Bosnia

Social Summit Report

Topic:
UnderstandingOperation Deliberate Force and
NATOs Role in it.

Author:

Varun Sundar.
INDEX
1. OVERVIEW

2. EPILOGUE TO OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE

3. NATO AND THE PEACE AGREEMENT IN BiH

A. Legal contradictions and constrains
B. Operation deliberate force

4. OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE - CONFLICTING

IDEALS

5. DAYTON AGREEMENT AND ITS CURRENT STATE

6. UNFPA ON BiH

7. ECONOMIC SITUATION TODAY

8. ETHNICITY OF BOSNIA TODAY

9. POLITICS IN BOSNIA TODAY

10. BILATERAL ISSUES BETWEEN Bi H AND CROATIA

11. BOSNIAAND EU

12.REFERENCE

13. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Overview this report have made utmost attempts to

In principle, intervention is an act or process bring about an unbiased presentation of an
that is carried out from external agents. It event that shaped BiH's present, one with
comes from the outside to the inside and aims facades more than what meets the eye.
at transforming the system into a better
setting or, better say, into the intended reality.
In other words, intervention has its own
agenda, structure and methodology. We have
often seen third actors, nation states,
intervening between two or more warring
parties with the fundamental purpose of
transforming violent conflicts into a stable
endurable peace. This norm of interventionism
constitutes the main framework of the world Epilogue
diplomacy aside the strategic interests and
In the 1990's the Soviet Union disintegrated
aspirations to be pursued by nation states.
into fourteen independent nation states
However, interventionism as a complex
together with other countries near Central
process does not yield the same results if
Europe. From the Socialist Federative
applied in different phases of the conflict.
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Croatia and
If we have human resources but we lack Slovenia were the first ones to secede in
means, then, we lack the structure. If we have 1991 amidst violent conflicts. In the South
the means (Structure) but we lack well- Eastern part of SFRY, the Republic of
trained human resources, then, we lack the Macedonia seceded non violently in 1991 to
ways, the methodology to resolve the become internationally known as the
situation. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(fYROM). Consequently, the six-republic
Operation Deliberate Force is thus a test of
SFRY downsized into three hence
ideology and principles, which shall be further
accumulating so much tensions and raising
elaborated upon in this report. The authors of
so many interethnic fears and suspicions.
 In 1991, Germany played an important
role for the independence of Croatia and
Slovenia by lobbying with the Western
countries and recognizing on 25 December
1991 the two new breakaway catholic
republics of the federation. It was a
successful intervention despite the fact that
it came after a brutal war between Belgrade
and Zagreb that claimed a lot of human
lives, refugees and displaced persons
resembling WWII. Conflicts domino effect
was transmitted to
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) throughout
1992-1995 which marked the deadliest
conflict in humanitys modern history with
more than 200.000 people killed and nearly
1.4 million displaced1. Interventionism of
the international community in this conflict
was finalized as a process with the signing of
the Dayton Agreement on 21 November
1995 in
Ohio, USA, among representatives of the
Republic of BiH, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia. The
Dayton Agreement considerably stopped the
conflict hence accomplishing the aim of the
international community in the Balkan
Region. However, the road to Dayton was
not an easy one. Before making the three
warring parties sit down on the negotiation
table and sign the agreement in 1995 certain
developments took place before which shed
light on the productive or counterproductive
nature of interventionism of world
diplomacies.
NATO and peace agreement
in BiH
The Agreement on the Military Aspects of the
Peace Settlement, signed in Paris on 14
December 1995 as Annex 1-A to the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina1, invites the United
Nations Security Council 'to adopt a resolution
by which it will authorise Member States or
regional organisations and arrangements to
establish a multinational military
Implementation Force ( IFOR )-'
The multinational force would 'assist in
implementation of the territorial and other
military related provisions of the agreement',
and notably undertake 'such enforcement
action by the IFOR as may be necessary to
ensure implementation' . The 'regional
organisation or arrangement' entrusted with
the establishment of IFOR is immediately
identified in Article I of Annex I-A6 as NATO,
even though it is made clear that IFOR would
be 'composed of ground, air and maritime
units from NATO and non-NATO nations'. The
willingness of NATO to play such a
fundamental part in the implementation of the
Peace Agreement shows that the member
States have been able to adapt their political
understanding of the role of the Alliance in the
international order to the new security
priorities of the post-cold war era. However
this had legal complications and
contradictions.
LEGAL CONTRADICTIONS AND
CONSTRAINS
The first and most evident legal problem
raised by Annex 1-A is that although Article
53 of the United Nations Charter Article 53
of the United Nations Charter provides that
'[t]he Security Council shall, where
appropriate, utilise such regional
arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action under its authority', and although
Article I,a of Annex 1-A invites the Security
Council to do precisely that, NATO is not a
regional organisation designed to undertake
peace-enforcement or peace-keeping
operations, however consensual these may
 be. The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 was
firmly based on the provisions of Article 51
of the United Nations Charter, which
recognises the 'inherent' right of
individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and
security'. On the face of it, the NATO,
therefore, camee into effect when the
Security Council had not exercised its
primary responsibility to maintain (or -
more properly- to restore) in- ternational
peace and security, and even then
exclusively until the Security Council does
so.
OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE
As early as June 1992, at the Ministerial
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council ('NAC')
in Oslo, NATO announced its readiness to
support peacekeeping activities under the
responsibility of the NATO-sponsored
Conference on Security and Co- operation in
Europe(OSCE).
This means that NATO, on a case by case
basis, declared itself prepared to place at the
OSCE's disposal standing forces from all
States in the Alliance, to- gether with their
C3I capabilities for peace-keeping operations.
The same offer of co- operation was
reiterated in December 1992 to the United
Nations Security Council and Secretary-
General.
NATO forces had, in fact, already been
involved in peace- keeping and peace-
enforcement missions in the former
Yugoslavia since November 1992 with
Operation 'Sharp Guard' undertaken jointly
with the Western European Union under
unified command and control to implement
Security Council resolution 713, which
established an arms embargo against all the
Republics of the former Yugoslavia and
resolution 757, which applied sanctions
against the Federal Re- public of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro). On 12 April 1993
NATO also under- took the enforcement of
the so-called 'No-Fly Zone' pursuant to
Security Council resolution 816 of 31 March
1993.
This was clearly an enforcement operation
and it was the occasion for the first ever
military engagement undertaken by the
Alliance: on 28 February 1994 four warplanes
violating the no-fly zone over Bosnia and
Herzegovina were shot down by NATO aircraft.
Finally, at the request of the United Nations
military commanders, under United Nations
Security Council resolution 836, initiated the
operation code-named 'Deliberate Force',
which involved tar- geting Bosnian-Serb
artillery surrounding Sarajevo and other United
Nations- designated 'Safe Areas', to deter
further attacks.
Deliberate Force was conducted between
August 30 and September 14, 1995. During
that period, actual bombing operations
occurred only on twelve days due to periods of
poor weather and a brief operational pause in
the first week of September. Nations
contributing combat and support aircraft
included the United States, Great Britain,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain,
and Turkey. On a typical day, those air forces
launched about 300 individual aircraft sorties,
of which about 70 actually carried weapons. In
all, NATO aircraft released 1070 heavy bombs
and missiles against Serb targets for a total
ordnance tonnage of about 500 tones.
These military operations were undertaken
under the authority of the Security Council,
which authorized member States 'acting
nationally or through regional organisations
or arrangements ... to take all necessary
measures'to enforce the respective
resolutions.
Operation Deliberate
Force - conflicting ideals
presented
Operation Deliberate force undertaken by
the NATO under the SC was distinguished by
many of its features and the message it
presented. this operation was one with the
objective of peace, and showed the
primordial success of air strikes in an armed
strike containment. NATO air forces quickly
surmounted and suppressed Bosnian Serb
air warfare capabilities. The Serbs had no air
force of consequence in the face of an air
assault, and their ground-based air defenses
consisted of a net of air defense radars,
command and control systems, a few
medium surface-to-air missile (SAM)
batteries, and a ubiquitous scattering of
light anti-aircraft (AA) guns. Deliberate Force
was also distinguished by an unprecedented
reliance on precision weapons, which
comprised 708 of the 1070 heavy weapons
delivered against the Serb Republic.
Deliberate Force resulted in few casualties
on either side. Only two allied aviators were
shot down and captured, the crew of a
FrenchMirage. None were killed. Casualties
among the Serb military and non-combatant
civilians are not precisely known, but the
latter were less than thirty.
This operation brought in a relation between
air warfare and humanitarian objectives, even
presenting a way of effectively controlling
regions for a humanitarian cause. Yet this
strike (or operation) was contradictory, since
the NATO was primarily a
peace keeping force, an
organization of countries
meant for
mutual self defense. Thus,
as explained in the
previous section, this
operation was technically
and theoretically not
supposed to be conducted
by a peace keeping, mutual
self defense force, and that
too sanctioned by the SC.
However, it may be
notably shown that this operation was
conducted only after a period of three years
where in the United Nations had pursued a
Fabian strategy of public moralizing,
diplomacy, and inter-positioning peacekeeping
troops between warring factions. NATO air
units patrolled the skies over Bosnia during this
period, mainly providing surveillance in
support of UN no-fly and safe zone resolutions.
But they did conduct small-scale punitive air
strikes against the Serbs in November 1994
and May 1995.
Thus, this operation presents at least two
fundamental questions: First, is effective air
warfare possible under humanitarian
constraints? Second, regardless of the answer
to the first question, should air warfare be
fought under humanitarian constraints?
 THE DUAL FACETS OF NATO

1. DAYTON AGREEMENT AND ITS CURRENT STATE

The October 1997 case to review the constitutionality of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina was notably one of the first cases in which the Court had to deal with the question
of the legal nature of the Constitution. Although the court's decisin and review (where the court questioned
its authority and competence see : court's statement of Article 4), the Court actually "established the ground
for legal unity" of the entire peace agreement, unlike what the fairly large amount of crticism it recieved
predicted. However, since the Court rejected the presented request of the appellants, it did not go into
details concerning the controversial questions of the legality of the process in which the new Constitution
(Annex IV) came to power, and replaced the former Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Court used the same reasoning to dismiss the similar claim in a later case. This infact
helped preserve the integrity of the Republic of Bosnia, ensuring n ethno-communal strifes in an already
tensed and delicate social environment.(see: socio-ethno differences in Bosnia, by Falkenar, 1993-1996).
Notably,the ethnicity of Bi H's population did not change much (see : census readings of 1995 and 2005,
citations reviewal), which is now seen as both a drawback and advantage of this agreement.

Moreover, the Dayton Agreement did further strengthen the ' canton' system (now regarded as a novel
and unique framework). Thus, the Dayton agreement did prove to be flexible allowing consolidation and
reconstruction during a post-conflict period. Like every agreement, this one too had its own shortcomings
including enabling international actors (such as the OHR), unaccountable to Bi H's citizens, to shape the
agenda of post-war transition, up to enacting punishment over local political actors.

Moreover, the current legal structure of the agreement is criticised as not abiding by principles of
international law and the concept of national citizenship, making the Bosnian territorial and political
situation fractious since its implementation in 1995.

NEWSPAPERS
OFTEN CRITICISED
THE DAYTON
AGREEMENT
UNFPA ON BiH

Population data

Last census in BiH was conducted 19 years ago and 4.377. 000 persons were enumerated as a
resident population in the places where their famlies lived and according to the Household Budget
Survey in BiH 2007 resident population is 3.447.156 (48,8 per cent male and 51,2 per cent female)
which clearly shows that BiH has undergone enormus changes in this period of time. The sources
estimate that 21,65 per cent of the population are under the age of 17; 63,3 per cent aged 18-64 and
15,05 per cent aged over 65.
The lack of reliable and comprehensive demographic data represents one of the challenges for the
planned development of the country, recognizing this the Government of Bosnia has taken many
steps in ensuring better census coverage and data interception.Year 2011 is planned for next census
with the aim to support the State Government, the Entities, Cantons and Municipalities, and the
civil society with necessary statistical data for the planning and application of the general
development policy, and also to increase the knowledge level and perception for the demographic,
economic and social reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Average age of population according to
Household Budget Survey in BiH in 2007 was 37, 2 for men and 39, 4 for women. Natural change
as difference between the number of births and number of deaths in a period of 2008 is 150 ,
meaning 34.176 live births and 34.026 deaths. According to the estimates of the Bosnia and
Herzegovina Agency for Statistics the total fertility rate for 2008 is 1.194 . This is considerable
improvement underlining firm policies taken up by the Bosnian Government, especially during
2004-2007.
The Gender Equality Law of BiH was introduced in 2003 and a number of other legal frameworks
contain elements relating to gender equality and gender based violence. These points are of
uttermost importance considering that women make up about 51 percent of the BiH population.
Life expectancy at birth is 74 years (72.1 for men and 77.3 for women), which is five years higher
than the average in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Infant mortality (0-5 years) stands at 15 per
1000 live births .

(SOURCES: CENSUS OF BOSNIA 2011, UNFPA SOURCES)

ABOVE: POPULATION PYRAMID
BELOW:POPULATION GROWTH
Economic Situation today
Bosnias public sector amounts to nearly 50% of the countrys GDP. Dodiks hegemony has
simplified matters in the RS, while. Zivko Budimirs policies have helped in increasing private and
foreign investment
Living standards improved in Bosnia before the global economic crisis; real wages increased by 44%
between 2000 and 2007. Real GDP increased by 30% in the same period. The global economic crisis
caused a drop in real GDP of 3.1% in 2009.

Since then, Bosnias economy has stagnated. Real GDP rose by 0.7% in 2010 and 1.3% in 2011.This
double-dip recession, due to the effects of the Eurozone crisis, has had a negative impact on trade,
remittances from Bosnians working abroad, and foreign investment. However, the Government has
taken many positive steps including supporting livelihoods of the unemployed and poor,..etc, which
have brought some change to the situation.

In this climate, budget deficits have increased and tax receipts have declined. In order to secure
funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), both the Federation and the Republika Srpska
have been forced to make cuts in veterans benefits and government salaries (including those of
teachers) in order to bring the budget deficit in line with the IMF mandated target of 3%. In December
2012, the IMF released a second tranche of a two-year, $522 million stand-by loan in recognition of
Bosnias fiscal consolidation efforts, which further lightened the situation.

However, austerity may be exacerbating long-standing social problems. Living standards remain
moderate for many Bosnians and unemployment remains a problem, despite concrete steps by the
governments in this direction.
 Graphical
representation of BiHs
economy.
 ETHNICITY OF BOSNIA TODAY
More than 95% of population of Bosnia and Herzegovina belongs to one of its three
constituent nations: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats . On a dialectal level, Serbs, Croats and
Bosniaks speak a variety of tokavian dialects: Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats "southern" neo-
tokavian; Croats and Bosniaks "western" neo-tokavian and Bosniaks and Croats "eastern-
Bosnian" old-tokavian.

These dialects are mutually intelligible, but have fixed phonetic, morphological and lexical
differences. The question of standard language of Bosnia and Herzegovina is resolved in such
a way that three constituent ethnic groups have their educational and cultural institutions in
their respective native or mother tongue languages: Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian.
The most easily recognizable feature that distinguishes the three ethnic groups is their religion,
with Bosniaks predominantly Muslim, Serbs predominantly Orthodox Christians, and Croats
Catholic Christians.

POLITICS IN BOSNIA TODAY

The main issue raised by internationalorganizations and some countries (even today) has been the ethnic problems
spiraling politics in Bosnia. However, it was shown via furtherstudy and ground zero inspection that the situation has
drastically improved (which was even noted by the UNDP in the HRD report which gives Bosniaa HRD rank of 91).
Consider the following:
Politics - Human Rights Elections and Security

The first positive and promising step that has been taken for the eradication of interethnic differences was the
Mrakovica-Sarajevo Agreement signed on 27 March 2002 by all political parties in BiH 9except for SDA). The Mrakovica
Agreement can be regarded as the first attempt to transform the divisive nature of GFAP from its ethnic trichotomy
orientation into a multi-partial framework. A multiculturalist approach is not an untried practice in BiH. History shows
that it has strong roots in the collective conscience and sub-conscience of BiH people. There are ample spaces in their
shared history in which the three ethnic groups lived golden times of amity between them. Yet, this very ethnic diversity
or multi-culturalist approach when provoked by internal or external factors, like ethnonationalism (internally) or
invasions (externally), can trigger dormant ethno and/or ego- centrist forces within each social group which can be a
casus belli announcing future violent confrontation between the parties. Therefore, we agree with paradigm of social
diversity when we see it as culturalism and multiplicity of social values. But, on the other hand, societies often fail to
preserve such a positivist approach about diversity once the latter is provoked by internal or external socio-political
factors. As a result, the Mrakovica Agreement was a good step in lifting the ethnic diversity to a commonality of
governance by assuring a proportional representation of the three ethnic groups in all government levels and granted
the same status to all constituent peoples and citizens in the whole territory of BiH. As remarked by Solioz,
nevertheless, the agreement is de facto a first step towards overcoming separatist tendencies and, ultimately, towards
the abolition of the entities35. The specialty of this agreement was that it was reached within the BiH political parties
themselves without the mediation or interference of the OHR or other international players.
Election infrastructure has undergone positive changes, too. The role of the Provisional Election Commission, as
established by the GFAP in Annex 3/Article III and responsible for the management of the entire election infrastructure,
was transformed and handed over to the Bosnian Election Commission (BEC) in 2001. The nationalization of this key
institution underscores satisfactory political atmosphere and an increase of interethnic trust at state level. By end of
June 2005, the three international members of the seven-member Bosnian Electoral Commission, withdrew. Since 2002,
BEC has been in charge of organizing elections hence giving the OSCE only a monitoring role rather than managerial as
previously foreseen in the GFAP. However, trust among the ethnicities still needs to be worked on as it is the only tool
with which reforms can move forward. Pitifully, in a recent United Nations Development Programme evaluating social
trust in BiH: only around 7% of the population said they trusted other ethnic groups.

In security terms, the main progress has been achieved in the sector of returnees from the Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs). As Solioz reports, at the end of 2004, over one million refugees and IDPs had returned to their pre-war homes,
out of an estimated 2.2 million persons forcibly displaced42. Regional initiatives have been taken to resolve this issue
recalling here the 2005 Agreement between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia on the resolution or displaced persons and
refugees. Various reforms have been also taken in judiciary and military. In March 2005, a special Department for War
Crimes was inaugurated in the Prosecution Office as well as a Chamber for War Crimes opened in the State Court. Such
measures have enabled the consolidation of actions taken by the state against war suspects allegedly involved in
atrocities. The cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) in the Hague has
noted significant progress recently especially with the capture and handing over of the war criminal Radovan Karadzic in
July 2008.
BILATERAL ISSUES BETWEEN Bi H AND CROATIA
BOSNIAAND EU
On 30 June 2011 the European Council announced the closure of negotiations pertaining to the accession of the
Republic of Croatia to the European Union following a proposal from the European Commission who also
proposed that on 1st July 2013 Croatia should accede to the European Union. Croatia will become the 28th
member state of the EU on the aforementioned date provided that no unexpected problems occur in the
meantime.

Croatias accession has the potential to significantly affect the overall situation in the region and to open new
possibilities for the Western Balkans in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. It will also offer a new insight
into the negative implications of the current outstanding and unresolved problems between Croatia and the other
countries in the region. Many outstanding issues in the region may cause further deterioration in the overall
situation in Bi H, especially in the economic and political spheres. The consequences arising from the delay in
harmonising standards with those which will be applied in Croatia as an EU member state, in particular in the
area of the economy, will be presented in a new light and with a new intensity. Standards in neighboring
countries will be incompatible with those newly applicable in Croatia.

Those differences and lack of harmonisation will be unfavorable primarily for neighboring countries but they will
nevertheless have significant repercussions for Croatia too.
In particular, the new circumstances that will exist after Croatias accession have implications for Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Bi H). On a positive note, EU membership of Croatia (with which Bi H has the longest border)
represents for Bi H (a country strategically committed to Europe; potential candidate for the membership in the
European Union and a permanent regional partner of Croatia) a challenge and an opportunity for the swift
internal reforms and resolution of outstanding issues on the long and complex path to the European Union.

On the other hand, the outstanding issues between the two countries, both those with a strictly bilateral meaning
and reflection and others with a wider, regional impact, could result in long-determinative consequences for
political, economic and social relations, and moreover become a factor of destabilization in the region. The
failure to resolve outstanding issues between the two countries in a swift manner, based on European principles
and standards, represents a challenge that could be a powerful impetus for an accelerated strengthening of the
European Partnership, but it could also result in serious problems with varying potential outcomes.
The state of Bosnia

Both Bi H and Croatia states are at the intent of joining the EU as intrinsic members. It is thus of great
importance and matter that any disagreement as well as the current bilateral disputes be settled at the earliest, as
well as satisfactorially , so as to guarantee policy stronghold on (an) further issue, and for a socio-politico-
economic integration without any dis arrayment.(note:refer to further sections for Bosnia's EU status).

Thus being the case the following current issue(s) are at hand which have been presented as balanced as possible
with great importance factual occurances and events.

1. The following fall under the broader context of outstanding issues in relation to the border between Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina since the end of the nineties to the present day:

A. Agreement on the State Border between Bi H and the Republic of Croatia: This Agreement was
concluded on 30 July 1999. However, since no document relating to the border with Croatia was ratified by the
Parliamentary Assembly of Bi H, nor by the Croatian Parliament (except the Agreement on Free Transit to and
from the Port of Ploce and through Neum, which was ratified in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bi H but not in
the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia), the entire border line with Croatia remains an open issue.

B. The Sea Border Delineation: The border and the border issues between Croatia and Bi H are closely
related to the application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (entered into force on 16
November 1994. Signed by 152 countries as of end of 2006). Bosnia and Herzegovina believes that the sea
border delineation was not completed as provided in the aforementioned Convention and specifically
highlighted that Croatia had unilaterally, contrary to the UN Convention, applied the straight baseline (drawn
from the Island Vodnjak-Hvar to the Cape Proizd-Korcula) pursuant to the state of borders at the time of the
SFRY. In this way Croatia has established its internal waters, which pursuant to the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea have the same status as land territory, having Croatia close the sea area of Bosnia and Herzegovina
within its unilaterally declared sovereignty.

The current situation, which is clearly incompatible with the Convention and international law, is directly related
to the implementation of the Bi H Law on Border Control. This particularly applies to the provisions of the Law
dealing with the issues of maritime border crossings, control, reporting, various approvals and all other issues
provided by the Law. Bi H is therefore of the opinion that ratification of the Agreement on the State Border
should be preceded by the adoption of a bilateral agreement on the sea delineation between Bi H and Croatia in
the form of an annex to the Agreement and/or as an integral part of the State Border Agreement. Such an
agreement can be prepared by the jointly established expert committee which would engage domestic and
international institutions in the area of maritime law. Although Bi H has, on several occasions, pointed out that
the State Border Agreement concluded in 1999 contains all international principles on defining borders between
states and therefore the request of Croatia to change the Croatian border line on the K lek and Peljesac
Peninsulas cannot be consider or politicised any further, there remain three possible solutions offered to resolve
the status of the border between the two states:

Ratification of the State Border Agreement without amending the existing Agreement. After that,
the two sides could, by issuing a conclusion or presidential statement, express readiness for possible
correction of the border in some areas.
Proceed with ratification but pre-define disputable parts of the border. Attempt to find a solution
regarding disputable parts of the Agreement and if that is not possible, reach an agreement to send the
disputable part to international arbitration.
Express readiness to establish the border between the two states through international arbitration
and make all disputable areas of the border subject to arbitration.
C. Bridge to Peljesac: In the context of the currently non-harmonised sea border delineation between the two
countries there is a dispute regarding construction of a bridge from Komarna to Peljesac by which Croatia intends
to connect its territory and overcome territorial interruption in Neum. At the 11th session of the Interstate
Council for Cooperation between Bi H and the Republic of Croatia held on 3 March 2007 the Presidency of Bi H
presented its official standpoint against construction of this bridge until the outstanding issues in relation to
identification of the sea border between the two countries were resolved. This standpoint was subsequently
officially repeated several times to the Croatian authorities. Despite this, on 24 October 2007 the then Premier of
Croatia Ivo Sanader laid the corner stone for the bridge in Brijest on Peljesac, thus initiating the construction. At
the time, Croatia disregarded all allegations or arguments fromBiH suggesting that the bridge would not be
constructed in Croatian territorial waters and pointing out that Croatia did not need any consent to continue
construction of the bridge. The bridge, according to the Croatian authorities, is not an alternative to the
Adriatic-Ionian motorway, part of which will go through Neum to Dubrovnik. The Croatian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and European Integration claims that the construction of the bridge represents a sovereign right of Croatia,
that it cannot be linked to any other pending issue between the two countries and thatthe Ministry fails to see any
grounds or reasons for turning the bridge construction issue into a political one.
Meetings, exchange of letters and discussions in relation to this issue continue. Croatia continued constructing the
bridge until work stopped in 2011 due to the countrys internal difficulties; however the overall issue at the state
level was not clarified, nor the approach changed: The bridge construction issue was not placed into the context of
the sea border delineation and other border related issues which de facto means that the issue of the border
between the EU and Bi H in this area remains unresolved.

D. The Port of Ploce: The Agreement on Free Transit through the Territory of Croatia to and from the Port
of
Ploce and through the Territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Neum, was concluded on 22 November 1998 in
Zagreb. Soon after this it was ratified in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bi H but not in the Parliament of the
Republic of Croatia.
At present, and ever since HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) came to power in Croatia following the 2003
elections, this Agreement is inapplicable in practice in its present form and it has no legal effect because it was not
ratified by Croatia. For many years Croatia has refused to ratify it in the present text. In essence, the Agreement
which was concluded and ratified in Bi H foresees joint management of the port which
is, after the breakup of Yugoslavia, located in Croatian sovereign territory but which can fulfill its purpose only in
connection with the hinterland in Bi H. A significant part of the ports capacities, terminals and warehouse
construction was financed by Bi H. The railway connection with the hinterland and beyond through Bi H connects
the port with central Europe and enables the fulfillment of its purpose.
E.Border Inspection Services: In the course of accession negotiations with the EU, within Chapter 12 (Food
Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy) and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security), Croatia decided
that a total of eight border crossings with neighbouring countries should provide border inspection services
(Bajakovo, Stara Gradiska, Karasovici, Metkovic, the Ports of Ploce and Rijeka, Zagreb Airport and Zagreb Post
Office).
Border inspection services are important for Bi Hs export of goods of animal and vegetable origin to the EU
which are subject to inspection and control as well as for the export fromBiH to third countries through the
territory of EU member states.
In accordance with the agreed list of border crossings, as of 1 July 2013 Bi H will be able to continue exporting
all its products to Croatia and the EU subject to inspection control, at Stara Gradiska - Gradiska and Bijaca
Metkovic border crossings. These border crossings must be fully equipped in accordance with strict standards
and must also be operational six months in advance of Croatias accession to the EU, i.e. on 1 January 2013.
Croatia justified its position regarding the selection of border crossings on the basis that there were a small
number of shipments of goods that are subject to inspection and insufficient frequency at other border
crossings. Another significant reason is the costly construction and equipping of such border crossings. In this
case, it is true that the two selected border crossings with Bosnia and Herzegovina are by far the worst equipped,
but it is also true that Bi H has border crossings which are fully equipped for inspections. In addition they are
financed by the EU, such as the Izacic border crossing. Preparations for the construction of Bijaca - Metkovic II
border crossing are ongoing and it is expected that the work will be completed six months in advance of Croatia

s
accession to the EU.

2. PROPERTY-RIGHTS AFFAIRS
Negotiations on the regulation of property-rights affairs between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, which
would regulate relations in this area, were conducted with a different intensity before and after independence of
the two countries and have ultimately been unsuccessfully at various levels since 1996. On several occasions an
agreement was almost signed only to be blocked literally at the last minute, usually because of dissent on the part
of the Government of the Republika Srpska (RS), since the agreement did not take into account their opinion
which they have been expressing since the outset but that Croatia has refused to accept.

3. THE NEUM CORRIDOR

Free transit through Croatian territory to and from the Port of Ploce and through the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in Neumis very important because even after Croatian accession to the EU these corridors will be
used mainly by businesses fromBiH. In addition, these routes, especially the one through Neum, are gaining
importance through the commitment of both countries to the Adriatic-Ionian corridor that passes through seven
countries, beginning with Italy (Trieste) through Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro,
Albania and Greece (Kalmata). Anticipating this fact the European Commission gave its recommendation during
a meeting of the Interim Subcommittee for Transportation, Environment, Energy, and Regional Development to
establish and intensify the bilateral dialogue with Croatia on finding solutions to disputed issues relating to
transit through the Neum corridor.
4. ELECTRICAL ENERGY SECTOR
There is an unresolved issue between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia of the distribution of electricity
produced at hydroelectric power plants located on common rivers. Of particular significance is the problem
of the use of larger amounts of water than agreed by the Croatian Electric Power Corporation (HEP) to the
detriment of the hydro electric power plant on Trebisnjica (HET), which has considerably damaged the Bi H
economy in the past 16 years.
The subject of the dispute is the division of electrical energy. From1968 to 11 January 1994 the ratio was
22% to 78% in favour of HET Trebisnjica, and on 11 January 1994 Croatia changed the ratio to 37.73% to
62.27% in their favour. Negotiations on this subject, initiated on several occasions, have not yielded any
results. After unsuccessful attempts to find a solution involving the competent ministries of the two countries,
Bi H proposed starting an initiative for international arbitration with the expert help of the International
Chamber of Commerce in Paris. The Croatian side informed Bi H in writing that it did not accept resolving
the dispute through arbitration because all possibilities for negotiation had not been exhausted.

5. TRADE RELATIONS
With the accession of Croatia to the EU, this country will leave the Central European Free Trade Agreement
(CEFTA), signed in 2006, which regulates current trade relations between Croatia and Bi H. Thus the
benefits that Bi H and other member countries of CEFTA have in the context of foreign trade exchange with
Croatia will cease. The Croatian market will become part of the internal EU market, which directly requires
changing the regime in Bi H foreign trade relations with Croatia. So far little has been done in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in anticipation of this situation and this will put the entire economy, particularly trade, in an
extremely inferior position with respect to Croatia and EU markets because of the restrictions brought about
by new standards that will represent an obstruction to trade.

6. LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT, SOCIALWELFARE AND PENSION SECTOR

On two occasions, firstly at the end of 2006 and then in 2008, Bosnia and Herzegovina officially proposed,
in the form of letters of intent from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the conclusion of an agreement on
temporary employment of Bi H workers in Croatia. Croatia did not respond to either of these initiatives. The
purpose of these proposals was to regulate relations in the area of labour and employment, to encourage the
mobility of the work force and increase employment of Bi H workers, to achieve control of the labour
market and reduce black labour and create a safer environment and working conditions for Bi H workers
temporarily working in Croatia.
By joining the EU, Croatia enters the single labour market of EU countries and workers from Bosnia and
Herzegovina will be treated as workers fromcountries outside the EU. Since it is obvious that there is
existence of mutual advantagehere, the competent authorities and institutions must make an additional
effort to put this issue on the table and to strive to solve it in the period remaining before Croatian accession
to the EU.

CONCLUSION:
Croatian accession to the EU will have a very positive impact, not only on Croatia but also on other
countries in the region and especially its neighbours Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular- for a number of
obvious reasons. The accession will, at the same time, fundamentally alter relations in the region and in
some sectors, (especially the economic and trade sectors), and will have a dramatic impact on the situation in
Bi H. Both the positive and (in particular) the negative implications accompanying this immense change in
the region could change the social, economic and political situation in Bi H, especially in the short term,
altering the present state of affairs by abandoning some existing practices and starting many new, different
ones.
The crucial fact in this context is that there is no solution for the elimination of the negative impact of
Croatian accession to the EU for Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the long run, other than the prompt
and concrete improvement of all the standards necessary for the functioning of Bi H and harmonisation with
EU standards that will be implemented in Croatia from 1 July 2013.
List of Abbreviations
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

IFOR Implementation Force

PIC Peace Implementation Council

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OHR Office of the High Representative

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

RS Republika Srpska

FBiH Federation of Bosnia i Herzegovina

EUFOR European Union peacekeeping force

SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement

CBiH Constitution of Bosnia i Herzegovina

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

ICTFY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia
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