional onerous task of maiptaising high levele of eecurity surveillance for prolonged periods. Shipeweers vill wish to consider enhancing security watchere if their sbip is in watere or at anchor off porte, where attacks occur, Shipoyners will wieh to consider providing appropriate surveillance and detection equipment to aid their crews aod protect their ships. Shipowners should seek to verify the hogs fide of may security personne] they may engage locally. Recomended practices & The recommended practices outlined below are based on reports of incidents, advice published by commercial organizations and aeasures developed to enhance chip security. ‘The extent to which the recommendations are followed or applied are matters solely for the ovsere or master of vercele operating in areas where attacks occur, 7 Tae recommended actions are defined as phases related to any voyage ins piracy thrent area. The phases define the main etager in al} situations of pon-piracy, attempted piracy and confirmed piracy. Depending on the y OF may not materialize. evelopment of any one situation, they ‘The pre-piracy phase - Anti-attack.plag 8 ANI ships operating in waters wbere attacks occur should have am anti-attack plac, The anti-attack plan should be prepared having regaré to the risks that may be faced, the crew meabers avallable, their capability and training, the ability to establish secure areas on board ebip and the surveillacce and detection equipment that has been provided. The plan should, Antex alia. cover: the need for enbanced surveiliance and the use of lighting. Surveillance and detection equipment: 1 erey reaponnas. [f= puren tat underway; .3 the radio alarm procedures to be followed: and the reports that must be made after an attack or on attempted attack. Anti-attack plane must onsure that masters and crews are made fully avare of the risks involved during attacke by pirates or armed robbers. In particular, they should address the dangers that nay arise if a crev adopts an oggressive response to an attack, Early detection of a possible attach is the pat affective deterrent. Aggressive respouses, once sn attack is underway and, in particular, once the attackers have boarded the ship, could significantiy increase the risk to the ship snd those on board. Routing and deleying anchociag 9 If at all possible, ships choutd be routed away from areas where attacks are kaova to have taken place and, im particular, seek to avoid bottle-aecks. wr9519ewo uScrcire.623 2k Pips are approaching ports where attacks have taten place gochor’ rather than vessels underway, and it is known that the ship will have ke anchor off port for some time, consideration should be given ta delaying saenlasseey Slot steaming or longer routing to remain well off shore thereby seducing the period during which the ship vill be at risk. charces party sree eee gneule Kecogsize that ships may need to delay arrival et berse TESA GREENS occur either when no berth ie available fer the ship of eftehore teeing ot unloading will be delayed for a protracted period. Prackice the emti-attack plap Should hee ep eeeeing sa area. where attacks have occurred, the ship's crew should have practised aod perfected the procedures set dowa in the enip'e practiced, Fe rae eT Ti9NeIe amd Procedures should have been thorovghly eepaonad cndseg peRuCr i908 a7e to be given over the ship's eddrece cyorene, or aera catige. they mast be clearly understood by those who my not cece (ay mestered the language in wich the instructions will be gives, at anchor and when undervay. Crews should be t. eeditional surveitiaace or detection equipmest in coe te ene egg Taining aust be on the basis that aa attack vill tale place and por ip the belief that with some luck it will not happen. ‘Indicee lone ee SEESEEEL Phat te ship bas an aiert and trained crew implementing on aetivatteck plas will help to deter thea from attactiag the ship, Execautions at anchor 9: in port 5 where attacks occur it is important to Dimit, recoré and 5 to 9 ship when iz port or at anchor. JaeeTERPRI2G those who board the ship can bee useful Geterrent or arcict the Sceotitteation of attackers who aay have had access to the ship prior te there SEeeete, grim need only be developed in the event of a subsequ Given that attackers m targete 12 To ar control those who are allowed acc doors 0s to leaving port the ship shovld be thoroughly searched and all SOOEE OE SoeeES pointe secured or controlled. This is particularly imeortent in the case of the bridge, engine room, steerin Breas. Doors and access points should be requl Hatchkeeping and vigilance Af agitintaining vigilance Is essentiel, 411 too often the first indication of an attack hag been when the attackers appear on the bridge or ia che master's cabin, Advance warning of 8 possible attack will give the sppertunity to sound atarns, alert other ships and the coostal sutnorities, iduninate the suspect cratt, undertake evasive mancouveing or initiate cever negbonke Procedures. Signs that the ship is aware it is beiag approncned ea deter attackers, W/95198aSC/Cire.623, NINE. Page 4 15 When ships are in, or approaching areas where attacks tate place, bridge watches and look-outs should be doubled. Additions) watches on the stera or covering rader “blind spots" shoud be considered. Companies should consider investing in low-light binoculars for bridge eteff and look-outs, Radar should be cocstantly manned but it may be difficult to detect lov profile fa1 moving eraft on ship's radars. & yacht radar mounted on the stern may provide additional radar cover capable of detecting emall craft approaching fram astern when the ship is underway, Use of an appropriately positioned yacht radar when the vessel is at anchor may aleo provide warning of the close epproach of small craft. 16 It is particularly important to maintain 2 redor and visual watch for craft which may be tratling the ship when underway but which could close in quickly wher mounting an attack, Smal] ceaft which appear to be matchiag the speed of the ship on a parallel or following course should always be treated with suspicion. When a suspect craft has been noticed, it is important that. oo effective all-round watch is maintained for fear the first craft is a decoy with the intention to board the ship from a eecond craft hile attention is focused on the first. 17 Companies owning ships that frequently visit ereas where attacks occur should consider the purchase and use of nore cophisticated visual and electronic devices in order to augment both radar ané vigual watch capability against atteckers’ craft at night, thereby improving the prospects of obtaining an early varning of 2 possible attack. In particular, the provision of night vision devices, small regars to cover the pliné stern arce, closed circuit television aad physical devices. such ac barbed wire, way be considered. In certain circumstances non-lethal veapoos, such as CS gas projectiles, may also be appropriate. Infrared detection and alerting equipment may also be utiized. Radio procedures 18 A suitable qualified radio operator should be on duty at all times when ships are in, or approaching, areas where attacks occur. Thie duty shoeld not be performed by the master though, on occasions, this may be uoavoidable. 19 Prior to entering areas where attacks Rove occurred. roti anal should praccice and perfect 921 appropriate radio operational procedures and ensure all tracsmitters, including satellite Ship Earth Stations, ace fully operations] and available for imediate use on distress and safety frequencies. When a GMDSS instatlation is provided end “ship's position” date are oot sutomatically updated from an associated electronic navigation aia. radio operators are strongly recomended to enter the ship's position at regular intervals inte the appropriate coamunicatioor equipment manually. Where an INMARSAT Ship Earth Station fe provided, it may prove useful to drafe and store “standard messoges” (see paragraph 27) for ready use in an energoncy in either the equipmeat’s memory or on computer disk. Masters should ensure that a11 procedures to generate a distress alert on any communications equipment are clearly marked on, or near, the equipment and all appropriate crew members briefed on their operation, 20 Masters should bear in miod the poceibility that attackers are monitoring ship-to-shore conmunications and using intercepted information to select their tergets. Caution should, therefore, be exercised when transmitting information on cargo or valuables on board by radio in areas where attacks W/9519¢MSC/Cire.623 ANNEX ° Page 5 Radio watchkeeping and responses 21 A constant radio watch should be maintained with the appropriate shore or navi authorities when in areas where attacks have occurred. Continuous waten s2otld also be maintained on a1) distress and safety Erequenciec, particularly Channel 16 acd 2,182 KHz. Ships should also ensure al} meritine satety information broadcasts for the area are monitored. As it is anticipated that INMARSAT’s enhances group calling system (EGC) will normally be used for such broadcasts using the SafetyNET service, ovsers should ensure a uitebly configured EGC receiver is continuovsly available when in, or approaebing, vees where there is risk of attack. Owners should also consider fitting » Gedicated receiver for this purpose, i.e, one that is not incorporated inte @ Ship Earth Station used for commercial purposes te ensure no urgent broadcasts are miseed. 22° The International Maritime Organization (IMC) recommends ia MSC/Circ.597, issued in Auguet 1992, that reports conceraing attacks by pirates or armed robbers should be made tc the relevant Rescus Co-ordination Centre (RCC) for the area. MSC/Cire.597 also recommends that Governneats should arrange for the RCCs to be able to pass reports of attacks to the appropriate lew enforcement agencies or aeval authorities. This action should be taken ac quickly a6 possible. 23. If suspicious movements are identified which may result ip an imminent attack, the ship is advised to contact the relevant RCC. Where the moster believes these movements could constitute a direct danger to navigation, consideration should be given to broadcasting an “All Stations (CQ)" “danger mersege” as a warning to other ships in the vicimity ar well ae advising the appropriate RCC. danger message should be tranemitted in plain language on 2 YE vorking frequency following an announcement on VEF Chaanel 70 uelag the ‘ALL euch mensures shall be preceded by the eafety signal “safety” priority. (Securité). 24 Ween, in bis opinion, there Is conclusive evideace that the safety of nis ship is threatened, the master should immediately contact the Televant RCC and, if considered eppropriate, authorize broadcast of an Al] Stations” "Urgent Message” on VEF Channa! 16 2 oz aay athe: AcGtivas service be considers appropriat + 500 Ra, THMARSAT, 1 such messages shall be preceded by the appropriate Urgency signal } and/or a DSC coll on VAF Channel 70 and/or 2,187.5 tin using the “ali ships urgency" category. If the Urgency signal has been used and an attack does not, in fact, develop, the ship should cancel the message ar soon as it knows that action is no longer necessary. This message of cancellation should likewise be addressed to “nll stations”. 25 Should an attack occur and, In the opinion of the master. the ship or crew are in grave and imminent danger requiring immediate assistance, be should immediately authorize the broadcasting of a distress message, preceded by the appropriate distress slerts (MAYDAT, SOS, DSC, etc.), veing all available radioconmunications systems. The appropriate RCC should acknowledge receipt and attempt to establish communications. To minimize delay, if using 3 ship earth station, ships should engure the coast earth station sscociated with the RCC is used. shovld bear in mind that the distress signa} is provided for use 26 Masters of imminent danger and ite use for Jess urgent purposes might only iz case Ky951seoO oy MSC/Cire.623 REX Page 6 result in ineufficient attention being paid to calls from ships really in Care and éiscretion must be employed in ite use, to were the transmission of the Distress of immediate assistance. prevent its devaluation in the future. signa? is oot fully justified, use should be made of the Urgency signal. The Urgency signal has priority over al} communications other than dietr Standard message foxmets a for all 27. The standard mescage formats given in appendix 1 should be ui piracy alert reports. In ali cases of suspected or actual pirate attack, THO aod IMD should invariably be Informed so that a reliable set of statiatics is compiied ard action is taken, ae appropriate. Lighting 24 Ships should use the maximum lighting available consistent vith sate pavigation. hevig regard in particular to the provisions of Rule 20(b) of the Bo and overside lights should be left om if possible, Ships must not Xeep oz deck lighte when underway, ag it may 300d Ether chips to assume the snip is at anchor. Wide beam floods could Gituinete the orea eetern of the snip. Signal projector lights can be used aystenaticslly to probe for suspect cratt using the radar guidance if piseibie. So for ge is practicable crev merbers oo duty outside the ebip’e Eecure areas wheo in port or et anchor should avail themselves of shadov and avoid being silhouetted by deck lights ac this may make then targets for Seizure by approaching attackers. 1922 Collision Regulations. 29° Tt has bees suggested that ships should travel blacked out except for mandatory navigation lighte. This may prevent attackers establishing pointe of reference wher approachizg @ ship. In addition, turning on the ship's lights as attackers approach could alert them that they have been seen, dassle them and encourage them to desist. It ie difficult, however, to maintain full piackout on a merchant ship. The effectiveness of this approach will ultinately depend in part on the level of moonlight, but primarily on the vigilance of the ship's crew. While suddenly turning on the ship's light mi alam or darrle attackers, it could also place the crew at 0 disadvantage at o crucial point through temporary lose of their night vision. On baleace, this ot be recemnend approseh & Secure areas In accordance vith the chip's anti-attact plan, all doors allowing access to the bridge, engine room, steering gear compartments, officers’ cabins and crew acconnodation should be secured and controlled at a1} tines and should be regularly inspected. The intention should be to establish secure areas which attackers will (ind difficult to penetrate, Consideration chovld be given to the installation of special access control systems to the chip's secure areas. Ports, scuttles and windows which could provide access to such secure areas should be securely closed and should have laminated gless, if possib3| Deadlights should be shut and clipped tightly. The internal doors within secure areas which give immediate access to key areas such as the bridge, redio office, engine room and master's cabin, should be strengthened and have special access control systems ond automatic elerms. 30 Securisg doors providing access to, and egress from, secure or key areag o Tm any nay give rise to concern over safety in the event of aa accident. wrosiveMSC/Cire.623 ANNEX situation where there is s conflict between safety and security, the eafety requirements should be paramount. Neverthelese, attempts should be made to incorporate appropriate safety provisions while allowing accesses and exits to be secured or controzled. Owners may wish to consider providing closed-circuit television (CCTV) werage and recording of the main access points to the ship's secure areas. Ne corridors approaching the entrances to key areas and the bridge, 32° To prevent seizure of individual crew members by attackers - seizure and Urreatening @ crew member i6 one of the more conmon means of attackers gaining ‘eatrol over a ship - all crew member not engaged on essential outside duties should remain within a secure area during the heurs of darkness. Those whose Guries necessarily involve working cuteide euch areas st night should remaia in constant communication with the bridge and should have practiced using alternetive routes to return to # secure area iz the event of on attack. Crew mecbers whe fear they may not be able to return tc secure aree during an attack, ehealé select places ir advance in which they can take temporary refuge. 34 There should be designated muster areas within the ship's secure areas where the crew can muster during an attack and ccamunicate their location and aunbere to the bridg Alares 35 Alarm ¢ignals, including the ship's whistle, should be sounded on the eprroech of attackers. Alarms and signs of response can discourage ettacters. Alarm signals or announcements which provide an Indication et the aay belp crew members. point at which the attacker may board, or have boarded im exposed locetions select the most oppropriate route to return to a secure Use of Aistress flares Tae only flares authorized for carriage on board ship are intended for ae 36 use if the vessel is in distress and i In need of inmediate arsietance. ith the creareapiad wee af ee the Mo (ore pee .grugh oe above), use of distress flares simply to olert shipping rather thaa to indicate that the vessel is is grave and iminent danger may reduce their effect in the situations in which they are intended to be used and responded Radio transmigeions should be ured to alert shipping of the risk of te. attacks rather than distress flares. Distress flares should only be ured when the master considers that the attackers’ ections ere putting his ship in seat danger. should consider, “riding 37 Provige@ that navigational safety allows, master The effect of off" attackers craft by heavy wheel movements as they approach. the bow wave and vach may deter would-be attackers ond make it difficult for Uhes to attach poles or grappling irons to the ship. Manceuvres of this kind shou: rot be used in confined or congested waters or close inshore or by vesseis constrained by their draught in the confined deep water routes found, im the Malacca and Singapore Straits. for exemple. wrest} ascrcire.623 ANNEX Page & 38 The use of water hoses should also be considered though they may be Gifficult to train if evasive manoeuvring is also taking place. Mater pressures of 80 2D per square inch and above have deterred and repulsed attackers. Not only does the attacker have to fight against the jet of water but the flow moy svamp bis bost and damage engines and electrical systems. Special fittings for training heses could be considered which would also provide protection for the hose operator. A number of epare fire hoses could be rigged and tied down to be pressurized at short notice if a potential attack is detected. 39 Employing evasive manoeuvres and hoses must rest o2 a determination to successfully deter attackers or to delay their boarding to allow all cre members te gain the sanctuary of gecure areas. Continued heavy wheel movements with ettackers on board may lessen their coafideace thet they wil? be able to returs safely to their craft and may persuade then to disenberk quickly. However, responses of this ied covid lead to repricele by the attackers if they seize crew menders and should aot be engaged in unless the master is convinced he can use then to advantage and without risk to those on board. They should sot be used if the attackers have already seized crew members. Firearms 40 The carrying and use of firearms for persosal protection or protection of a ship is strongly discouraged. 41 Carriage of arms on board chip may encourage attackers to carry firearms thereby escalating an alreacy dangerous situation, and any firearms on board may thenselves become an attractive target for an attacker. The use of firearms requires special training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board ehip is great. In gome jurisdictions, Billing a national may have unforeseen consequences even for a pereon who believes be bag acted in eelf defence. The_phase of suspected or attempted piracy attack Suspected piracy vessel detected sz Early Seteceion of suspected attacks ust be the firme tins of defence If the vigilance and surveillance has been cucceseful- & virnte/ecned robbery versel vill be detected early. This is the stage at which the lav enforcancat agencies of the nearest littoral or coastal State must be informed. The ship's crew should be warned and, if not already in their defensive position: they should move to them. Evasive manoeuvres and hoses should be vigorously employed as detailed in the preparation phase. Being certain thet piracy will be attempted 43 If not already in touch with the law enforcement agencies of the littoral coastal State, efforts should be made to establish costact. Crev preparations should be completed and NUC lighte should be flashed to warn other veese2s in the vicinity that am attack is about to take place. Vigorous monoeuvring should be continued and maximum speed should be sustained if navigation conditions permit. wrysioewSC/Cire. 623 AEX Page 9 Pirabe_vescel in proximity to, or in contact with, ovp verse) 44 Vigorous use of hoses in the boarding area should be continued. It may be possible to cast off grappling hooke aré poles, provided the ship's crew are not put to unnecessary danger. Pirates start to boord vessel 45 Timing during this phase will be critical and ne goon as it is appreciated that @ boarding is inevitable all crew should be ordered to seek their secure positions. The picacy attack stege 46 Pirates have succeeded in eatering vescel. Early detection of potential attacks must be the firet line of defence, ection to prevent the attectere actually boarding the second, but there will he incidents when attackers succeed in boarding a ship. ‘The majority of pirates avd armed robbers are opportunists seeking an easy target and tine may not be on their side, particularly if the crew are avare they are ou board and are raising the However, the attackers may seek to compensate for the pressure of time alam. they face by escalating their threats or the violence they employ. Whea attackers are on board the actions of the master and crew should be aimed at <1 eecuring the greatest level of safety for those on board the ship: +? seeking to ensure thet the crew remain in control of the savigation of the ehip: and © possible departure of the attackers from the +32 securing the earli ship. 47 The options available to the master and crey will depend on the extent to which the attackers have secured control of the ship, e.g. by having gaised access to the bridge or engine rooe, or by seizing crev members who they can Dhrezten, £0 fores the man’ar 1 wnew bo comply seh tee a. te even if the crew ore all sofely vithia secure areas, the master wit) alvays have to consider the rink to the ship the attsckers could cause outsise those areas, e.g. by using firebombs to start fires on # tanker or chemical carrier. 48 If the master is certain that all bis crew are within eecure areas and that the attackers cannot gain access or by their actions outside the cecure areas they é0 not place the entire ship at imminent risk, then he may consider undertaking evasive manoeuvres of the type referred to above to encourage the attackers to retura to their craft. The poseibility of a sortie by » well-organized crew has, in the past, succesefully persuaded attackers to Reave a ship but the use of this tactic Is only appropriate if it can be undertaken at no riek to the crew, 49 For an action like this to be attempted the master must have clear Anowledge of vhere the attackers are on the ship, that they are not carrying firearms or other potentially lethal weapons and that the number of crew involved significantly outaunbers the attackers they will face. If a sortie wr9519eMsc/Cire.623 AEX Page 10 Party can use voter hoses. they stand an increased chance of success. ‘The intention should be to encourage the attackers back to their craft. Crew members should not seek to come between the ettacters and their craft nor should they seek to capture attackers as to éo so may increase the resistance the attackers offer which will, in tura, increase the risk faced by members of the sortie party. Once outsige the secure area, the sortie party should Biways stay together. Pursuit of an individual attacker by a lone crew member may be attractive but if it results in the crew member being isolated and seized by the attackers, the edvantage turns to the ettackers. Crev meabere should operete together and remain in constant conmunicetion vith the bridge and should Se recalled if their line of withdrawal to a secure area is threatened. 50 Is the crew do apprehend az attacker, he should be placed in secure confiement and well cared for. Arrangements should be made to transfer him to the custody of lew enforcement officers oz naval authorities of » cosstal State at the wsrliest possible opportunity. Aay evidence relating to this activities should elso be handed over te the euthorit: custody. 51 _If the attackers have gained control of the engine room or bridge, have seized crew menbers or can pose an imminent threat to the safety of s ship, the master or officer in charge should remain calm and, if possible, seer to negotiate with the attackers with the intention of meistaining the crew's control over the navigation of the ship, the cafe retura of any hostages they may bold and the early departure of the attackers from the ship. There vill be many circumstances when compliance with the attackers’ Gemands will be the only safe alternative and when resistance or obstruction of aay kind could be doth futile and dangerous. 52 In the event of attackers gaining temporary control of the vessel, crew embers should, if it is safe and practicable, leave Close Circuit Television (CCTV) records running. 53__As there have been occneicns when entire «. skeen isiwiacivu suvuid be given to secreting equipment within sreas ia which the crew could be detained to facilitate their early esca: ‘The pirates. bave stolen property/money, etcs Sa At this stage it is essential that the pirates are assured that they have been given everything they demand and a strong reassurace that nothing bas been secreted may persuade the pirates to leav ‘The_pirotes stert to disembark from the vessel 55 If the crew are in their secure positions, it would be unwise of them to Jeave this security until it is confirmed that the pirates have left the ship. pre-arranged eignal on the ship's eiren will alert the crew to the all clear". #795290ee MSC/Cire. 623 aoe Page 11 ; ; 1 Asticn efter an attack and reporting incidents Port should be made to the relevant RCC and, through then, to the law eaforcenent agencies or naval authorities of the eeastad State concerned, Ae well as information on the ideatity and location of the ship, any injuries to crew members or danage to the ship should be reported as should the airection in which the attackers departed together vith brief details of their numbers and, if possible, a description of their craft. If the crew have apprehended an attacker, that should also be reported in this report. 56 An immediate post attack rey ot TY en attack has resulted in the death of, of sersous injury to. any Person on board the ship cr serious danage to the ship itself, an imeaicte report should algo be seat to the ship's moritine A@ninigtration. 1m aay event a report of an attack is vitel if follow-up action is to be taken by the ship's maritime Administration. 58 Any CCTV or other recording of the incident should be secured, If areas that have been damaged or rified should be secured and renain untouched by crew members pending possible forensic exanination by the lav enforcement agencies of a coastal State. Crew meabers who cane fate contact with the attackers should be asked to prepare an individual report on their experience noting, in particular, any distinguishing features which could help subsequent identification of the attacters. full iavestory, including » description of aay personnl possessions or equipment tates. vith Serial numbers when known, should also be prepared, practicable, 59 As soon as possible after the incident, a fuller report should be transaitted to the suthorities of the coastal State in whose vaters the attack occurred or, if om the high seas, to the authorities of the nearest coastal State. Due and serious consideration should be given to complying with any request made by the competent authorities of the coastal State to allov Ine enforcement officers to board the vescel, take etatenente from crev meabere and undertake forensic and other investigations. Copies of aay CCIV recordings, photographs, etc. should be provided if they are available. 60 Any report transmitted to 2 coastal State should aleo be transmittea to the ship's maritime Administration at the carliest opportuaity, A complete report of the incident. including details of any folley-up action thet wa talen or eifficuities that may have been experienced, should eventually be sutnitted to the ship's maritime Administration. 61 The report received by maritine Administrations may be used in any diplomatic approaches made by the f1ag State to the Government of the coastal State in which the incident occurred. This will also provide the basie for the report to 1H0. S2 The format required for reports to IMO is ettached at appendix 1 Indeed, at present the lack of adequate and accurate reporting of attacks is Girectly affecting the ability of secure governmental and International action. Reports may aleo contribute to future refining and updeting any edvice that might be issued to ships. w/95198MSC/Cire.623 ANHEX Page 12 61 Reports to the RCC, coastal State and the ship's saritine Administration should iso be made if an attack has been unsuccessful. $4 Jt is hoped that using RCCs, as recommended Dy IMO in MSC/Cire.597, will eliminate communication difficulties. Jurisdiction end jatervention Criminal iurisdiction 65 Firacy is an offence committed om the high sens or in # place outside the Jurisdiction of azy Stete. A pirate who hes been apprehended on the high Sees, therefore, folle to be dealt with vader the law of the flag State of bis captors. On. Jeeving. piracy threat areas 85 On leaving piracy threat areas, shipmasters chould make certain that those stowages that need to be uolocked for safery reatone are unlocked, unrig hoses and revert to normal watchkeeping/ lighting. 7 A summary of the piracy phases and how they may. or may not, develop is Given in appeadiz 2, w/9519¢oSc/Cire.623 AEX Page 13 appendix 1 MESSAGE FORMATS Report 1 - feitiel message - Piracy attack alert Ship's name and callsiga/INMARSAT 1D (plus ocean region code} MAYDAY (see note) PIRACY ATTACK Ship's position (and tine of position UTC) Nature of event It is expected that this message vill be a Distress Message because the ship or persons will be in grave or imminent danger vheo usder attack. Where this is not the case, the word MAYDAY is to be omitted. Use of distress priority (3) in the INMARSAT syetem will not require MAYDAY to be included. Report 2 - Initial message = Pirecy attack alert 1 z 9 Ship's name and callsign Reference initial PIRACY ALERT Fosition of incident Details of incident, e.g Method of atrack wescrigtion of suspect crate Number and brief description of pirates Injuries to crew Damage to ship Brief details of stolen property/eargo Last observed movements of pirate/euspect craft, €.9, Date/tine/course/posit ion/speed Assistance required Preferred communications with reporting ship, Appropriate Coast Radio Station HM /MP/VHE INMARSAT ID (plus ocean cegioa code) Date/time of report (UTC) w95198mscvcire.623 DEX Page 14 Phase W/9S190 Appendix 2 “PHASES” RELATED TO VOYAGES IN PIRACY THREAT AREAS Phese Description Approaching @ piracy threat arez (1 hour prior to entering) Entering a piracy threat aree 8, but no suspect piracy vessel detected caside a piracy threat inside e piracy threat srea: suspect piracy vessel detected Certainty that piracy will be attempted Pircte vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own vessel Pirates start attempts to enter ship Pirates have succeeded in entering chip Pirates have one or more of the ship's personne] in their control/eustody The pireces have gained access to the bridge or the master's office The pirates have stolen property/money etc The pirates start to disembark ‘The pirates have disembarked The pirate vessel is no longer in contact with the ship twa ship seavee the piracy threat ares