Global Catastrophic Risks 2017 BW

GCF & thought leaders
sharing what you need to know on
Global Catastrophic
Risks 2017
INTRODUCTION
GLOBAL CHALLENGES ANNUAL REPORT: GCF & THOUGHT LEADERS SHARING

WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ON GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISKS 2017
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors. Their statements are not
necessarily endorsed by the affiliated organisations or the Global Challenges Foundation.
ANNUAL REPORT TEAM

Carin Ism, project leader Elinor Hgg, creative director
Julien Leyre, editor in chief Kristina Thyrsson, graphic designer
Ben Rhee, lead researcher Erik Johansson, graphic designer
Waldemar Ingdahl, researcher Jesper Wallerborg, illustrator
Elizabeth Ng, copywriter Dan Hoopert, illustrator
CONTRIBUTORS
Nobuyase Abe Maria Ivanova Janos Pasztor
Japanese Ambassador and Commissioner, Associate Professor of Global Governance Senior Fellow and Executive Director, C2G2
Japan Atomic Energy Commission; former UN and Director, Center for Governance and Initiative on Geoengineering, Carnegie Council
Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Sustainability, University of Massachusetts
Affairs Boston; Global Challenges Foundation Anders Sandberg
Ambassador Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity
Anthony Aguirre Institute
Co-founder, Future of Life Institute Angela Kane
Senior Fellow, Vienna Centre for Disarmament Tim Spahr
Mats Andersson and Non-Proliferation; visiting Professor, CEO of NEO Sciences, LLC, former Director
Vice chairman, Global Challenges Foundation Sciences Po Paris; former High Representative of the Minor Planetary Center, Harvard-
for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics
Seth Baum
Executive Director, Global Catastrophic Risk Victoria Krakovna Stephen Sparks
Institute Co-founder, Future of Life Institute Professor, School of Earth Sciences, University
of Bristol
Kennette Benedict Richard Mallah
Senior Advisor, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Director, AI Projects, Future of Life Institute Leena Srivastava
Vice Chancellor, TERI University, New Delhi
Ariel Conn Wanjira Mathai
Director, Media and Outreach, Future of Life Director, wPower Partnership in Nairobi; Chair, Anote Tong
Institute Green Belt Movement and Wangari Maathai former President of Kiribati; Global Challenges
Foundation; Global Challenges Foundation Foundation Ambassador
Allan Dafoe Ambassador
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale Max Tegmark
University; Research Associate, Future of Malini Mehra President and Co-founder, Future of Life
Humanity Institute, University of Oxford Chief Executive, GLOBE International Institute
secretariat; Global Challenges Foundation
Eric Drexler Ambassador Roey Tzezana
Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute Futurist, researcher at Blavatnik
and Oxford Martin Senior Fellow, Oxford Philip Osano Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Centre (ICRC),
Martin School, Oxford University Research Fellow, Natural Resources and Tel Aviv University, affiliated with Humanity
Ecosystems, Stockholm Environment Institute Centred Robotics Initiative (HCRI), Brown
Owen Gaffney University
Director, International media and strategy, Martin Rees
Stockholm Resilience Centre UK Astronomer Royal, and Co-founder, Raymond Zilinskas
Cambridge Centre for the Study of Existential Director, Chemical & Biological Weapons
David Heymann Risk Nonproliferation Program, James Martin
Head and Senior Fellow, Centre on Global Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Health Security, Chatham House, Professor Johan Rockstrm Middlebury Institute of International Studies
of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, London Professor and Director, Stockholm Resilience at Monterey
School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Centre
2 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017

INTRODUCTION
THE GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOUNDATION works to incite deeper under-

standing of the global risks that threaten humanity and ideas to
tackle them. Rooted in a scientific analysis of risk, the Foundation brings
together the brightest minds from academia, politics, business and civil
society to forge transformative approaches to secure a better future for all.
Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 3

CONTENTS
Contents
Foreword5
What is a Global Catastrophic Risk? 6
Global Challenges Foundation Annual Report
Ambassadors Preface 7
Why care now? 9
Taxonomy11
Weapons of Mass Destruction 12
Nuclear warfare 14
Biological and chemical warfare 17
Catastrophic climate change 21
Ecological collapse 29
Pandemics34
Asteroid impact 37
Supervolcanic eruption 40
Geoengineering42
Artificial intelligence 45
Unknown risks 50
Global catastrophic risk insights 52
New models of nuclear war risk assessment 53
Climate tipping points 56
Recent progress in AI and efforts to ensure its safety 60
Endnotes62

FOREWORD
Dear reader,
T
his is the third Annual Report on
Global Risk from the Global Challenges
Foundation. We have worked with
leading academic experts to describe
the greatest threats to humanity. In
this years report, we present updates to previously
published information about global risks, but
also extend the content, in particular by offering
descriptions of official bodies and regulatory
frameworks currently in place to manage those risks.
The report ends with three articles in which
three scientists give an account of the latest state
of research in three different areas: tipping points
that may be triggered by global warming, the risk of
nuclear war, and the study of artificial intelligence.
The group of scientists recruited as authors and
reviewers on this annual report is considerably
broader than in previous years, both in numbers and
geographically.
Understanding global catastrophic risks is

important. Without an intimate knowledge of these
threats, we cannot even begin to work on models
that can help us manage, reduce and, preferably,
eliminate them more rapidly, effectively and
equitably.
It is a great satisfaction for me to announce that the
competition for the Global Challenges Prize 2017 A
New Shape has been launched. Offering USD 5 million
as a prize sum, we are challenging thinkers from all
over the world to propose models for more effective
global collaboration in order to address the greatest
risks to humanity.
In conclusion, I would like to extend my warmest

thanks to everyone who has contributed to this
publication in various ways. Let us hope that the
knowledge and the insights shared here can
become fertile ground for new, productive ideas,
and a discussion about more effective forms of
global cooperation.
LASZLO SZOMBATFALVY
Chairman of the Global Challenges Foundation

WHAT IS A GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISK?
WHAT IS A GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISK?
Level of risk =
probability x impact
W
e fret about that even one such incident would
familiar risks be too many. These potentially
air crashes, catastrophic threats surely deserve
carcinogens expert analysis. Its crucial to
in food, assess which can be dismissed
low radiation doses, etc and firmly as science fiction, and which
theyre all intensively studied. could conceivably become real; to
But were in denial about some consider how to enhance resilience
emergent threats the potential against the more credible ones;
downsides of fast-developing new and to guard against technological
technologies and the risk of crossing developments that could run out of
environmental tipping points. control. This topic should be higher
These may seem improbable, but on the international agenda. Its a
in our interconnected world, their wise mantra that The unfamiliar
consequences could is not the same as the improbable.
cascade globally, And thats why the topics addressed
causing such in these pages are so timely and
devastation deserve to be widely read.
MARTIN REES
UK Astronomer Royal, and Co-founder, Cambridge
Centre for the Study of Existential Risk
6
Global Challenges Annual Report 2017
GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOUNDATION ANNUAL REPORT AMBASSADORS PREFACE
Global Challenges
Foundation Annual Report
Ambassadors Preface
M
anaging global risks requires
global governance. Over the past
100 years we have created a series
of international institutions to
provide a forum for negotiation,
guidelines on behavior, and tools for implementation
of commitments. Our understanding of risks and
their causes and consequences has improved
significantly. Connectivity has increased
dramatically, allowing us to witness and project
impacts, engage with people across the world, and
create communities of change makers. Ultimately,
our ability to imagine, initiate, and implement
change has magnified and multiplied.
We now stand at a crossroads. The decisions and

actions we take today will shape our future for years to
come; yet, the institutions we rely on to ensure peace,
security, development, and environmental integrity
are woefully inadequate for the scale and scope of the
challenges at hand. Governments have created new
institutions for every new risk. The global community,
however, needs to collaborate across scales and
sectors to manage the threat of nuclear conflict, avert
climate change, or deal with the risks of biotechnology
and Artificial Intelligence, among others. When it
comes to the structures of global governance, business
as usual is no longer an option.
The Global Challenges Foundation launched
The New Shape Prize to catalyse creative and
transformational thinking on global decision-
making. The US$ 5 million prize competition calls
for ground breaking ideas from change makers in
all spheres: policy makers, academics, think tank
analysts, NGO activists, business leaders, scientists,
or tech innovators. It is an ambitious bid to remodel
global cooperation, to reshape the very architecture
of global governance.
We seek ideas that will help break down old silos
and lay aside narrow national and political interests,
that build on lessons from the successes and the
failures in global cooperation to date, and that
engage new voices from every quarter.

GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOUNDATION ANNUAL REPORT AMBASSADORS PREFACE
The response to the New Shape challenge has

inspired and motivated us. People from every corner
of the planet have expressed genuine commitment
in imagining a new system and tapped a well
of creativity. Over the past months, the Global
Challenges Foundation has been partnering with
universities, think tanks and other institutions
around the world to promote debate of global
governance and encourage entries from brilliant
thinkers and inter-disciplinary shape maker super
teams.
In Stockholm and So Paolo, Bejing and Bogota,
New Delhi and New York, conversations have
ignited and ideas fomented. We look forward to
their outcomes when the prize competition closes
on September 30. We will announce the winners
in May 2018 at a New Shape Forum in Stockholm.
And then the real work begins as ideas turn into
implementable frameworks and a new reality for us
and future generations.
MATS MARIA IVANOVA WANJIRA MATHAI MALINI MEHRA ANOTE TONG

ANDERSSON Associate Professor of Global Director, wPower Partnership Chief Executive, GLOBE Former President of Kiribati;
Governance and Director, Center in Nairobi; Chair, Green Belt International secretariat, Global Challenges Foundation
Vice chairman, Global
for Governance and Sustainability, Movement and Wangari Global Challenges Foundation Ambassador
Challenges Foundation
University of Massachusetts Maathai Foundation; Global Ambassador
Boston; Global Challenges Challenges Foundation
Foundation Ambassador Ambassador

Reviewed by Reviewed by
ALLAN ANDERS
DAFOE SANDBERG
Why care now?

As a world leader, community leader, or global citizen,
there is a broad range of issues that you could be concerned about.
Why should global catastrophic risks be the a priority?
What do we Systemic risks

have to lose?
Many critical challenges today, such Many studies have shown that poverty
as climate change and political violence, is a significant contributor to political
are not contained within national violence1, which in turn further impairs
borders, nor do they fit into the silos economic development. Todays risks
Whatever you care of separate government agencies or
academic specialties. No matter who
are interconnected. We cannot view
them or manage them in isolation.
most about, be it burns fossil fuels, the worlds oceans
continue to absorb carbon dioxide,
Leaders can ignore them because
they fall outside the limited scope of
justice, knowledge, and the resulting acidification affects their mandate, but silos will not offer
fisheries and food security for millions. protection from the consequences.
achievement, or family,
it is likely to require this
planet. Conserving this
world is a prerequisite
The limits of our cognitive ability
Were affected by cognitive bias. Our are non-linear: beyond a certain
for the continued brain is not optimized to think about threshold, change is sudden, rapid, and
catastrophic risk. It either completely sometimes exponential. This directly
existence of everything neglects or massively overweighs low betrays our cognitive expectations.
we know and fight for.

probabilities2, and it is wired to make Global catastrophic risk is not an
sense of linear correlations3. However, intuitive matter, and as such, it
most of our greatest challenges requires intellectual focus.
Striking exponential developments
?
% decr mean species abundance PPM Billion FLOPS/$1,000
40 400 350
30
350
20 175
300
10
0 250 0
1750 2010 1750 2010 1750 2016
Terrestrial biosphere Advances in digital Institutional

degradation4 technology5 development

Scenario 1: Scenario 2: Scenario 3:
100% 1% of humanity is alive and well A catastrophe kills 99% of the worlds
0%
A catastrophe kills 100% of the
existing population worlds existing population
Imagine the three scenarios above, where is there of the scale, many of them could cause human extinction, and
the most difference in terms of human loss? Is it never give these future generations a chance to live. Putting
between scenarios 1 and 2, or between scenarios 2 and it in purely numerical terms, there are currently 7.5 billion
3? Instinctively, we might think that the death of 99% of people alive. Although we know that our planet is not eternal,
humanity marks greater loss. But the difference between 1% scientists have postulated that the world will remain habitable
surviving or nobody is far greater: in the case of complete for a few hundred million years at least7. Over that period,
extinction, no future generations will ever come to be, and hundreds of millions of generations could come to the world.
all of humanitys potential will be lost6. But even if humanity was to live for only 10,000 more
years, maintaining its current size, this would add up to
The risks addressed in this report are not only catastrophic at least 2000 billion lives. The potential of the far future is
in terms of suffering and economic loss: at the extreme end immeasurable and, unfortunately, systematically neglected.
Knowledge = opportunity Navigating suddenness

For the first time in human history, we have reached a Emerging risks like synthetic biology or
level of scientific knowledge that allows us to develop an nanotechnology might seem far-removed, but a mere
enlightened relationship to risks of catastrophic magnitude. 100 years ago, weapons of mass destruction, climate
Not only can we foresee many of the challenges ahead, change, and AI were not part of our lexicon either.
but we are in a position to identify what needs to be From the time that climate change was recognised as
done in order to mitigate or even eliminate some of both man-made and potentially catastrophic to the time
those risks. Our enlightened status, however, also requires when effective cooperation started, the risk increased
that we consider our own role in creating those risks, and dramatically, putting us all in jeopardy. Fostering better
collectively commit to reducing them. foresight and responsiveness in our institutions is essential
to prepare for new risks on the horizon.
The next 50 years will determine the next 10,000 years

This report focuses on the greatest of our present businesses, politics and society onto a sustainable path
risks, with potential for catastrophic damage. However, has never been greater than today. The extent to which we
if we consider environmental risks alone, the last 50 protect our natural environment and transform harmful
years of human activity have pushed us away from the patterns of consumption in the next 50 years will shape
environmental stability of the past 12,000 years8. As global our far future, over the next 10,000 years and beyond. So
temperature continues to rise, the possibility that may why care now? Because so much is at stake, too little
trigger catastrophic disasters increases in tandem. The is done, and if we wait until later, caring may no longer
need for decisive leadership and citizen initiatives to shift matter.

TAXONOMY
Taxonomy
T
his report aims to present an overview
of the global catastrophic risks that
the world currently faces, based on
consideration of certain crucial facts and
the latest scientific research. It proposes
to complement the World Economic Forums Global
Risks Report1, which offers an up-to-date picture
of global risks as perceived by leading political and
economic actors. These two approaches are highly
complementary: perception is a strong driver of
collective action and decision-making, while a more
focused examination of the risks themselves will guide CURRENT RISKS FROM
better long-term strategy and support the design of HUMAN ACTION
more efficient governance models. Weapons of mass destruction nuclear, chem-
When preparing this report, we aimed to develop ical and biological warfare catastrophic climate
a taxonomy that would reflect the best current change and ecological collapse are all current
understanding and be useful to decision-makers. risks that have arisen as a result of human ac-
We combined historical evidence and scientific tivity. Although action on them is time sensitive,
data to decide which risks should be included in they are still within our control today.
the report. For the sake of clarity, we identified
ten key risks, which we then organised into three NATURAL CATASTROPHES
main categories: current risks from human action, Pandemics, asteroid impacts and super-volcanic
natural catastrophes, and emerging risks. The eruptions are known to have caused massive
reader should keep in mind, however, that many destruction in the past. Though their occurrence
of those risks are closely interconnected, and their is beyond human control to a large extent, our
boundaries sometimes blur, as with climate change actions can significantly limit the scale of impact.
and ecological collapse, or as in the case of synthetic This is especially true for pandemics, where the
biology, which could be presented as a risk of its recent experience of Ebola and Zika outbreaks
own, an additional risk factor in biological warfare, highlighted the challenges and opportunities of
or a potential cause for engineered pandemics. global cooperation.
In each section, a first part offers a description of EMERGING RISKS

the current risk, exploring what is at stake, what Artificial intelligence, nanotechnology,
is known, and key factors affecting risk levels. geo-engineering or risks as yet unknown2 might
A second part considers current governance not seem like an immediate source of concern.
frameworks for mitigating the risk. Each section However, we should remember that challenges
was prepared in collaboration with leading experts widely recognized as the greatest today climate
in the field. change and nuclear weapons were unknown
only 100 years ago, and late response as in
the case of climate change has increased the
risk level considerably. Significant resources are
devoted to further the potential of those techno-
logies; In comparison, very little goes into map-
ping and managing the new dangers they bring.
As we cannot expect the pace of technological
development to be linear, and given our limited
knowledge and resources, leading experts are
pressing for action on those risks today3.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Weapons of Mass Destruction

Nuclear warfare
On August 6, 1945, a nuclear bomb exploded in
Hiroshima, killing some 70,000 people within the
day. In total, almost a half of the city perished from
the effects of the bomb, half in the heat, radiation,
fires and building collapses following the blast, and
another half before the end of the year from injuries
and radiation, bringing the total number of deaths to
some 150,0001. Since then, the world has lived in the
shadow of a war unlike any other in history. Although
the tension between nuclear states has diminished
since the end of the Cold War and disarmament efforts
150,000
have reduced arsenals, the prospect of a nuclear war
remains present, and might be closer today than it
was a decade ago2. Its immediate effect would be
the catastrophic destruction of lives and cities, and
debilitation, illness and deaths from radiation, but
another concern is the risk that the dust released from
nuclear explosions could plunge the planet into a
mini ice-age3, with dramatic ecological consequences, is the estimated number of deaths caused by
severe agricultural collapse, and a large proportion of the nuclear bomb in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.
the world population dying in a famine4.
Biological and chemical warfare

Toxic chemicals or infectious micro-organisms create panic. Up to now, their destructive effect has
have been used as weapons to harm or kill humans been locally contained. However, new technological
for millennia, from the ancient practice of developments give cause for concern. In particular,
poisoning an enemys wells and throwing plague- developments in synthetic biology and genetic
infected bodies over the walls of cities under siege, engineering make it possible to modify the
to the horrifying usage of germ warfare during characteristics of micro-organisms. New genetically
the Second World War in Asia, or the use of nerve engineered pathogens released intentionally
gases in the Iran-Iraq War. Biological and chemical or inadvertently might cause a pandemic of
attacks not only cause sickness and death but also unprecedented proportions.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF THE US, RUSSIA,

AND THE WORLD FROM 1945 UNTIL TODAY5
Number of nuclear warheads

Thousands
80
80
70
70 Russia
60
US
60
Global
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
00
1945 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014
1945 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014
Year
NUCLEAR WARFARE
KENNETTE AMBASSADOR
BENEDICT NOBUYASE ABE
Nuclear Warfare
HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW? WHAT ARE KEY FACTORS AFFECTING
Depending on their yield, technical characteristics RISK LEVELS?
and mode of explosion, todays more powerful Continued efforts towards arsenal reduction
nuclear weapons will cause 80 to 95% fatalities will reduce the overall level of nuclear risk, while
within a radius of 1 to 4 km from their point of attention to geopolitical tensions and continued
detonation, and very severe damage for up to six efforts towards global conflict management,
times as far5. The largest arsenals are currently held particularly among nuclear states, will reduce the
by the US and Russia, who control approximately underlying risk of an intentional nuclear war11.
7,000 warheads each6. Seven other States are known In addition, controlling and limiting horizontal
to or widely believed to possess nuclear weapons: proliferation12 will limit the number of potential
the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea nuclear conflict scenarios, and is highly likely to
and Israel7. Various scenarios of intentional use are reduce the overall risk level.
currently imaginable, but nuclear weapons could also The risk of accidental use depends largely on
be released by accident, and trigger an inadvertent the systems in place to launch missiles. Hundreds
nuclear war as almost happened a number of times of nuclear weapons are currently in a state of high
since 19458. readiness, and could be released within minutes of
In addition to their destructive effect at the point an order13. Building in longer decision making time
of impact, nuclear explosions may cause what is and broader consultation would reduce the risk
known as a nuclear winter9, where clouds of dust of unauthorized launches or accidental launches
and sulphates released by burning materials obscure based on misperception or false alarms.
the sun and cool the planet for months or years. Increased awareness and understanding of the
According to one model, an all-out exchange of 4,000 grave effects that nuclear weapons have on human
nuclear weapons, in addition to the enormous loss of life, economic infrastructure, governance, social
lives and cities, would release 150 teragrams of smoke, order and the global climate, would motivate
leading to an 8 degree drop in global temperature for efforts to avoid such catastrophic harm to our
a period of 4 to 5 years10, during which time growing societies14.
food would be extremely difficult. This would likely
initiate a period of chaos and violence, during which
most of the surviving world population would die
from hunger.
NUCLEAR SECURITY
The production of a nuclear weapon requires
rare materials, whose production in turn requires
sophisticated machinery15. This limits the risk of
proliferation. However, stocks of those materials exist
in countries that possess nuclear weapons, and their
storage conditions raise security concerns. In addition,
nuclear technology used for civilian purposes energy
production and medical use principally yields materials
that could be used for destruction, in the form of a so
called dirty bomb spreading radioactive materials over
a large radius16. If they were to appropriate nuclear
materials, sub-national groups could target a major
urban centre and, depending on the type of bomb
used, cause hundreds or thousands of deaths, and
contaminate an area for decades17. Although it is highly
improbably that this scenario would escalate to a global
nuclear war, it could have a major disruptive effect on
social and economic systems18.

NUCLEAR WARFARE
PROBABILITY CLOSE CALLS

OVER TIME The most dangerous nuclear war scenarios may be
those resulting from an accident or misperception. Close
When we hear that the probability of a global nuclear calls have occurred a number of times since 1945.
war is estimated to be no more than 1%, 0.1% or 0.01%
every year, this may sound reassuringly low but how does
this compound over time? Lets imagine that you flip a coin During the Cuban missile crisis, in October 1962, the
exactly once every year. What is the probability that no sin- United States targeted a Soviet submarine that carried
gle coin flip will fall on heads in a certain amount of years? nuclear weapons. Two of the three Soviet officers wanted
Over the course of one year the probability is 50%. Over to launch nuclear weapons in response. The procedures
two years, it goes down to 25%, 12.5% over three years, required agreement between all three. Vasili Arkhipov, the
6.25% over four years, and so on along an exponential third officer, refused, potentially averting nuclear war.
curve. Using the same logic, if there was a 99.9% probabi-
lity that we wont have a global nuclear war in a given year, In September 1983, a Soviet satellite detected five missiles
this number goes down along a similar exponential curve directed at the Soviet Union. The officer on duty, Stanislav
to just above 99% over the course of a decade, and about Petrov, had minutes to decide whether this was a false
90.5% over a century or a 9.5% probability that a global alarm. Procedure would have required him to alert his
nuclear war would occur. superiors but, on gut instinct, he reported the incident as
However, two elements challenge this purely logical a false alarm. Investigations later revealed that reflections
model. First, the reasoning presupposes that probability of the sun on the top of clouds had been mistaken for
remains stable over time, which is empirically unlikely. nuclear rockets.
In the case of nuclear war, for instance, the absence
of any incident might increase the sense of safety, In September 1983, a Soviet satellite detected five
leading to relaxed security measures, and a missiles directed at the Soviet Union. The officer
greater probability that an incident would occur. on duty, Stanislav Petrov, had minutes to decide
Second, risk estimates are often contentious whether this was a false alarm. Procedure
to start with, and our understanding of Todays more would have required him to alert his superi-
interconnected causal chains decreases powerful nuclear ors but, on gut instinct, he reported the inci-
95%
over time. This is why probabilities are dent as a false alarm. Investigations later
weapons will cause up to
typically given as a bracket rather than revealed that reflections of the sun on
a single number acknowledging the top of clouds had been mistaken
that all predictions about the future for nuclear rockets.
include margins of uncertainty
but that we can, nonetheless, Similar close call in the future
produce educated estimates. have the potential to trigger a
global nuclear war19.
fatalities within a radius of 1 to 4 km
from their point of detonation, and very
severe damage for up to six times as far.

GOVERNANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Governance of nuclear weapons
S
tates currently manage the risks associated when suspicions arose about its possible pursuit of
with nuclear weapons through a range of nuclear weapons. After intense negotiations, the Joint
measures that, together, have prevented Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed in 2015, provides
world-wide spread, but not significantly for continuous monitoring by the IAEA of Irans
reduced the risk. civilian nuclear program so that no nuclear weapons
The pillar of nuclear military strategy is deterrence, are developed.
whereby nuclear-armed states threaten to retaliate The difficulties of enforcing the NPT when countries
against other states that could use nuclear weapons do not wish to cooperate are illustrated by the case
against them. This doctrine is considered to be an of North Korea. North Korea withdrew from the NPT
effective way of discouraging the use of nuclear in 2003, as was its right under international law the
weapons. The fact that no nuclear weapons have been Treaty being voluntary and has since conducted five
used in any conflict since 1945 also suggests that an or six nuclear weapons tests. Despite international
emerging moral norm may play a role in preventing pressure, including economic sanctions, North Korea
their use. continues its program.
Beginning with the US-Soviet treaty in 1963 to ban
atmospheric testing, US-Soviet/Russian bilateral Nuclear weapons programs are conducted with
treaties and agreements have stabilized and reduced utmost secrecy, and do not permit democratic
arsenals from a high of 68,000 in the late 1980s to participation in policymaking. Yet, public protests in
some 14,000 today. As important, the 1970 Nuclear the United States and Europe from the 1950s through
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has prevented the the 1980s have raised awareness about risks and
development of nuclear weapons in all countries pressured governments to curtail nuclear weapons
beyond the original five (United States, Soviet Union/ programs. Recently, an international humanitarian
Russia, United Kingdom, France and China) with the movement spurred by major nongovernmental
exception of India, Pakistan, North Korea, and probably organizations encouraged non-nuclear weapons states
Israel. In fact, 25 to 40 governments have willingly to introduce a UN treaty banning all nuclear weapons.
given up their nuclear weapons programs, including Not since the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970
South Africa, Libya, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. have states taken such dramatic and collective action
Others, such as Canada, Brazil, and Argentina, have to prohibit possession of nuclear weapons. More than
contemplated programs but not embarked on them, in 130 countries are debating the treaty with the aim of
keeping with their responsibilities under the NPT. reaching consensus by July 2017. Meanwhile, in states
that are boycotting the negotiations,
The UN Security Council, whose permanent members legislators and citizens are
include the five recognized nuclear weapons states, pressuring foreign ministers
enforces the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in to explain why they are not
partnership with the International Atomic Energy participating. By adopting
Agency (IAEA). Although the IAEA was established the treaty, the majority
primarily to promote and oversee the development of of nations will declare
civilian nuclear power, under Article III of the NPT, that nuclear deterrence
the IAEA is entrusted with verifying adherence to the is no longer acceptable in
Treaty by all the parties. Parties to the NPT regularly international relations, further
report to the IAEA about the means used to safeguard stigmatizing their use and
and secure enriched uranium used in civilian power reducing the risks of catastrophe.
plants, as well as steps to prevent the use of nuclear
materials for nuclear bombs.
Several states have not complied with their NPT
obligations and faced penalties from the international
community. Iraq embarked on a nuclear weapons
program, but after nuclear bomb technology was READ MORE
about new models
discovered in 1991, the program was destroyed by KENNETTE BENEDICT of nuclear war risk
assessment on
a special UN Security Council-mandated force. Senior Advisor, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists p. 53
International economic sanctions were applied to Iran

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE
RAYMOND ANGELA KANE
ZILINSKAS
Biological and
chemical warfare
HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW? WHAT ARE KEY FACTORS
Unlike nuclear weapons, which require rare AFFECTING RISK LEVELS?
materials and complex engineering, biological Global frameworks controlling research on
and chemical weapons can be developed at a chemical or biological weapons including revised
comparatively low cost20, placing them within strategic trade controls on potentially sensitive
the reach of most or all states as well as organized dual-purpose goods, technology and materials,
non-state actors. Chemical and biological weapons biological and chemical safety and security
carry various levels of risk. Toxic chemicals could be measures, as well as an ongoing commitment and
aerosolized or placed into water supplies, eventually capacity to enforce disarmament and arms control
contaminating an entire region. Biological weapons conventions24.
possess greater catastrophic potential, as released The number of laboratories researching
pathogens might spread worldwide, and cause a potential pandemic pathogens for military or
pandemic. civilian purposes, and the public availability of
Recent developments in synthetic biology and dangerous information circulating for scientific
genetic engineering are of particular concern21. The purposes, increase the level of risk25.
normal evolution of most highly lethal pathogens Further developments in synthetic biology
ensures that they will fail to spread far before killing and genetic engineering lowering skill levels and
their host. Technology, however, has the potential to costs to modify existing pathogens or to develop
break this correlation, and create both highly lethal new pathogens which, in turn, may significantly
and highly infectious agents22. Such pathogens could increase biological risks to society26.
be released accidentally from a lab, or intentionally
released in large population centres23. Current trends
towards more open knowledge sharing can both
contribute to and mitigate such risks.

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS: AN RECENT USAGE

UNRAVELLING CONSENSUS? Though their production and use is
banned by International conventions,
Deadly agents like sulphur mustard were used during and
biological and chemical weapons have
between the World Wars, but the horrific results of such attacks
been used at least on four occasions in
eventually led to a global consensus to ban toxic chemical
the last forty years, three times in war,
weapons, the most widely-used and easily proliferated weapon of
and once in an act of terrorism:
mass destruction27.
Rhodesia, late 1970s: cholera, anthrax,
This consensus, however, represented by the near-universal
epidemic typhus and typhoid fever
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is under strain.
pathogens were released in water supplies
The Syrian Civil War has resulted in well-documented and
used by guerillas.
indiscriminate uses of various deadly toxic chemicals against
the civilian population, most recently in Khan Sheikhoun on 4
Iraq-Iran, 1980-1988: mustard gas used in
April28. The Khan Sheikhoun attack resulted in at least 85
trench warfare killed 20,000 and affected
victims including some 20 children dying from the deadly
100,000. In March 1988, poison gas
nerve agent Sarin (or sarin-like compound). Though the risk
killed between 3,200 to 5,000 people in
may always exist from easily available dual-use chemicals, and
Halabja and injured 7,000 to 10,000 more.
from terrorists like the Aum Shinrikyo, which perpetrated the
Thousands have since died prematurely of
Tokyo attack in 1995, there is a global risk that the hard-won
the after-effects. Others continue to receive
consensus on banning state-use of toxic chemicals will be further
medical treatment and/or remain under
weakened29. This could lead to the devastating return of more
periodic medical observation and care.
advanced toxic chemical weapons of mass destruction in any
potential large-scale conflict in the future, as well as long-term
Japan, March 1995: Sarin gas released on
changes in how states understand the development, evaluation
trains in Tokyo by the Aum Shinrikyo cult
and use of non-standard chemical substances (substances
killed 12 people, and severely injured 50.
other than deadly substances like sarin) for domestic riot
control purposes, counter-terrorism operations, international
Syria, 2012 2017: Sarin and chlorine gas
peacekeeping operations, and as a mechanism to maintain a
attacks have been recurring and are still
standby offensive chemical weapons capability.
ongoing. The most lethal attack killed 837
people in August 2013, another killed up to
100 on April 201730.

GOVERNANCE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Governance of chemical
and biological weapons
B
iological and chemical and biosecurity, but implementation
weapons are banned by is voluntary.
two international treaties:
the Biological Weapons Under the BWC, complaints can be
Convention (BWC) of lodged with the UN Security Council
1975, with 178 State Parties, and the which can investigate them but
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) no complaint has ever been made,
of 1997, with 189 State Parties. In both and enforcement mechanisms do not
cases, dual-use creates a particular exist. The CWC includes a provision
difficulty: the same chemicals and for challenge inspections in case of
biological agents can be applied for suspected chemical weapons use
beneficial purposes, or serve as the but again, it has never been invoked,
core components of deadly weapons. not even in the case of Syria, though
The CWC, negotiated with doubts about a chemical weapons
participation of the chemical program are regularly debated at
industry, defines a chemical weapon the Security Council. Over the last
by its intended purpose, rather than three and a half years, 28 visits by the
lethality or quantity. It allows for Declaration Assessment Team have
stringent verification of compliance: not been able to clarify discrepancies
acceding to the CWC means and determine if Syrias declaration is
mandatory destruction of all declared accurate and complete. Additionally,
chemical weapons as well as their the security context and shifting
production sites to be subsequently territorial control present significant
verified by appointed inspectors. challenges in ensuring that prohibition
The BWC is less prescriptive, which is fully implemented within the
results in ambiguities and loopholes. country. In case of alleged use of
Research is permitted under the chemical or biological weapons in
Convention, but it is difficult to tell countries not party to the conventions
the difference between legitimate like Syria in 2013 investigations
and potentially harmful biological can be requested through the UN
research. States are required to Secretary-Generals Mechanism
destroy or to divert to peaceful for Investigation of Alleged Use of
purposes their biological weapons, Chemical and Biological Weapons,
but no agreed definition of a concluded in 1988.
biological weapon exists. In addition,
there is no secretariat to monitor Only four countries are not State
and enforce implementation, except Parties to the CWC (Egypt, Israel,
for a small support unit in Geneva, North Korea and South Sudan). The
and no mechanism exists to verify highest concern among those is North
destruction or diversion, despite Korea, said to possess large quantities
efforts since 1991 to include legally- of chemical weapons which could
binding verification procedures in be sold or traded to unscrupulous
the BWC. Some lesser steps have non-State actors. It also needs to be
been taken, including confidence- mentioned that neither the United
building measures on which State States nor Russia have destroyed their
Parties are to report each April, and large chemical arsenal, due to the
management standards on biosafety cost and environmental challenges

GOVERNANCE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
of chemical disposal. Both countries global travel increases, could quickly

requested extensions of the deadlines have a regional or even global impact.
imposed by the Organisation for the Terrorists could contaminate the water
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, yet supply or release deadly bacteria, but
the existence of large stocks remain it is also possible that the lack of lab
a risk. safety could result in the inadvertent
In the 55 years since the BWC release of a virus or disease. The first
was negotiated, rapid advances in step towards a solution would be
biotechnology have been made, which to acknowledge the seriousness of
challenge our current governance the situation. But leadership is also
models. The pharmaceutical and needed to place this issue at the right
medical industries possess the tools place on the global agenda, and may
and knowledge to develop biological come from the UN Security Council,
weapons, and the Internet spreads the G7 or the G20, coalitions of
this know-how to those who might use government and industry bodies, civil
it for nefarious purposes. Biological society groups, or one or more nations
threats do not respect borders and, as acting as global champions.
ANGELA KANE
Senior Fellow, Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; visiting Professor,
Sciences Po Paris; former High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations

CATASTROPHIC CLIMATE CHANGE
Catastrophic climate change

WHAT IS AT STAKE? remain a one-third probability of climate change in
Discussions of climate change typically focus excess of 3C and we are presently not on track to
on low- to mid-range scenarios, with temperature meet the pledges.
increase of 1C to 3C1. These would have severe
consequences, with potentially devastating effects The Earths climate is impacted by the
on the environment and human societies. However, concentration of certain gases in the atmosphere,
there is also a non-negligible and less often known as greenhouse gases, the most important
considered tail-end risk that temperatures might being carbon dioxide and methane. As a result of
rise even further, causing unprecedented loss of human activity since the Industrial Revolution, the
landmass and ecosystems2. Even in mid-range atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases
scenarios, entire ecosystems would collapse, much generally expressed as the number of greenhouse
agricultural land would be lost, as would most gas molecules per million or PPM are at their
reliable freshwater sources, leading to large-scale highest level for hundreds of thousands of years6.
suffering and instability3. Major coastal cities New Scientists had demonstrated an approximately
York, Shanghai, Mumbai would find themselves linear relationship between the total amount
largely under water4, and the populations of low- of greenhouse gases emitted and the resulting
lying coastal regions currently more than a billion temperature increase7. However, there is now also
people5 may need to be relocated. In high-end a scientific consensus that climate change is a
scenarios, the scale of destruction is beyond our non-linear phenomenon where tipping points play
capacity to model, with a high likelihood of human a determining role8. When warming rises above a
civilization coming to an end. certain level, self-reinforcing feedback loops set
in, and the concentration of greenhouse gases
HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW? increases rapidly9.
The Earths climate is impacted by the Although precise thresholds and exact scenarios
concentration of certain gases in the atmosphere, remain uncertain, we know that the level of risk
known as greenhouse gases, the most important increases with the rise in temperature10. The
being carbon dioxide and methane. As a result of emissions pledge pathway negotiated at the Paris
human activity since the Industrial Revolution, the conference has a probability of over 90% to exceed
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases 2C, and only a likely (>66%) chance of remaining
generally expressed as the number of greenhouse below 3C this century11. In other words, even if
gas molecules per million or PPM are at their current commitments were kept, there would
highest level for hundreds of thousands of years6. remain a one-third probability of climate change in
Scientists had demonstrated an approximately excess of 3C and we are presently not on track to
linear relationship between the total amount meet the pledges.
of greenhouse gases emitted and the resulting
temperature increase7. However, there is now also
a scientific consensus that climate change is a
non-linear phenomenon where tipping points play
a determining role8. When warming rises above a
certain level, self-reinforcing feedback loops set After years of effort and considerable
in, and the concentration of greenhouse gases
resources devoted to airplane safety, we
increases rapidly9.
Although precise thresholds and exact scenarios have reached a point where 27 planes
remain uncertain, we know that the level of risk crash on average every year. If dying in a
increases with the rise in temperature10. The flight accident was as likely as a 3C global
emissions pledge pathway negotiated at the Paris
conference has a probability of over 90% to exceed
temperature increase, then the number of
2C, and only a likely (>66%) chance of remaining people dying in airplanes every year would
below 3C this century11. In other words, even if be 15,000,00012.
current commitments were kept, there would

Reviewed by
LEENA
SRIVASTAVA
AT 3C
If climate change was to reach 3C, most of Bangladesh and
Florida would drown, while major coastal cities Shanghai,
Lagos, Mumbai would be swamped, likely creating large
flows of climate refugees. Most regions in the world would see a
significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of
extreme weather events, whether heat waves, floods or storms13.
This likely scenario for a 3C rise does not take into account the
considerable risk that self-reinforcing feedback loops set in when
a certain threshold is reached, leading to an ever increasing rise
in temperature. Potential thresholds include the melting of the
arctic permafrost releasing methane into the atmosphere, forest
dieback releasing the carbon currently stored in the Amazon
and boreal forests, or the melting of polar ice caps that would no WHY ICE
longer reflect away light and heat from the sun.
MATTERS?
The Arctic region, mostly consisting
of oceans, is covered with an ice sheet
CITIES FACING THE HIGHEST RISK spanning about 14.4 million km , or
approximately half the size of Africa16. Ice
FROM COASTAL FLOODING is reflective, and therefore absorbs less of
the suns heat and energy. When it melts
Coastal cities are at particular risk from climate change, in under the effect of climate change, to be
developed and developing countries alike. This is of particular relevance replaced with open ocean, the amount of
as 1 billion people are currently estimated to live in coastal areas, lower solar radiation reflected back to space is
than 20m above sea level, many of them in Asia14. reduced, and the result is further warming
of the planet17.
According to one study, taking the absolute estimated value of
potential losses as a basis, the following cities face the highest risk from
coastal flooding by 2050: Large quantities of water are also
currently stored in frozen form on
SA am
land most of it over Greenland,

, U etn
Antarctica, and in mountain ranges as

ns Vi
r
glaciers. It is predicted that approxi-

m , C do
4. ka Ind na
ea ty,
SA na
mately 1 meter of sea level rise from

a
i
Ko bai , Ch
. N i M SA
M he cu
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the melting of land ice is currently

in
6. nz l, E
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h
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u
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ew Ch
unavoidable, but things could get

um ho
k
i
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,
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z
worse18. If the entire Greenland ice

t
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sheet was to melt, it could potentially

ia
e
l
o
u
M
G
raise the worlds oceans by more

1.
2.
3.
7.
8.
9.
than 6 meters. If all the ice currently

standing on land and at the poles
The risk of climate change for coastal cities can be measured in
melted, at current estimates, sea
multiple ways. If we were to consider the increase in the level of risk,
levels would rise by more than 65
which may catch a city unprepared and cause sudden catastrophe, then,
meters19, flooding much of the plan-
according to the same study, Alexandria, Barranquilla, Naples, Sapporo,
ets inhabited land on all continents.
and Santo Domingo face the greatest danger15.
DISPLACEMENT DUE
TO CLIMATE CHANGE
An important effect of climate change is an increase in the frequency and magnitude of extreme weather events - floods
and storms principally - that affect the built environment, access to drinking water and other resources to support daily life, as
well as social structures, and often result in the displacement of populations. Although precise attributions of causality can be
complex, there is significant quantitative and qualitative data on past displacement associated with natural hazards and disasters.
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centres 2015 Global Estimates report, since 2008, an average of 26.4 million
people per year have been displaced from their homes by disasters brought on by natural hazards, 85% of those weather
related. This is equivalent to one person displaced every second.24

WHAT ARE KEY FACTORS

AFFECTING RISK LEVELS?
Climate change is a complex phenomenon affected
by many factors. We may classify them into four
categories to better discern the various areas where
action is possible:
The risk is directly related to the release of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere through
human activity. Carbon dioxide mainly results
from the burning of fossil fuels for energy and
transport. In turn, this is a factor of population
growth and unsustainable production and
consumption models20. As to methane emissions,
they largely relate to large-scale animal farming,
driven by demand for meat, wool and dairy.
Some ecosystems store large amounts of carbon,
particularly forests and coastal marine ecosystems21,
and their destruction could result in the large-scale
release of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
The third factor is our capacity for global
coordination to reduce emissions. This may be
positively impacted by a better understanding of
tail-end climate risk and climate tipping points,
increasing the sense of urgency and prompting
faster action22.
Finally, the risk of catastrophic climate change
is increased by insufficient knowledge and
understanding of impacts and vulnerability, in
turn affecting our ability to build resilience.

CIVILIZATIONS LOST TO CLIMATE CHANGE

History records at least three hydraulic cities, with a sophisticated In all three instances, climate
instances of past civilizations system for irrigation to ensure change was local, its cause was
collapsing under the local effects optimal water reserves for the independent from human action,
of climate change. populations growing needs. In the and the civilizations affected could
14th and 15th centuries, decades of not anticipate the change in their
Norse Viking settlers arrived and severe drought struck, interspersed natural environment. The global
thrived in Greenland during the with violent monsoon floods, nature of the climate change risk we
medieval warm period (800-1200 bringing about political and social face today bodes ill for humanity.
AD). When a period of cooling unrest which eventually led to the If our civilization collapses on
known as the Little Ice Age began empires collapse26. this planet, there is currently no
in the early 14th century, it became alternative location where humanity
increasingly difficult to farm. By From 3300 to 1700 BC, the Indus may thrive. However, scientific and
the middle of the 16th century, the Valley Civilization developed technological developments have
changing climate had contributed sophisticated infrastructure and made us more aware both of the
to the Vikings deserting their urban planning, and the population risk we face, and of our influence
settlements and moving on to is estimated to have reached over on it. As a result, for the first time
warmer lands25. 5 million. A 200-year drought that in history, we are in a position to
began around 2000 BC made reduce and possibly avoid the risk
The Khmer Empire flourished from agriculture unsustainable, and cities of civilization collapse due to climate
802 to 1431. Its capital of Angkor were gradually abandoned27. change.
Wat was one of the most ancient
CLIMATE CHANGE LONG TAIL23

40%
35%
30%
Probability density
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0% <10%
o o o o o o o o o o o
0C 1C 2C 3C 4C 5C 6C 7C 8C 9C 10 C
Eventual global average warming based on passing 700 ppm CO2e.

THE GOVERNANCE OF CATASTROPHIC CLIMATE CHANGE
Governance of catastrophic
climate change
T
he challenge of climate Scientific assessments undertaken
change has been by IPCC have emphasised the need
defined as a super- to limit global average temperature
wicked problem. It increase to below 2C, but also
needs urgent responses. covered a range of likely scenarios
It needs those responsible to accept up to a 6C increase and beyond.
responsibility, and provide solutions Political negotiations, however,
and support. It requires aspects have consistently disregarded the
of sovereignty to be ceded to an high-end scenarios that could lead
international body, or that wide- to abrupt, irreversible or runaway
ranging powers be conferred to a climate change. This was despite
central body at the national level. scientific evidence that risks
And it carries perverse incentives to associated with tipping points
push action into the future28. increase disproportionately as
temperature increases between 12C
Despite these complexities, additional warming and become
international negotiations to address high above 3C29.
the challenge of climate change Thus, in the lead up to and during
have been underway since the UN the Paris negotiations, the focus
Conference on Environment and was on ensuring that temperature
Development at Rio in 1992, and increases remained well below
under the aegis of the UN Framework 2C30. Pessimism relating to the
Convention on Climate Change ability to meet the 2C goal could
(UNFCCC) since 1994. The first have led to lower ambition in
protocol on climate change the global commitments, delays in
Kyoto Protocol was adopted at mitigation efforts, and exponentially
the third Conference of the Parties higher costs of subsequent
(COP) to the UNFCCC in 1997. Since adaptation actions. Unfortunately,
then, negotiations have continuously accompanying adaptation options
evolved to culminate in the Paris and response measures too, although
Agreement at the 21st COP in less scientifically robust, were
December 2015. limited to this ambitious, highly
The task of comprehensively uncertain, scenario of remaining
assessing the relevant science was under 2C increase. As such, despite
given to the Inter-governmental the fact that the current pathways
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). offer a greater than 50% chance
IPCCs first assessment report was of exceeding the 2C guardrail,
published in 1990, and it has since the world is currently completely
been regularly assessing the growing unprepared to envisage, and even
body of literature on impacts, less deal with, the consequences of
vulnerability and mitigation options catastrophic climate change.
for climate change. Governments The Sendai Framework for
have a key role in nominating Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-
authors and approving texts. 2030), which was the outcome of
These assessments have had a key inter-governmental negotiations
influence on the global negotiation supported by the UN Office for
processes. Disaster Risk Reduction at the

Reviewed by
OWEN
GAFFNEY
A GLOBAL CARBON LAW ROADMAP

TO MAKE PARIS GOALS A REALITY33
The Paris Agreement on climate commits countries of thumb analogous to Moores Law in the IT sector, of
to aim to keep global average temperature increase halving emissions every decade to reach around zero
well below 2C based on the best available science. On by 2050, turn carbon sources to sinks and develop new
24 March 2017, an international team of researchers carbon sinks. This is explained in the graphs below. The
published a roadmap for rapid decarbonisation that researchers pointed out that, in terms of renewable
reduces the risk of Earth passing the 2C threshold. The energy, the world is currently on a good exponential
analysis can be summarised as a Carbon Law, a rule trajectory to decarbonise by 2050.
Decarbonization pathway consistent with the Paris agreement
40 800
800
Cumulative global anthropogenic CO2

emissions from 2017 onward (GtCO2)
40
30
30
600
600
20
20 400
400
10
10 200
200
00 00
Annual global CO2 emissions (GtCO2/yr)
-10
- 10
- 20
-20
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
Anthropogenic CO2 removals

o
Limiting warming below 2 C with 66% probability Land use and land-use change
o
Limiting warming below 1,5 C with 50% probability Engineering CO2 sink (BECCS)
Anthropogenic CO2 emissions (gross) Biosphere carbon sink

Fossil fuel and industry Land carbon sink
Land use and land-use change Ocean carbon sink
Whiskers on total sinks: the 90% range of modeled uncertainties

FOSSIL FUEL PHASE OUT34

Globally, primary energy installation has been doubling in capacity every 5-6 years for a
decade. If this doubling pace continues, the world will be 100% powered by renewables by
2050. We need to go beyond linear thinking to think exponentially about the carbon challenge.
Period of doubling (years)

33 44 5 5 66 77 88 99 10
10
100
100
Hydro
90
90 Nuclear
80
80
Gas
Renewables
70
70
Share of primary enargy (%)
60
60
Constant rates of doubling:
50
50
Oil every 5,4 years
40
40
Linear increase of annual gains
30
30
Constant annual gains
20
20
Coal
10
10 2005: 2015:
2,8%
00 0,8%
2000
2000 2010
2010 2020
2020 2030
2030 2040
2040 2050
2050 2060
2060 2070
2070 2080
2080 2090
2090 2100
2100
GLOBAL CARBON LAW

GUIDING DECADAL PATHWAYS35
The three components of the Carbon Law: halve
fossil fuel emissions every decade, reduce land-use
related emissions, ramp up carbon storage solutions.
40
40
35
35
CO2 removal (GtCO2/yr)
Global CO2 emissions
30
CO2 emissions from
30
land use (GtCO2/yr)
25
25
GtCO2/yr
20
20
15
15
10
10
55
00
2020 2030 2040 2050
2020 2030 2040 2050

behest of the UN General Assembly,

adopted in March 2015, could have CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS
addressed itself specifically to the One central method to assess the expected increase of average global
risks emanating not just from the temperatures is the development of climate change scenarios. Those
aspirational 2C scenario but the scenarios are descriptions of alternative futures, where total greenhouse
gas emissions and the resulting global temperature increase are projected
almost equally likely scenario of
on the basis of various socio-economic factors affecting emission levels,
tending towards a 3C to 4C world. including population growth, economic activity, technological change, as
Instead, it generically limited well as governance and cultural values. These scenarios typically compare
itself to be within the mandate the anticipated effects of various parameters particularly the anticipated
effects of various changes in policy settings with a business-as-usual
of the United Nations Framework
situation, and play an important part in both policy development and
Convention on Climate Change climate change negotiations, on a national and global level36.
under the competences of the Parties
to the Convention.
The Paris Agreement came

into force in October 2016, with
national pledges falling woefully
short setting the world on a
3.6C temperature increase track37.
Although climate change action has
now become part of mainstream
economic and social strategies,
and is one of the Sustainable
Development Goals, too little
emphasis is put on the risk of
catastrophic climate change.
READ MORE
about climate
LEENA SRIVASTAVA tipping points on
p. 56
Vice Chancellor, TERI University, New Delhi

ECOLOGICAL COLLAPSE
Ecological collapse
WHAT IS AT STAKE? Scholars describe the current historical moment
Ecosystems are the foundation for human as the start of a new geological era, called the
life. They perform a range of functions, generally Anthropocene11, where humans as the predominant
referred to as environmental services, without which agent of change at the planetary level change the
human societies and economies could not operate nature of nature itself. Since the mid 1950s, many
at their current level1. We depend on the services elements that ensure the habitability of the planet,
they provide for air, water, food, shelter and energy. whether greenhouse gas concentration, forested areas
Local ecological collapse may have caused the end or the health of marine ecosystems, are degrading at
of a civilization on Easter Island2. More recently, an accelerating pace12. In 2009, an international group
ecological collapse in and around the Aral sea has of experts identified nine interconnected planetary
had dramatic social and economic consequences boundaries that underpin the stability of the global
for the region3. Ecosystems can tolerate a measure ecosystem, allowing human civilization to thrive13.
of impact from human use with no negative effects Research indicates that we have exceeded safe limits
an attribute generally known as resilience but for four of those, and are now operating in a high-
beyond a certain threshold, or tipping point, sudden, risk zone for biosphere integrity and biogeochemical
radical and sometimes irreversible disruption occurs. flows15. Unless we rapidly change trends and adopt a
Soil quality, freshwater supplies and biodiversity new sustainable paradigm, we are very likely to exceed
diminish drastically, while agricultural capacity all nine boundaries, and leave the safe operating
plummets and daily living conditions deteriorate ecological space where humanity has thrived.
significantly4. Displaced populations and the loss of
previous food sources add pressure to other areas, WHAT ARE KEY FACTORS
so that local disruption might escalate into the rapid AFFECTING RISK LEVELS?
and irreversible collapse of most ecosystems across The development and adoption of new
the Earth5, drastically compromising the planets technologies or production models that are less
capacity to support a large human population. resource-intensive and/or less polluting will
reduce the risk of ecological collapse, as will a
HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW? shift towards more sustainable lifestyles, more
Ecosystems are complex entities, which consist specifically changing consumption patterns,
of a community of living organisms in their non- possibly accompanied by behaviour change16.
living environment, linked together through flows of It is estimated that environmental services,
energy and nutrients. The behaviour of an ecosystem should their contribution to human well-being
is relatively stable over time, but when the balance
between some of its elements is altered beyond a
certain threshold, it can experience a non-linear,
possibly catastrophic transformation6. NAURU AN EXAMPLE OF
Human-induced factors that affect ecosystem
ECOLOGICAL COLLAPSE
vitality may be classified in the following manner: Nauru, a small island in the central Pacific, provides
a telling example of the risks and consequences of
changes in the balance of local biodiversity
ecological collapse. The mining of rich phosphate
caused by human intervention, in particular resources placed this island-nation among the wealthiest
as a result of introducing new species or in the world in the 1970s, but it resulted in a severe
overexploitation7 degradation of the islands ecosystem. Many key plant
and animal species are now either extinct or endangered,
alteration of the chemical balance in the
previously rich and abundant food sources such as
environment due to pollution8 pandanus fruits, almonds and noddy birds have been
modifications in the local temperatures and destroyed, and 40% of Naurus coastal marine life was
water cycle because of climate change9 devastated by run-off from the mines21. With no topsoil
left to restore a once thick tropical forest in the mined-
habitat loss, whether through destruction or
out island core, Nauruans are no-longer self-sufficient on
ecosystem fragmentation10. their island home22.

ECOLOGICAL COLLAPSE
MARIA PHILIP
IVANOVA OSANO
be calculated, would be worth more than twice as governance of ecosystems and trade, are of
much as the entire global GDP17. Integrating the particular importance, as many ecosystems do
valuation of ecosystems into economic decision not overlap with national boundaries, and trade is
making and employing robust environmental an important driver of ecosystem collapse19. This
accounting systems across businesses and national is an emerging area of global governance that is
economies would contribute to reducing the risk18. beginning to be applied, for instance, to assess the
Global governance mechanisms to preserve synergies and trade-offs among the Sustainable
ecosystems and reduce pollution, in particular Development Goals20.
more integrated approaches between the
PLANETARY BOUNDARIES
TE CHANGE
CLIMA
ITY NO
GR VE
TE LE
IN N
E T
ER
Ge ers
div
ne ity
IT
PH
tic
IE
OS
Fu
S
?
di nct
BI
ve io
rs na
ity l
STR
?
GE
ATO
AN
SPH
LAND-SYSTEM CH
ERIC
OZONE DEPLETION
?
DING
FR E
us
LOA
or
SH
ph
OL
os
OS
W
Ph
RE
AT
CA
ER
RI
HE
US
SP
Nitrogen
E
M
AT
BI N
OC IO
HE AT
MIC
AL F I DIFIC
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LOWS O CEAN A
In 2009, an international group of experts proposed a carries a high risk of sudden and irreversible environmental
framework of nine planetary boundaries that underpin change, which could make the planet less hospitable to
the stability of the global ecosystem, allowing human human life. The latest research indicates that, as a result of
civilization to thrive. Each of the nine identified boundaries is human activity, we have now exceeded the safe limits for four
characterized by thresholds or tipping points. Exceeding those of the nine identified planetary boundaries14.

GOVERNANCE OF ECOLOGICAL COLLAPSE
Governance of
ecological collapse
C
ontemporary ecological migratory species, trade in
risks are increasingly endangered species, desertification,
global in scale, scope, persistent organic pollutants,
and impact. Action to among others. The expectation is
address them, however, that when countries implement
has to be taken at both global and their obligations under the treaties,
national level. The environment the problems will be managed and
is a classic common good: all ultimately resolved. At the national
benefit from healthy ecosystems level, governments have established
and a pollution-free planet, while ministries and authorities to deal
extraction of natural resources and with environmental concerns,
pollution by some compromise the advocate for ecologically informed
benefit for many. decision making, and improve
national capacity.
A number of international States voluntarily create
institutions oversee monitoring, international agreements to govern
assessment, and reporting on their relations through legal
problem identification and responsibilities. There is, however,
implementation; they set standards, no overarching judicial system or
policies, and laws; and they support a coercive penal system that could
the development of institutional ensure effective enforcement of
capacity to address existing and these agreements. Breaches cannot
emerging problems at the national be sanctioned. Compliance and
level. Governments crafted the implementation have to be enticed
institutional architecture for rather than coerced. Environmental
managing global ecological risks agreements such as the 2015 Paris
in the 1970s with the creation Agreement, for example, are
of the anchor institution for the explicitly non-punitive: countries
global environment: the United face no penalties for not meeting
Nations Environment Program, now their commitments. Rather, they
known as UN Environment. Global are facilitative, as international
environmental conventions, also institutions commit to support
known as treaties or agreements, compliance and implementation.
are the main international legal
instrument for promoting collective Reporting is the fundamental
action toward managing ecological mechanism to entice and ensure
risk and staying within the safe implementation. National reports
planetary operating space. Their on progress in achieving global
number and membership has commitments are part of every
increased dramatically. agreement. National reporting,
About a dozen international however, is a challenge because of
treaties deal with global issues an inadequate reporting system
including climate change, land- that does not always cover the
system change, biosphere change, comprehensive nature of the issues,
and chemicals and waste. These lack of analysis of and feedback on
include the UN conventions on submitted reports, and low reporting
climate change, biodiversity, rates by countries.

MEMBERSHIP TO GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTIONS24
200
180
160
Number of state parties
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
CITES Ramsar CMS Basel UNFCCC
CBD UNCDD Rotterdam Stockholm
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER

OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS26
1500
Number of environmental agreements
1350
1200
1050
900
750 1972
Creation of UN
600 Environment
450
300
150
0
1860 1870 1880 1890 1990 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year

Enforcement mechanisms do In the run up to the 2015 Paris

not guarantee that international Agreement, the narrative around
commitments will be implemented, climate change changed from a story
and much less that problems will of sacrifice to a story of opportunity.
be solved. Countries, however, Companies, counties, and countries
care about reputation and can be saw the transformation to a low
influenced by ratings and rankings, carbon economy as desirable,
an approach to global performance inevitable, and irrevocable and
assessment that has come to be pledged to lead it. The commitments
known as scorecard diplomacy.27 of Ethiopia, Rwanda, or the
This form of soft power can shape Marshall Islands to development
national policies and outcomes as it that is both climate resilient and
goes beyond naming and shaming carbon neutral motivated other
to naming and acclaiming. It countries to embark on similarly
outlines actions that could lead ambitious pathways. By embracing
to better ranking, and enables the challenge of environmental
learning across peers. Scorecard preservation as an opportunity
diplomacy has proven effective in for the future, institutions and
national governance, corruption, individuals could support effective
human trafficking, environmental implementation of ambitious
democracy, and environmental proposals and create a community of
performance.28 change agents around the globe.
MARIA IVANOVA
Associate Professor of Global Governance and Director, Center for Governance and
Sustainability, University of Massachusetts Boston; Global Challenges Foundation Ambassador

PANDEMICS
Pandemics
WHAT IS AT STAKE?
In the 5th and 14th century, Plague epidemics spread
internationally and killed approximately 15% of the
global population over the course of a few decades1.
Systematic vaccination campaigns have allowed us
to eradicate two diseases that had affected humanity
for centuries, Smallpox in humans and Rinderpest
in animals, and two more diseases Guinea Worm
and Polio are close to being eradicated. Progress
in medical treatment and public health systems has
significantly reduced the prevalence and impact of
others, such as Malaria, Typhus and Cholera. However,
there remains a serious risk that the emergence of a
new infectious disease in humans could cause a major
outbreak, with particularly high mortality and rapid
spread in our densely populated, urbanized and highly
interconnected world.
HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW?

Catastrophic pandemics diseases with high
lethality that spread globally are extremely RISK FACTORS 2
disruptive, but very rare. Outbreaks of lethal Three main factors determine the potential danger
diseases that remain locally contained or of an outbreak:
1
pandemics with less acute effects on human Virulence: the ability of a micro-organism to
health are however more common, and can have damage human tissues and cause illness and
significant disruptive effects. death.
2
Outbreaks occur when a micro-organism virus,
Infection risk: the probability that a micro-
bacteria, parasite, etc. is able to spread across the organism will spread in a population. One key
population. At times and under certain conditions, factor is the means of transmission whether
such as failure of water or sanitation systems, an by blood, bodily fluids, direct contact with a lesion
outbreak is caused by a micro-organism known to such as a skin ulcer, or by aerosol in the air.
3
be circulating at low levels in human populations. Incubation period: the time between infection
At others, an outbreak is caused by a micro- and appearance of the first symptom(s). A
organism that has crossed the animal/human longer incubation period could result in a
species barrier to infect humans, and spreads to micro-organism spreading unwittingly, as in the case
of HIV. Conversely, a shorter incubation period, if the
new and more densely populated areas. If mutation infection is highly lethal, is less likely to be transmitted
occurs, virulence can increase or decrease. Mutation unwittingly, and can cause considerable disruption of
can also cause a micro-organism to transmit more social, economic and medical systems in a very short
easily from human to human. period of time. The disruption caused by a highly
lethal infection with a longer incubation period, such
as HIV, is of longer term consequence.
Ebola is a highly lethal infection with a short

incubation period but a relatively low infection rate,
which explains why most Ebola outbreaks to date
have been localized3. New developments in synthetic
biology, however, raise concern among certain
scientists that an engineered micro-organism both
highly virulent and with a high infection rate could
be released in the population whether by malice
or accident and cause an unprecedented outbreak,
possibly leading to the international spread of a
highly lethal infectious disease.

PANDEMICS
Reviewed by
DAVID
HEYMANN
WHAT ARE KEY FACTORS POSSIBLE SCENARIO

AFFECTING RISK LEVELS? In February 2003, an elderly woman ANTIBIOTICS
New micro-organisms affecting infected by the SARS virus travelled
AND BACTERIA
humans are more likely to arise from Hong Kong to Toronto. SARS Antibiotics have saved
millions of lives and
when environments with high is a highly infectious and often fatal
dramatically increased
levels of biodiversity are disrupted, pulmonary disease that emerged in lifespans since they were
so that humans or domesticated the Pearl River Delta, in China. The introduced in the 1940s8,
animals come into close contact infected woman died soon afterwards allowing us to contain
most bacterial infections
with other animal species that serve in Toronto, after inadvertently
and diseases. However,
as reservoirs for micro-organisms infecting over forty people, resulting more recently, as a result
not yet present in human in a localized outbreak. One of of random mutations,
populations4. Experts now consider those persons infected in Canada improper use of antibiot-
ics among humans and
this is likely to be the way that the went on a plane to the Philippines,
animals, and the build-
HIV-AIDS pandemic started5. where another outbreak occurred. up effects of evolution,
Infections are easier to contain Meanwhile, from Hong Kong, the virus some strains of bacteria
when they occur among small had also spread to Singapore, where have become resistant
to traditional antibiotics.
populations with limited it likewise caused an outbreak. The
These superbugs require
external contacts. Conversely, outbreaks that occurred around the alternative medications
dense urbanization and global world were eventually contained, after with more damaging side
interconnection strongly increases infecting over 8,000 people, of whom effects or, in the worst
cases, can no longer be
the risk of an infectious disease 774 died, through concerted public
treated effectively. Anti-
spreading internationally6. health action coordinated by the WHO. biotic-resistant bacteria
Access to healthcare and the broad Severe social and economic disruption currently kill an estimated
adoption of hygiene practices can occurred, and a similar scenario with 700,000 people each year
worldwide. That number
have a significant effect in reducing only minor variations a few more
is predicted to reach 10
the impact of a pandemic. The international contacts, a slightly longer million by 2050 if efforts
capacity to monitor a disease and incubation period for the virus, or a are not made to curtail
deploy very rapid containment early few more days of delay in deploying resistance or develop new
antibiotics9.
in the process also has a large impact strict containment measures, could
on the final number of deaths7. have a similar or even greater outcome.
THE 5 DEADLIEST PANDEMICS IN HISTORY 10
1. 165-180: the Antonine Plague 3. 1347-1351: The Black Death 4. 1918-1919: The Spanish Influenza
outbreak lasted for 15 years, killing caused the death of at least 75 is estimated to have killed more than
an estimated 5 million people. million from a global population of 50 million out of a global population
450 million with some estimates of 1.6 billion.
2. 541-542: the Plague of Justinian
putting the figure as high as 200
took 25 million lives, or about 13% 5. 1970s-present: HIV/AIDS, so far,
million deaths.
of the global population at the has killed more than 25 million
time. people.

PANDEMICS GOVERNANCE
Governance of pandemics
T
he World Health Organisation (WHO), health capacity, and to report the outcome of their
established in 1948 as a specialised assessment to the WHO. However, there is no
agency of the United Nations, is sanction for non-reporting, and many countries do
currently the global body in charge of not report.
governing the risk of pandemics. It does The revised IHR provide a decision tree which can
this mainly through a governance mechanism called be used by countries to determine whether a public
the International Health Regulations (IHR), the goal health event in their country has the potential
of which is to stop public health events that have for international spread, and should therefore be
the potential to spread internationally with minimal reported as a potential public health emergency
interference of travel and trade. The IHR first came of international importance (PHEIC). The WHO
into force in 1969, with an initial focus on four Director General then conducts a risk assessment.
infectious diseases Cholera, Plague, Yellow Fever For this, they can ask for a recommendation from
and Smallpox. an emergency committee set up under the auspices
Revised in 2005, the IHR now acknowledge of the IHR, and/or from other experts from around
that many more diseases than the four originally the world. If the Director General decides that the
covered may spread internationally, and that many event is a PHEIC, the WHO must provide emergency
cannot be stopped at international borders, as was recommendations aimed at curbing international
demonstrated by the spread of HIV in the 1980s and spread, and review those recommendations every
SARS in 2003. Emphasis is therefore placed now three months until the PHEIC has been declared
on the requirement that countries rapidly detect over.
and respond to outbreaks and other public health After the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa, an
events with potential to spread internationally. The external review of the revised IHR was conducted,
revised version of the IHR also includes a global and recommendations from that review are now
safety mechanism that calls for collaborative action being considered by
should a public health event be assessed as at risk of the World Health
spreading internationally. Assembly of the
WHO.
The governance of pandemics typically involves
collaboration between the WHO, ministries of health
and public health institutions. Some nations have
established Centres for Disease Control (CDC) whose
role is to monitor transmissible public health events.
Some of those, including the US CDC and Public
Health England, provide international support to
developing countries, helping them strengthen
their capacity to better detect and respond to public
health events. When an outbreak occurs, other
national institutions, hospitals in particular, play a
major role in early detection and containment.
The IHR are a binding agreement under
international law, and as such provide a framework
for national legislation and responsible national and
international action. But like all international law
and treaties, there is no enforcement mechanism.
Under the IHR, countries are required to
strengthen eight core capacities in public
health that are deemed necessary for rapid
detection of and response to a disease DAVID HEYMANN
Head and Senior Fellow, Centre on Global Health Security, Chatham House, Professor
outbreak. Each year countries are required of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine
to do a self-assessment of their core public

ASTEROID IMPACT
Reviewed by
TIM
SPAHR
Asteroid impact
WHAT IS AT STAKE? been estimated likely to enter in collision with the
Around 65 million years ago, an asteroid of about Earth6. Currently there are no known objects of any
10km in diameter struck Chicxulub in Mexico. This size for which we have well-computed orbits that are
impact probably caused one of the three largest predicted to have significant probability of hitting
mass extinctions in history, abruptly ending the Earth. However, after more than twenty years of
age of the dinosaurs1. Large asteroids still exist in survey, the current data for smaller objects of 140
orbits near the Earths and the impact of an asteroid meters up to 1 kilometer in size is only about 30%
bigger than 1 km in size would eject enough particles complete for the estimated total population. Further
into the atmosphere to dim the sun for a number of monitoring is required to properly establish risk
months2. The resulting cooling of the climate would levels. Although unlikely to directly cause a global
undermine ecosystems and global agriculture for catastrophe by cooling the climate, those smaller
at least an entire growing season, and could cause a objects could have significant local impact, and
famine leading to the death of hundreds of millions3. indirectly disrupt social and economic systems.
HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW? WHAT ARE KEY FACTORS

Asteroids are small rocks leftover from the AFFECTING RISK LEVELS?
formation of our solar system about 4.6 billion years It is technologically possible to identify whether
ago. Too small to be called planets, they revolve an asteroid is on a collision course with Earth
around the sun, typically along elliptical orbits. The long enough in advance, giving humanity time to
orbits of Earth and the asteroids can occasionally react. However, many asteroids have not yet been
intersect and result in collisions. spotted, and shorter reaction times would carry
The likelihood of asteroid-related risk is better higher risk. Enhanced effort to detect and monitor
understood than that of many other global asteroids would therefore decrease the risk7.
catastrophic risks because the underlying dynamics New technologies that could either deflect the
have been well understood for a very long time. trajectory of an asteroid or reduce its impact
Many asteroids have hit Earth in the past, and more would considerably reduce the overall risk level8.
will continue to do so. While smaller objects would Systematic monitoring has considerably reduced
have only local effects, larger ones could cause a the estimated risk of impacts from larger objects
global cooling resulting in large-scale disaster4. >1km that would significantly affect the climate.
On the basis of historical evidence, an asteroid However, to address the remaining risk, resilience
impact large enough to cause a global catastrophe is building, particularly the potential to rely on food
estimated likely to occur every 120,000 years5. sources less dependent on sunlight mushrooms,
In 2011, NASA held a press conference announcing insects, or bacteria could significantly reduce
that over 90% of objects larger than 1 km in diameter the death rate among humans9.
had now been discovered, and none of those has
THE 5 LARGEST ASTEROID IMPACTS ON EARTH
1 3 5
Vredefort Crater, South Africa Sudbury Basin, Canada Esti- Acraman Crater, Australia
Estimated impact date: 2 billion mated impact date: 1.8 billion Estimated impact date: 590
years ago. Worlds largest known years ago. Approximate diame- million years ago. Approximate
impact structure, with an approximate ter of 130km. diameter of 90km.
4
diameter of 160km.
Popigai Crater, Russia Esti- In more recent history, sources
2
Chicxulub Crater, Mexico Es- mated impact date: 35.7 million indicate that an asteroid impact may
timated impact date: 65 million years ago. Approximate diame- have caused the death of up to 10,000
years ago. Many researchers ter of 90km. people in the Chinese city of Qingyang
believe that this was the asteroid that in 149010, and an explosion generally
caused or contributed to the extinc- attributed to an asteroid impact de-
tion of the dinosaurs, with an approxi- stroyed 2000km2 of Taiga close to the
mate impact diameter of 150km. Tunguska River in Siberia in 1908.11

GOVERNANCE OF ASTEROID IMPACT
Governance of asteroid impact
T
here is currently a worldwide effort
underway to search the sky for Near-
Earth Objects (NEOs). While the bulk
of discoveries are made by ground-
based telescopes funded by the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and operated in the United States, other
recent discovery sites include Morocco, Brazil,
China and Japan. After an object is discovered,
follow up observations undertaken by dozens of
observatories around the world are collected to
perform precise orbital calculations, which in turn
allows analysis to quantify the risk. Should an
impact be predicted with sufficient warning time,
several techniques are being studied (both by the
NASA Planetary Defense Coordination Office and
the European Unions NEOShield-2 project) that
may allow successful deflection of an object away
from an impacting trajectory. Even if an impact is
imminent, evacuation of the impact zone would
allow people to escape harm if they are able to move
a sufficient distance, and if the size of the object is
such that only local damage is expected.
NASA is a signatory to the International Asteroid
Warning Network (or IAWN), and as such part of a
United Nations-endorsed effort established through
the work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (COPUOS) that currently includes
at least 10 different efforts around the world
focusing on asteroid defense, communication, and
education. Membership in the IAWN is non-binding
and voluntary but it enables data to be collected
worldwide, consolidated and analyzed, and the
resulting information is released to all UN COPUOS
member states.
The United States Congress has directed NASA

to find at least 90% of all asteroids larger than 140
meters whose orbits could lead to an impact with
Earth. NASA funds several survey teams in the On the basis
United States specifically to search for asteroids. of historical evidence,
NASA also funds the Minor Planet Center, which an asteroid impact large
serves as an international clearing house for enough to cause a global
asteroid-related data, as well as the JPL Center for catastrophe is estimated
NEO Studies, which computes high-precision orbits likely to occur every
120,000
and evaluates the impact hazard from each object.
NASA requires, as a condition for continued
funding, that all data and data products from
asteroid surveys and orbit computations be YEARS
made available in the public domain.

GOVERNANCE OF ASTEROID IMPACT
In other countries, surveys often operate on a

voluntary basis, with no binding mechanism to
force data submission to the MPC. However, as
the MPC is currently recognized as the worldwide
clearing house for asteroid data, and on the basis
of the International Astronomical Unions rules for
asteroid naming rights, the desire of all individuals
involved in contributing to the inventory of NEOs
tends to drive them to submit data for publication.
In the field of NEO discovery and tracking, there
are few if any non-formal mechanisms in place. A
few mailing lists support discussion of the subject,
as well as occasional meetings bringing together
members of the professional community with
enthusiast astronomers. The latter, often unpaid
amateurs, through the supply of observations,
support the research conducted mainly by
professional astronomers in the United States and,
to a somewhat lesser extent, in Europe.
TIM SPAHR
CEO of NEO Sciences, LLC, former Director of the Minor Planetary Center,
Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics

SUPERVOLCANIC ERUPTION
Reviewed by
STEPHEN
SPARKS
Supervolcanic eruption
WHAT IS AT STAKE? WHAT ARE KEY FACTORS
The eruption of the Toba supervolcano in AFFECTING RISK LEVELS?
Indonesia, around 74,000 years ago, ejected There is no current prospect of reducing the
billions of tonnes of dust and sulphates into the probability of a supervolcanic risk, but there may
atmosphere1. Experts estimate that it caused be ways to mitigate its impact9.
a global cooling of 3-5C for several years, and Improvements in the ability to identify volcanoes
led to devastating loss of plant and animal life2. with potential for future super-eruptions and
Some have argued that Toba caused the greatest predict eruptions will increase preparedness,
mass extinction in human history, bringing our and ensure that food stockpiles are available to
species to the brink of extinction3. Super-volcanic mitigate a temporary collapse of agricultural
eruptions are events in which at least 500 km3 systems.
of bulk material is expelled. Eruptions of such Resilience building, particularly the potential to
magnitude may happen at any time in the future, rely on food sources less dependent on sunlight
with catastrophic consequences. including mushrooms, insects and bacteria
could significantly reduce the death rate among
HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW? humans10.
In order to assess the likelihood of supervolcanic
eruptions, we have to rely on a relatively limited
set of past observations, which makes any
estimates very uncertain4. Existing data suggest
that a supervolcanic eruption will occur every
30,000- 50,0005 years on average with the last
known event occurring 25,000 years ago in New
Zealand6. We are currently unable to anticipate
volcanic eruptions beyond a few weeks or months
in advance, but scientists are monitoring a number
of areas, including Yellowstone in the US7, which
have been identified as potential sites of a future
supervolcanic eruption.
The impact of a supervolcanic eruption is directly
connected to the quantities of materials ejected
by the volcano. Dust and ashes will kill human
populations nearby and devastate local agricultural
activity. In addition, the release of sulphate and
ashes in the atmosphere will affect the amount of
solar energy reaching the surface of the planet and VOLCANIC ERUPTIONS
may lead to temporary global cooling8 and severe Volcanic eruptions are measured through a mag-
environmental effects. nitude scale, a logarithmic scale, ranging from 0 to
9, where each unit increase indicates an eruption
10 times greater in erupted mass11. At the top of
the scale, supervolcanic eruptions (M 8) release
more than 500 km3 of magma. By comparison,
the largest volcano eruption recorded in
human history, the 1815 Tambora eruption in
Indonesia, was a magnitude of about 7: 41km3
of magma was expelled12, claiming over 70,000
lives13. When Mount Vesuvius erupted in 79 AD,
devastating the Roman cities of Pompeii and
Herculaneum, it released approximately 4km3 of
magma, placing it at magnitude 614. More recently,
the May 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens in
Washington, USA, with just over 0.5km3 released,
was a magnitude 5.115.

GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC VOLCANIC ERUPTION
Governance of global
catastrophic volcanic eruption
M
onitoring volcanoes is largely working groups on many issues related to volcanic
a responsibility of national risk management. These activities are voluntary, so
institutions that operate Volcano the coverage of key issues on volcanic risk and its
Observatories, and work with governance can be uneven.
political authorities, civil
protection agencies and communities to manage Although super-eruptions are very infrequent
the risk. Over the past century, these institutions (perhaps one such event every 30,000 years), seen
have been set up in many countries to monitor through the lens of deep geological time they are
either a single volcano or multiple volcanoes: rather common, and so humanity will eventually
the World Organisation of Volcano Observatories experience one. Volcanoes with potential for future
lists 80 Volcano Observatories in 33 countries and super-eruptions either have a past record of super-
regions16, and plays a coordinating role among eruptions or have been long dormant. Known
them. In countries with infrequent eruptions and sites include volcanoes in the USA, Japan, New
no Volcano Observatory, national institutions Zealand and several south American countries,
responsible for natural hazards would be but identifying potential future sites of eruptions
responsible for monitoring the risk. with no previous record is significantly more
On an international scale, bilateral and challenging.
multilateral agreements support scientific The existing system provides an effective, though
investigation and volcanic risk management. These imperfect, structure to manage local volcanic
commonly involve developed nations (e.g. France, risk. Depending on the magnitude of the event,
Italy, Japan, New Zealand, UK and USA) supporting the system is likely to come under pressure and
developing nations. In particular, the Volcano prove inadequate in the event of a catastrophic
Disaster Assistance Program of the US Geological eruption with global reach. No organisation has a
Survey and the U.S. Agency for International specific mandate to address risk from super-
Development provide global support to developing eruptions. If one occurred in a
nations through training, donations of monitoring populated location, we could
equipment and assistance in responding to volcanic anticipate an immediate
emergencies at the invitation of governments. In major humanitarian
addition, an international network of nine Volcanic crisis, with overwhelmed
Ash Advisory Centres issues warnings of volcanic institutions and services,
ash eruptions into the atmosphere to protect and long term effects on
aviation, with world-wide coverage. Apart from the environment, climate,
those, there is no organization or institution that critical infrastructure,
has a mandate to manage volcanic risk on a global food security and global
scale. trade. Developing a global
More informal global coordination is achieved response plan under the
through voluntary international and regional auspices of a UN agency
organizations, networks and projects that and IAVCEI would be a
coordinate the sharing of scientific knowledge, good start to improve
technical expertise and best practice. The governance of this
International Association of Volcanology and global risk.
Chemistry of the Earths Interior (IAVCEI) is the
main scientific organization for volcanology with
a membership of over 1000, consisting both of
academics and Volcano Observatory staff. IAVCEI STEPHEN SPARKS
co-ordinates international commissions and Professor, School of Earth Sciences, University of Bristol

GEOENGINEERING
Reviewed by
JANOS
PASZTOR
Geoengineering
WHAT IS AT STAKE? drastic reduction of greenhouse
Two sets of new technologies gas emissions, but according to
known together as geo-engineering some estimates, solar radiation
now make it possible to manipulate management intended as an interim
the atmosphere in order to reduce solution could be deployed on its
climate risk1. The first set directly own for the relatively low sum of
removes carbon dioxide from the $10 billion per year4. The cost is low
atmosphere, and if emissions are enough that nation states, or even
eventually reduced to zero, may wealthy individuals or companies,
provide a lasting solution to climate could feasibly deploy this technology
change. The second, known as Solar unilaterally without properly taking
Radiation Management, reflect the into account the interests of others.
light and heat from the sun back This not only could lead to serious
into space, particularly through geopolitical tensions, but if side
the injection of sulphates or other effects prove to be negative, it also
particles into the stratosphere. Solar opens the relatively close prospect of
radiation management is now ready climatic chaos triggered by reckless
for testing, but along with hope, human intervention5.
it brings cause for concern that its
deployment could have dramatic WHAT ARE KEY FACTORS DRIVING
impacts on climate stability. IMPACT AND PROBABILITY?
Unless strong efforts on
HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW? greenhouse gas reduction
Solar radiation management are made, the chances that
is the only known technique for geoengineering technology will
quickly stopping or even reversing be deployed increase. Conversely,
the rise in global temperatures. geoengineering could present a
Although it does not solve the root serious moral hazard, and may
cause of climate change, it could lead countries to avoid emission
be used to manage temperatures abatement6.
during a period of transition, or Better understanding of the
provide insurance against a climate climate system will improve our
emergency2. However, we know very understanding of risks associated
little about the precise effects of the to geoengineering, and may lead to
technology, and geo-engineering considerably safer interventions7.
carries potentially considerable risks One important risk factor
in particular, it may destabilize is the potential for unilateral
local and global precipitation deployment, which better
patterns, or have other unexpected frameworks for global coordination
effects on the climate and various could reduce8.
elements of the global ecosystem.
In addition, we know that sudden
termination of solar radiation
management would lead to rapid
and severe global warming, with no
time for natural and social systems
to adapt3.
A complete geoengineering
intervention would require
considerable investment and involve

GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE
Governance of climate
geoengineering
T
here is at present on a 2008 decision (IX/16 C) that
no single unified limited use of ocean fertilization,
governance framework CBD parties further agreed in 2010
to manage risks to consider limiting all large-scale
associated with climate climate engineering activities
geoengineering, nor is there a that may affect biodiversity until
set of interrelated elements from such time that science-based,
different governance frameworks global, transparent, and effective
which, together, would be able global governance mechanisms
to comprehensively manage the are developed (decision X/33).
risk. More importantly, there is This decision was reconfirmed
no framework(s) at national or in 2016 at the Cancun meeting of
international levels where the risks the Conference of the Parties in
of climate geoengineering could be decision (XIII/14) which added to
addressed together with those of this corpus of internationally agreed
other climate interventions, such direction by specifying application
as mitigation and adaptation, as of a precautionary approach and
well as the risks of non-action, such suggesting the need for cross-
as continued high emissions of institutional and transdisciplinary
greenhouse gases. research and knowledge-sharing.
While multilateral actions usually
follow considerations and actions In parallel, the London Protocol
at the national level, in the case to the London Convention on
of climate geoengineering, most Ocean Dumping was amended in
of the governance elements have 2013 to create non-legally binding
transboundary dimensions, thus guidelines to assess proposals for
international and multilateral geoengineering research in the
arrangements will be key. Some ocean. Specifically, the amendments
aspects of existing national and provide criteria for assessment of
international environmental law are such proposals and set up a stringent
applicable to different components and detailed risk assessment
of climate geoengineering but framework. This framework could
not to the totality of any set of be extended to Solar Radiation
geoengineering technologies. Two Management technologies if taken
cases of existing governance at up in other relevant fora. These
international levels are, however, amendments already provide
particularly relevant to geo- a model for cross-institutional
engineering: one in the Convention cooperation, having been recognized
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and by the CBD as a model to guide
the other in the London Convention. Parties.
Both could open a path towards Decisions of Parties to conventions
better coordination. like the CBD or the London
A series of decisions taken by Convention are non-legally binding
the Parties to the CBD provide on the Parties that have ratified
a broad mandate for addressing the convention. There are usual
geoengineering and have already reporting requirements under each
begun to govern this issue. Building of the treaties, and implementation

GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE GEOENGINEERING
is monitored through the regular Parties shall promote the

reports prepared by the Parties. effective control of all sources
There are, however, no sanctions for of pollutiontake effective
lack of compliance. measures prohibit dumping
A closer look at the operative etc.10 The London Convention does
words in the decisions further additionally include articles on the
indicates the limitations of these establishment of liabilities and on
frameworks. The CBD decision dispute settlement, as well as on
invites Partiesto consider the compliance procedures.
guidance below9 the guidance
in question includes 26 sub- Risks associated to geoengineering
paragraphs on climate change in have not yet been broadly adopted
general, and only one, the 22nd in international forums or civil
on geoengineering. The operative society, to the same extent that
language of this decision is weak, climate change has, although some
as it does not require any Party to researchers have been developing
undertake any particular course voluntary codes of conduct, such
of action. In addition, the CBD as, the Geoengineering Research
includes no formal enforcement Governance Project at the University
mechanisms. of Calgary11. It is, however, at
This is different in the London present, still unclear what exact
Convention, where the operating formats the global governance of
language is much stronger, geo-engineering risk will take.
indicating stronger consensus
by Parties about the approach.
JANOS PASZTOR
Senior Fellow and Executive Director,
C2G2 Initiative on Geoengineering, Carnegie Council

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Artificial intelligence
WHAT IS AT STAKE? enemy, these weapons would be
In narrow domains, artificial designed to be extremely difficult
intelligence (AI) systems have proven to simply turn off, so humans
to reach superhuman level relatively could plausibly lose control of such
quickly for instance, in identifying a situation. This risk is one that is
the location of a photograph or present even with narrow AI, but
playing complex games like Jeopardy grows as levels of AI intelligence
or Go. In the coming decades, and autonomy increase.
there is a high probability that they The AI is programmed to do
may surpass humans in broader something beneficial, but it
domains. The danger of entities more develops a destructive method for
intelligent than us can be understood achieving its goal: this can happen
by considering the power we humans whenever we fail to fully align
have drawn from being the smartest the AIs goals with ours, which is
creatures on the planet. Even if strikingly difficult. If you ask an
the values of artificial intelligence obedient intelligent car to take you
systems can be aligned with those of to the airport as fast as possible,
their creators, they are likely to have a it might get you there chased by
profound impact on socio-economic helicopters and covered in vomit,
structures and geopolitical balance. doing not what you wanted but
But if the goals of powerful AI systems literally what you asked for. If a
are misaligned with ours, or their superintelligent system is tasked
architecture even mildly flawed, they with an ambitious societal project,
might harness extreme intelligence it might wreak havoc as a side
towards purposes that turn out to effect, and view human attempts to
be catastrophic for humanity. This stop it as a threat to be met.
is particularly concerning as most
organizations developing artificial As these examples illustrate, the
intelligence systems today focus on concern about advanced AI isnt
functionality much more than ethics. malevolence but competence. A
super-intelligent AI will be extremely
POSSIBLE SCENARIOS1 good at accomplishing its goals, and if
Most experts agree that a those goals are not aligned with ours,
superintelligent AI is likely to be we have a problem. You are probably
designed as benevolent or neutral not an evil ant-hater who stomps
and is unlikely to become malevolent on ants out of malice, but if you are
on its own accord. Instead, concern in charge of a hydroelectric green
centers around the following two energy project and there is an anthill
scenarios: in the region to be flooded, too bad
The AI is programmed to for the ants. A key goal of AI safety
do something devastating: research is to never place humanity
autonomous weapons are AI in the position of those ants.
systems that are programmed to
kill. In the hands of the wrong HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW?
person, these weapons could It is now widely accepted that
easily cause mass casualties. we will be able to create AI systems
Moreover, an AI arms race could capable of performing most tasks
inadvertently lead to an AI war as well as a human at some point.
that also results in mass casualties. According to the median surveyed
To avoid being thwarted by the expert, there is a roughly 50% chance

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Reviewed by Reviewed by Reviewed by Reviewed by Reviewed by

VICTORIA RICHARD ARIEL CONN MAX TEGMARK ANTHONY
KRAKOVNA MALLAH AGUIRRE
of such AI by 2050 with at least

a 5% chance of superintelligent AI
within two years after human-level
AI, and a 50% chance within thirty
years2. The long-term social impact of
human-level AI and beyond, however,
is unclear, with extreme uncertainty
surrounding experts estimates.
The ability to align AI with human
values is widely considered to be
important in determining the risk
factor. However, aside from the
open question of which values to
select, there are important unsolved
technical problems regarding how to
make an AI understand human goals,
making an AI adopt these goals, and
ensuring that it retains these goals if
it recursively self-improves.
WHAT ARE KEY FACTORS

IMPACTING RISK LEVELS?
AI risk is still emerging today,
but could rapidly accelerate
if sudden technological
breakthroughs left inadequate time
for social and political institutions WHAT IS ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE?
to adjust risk management
mechanisms. If AI development
gets automated, in particular, new AI is non-biological intelligence more specifically, technology that en-
capabilities might evolve extremely ables machines to accomplish complex goals. One typically distinguishes
quickly. between weak/narrow AI, designed and trained for a particular task such
as spam filters, self-driving cars or Facebooks newsfeed, and general AI or
Risks can be exacerbated by
Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), which is able to find a solution when
geopolitical tensions leading to an presented with an unfamiliar task, with human-level ability or beyond.
AI weapons race, AI development
races that cut corners on safety, The current quest for AGI builds on the capacity for a system to au-
tomate predictive analysis a process generally described as machine
or ineffective governance of
learning. One important element of machine learning is the use of neural
powerful AI. networks: systems that involve a large number of processors operating
The level of AI risk will partly in parallel and arranged in tiers. The first tier receives a raw input, and
depend on the possibility to align each successive tier receives the output from the tier preceding it. Neural
networks adapt and modify themselves autonomously, according to initial
the goals of advanced AI with
training and input of data, in ways that are typically not transparent to the
human values which will require engineers developing them.
more precise specification of human
values and/or novel methods by If researchers one day succeed in building a human-level AGI, it will
probably include expert systems, natural language processing and
which AIs can effectively learn and
machine vision as well as mimicking cognitive functions that we today as-
retain those values. sociate with a human mind, e.g., learning, reasoning, problem solving, and
self-correction. However, the underlying mechanisms may differ consid-
erably from those happening in the human brain just as the workings of
todays airplanes differ from those of birds3.

GOVERNANCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RISK
Governance of
Artificial Intelligence
U
ntil recently, race could be highly destabilizing or
advanced artificial have strong undesired side-effects
intelligence was such as empowering terrorists and
still thought of as other non-state actors. There is
science fiction. ongoing debate and formal United
As such, researchers in industry, Nations discussion regarding the
academia, and government were use of international agreements
more concerned with simply making to curtail LAWS development and
it work. Only in the last few years, as deployment, supported by thousands
AI has become more advanced and of AI researchers.4 Another major
commonplace, have more people issue coming onto the radar is that of
considered the possible risks of automation and potential resulting
advanced AI. large-scale economic impacts,
including massive loss of jobs and
Since the general perception is that increase in income inequality.
human-level AI is at least decades Longer-term concerns surrounding
away, there has been relatively little highly advanced AI have essentially
action planning for it. However, the no special-purpose formal structures
timelines are uncertain. Meanwhile, in place at the government level to
the problem of controlling or manage risk, though recent legislation
aligning very advanced AI with in the European Union attempts to set
human goals is extremely difficult a roadmap for developing AI-related
and may require decades to solve, policies. It is highly unclear what
motivating current research on the formal structures at the governmental
problem. In the shorter term, current level would currently be appropriate
or near-future AI also poses less concerning advanced AI, and for
extreme threats for example in now, investigation and planning for
warfare, finance, cybersecurity, and advanced AI risk occurs mainly in the
political institutions, threatening academic, corporate, and non-profit
privacy, employment, and income communities.
equality that need to be managed
now and will only increase in In the past few years, many non-
magnitude. profits (MIRI, FHI, CSER, FLI,
Such concerns are currently CFI, CHAI, OpenAI)5 have taken
managed by the many existing it upon themselves to develop
laws and institutions that apply to early solutions to help push AI
particular fields where AI plays a development in safer directions.
role. However, governance of AI will Groups such as the Partnership on
present a unique challenge requiring AI, the Institute of Electrical and
special consideration, some of it on Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and
a short timescale. A particular and some groups within governments
timely issue concerns AI systems have also begun trying to understand
deliberately designed to kill or those risks. These initiatives and
destroy, a.k.a. Lethal Autonomous structures operate essentially
Weapons Systems (LAWS). LAWS are on a voluntary basis. The IEEE
more likely to be used offensively, Ethically Aligned AI program6
rather than defensively, and an arms and the Asilomar AI Principles7 are

MYTHS &
PROJECTS TO KNOW ABOUT FACTS ABOUT AI
Over the past decade, various initiatives have been set up to explore There are fascinating controver-
potential safety issues associated with the development of artificial sies where the worlds leading
intelligence. Six of those deserve special mention. experts disagree, such as AIs
future impact on the job market,
OpenAI, a nonprofit research organization developed if/when human-level AGI will be
under the leadership of Elon Musk, aims to discover developed, whether this will lead
and enact a path to safe artificial general intelligence, to an intelligence explosion, and
with an aim to make high-powered AI systems whether this is something we
available more widely and apart from a corporate should welcome or fear. To help
profit motive or government structure. focus on these real controversies
and avoid getting distracted by
DeepMind, part of the Alphabet Group, has misunderstandings, the text below
developed several breakthrough AI systems including clears up some common AI myths.
AlphaGo. It also has a strong safety focus, with an
internal ethics board and safety research group. MYTH: Superintelligence by 2100 is
inevitable.
The Machine Intelligence Research Institute MYTH: Superintelligence by 2100 is
(MIRI) is a non-profit organization originally founded impossible.
in the year 2000 to research safety issues related FACT: It may happen in decades,
to the development of Strong AI. The British non- centuries or never: AI experts dis-
profits Future of Humanity Institute (FHI), Centre for agree & we simply dont know.
the Study of Existential Risk (CSER) and Centre for
Intelligence have joined this research effort. MYTH: Only Luddites worry about
AI.
The Future of Life Institute, established in 2014 with FACT: Many top AI researchers are
a mission to support the beneficial use of technology, concerned.
granted 7 million dollars in 2015 to 37 research teams
dedicated to keeping AI robust and beneficial. MYTHICAL WORRY: AI turning evil.
MYTHICAL WORRY: AI turning
The Partnership on AI, created in 2016, is a conscious.
consortium of industry and non-profit members with ACTUAL WORRY: AI turning com-
an aim to establish best practices to maximize AIs petent, with goals misaligned with
widespread benefit. ours.
SAIRC is a joint Oxford-Cambridge initiative housed MYTH: Robots the main concern.
by the Future of Humanity Institute, that aims to solve FACT: Misaligned intelligence is the
the technical challenge of building AI systems that main concern: it needs no body,
remain safe even when highly capable, and to better only an internet connection.
understand and shape the strategic landscape of long-
term AI development. MYTH: AI cant control humans.
FACT: Intelligence enables control:
we control tigers by being smarter.
The AI research and development community has taken an unusually proactive MYTH: Machines cant have goals.
stance toward self-governance, with businesses organizing their own ethics FACT: A heat-seeking missile has a
committees and developing incentive systems for research and development, goal.
independently of national governments or the UN. While this ensures that the
development of norms and guidelines is conducted by people with most expertise MYTHICAL WORRY: Superintelli-
in the field, it has also raised concerns as to potential conflicts of interest and gence is just years away.
balanced representation. ACTUAL WORRY: Its at least
decades away, but it may take that
long to make it safe.


seen as best practices and general conferences and meetings, as well

aspirational principles, but they as significantly more research on
have no specific legal authority the technical side. At this point, the
or binding force. The nascent most effective short-term strategy
Partnership on AI8 has tenets that for ensuring that AI remains
are formally binding for members beneficial as it advances may be
of the partnership, though the continued and enhanced support
enforcement mechanism is unclear for such AI safety organizations as
and the tenets provide only weak well as creating government grant
constraints on AI development. funding for AI safety research,
Generally, the most effective to nurture a robust and growing
enforcement mechanism within AI safety research community
the AI community today is social permeating both academia and
stigma, which can harm recruitment industry. This could result both in
and participation for groups and technical solutions being available
individuals. by the time they are needed, and
In addition to those mentioned also in a pool of technically skilled
above, initiatives by various AI safety experts from which
risk-oriented groups such as the governments can recruit expertise
above-mentioned non-profits have when needed.
led to a dramatic increase in AI
safety sessions at professional AI
READ MORE
about recent
progress in AI and
efforts to ensure
its safety on
p. 60
RICHARD MALLAH VICTORIA KRAKOVNA ANTHONY AGUIRRE MAX TEGMARK ARIEL CONN
Director of AI Projects, Future of Co-founder, Future of Life Institute Co-founder, Future of Life Institute President and Co-founder, Director of Media and
Life Institute Future of Life Institute Outreach, Future of Life
Institute

UNKNOWN RISKS
ROEY ERIC
TZEZANA DREXLER
Unknown risks
WHAT IS AT STAKE? WHAT ARE KEY FACTORS
In 1900, forty-five years before the first nuclear AFFECTING RISK LEVELS?
bomb exploded, very few could have predicted that A fast rate of technological change increases the
atomic energy would be one of the main potential chances of a risk rising to global concern before
causes of global catastrophe. Climate change is now proper governance mechanisms can be put in
broadly regarded as an urgent global concern, but place. Conversely, foresight work will support our
when the United Nations was established in 1945, it ability to prepare for new risks in advance.
was very far from public attention. Rapid economic, The probability and impact of unknown
scientific and technological development which risks correlates with the overall fragility of our
seems set to continue in the 21st century brings societies, which in turn depends on the state of our
unforeseen new risks in its wake. It is therefore likely environment, the availability of new technologies,
that many future global catastrophic risks are at and global governance systems in place.
present unknown.
HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW?

There is obviously little that we know about
unknown risks, but we do have the capacity
to develop better methods for scanning and NANOTECHNOLOGY
monitoring them.
Some risks independent from human action,
A NEW EMERGING RISK?
mostly connected to distant cosmic forces, are Our capacity to manipulate matter on the nano-
currently assigned such a low probability that scale has made it possible to manufacture materials
engineered at the molecular level. These new
we chose to leave them outside of this report. For products display remarkable characteristics and have
instance, if the Earth found itself in the direct path the potential to address pressing human needs at low
of a gamma ray burst from a distant star, this could cost2. Research on nanotechnology shows promise in
result in a mass extinction event, but there is no a range of fields. Nanomedicine could help detect and
destroy cancerous tumors more effectively3 and has
clear trace of such an event ever occurring, and the the potential to significantly extend healthy lifespans4.
risk remains theoretical1. Scientific progress may New solar cells and batteries based on nano-particles
lead us to reconsider the likelihood and expected could be many times more efficient than those
impact of certain natural risks and bring new ones to available at present and revolutionize renewable
energy production5. Nano-materials could exhibit
our awareness. unique capabilities: nano-fibers could also be used as
As for risks resulting from human activity, they sensors, to create clothing that monitors the wearers
will most likely be related to new technologies and health, or conjoined with nano-particles that prevent
their interaction with existing social and natural the growth of bacteria and eliminate bad smells.
The strongest nano-materials like carbon nanotubes
systems. We cannot foresee what these risks will be could be used to create structures that are extremely
in advance, but we can closely monitor scientific and lightweight and yet highly strong and durable.
technological breakthroughs, and assess what their
potential impact may be, in order to take appropriate However, we know very little about associated
risks. Studies have shown potential side-effects
measures in advance. on health associated to the inhalation or ingestion
of nano-particles6, though very little is known as to
potential broader impact on public health or the
risk of large-scale pollution7. Nano-technology also
now raises significant concerns as to the possibility
of large-scale surveillance through networks of
microscopic sensors and robots a technology
generally referred to as smart dust. Research on risks
associated with nanotechnology and development
of global governance frameworks in par with
development of the technology itself will reduce the
chances that materials with high potential impact
on human health and the environment get into
circulation8.

GOVERNANCE OF UNKNOWN RISKS
Governance of unknown risks
T
here is little doubt that global threat All of these organizations can serve as a boon to
paradigms are going to evolve in the governments. They constantly sniff for subtle hints
coming decades, but can governments and weak signals, and are able to alert governments
prepare for new challenges even before when a related wild card becomes more plausible.
they are identified as such? Many Unfortunately, many governing bodies are unaware
sponsor attempts to do just that. In Singapore, the of these organizations, or even try to confine their
Center for Strategic Futures has been studying wild activities as in the case of prediction markets,
cards improbable futures that would have a massive which are seen as illegal gambling venues and have
impact should they become reality. The US marine been terminated in many nations.
force has similarly explored surprising futures by The only way to prepare for the unexpected is
asking the marines themselves to write science fiction to construct scenarios ahead of time, and harness
stories, and the US National Intelligence Council collective energies to highlight the more plausible
has dealt with potential game changers in a report ones as they come closer to fruition. While we cannot
describing the state of the world in 2030. be sure what 2020, 2030 or 2050 will look like, if we
However, these are all projects led by national continue to monitor wild cards, we will at least be
governments for national interest. The only similar able to reduce the extent of the unknown, and better
attempts sponsored by multiple governments were prepare for new risk scenarios.
two projects erected by the European Union in
this last decade FESTOS and iKnow inviting
global experts to create wild card scenarios about
unexpected opportunities and risks. The results,
however, have not yet been added to the agendas
of other international bodies, or resulted in a
coordinated governance body for unknown risks.
One core insight from those projects has been

the role of weak signals: hints that a strange
future might come closer to fulfillment, and which
could be tracked by government analysts. Sadly,
nobody seems to do the actual tracking: potential
catastrophes are essentially ignored by governments
in their strategic plans, under the pressure of limited
time, money and attention.
Where governments are lacking, private and public
organizations may step in. Some, like TechCast
Global, seek expert advice about the likelihood of
wild card scenarios becoming a reality, independent
of any governmental support. Others, like the Good
Judgement Project, invite the wider public experts
and laymen to assess the chances that both plausible
and implausible scenarios will come to fruition within
a defined timeframe. By identifying superforecasters
respondents whose forecasts are more accurate
than 98% of participants they can form a more
reliable forecast for the short-term future. These
projects act like electronic prediction
markets, where people bet on future ROEY TZEZANA
events: they outsource signal tracking to a crowd of Futurist, researcher at Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Centre
(ICRC), Tel Aviv University, affiliated with Humanity Centred Robotics Initiative
observers incentivized by market mechanisms to act (HCRI), Brown University
as monitors.

Global catastrophic
risk insights
NEW MODELS FOR NUCLEAR WAR RISK ASSESSMENT
How can we assess risks with limited historical precedents, such as
nuclear war? With financial support from the Global Challenges Foundation,
the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute developed a model that relies on
systematic analysis of cause and consequence, taking into consideration near-
misses and other incidents. This method can help identify effective mitigation
policy, and can be applied to the study of other global catastrophic risks.
CLIMATE TIPPING POINTS

Exponential growth in environmental pressures, following the
development of modern industrial societies, is putting the stability of
the Earth system at risk. There is strong scientific evidence today that
large systems on Earth, ocean circulations, ice sheets, or rainforests, can
abruptly shift when pushed across tipping points. Even if the rise in global
temperatures resulting from human activity remained at 1-2 C, it could
trigger tipping points in the biosphere, pushing Earth beyond 3-4 C
warming. Since the stability of the Earth system underpins human
civilization and welfare, avoiding this scenario would seem an attractive
course of action.
RECENT PROGRESS IN AI AND EFFORTS TO ENSURE ITS SAFETY

With careful management, research, and cooperation, AI has the potential
to become the most beneficial technology ever developed. As the technology
further advances, however, what is its potential for disruption, both positive
and negative? After many decades of slow but continuous progress, the last
few years have seen an explosion of artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities.
In parallel, a significant response to AI risk is underway: over the last few
years, multiple efforts have been made to map out the landscape of research
required to ensure AI safety, and to tackle some of the basic questions
relating to AI risk.

NEW MODELS OF NUCLEAR WAR RISK ASSESSMENT
New models of nuclear

war risk assessment
A
fter the end of the Cold War, the risk of be inaccurate to calculate the ongoing risk of nuclear
nuclear war had largely fallen out of war using nothing but the one occurrence of nuclear
view. But while most nuclear weapons weapon use in WWII.
have been disarmed, a staggering Our probability model, instead, explores the
15,350 weapons still remain, of which various pathways through which nuclear war could
14,300 are held by the US and Russia. Right now, occur. These pathways were developed through
4,000 of these weapons are in active deployment, consideration of historical data and possible future
meaning that they are available for use at any time. conflict scenarios, considering potential chains
A nuclear war could be just moments away. of successive events, in the form of a fault tree.
This model makes it possible to incorporate the
The risk of nuclear war is central to a number of probability of each successive event across the range
major policy questions. How high on the agenda of scenarios, and obtain the overall probability.
should nuclear war risk be? Which policies are most The model contains two main sets of pathways.
effective at reducing the risk? How should nuclear One set considers a nuclear-armed state
states manage their nuclear weapons? Under what intentionally making a first strike attack. This could
conditions should the weapons be disarmed? These involve conventional wars going nuclear (as in
are important questions for policy makers of every WWII) or crises leading directly to nuclear war (as in
country and concerned citizens around the world. the Cuban missile crisis). The other set of pathways
To address them, it is essential to understand results in a nuclear-armed state unintentionally
the risk of nuclear war. But despite the topics making an attack under the mistaken belief that they
importance, there has been little risk analysis of are under nuclear attack. This can occur if a nuclear
nuclear war. Prior studies have focused on specific weapon detonates for some other reason (such as a
scenarios, such as crises escalating to nuclear war (as nuclear terrorist attack) and is mistaken for a first-
in the Cuban missile crisis) and false alarms being strike attack by another state. It can also occur if a
misinterpreted as real attacks (as in the Norwegian false alarm (such as a military exercise) is mistaken
rocket incident). This is important work, but stops as an actual nuclear attack. These various pathways
short of answering the question of overall nuclear are detailed in the figure below.
war risk, which is crucial for a range of major policy
issues. In order to help characterize the overall risk, Except for conventional war going nuclear, none
researchers at the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute of these pathways have ever led to nuclear war.
(GCRI) have completed the first-ever risk models However, there have been many near-misses:
that consider the total probability and impact of incidents that went partway to nuclear war. Our
nuclear war. research created a new data set of 40 such historical
Traditional risk analysis is based on the historical near-miss incidents. They range from the Korean
frequency and severity of harmful events. For War in 1950-1951, when the U.S. considered using
example, the World Health Organization reports nuclear weapons against Chinese forces, to recent
that 1.25 million people die each year worldwide moments in the Ukrainian Civil War, in which
due to road traffic crashes. This means that, for the Russia has made several nuclear threats. This is not
average person, the risk of dying in a road traffic a complete set of nuclear war near-miss incidents,
crash is about one-in-5,700 per year. But the history but provides important insight to assess ongoing
of nuclear war does not allow for the risk to be probabilities.
calculated accurately on this basis. Nuclear weapons This historical record shows that nuclear
have only been used once in a military context deterrence can fail and that the world has been
during World War II and under circumstances lucky to avoid a second nuclear war. Repeatedly
very different from today. Particularly, at the time, throughout history, aggressive actions have been
only one country possessed nuclear weapons, and taken against nuclear-armed states, despite the
nuclear deterrence did not play a role. It would likely threat of nuclear retaliation. In some cases, nuclear

attacks were seriously considered by state leadership This research on nuclear impact and probability
or by military officers with the capability of launching modeling is the first to take such a comprehensive
nuclear weapons without explicit permission of state and systematic view of the issue. Our research
leadership. There have also been many false alarms takes a major step by offering the first full models
that went partway to prompting nuclear weapons of the probability and impacts of nuclear war.
launches. It may only be a matter of time until one These models lay the foundation for quantifying
such incident goes all the way to nuclear war. probability and impacts. However, they stop short
The impact model is based on the various of quantification. At this stage of the research,
ways that nuclear war can affect human society. quantification would require a lot of guesswork as to
Five effects of detonating nuclear weapons are the probability or impact of each event, and would
modeled. Four of those are physical: thermal likely be very inaccurate. Successful risk analysis
radiation (mainly visible light, essentially a bright and risk management requires that people not cut
flash of light), blast (air moving at high pressure), corners or place too much belief in unfounded
ionizing radiation (high energy radiation capable numbers.
of dislodging electrons from atoms and molecules), The GCRI research does offer a full account of how
and electromagnetic pulse (an electromagnetic field nuclear war can happen and what its impacts could
that can couple with and destroy electronics). Each be. The models show the many facets of nuclear
of these can cause extensive harm to human bodies war risk and how they fit together. This is valuable
and/or built infrastructure. The fifth effect is human in its own right for helping people understand the
perception of nuclear weapons detonations, which risk of nuclear war. Indeed, understanding the risk
can also lead to major consequences, such as shifts can be just as important as quantifying it. Each part
in norms about future weapons use, making it more of the risk points to unique opportunities for risk
or less likely that nuclear weapons would be used in management. For example, an understanding of
future disputes. false alarm scenarios can highlight opportunities
In order to properly assess impact, many elements to make nuclear weapon monitoring systems
must be accounted for. Nuclear war can destroy less prone to false alarm. An understanding of
buildings, cause fires, disrupt telecommunications, how nuclear war can disrupt food supplies can
shut down supply chains, induce dehydration and highlight opportunities to improve postwar food
starvation, cool the entire planet, and directly security. The GCRI risk models make it easy to
harm people exposed to the blast by causing identify these sorts of opportunities. The models
hemorrhaging, embolisms, and other injuries. also show how risk management opportunities
Various factors in the scenarios will affect the affect different aspects of the risk, which can point
overall impact. How many nuclear weapons were to synergies across different opportunities. There
detonated? What types of nuclear weapons were is a wide range of nuclear war risk management
they? Where and when did the detonations occur? opportunities available for a wide range of people,
On this basis, the risk of nuclear war is not a single both government officials and private citizens.
number but a complex array of phenomena, all
of which are important to understand in order to Rigorous quantification of probability and impacts
successfully characterize and manage the risk. is an important task for future research. For
The impact model also considers other global probability, this would entail research activities such
catastrophic risks that might result from the use of as creating a more comprehensive set of historical
nuclear weapons. Nuclear war can lead to infectious incidents, analyzing each incident in terms of how
disease outbreaks, such as by destroying health close it got to nuclear war, and developing and
care infrastructure. It can affect global warming applying theory to extrapolate from near-misses to
by changing greenhouse gas emissions, such as by actual nuclear wars. It could also involve eliciting
disrupting energy supply chains. It can affect the expert judgment on sections of the model for which
development and use of risky new technologies, historical data is scarce, and developing forecasts
including stratospheric geo-engineering. Each of on how components of the model might change
these consequences could be as large or larger than in future years. In addition, it will be important
the more direct impacts of nuclear war. Modeling the to model distinctions between different nuclear-
full impacts of nuclear war thus requires models for armed states, so as to identify which states are most
each of these other global catastrophic risks. Future likely to engage in nuclear war and under what
work is needed to connect the nuclear war impacts circumstances.
model to these other models. For impacts, quantification would entail

MAPPING PATHWAYS TO NUCLEAR WAR
Conventional Direct War
Conventional Proxy War Intentional Escalation
Crisis True Belief of

Intentional
Threat Without
First Strike
Conventional Direct War Nuclear Attack
Conventional Proxy War Inadvertent Escalation
Crisis
Nuclear War
Unauthorized Detonation
Detonation Of Nonstate Nuclear Weapon Non-war

Nuclear
Weapon On Home Soil Detonation
Accidental
Detonation
Weapon On Foreign Soil First Strike
False Belief of Believed
Nuclear Attack To Be
Military Exercise
Event Looks Like Retaliation
Nuclear Attack
Nonmilitary Event
False Alarm
Human Error
Monitoring
System Mistake
Technology Glitch
quantifying each type of impact and how it affects

the other types of impacts. Some types of impacts
are already well characterized, with models available
in existing literature. Future research could comb
this literature for models applicable to the nuclear
war impacts model. Other impacts require original
modeling. Those in most need of characterization
are impacts involving systemic effects to critical
infrastructure systems and to other catastrophic risks,
especially where there is potential for cascading effects
across systems and geographic regions, as well as long-
term effects on human civilization.
The work needed to further understand probability
and impacts makes for a sizable research agenda,
which speaks to the complexity of nuclear war risk.
However, given how high the risk could be, and its SETH BAUM
importance to policy decisions, this is an important Executive Director, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute
activity for society to pursue.

Climate tipping points
I
n a remarkably short space of time, industrial temperatures of between 23C above pre-industrial
societies have pushed Earth into a new levels, the risk of various subsystems collapsing
geological epoch, the Anthropocene, where becomes high5. In fact, even within the Paris range
human action has become the greatest of 1.5 - 2C global warming, the world faces the real
agent of change on the planet. As a result risk of irreversible and abrupt shifts in several key
of exponential growth in environmental pressures regulating systems. As far as we know, tropical coral
following the development of modern industrial reefs could collapse before 2C warming. Alpine
societies, the stability of the Earth system is at risk. glaciers and Arctic summer sea ice are at risk at 2C,
Greenhouse gas levels as high as today may not have as are Greenland and the West Antarctic ice sheets,
been seen for at least three million years1. Three years though with a much wider range of uncertainty.
in a row (2014-2016), we have hit an average global Melting from underneath the West Antarctic ice
temperature increase of 1C, the highest on Earth sheet, caused by warmer waters, has now reached a
since the last Ice Age. The chemistry of the oceans point where no natural barrier will prevent further
is changing faster than at any point in perhaps 300 melting. This could lead to the complete collapse
million years2. And the planet is losing biodiversity at of the West Antarctic ice sheet and cause global sea
mass extinction rates3. levels to rise six meters or more6. It has also been
shown that burning the remaining known reserves of
Over the past million years, Earth has been tipping fossil fuels would add enough greenhouse gases to the
in and out of different stable states, from cold glacial atmosphere to trigger the risk of an entire melt of the
periods to warm inter-glacial periods. Increasingly, Antarctic ice sheet, which alone will raise sea levels
we learn that these shifts are regulated not only by by around 58 meters7.
changes in the position of Earth in relation to the Sun, The tipping point risk that humanity faces is
but also by feedback loops and tipping points in the double. The first aspect is that human-induced global
Earth system itself. Now, humanity is playing the warming could trigger tipping points with major
role of the Sun through our emissions of greenhouse impact on human societies, such as rising sea levels
gases from fossil fuels. The global risk is that the rise or the collapse of coral reef systems. The second is
in global temperatures resulting from this human the risk of crossing tipping points in the Earth system
activity, even if it remained at 1-2C, could trigger itself with cascading effects on global warming. These
additional tipping points in the biosphere, pushing include the gradual weakening of carbon sinks, forest
Earth into a mega-warm state beyond 3-4C warming. dieback and permafrost thawing. See the figure to the
left.
There is strong scientific evidence today that
large systems on Earth, such as the ocean circulation To stand a reasonable chance (> 66 %) of staying
system, permafrost, ice sheets, rainforests and under 2C, the remaining global carbon budget
atmospheric circulation can abruptly shift when or amount of carbon that we can release in the
pushed across tipping points4. Moreover, human atmosphere is approximately 225 GtC. The 5th
activities, such as industrial scale farming and Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on
fishing, are reducing the resilience of these Climate Change (IPCC AR5), published in 2013, shows
subsystems, and pushing them toward new states. that the absorption capacity of the land and ocean
If one system collapses to a new state, it may trigger carbon sinks, which currently store large amounts
positive feedback loops, amplifying the change, and of greenhouse gases, could decline by 157 Gigatons
triggering changes in other subsystems, thus causing of Carbon (GtC) around 2.5C of warming above
a cascading collapse. Since the stability of the Earth pre-industrial in 21008. Even though the remaining
system underpins human civilization and welfare, carbon budget hedges for a decline in biosphere
avoiding this scenario would seem an attractive carbon sinks, it is unclear whether it takes full
course of action. account of the risks from self-reinforcing warming. In
The figure on the next page shows what level of other words, it cannot be excluded that the remaining
increase in global temperature would risk triggering global carbon budget of 225 GtC compatible with the
tipping points in major biophysical systems on 2C guardrail may have to be further reduced in order
Earth, on the basis of the best current science. At to account for the lower absorption capacity of land

TIPPING POINTS
Tipping elements possibly

Amazon rainforest
Boreal forest
switched within Rais range
8
Temperature anomaly ( C)
ENSO
Artic summer sea ice
o
Sahel
WAIS
THC
Alpine glaciers
6
Greenland
Arctic winter sea ice

RCP8.5
Coral reefs
Permafrost
EAIS
4
RCP6.0
RCP4.5
2 RCP2.6
Paris range
20000 15000 10000 5000 0 20002100 Year
Evolution of global mean surface temperature from the Last Glacial Maximum through the
Holocene and future global warming scenarios (RCP, Representative Concentration Pathways)
related to tipping elements. WAIS, West Antarctic ice sheet; THC, thermohaline circulation; ENSO,
El Nio-Southern oscillation; EAIS, East Antarctic ice sheet. Adapted from Shellnhuber et al. 2016.

TIPPING POINTS IN THE EARTH SYSTEM
Melt of Greenland Arctic sea-ice loss

ice shelf
Permafrost and
tundra loss
Boreal forest
dieback Boreal
forest dieback
Atlantic deep
water formation Indian monsoon
chaotic multistability
Climate change Sahara greening
-induced ozone hole
West African
Dieback of monsoon shift
Amazon rainforest
Change in ENSO
amplitude
of frequency
Instability of West Changes in Antarctic

Antarctic ice shelf bottom water formations

and ocean carbon sinks. cause catastrophic climate change could be triggered
Permafrost thawing and forest dieback are at 2C global warming, i.e. at the upper range of the
additional self-reinforcing processes that can agreed Paris Climate Agreement. These include the
contribute to further destabilise the climate system, risk of losing all tropical Coral Reef systems on Earth,
and which are not included in the global carbon and irreversible melting of inland glaciers, Arctic sea
budget emerging from the IPCC AR5 of 225 GtC9. ice and potentially the Greenland ice sheet.
Carbon loss from permafrost thawing has been We must now also seriously consider the global
studied under a range of climate scenarios10, and risks of triggering tipping points in the biosphere.
forest dieback linked to climate change is a global We can no longer exclude that if human emissions
concern11. It remains uncertain how much carbon of greenhouse gases from fossil-fuel burning, air
loss could be associated with permafrost thawing and pollutants, land use change and agriculture, cause
forest dieback at 2C global warming, but the risks global warming up to 2C, we may be faced with a risk
lie in a range of 50 GtC, or about one full decade of of an inevitable further warming of perhaps up to
fossil-fuel burning. 0.5C due to tipping points in the biosphere.
This requires the adoption of a planetary
Human burning of fossil-fuels destabilises energy resilience strategy. Risks are always associated with
flows in the Earth system, in a way similar to shifts in uncertainty. Humanity now faces a new spectrum
solar radiation when Earth gradually tips in and out of global risks related to Earths self-reinforcing
of Ice Ages. The big question is how Earth responds. tipping points. To avoid these risks requires a global
Science clearly shows that the response is complex. insurance behaviour, which entails backing-off
So far, negative feedbacks where the biosphere from the danger zone of irreversible and potentially
dampens and reduces global warming have catastrophic Earth system thresholds. It is high time
dominated. But these could very well shift to positive to apply human precaution in order to support Earth
feedbacks, and trigger abrupt, irreversible and resilience, and provide humanity with a genuine
potentially catastrophic tipping points. The latest chance to continue developing within the safe
science shows that tipping points with potential to operating space of a stable planet.
JOHAN ROCKSTRM
Director, Professor, Stockholm Resilience Centre

Recent progress in AI and

efforts to ensure its safety
A
fter many decades of million jobs will be automated by
slow but continuous 2020, and many experts fear this
progress, the last few number will grow too rapidly for
years have seen an society to adjust. Looking forward,
explosion of artificial as AI advances, there is potential
intelligence (AI) capabilities, leading for major disruption, both positive
to better data analysis, increased and negative. Humans are the most
automation, more efficient machine powerful species on the planet
learning systems, and more general because of our intelligence, so
research interest from academics, machines smarter than us could
governments, and corporations. pose opportunities and risks unlike
anything previously seen with other
Last year, Google DeepMind shocked technologies which could unfold
the AI world when it revealed with stunning speed if AIs learn to
AlphaGo, a program that had learned create better AIs.
to master the famous game of Go. In 2014, Nick Bostroms book
This classic challenge to AI had been Superintelligence raised public
expected to require at least another awareness of AI related risk, and
decade. Concurrently, a slew of AI prominent thinkers such as Elon
advances repeatedly surprised and Musk, Stephen Hawking, and Bill
impressed AI researchers. Google Gates expressed concern about AI.
Translate became strikingly better. A groundbreaking 2015 meeting in
Machines learned to accurately Puerto Rico helped mainstream such
describe what is taking place in concerns, after which thousands of
a picture, and to create images AI researchers signed open letters
based on minimal descriptions of a supporting research on how to keep
scene. Self-driving cars are closer to AI beneficial and opposing an arms-
becoming a daily reality. Programs race in AI-powered weapons. This
are being developed that can mimic mainstreaming helped trigger seed
someones voice, which can then funding for dozens of teams around
be added to an AI-generated video. the world to research how to keep AI
More generally, AI is learning to do safe and beneficial.
more and more with less and less
data, highlighting AIs huge potential By 2016, a significant response
for solving humanitys greatest to AI risk was underway. Multiple
problems. efforts were made to map out the
But there were also debacles, such landscape of research required to
as Microsofts Twitter chatbot Tay, ensure AI safety, and to tackle some
which learned to be racist and sexist of the basic questions. For example,
in under 24 hours, and Googles image researchers at Google and the Future
classifier, which identified dark- of Humanity Institute presented
skinned people as gorillas. Indeed, steps toward ensuring that, if an AI
artificial intelligence, like all powerful does something we dont like, we can
technologies, naturally has risks safely turn it off without it acting to
associated with it. prevent us from doing so. But these
efforts are just the beginning of what
Most immediately, the World AI safety researchers predict will
Economic Forum predicts that five be major technical and intellectual

challenges en route to beneficial AI. reports outlining how to tackle

Moreover, society will need to challenges that AI may pose. In
adapt to the rapidly changing AI 2017, these and other guidelines
landscape in order to manage it. were distilled into the Asilomar AI
Many governments, businesses, and Principles1, signed by over 1,000
non-profits started to take action in AI researchers from around the
2016. Perhaps the biggest news was world, aimed at ensuring that AI
the formation of the Partnership development will benefit humanity
on AI, which currently includes the as a whole. The rapid development
Association for the Advancement of AI portends significant changes
of Artificial Intelligence, the and possible dangers unfolding
American Civil Liberties Union, over the coming decades, but with
Amazon, Apple, DeepMind, Google, careful management, research, and
Facebook, IBM, Microsoft, and cooperation, AI has the potential
OpenAI. The White House, Stanford, to become the most beneficial
and the Institute of Electrical and technology ever developed.
Electronics Engineers all produced
RICHARD MALLAH VICTORIA KRAKOVNA ANTHONY AGUIRRE MAX TEGMARK ARIEL CONN
Director of AI Projects, Future of Co-founder, Future of Life Institute Co-founder, Future of Life Institute President and Co-founder, Director of Media and
Life Institute Future of Life Institute Outreach, Future of Life
Institute

ENDNOTES
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ENDNOTES
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viewed 13/4/2017, http://keith.seas.harvard.edu/geoengineering Science, 26 May, viewed 18/04/2017, http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/05/
5. Bodle, R. Climate Law and Geoengineering (ch.17) in Climate Change and how-build-better-battery-through-nanotechnology
the Law (Hollo, Kulovesi and Mehling {eds}), Springer, UK: Also seee Scott 6. See for example Leary, S. P., Charles Y. L., and Michael L. J., 2006. Toward the
Barrett, Geoengineering Governance Written Statement Prepared for US emergence of nanoneurosurgery: Part III-Nanomedicine: Targeted nanotherapy,
House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology Hearing on nanosurgery, and progress toward the realization of nanoneurosurgery,

ENDNOTES
Neurosurgery, 58(6), p.1009-1026 Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
7. Feitshans, I. L., 2013. Nanotechnology: balancing benefits and risks to public [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A.
health and the environment, p.7-9 Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA
8. Donaldson, K., 2009. Engineered Nanoparticles: Understanding and Managing
Potential Risks, Science for Environment Policy, vol.12, April 9. Ciais, P., C. Sabine, G. Bala, L. Bopp, V. Brovkin, J. Canadell, A. Chhabra, R. DeFries,
J. Galloway, M. Heimann, C. Jones, C. Le Qur, R.B. Myneni, S. Piao and P.
Thornton, 2013: Carbon and Other Biogeochemical Cycles. In: Climate Change
CLIMATE TIPPING POINTS 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
1. The NOAA Annual Greenhouse Gas Index. 2016. Butler, J.H, Montzka, S. NOAA
[Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A.
Earth System Research Laboratory
Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press,
2. Hnisch, B. et. al. 2012. The Geological Record of Ocean Acidification. Science, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA
Vol. 335, Issue 6072, pp. 1058-1063
10. Schaefer, K. et. al. 2014. The impact of the permafrost carbon feedback on global
3. Ceballos, C. et. al.2015. Accelerated modern humaninduced species losses: climate. Environ. Res. Lett. 9 085003; see also Schneider von Deimling. T. et al.
Entering the sixth mass extinction. Science Advances, Vol. 1, no. 5, e1400253 2015. Observation-based modelling of permafrost carbon fluxes with accounting
4. Lenton, T.M. et. al. 2007. Tipping elements in the Earths climate system. PNAS for deep carbon deposits and thermokarst activity. Biogeosciences, 12, pp. 3469-
vol. 105, no. 6, pp. 1786-1793 3488; see also Koven, C.D. et. al. 2015. Permafrost carbonclimate feedback
is sensitive to deep soil carbon decomposability but not deep soil nitrogen
5. Schellnhuber, H. J., Serdeczny, O. M., Adams, S., Khler, C., Otto, I. M.,
dynamics. PNAS, vol. 112, no. 12, pp. 37523757
Schleussner, C. F. (2016). The Challenge of a 4 C World by 2100. In Brauch,
H.G., Oswald Spring, U., Grin, J., Scheffran, J. (Eds.): Handbook on Sustainability 11. Allen, C.D. et.al. 2010. A global overview of drought and heat-induced tree
Transition and Sustainable Peace. Springer International Publishing, Switzerland mortality reveals emerging climate change risks for forests. Forest Ecology and
Management, Volume 259, Issue 4, pp. 660684
6. Rignot, E. et. al. 2014. Widespread, rapid grounding line retreat of Pine Island,
Thwaites, Smith, and Kohler glaciers, West Antarctica, from 1992 to 2011.
Geophysical Research Letters, Volume 41, Issue 10
RECENT PROGRESS IN AI AND EFFORTS TO
7. Winkelmann et al. 2015. Combustion of available fossil fuel resources sufficient
to eliminate the Antarctic Ice Sheet. Science Advances, vol 1, n.8, e1500589 ENSURE ITS SAFETY
8. Ciais, P., C. Sabine, G. Bala, L. Bopp, V. Brovkin, J. Canadell, A. Chhabra, R. DeFries, 1. FLI, 2017. Asilomar AI Principles, Future of Life Institute, viewed 02/05/2017,
J. Galloway, M. Heimann, C. Jones, C. Le Qur, R.B. Myneni, S. Piao and P. https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/
Thornton, 2013: Carbon and Other Biogeochemical Cycles. In: Climate Change
2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth
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GLOBAL CHALLENGES ANNUAL REPORT: GCF & THOUGHT LEADERS SHARING

ANNUAL REPORT TEAM

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THE GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOUNDATION works to incite deeper under-

Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 3

4 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017

Understanding global catastrophic risks is

In conclusion, I would like to extend my warmest

Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 5

WHAT IS A GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISK?

We now stand at a crossroads. The decisions and

Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 7

The response to the New Shape challenge has

MATS MARIA IVANOVA WANJIRA MATHAI MALINI MEHRA ANOTE TONG

8 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017

Why care now?

What do we Systemic risks

we know and fight for.

Striking exponential developments

Terrestrial biosphere Advances in digital Institutional

Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 9

Knowledge = opportunity Navigating suddenness

The next 50 years will determine the next 10,000 years

10 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017

In each section, a first part offers a description of EMERGING RISKS

Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 11

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Biological and chemical warfare

12 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017

NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF THE US, RUSSIA,

Number of nuclear warheads

14 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017

PROBABILITY CLOSE CALLS

Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 15

Governance of nuclear weapons

16 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017

Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 17

CHEMICAL WEAPONS: AN RECENT USAGE

18 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017

Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 19

of chemical disposal. Both countries global travel increases, could quickly

20 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017

Catastrophic climate change

Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 21

land most of it over Greenland,

Antarctica, and in mountain ranges as

glaciers. It is predicted that approxi-

mately 1 meter of sea level rise from

the melting of land ice is currently

unavoidable, but things could get

worse18. If the entire Greenland ice

sheet was to melt, it could potentially

raise the worlds oceans by more

than 6 meters. If all the ice currently

22 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017

WHAT ARE KEY FACTORS

Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 23

CIVILIZATIONS LOST TO CLIMATE CHANGE

CLIMATE CHANGE LONG TAIL23

24 Global Challenges Annual Report 2017

Global Challenges Annual Report 2017 25

A GLOBAL CARBON LAW ROADMAP