SUGGESTED READINGS SET 2

1. Delos Sanots vs Jebson Maritime Inc Nov 22, 2005

AMELIA J. DELOS SANTOS, G.R. No. 154185

Petitioner,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
JEBSEN MARITIME, INC.,
Respondent. November 22, 2005

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Petitioner Amelia J. Delos Santos seeks in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside
the decision and resolution dated 21 March 2002[1] and 03 July 2002[2], respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62229.

From the petition and its annexes, the respondents comment thereto, and the parties respective memoranda, the Court gathers the following
factual antecedents:
On 10 August 1995, or thereabout, herein respondent Jebsen Maritime, Inc., for and in behalf of Aboitiz Shipping Co. (Aboitiz Shipping,
for short), hired petitioners husband, Gil R. Delos Santos (hereinafter, Delos Santos) as third engineer of MV Wild Iris. The corresponding contract
of employment, as approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), was for a fixed period of one (1) month and for a
specific undertaking of conducting said vessel to and from Japan. It quoted Delos Santos basic monthly salary and other monetary benefits in US
currency. Under POEA rules, all employers and principals are required to adopt the POEA - standard employment contract (POEA-SEC) without
prejudice to their adoption of terms and conditions over and above the minimum prescribed by that agency. [3]

On the vessels return to the Philippines a month after, Delos Santos remained on board, respondent having opted to retain his services
while the vessel underwent repairs in Cebu. After its repair, MV Wild Iris, this time renamed/registered as MV Super RoRo 100, sailed within
domestic waters, having been meanwhile issued by the Maritime Industry Authority a Certificate of Vessel Registry and a permit to engage in
coastwise trade on the Manila-Cebu-Manila-Zamboanga-General Santos-Manila route.[4] During this period of employment, Delos Santos was paid
by and received from respondent his salary in Philippine peso thru a payroll-deposit arrangement with the Philippine Commercial & Industrial
Bank.[5]

Some five months into the vessels inter-island voyages, Delos Santos experienced episodes of chest pain, numbness and body
weakness which eventually left him temporarily paralyzed. On 17 February 1996, he was brought to the Manila Doctors Hospital a duly accredited
hospital of respondent - where he underwent a spinal column operation. Respondent shouldered all operation-related expenses, inclusive of his
post operation confinement.

As narrated in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, the following events next transpired:

1. After his discharge from the Manila Doctors, Delos Santos was made to undergo physical therapy sessions at the
same hospital, which compelled the Batangas-based Delos Santoses to rent a room near the hospital at P3,000.00 a month;
2. Delos Santos underwent a second spinal operation at the non-accredited Lourdes Hospital at the cost of P119,
536.00; and

3. After Lourdes, Delos Santos was confined in a clinic in San Juan, Batangas where P20,000.00 in hospitalization
expenses was incurred.

It would appear that the spouses Delos Santos paid all the expenses attendant the second spinal operation as well as for the subsequent
medical treatment. Petitioners demand for reimbursement of these expenses was rejected by respondent for the reason that all the sickness
benefits of Delos Santos under the Social Security System (SSS) Law had already been paid.

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 Thus, on 25 January 1997, petitioner filed a complaint[6] with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
against respondent and Aboitiz Shipping for recovery of disability benefits, and sick wage allowance and reimbursement of hospital and medical
expenses. She also sought payment of moral damages and attorneys fees.

After due proceedings, the labor arbiter rendered, on 08 January 1999, [7] judgment finding for petitioner and ordering respondent and
Aboitiz Shipping to jointly and severally pay the former the following:

(1) P119,536.01, representing reimbursement of medical, surgical and hospital expenses;

(2) P9,000, representing reasonable cost of board and lodging;

(3) P500,000, representing moral damages;

(4) US$60,000, representing disability benefits corresponding to Total Permanent Disability;

(5) US$2,452, representing Sick Wage allowance;

(6) P62,853.60, representing attorneys fees; and,

(7) US$6,245.20, also representing attorneys fees.

On appeal, the NLRC, in a decision[8] dated 29 August 2000, modified that of the labor arbiter, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED to the extent that respondents Jebsen Maritime, Inc., and
Aboitiz Shipping Company are hereby ordered jointly and severally liable to pay Gil delos Santos through Amelia delos Santos
the Philippine peso equivalent at the time of actual payment of US DOLLARS SIXTY THOUSAND (US$60,000.00) and US
DOLLARS TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRD (sic) FIFTY TWO (US$2,452.00) representing total disability compensation
benefits and sickness wages, and the amount of ONE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND EGHT (sic) HUNDRED FOUR AND
87/100 PHILIPPINE PESOS (P103,804.87) representing reimbursement of surgical, medical and hospital expenses, plus the
equivalent of five percent (5%) of the aggregate award as and for attorneys fees.

All other dispositions are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Like the labor arbiter, the NLRC predicated its ruling mainly on the theory that the POEA-approved contract of employment continued to govern
Delos Santos employment when he contracted his illness. In specific terms, the NLRC states that the same contract was still effective when Delos
Santos fell ill, thus entitling him to the payment of disability and like benefits provided in and required under the POEA-SEC.

Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration per NLRC Resolution[9] of 31 October 2000, respondent went to the Court of
Appeals on a petition for certiorari, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. No. 62229, imputing on the NLRC grave abuse of discretion. In its petition,
respondent scored the NLRC for, among other things, extending the application of the expired POEA-approved employment contract beyond the
one-month limit stipulated therein.
On 21 March 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment[10], modifying the NLRCs decision by deleting altogether the award of
disability compensation benefits, sickness wages and attorneys fees, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated August 29, 2000
and the Resolution of October 31, 2000 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, that the disability compensation benefits of US$60,000.00 and the sickness wages of US$2,452.00 are
hereby deleted, without prejudice to claiming the same from the proper government agency. The award of attorneys fees is
likewise deleted.

In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied the motion per its resolution of 03 July 2002. [11]

Hence, petitioners present recourse on the grounds that the Court of Appeals seriously erred: [12]

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 IN DELETING THE AWARD OF US$60,000.00 REPRESENTING THE MAXIMUM DISABILITY BENEFITS APPLYING THE
PROVISIONS OF THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

(A) PRIOR TO HIS ACCIDENT, THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT OF SEAFARER DELOS SANTOS HAS NOT YET
BEEN TERMINATED, IN RELATION TO SECTION 2, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) AND SECTION 18 (A), POEA STANDARD
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

(B) THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF SEAFARER DELOS SANTOS ACCIDENT HAS NOT YET
EXPIRED BECAUSE IT WAS MUTUALLY EXTENDED BY THE PARTIES WHEN DELOS SANTOS WAS NOT SIGNED OFF
AND REPATRIATED PRIOR TO SAID ACCIDENT.

II

IN CONCLUDING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONTINUATION OF DELOS SANTOS EMPLOYMENT ON BOARD THE
SAME VESSEL AND UNDER THE SAME CONTRACT, IT IS THE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED,
THAT SHALL GOVERN HIS EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS.
III

IN DELETING THE AWARD OF SICKNESS ALLOWANCE IN THE AMOUNT OF US$2,452.00.

(A) THERE IS NO BASIS IN THE DELETION OF THE AWARD OF SICKNESS ALOWANCE (sic) SINCE PAYMENT OF
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM SICK LEAVE BENEFIT IS INDEPENDENT, SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE
SICKNESS ALLOWANCE PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

The petition is devoid of merit.

As a rule, stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of law between the
contracting parties.[13] An employment with a period is generally valid, unless the term was purposely intended to circumvent the employees right to
his security of tenure.[14] Absent a covering specific agreement and unless otherwise provided by law, the terms and conditions of employment of all
employees in the private sector shall be governed by the Labor Code [15] and such rules and regulations as may be issued by the Department of
Labor and Employment and such agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of the Code.

The differing conclusions arrived at by the NLRC, finding for the herein petitioner, and the Court of Appeals, siding in part with the herein
respondent, on Delos Santos entitlement to disability benefits and sickness allowance are veritably attributable to the question of applicability,
under the premises, of the POEA-SEC. The principal issue to be resolved here, therefore, boils down to: which, between the POEA-SEC and the
Labor Code, governs the employer-employee relationship between Delos Santos and respondent after MV Wild Iris, as later renamed Super RoRo
100,returned to the country from its one-month conduction voyage to and from Japan.

The Court of Appeals ruled against the governing applicability of the POEA-SEC and, on that basis, deleted the NLRCs award of
US$60,000.00 and US$2,452.00 by way of disability benefits and sickness allowance, respectively. An excerpt of the appellate courts explanation:

xxx Both parties do not dispute the existence of the POEA approved contract signed by the parties. The said contract
is the law between the contracting parties and absent any showing that its provisions are wholly or in part contrary to law,
morals, good policy, it shall be enforced to the letter by the contracting parties (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Wong,
G.R. No. 120859, June 26, 2001). The contract in question is for a duration of one (1) month. Being a valid contract between
Delos Santos and the [respondent], the provisions thereof, specifically with respect to the one (1) month period of employment
has the force of law between them (D.M. Consunji vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 116572, December 18, 2000). Perforce, the said
contract has already expired and is no longer in effect.

The fact that Delos Santos continued to work in the same vessel which sailed within Philippine waters does not mean
that the POEA standard employment contract continues to be enforced between the parties. The employment of Delos Santos
is within the Philippines, and not on a foreign shore. As correctly pointed out by [respondent], the provisions of the Labor Code
shall govern their employer-employee relationship. xxx. (Words in bracket added.)

The Court agrees with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for two (2) main reasons. First, we the start with something elementary, i.e.,
POEA was created primarily to undertake a systematic program for overseas employment of Filipino workers and to protect their rights to fair and
equitable employment practices.[16] And to ensure that overseas workers, including seafarers on board ocean-going vessels, are amply protected,
the POEA is authorized to formulate employment standards in accordance with welfare objectives of the overseas employment program.[17] Given
this consideration, the Court is at a loss to understand why the POEA-SEC should be made to continue to apply to domestic employment, as here,
involving a Filipino seaman on board an inter-island vessel.

Just as basic as the first reason is the fact that Delos Santos POEA-approved employment contract was for a definite term of one (1)
month only, doubtless fixed to coincide with the pre-determined one-month long Philippines-Japan-Philippines conduction-voyage run. After the

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lapse of the said period, his employment under the POEA-approved contract may be deemed as functus oficio and Delos Santos employment
pursuant thereto considered automatically terminated, there being no mutually-agreed renewal or extension of the expired contract. [18] This is as it
should be. For, as we have held in the landmark case of Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission:[19]

From the foregoing cases, it is clear that seafarers are considered contractual employees. Their employment is
governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract
expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 [of the
Labor Code] whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking . . . We need not depart from the rulings of
the Court in the two aforementioned cases which indeed constitute stare decisis with respect to the employment status of
seafarers. (Underscoring and words in bracket added)

Petitioners posture, citing Section 2 (A)[20] in relation to Section 18[21] of the POEA-SEC about the POEA approved contract still
subsisting since Delos Santos was never signed off from the vessel and repatriated to Manila, the point of hire, is untenable. With the view we have
of things, Delos Santos is deemed to have been signed off when he acceded to a new employment arrangement offered by the respondent. A
seaman need not physically disembarked from a vessel at the expiration of his employment contract to have such contract considered terminated.
And the repatriation aspect of the contract assumes significance only where the vessel remains in a foreign port. For, repatriation presupposes a
return to ones country of origin or citizenship. [22] In the case at bar, however, there can be quibbling that MV Wild Iris returned to the port of Cebu
with Delos Santos on board. Parenthetically, while the parties are agreed that their underlying contract was executed in the country, the records do
not indicate what city or province of the Philippines is the specific point of hire. While petitioner says it is Manila, she did not bother to attach to her
petition a copy of the contract of employment in question.

Petitioner next submits, echoing the NLRCs holding, that the POEA-approved contract remained in full force and effect even after the expiry thereof
owing to the interplay of the following circumstances: 1) Delos Santos, after such contract expiration, did not conclude another contract of
employment with respondent, but was asked to remain and work on board the same vessel just the same; and 2) If the parties intended their
employer-employee relationship to be under the aegis of a new contract, such intention should have been embodied in a new agreement.

Contract extension or continuation by mutual consent appears to be petitioners thesis.

We are not persuaded.

The fact that respondent retained Delos Santos and allowed him to remain on board the vessel cannot plausibly be interpreted, in
context, as evidencing an intention on its part to continue with the POEA-SEC. In the practical viewpoint, there could have been no sense in
consenting to renewal since the rationale for the execution of the POEA-approved contract had already been served and achieved.

At any rate, factors obtain arguing against the notion that respondent consented to contract extension under the same terms and
conditions prevailing when the original contract expired. Stated a bit differently, there are compelling reasons to believe that respondent retained
the services of the acceding Delos Santos, as the Court of Appeals aptly observed, but under domestic terms and conditions. W e refer first to the
reduced salary of Delos Santos payable in Philippine peso[23] which, significantly enough, he received without so much of a protest. As respondent
stated in its Comment, without any controverting response from petitioner, Delos Santos, for the period ending October 31, 1995, was drawing a
salary at the rate of P8,475.00 a month, whereas the compensation package stipulated under the POEA-approved contract provided for a US$613
basic monthly salary and a US$184 fixed monthly overtime pay. And secondly, MV Super RoRo 100 was no longer engaged in foreign trading as it
was no longer intended as an ocean-going ship. Accordingly, it does not make sense why a seafarer of goodwill or a manning agency of the same
disposition would insist on being regulated by an overseas employment agency under its standard employment contract, which governs
employment of Filipino seamen on board ocean-going vessels.[24]

Petitioners submission about the parties not having entered into another employment contract after the expiration of the POEA-approved
employment contract, ergo, the extension of the expired agreement, is flawed by the logic holding it together. For, it presupposes that an
agreement to do or to give does not bind, unless it is embodied in a written instrument. It is elementary, however, that, save in very rare instances
where certain formal requisites go into its validity, a contract, to be valid and binding between the parties, need not be in writing. A contract is
perfected when the contracting minds agree on the object and cause thereof. [25] And, as earlier discussed, several
circumstantial indicia tended to prove that a new arrangement under domestic terms was agreed upon by the principal players to govern the
employment of Delos Santos after the return of MV Wild Iris to the country to engage in coastwise trading.

Given the foregoing perspective, the disallowance under the decision subject of review of the petitioners claim for maximum disability benefits and
sickness allowance is legally correct. As it were, Delos Santos right to such benefits is predicated on the continued enforceability of POEA-SEC
when he contracted his illness, which, needless to stress, was not the case.
Likewise legally correct is the deletion of the award of attorneys fees, the NLRC having failed to explain petitioners entitlement thereto. As a matter
of sound policy, an award of attorneys fee remains the exception rather than the rule. It must be stressed, as aptly observed by the appellate court,
that it is necessary for the trial court, the NLRC in this case, to make express findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the
exception. In fine, the factual, legal or equitable justification for the award must be set forth in the text of the decision.[26] The matter of attorneys
fees cannot be touched once and only in the fallo of the decision, else, the award should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural. [27] In
the absence of a stipulation, attorneys fees are ordinarily not recoverable; otherwise a premium shall be placed on the right to litigate.[28] They are
not awarded every time a party wins a suit.

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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

2. INTEGRATED CONTRACTOR AND PLUMBING WORKS, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GLEN
SOLON, respondents. [G.R. No. 152427. August 9, 2005]

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review assails the Decision[1] dated October 30, 2001 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution[2] dated February 28, 2002
in CA-G.R. SP No. 60136, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The decision affirmed the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which declared private respondent Glen Solon a regular employee of the petitioner and awarded him 13th month pay, service
incentive leave pay, reinstatement to his former position with full backwages from the time his salary was withheld until his reinstatement.

Petitioner is a plumbing contractor. Its business depends on the number and frequency of the projects it is able to contract with its clients.[3]

Private respondent Solon worked for petitioner. His employment records is as follows:

December 14, 1994 up to January 14, 1995 St. Charbel Warehouse

February 1, 1995 up to April 30, 1995 St. Charbel Warehouse
May 23, 1995 up to June 23, 1995 St. Charbel Warehouse
August 15, 1995 up to October 31, 1995 St. Charbel Warehouse
November 2, 1995 up to January 31, 1996 St. Charbel Warehouse
May 13, 1996 up to June 15, 1996 Ayala Triangle
August 27, 1996 up to November 30, 1996 St. Charbel Warehouse[4]
July 14, 1997 up to November 1997 ICPWI Warehouse
November 1997 up to January 5, 1998 Cathedral Heights
January 6, 1998 Rockwell Center[5]

On February 23, 1998, while private respondent was about to log out from work, he was informed by the warehouseman that the main office
had instructed them to tell him it was his last day of work as he had been terminated. When private respondent went to the petitioners office on
February 24, 1998 to verify his status, he found out that indeed, he had been terminated. He went back to petitioners office on February 27, 1998 to
sign a clearance so he could claim his 13th month pay and tax refunds. However, he had second thoughts and refused to sign the clearance when
he read the clearance indicating he had resigned. On March 6, 1998, he filed a complaint alleging that he was illegally dismissed without just cause
and without due process.[6]

In a Decision dated February 26, 1999, the Labor Arbiter ruled that private respondent was a regular employee and could only be removed
for cause. Petitioner was ordered to reinstate private respondent to his former position with full backwages from the time his salary was withheld
until his actual reinstatement, and pay him service incentive leave pay, and 13 th month pay for three years in the amount of P2,880 and P14,976,
respectively.

Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which ruled:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing and in the interest of justice, the decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby AFFIRMED with a
MODIFICATION that the 13th month pay should be given only for the year 1997 and portion of 1998. Backwages shall be computed from the time
he was illegally dismissed up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Likewise, service incentive leave pay for three (3) years is also awarded to
appellee in the amount of P2,880.00.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied.[8]

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that the private respondent
was a regular employee and in awarding 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and holiday pay to the private respondent despite evidence of
payment. The said petition was dismissed for lack of merit.[9]

Before us now, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) Whether the respondent is a project employee of the petitioner or a regular
employee; and (2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred seriously in awarding 13 th month pay for the entire year of 1997 and service incentive leave
pay to the respondent and without taking cognizance of the evidence presented by petitioner. [10]

The petitioner asserts that the private respondent was a project employee. Thus, when the project was completed and private respondent
was not re-assigned to another project, petitioner did not violate any law since it was petitioners discretion to re-assign the private respondent to
other projects.[11]

Article 280 of the Labor Code states:

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The provisions of written agreement of the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season (Italics supplied.)

We held in Tomas Lao Construction v. NLRC[12] that the principal test in determining whether an employee is a project employee or regular
employee, is, whether he is assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration (and scope) of which are specified at the time the
employee is engaged in the project.[13] Project refers to a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer,
but which is distinct and separate and identifiable from the undertakings of the company. Such job or undertaking begins and ends at determined or
determinable times.[14]

In our review of the employment contracts of private respondent, we are convinced he was initially a project employee. The services he
rendered, the duration and scope of each project are clear indications that he was hired as a project employee.

We concur with the NLRC that while there were several employment contracts between private respondent and petitioner, in all of them,
private respondent performed tasks which were usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of petitioner. A review of private
respondents work assignments patently showed he belonged to a work pool tapped from where workers are and assigned whenever their services
were needed. In a work pool, the workers do not receive salaries and are free to seek other employment during temporary breaks in the business.
They are like regular seasonal workers insofar as the effect of temporary cessation of work is concerned. This arrangement is beneficial to both the
employer and employee for it prevents the unjust situation of coddling labor at the expense of capital and at the same time enables the workers to
attain the status of regular employees.[15] Nonetheless, the pattern of re-hiring and the recurring need for his services are sufficient evidence of the
necessity and indispensability of such services to petitioners business or trade. [16]

In Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC[17] we ruled that once a project or work pool employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently, re-
hired by the same employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business
or trade of the employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular employee.

In this case, did the private respondent become a regular employee then?

The test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if
the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient
evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of that activity to the business.[18] Thus, we held that where the employment of project employees is
extended long after the supposed project has been finished, the employees are removed from the scope of project employees and are considered
regular employees.[19]

While length of time may not be the controlling test for project employment, it is vital in determining if the employee was hired for a specific
undertaking or tasked to perform functions vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. Here, private
respondent had been a project employee several times over. His employment ceased to be coterminous with specific projects when he was
repeatedly re-hired due to the demands of petitioners business.[20] Where from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to
preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down as contrary to public policy, morals, good customs or
public order.[21]

Further, Policy Instructions No. 20 requires employers to submit a report of an employees termination to the nearest public employment office
every time his employment was terminated due to a completion of a project. The failure of the employer to file termination reports is an indication
that the employee is not a project employee.[22] Department Order No. 19 superseding Policy Instructions No. 20 also expressly provides that the
report of termination is one of the indications of project employment.[23] In the case at bar, there was only one list of terminated workers submitted to
the Department of Labor and Employment.[24] If private respondent was a project employee, petitioner should have submitted a termination report
for every completion of a project to which the former was assigned.

Juxtaposing private respondents employment history, vis the requirements in the test to determine if he is a regular worker, we are
constrained to say he is.

As a regular worker, private respondent is entitled to security of tenure under Article 279 of the Labor Code [25] and can only be removed for
cause. We found no valid cause attending to private respondents dismissal and found also that his dismissal was without due process.

Additionally, Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that

... Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized
cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is
sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment

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 The failure of the petitioner to comply with these procedural guidelines renders its dismissal of private respondent, illegal. An illegally
dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement with full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement, pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code.

However, we note that the private respondent had been paid his 13th month pay for the year 1997. The Court of Appeals erred in granting the
same to him.

Article 95(a) of the Labor Code governs the award of service incentive leave. It provides that every employee who has rendered at least one
year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay, and Section 3, Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations, defines the term at least one year of service to mean service within 12 months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the
date the employee started working, including authorized absences and paid regular holidays, unless the working days in the establishment as a
matter of practice or policy, or that provided in the employment contract is less than 12 months, in which case said period shall be considered as
one year. Accordingly, private respondents service incentive leave credits of five days for every year of service, based on the actual service
rendered to the petitioner, in accordance with each contract of employment should be computed up to the date of reinstatement pursuant to Article
279 of the Labor Code.[26]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated October 30, 2001 and the Resolution dated February 28, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 60136, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioner is hereby ORDERED to (1) reinstate the respondent with no loss of
seniority rights and other privileges; and (2) pay respondent his backwages, 13th month pay for the year 1998 and Service Incentive Leave Pay
computed from the date of his illegal dismissal up to the date of his actual reinstatement. Costs against petitioner.

3.Universal Robina Corp vs Catapang oct 14 2005

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Petitioner Universal Robina Corporation is a corporation duly organized and existing under the Philippine laws, while petitioner Randy
Gregorio is the manager of the petitioner companys duck farm in Calauan, Laguna.[1]
The individual respondents were hired by the petitioner company on various dates from 1991 to 1993 to work at its duck farm
in Barangay Sto. Tomas, Calauan, Laguna. The respondents were hired under an employment contract which provided for a five-month
period. After the expiration of the said employment contracts, the petitioner company would renew them and re-employ the respondents. This
practice continued until sometime in 1996, when the petitioners informed the respondents that they were no longer renewing their employment
contracts.[2]
In October 1996, the respondents filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorneys fees
against the petitioners. The complaints were later consolidated.

On March 30, 1999, after due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the respondents:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that complainants have indeed been
illegally dismissed from their employment.
Accordingly, respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate individual complainants to their former positions without
loss of seniority rights and to pay them their backwages as follows:

Complainants Amount
1. Reynaldo Ararao P113,703.20
2. Carlos Ararao P100,372.48
3. Resty Alcoran P100,372.48
4. Richard Coronado P113,703.20
5. Quirino Platero P113,703.20
6. Benito Catapang P113,703.20
7. Jose Loria, Jr. P100,372.48
8. Elpidio Villanueva P113,703.20
9. Jonathan Villanueva P113,703.20
10. Baltazar Villanueva P113,703.20
11. Victoriano Loria P144,881.10
12. Roderick Pangao P100,372.48
13. Lito Cabrera P113,703.20
14. Elmer Hiling P113,703.20
15. Jaime Villegas P113,703.20
16. Angelito Conchada P119,192.20
17. Juan Aristado P113,703.20
18. Joel Villanueva P113,703.20
19. Ben Cervas P113,703.20
20. Ruel Marikit P113,703.20
21. Ireneo Comendador P113,703.20
7|Page
 Total ------------------------ P2,339,933.44

Respondents are likewise ordered to pay fifteen percent (15%) of the total amount due, or P 350,990.01, as and by
way of attorneys fees. SO ORDERED.[3]

On May 17, 1999, the petitioners filed an Appeal Memorandum with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on the ground that the Labor
Arbiter erred in ruling that the respondents are the petitioner companys regular employees.
Meanwhile, on May 18, 1999, the respondents filed a Motion for Enforcement of Reinstatement Order with the Labor Arbiter. On June 3,
1999, the latter issued an Order, which reads in full:

Finding the Motion for Enforcement of Reinstatement Order dated 18 May 1999, filed by the complainants to be in order, respondents are
hereby directed to immediately comply in good faith to the reinstatement aspect of the Decision of this Office dated 30 March 1999.

Furthermore, it appearing from the records that several individuals in this case were inadvertently omitted as party-
complainants in the aforesaid Decision, clarification is hereby made that the complainants hereinbelow set forth are to be
deemed included in the coverage of the said decision with the corresponding right(s) to their backwages, to wit:

1. Alvin Alcantara - P129,126.40

2. Onofre Casano - P106,917.20
3. Joseph Chuidian - P104,165.10
4. Ramon Joyosa - P128,029.20
5. Pablito Redondo - P105,409.20
6. Ramil Roxas - P109,330.00
7. Resty Salazar - P105,296.10
8. Noel Trinidad - P108,312.10
9. Felicisimo Varela - P119,358.20
TOTAL - P1,015,943.50 SO ORDERED.[4]

On June 21, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution enforcing the immediate reinstatement of the respondents as mandated
in the March 30, 1999 Decision.
On July 13, 1999, the petitioners manifested to the Labor Arbiter that they can reinstate only 17 of the 30 employees in view of the phase
out of the petitioner companys Agricultural Section as early as 1996. They averred that there were no other available positions substantially similar
to the positions previously occupied by the other 13 respondents, but that 10 of them could be accommodated at the farms Duck Dressing Section
which operates at an average of three days a week only.[5]

On August 2, 1999, the Sheriff filed a Report stating that the petitioners had not yet reinstated the respondents. [6] The respondents then
urged the Labor Arbiter to order their physical or payroll reinstatement and to cite the petitioners in contempt. On November 26, 1999, the Labor
Arbiter issued an Order[7] directing the petitioners, under pain of contempt, to comply with the March 30, 1999 Decision.

On December 16, 1999, 17 employees were reinstated to their former positions. Thereafter, the respondents moved for the immediate
reinstatement of the remaining 13 respondents. In the meantime, the petitioners manifested to the Labor Arbiter about the closure of the duck farm
effective March 15, 2000.[8]

On February 9, 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order[9] directing the petitioners to immediately effect the actual or payroll
reinstatement of the remaining 13 respondents. In the said Order, the petitioners were likewise directed to settle whatever financial accountabilities
they may have with the said respondents due to the delay in complying with the reinstatement aspect of the March 30, 1999 Decision.

On February 16, 2000, the respondents manifested that the petitioners still failed and refused to comply with the February 9, 2000 Order.
That same day, the Labor Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution commanding the Sheriff to cause the immediate reinstatement of the 13
respondents and to collect their withheld salaries.[10]

On February 21, 2000, the respondents moved for the issuance of a notice of garnishment to collect the accumulated withheld wages of
the 17 respondents who were reinstated on December 16, 1999 amounting to P649,400.00. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion and issued a
Second Alias Writ of Execution directing the Sheriff to proceed to collect the said amount plus execution fees. [11]

Thereafter, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to reconsider the February 9, 2000 Order and to quash the Alias Writ of Execution.
They reiterated their previous contention that they are unable to comply with the order either because the section to which the 13 respondents were
previously assigned had been phased out or the positions previously held by them have already been filled up. [12]

On March 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order[13] denying the petitioners motion to quash insofar as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned as well as the motion to reconsider and set aside the February 9, 2000 Order. In case of failure to comply with the reinstatement of the
13 respondents, the Labor Arbiter directed the petitioner company to pay them separation pay instead. [14]

8|Page
 On March 13, 2000, the petitioners filed a Memorandum and Notice of Appeal with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order[15] with the NLRC, assailing the February 9, 2000 and March 1, 2000 Orders and the two Alias Writs of Execution issued by the Labor Arbiter.

On November 22, 2000, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with the modification that the award of attorneys fees was
reduced to 10% of the total monetary award.[16]

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). On August 21, 2003, the CA denied the petition for
lack of merit.[17] The CA held that after rendering more than one year of continuous service, the respondents became regular employees of the
petitioners by operation of law. Moreover, the petitioners used the five-month contract of employment as a convenient subterfuge to prevent the
respondents from becoming regular employees and such contractual arrangement should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public
policy or morals. The petitioners act of repeatedly and continuously hiring the respondents in a span of three to five years to do the same kind of
work negates their assertion that the respondents were hired for a specific project or undertaking only. As to the issue of the failure to reinstate the
13 respondents pending appeal, the CA opined that the petitioners should have at least reinstated them in the payroll if there were indeed no longer
any available positions for which they could be accommodated.[18] Finally, the CA did not believe that the petitioners counsel was not furnished with
copies of the assailed orders and the alias writs of execution considering that, after the issuance of the said orders, the petitioners were able to file
several pleadings questioning the same.[19]

On September 23, 2003, the petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion for Additional Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration of the
CA Decision.[20] They alleged therein that they received a copy of the decision on September 8, 2003 and had until September 23, 2003 to file a
motion for reconsideration. They then prayed for an extension of 10 days, or until October 3, 2003, to submit a motion for reconsideration.

Realizing their error, the petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration two days later. In a Resolution [21] dated September 30, 2003,
the CA denied the petitioners earlier motion for extension of time for being a prohibited pleading. Subsequently, the petitioners filed their Urgent
Motion to Admit Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA merely noted the petitioners motion for reconsideration in its April 15, 2004
Resolution. This prompted the petitioners to file a Motion to Resolve Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. [22] Finding no cogent reason to depart
from its previous resolution denying the motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, the CA denied the said motion for lack of
merit on July 19, 2004.[23]
Hence, this petition for review wherein the petitioners raise the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE RESPONDENTS ATTAINED THE STATUS
OF REGULAR EMPLOYMENT AFTER THE LAPSE OF ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT DESPITE THE UNAVAILABILITY OF POSITIONS
WHERE THE THIRTEEN (13) RESPONDENTS ARE TO BE REINSTATED THEY SHOULD STILL BE REINSTATED
THROUGH PAYROLL.

III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE
PETITIONERS SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE ALLEGED WITHHELD SALARIES OF THE
RESPONDENTS FROM THE DATE OF ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT DESPITE THAT RESPONDENTS BELATED OR NON-
REINSTATEMENT CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PETITIONERS.

IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RESOLVED PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
CONSIDERING THAT THE DELAY WAS ONLY FOR TWO (2) DAYS AND WAS THE RESULT OF AN HONEST MISTAKE.[24]
The petitioners submit that the respondents are not regular employees. They aver that it is of no moment that the respondents
have rendered service for more than a year since they were covered by the five-month individual contracts to which they duly
acquiesced. The petitioners contend that they were free to terminate the services of the respondents at the expiration Of their individual
contracts. The petitioners maintain that, in doing so, they merely implemented the terms of the contracts. [25]
The petitioners assert that the respondents contracts of employment were not intended to circumvent security of tenure. They point out
that the respondents knowingly and voluntarily agreed to sign the contracts without the petitioners having exercised any undue advantage over
them. Moreover, there is no evidence showing that the petitioners exerted moral dominance on the respondents. [26]

The petitioners further assert that they cannot be compelled to actually reinstate, or merely reinstate in the payroll the 13 respondents
considering there are no longer any available positions in the company. They submit that reinstatement presupposes that the previous positions
from which the respondents had been removed still exist or that there are unfilled positions, more or less, of similar nature as the ones previously
occupied by the said employees. Consequently, they cannot be made to pay the salaries of these employees from the time the writ of execution
was issued.[27]

Finally, the petitioners aver that their motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision should have been admitted by the CA considering
that the delay was only for two days and such delay was due to an honest mistake. They maintain that the ends of substantial justice would have

9|Page
been better served if the motion for reconsideration was resolved since it raised critical issues previously raised in the petition but not resolved by
the CA.[28]

For their part, the respondents aver that the instant petition should be dismissed outright because the CA Decision has already become
final since the petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration beyond the reglementary 15-day period. They also aver that the motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading, did not suspend the running of the period to file a motion for reconsideration,
which is also the period for filing an appeal with this Court. Hence, at the time the present petition was filed with this Court, the period for filing the
appeal had already lapsed.[29] The respondents further aver that the petition should likewise be dismissed for lack of a verified statement of material
dates. They assert that the Rules of Court requires a separate verified statement of material dates and its incorporation in the body of the petition is
not substantial compliance of such requirement.[30]
The respondents aver that they acquired the status as regular employees after rendering one year of service to the petitioner company.
They contend that the contracts providing for a fixed period of employment should be struck down as contrary to public policy, morals, good
customs or public order as it was designed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security. [31]
The respondents contend that the order directing their payroll reinstatement was proper considering that the petitioners have failed to
actually reinstate them.[32] They assert that the delay in the reinstatement of the 13 respondents could only be attributed to the petitioners; hence,
they are liable for withheld salaries to these employees.[33]

It appears that the present petition has, indeed, been filed beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. This period is set forth in Section 2, Rule 45, which provides as follows:

SEC. 2. Time for filing; extension. The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice
of judgment. (Emphasis supplied.)
In conjunction with the said provision, Section 1, Rule 52 of the same Rules provides:
SEC. 1. Period for filing. A party may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within fifteen
(15) days from notice threof, with proof of service on the adverse party.

Clearly, the period for filing a motion for reconsideration and a petition for review with this Court are the same, that is, 15 days from notice
of the judgment. When an aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration within the said period, the period for filing an appeal is suspended. If
the motion is denied, the aggrieved party is given another 15-day period from notice of such denial within which to file a petition for review under
Rule 45. It must be stressed that the aggrieved party will be given a fresh 15-day period only when he has filed his motion for reconsideration in
due time on or before the expiration of the original 15-day period. Otherwise, if the motion for reconsideration is filed out of time and no appeal has
been filed, the subject decision becomes final and executory. [34] As such, it becomes immutable and can no longer be attacked by any of the parties
or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. [35]

The petitioners received the CA Decision on September 8, 2003; hence, they had until September 23, 2003 within which to file a motion
for reconsideration, or an appeal, through a petition for review, with this Court. Instead, the petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration on September 23, 2003, which is a prohibited pleading. [36] Thus, it did not suspend the running of the period for filing an
appeal. Consequently, the period to file a petition for review with this Court also expired on September 23, 2003. Instead of going straight to this
Court to attempt to file a petition for review (which had already expired), the petitioners pursued recourse in the CA by filing their motion for
reconsideration two days later, or on September 25, 2003. The CA merely noted the same. Dissatisfied, the petitioners subsequently filed a motion
to resolve their motion for reconsideration. The CA acted on this motion only on July 19, 2004 and denied the same for lack of merit.

In filing their petition for review with this Court, the petitioners counted the 15-day period from their receipt of the July 19, 2004 CA
Resolution on August 4, 2004. Hence, according to their Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review which they filed on August 19,
2004, they had until that day within which to file a petition for review. They then asked the Court that they be granted an extension of 30 days, or
until September 21, 2004 within which to file their petition. The Court granted the motion on the belief that the petitioners motion for reconsideration
before the CA was duly filed and that the assailed July 19, 2004 CA Resolution had denied the said motion. Thereafter, the petitioners filed their
petition for review on September 20, 2004.

It is, therefore, evident from the foregoing that the present petition was filed way beyond the reglementary period. Hence, its outright
dismissal would be proper. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. [37] Just as a losing party has the privilege
to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision.[38]

Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of
exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such deviation. [39] In this case, the petitioners failed to prove the existence of any fact which would
warrant the relaxation of the rules. In fact, they have not even acknowledged that their petition was filed beyond the reglementary period.
In any case, we find that the CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter correctly categorized the respondents as regular employees of the
petitioner company. In Abasolo v. National Labor Relations Commission,[40] the Court reiterated the test in determining whether one is a regular
employee:

The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the
former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by

10 | P a g e
 considering the nature of work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if
the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely
intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not
indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such
activity and while such activity exists.[41]

Thus, we quote with approval the following excerpt from the decision of the CA:

It is obvious that the said five-month contract of employment was used by petitioners as a convenient subterfuge to
prevent private respondents from becoming regular employees. Such contractual arrangement should be struck down or
disregarded as contrary to public policy or morals. To uphold the same would, in effect, permit petitioners to avoid hiring
permanent or regular employees by simply hiring them on a temporary or casual basis, thereby violating the employees
security of tenure in their jobs.

Petitioners act of repeatedly and continuously hiring private respondents in a span of 3 to 5 years to do the same
kind of work negates their contention that private respondents were hired for a specific project or undertaking only. [42]

Further, factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are
generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence. [43] WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

4. Mercado vs NLRC Sept 5, 1991

PADILLA, J.:p

Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the decision * of the respondent national Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 8 August 1984 which
affirmed the decision of respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino with the slight modification of deleting the award of financial assistance to
petitioners, and the resolution of the respondent NLRC dated 17 August 1987, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

This petition originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive
leave benefits, emergency cost of living allowances and 13th month pay, filed by above-named petitioners against private respondents Aurora L.
Cruz, Francisco Borja, Leticia C. Borja and Sto. Nio Realty Incorporated, with Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, National Labor Relations
Commission in San Fernando, Pampanga. 1

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were agricultural workers utilized by private respondents in all the agricultural phases of work on the
7 1/2 hectares of ace land and 10 hectares of sugar land owned by the latter; that Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Leon Santillan worked in the farm of
private respondents since 1949, Fortunato Mercado, Jr. and Antonio Mercado since 1972 and the rest of the petitioners since 1960 up to April
1979, when they were all allegedly dismissed from their employment; and that, during the period of their employment, petitioners received the
following daily wages:

From 1962-1963 P1.50

1963-1965 P2.00
1965-1967 P3.00
1967-1970 P4.00
1970-1973 P5.00
1973-1975 P5.00
1975-1978 P6.00
1978-1979 P7.00

Private respondent Aurora Cruz in her answer to petitioners' complaint denied that said petitioners were her regular employees and instead averred
that she engaged their services, through Spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, their "mandarols", that is, persons who take charge
in supplying the number of workers needed by owners of various farms, but only to do a particular phase of agricultural work necessary in rice
production and/or sugar cane production, after which they would be free to render services to other farm owners who need their services. 2

The other private respondents denied having any relationship whatsoever with the petitioners and state that they were merely registered owners of
the land in question included as corespondents in this case. 3

The dispute in this case revolves around the issue of whether or not petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers and therefore entitled to
the benefits which they pray for. And corollary to this, whether or not said petitioners were illegally dismissed by private respondents.

11 | P a g e
Respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino ruled in favor of private respondents and held that petitioners were not regular and permanent
workers of the private respondents, for the nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that they were required to perform phases of
agricultural work for a definite period of time after which their services would be available to any other farm owner. 4 Respondent Labor Arbiter
deemed petitioners' contention of working twelve (12) hours a day the whole year round in the farm, an exaggeration, for the reason that the
planting of lice and sugar cane does not entail a whole year as reported in the findings of the Chief of the NLRC Special Task Force. 5 Even the
sworn statement of one of the petitioners, Fortunato Mercado, Jr., the son of spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, indubitably show
that said petitioners were hired only as casuals, on an "on and off" basis, thus, it was within the prerogative of private respondent Aurora Cruz
either to take in the petitioners to do further work or not after any single phase of agricultural work had been completed by them. 6

Respondent Labor Arbiter was also of the opinion that the real cause which triggered the filing of the complaint by the petitioners who are related to
one another, either by consanguinity or affinity, was the filing of a criminal complaint for theft against Reynaldo Mercado, son of spouses Fortunate
Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, for they even asked the help of Jesus David, Zone Chairman of the locality to talk to private respondent, Aurora
Cruz regarding said criminal case. 7 In his affidavit, Jesus David stated under oath that petitioners were never regularly employed by private
respondent Aurora Cruz but were, on-and-off hired to work and render services when needed, thus adding further support to the conclusion that
petitioners were not regular and permanent employees of private respondent Aurora Cruz. 8

Respondent Labor Arbiter further held that only money claims from years 1976-1977, 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 may be properly considered since
all the other money claims have prescribed for having accrued beyond the three (3) year period prescribed by law. 9 On grounds of equity, however,
respondent Labor Arbiter awarded petitioners financial assistance by private respondent Aurora Cruz, in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) to be equitably divided among an the petitioners except petitioner Fortunato Mercado, Jr. who had manifested his disinterest in the
further prosecution of his complaint against private respondent. 10

Both parties filed their appeal with the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC). Petitioners questioned respondent Labor Arbiter's finding
that they were not regular and permanent employees of private respondent Aurora Cruz while private respondents questioned the award of
financial assistance granted by respondent Labor Arbiter.

The NLRC ruled in favor of private respondents affirming the decision of the respondent Labor Arbiter, with the modification of the deletion of the
award for financial assistance to petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision of the NLRC reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino dated March 3, 1983 is hereby modified in that the award of
P10,000.00 financial assistance should be deleted. The said Decision is affirmed in all other aspects.

SO ORDERED. 11

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Third Division of the NLRC dated 8 August 1984; however, the NLRC denied tills
motion in a resolution dated 17 August 1987. 12

In the present Petition for certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the above-mentioned rulings. Petitioners contend that respondent Labor Arbiter
and respondent NLRC erred when both ruled that petitioners are not regular and permanent employees of private respondents based on the terms
and conditions of their hiring, for said findings are contrary to the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code. 13 They submit that petitioners'
employment, even assuming said employment were seasonal, continued for so many years such that, by express provision of Article 280 of the
Labor Code as amended, petitioners have become regular and permanent employees. 14

15
Moreover, they argue that Policy Instruction No. 12 of the Department of Labor and Employment clearly lends support to this contention, when it
states:

PD 830 has defined the concept of regular and casual employment. What determines regularity or casualness is not the
employment contract, written or otherwise, but the nature of the job. If the job is usually necessary or desirable to the main
business of the employer, then employment is regular. If not, then the employment is casual. Employment for a definite period
which exceeds one (1) year shall be considered re for the duration of the definite period.

This concept of re and casual employment is designed to put an end to casual employment in regular jobs which has been
abused by many employers to prevent so-called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular employees or to prevent casuals
from joining unions.

This new concept should be strictly enforced to give meaning to the constitutional guarantee of employment tenure. 16

Tested under the laws invoked, petitioners submit that it would be unjust, if not unlawful, to consider them as casual workers since they have been
doing all phases of agricultural work for so many years, activities which are undeniably necessary, desirable and indispensable in the rice and
sugar cane production business of the private respondents. 17

12 | P a g e
In the Comment filed by private respondents, they submit that the decision of the Labor Arbiter, as aimed by respondent NLRC, that petitioners
were only hired as casuals, is based on solid evidence presented by the parties and also by the Chief of the Special Task Force of the NLRC
Regional Office and, therefore, in accordance with the rule on findings of fact of administrative agencies, the decision should be given great
weight. 18Furthermore, they contend that the arguments used by petitioners in questioning the decision of the Labor Arbiter were based on matters
which were not offered as evidence in the case heard before the regional office of the then Ministry of Labor but rather in the case before the Social
Security Commission, also between the same parties. 19

Public respondent NLRC filed a separate comment prepared by the Solicitor General. It submits that it has long been settled that findings of fact of
administrative agencies if supported by substantial evidence are entitled to great weight. 20 Moreover, it argues that petitioners cannot be deemed
to be permanent and regular employees since they fall under the exception stated in Article 280 of the Labor Code, which reads:

The provisions of written agreements to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion
or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. 21 (emphasis supplied)

The Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda after which the case was
deemed submitted for decision.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

The invariable rule set by the Court in reviewing administrative decisions of the Executive Branch of the Government is that the findings of fact
made therein are respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant; 22 that it is not for
the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of
the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence; 23 that the administrative decision in matters within the executive's jurisdiction can only
be set aside upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. 24

The questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter reads:

Focusing the spotlight of judicious scrutiny on the evidence on record and the arguments of both parties, it is our well-discerned opinion
that the petitioners are not regular and permanent workers of the respondents. The very nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring
reveal that the petitioners were required to perform p of cultural work for a definite period, after which their services are available to any
farm owner. We cannot share the arguments of the petitioners that they worked continuously the whole year round for twelve hours a
day. This, we feel, is an exaggeration which does not deserve any serious consideration inasmuch as the plan of rice and sugar cane
does not entail a whole year operation, the area in question being comparatively small. It is noteworthy that the findings of the Chief of
the Special Task Force of the Regional Office are similar to this.

In fact, the sworn statement of one of the petitioners Fortunato Mercado, Jr., the son of spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa
Mercado, indubitably shows that said petitioners were only hired as casuals, on-and-off basis. With this kind of relationship between the
petitioners and the respondent Aurora Cruz, we feel that there is no basis in law upon which the claims of the petitioners should be
sustained, more specially their complaint for illegal dismissal. It is within the prerogative of respondent Aurora Cruz either to take in the
petitioners to do further work or not after any single phase of agricultural work has been completed by them. We are of the opinion that
the real cause which triggered the filing of this complaint by the petitioners who are related to one another, either by consanguinity or
affinity was due to the filing of a criminal complaint by the respondent Aurora Cruz against Reynaldo Mercado, son of spouses Fortunato
Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado. In April 1979, according to Jesus David, Zone Chairman of the locality where the petitioners and
respondent reside, petitioner Fortunato Mercado, Sr. asked for help regarding the case of his son, Reynaldo, to talk with respondent
Aurora Cruz and the said Zone Chairman also stated under oath that the petitioners were never regularly employed by respondent
Aurora Cruz but were on-and-off hired to work to render services when needed. 25

A careful examination of the foregoing statements reveals that the findings of the Labor Arbiter in the case are ably supported by evidence. There
is, therefore, no circumstance that would warrant a reversal of the questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the National Labor
Relations Commission.

The contention of petitioners that the second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code should have been applied in their case presents an
opportunity to clarify the afore-mentioned provision of law.

Article 280 of the Labor Code reads in full:

Article 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of
the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform

13 | P a g e
 activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has
rendered at least one year of service whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect
to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists.

The first paragraph answers the question of who are employees. It states that, regardless of any written or oral agreement to the contrary, an
employee is deemed regular where he is engaged in necessary or desirable activities in the usual business or trade of the employer, except for
project employees.

A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or where the work or service to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season 26 as in the present case.

The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as "casual" employees, all other employees who do not fan under the definition of the preceding
paragraph. The proviso, in said second paragraph, deems as regular employees those "casual" employees who have rendered at least one year of
service regardless of the fact that such service may be continuous or broken.

Petitioners, in effect, contend that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 is applicable to their case and that the Labor Arbiter should have
considered them regular by virtue of said proviso. The contention is without merit.

The general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the
clause that it immediately follows. 27 Thus, it has been held that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the
provision to which it is attached, and not to the statute itself or to other sections thereof. 28 The only exception to this rule is where the clear
legislative intent is to restrain or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding it (the proviso) but also earlier provisions of the statute or even
the statute itself as a whole. 29

Policy Instruction No. 12 of the Department of Labor and Employment discloses that the concept of regular and casual employees was designed to
put an end to casual employment in regular jobs, which has been abused by many employers to prevent called casuals from enjoying the benefits
of regular employees or to prevent casuals from joining unions. The same instructions show that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280
was not designed to stifle small-scale businesses nor to oppress agricultural land owners to further the interests of laborers, whether agricultural or
industrial. What it seeks to eliminate are abuses of employers against their employees and not, as petitioners would have us believe, to prevent
small-scale businesses from engaging in legitimate methods to realize profit. Hence, the proviso is applicable only to the employees who are
deemed "casuals" but not to the "project" employees nor the regular employees treated in paragraph one of Art. 280.

Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal employees, their employment legally ends upon
completion of the project or the season. The termination of their employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal. 30

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission affirming that of the Labor Arbiter, under
review, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

5. Abasolo vs NLRC GR No. 118475 Nov 29 2000

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul two Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Third Division,
dated July 6, 1994[1] and September 23, 1994[2], in its affirmance of the Decision[3] of Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Olairez dated December 29, 1993
dismissing petitioners consolidated complaint for separation pay for lack of merit.

The facts are as follows:

Private respondent La Union Tobacco Redrying Corporation (LUTORCO), which is owned by private respondent See Lin Chan, is engaged in
the business of buying, selling, redrying and processing of tobacco leaves and its by-products. Tobacco season starts sometime in October of
every year when tobacco farmers germinate their seeds in plots until they are ready for replanting in November. The harvest season starts in mid-
February. Then, the farmers sell the harvested tobacco leaves to redrying plants or do the redrying themselves. The redrying plant of LUTORCO
receives tobacco for redrying at the end of February and starts redrying in March until August or September.

Petitioners have been under the employ of LUTORCO for several years until their employment with LUTORCO was abruptly interrupted
sometime in March 1993 when Compania General de Tabaccos de Filipinas (also known as TABACALERA) took over LUTORCOs tobacco

14 | P a g e
operations. New signboards were posted indicating a change of ownership and petitioners were then asked by LUTORCO to file their respective
applications for employment with TABACALERA. Petitioners were caught unaware of the sudden change of ownership and its effect on the status
of their employment, though it was alleged that TABACALERA would assume and respect the seniority rights of the petitioners.

On March 17, 1993, the disgruntled employees instituted before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San Fernando, La Union a
complaint[4] for separation pay against private respondent LUTORCO on the ground that there was a termination of their employment due to the
closure of LUTORCO as a result of the sale and turnover to TABACALERA. Other equally affected employees filed two additional complaints [5],
also for separation pay, which were consolidated with the first complaint.

Private respondent corporation raised as its defense that it is exempt from paying separation pay and denied that it terminated the services of
the petitioners; and that it stopped its operations due to the absence of capital and operating funds caused by losses incurred from 1990 to 1992
and absence of operating funds for 1993, coupled with adverse financial conditions and downfall of prices. [6] It alleged further that LUTORCO
entered into an agreement with TABACALERA to take over LUTORCOs tobacco operations for the year 1993 in the hope of recovering from its
serious business losses in the succeeding tobacco seasons and to create a continuing source of income for the petitioners.[7] Lastly, it manifested
that LUTORCO, in good faith and with sincerity, is willing to grant reasonable and adjusted amounts to the petitioners, as financial assistance, if
and when LUTORCO could recover from its financial crisis. [8]

On December 29, 1993, Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Olairez rendered his decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. In upholding private
respondent LUTORCOs position, the Labor Arbiter declared that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefits under Article 283[9] of the Labor
Code since LUTORCO ceased to operate due to serious business losses and, furthermore, TABACALERA, the new employer of the petitioner has
assumed the seniority rights of the petitioners and other employment liabilities of the LUTORCO.[10]

Petitioners appealed[11] then the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the public respondent NLRC where it was assigned to the Third Division.

In its Opposition to Appeal[12] dated February 5, 1994 private respondent LUTORCO presented new allegations and a different stand for
denying separation pay. It alleged that LUTORCO never ceased to operate but continues to operate even after TABACALERA took over the
operations of its redrying plaint in Aringay, La Union. Petitioners were not terminated from employment but petitioners instead refused to work with
TABACALERA, despite the notice to petitioners to return to work in view of LUTORCOs need for workers at its Agoo plant which had approximately
300,000 kilos of Virginia tobacco for processing and redrying. Furthermore, petitioners are not entitled to separation pay because petitioners are
seasonal workers.

Adopting these arguments of private respondent, the NLRC, in a Resolution[13] dated July 6, 1994, affirmed the dismissal of the consolidated
complaints for separation pay. Public respondent held that petitioners are not entitled to the protection of Article 283 of the Labor Code providing for
separation pay since there was no closure of establishment or termination of services to speak of. It declared that there was no dismissal but a non-
hiring due mainly to [petitioners] own volition.[14] Moreover, the benefits of Article 283 of the Labor Code apply only to regular employees, not
seasonal workers like petitioners.[15] Inasmuch as public respondent in its Resolution[16] dated September 23, 1994 denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, petitioners now assail the correctness of the NLRCs resolution via the instant petition.

Petitioners anchor their petition on the following grounds, to wit:

I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO DISMISSAL OR TERMINATION OF SERVICES.

II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT REGULAR EMPLOYEES.

III. PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT AWARDING SEPARATION PAY TO THE PETITIONERS.

Petitioners vigorously maintain that they are regular workers of respondent LUTORCO since they worked continuously for many years with
LUTORCO, some of them even for over 20 years, and that they performed functions necessary and desirable in the usual business of
LUTORCO.[17] According to them, the fact that some of them work only during the tobacco season does not affect their status as regular workers
since they have been repeatedly called back to work for every season, year after year.[18] Thus, petitioners take exception to the factual findings and
conclusions of the NLRC, stressing that the conclusions of the NLRC were based solely on the new theory advanced by private respondent
LUTORCO only on appeal, that is, that it was only LUTORCOs tobacco re-drying operation that was sold, and hence, diametrically opposed to its
theory before the Labor Arbiter, i.e., that it is the entire company (LUTORCO) itself that was sold.

Private respondent LUTORCO, on the other hand, insists that petitioners employment was not terminated; that it never ceased to operate,
and that it was petitioners themselves who severed their employer-employee relationship when they chose employment with TABACALERA
because petitioners found more stability working with TABACALERA than with LUTORCO. [19] It likewise insists that petitioners are seasonal
workers since almost all of petitioners never continuously worked in LUTORCO for any given year [20] and they were required to reapply every year
to determine who among them shall be given work for the season. To support its argument that petitioners are seasonal workers, private
respondent LUTORCO cites the case of Mercado, Sr. v. NLRC[21] wherein this Court held that the employment of [seasonal workers] legally ends
upon the completion of the xxx season.

Clearly, the crux of the dispute boils down to two issues, namely, (a) whether petitioners employment with LUTORCO was terminated, and
(b) whether petitioners are regular or seasonal workers, as defined by law. Both issues are clearly factual in nature as they involved appreciation of
evidence presented before the NLRC whose finding of facts and conclusions thereon are entitled to respect and finality in the absence of proof that
they were arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously.[22] In the instant case, however, cogent reasons exist to apply the exception, to wit:

15 | P a g e
 First, upon a thorough review, the records speak of a sale to TABACALERA in 1993 under conditions evidently so concealed that petitioners
were not formally notified of the impending sale of LUTORCOs tobacco re-drying operations to TABACALERA and its attendant consequences with
respect to their continued employment status under TABACALERA. They came to know of the fact of that sale only when TABACALERA took over
the said tobacco re-drying operations. Thus, under those circumstances, the employment of petitioners with respondent LUTORCO was technically
terminated when TABACALERA took over LUTORCOs tobacco re-drying operations in 1993.[23]

Moreover, private respondent LUTORCOs allegation that TABACALERA assured the seniority rights of petitioners deserves scant
consideration inasmuch as the same is not supported by documentary evidence nor was it confirmed by TABACALERA. Besides, there is no law
requiring that the purchaser of an entire company should absorb the employees of the selling company. The most that the purchasing company can
do, for reasons of public policy and social justice, is to give preference to the qualified separated employees of the selling company, who in its
judgment are necessary in the continued operation of the business establishment. In the instant case, the petitioner employees were clearly
required to file new applications for employment. In reality then, they were hired as new employees of TABACALERA.

Second, private respondent LUTORCOs contention that petitioners themselves severed the employer-employee relationship by choosing to
work with TABACALERA is bereft of merit considering that its offer to return to work was made more as an afterthought when private respondent
LUTORCO later realized it still had tobacco leaves for processing and redrying. The fact that petitioners ultimately chose to work with
TABACALERA is not adverse to petitioners cause. To equate the more stable work with TABACALERA and the temporary work with LUTORCO is
illogical. Petitioners untimely separation in LUTORCO was not of their own making and therefore, not construable as resignation therefrom
inasmuch as resignation must be voluntary and made with the intention of relinquishing the office, accompanied with an act of relinquishment.[24]

Third, the test of whether or not an employee is a regular employee has been laid down in De Leon v. NLRC,[25] in which this Court held:

The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the
scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the
performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of
the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such
activity, and while such activity exists.

Thus, the nature of ones employment does not depend solely on the will or word of the employer. Nor on the procedure for hiring and the
manner of designating the employee, but on the nature of the activities to be performed by the employee, considering the employers nature of
business and the duration and scope of work to be done.[26]

In the case at bar, while it may appear that the work of petitioners is seasonal, inasmuch as petitioners have served the company for many
years, some for over 20 years, performing services necessary and indispensable to LUTORCOs business, serve as badges of regular
employment.[27] Moreover, the fact that petitioners do not work continuously for one whole year but only for the duration of the tobacco season does
not detract from considering them in regular employment since in a litany of cases [28] this Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are
called to work from time to time and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period, but are merely
considered on leave until re-employed.

Private respondents reliance on the case of Mercardo v. NLRC is misplaced considering that since in said case of Mercado, although the
respondent company therein consistently availed of the services of the petitioners therein from year to year, it was clear that petitioners therein
were not in respondent companys regular employ. Petitioners therein performed different phases of agricultural work in a given year.However,
during that period, they were free to contract their services to work for other farm owners, as in fact they did. Thus, the Court ruled in that case that
their employment would naturally end upon the completion of each project or phase of farm work for which they have been contracted.

All the foregoing considered, the public respondent NLRC in the case at bar erred in its total affirmance of the dismissal of the consolidated
complaint, for separation pay, against private respondents LUTORCO and See Lin Chan considering that petitioners are regular seasonal
employees entitled to the benefits of Article 283 of the Labor Code which applies to closures or cessation of an establishment or undertaking,
whether it be a complete or partial cessation or closure of business operation. [29]

In the case of Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying Corporation v. NLRC[30] this Court, when faced with the question of whether the
separation pay of a seasonal worker, who works for only a fraction of a year, should be equated with the separation pay of a regular worker,
resolved that question in this wise:

The amount of separation pay is based on two factors: the amount of monthly salary and the number of years of service. Although the Labor Code
provides different definitions as to what constitutes one year of service, Book Six[31] does not specifically define one year of service for purposes of
computing separation pay. However, Articles 283 and 284 both state in connection with separation pay that a fraction of at least six months shall be
considered one whole year. Applying this case at bar, we hold that the amount of separation pay which respondent members xxx should receive is
one-half (1/2) their respective average monthly pay during the last season they worked multiplied by the number of years they actually rendered
service, provided that they worked for at least six months during a given year.

Thus, in the said case, the employees were awarded separation pay equivalent to one (1) month, or to one-half (1/2) month pay for every year they
rendered service, whichever is higher, provided they rendered service for at least six (6) months in a given year. As explained in the text of the
decision in the said case, month pay shall be understood as average monthly pay during the last season they worked.[32] An award of ten percent

16 | P a g e
(10%) of the total amount due petitioners as attorneys fees is legally and morally justifiable under Art. 111 of the Labor Code,[33] Sec. 8, Rule VIII,
Book III of its Implementing Rules,[34] and par. 7, Art. 2208[35] of the Civil Code.[36]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Resolutions dated July 6, 1994 and September 23, 1994 of public
respondent NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent La Union Tobacco Redrying Corporation is ORDERED: (a) to pay
petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1) month, or one-half (1/2) month pay for each year that they rendered service, whichever is higher,
provided that they rendered service for at least six (6) months in a given year, and; (b) to pay ten percent (10%) of the total amount due to
petitioners, as and for attorneys fees. Consequently, public respondent NLRC is ORDERED to COMPUTE the total amount of separation pay which
each petitioner who has rendered service to private respondent LUTORCO for at least six (6) months in a given year is entitled to receive in
accordance with this decision, and to submit its compliance thereon within forty-five (45) days from notice of this decision.

6. Benares vs Pancho April 29 2005

JOSEFINA BENARES, petitioner, vs. JAIME PANCHO, RODOLFO PANCHO, JR., JOSELITO MEDALLA, PAQUITO MAGALLANES, ALICIA
MAGALLANES, EVELYN MAGALLANES, VIOLETA VILLACAMPA, MARITESS PANCHO, ROGELIO PANCHO AND ARNOLFO
PANCHO, respondents.

TINGA, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] is the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the National Labor Relations
Commissions (NLRC) decision[3] holding that respondents were illegally dismissed and ordering petitioner to pay respondents separation pay,
backwages, 13th month pay, Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), emergency relief allowance (ERA), salary differentials and attorneys fees. The
NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters finding that respondents failed to lay down the facts and circumstances surrounding their dismissal and to prove
their entitlement to monetary awards.[4]

The antecedents, as narrated by the NLRC, follow.

Complainants alleged to have started working as sugar farm workers on various dates, to wit:

1. Jaime Pancho November 15, 1964

2. Rodolfo Pancho, Jr. February 1, 1975
3. Joselito Medalla November 15, 1964
4. Paquito Magallanes March 10, 1973
5. Felomino Magallanes November 15, 1964
6. Alicia Magallanes January 15, 1964
7. Evelyn Magallanes January 1, 1974
8. Violeta Villacampa December 1, 1979
9. Maritess Pancho December 15, 1985
10. Rogelio Pancho December 1, 1979
11. Arnolfo Pancho February 1, 1975

Respondent Hda. Maasin II is a sugar cane plantation located in Murcia, Negros Occidental with an area of 12-24 has. planted, owned and
managed by Josefina Benares, individual co-respondent.

On July 24, 1991, complainants thru counsel wrote the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment, Bacolod City for
intercession particularly in the matter of wages and other benefits mandated by law.

On September 24, 1991, a routine inspection was conducted by personnel of the Bacolod District Office of the Department of Labor and
Employment. Accordingly, a report and recommendation was made, hence, the endorsement by the Regional Director of the instant case to the
Regional Arbitration Branch, NLRC, Bacolod City for proper hearing and disposition.

On October 15, 1991, complainants alleged to have been terminated without being paid termination benefits by respondent in retaliation to what
they have done in reporting to the Department of Labor and Employment their working conditions viz-a-viz (sic) wages and other mandatory
benefits.

On July 14, 1992, notification and summons were served to the parties wherein complainants were directed to file a formal complaint.

On July 28, 1992, a formal complaint was filed for illegal dismissal with money claims.

From the records, summons and notices of hearing were served to the parties and apparently no amicable settlement was arrived, hence, the
parties were directed to file their respective position papers.

17 | P a g e
On January 22, 1993, complainant submitted their position paper, while respondent filed its position paper on June 21, 1993.

On March 17, 1994, complainants filed their reply position paper and affidavit. Correspondingly, a rejoinder was filed by respondent on May 16,
1994.

On August 17, 1994, from the Minutes of the scheduled hearing, respondent failed to appear, and that the Office will evaluate the records of the
case whether to conduct a formal trial on the merits or not, and that the corresponding order will be issued.

On January 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter issued an order to the effect that the case is now deemed submitted for resolution.

On April 30, 1998, the Labor Arbiter a quo issued the assailed decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.

On June 26, 1998, complainants not satisfied with the aforecited ruling interposed the instant appeal anchored on the ground that:

THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
COMPLAINANTS FAILED TO DISCUSS THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THEIR DISMISSAL, HENCE, THERE IS NO
DISMISSAL TO SPEAK OF AND THAT COMPLAINANTS FAILED TO ALLEGE AND PROVE THAT THEIR CLAIMS ARE VALID, HENCE THE
DISMISSAL OF THEIR COMPLAINT WOULD CAUSE GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO HEREIN COMPLAINANTS. [5]

The NLRC held that respondents attained the status of regular seasonal workers of Hda. Maasin II having worked therein from 1964-1985. It
found that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that the termination of respondents was for a just or authorized cause. Hence,
respondents were illegally dismissed and should be awarded their money claims.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration[6] dated May 12, 1999 was denied in the resolution[7] dated October 29, 1999.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRCs ruling, with the modification that the backwages and other monetary benefits shall be computed
from the time compensation was withheld in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715.

In its Resolution[8] dated November 28, 2001, the appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Petitioner is now before this Court averring that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC. While petitioner concedes
that the factual findings of the NLRC are generally binding on the appellate court, petitioner insists that the findings of the NLRC are vague and
contradictory, thereby necessitating review.

According to petitioner, the fact that she was able to present sufficient proof to rebut the claim of illegal dismissal should be considered in
light of the NLRCs admission that there are gray areas in the case which require clarification. Petitioner avers that the NLRC should have at least
remanded the case to the labor arbiter to thresh out these gray areas. She further claims that the NLRC was overly zealous in awarding COLA and
ERA despite the fact that respondents did not even pray for these awards in their complaint. She also questions the NLRCs general statement to
the effect that the payroll she submitted is not convincing asserting that she submitted 235 sets of payroll, not just one, and that the NLRC did not
even bother to explain why it found the payroll unconvincing.

Respondents filed a Comment[9] dated May 10, 2002 alleging that petitioner failed to submit certified true copies of the assailed decisions and
resolutions, and that the petition lacks proof of service and raises questions of fact.

In her Reply to Comment[10] dated September 17, 2002, petitioner points out that the Rules of Court do not require that all copies of the
petition contain certified true copies of the questioned decisions and resolutions. Further, all copies of the petition filed with the Court contain an
affidavit of service. Respondents copy does not have an affidavit of service because the sworn declaration can not be executed before service of
the petition is actually made. Petitioner also maintains that the rule on review of findings of fact by the Supreme Court admits of certain exceptions
such as when the conclusions arrived at are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures as in this case.

The petition was given due course and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda in the Resolution[11] dated March 3,
2003. Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Compliance[12] dated April 22, 2003 adopting the allegations in her Petition for Review on
Certiorari and Reply to Comment as her memorandum. For their part, respondents filed a Memoranda For Private Respondents[13] dated May 7,
2003 alleging that the Court of Appeals correctly relied upon the factual findings of the NLRC after having found the same to be supported by
substantial evidence. They insist that they are regular seasonal employees of the sugar plantation. As such, petitioner has the burden of proving
that their dismissal was for a just or authorized cause.

As regards the contention that the NLRC erroneously awarded COLA and ERA, respondents cite Osias Academy v. DOLE,[14] which provides
that the NLRC can extend monetary awards even if these are not prayed for if the monetary benefits are statutory grants intended to alleviate the
laborers plight like the COLA and ERA.

The main question raised by the present petition is whether respondents are regular employees of Hacienda Maasin and thus entitled to their
monetary claims. Related to this is the issue of whether respondents were illegally terminated.

This case presents a good opportunity to reiterate the Courts rulings on the subject of seasonal employment. The Labor Code defines regular
and casual employment, viz:

18 | P a g e
Art. 280. REGULAR AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT.The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which
he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.

The law provides for three kinds of employees: (1) regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; (2) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for
a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season; and (3) casual employees or
those who are neither regular nor project employees.[15]

In Mercado v. NLRC,[16] the Court ruled that seasonal workers do not become regular employees by the mere fact that they have rendered at
least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, because the proviso in the second paragraph of Article 280 demarcates as casual
employees, all other employees who do not fall under the definition of the preceding paragraph. It deems as regular employees those casual
employees who have rendered at least one year of service regardless of the fact that such service may be continuous or broken.

The factual circumstances obtaining in the Mercado case, however, are peculiar. In that case, the workers were engaged to do a particular
phase of agricultural work necessary for rice and/or sugarcane production, after which they would be free to render services to other farm workers
who need their services.

In contrast, in the case of Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers-Food and General Trade,[17] respondents performed
the same tasks for petitioners every season for several years. Thus, they were considered the latters regular employees for their respective tasks.
The fact that they do not work continuously for one whole year but only for the duration of the season does not detract from considering them in
regular employment since in a litany of cases this Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from time to time and are
temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in that period, but merely considered on leave until re-employed.[18]

Citing jurisprudence, the Court, in Hacienda Fatima, condensed the rule that the primary standard for determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee vis--vis the usual trade or business of the employer. This
connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in
its entirety. If the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the
law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the
business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. [19]

In this case, petitioner argues that respondents were not her regular employees as they were merely pakiao workers who did not work
continuously in the sugar plantation. They performed such tasks as weeding, cutting and loading canes, planting cane points, fertilizing, cleaning
the drainage, etc. These functions allegedly do not require respondents daily presence in the sugarcane field as it is not everyday that one weeds,
cuts canes or applies fertilizer. In support of her allegations, petitioner submitted cultivo and milling payrolls.

The probative value of petitioners evidence, however, has been passed upon by the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.
Although the labor arbiter dismissed respondents complaint because their position paper is completely devoid of any discussion about their alleged
dismissal, much less of the probative facts thereof, [20] the ground for the dismissal of the complaint implies a finding that respondents are regular
employees.

The NLRC was more unequivocal when it pronounced that respondents have acquired the status of regular seasonal employees having
worked for more than one year, whether continuous or broken in petitioners hacienda.

According to petitioner, however, the NLRCs conclusion is highly suspect considering its own admission that there are gray areas which
requires (sic) clarification. She alleges that despite these gray areas, the NLRC chose not to remand the case to the Labor Arbiter.as this would
unduly prolong the agony of the complainants in particular. [21]

Petitioner perhaps wittingly omitted mention that the NLRC opted to appreciate the merits of the instant case based on available
documents/pleadings.[22] That the NLRC chose not to remand the case to the labor arbiter for clarificatory proceedings and instead decided the
case on the basis of the evidence then available to it is a judgment call this Court shall not interfere with in the absence of any showing that the
NLRC abused its discretion in so doing.

The Court of Appeals, in fact, found no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. Accordingly, it dismissed the petition for
certiorari and affirmed with modification the findings of the NLRC. It is well to note at this point that in quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of
evidence required to support the findings of the NLRC is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[23]

The issue, therefore, of whether respondents were regular employees of petitioner has been adequately dealt with. The labor arbiter, the
NLRC and the Court of Appeals have similarly held that respondents were regular employees of petitioner. Since it is a settled rule that the factual

19 | P a g e
findings of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in the matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only
respect but even finality,[24] we shall no longer disturb this finding.

Petitioner next underscores the NLRC decisions mention of the payroll she presented despite the fact that she allegedly presented 235 sets
of payroll, not just one payroll. This circumstance does not in itself evince any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC as it could well
have been just an innocuous typographical error.

Verily, the NLRCs decision, affirmed as it was by the Court of Appeals, appears to have been arrived at after due consideration of the
evidence presented by both parties.

We also find no reason to disturb the finding that respondents were illegally terminated. When there is no showing of clear, valid and legal
cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that
the termination was for a just or authorized cause. [25] In this case, as found both by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to prove
any such cause for the dismissal of respondents.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals respectively dated June 29,
2001 and November 28, 2001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

7. Hacienda Fatima Case GR 149440 Jan 28 2003

HACIENDA FATIMA and/or PATRICIO VILLEGAS, ALFONSO VILLEGAS and CRISTINE SEGURA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF SUGARCANE WORKERS-FOOD AND GENERAL TRADE, respondents. [G.R. No. 149440. January 28, 2003]

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Although the employers have shown that respondents performed work that was seasonal in nature, they failed to prove that the latter worked
only for the duration of one particular season. In fact, petitioners do not deny that these workers have served them for several years
already. Hence, they are regular -- not seasonal -- employees.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 20, 2001 Decision of the
Court of Appeals[1] (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 51033. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is hereby DENIED. [2]

On the other hand, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Decision,[3] upheld by the CA, disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby SET ASIDE and VACATED and a new one entered declaring
complainants to have been illegally dismissed. Respondents are hereby ORDERED to reinstate complainants except Luisa Rombo, Ramona
Rombo, Bobong Abriga and Boboy Silva to their previous position and to pay full backwages from September 1991 until reinstated. Respondents
being guilty of unfair labor practice are further ordered to pay complainant union the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages.[4]

The Facts

The facts are summarized in the NLRC Decision as follows:

Contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter that complainants [herein respondents] refused to work and/or were choosy in the kind of jobs they
wanted to perform, the records is replete with complainants persistence and dogged determination in going back to work.

Indeed, it would appear that respondents did not look with favor workers having organized themselves into a union. Thus, when complainant union
was certified as the collective bargaining representative in the certification elections, respondents under the pretext that the result was on appeal,
refused to sit down with the union for the purpose of entering into a collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the workers including complainants
herein were not given work for more than one month. In protest, complainants staged a strike which was however settled upon the signing of a
Memorandum of Agreement which stipulated among others that:

20 | P a g e
a) The parties will initially meet for CBA negotiations on the 11th day of January 1991 and will endeavor to conclude the same within thirty (30)
days.

b) The management will give priority to the women workers who are members of the union in case work relative x x x or amount[ing] to gahit and
[dipol] arises.

c) Ariston Eruela Jr. will be given back his normal work load which is six (6) days in a week.

d) The management will provide fifteen (15) wagons for the workers and that existing workforce prior to the actual strike will be given
priority. However, in case the said workforce would not be enough, the management can hire additional workers to supplement them.

e) The management will not anymore allow the scabs, numbering about eighteen (18) workers[,] to work in the hacienda; and

f) The union will immediately lift the picket upon signing of this agreement.

However, alleging that complainants failed to load the fifteen wagons, respondents reneged on its commitment to sit down and bargain
collectively.Instead, respondent employed all means including the use of private armed guards to prevent the organizers from entering the
premises.

Moreover, starting September 1991, respondents did not any more give work assignments to the complainants forcing the union to stage a strike
on January 2, 1992. But due to the conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another Memorandum of Agreement was signed by the complainants and
respondents which provides:

Whereas the union staged a strike against management on January 2, 1992 grounded on the dismissal of the union officials and members;

Whereas parties to the present dispute agree to settle the case amicably once and for all;

Now therefore, in the interest of both labor and management, parties herein agree as follows:

1. That the list of the names of affected union members hereto attached and made part of this agreement shall be referred to the Hacienda payroll
of 1990 and determine whether or not this concerned Union members are hacienda workers;

2. That in addition to the payroll of 1990 as reference, herein parties will use as guide the subjects of a Memorandum of Agreement entered into by
and between the parties last January 4, 1990;

3. That herein parties can use other employment references in support of their respective claims whether or not any or all of the listed 36 union
members are employees or hacienda workers or not as the case may be;

4. That in case conflict or disagreement arises in the determination of the status of the particular hacienda workers subject of this agreement herein
parties further agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration;

5. To effect the above, a Committee to be chaired by Rose Mengaling is hereby created to be composed of three representatives each and is given
five working days starting Jan. 23, 1992 to resolve the status of the subject 36 hacienda workers. (Union representatives: Bernardo Torres, Martin
Alas-as, Ariston Arulea Jr.)

Pursuant thereto, the parties subsequently met and the Minutes of the Conciliation Meeting showed as follows:

The meeting started at 10:00 A.M. A list of employees was submitted by Atty. Tayko based on who received their 13 th month pay. The following are
deemed not considered employees:

1. Luisa Rombo
2. Ramona Rombo
3. Bobong Abrega
4. Boboy Silva
The name Orencio Rombo shall be verified in the 1990 payroll.
The following employees shall be reinstated immediately upon availability of work:
1. Jose Dagle 7. Alejandro Tejares
2. Rico Dagle 8. Gaudioso Rombo
3. Ricardo Dagle 9. Martin Alas-as Jr.
4. Jesus Silva 10. Cresensio Abrega

21 | P a g e
5. Fernando Silva 11. Ariston Eruela Sr.
6. Ernesto Tejares 12. Ariston Eruela Jr.

When respondents again reneged on its commitment, complainants filed the present complaint.
But for all their persistence, the risk they had to undergo in conducting a strike in the face of overwhelming odds, complainants in an ironic twist of
fate now find themselves being accused of refusing to work and being choosy in the kind of work they have to perform. [5] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature, they were considered to be merely on leave during the off-
season and were therefore still employed by petitioners. Moreover, the workers enjoyed security of tenure. Any infringement upon this right was
deemed by the CA to be tantamount to illegal dismissal.

The appellate court found neither rhyme nor reason in petitioners argument that it was the workers themselves who refused to or were
choosy in their work. As found by the NLRC, the record of this case is replete with complainants persistence and dogged determination in going
back to work.[6]

The CA likewise concurred with the NLRCs finding that petitioners were guilty of unfair labor practice.

Hence this Petition.[7]

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for the Courts consideration:

A. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondents, admittedly seasonal workers, were regular employees,
contrary to the clear provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code, which categorically state that seasonal employees are not covered
by the definition of regular employees under paragraph 1, nor covered under paragraph 2 which refers exclusively to casual
employees who have served for at least one year.

B. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the ruling in Mercado, xxx, and relying instead on rulings which are not
directly applicable to the case at bench, viz, Philippine Tobacco, Bacolod-Murcia, and Gaco, xxx.

C. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the NLRCs conclusion that private
respondents were illegally dismissed, that petitioner[s were] guilty of unfair labor practice, and that the union be awarded moral and
exemplary damages.[8]

Consistent with the discussion in petitioners Memorandum, we shall take up Items A and B as the first issue and Item C as the second.

The Courts Ruling: The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Regular Employment

At the outset, we must stress that only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari of CA
decisions.[9] Questions of fact are not entertained.[10] The Court is not a trier of facts and, in labor cases, this doctrine applies with greater
force.[11] Factual questions are for labor tribunals to resolve.[12] In the present case, these have already been threshed out by the NLRC. Its findings
were affirmed by the appellate court.

Contrary to petitioners contention, the CA did not err when it held that respondents were regular employees.

Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, states:

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. - The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which
he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exist. (Italics supplied)

22 | P a g e
 For respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is not enough that they perform work or services that are
seasonal in nature. They must have also been employed only for the duration of one season. The evidence proves the existence of the first, but not
of the second, condition. The fact that respondents -- with the exception of Luisa Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abriga and Boboy Silva --
repeatedly worked as sugarcane workers for petitioners for several years is not denied by the latter. Evidently, petitioners employed respondents
for more than one season. Therefore, the general rule of regular employment is applicable.

In Abasolo v. National Labor Relations Commission,[13] the Court issued this clarification:

[T]he test of whether or not an employee is a regular employee has been laid down in De Leon v. NLRC, in which this Court held:

The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual
trade or business of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the
scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the
performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of
the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such
activity and while such activity exists.

xxxxxxxxx

x x x [T]he fact that [respondents] do not work continuously for one whole year but only for the duration of the x x x season does not detract from
considering them in regular employment since in a litany of cases this Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from
time to time and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period, but merely considered on leave until re-
employed.[14]

The CA did not err when it ruled that Mercado v. NLRC[15] was not applicable to the case at bar. In the earlier case, the workers were required
to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time, after which their services would be available to any other farm owner. They were
not hired regularly and repeatedly for the same phase/s of agricultural work, but on and off for any single phase thereof.On the other hand, herein
respondents, having performed the same tasks for petitioners every season for several years, are considered the latters regular employees for their
respective tasks. Petitioners eventual refusal to use their services -- even if they were ready, able and willing to perform their usual duties whenever
these were available -- and hiring of other workers to perform the tasks originally assigned to respondents amounted to illegal dismissal of the
latter.

The Court finds no reason to disturb the CAs dismissal of what petitioners claim was their valid exercise of a management prerogative.The
sudden changes in work assignments reeked of bad faith. These changes were implemented immediately after respondents had organized
themselves into a union and started demanding collective bargaining. Those who were union members were effectively deprived of their
jobs. Petitioners move actually amounted to unjustified dismissal of respondents, in violation of the Labor Code.

Where there is no showing of clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid and authorized cause. [16] In the case at bar, petitioners
failed to prove any such cause for the dismissal of respondents who, as discussed above, are regular employees.

Second Issue:
Unfair Labor Practice

The NLRC also found herein petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice. It ruled as follows:

Indeed, from respondents refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic inducements resulting in the promotion of those who withdrew from the
union, the use of armed guards to prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and members, one cannot but conclude
that respondents did not want a union in their haciendaa clear interference in the right of the workers to self-organization.[17]

We uphold the CAs affirmation of the above findings. Indeed, factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in
matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Their findings are binding on the Supreme
Court.[18] Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal, especially when supported by substantial evidence. [19] Consequently, the
Court is not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing that these were arbitrary and bereft of
any rational basis.[20]

The finding of unfair labor practice done in bad faith carries with it the sanction of moral and exemplary damages. [21] WHEREFORE, the
Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

8. Lacuesta vs ADMU Dec 9 2005

QUISUMBING, J.:

23 | P a g e
 This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated October 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61173 and
its Resolution[2] dated February 21, 2002, denying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court affirmed the Decision [3] dated February 24,
2000 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which had reversed the Decision dated March 20, 1998 of the Labor Arbiter.

The facts are undisputed.

Respondent Ateneo de Manila University (Ateneo) hired, on a contractual basis, petitioner Lolita R. Lacuesta as a part-time lecturer in its
English Department for the second semester of school year 1988-1989. She was re-hired, still on a contractual basis, for the first and second
semesters of school year 1989-1990.

On July 13, 1990, the petitioner was first appointed as full-time instructor on probation, in the same department effective June 1, 1990
until March 31, 1991. Thereafter, her contract as faculty on probation was renewed effective April 1, 1991 until March 31, 1992. She was again
hired for a third year effective April 1, 1992 until March 31, 1993. During these three years she was on probation status.

In a letter dated January 27, 1993, respondent Dr. Leovino Ma. Garcia, Dean of Ateneos Graduate School and College of Arts and
Sciences, notified petitioner that her contract would no longer be renewed because she did not integrate well with the English Department.
Petitioner then appealed to the President of the Ateneo at the time, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.

In a letter dated February 11, 1993, Fr. Bernas explained to petitioner that she was not being terminated, but her contract would simply
expire. He also stated that the university president makes a permanent appointment only upon recommendation of the Dean and confirmation of
the Committee on Faculty Rank and Permanent Appointment. He added that any appointment he might extend would be tantamount to a midnight
appointment.

In another letter dated March 11, 1993, Fr. Bernas offered petitioner the job as book editor in the University Press under terms comparable to that
of a faculty member.

On March 26, 1993, petitioner applied for clearance to collect her final salary as instructor. Petitioner also signed a Quitclaim, Discharge and
Release on April 16, 1993.[4]

Petitioner worked as editor in the University Press from April 1, 1993 to March 31, 1994 including an extension of two months after her contract
expired. Upon expiry of her contract, petitioner applied for clearance to collect her final salary as editor. Later, she agreed to extend her contract
from June 16, 1994 to October 31, 1994. Petitioner decided not to have her contract renewed due to a severe back problem. She did not report
back to work, but she submitted her clearance on February 20, 1995.

On December 23, 1996, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, back wages, and moral and exemplary
damages. Dr. Leovino Ma. Garcia and Dr. Marijo Ruiz were sued in their official capacities as the previous and present deans of the College of Arts
and Sciences, respectively.

Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion held that petitioner may not be terminated by mere lapse of the probationary period but only for just
cause or failure to meet the employers standards. Moreover, said the Labor Arbiter, the quitclaim, discharge and release executed by petitioner
was not a bar to filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. [5] Thus, he ordered reinstatement with payment of full back wages.

The NLRC upon appeal of respondents reversed the Labor Arbiters decision and ruled that petitioner was not illegally dismissed, and that
her quitclaim was valid. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
assailing the NLRC decision. The appellate court dismissed the petition saying there was no grave abuse of discretion and affirmed the NLRC
decision. It ruled:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied and accordingly DISMISSED.[6]

Hence, this instant petition where petitioner assigns the following as errors:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that it is the Manual of Regulations For Private Schools, not the Labor
Code, that determines the acquisition of regular or permanent status of faculty members in an educational institution;

2. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the Quitclaim that was signed by the Petitioner and in taking that
against her claims for illegal dismissal and for moral and exemplary damages against the respondents. [7]

Simply put, the issue in this case is whether the petitioner was illegally dismissed.

24 | P a g e
 Petitioner contends that Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code, [8] not the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, is the applicable
law to determine whether or not an employee in an educational institution has acquired regular or permanent status. She argues that (1) under
Article 281, probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from date of employment unless a longer period had been stipulated by an
apprenticeship agreement; (2) under Article 280, if the apprenticeship agreement stipulates a period longer than one year and the employee
rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, the employee shall be considered as regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed while such activity exists; and (3) it is with more reason that petitioner be made regular since she had rendered
services as part-time and full-time English teacher for four and a half years, services which are necessary and desirable to the usual business of
Ateneo.[9]

Furthermore, the petitioner contends that her clearance was granted and completed only after she signed the quitclaim on April 16, 1993.
She contends also that the respondents failed to show that her quitclaim was voluntary.

Respondents, for their part, contend that the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools is controlling. In the Manual, full-time teachers
who have rendered three consecutive years of satisfactory service shall be considered permanent. Respondents also claim that the petitioner was
not terminated but her employment contract expired at the end of the probationary period. Further, institutions of higher learning, such as
respondent Ateneo, enjoy the freedom to choose who may teach according to its standards. Respondents also argue that the quitclaim, discharge
and release by petitioner is binding and should bar her complaint for illegal dismissal.

After considering the contentions of the parties in the light of the circumstances in this case, we find for respondents.

The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, and not the Labor Code, determines whether or not a faculty member in an educational institution
has attained regular or permanent status.[10] In University of Santo Tomas v. National Labor Relations Commission the Court en banc said that
under Policy Instructions No. 11 issued by the Department of Labor and Employment, the probationary employment of professors, instructors and
teachers shall be subject to the standards established by the Department of Education and Culture. Said standards are embodied in paragraph
75[11] (now Section 93) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.[12]

Section 93[13] of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides that full-time teachers who have satisfactorily completed
their probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent. [14] Moreover, for those teaching in the tertiary level, the probationary period
shall not be more than six consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service. [15] The requisites to acquire permanent employment, or security of
tenure, are (1) the teacher is a full-time teacher; (2) the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must
have been satisfactory.[16]

As previously held, a part-time teacher cannot acquire permanent status. [17] Only when one has served as a full-time teacher can he
acquire permanent or regular status. The petitioner was a part-time lecturer before she was appointed as a full-time instructor on probation. As a
part-time lecturer, her employment as such had ended when her contract expired. Thus, the three semesters she served as part-time lecturer could
not be credited to her in computing the number of years she has served to qualify her for permanent status.

Petitioner posits that after completing the three-year probation with an above-average performance, she already acquired permanent
status. On this point, we are unable to agree with petitioner.

Completing the probation period does not automatically qualify her to become a permanent employee of the university. Petitioner could
only qualify to become a permanent employee upon fulfilling the reasonable standards for permanent employment as faculty member.[18] Consistent
with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher learning has the prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and
determine whether these standards have been met.[19] At the end of the probation period, the decision to re-hire an employee on probation, belongs
to the university as the employer alone.

We reiterate, however, that probationary employees enjoy security of tenure, but only within the period of probation. Likewise, an
employee on probation can only be dismissed for just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable
standards made known by the employer at the time of his hiring. Upon expiration of their contract of employment, academic personnel on probation
cannot automatically claim security of tenure and compel their employers to renew their employment contracts. [20] In the instant case, petitioner, did
not attain permanent status and was not illegally dismissed. As found by the NLRC, her contract merely expired.

Lastly, we find that petitioner had already signed a valid quitclaim, discharge and release which bars the present action. This Court has
held that not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy, except (1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. [21] In this case, there is no showing that
petitioner was coerced into signing the quitclaim. In her sworn quitclaim, she freely declared that she received to her full satisfaction all that is due
her by reason of her employment and that she was voluntarily releasing respondent Ateneo from all claims in relation to her
employment.[22] Nothing on the face of her quitclaim has been shown as unconscionable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
61173 and its Resolution dated February 21, 2002 are AFFIRMED.

25 | P a g e
9. Kasapian ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Coca-Cola (KASAMMA-CCO) CFW Local 245 vs CA Aoril 19, 2006

KASAPIAN NG MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA SA COCA-COLA (KASAMMA-CCO)-CFW LOCAL 245, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., Respondents. G.R. No. 159828 April 19, 2006

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Decision2 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissing petitioners complaint against private
respondent for violations of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)/Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), nonpayment of overtime pay and 13th
month pay, illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, recovery of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

On 30 June 1998, the CBA for the years 1995-1998 executed between petitioner union and private respondent company expired. As the duly
certified collective bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of private respondents Manila and Antipolo plants, petitioner submitted its
demands to the company for another round of collective bargaining negotiations. However, said negotiations came to a gridlock as the parties failed
to reach a mutually acceptable agreement with respect to certain economic and non-economic issues.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a notice of strike on 11 November 1998 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), National Capital
Region, on the ground of CBA negotiation deadlock. With the aim of resolving the impasse, several conciliation conferences were conducted but to
no avail as the parties failed to reach a settlement. On 19 December 1998, petitioner held the strike in private respondents Manila and Antipolo
plants.

Subsequently, through the efforts of NCMB Administrator Buenaventura Magsalin, both parties came to an agreement settling the labor dispute.
Thus, on 26 December 1998, both parties executed and signed a MOA providing for salary increases and other economic and non-economic
benefits. It likewise contained a provision for the regularization of contractual, casual and/or agency workers who have been working with private
respondent for more than one year. Said MOA was later incorporated to form part of the 1998-2001 CBA and was thereafter ratified by the
employees of the company.

Pursuant to the provisions of the MOA, both parties identified 64 vacant regular positions that may be occupied by the existing casual, contractual
or agency employees who have been in the company for more than one year. Fifty-eight (58)3 of those whose names were submitted for
regularization passed the screening and were thereafter extended regular employment status, while the other five failed the medical examination
and were granted six months within which to secure a clean bill of health. Within the six-month period, three4 of the five employees who have
initially failed in the medical examination were declared fit to work and were accorded regular employment status. Consequently, petitioner
demanded the payment of salary and other benefits to the newly regularized employees retroactive to 1 December 1998, in accord with the MOA.
However, the private respondent refused to yield to said demands contending that the date of effectivity of the regularization of said employees
were 1 May 1999 and 1 October 1999. Thus, on 5 November 1999, petitioner filed a complaint before the NLRC for the alleged violations of the
subject MOA by the private respondent.

Meanwhile, a certification election was conducted on 17 August 1999 pursuant to the order of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
wherein the KASAMMA-CCO Independent surfaced as the winning union and was then certified by the DOLE as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees of private respondents Manila and Antipolo plants for a period of five years from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2004.
On 23 August 1999, the KASAMMA-CCO Independent demanded the renegotiation of the CBA which expired on 30 June 1998. Such request was
denied by private respondent on the contention that there was no basis for said demand as there was already an existing CBA which was
negotiated and concluded between petitioner and private respondent, thus, it was untimely to reopen the said CBA which was yet to expire on 30
June 2001.

On 9 December 1999, despite the pendency of petitioners complaint before the NLRC, private respondent closed its Manila and Antipolo plants
resulting in the termination of employment of 646 employees. On the same day, about 500 workers were given a notice of termination effective 1
March 2000 on the ground of redundancy. The affected employees were considered on paid leave from 9 December 1999 to 29 February 2000 and
were paid their corresponding salaries. On 13 December 1999, four days after its closure of the Manila and Antipolo plants, private respondent
served a notice of closure to the DOLE.

As a result of said closure, on 21 December 1999, petitioner amended its complaint filed before the NLRC to include "union busting, illegal
dismissal/illegal lay-off, underpayment of salaries, overtime, premium pay for holiday, rest day, holiday pay, vacation/sick leaves, 13th month pay,
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees."

26 | P a g e
On 14 January 2000, KASAMMA-CCO Independent filed a notice of strike due to unfair labor practice with the NCMB-NCR. Failing to arrive at an
amicable settlement of the labor dispute with the private respondent, KASAMMA-CCO Independent held a strike from 9 March 2000 to 4 May 2000.
On 4 May 2000, the Secretary of Labor issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute subject of the strike and certified the case to
the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.

On 9 July 2001, the NLRC rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. According to the Commission:

Evaluating, with utmost caution, both parties contrasting factual version, supporting proofs, related legal excerpts and applicable jurisprudential
citations, we discern that, under the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated December 26, 1998, the 61 regularized employees are not entitled to
their claims for the P60.00 per day salary increase, mid-year gratuity pay of P5,000.00, one sack of rice, and overtime and thirteenth month
differentials effective December 1, 1998 onward.

Initially, under the MOA, only the employees who were regular on July 1998 and continued being such upon the signing of the MOA on December
26, 1998 deserve retroactive payment of the MOA benefits amounting to a lump sum of P35,000.00.

This entitlement springs from the following pertinent provisions of the MOA:

"All covered employees who were regular as of July 1, 1998 and upon the signing of this Agreement shall each be entitled to a lump sum in
the amount of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00) which shall, subject to the ratification of the employees within the bargaining unit,
be released on or before 31 December 1998.

"The aforesaid amount shall be in lieu of the wage increase as well as THE Operation Performances Incentive DESCRIBED UNDER Item
11(B) hereof, all premium pay, the 13th month and 14th month pay differentials, sick leave and vacation leave credits for the period July 1,
1998 to December 31, 1999." Underscoring supplied)

In the case at bar, since the 61 regularized employees were regularized only on May 1, 1999 and October 1, 1999, as the case may be, they
therefore have no right whatsoever to claim entitlement to the MOA benefits.

Moreover, CFW Local 245s insistence that the 61 regularized employees became regular on December 1, 1998 is non sequitor. It merely flows
from its specious interpretation of the MOA provisions. The MOA does not provide that non-regular employees who would be deployed to fill up
vacant plantilla positions covered by the 1998 and 1999 manpower budget of CCBPC should be automatically considered regular effective
December 1, 1998. What the MOA stipulates are that: 1) effective December 1, 1998, non-regular employees who have been occupying the
position to be filled up for at least one year shall be given priority in filling up the positions; and 2) that in that case, they will not undergo the
companys regular recruitment procedures, like interviews and qualifying examinations.

The only importance of the date of December 1, 1998 is its being the reckoning date from which the one year employment requirement should be
computed. Consequently, under the MOA, only the non-regular employees who had worked with the company for at least a year counted
retroactively from December 1, 1998 should be given priority in the filling up of vacant plantilla positions.

Anyway, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the 61 regularized employees were regularized effective December 1, 1998, they, still, are not
entitled to the MOA benefits. As discussed above, only employees who were regular on July 1, 1998 and were still so until the signing of the MOA
on December 26, 1998 could be covered by the retroactivity clause.

Furthermore, entitling the 61 regularized employees to the MOA benefits would certainly infringe the well-entrenched principle of "no-work-no-pay".
Since such employees started becoming regular only on May 1, 1999 and October 1, 1999, as the case may be, it would thus be most unfair to
require CCBPI to pay them for their unworked period, for they would certainly, be unjustly enriched at the expense of CCBPI.

We also hold that the allegedly redundant six hundred thirty-nine (639) employees were not illegally dismissed.

Initially, there was just cause for the employees dismissal.

It bears to stress that, aimed at 1) attaining efficiency and cost effectiveness, 2) maximizing its production capacity and 3) ensuring that its
customers obtain products manufactured only under the most stringent quality standards of CCBPIs modern, technologically advanced production
plants, CCBPI conducted an extensive study on the operational mechanics of its Manila and Antipolo plants.

From this study, it was established that there was inadequate water supply at CCBPIs Manila and Antipolo plants. As a consequence, the company
was constrained to transport water from several sources to its production line in Manila in 1998 and 1999. Worse, it was discovered that the quality
of water supply was fast deteriorating due to the rise of its salt level. This reality prompted the company to reduce its production capacity.
Moreover, the bottling process of treating this water of decadent quality resulted in higher production costs. Under these twin conditions, the
company could not thus efficiently continue on with its operations.

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The study also reveals the decadent state of the production equipment of CCBPIs Manila and Antipolo Plants. Their production lines were among
the oldest and hence, had very low line efficiency. In comparison with the line efficiency of 71.18% of the companys other plants, the Manila and
Antipolo Plants had only efficiency ratings of 61.09% and 58.39%, respectively. Whereas the other production lines had an average wastage rating
of 1.01%, the twin plants had a higher average wastage ratings of 2.05% and 1.77%, respectively. The companys production studies in 1998 and
1999 likewise reveal substantial issues on Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) and process control for such plants.

From this study, the impracticability of rehabilitating the twin plants was also found out. Although the problems cited may be remedied by way of a
major reconstruction, this would, however, entail an investment of huge capital. Further, the congestion of the twin plants sites would render
impracticable such a major reconstruction. Besides, there was utter lack of effective solution to the retrograding water supply.

The foregoing significant facts are substantially evidenced by the Technical Evaluation of Production Requirements, Annex "20", CCBPIs
Rejoinder; Affidavit of its Operations Manager dated 3 March 2000, Annex "1", its Position Paper dated 20 July 2000; and Certification dated May
21, 2001 of Mr. Bruce A. Herbert, its Sur-Rejoinder.

To solve the problems cited, however, CCBPI, as soundly recommended by the study, integrated the production capacities of the different CCBPI
modern and technologically advanced production facilities. This imperative integration indispensably prompted CCBPI to close, its production lines
at the Manila and Antipolo Plants.

This measure taken by CCBPI indeed draws jurisprudential justification from the following sound pronouncement of the Supreme Court:

"Business enterprises today are faced with the pressures of economic recession, stiff competition and labor unrest. Thus, businessmen are always
pressured to adopt certain changes and programs in order to enhance their profits and protect their investments. Such changes may take various
forms. Management may even choose to close a branch, department, a plant, or a shop." (Philippine Engineering Corp. vs. CR, 41 SCRA 89)

Urgently propelled by this closure, CCBPI inevitably redundated the services of 639 employees based at the Manila and Antipolo Plants. The fact
that their services became superfluous or in excess of what were reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the company as a
consequence of the closure certainly shows the undertone of good faith on CCBPIs part in resorting to the redundation measure.

Well in support of this urgent economic measure taken is the following postulation of the Supreme Court in the case of Wiltshire File Co., Inc. vs.
NLRC, et al., 193 SCRA 665:

"We believe that redundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably
demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is a superfluity, and superfluity of a
position or positions may be the outcome of a number of facets, such as over hiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a
particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprises. The employer has no legal obligation to keep in
its payroll more employees than are necessary for the operation of its business.

"x x x.

"x x x The characterization of (the employees) service as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly terminable, was an exercise
of business judgment on the part of (the employer). The wisdom or soundness of such characterizing or decision was not subject to discretionary
review on the part of the Labor Arbiter nor of the NLRC so long, of course, as violation of law or merely arbitrary and malicious action is not shown.
X x x The determination of the continuing necessity of a particular officer or position in a business corporation is managements prerogative, and
the courts will not interfere with the exercise of such so long as no abuse of discretion or merely arbitrary or malicious action on the part of
management is shown."

Another reason why the dismissal of the 639 employees was legal is that the same was attended by the observance of the requirements of due
process. Indeed, as early as 9 December 1999, more than thirty (30) days prior to their actual dismissal on 1 March 2000, CCBPI served on the
affected employees a written notice informing them of the closure of the two plants and subsequent redundation. Later, by 13 December 1999,
CCBPI filed with the DOLE the required written notice informing it of the subject closure and consequent redundation.

This finding is perfectly in line with the following applicable legal excerpts:

"ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. ---The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to
.redundancy. or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof."lawphil.net

"For termination of employment based on just causes defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:

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 (i) A written notice served [on] the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side;

(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and

(iii) a written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon, due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify his termination.

"For termination of employment as defined in Article 283 of the Labor Code, the requirement of due process shall be deemed complied with upon
the service of a written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment at least thirty days
before [effectivity] of the termination, specifically the ground or grounds for termination." (Par. D, Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI, Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code)

Needless to state, having been lawfully redundated, as comprehensively discussed above, the affected employees are entitled to payment of
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor Code which provides:

"In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to separation pay
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least One (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher."

However, due to the economic adversity besetting our workers today brought about by the ever increasing standards of living, CCBPI realized that
such a legal package was no longer conformable with such on obtaining economic reality. Accordingly, CCBPI granted the affected employees
separation package much bigger than that legal separation package. Specifically, CCBPI paid affected employees with less than fifteen (15) years
of service 150% monthly salary for every year of service and those with fifteen (15) years and above of service 195%.

xxxx

We, moreover, view that CCBPI is not guilty of unfair labor practice.

Contrary to KASAMMA-CCO-Independents contention, CCBPI did not resort to the closure of Manila and Antipolo plants and resultant redundation
of their 637 employees just to prevent the renegotiation of the CBA entered into between CCBPI and CFW Local 245. First, there is no substantial
evidence on record supporting this claim. Secondly, as exhaustively explained supra, CCBPIs decision to undertake the subject closure and
subsequent redundation was due to legitimate business considerations, namely 1) the production lines at the two plants had very low line
efficiency; 2) the quality of water supply at such plants was rapidly deteriorating; and 3) the rehabilitation of such plants was not feasible due to the
huge capital investment required as well as the congestion of their areas.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, KASAMMA-CCO Independent, and CFW Local 245s charges in the instant labor dispute for non-grant of the
CBA salary increase, mid-year gratuity, one sack of rice, overtime pay and thirteenth (13th) month pay; illegal dismissal; unfair labor practice; and
recovery of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., however, is directed to grant the separation package adverted above to the affected employees who have
not yet received the same. Further, the company is ordered to accord the affected employees priority in rehiring in the event the company needs, in
the future, additional personnel.5

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated 24 September 2001, thus on 22 November 2001 petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which was disposed by the appellate court in this wise:

After painstaking efforts and a careful examination of the records, we rule against the contention of the petitioner. The conflicting factual
submissions of the parties in the case at bar cannot close our eyes to the fact that the instant case pose upon an obligation on this Court to review
and re-examine the factual findings and to re-evaluate the pieces of evidence which supported the conclusion of the public respondent in its
disposition of the present controversy. This issue has already been settled in Deles, Jr. vs. NLRC [327 SCRA 540 (2000)], where the Supreme
Court ruled:

"On its face, petitioners contention would require the Court to delve into the findings of fact a quo. This we cannot do. In the review of NLRC
decisions through a special civil action for certiorari, we are confined only to issues of want of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the labor tribunal. We are precluded from inquiring unto the correctness of the evaluation of that evidence that underpins the labor tribunals
conclusion on matters of fact. Nor could we examine the evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, nor substitute our findings of fact for

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those of an administrative body which has the authority and expertise in its specialized field. Arguably, there may even be an error in judgment.
This however is not within the ambit of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari."

Moreover, the pronouncement of the High Tribunal in Dela Salle University v. Dela Salle University Employees Association [330 SCRA 363 (2000)],
citing established jurisprudence, has clarified the guidelines in the resolution of petitions for certiorari involving labor cases in this wise:

"As we reiterated in the case of Caltex Refinery Employees Association (CREA) vs. Jose S. Brillantes, the following are the well-settled rules in a
petition for certiorari involving labor cases.

First, the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies (such as the DOLE), when supported by substantial evidence, are binding on this Court and
entitled to great respect, considering the expertise of these agencies in their respective fields. It is well established that findings of these
administrative agencies are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.

Second, substantial evidence in labor cases is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.

Third, in Flores vs. NLRC, we explained the role and function of Rule 65 as an extraordinary remedy. It should be noted, in the first place, that the
instant petition is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. An extraordinary remedy, its use is available only and
restrictively in truly exceptional cases those wherein the action of an inferior court, board or officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is
challenged for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction.

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not include correction of public respondent NLRCs evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based
thereon, which are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality."

In the light of the rulings established under the abovecited cases, we find no ground for disturbing the factual findings of the public respondent vis-
-vis its resolution with regard to the issue of the validity of the claims of the newly-regularized members of the petitioner union, as the same is
supported by substantial evidence and in accord with established jurisprudence herein cited. It must be stressed that factual findings of labor
officials are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence.

Anent the issue of the closure of the Manila and Antipolo plants of the private respondent which resulted in the termination from employment of 639
or 646 employees working under the said facilities, we find the same in order and in accord with law.

xxxx

It must be noted that in sustaining the contention of the private respondent on the said issue, the public respondent has relied on the grounds
asserted by the private respondent as basis in effecting the closure and the resultant cessation of business operations in the aforesaid plants. The
recent accretion to the corpus of our jurisprudence is the principle enunciated in National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC [327 SCRA 158 (2000)]
which holds the view that:

The closure of establishment contemplated under Article 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral and voluntary act on the part of the employer to close
the business establishment as may be gleaned from the use of the word "may" it does not contemplate a situation where the closure of the
business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the employees.

Although the Constitution provides for protection to labor, capital and management must also be protected under a regime of justice and the rule of
law.

Hence, the claim of the petitioner that the technical evaluation of the private respondent which served as basis for the closure of the said facilities
must be presented to the petitioner union first before the private respondent can implement the said action is bereft of legal basis. The same fate
must suffer with respect to the claim of the petitioner that a prior consultation is a condition sine qua non as required under the Labor Code vis--vis
the provision on the participation of the employees in the decision-making processes of the employer private respondent, before the latter can
effectuate the said closure, is devoid of legal and jurisprudential basis.

As aptly stated by an authority in labor laws [Cesario A. Azucena, Jr., Everyones Labor Code, 2001 Edition, p. 302], the author opined that even if
the business is not losing but its owner, for reasons of his own, wants to stop doing business, he can lawfully do so anytime provided he is in good
faith. He further lamented in saying that "just as no law forces anyone to go into business, no law compels anybody to stay in business."

Moreover, the private respondent has complied with the aforesaid requirements of the law when it decided to close the said establishments. The
records disclose that the alleged redundant, or more appropriately, separated employees affected by the said closure were in fact individually
served with a notice of termination. All of the subject employees were offered and given a separation package by the private respondent more than

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what is provided by the law and more than what is stipulated under their CBA, although, some refused to accept the said benefits, and insisted on
their being reinstated. We take note that as of the present, 546 of the 639 terminated or separated employee-members of the petitioner union were
ale to receive the said separation benefits. Moreover, the receipt of the said separation benefits was admitted by the petitioner. The Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) was also notified of such closure through a letter sent by the private respondent dated December 10, 1999.

The petitioner claims that the private respondent failed to comply with the one-month notice requirement as required under the said legal provision
since the subject employees were no longer allowed to report for work effective immediately upon receipt of their termination notice. However, they
were still paid their salaries effective from December 9, 1999 until February 29, 2000, although they did not anymore render service for the period.
Significantly, this peculiar fact which petitioner claims as an indirect circumvention of the said law has already been addressed, albeit by analogy, in
the recent case of Serrano v. NLRC [331 SCRA 341 (2000)]. In the said case, the Supreme Court held:

In that case (Associate Labor Unions-VIMCONTU vs. NLRC [204 SCRA 913]), the employees and the then Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE) were notified in writing on August 5, 1983 that the employees services would cease on august 31, 1983 but that they would be paid their
salaries and other benefits until September 5, 1983. It was held that such written notice was "more than substantial compliance with the notice
requirement of the Labor Code."

Indeed, there was more than substantial compliance with the law in that case because, in addition to the advance written notice required under Art.
284 (now Art. 283) of the Labor Code, the employees were paid for five days, from September 1 to 5, 1993, even if they rendered no service for the
period.1avvphil.net

Had private respondent given a written notice to the petitioner on October 1, 1991, at the latest, that effective October 31, 1991 his employment
would cease although from October 1 he would no longer be required to work, there would be basis for private respondents boast that [p]ayment
of this salary even [if he is] no longer working is effective notice and is much better than 30 days formal notice but working until the end of the 30
days period." This is not the case here, however. What happened here was that on October 11, 1991, petitioner was given a memorandum
terminating his employment effective on the same day on the ground of retrenchment (actually redundancy).

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision dated July 9, 2001 and the Order
dated September 24, 2001 issued by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.6

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated 5 September 2003. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner presents before this Court two issues for resolution, namely: 1) whether or not private respondent violated the terms and conditions
contained in the MOA dated 26 December 1998 when it did not recognize the regularization of the 61 employees as effective on 1 December 1998;
and 2) whether or not the closure of private respondents Manila and Antipolo plants, resulting in the termination of employment of 646 employees,
was legal.

In dismissing the petition before it, the Court of Appeals opined that the resolution of the validity of the claims of the newly regularized employees
would entail a review and re-examination of the factual findings and the re-evaluation of the pieces of evidence which supported the conclusion of
the NLRC in the latters disposition of the instant controversy. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals. The said issue is not a question of fact
which will necessitate the appellate court to again examine the evidence. It is, rather, a question of law. There is a question of law when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns
the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. 7 On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is
correct is a question of law.8

What is necessary in determining whether the private respondent violated the provisions of the MOA with respect to the date of regularization of the
61 employees is an interpretation of the pertinent provision of the MOA as agreed upon by the parties. It must be noted that both parties admit the
existence of said MOA and that they have voluntarily entered into said agreement. Furthermore, neither of the parties deny that the 61 employees
have indeed been regularized by private respondent. Clearly, as the facts are admitted by the parties, the appellate court does not have to inquire
into the veracity of any fact in order to establish the rights of the parties. All that the Court of Appeals must do is to interpret the provisions of the
MOA and resolve whether said regularization must be made retroactive to 1 December 1998, which according to petitioner is provided for under the
said MOA. The MOA, being a contract freely entered into by the parties, now constitute as the law between them, and the interpretation of its
contents purely involves an evaluation of the law as applied to the facts herein.

Thus, the issue being a question of law, this Court will now endeavor to resolve such matter. According to the pertinent provision of the MOA:

1. Non-economic issues

A. Filling-up of vacant regular plantilla positions; regularization

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The company shall fill-up all vacant plantilla positions covered by the 1998 manpower budget as already identified by the Task Force created by the
parties for the purpose following the following procedures:

1. Non-regular employee (casual, contractual or agency worker) who has already served the company and is presently occupying or has occupied
the position to be filled-up for at least one (1) year shall be given priority in filling-up the position by converting his non-regular employment status to
regular employment status, effective 01 December 1998 without need of undergoing through the companys regular recruitment procedures such
as interview and qualifying examination. x x x9

It is the contention of petitioner that the date 1 December 1998 refers to the effective date of regularization of said employees, while private
respondent maintains that said date is merely the reckoning date from which the one year employment requirement shall be computed. We agree
with petitioner. It is erroneous for the NLRC to conclude that the regularization of the 61 employees does not retroact to 1 December 1998. A
fastidious reading of the above quoted provision will clearly point to the conclusion that what is pertained to by the phrase "effective December 1,
1998" is the phrase immediately preceding it which is "converting his non-regular employment status to regular employment status." It will be
defying logic to adopt private respondents contention that the phrase "effective December 1, 1998" designates the period when the non-regular
employees will be given priority in filling-up the positions, simply because the MOA was signed only on 26 December 1998. Therefore, it is logically
absurd that the company will only begin to extend priority to these employees on a date that has already passed, when in fact they have already
extended priority to these employees by agreeing to the contents of the MOA and signing said agreement. Consequently, we hold that the
effectivity date of the regularization of the 61 employees was 1 December 1998.

We, too, cannot agree with the NLRCs rationale that entitling the 61 regularized employees to the MOA benefits would certainly infringe the well-
entrenched principle of "no-work-no-pay," since they only became regular, according to private respondent, on 1 May 1999 and 1 October 1999. As
stated in the MOA, only those who have worked with the company for one year as of 1 December 1998 and are still working for the company as of
the signing of the MOA, will be considered for regularization. Evidently, it is erroneous for the NLRC to conclude that extending to them the benefits
of the MOA would violate the principle of "no-work-no-pay" as they are actually rendering service to the company even before 1 December 1998,
and continued to do so thereafter. Truly, they were accorded the status of regular employees precisely because they were rendering service to the
company for the required period.

Moreover, at this point it must be stressed that under Article 280 of the Labor Code, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such activity exists. Also, under the law, a casual employee is only casual for one year, and it is the passage of
time that gives him a regular status. Hence, even without the subject MOA provision, the 61 employees must be extended regular employment
status after the lapse of one year. Even if we were to follow private respondents contention that the date 1 December 1998 provided in the MOA is
merely a reckoning date to determine who among the non-regular employees have rendered one year of service as of said date, all those who have
been with the company for one year by said date must automatically be considered regular employees by operation of law. Therefore, contrary to
the interpretation of the NLRC, private respondent violated the provision of the MOA when it did not consider the regularization of the 61 employees
effective 1 December 1998, and accorded to them the full benefits of the MOA.

Relative to the issue of whether the closure of private respondents Manila and Antipolo plants was legal, we agree in the conclusions of the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals that the closure of said plants is for an authorized cause.

As correctly pointed out by the NLRC, the Court has already resolved that the characterization of the employees service as no longer necessary or
sustainable, and therefore properly terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer. 10 The wisdom or soundness of
such characterizing or decision is not subject to discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter nor of the NLRC so long, of course, as violation
of law or merely arbitrary and malicious action is not shown.11 The determination of the continuing necessity of a particular officer or position in a
business corporation is managements prerogative, and the courts will not interfere with the exercise of such so long as no abuse of discretion or
merely arbitrary or malicious action on the part of management is shown. 12 In the case at bar, the closure of the Manila and Antipolo plants and the
resulting termination of the employment of 646 employees is not tainted with bad faith. As found by the NLRC, the private respondents decision to
close the plant was a result of a study conducted which established that the most prudent course of action for the private respondent was to stop
operations in said plants and transfer production to other more modern and technologically advanced plants of private respondent.

Other than its mere allegations, petitioner union failed to show that the closure of the two plants was without factual basis and done in utter bad
faith. No evidence was presented by petitioner to prove its assertion that private respondent resorted to the closure of the Manila and Antipolo
plants to prevent the renegotiations of the CBA entered into between the parties. As adequately explained by the NLRC, the subject closure and
the resulting termination of the 639 employees was due to legitimate business considerations, as evidenced by the technical study conducted by
private respondent.

Anent the allegation that private respondent failed to comply with the notice requirements as provided by the Labor Code in the cessation of its
operations, we have already settled this matter in a similar case which was accordingly cited by the appellate court. In the case of Serrano v.
National Labor Relations Commission,13 we held that:

In that case [Associate Labor Unions-VIMCONTU v. NLRC (204 SCRA 913)], the employees and the then Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE) were notified in writing on August 5, 1983 that the employees services would cease on August 31, 1983 but that they would be paid their

32 | P a g e
salaries and other benefits until September 5, 1983. It was held that such written notice was "more than substantial compliance" with the notice
requirement of the Labor Code.

Indeed, there was "more than substantial compliance" with the law in that case because, in addition to the advance written notice required under
Art. 284 (now Art. 283) of the Labor Code, the employees were paid for five days, from September 1 to 5, 1993, even if they rendered no service for
the period. x x x Had private respondent given a written notice to the petitioner on October 1, 1991, at the latest, that effective October 31, 1991 his
employment would cease although from October 1 he would no longer be required to work, there would be basis for private respondents boast that
[p]ayment of this salary even [if he is] no longer working is effective notice and is much better than 30 days formal notice but working until the end
of the 30 days period." This is not the case here, however. What happened here was that on October 11, 1991, petitioner was given a
memorandum terminating his employment effective on the same day on the ground of retrenchment (actually redundancy). 14

In the instant case, the employees were served notice on 9 December 1999 that their employment were being severed effective 1 March 2000;
however they were no longer required to report for work but they will continue to receive their salary up to 29 February 2000. Therefore, as
enunciated in the ruling in Serrano v. NLRC, said act of private respondent constitutes substantial compliance with the notice requirement of the
Labor Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67775 and of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC Case No. 30-11-00466-99 and NLRC CC No. 000182-00 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The 61 subject
employees are hereby declared regular employees as of 1 December 1998 and are entitled to the CBA salary increase, mid-year gratuity pay, one
sack of rice, overtime pay and thirteenth (13th) month pay as provided for in the Memorandum of Agreement. No costs.

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