DP Operator Manual

DP Operator Manual
DP INCIDENTS
The following incidents have been reproduced with

the kind permission of IMCA. (International Marine
Contractors Association.)
They are intended to show an example of the full set

of reports to the attendees of the Basic and Advanced
DP Operator courses.
All operators should have access to the complete set

of data on their own vessels.
15 DP Incidents.doc Page 1 of 21
DP Operator Manual
T ENSIONING
VESSEL ON DP IN DUAL DGPS
M OORING
OP EN W AT ER
COM P LET ED ON LINE
POSITION OUT
OFLIMITS
ADDIT IONAL
T HRUST ER
SELECT ED
T HRUST ER AT BOT H DGP S

FULL P OW ER INP UT S
AND T RIP S REJECT ED
BOTH DGPS POSITION

DE-SELECTED DROP OUT
DGPS 1
RE-SELECTED
POSITION POSITION HEADING LOSS

LOSS 120M STABILISED 40 DEGRESS
Figure 95/04
COMMENTS
This incident has been explained as a typical soliton effect that can catch an operator unaware in the
South China Sea (for more information see IMCA seminar November 1995)
MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

Soliton Thruster failure
DP Operator Manual
VESSEL ON DP ROV AND 2 TWs AND

ALONGSIDE DIVERS IN HPR ON LINE
PLATFORM WATER
PORT AZIMUTH
THRUSTER
TRIPS
AMBER
ALERT
DIVERS TO
ENGINEER
CLUMP
INVESTIGATES
WEIGHT
WRONG PUMP
STOPPED
STBD AZIMUTH POSITION OUT

THRUSTER RED ALERT OF LIMITS
TRIPS
MANUAL STBD AZIMUTH

CONTROL TO THRUSTER
AVOID PLATFORM RE-STARTED
DIVERS
RECOVERED
Figure 95/09
COMMENTS
Low pitch pressure alarm on the port hydraulic pump came up and the port thruster tripped on low
pressure. The engineer went to investigate and witnessed a large oil spray. On returning to the ECR
the starboard pitch pump was shut down by mistake. The loss of pressure had been caused by a nipple
coming out of the valve block, possibly due to a partly stripped thread.

Operator error Thruster fault (hydraulic)
DP Operator Manual
VESSEL ON DP 10
DIVERS AND DGPS, HPR AND 2
M FROM
ROV IN WATER TWs ON LINE
PLATFORM
RAPID RISE IN
VESSEL SWINGS NUMEROUS
NOISE AND
TO STBD DP ALARMS
VIBRATION
JOYSTICK FIXED THRUSTER

CONTROL RED ALERT MODE
SELECTED DESELECTED
VESSEL FAILS LEVEL CONTROL

TO RESPOND SELECTED
STBD AXIMUTH THRUSTER AT 100%

PITCH IN WRONG DIRECTION
EMERGENCY
CONTACT WITH
STOPPED STBD
PLATFORM
THRUSTER
ROV VESSEL DIVERS

RECOVERED MOVED CLEAR RECOVERED
Figure 95/02
COMMENTS
The DPO had little chance of stopping contact with the platform when the powerful thruster gave full
power 135 degrees from the requested direction. The vessel was off hire for 3 days while starboard
azimuth thruster was stripped down, and a foreign body was found. Presumably the DP alarms
included a thruster fault alarm and the starboard azimuth thruster should have been stopped more
quickly and then the collision could have been avoided.

Thruster fault (hydraulic) Operator error
DP Operator Manual
PIPE LAYING VESSEL ON DP IN

OPEN WATER
DGPS ON LINE
TO SPM
STERN TO WEATHER
WEATHER INCREASING
MAIN PROPERELLOR TO DECISION TO TURN

80% PITCH HEAD TO SEA
INSUFFICIEN T VESSEL POSIITON

THRUST TURNING BEING LOST
VESSEL STERN
MANUAL CONTROL
70M OFF POSITION
Figure 96/18
COMMENTS
There will also be a loss of position when changing heading a large amount quickly especially if the
vessel has heading priority. It should never be necessary to go into manual control to out perform the
DP software unless the software is poor or not designed for the operation being performed. In addition
on this vessel the azimuth thrusters do not assist the astern until the main propeller reached 100%
pitch. The vessel is not optimal for working stern to rough weather.

Operator Error Poor Design (Software)
DP Operator Manual
DGPS AND ONE

VESSEL ON
CABLE LAYING TAUT WIRE ON
DP LINE
TAUT WIRE
RAISED
VESSEL DRIFTED
20M OFF POSITION
DGPS REFERENCE TAUT WIRE

SYSTEM DE- SELECTED DEPLOYED
POSITION
STABILISED AFTER
40M EXCURSION
Figure 12/92
COMMENTS
The DGPS reference was interfaced to the DP system via a navigation/survey computer which
configured the DGS into a pseudo-Artemis signal. When the taut wire was raised this pseudo-Artemis
signal became the sole reference. At the same time the navigation computer failed to receive adequate
data from the DGPS system, and continued to output the last pseudo-Artemis signal to the DP
computer.

DGPS software fault Insufficient commissioning/testing/QA
DP Operator Manual
VESSEL ON DP IN
2 DGPS ON
PIPE LAYING MODERATE
WEATHER LINE
POSIITON OUT CONSEQUENC

OF LIMITS E WARNING
No. 2 BOW
THRUSTER TRIPS ON
OVERLOAD
No. 1 BOW THRUSTER No. 3 BOW THRUSTER

TRIPS ON OVERLOAD TRIPS ON OVERLOAD
DRIFT OFF
PIPELINE PULLED
DRIFT OFF OF
OUT OF
ALIGNMENT 824M
Figure 96/14
COMMENTS
The vessel was operating with open bus ties, inadequate power on line and with power limit warnings
on bus 1 and bus 2. The thrusters were poorly set up so that the demanded thrust was either not met or
exceeded. There was heavy pitching and No.2 bow thrust tripped on overload (Amps) before any pitch
reduction was possible (DP unaware of overload because of poor set up). Failure of the other two
thrusters was a consequence of the failure of No. 2. It was not possible to restart them until an azimuth
thruster had been tripped because starting was inhibited when high power was being used by other
thrusters 85%.

Thruster Electrical Protection / Control Inadequate testing / commissioning / QA
DP Operator Manual
VESSEL ON DP 3 REFERENCE
WIND 35 KNOTS SYSTEMS ON LINE
WIND AND SEA STATE

INCREASING
MOVING CHANGING
ASTERN HEADING
MARKED POSITION NO "CURRENT"

NOT REACHED UPDATE
MANUAL CONTROL
SELECTED
Figure 21/92
COMMENTS
During operations the wind increased considerably and the decision ws taken to move the vessel to the
optimum heading. This required the vessel to move astern and change the heading 30 degrees. During
one of the moves the vessel failed to reach the marked position. It eventually became necessary to
go into manual control to complete the move. Subsequent tests of software revealed the program was
configured such that the estimated sea current was only updated when the vessel reached the marked
position.

DP control fault (software) Insufficient commissioning / QA
DP Operator Manual
ROV IN WATER
VESSEL ON DP IN 2 DGPS & HPR
CLOSE TO
GOOD WEATHER ON LINE
PLATFORM
AUTO CHANGE OVER

COMPUTER A TO B
PRESS "UPDATE THRUSTERS NOT

OFFLINE" RESPONDING
POSITION OUT HEADING OUT

OF LIMITS OF LIMITS
JOYSTICK
SELECTED
NO RESPONSE
MANUAL CONTROL
Figure 96/10
COMMENTS
There were alarms for A/B difference, network serial interface timeout and then thruster feedback for
thrusters 1, 4 and 5. No final explanation is available but clearly the ADP702 crashed and the vessel
lost position until manual control was selected.

Computer Fault Poor design
DP Operator Manual
MOVING TO VESSEL ON
2 TW& HPR ON
GANGWAY DP CLOSE TO
LINE
POSITION PLATFORM
REPLUMB
STARBROAD
TAUTWIRE
HPR TETHER
HPR STILL ON
PULLED
LINE
PREMATURELY
DRIVE OFF
THRUSTERS AT PORT TAUT WIRE

HIGH POWER OUT OF LIMITS
MANUAL CONTROL
POSITION
STABILISED
Figure 96/08
COMMENTS
The man on the transponder winch line was asked to stand by to skip beacon but failed to hear the
stand by part of the message.

Operator Error Poor Procedures
DP Operator Manual
ROV IN WATER
VESSEL ON DP IN DGPS ON LINE HPR
CLOSE TO
SHALLOW WATER ON STAND BY
PLATFORM
DGPS
POSITION HEADING
PERFORMANCE
EXCURSION 5M EXCURSION 8 DEG.
DEGRADED
HPR SELECTED
INSTEAD
VESSEL OUT MOVING AHEAD

OF POSITION BACK TO POSITION
POSITION
OVERSHOOT
BY 45M
ROV MANUAL MOVED OUT OF

RECOVERED CONTROL 5000M ZONE
Figure 96/04
COMMENTS
There had been tests carried out to prove that the arrangement of DGPS and HPR back up was
satisfactory and in the 71m of water the transponder had to be within 50m for it to be a good position
reference. It became outside this range.

DP Operator Manual
DIVERS IN WATER HPR AND TWO

VESSEL ON DP BETWEEN TAUT WIRES ON
MOORING LINES LINE
BLACKOUT OF
44V
SWITCHBOARD
REVERSE POWER TRIP EMERGENCY

OF GENRATORS No. 2 & GENERATOR AUTO
3 STARTS
VESSEL DRIFT OFF

POSITION (25M 40
Deg)
JOYSTICK DIVERS AND BELL

POWER RESTORED
CONTROL RECOVERED
Figure 5/92
COMMENTS
The vessel was working down weather of the rig and drifted away from the rig and mooring lines
during the blackout. The divers and equipment were back onboard twelve minutes after the blackout.
The cause of the blackout was the operation of the interlocks for shore power to the 440V switchboard
which tripped the high voltage/440V transformers. Any vessel with a shore connection and interlocks
should make sure that these are isolated during DP operations, so that a fault or a single act of mal-
operation cannot cause a DP blackout.

Electrical fault Poor design
DP Operator Manual
VESSEL ON DP DIVERS IN BELL ARTEMIS ON LINE
VESSEL MOVING
TO NEW LOCATION
ARTEMIS SIGNAL SYLEDIS

LOST SELECTED
DRIVE OFF
MANUAL
CONTROL
(JOYSTICK)
Figure 8/92
COMMENTS
When the vessel was initially set up on DP, trials were carried out using Artemis only as Syledis was
not available. The vessel was already working when Syledis became available and so DP trials on
Syledis only were not carried out. The vessel was moving in open waters with only one position
reference and one untested backup. Once the vessel commenced the planned movement the Artemis
signal was lost leaving Syledis as the only reference system available. The Syledis system was not
updating position, which was the cause of the drive off. Artemis signals were restored, and vessel went
back in full auto DP on Artemis.

DP Operator Manual
FOLLOW SUB DGPS ON LINE AS

VESSEL ON DP
MODE PSEUDO ARTEMIS
SURVEY DISPLAY DP CONTROL

SHOWS 20M OFF SHOWS 2M OFF
TRACK TRACK
PSEUDO ARTEMIS
DESELECTED
HPR SELECTED
POSITION
STABILISED
Figure 96/34
COMMENTS
The master discovered after the incident that the differential signal form Inmarsat A had been lost but
the other DGPS used for survey was using an HF diff signal. There was no alarm or rejection of DGPS
when the diff signal was lost and the survey team forgot to inform the bridge. This failure illustrates
the weakness of DGPS supplied by the survey team as pseudo Artemis

DGPS Failure (diff signal) Operator Error
DP Operator Manual
WAIT ING AT
ST AND-OFF HPR AND ARTEMIS
VESSEL IN DP
POSIT ION ON LINE
A/B DIFFERENCE
ALARM
"M AN/AUT O" "B RE-ST ART "

B COMPUTER
PUSHBUT T ON PUSHBUT T ON
PRESSED
RELOADED PRESSED
ON LINE COMPUTER A
STOPPED
MANUAL CONTROLS USED

TO MAINTAIN POSITION
A COMPUTER RE-
B COMPUTER RE- LOADED
LOADED
BACK ON DP
Figure 14/92
COMMENTS
After reloading the backup computer the operator pressed the restart pushbutton, which caused the
online A computer to stop with the subsequent loss of DP control. The vessels position was
maintained using the manual controls, whilst both A and B computers were again reload. No
investigation was undertaken into this incident and it is likely that the operator stopped the A computer
by mistake.

Operator error Poor Procedures
DP Operator Manual
VESSEL ON DP HPR AND TWO

AIR DIVING IN
CLOSE TO TAUT WIRES ON
PROGRESS
PLATFORM LINE
THRUSTERS IN
FIXED AZIMUTH
MODE
WIND SQUALL AND

DIRECTION
CHANGE
TAUT WIRES OUT POSITION

OF LIMITS (17M) LOSS (8M)
AMBER ALERT
THRUSTERS IN
POSITION
FREE AZIMUTH
RESTORED
MODE
DIVING
RESUMES
Figure 17/92
COMMENTS
The wind squall lasted approximately 3 minutes and was accompanied by a 70 degree change in wind
direction. Since the thrusters were in fixed positions, they could not supply sufficient thrust to counter
the vessels movement. The maximum position loss was 9 metres, after which the vessel started to
regain position. Had the thrusters been in free azimuth mode before the squall, it is likely that the
position loss would have been much less and not necessitated the amber alert. The large wind change
would have had a major impact on the vessel model and a stabilisation period should have been carried
out. Diving resumed after three minutes.

Wind Squall. Operator error (fixed azimuth mode)
Basic Operator Course
VESSEL ON DP TWO TAUT WIRES

DIVERS IN WATER
CLOSE TO WATER AND HPR ON LINE
WIND 30-35 KNOTS
POSITION OUT OF HEADING OUT OF

LIMITS LIMITS
BOW THRUSTER
TO 100% PITCH
CENTRE BOW
THRUSTER AMBER ALERT
OVERLOAD TRIP
POSITION
BELL RECOVERED
RESTORED
VESSEL MOVES AWAY TO

INVESTIGATE THRUSTER
FAILURE
Fig 26/92
COMMENTS
It was reported that the vessel initially lost position and heading because of a wind gust and a heavy
swell on the beam. In attempting to regain position the bow thruster wen to 100% starboard thrust, and
shortly afterwards the centre tunnel thruster tripped out. The thruster tripped on overload when
restarted. It was subsequently found that the setting of zero pitch on the centre tunnel thruster was out,
and the thruster motor overloaded when driven 100% starboard. The pitch setting was adjusted and
after testing driving recommenced.

Thruster fault (electrical) Insufficient maintenance
VESSEL ON DP CLOSE HPR AND TAUT WIRES

TO PLATFORM ON LINE
NEARBY VESSEL
INTERROGATES SAME
HPR TRANSPONDER
HPR LOST
LOSS OF POSITION
TOWARDS
PLATFORM
Figure 22/92
COMMENTS
No more information is available about this incident. Loss of one position reference should not cause a
loss of position. Of course there can be a small shift of position because the remaining position
reference would have 100% weighting and before it may have had a low weighting. Discussions had
taken place between the two vessels prior to this incident, regarding transponders channels to be used.

Operator error Poor Procedures
TAUT WIRE AND

VESSEL ON DP DIVERS IN WATER
ARTEMIS ON LINE
EMERGENCY
CLEANING 660V 660V BUS-TIE
GENERATOR
SWITCHBOARD OPEN
STARTS
DOOR TO EMERGENCY
GENERATOR ROOM SLAMS
BLACKOUT OF BRIDGE &

NAVIGATION SWITCHBOARD
YELLOW ALERT
GYRO FAILURE UPS ALARM
INITIATED
NO SATISFACTORY
RED ALERT
EXPLANATION
DIVERS RECOVERED AND

BELL RETRIEVED
Figure 32/92
COMMENTS
To clean the 660V switchboard the centre bus-tie was opened. Opening the bus-tie breaker caused the
emergency generator to start. When this was discovered, an engineer went to stop the emergency
generator, but as the door to generator room slammed shut the emergency switchboard supplies to the
bridge and diving switchboard tripped. The DP operators did not know why there was a loss of power
to the UPS and gyros, and initiated a Red Alert whilst the situation was brought under control. The
vessel maintained position while the divers were retrieved. There appears to have been little
communication between the engineers and DP operator, and certainly switchboard cleaning should not
have been undertaken while diving was in progress.

Operator error
VESSEL ON DUAL DGPS

PASSAGE AVAILABLE
DIFF SIGNALS OF
BOTH LOST
CONTINUE
WITHOUT DGPS
Figure 96/51
COMMENTS
The differential corrections were thought to be independent, one Inmarsat A the other Inmarsat B, thus
avoiding a potential single point failure. After this failure it was found that both were transmitted from
the same dish in Eik Norway, and failure of the dish caused loss of both DGPS. This failure happened
twice.

DGPS Fault Insufficient testing/Commissioning /QA
VESSEL ON DP DGPS & HPR ON

ROV IN WATER
NEAR PLATFORM LINE
10M MOVE
INSTIGATED
DGPS REJECTED HPR REJECTED
VESSEL OUT OF
POSITION
VESSEL MOVING
OPERATOR TRIES
TOWARDS
TO STOP MOVE
PLATFORM
MANUAL CONTROL
TO MOVE AWAY
Figure 96/09
COMMENTS
The vessel did not clearly establish the cause of this incident. A move to starboard was input and the
vessel moved to port and continued to move. The alarm print out shows the diff signal was frequently
being lost an hour earlier. We therefore think the most likely cause was DGPS fault or operator error
or both. Once high thrust was used it is possible that the HPR was lost. There should have been three
position references on line.

DGPS Failure (loss of diff) Operator error

DP Operator Manual

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

DP Operator Manual

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

DP Operator Manual

The following incidents have been reproduced with

They are intended to show an example of the full set

All operators should have access to the complete set

T HRUST ER AT BOT H DGP S

BOTH DGPS POSITION

POSITION POSITION HEADING LOSS

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

VESSEL ON DP ROV AND 2 TWs AND

STBD AZIMUTH POSITION OUT

MANUAL STBD AZIMUTH

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

JOYSTICK FIXED THRUSTER

VESSEL FAILS LEVEL CONTROL

STBD AXIMUTH THRUSTER AT 100%

ROV VESSEL DIVERS

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

PIPE LAYING VESSEL ON DP IN

MAIN PROPERELLOR TO DECISION TO TURN

INSUFFICIEN T VESSEL POSIITON

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

DGPS AND ONE

DGPS REFERENCE TAUT WIRE

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

POSIITON OUT CONSEQUENC

No. 1 BOW THRUSTER No. 3 BOW THRUSTER

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

WIND AND SEA STATE

MARKED POSITION NO "CURRENT"

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

AUTO CHANGE OVER

PRESS "UPDATE THRUSTERS NOT

POSITION OUT HEADING OUT

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

THRUSTERS AT PORT TAUT WIRE

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

VESSEL OUT MOVING AHEAD

ROV MANUAL MOVED OUT OF

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

DIVERS IN WATER HPR AND TWO

REVERSE POWER TRIP EMERGENCY

VESSEL DRIFT OFF

JOYSTICK DIVERS AND BELL

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

VESSEL ON DP DIVERS IN BELL ARTEMIS ON LINE

ARTEMIS SIGNAL SYLEDIS

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

FOLLOW SUB DGPS ON LINE AS

SURVEY DISPLAY DP CONTROL

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

"M AN/AUT O" "B RE-ST ART "

MANUAL CONTROLS USED

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

VESSEL ON DP HPR AND TWO

WIND SQUALL AND

TAUT WIRES OUT POSITION

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE

VESSEL ON DP TWO TAUT WIRES

WIND 30-35 KNOTS

POSITION OUT OF HEADING OUT OF

VESSEL MOVES AWAY TO

MAIN CAUSE SECONDARY CAUSE