[A.M. No. 01-1-15-RTC. July 10, 2003]
He also alleged that Judge Legaspi employed coercion
URGENT APPEAL/PETITION FOR IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION &
DISMISSAL OF JUDGE EMILIO B. LEGASPI, Regional Trial
Court, Iloilo City, Branch 22,
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a verified letter complaint[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] dated April 24,
2000, Rolando R. Mijares charged Judge Emilio B. Legaspi,
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 22, with Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence, Falsification and
Corruption. Complainant alleged that Judge Legaspi failed to
resolve more than 200 cases submitted for decision assigned to
him within the reglementary period of ninety days while he was
detailed as Presiding Judge of the RTC of San Jose, Antique,
Branch 10; that he rendered judgment in favor of a multi-
millionaire Chinese businessman in consideration of five hundred
thousand to one million pesos and a Mercedes Benz vehicle; and
that in Civil Case No. 2639, entitled Ernesto L. Villavert, Plaintiffs
versus Nenita Mijares, et al., Defendants, he erroneously
entertained an appeal and reversed the order of the Municipal
Trial Court of San Jose, Antique which denied[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif] the execution of the judgment by
compromise therein.
In his Comment,[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Judge Legaspi claimed that
Mijares was ill-motivated when he instituted this complaint
because of the adverse decision he rendered in Civil Case No.
2639[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] against him and his wife. He denied
the allegation that he failed to resolve 195 cases submitted for
decision, explaining that while he was detailed in Antique, only
eight cases were assigned to him since the other cases were
ordered re-raffled among the RTC judges of Kalibo, Aklan who
had lesser caseloads, per this Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 98-6-
201-RTC.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] He decided the said eight cases
within the ninety-day period counted from the time the last
pleading was filed.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] When he returned to the
RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 22, there were sixty-eight cases
assigned to his court which had accumulated during his detail in
Antique. As a result thereof, he was temporarily relieved of his
trial work by this Court in order to concentrate in deciding said
cases, which he was able to resolve within the 90-day period.[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif] He was, however, unable to decide two cases
because he was assigned Judge of RTC, Kabankalan City, Branch
61. Nevertheless, he resolved these two cases within ten days
from receipt of this Courts Resolution ordering him to do so.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]
He vehemently denied having received money and a Mercedes
Benz vehicle from a Chinese businessman in exchange for a
favorable judgment. He asserted that his two lawyer sons and a
daughter who is a U.S.-based registered nurse gave the vehicle to
him as a birthday present. He declared that he lived a
comfortable life even before he joined the judiciary. His wife is a
well-accomplished private medical practitioner in Antique, his
other daughter is a doctor of medicine, while his other son is a
law graduate.
In his Reply, complainant emphasized Judge Legaspis error in
entertaining the appeal of the MTCs Order which denied the
Motion for Execution of the Judgment by Compromise, in
violation of the settled principle that an interlocutory order is not
appealable.
on his court personnel so that the certification and the monthly
reports would reflect that no case was left undecided within the
90-day period.
Furthermore, complainant questioned the sound discretion of
this Court in ordering the re-raffle of the cases left unresolved by
Judge Legaspi in the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 22, while he was
detailed presiding Judge of RTC of San Jose, Antique, Branch 10.
He assailed the act of this Court in tolerating Judge Legaspis
ineptitude and insinuated that there must be someone up there
protecting and coddling Judge Legaspi.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
On February 19, 2001, the Urgent Appeal/Petition was dismissed
for lack of merit and complainant was ordered to show cause
why he should not be cited for indirect contempt for wasting the
time of the judiciary.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Complainant filed his explanation stating that his intention in
filing the complaint was not to waste the time of the Court but as
part of his crusade to clean up the judiciary. He reiterated his
belief that this Court will not tolerate fraud, dishonesty and
corrupt practices.
On August 29, 2001, the February 19, 2001 Resolution was
recalled in view of the gravity and seriousness of the charges. The
case was referred to Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis of the Court
of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif]
On February 6, 2002, Justice Magtolis submitted her report
recommending that Judge Legaspi be exonerated of the charges
against him for lack of a showing of malice or bad faith.[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif] The case was thereafter referred to the OCA
for evaluation. The OCA recommended that the Urgent
Appeal/Petition for Immediate Suspension and Dismissal filed
against Judge Legaspi be dismissed for lack of merit, but that
complainant Rolando R. Mijares be found guilty of indirect
contempt and fined in the amount of P1,000.00.
The recommendation of the OCA is well taken.
The records show that there were seventy-eight cases assigned to
Judge Legaspi, all of which were resolved by him, according to the
Reports of Compliance and the Certifications issued by the
respective Branch Clerks of Courts. Anent the raffle of some of the
cases of Judge Legaspi to other judges of Kalibo, Aklan, this Court
in the exercise of its administrative supervision over lower
courts, may order their re-raffle considering that they have
accumulated in Judge Legaspis court while he was detailed at the
RTC of Aklan.
With regard the charge of falsification, the record is bereft of any
evidence to conclusively show that Judge Legaspi falsified his
Reports of Compliance with the Resolutions of this Court. The
Certifications issued by the respective clerks of court corroborate
said Reports.
Anent the charge of corruption, Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court requires that complaints against judges must be supported
by the affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the
acts therein alleged and must also be accompanied by copies of
pertinent documents to substantiate the allegations. In the case at
bar, except for complainants bare allegations, surmises,
suspicions and rhetorics, no competent evidence was presented
to prove that Judge Legaspi committed corruption. In the case at bar, complainant made the following insinuation:

Regarding the charge of ignorance of the law, the settled doctrine
is that judges are not administratively responsible for what they
may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting
within their legal powers and jurisdiction.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
A judge may not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] To
hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for
no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] For a judge to be held
administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the error must be
gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with
evident bad faith.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong;
a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-
will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior
purposes.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
While this Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct
or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability
or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary, neither will it
hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits
that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
In the instant case, any perceived error which Judge Legaspi may
have committed in entertaining the appeal of the order of the
Municipal Trial Court, denying the motion for execution in Civil
Case No. 872, can only be deemed an error in judgment which is
more properly the subject of an appeal or petition for certiorari,
as the case may be, and not this administrative charge against
respondent judge.
Apparently, petitioner was in quandary why Judge Legaspi was
given premium of being sitting-pretty, despite of his glaring
ineptitude, instead of choking himself of the High Tribunals
wrath of hell, while those who failed to resolve their few cases
within 90-days period their salaries were suspended? Isnt equal
justice the equivalent of pantay-pantay lahat, or are some, with
big connections, or padrino, more equal than others? Or, maybe
because, Judge Legaspi have someone up there to protect and
coddle him?[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
The foregoing statements constitute contemptuous conduct.
Complainants imputation that this Court protects one of its own
is malicious and offends the dignity of the Judiciary. His
explanation that he made those statements merely as part of a
crusade to clean up the judiciary is unavailing. Indeed, this can be
done even without making malicious imputations on the Court.
For this, complainant must be sentenced to pay a fine of
P1,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint
against Judge Emilio B. Legaspi for gross ignorance of the law,
incompetence, falsification and corruption, is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. Complainant Rolando R. Mijares is found guilty of
indirect contempt and is FINED in the amount of One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) with the warning that a repetition of the same
or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Finally, we agree with the Court Administrator that complainant

was guilty of indirect contempt of court. Section 3 (d) of Rule 71
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a

charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:

xxxxxxxxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to

impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.

This Court may motu proprio initiate proceedings for indirect

contempt. Inherent in courts is the power to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and
of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it,
in every manner appertaining thereto.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]

In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, et al. v. Cloribel, etc., et al.,[if

!supportFootnotes][21][endif] we held that the use of language tending to

degrade the administration of justice constitutes indirect

contempt.
G.R. No. L-2217 March 23, 1950
MIGUEL R. CORNEJO, as attorney for Arcadia Acacio et al.,
petitioner,
vs.
BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the court of First Instance of
Rizal, respondent.
Petitioner in his own behalf.Respondent Judge in his own behalf.
BENGZON, J.:
In civil case No. 483 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled
"Cario, et al vs. Acacio, et al.," Atty. Miguel R. Cornejo was
(allegedly) asked by the defendants Acacio to act as their counsel;
but for his convenience he requested his companion, Atty.
Palacol, to handle it. The latter entered his appearance and acted
accordingly. On May 21, 1948, during the hearing of the case,
Cornejo was presented as a witness. Practically all the questions
were objected to by opposing counsel, and the judge, the
respondent Bienvenido A. Tan, sustained almost all objections.
Whereupon Attorney Cornejo left the witness stand and
approached the attorney's table asking that his appearance for
the defendants be noted. It was apparent he wanted to say as
counsel what he had been prevented from saying as witness. The
respondent judge told him he could not thus appear, there being
already one lawyer and no substitution of counsel had been
accompanied in accordance with the rules.
A few days later, Attorney Cornejo submitted a memorandum in
which he said, among other things, that the judge had unduly
favored the plaintiffs, to the extent of advising Attorney Palacol
"to fix the case because his position was hopeless," and the
memorandum was filed as a protest against the "unjust, hostile,
vindictive and dangerous attitude of the judge." The
memorandum further stated that copies thereof had been sent to
the Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Office of the
President of the Senate.
In an order dated May 26, 1948, the respondent judge, rejecting
the accusation of partially, stated that in accordance with his
usual practice he had told Attorney Palacol to see if the matter
could be settled amicably. Then he required attorney Cornejo to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt on four
counts, namely, for appearing in court without being a party or
attorney in the case, for using offensive language, for misbehavior
in the presence of the court and for publishing his memorandum
before it was submitted and decided by the court.
Answering the order, Attorney Cornejo expressed doubts that he
would be treated impartially because the charges of contemption
had been made by the judge himself, and reiterated his
accusation that the judge had unduly anticipated his opinion on
the case in favor of plaintiffs, "demonstrating his over-anxiety to
dispatch the case" "indirectly aiding counsel for the plaintiffs"
"insulting and humiliating the undersigned attorney while on the
witness stand, etc.". Then he went to explain away or rebut the
charges made. Immediately thereafter Attorney Cornejo repaired
to this Court asking for judgment ordering the respondent judge
to admit his appearance as counsel for the defendants in civil
case No. 483, to refrain from rendering his decision in said case
until he shall have allowed the petitioner as counsel for
defendants to present further evidence, and to stop all action on
the proceeding for contempt of court.
On June 7, 1948, we required the respondent to answer the
amended petition within ten days. We also resolved that upon the
filing of bond by petitioner in the amount of P200 a writ of
preliminary injunction will be issued. Such writ was actually
issued on June 15, 1948.
It appears, however, that on June 5, 1948, the respondent judge
decided civil case No. 483. And on June 4, 1948, he declared
Attorney Cornejo guilty of contempt and sentenced him to pay a
fine of P100 or in case of insolvency, to suffer imprisonment for
ten days. It also appears that on the same day Attorney Cornejo
interposed an appeal, which was denied by the respondent, on
the ground that there is no appeal in the matter of direct
contempts.
In view of these developments and of others to be indicated later
on, the petitioner now asks: (1) that the respondent be required
to admit and recognized his appearance as counsel in civil case
no. 483, and that the decision in that litigation be set aside on the
ground that defendants were deprived of the right to present
further evidence through the petitioner as counsel, and (2) that
the judgment for contempt be reviewed and revoked.
On the first point it further appears, that, as the injunction order
proved too late, Attorney Palacol submitted on June 23, 1948, a
"petition to set aside judgment or proceeding" seeking relief
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and that upon denial thereof
he appealed on July 12, 1948 to the Court of Appeals. Wherefore,
it is reasonable to expect that this question will be decided by the
Court of Appeals upon a review of the main controversy. Upon
this ground, and partly because petitioner failed too implead the
opposing parties in the said civil case No. 483, this portion of the
petition may not be granted in these proceedings.
On the second point, it is settled that no appeal lies from an order
of a superior court declaring a person in direct contempt thereof.1
Now, was the submission of the memorandum a direct contempt?
The respondent held it was (1) because Cornejo was not an
attorney in the case: (2) because it used offensive language
against the court; and (3) because it was published before it was
submitted and decided by the court. Copy of the memorandum is
part of the record before us. It contains the following paragraph:
It is further respectfully prayed that this memorandum be taken
for a protest against what he believes to be unjust, hostile,
vindictive and dangerous attitude or conduct of the presiding
Judge, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, of this Honorable Court in a
democratic government where laws shall reign supreme unless
the same Judge wants to sabotage the present administration of
the President who is seeking the restoration of public peace and
order and the faith of the people in our Government.
That is indeed strong language. It is insulting and contemptuous.2
The judge may have erred in some of his rulings; but mistakes
never justify offensive language. As was said in Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61, Phil., 729:
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause
and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and
energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so
for him to exercise said right by restoring to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity
of the courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the
courts guarantees the stability of their institution.

And the last paragraph informing the judge that copies of the
memorandum had been furnished "the Honorable, the Secretary
of Justice, etc.", could rightly be interpreted as an attempt to
intimidate the court in the exercise of its judicial functions.

Omitting reference to the other points, enough has been stated to

show that there was no clear abuse of the respondent's powers in
declaring Attorney Cornejo to be in direct contempt. Petition
denied. No costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes,

JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL
M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution,
respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written
Motion for Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed by
counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez, relating to the per
curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988. We have
reviewed once more the Court's extended per curiam Resolution,
in the light of the argument adduced in the Motion for
Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no sufficient
basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied in that
Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious
quotations and references to foreign texts which, however,
whatever else they may depict, do not reflect the law in this
jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some
measure, some of the conclusions reached in the per curiam
Resolution, addressing in the process some of the "Ten (10) Legal
Points for Reconsideration," made in the Motion for
Reconsideration.
1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this
Court "to charge respondent [with] indirect contempt and convict
him of direct contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that
"respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie
curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and
member of the bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in facie
curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though we
are aware that courts in the United States have sometimes used
that phrase in speaking of "direct contempts' as "contempts in the
face of the courts." Rather, the court sought to convey that it
regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which were made
both in a pleading filed before the Court and in statements given
to the media) and the misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as
serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a
frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the
Court, the entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is
that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988,
to explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court
and/or subjected to administrative sanctions" and in respect of
which, respondent was heard and given the most ample
opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that
he wanted to present for the consideration of this Court. The
Court did not summarily impose punishment upon the
respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71
of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider
respondent's acts as constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error
for this Court to charge respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not
139 of the Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of
the Revised Rules of Court pointing out that:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not
mandatory upon the Supreme Court such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is
certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139
(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge
consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in response to
respondent's motion for referral of this case either to the
Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines under
Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer
to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under
the old rule, Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor General was
similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not the only course
of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under
Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139,
"Proceedings for the removal or suspension of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or (2) upon
the complaint under oath of another in writing" (Parentheses
supplied). The procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule
139 is the procedure provided for suspension or disbarment
proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of another person,
rather than a procedure required for proceedings initiated by the
Supreme Court on its own motion. It is inconceivable that the
Supreme Court would initiate motu proprio proceedings for
which it did not find probable cause to proceed against an
attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor
General, which referral is made "for investigation to determine if
there is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the
respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has
initiated against the respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a
case to the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular case,
further factual investigation is needed. In the present case, as
pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the Court (page 18),
there was "no need for further investigation of facts in the
present case for it [was] not substantially disputed by respondent
Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed
to him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest
opportunity to present his defense: his defense is not that he did
not make the statements ascribed to him but that those
statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made
in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus
need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and
the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such
issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the
Motion for Reconsideration is from a dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Black in Green v. United State. 1 It may be pointed out that
the majority in Green v. United States, through Mr. Justice Harlan,
held, among other things, that: Federal courts do not lack power
to impose sentences in excess of one year for criminal contempt;
that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of
constitutional right; nor does the (US) Constitution require that
contempt subject to prison terms of more than one year be based
on grand jury indictments.
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said:
Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or
less dubious manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century, what is
indisputable is that from the foundation of the United States the
constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt without the
intervention of a jury has not been doubted. The First Judiciary Act
conferred such a power on the federal courts in the very act of
their establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary
Committee of eight that reported the bill to the Senate, five
member including the chairman, Senator, later to be Chief Justice,
Ellsworth, had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention
(Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb Strong,
Ricard Basett, William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First
Congress itself no less than nineteen member including Madison
who contemporaneously introduced the Bill of Rights, had been
delegates to the Convention. And when an abuse under this
power manifested itself, and led Congress to define more
explicitly the summary power vested in the courts, it did not
remotely deny the existence of the power but merely defined the
conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an Act "declaratory of
the law concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4
Stat 487.
xxxxxxxxx
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this
Court throughout its existence . In at least two score cases in this
Court, not to mention the vast mass of decisions in the lower federal
courts, the power to punish summarily has been accepted without
question. ... 2
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own
cause, is simplistic at best. The judge who finds himself
compelled to exercise the power to punish for contempt does so
not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person;
rather he upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and
integrity of the judicial institution and its claim to respectful
behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it, and
most especially from those who are officers of the court.
3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this
Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear
and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible
tendency," it was, more modestly, simply paraphrasing Section 3
(d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a
variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's
counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems
and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the
legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to
exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked,
absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present
danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out
the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in
certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been
recognized and applied by courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de
Gonzales, 3 this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-
Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred
position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming
Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is not, however, without limitations. As
held in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858
[1960]:
"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it
would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation.
No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however, a
literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It
would be too much to insist that all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There
are other societal values that press for recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is
such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of
the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
"balancing-of-interests test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando
on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle "requires a
court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay
of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation
(Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis Supplied) 4
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the
"balancing-of-interest test," we believe that the statements here
made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were
made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to
transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion
was implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is
important to point out that the "substantive evil" which the
Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the
instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt
violence or similar disruptions of public order. 5 What is here at
stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and
prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction
of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the
avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial
system of a country and the destruction of the standards of
professional conduct required from members of the bar and
officers of the courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in
other words, is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder or
rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching
in its implications for society.
4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for
this Court to hold that intent is irrelevant in charges of
misconduct." What the Court actually said on this point was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate
the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so
far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned.
He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain
import of his words and acts. It is, upon the other hand, not
irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered no apology in
his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance
(Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted).

The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because

such subjectivities (understood as pyschological phenomena)
cannot be ascertained and reached by the processes of this Court.
Human intent can only be shown derivatively and implied from
an examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the Court was
saying was that respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and
denigrate the Court, cannot prevail over the plain import of what
he did say and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear import of
his acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state
of mind incompatible with those acts or statements. It is scarcely
open to dispute that, e.g., one accused of homicide cannot
successfully deny his criminal intent by simply asserting that
while he may have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he
actually acted from high motives and kind feelings for the latter.

5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for

this Court to punish respondent for contempt of court for out of
court publications."

Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents

as alleged modern trends in the United Kingdom and in the
United States concerning the law of contempt. We are, however,
unable to regard the texts that he cites as binding or persuasive
in our jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to document
the state of our case law on this matter in its per curiam
Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances of this case that
would suggest to this Court that that case law, which has been
followed for at least half a century or so, ought to be reversed.

6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition

of indefinite suspension from the practice of law constitutes
"cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment". The Court finds it
difficult to consider this a substantial constitutional argument.
The indefiniteness of the respondent's suspension, far from being
"cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the effect of placing, as
it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a
lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving
respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of
his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such
misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the
exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for

Reconsideration for lack of merit. The denial is FINAL.

The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion,

dated October 25, 1988 and the Supplemental Manifestation,
dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,

Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 [G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000]
ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by
one of her heirs, CARMEN MATILDE M. TIONGCO
petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br.
26, JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
assailing the Order dated March 17, 1994[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, which reinstated
an earlier order cancelling the notice of lis pendens annotated on
the back of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-92383 and T-
5050, of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244
and 3246, respectively, located in Iloilo City.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:
On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared
filed an amended complaint[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] before the
Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, against
private respondents Jose B. Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the action was one for
"annulment of affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates
of title, reconveyance and damages.
In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent
Tiongco, on the basis of an affidavit of adjudication dated April
17, 1974 alleging that he is the sole surviving heir of the previous
owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco, succeeded in having the subject
properties registered in his name, to the prejudice of the other
surviving heir of the previous owner, petitioner among them.
Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and
both were among several heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco. The
aforesaid affidavit of adjudication was registered with the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City on May 10, 1974. Petitioner
prayed that the properties be reconveyed to the original
registered owners, subject to partition among the lawful heirs,
and that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages and
costs.
To protect her interest in the properties during the
pendency of the case, petitioner caused to be annotated on
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-52547, T-4666 and T-52546,[if
!supportFootnotes][3][endif] which covered Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and 1404,
respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-5050 were derived or
transferred from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and
registered in the name of Tiongco.
After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial
ensued during which, on three separate occasions, he filed
motions seeking the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens.[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif] All these motions were denied.[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]
On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a
Decision[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] dismissing petitioner's complaint
and private respondent's counterclaim. The trial court found that
petitioner's cause of action had already prescribed.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]on
December 17, 1993. As before, respondent Tiongco filed a motion
for cancellation of the notices of lis pendens[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
dated December 21, 1993; this was denied in an Order dated
January 10, 1994.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] He filed a "Second Motion
for Reconsideration"[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] which was also
denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Displaying remarkable tenacity, respondent Tiongco filed a
"Third Motion for Reconsideration."[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] This
time, however, his arguments proved persuasive. In an Order[if
!supportFootnotes][13][endif]dated February 14, 1994, the respondent
judge ruled to wit:
In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners
Association Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990),
cited in Vda. De Kilayko vs. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614-615
(1992), that "the continuance or removal of a notice of lis
pendens is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in
the action and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof so
that the notices of lis pendens in the case at bar may, on proper
grounds, be cancelled notwithstanding the non-finality of the
judgment of this Court brought about by plaintiff's appeal and
considering the finding of this Court that plaintiff's action had
already prescribed, which finding is based on the admitted fact
that the questioned deed of adjudication was registered way back
of May 10, 1974 so that the possibility of this finding being
reversed is quite remote if not totally nil and, considering further,
the circumstances obtaining in this case, among which are: (1)
that the criminal complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff against
defendant Jose B. Tiongco based on the same deed of adjudication
had already been dismissed with finality also on the ground of
prescription; (2) that the occupants of the property who were
alleged as formerly paying rentals to herein plaintiff, Estrella
Tiongco Yared, had already recognized defendant's ownership
and had long stopped paying rentals to plaintiff without the latter
intervening, much less, contesting the decision in Civil Case No.
15421 where defendant Jose B. Tiongco was declared with
finality as the true and lawful owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246;
and (3) that, if at all, the present claim of plaintiff covers but a
very small portion of subject lots consisting only a total of about
64 square meters hence, it would be unfair to the defendant who
has torrens title covering the parcels of lands solely in his name
to have the same subjected to the harsh effect of such a
encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the foregoing
considerations and upon further review of the records, hereby
reconsiders its stand on the subject matter of lis pendens and so
holds that the continued annotation of subject notices of lis
pendens is intended to molest the defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and
is not necessary to protect the rights of plaintiff as such rights, if
any, are now foreclosed by prescription.
This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek
reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] On March 4, 1994, the
public respondent issued an Order[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
reversing himself on the ground that (1) it had already lost
jurisdiction over the case due to the expiration of the last day to
appeal of both parties, (2) the notice of appeal has been
approved, and (3) the records had been ordered elevated to the
Court of Appeals.
Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion for
reconsideration[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] against the Order dated
March 4, 1994. On March 17, 1994, the respondent judge issued
the order, subject of this petition, which is quoted hereunder:
Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
although appeal had already been perfected, the Court, prior to
the transmittal of the records to the appellate court, may issue
orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal
and considering that in the case at bar, lis pendens is not a matter
litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been
transmitted to the appellate court so that this Court still has
jurisdiction to issue the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling
the notices of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-92383
covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 and
considering further, that the said Order does not direct
cancellation of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483
covering Lot no. 1404 which contains a total area of 1,587 square
meters where the area of 64 square meters claimed by plaintiff
can very well be taken; as prayed for by the defendant Jose B.
Tiongco, the Order of March 4, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and
set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994
cancelling the notices of lis pendens on TCT No. T-92383 covering
lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 is hereby
reinstated.
On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the
annotation of notices of lis pendens.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be
fruitless, petitioner filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari, alleging that:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY,
WHIMSICALLY AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK
OF THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE THAT ARE THE
SUBJECT OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE
AMONG THE DOCUMENTS THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE
DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE HEREIN
PETITIONER.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of
public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to make
known to the whole world that properties in litigation are still
within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated
and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] The notice of lis
pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular
real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one
who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own
risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[if
and Section 76 of Presidential Decree No.
!supportFootnotes][20][endif]
1529,[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree provide the statutory bases for notice of lis
pendens. From these provisions, it is clear that such a notice is
proper only in:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly
affecting title to the land or the use or
occupation thereof or the building thereon.[if
!supportFootnotes][22][endif]
Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of
possession or title over the subject property to put the property
under the coverage of the rule.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] It is not
necessary for her to prove ownership or interest over the
property sought to be affected by lis pendens.
Whether as a matter, of procedure[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
or substance,[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] the rule is that a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely (1) if
the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the
adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to
protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.[if
!supportFootnotes][26][endif]
The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear
violation of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy that we have taken
pains to emphasize in past jurisprudence.
Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
that:
[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain
if its is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to
it by fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of
dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs
should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or
where serious and important reasons exist therefor.
Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised
relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals,
bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or
another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals.
Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the
specific action for the writ's procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in
this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.
We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,[if
thus:
!supportFootnotes][28][endif]
xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of
certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive.
It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts
(formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the
writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It
is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial
Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate
Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was
restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be
taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after
all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative
of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
 for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial
Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.
Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra-resulting
from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction"-was evidently intended precisely
to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing
with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but
for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding
jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and
to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives
to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to
have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and
sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated
directly and, immediately by the highest tribunal of the land. The
proceeding at bar is a case in point. The application for the writ of
certiorari sought against a City Court was brought directly to this
Court although there is no discernible special and important
reason for not presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for
the information and guidance of all concerned, that it will not only
continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict
observance thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted
in disregarding the judicial hierarchy. As we noted in Santiago v.
Vasquez,[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case
a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the
same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses
before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact
that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of
their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by
law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only
because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court
but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore,
reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstance justify availment of a remedy within and calling for
the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
This policy found further application in People v. Court of
Appeals,[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] Aleria v. Velez, [if
!supportFootnotes][31][endif] and Tano v. Socrates.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif]
Only the presence of exceptional and compelling reasons justified
a disregard of the rule.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif]
Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation
as to her failure to comply with or non-observance of the
principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant
petition could not have been brought before the Court of Appeals,
considering all the more that the appeal of the main case was
already before it. In Magdalena, Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] we ruled, to wit:
The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is involved in an
action-is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the
court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in
an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the
merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or
warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal
with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in
the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the
results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to
those which may be finally determined and laid down therein.
The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a
mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court
having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or
removal-like the continuance or removal or removal of a
preliminary attachment of injunction-is not contingent on the
existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no
effect on the merits thereof.
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the
plaintiff's appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and resolve
any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal,
even before final judgment. The rule that no questions may be
raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to those
affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents
thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat,
the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies. [emphasis
supplied]
Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the
Court of Appeals, the same could, and would, have been
consolidated with the appeal, thereby bringing under the
competence of the said court all matters relative to the action,
including the incidents thereof.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition
of the instant case will be incomplete without a reference to the
improper and unethical language employed by respondent Jose B.
Tiongco, who is also counsel for private respondents, in his
pleadings and motions filed both before us and the court a quo. It
is his belief that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma, "a
rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a
dress which is not red, and who stampedes into the courtroom
like a mad fury and who speaks slang English to conceal her
faulty grammar,"[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] is impelled by less than
less than noble reasons in serving as counsel for petitioner. Her
ulterior motive? "[T]o please and tenderize and sweeten towards
her own self the readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco,"[if
!supportFootnotes][36][endif] a retired police major described by
respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's "nio bonito,"[if
!supportFootnotes][37][endif] an unmarried mestizo with curly hair who
lives with plaintiff for being houseless[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] who
rents a place on the subject property sought to be recovered by
petitioner. Atty. Deguma, apparently are unmarried maiden of a
certain age, is variously described by respondent Tiongco as "a
love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready to skin defendant
alive for not being a bastard,"[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] and a
"horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female bull of an
Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass (sic) and WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby DISMISSED,
injure defendant - if only to please and attract police-major without pronouncement as to costs.
Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the deeply desired object of her
unreciprocated affections - who happens not to miss every SO ORDERED.
chance to laugh at her behind her back."[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif] He
claims that Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the Public Attorney's
Office, is engaged in a game of one-upmanship with a fellow
employee, in that "she happens to be ambitious enough to
secretly (that what she thought) plot to put one over her office-
mate who simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by aiming at
no lest than an IMDC major - hoping to catch him by sheer brass
and audacity.[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] In so doing, Atty. Deguma is
using the PAO as a "marriage bureau for her own benefit.[if
!supportFootnotes][42][endif] Respondent Tiongco predicts that nothing

good will come out of opposing counsel's scheme since, quoting

Voltaire, "outside of virtue, ther's (sic) no happiness."[if
!supportFootnotes][43][endif]

Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of

character assassination. His verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a
fleeting way, are cast with little regard for truth. However, he
does nothing more than to obscure the issues, and his reliance on
the fool's gold of gossip betrays only a shocking absence of
discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give him an object
lesson in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect
members of the bar to comport themselves. These provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility are pertinent:

CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH

COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR
TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL
COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use

languages which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or

menacing language before the courts.

In Romero v. Valle,[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] we stated that a

lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed some latitude of
remarks or comment in the furtherance of the cause he upholds,
his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious to both
court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his
use of intemperate language invites the disciplinary authority of
the court.[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif] We are aghast at the facility with
which respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations
against the opposing party and her counsel, although it is of
public record that in Tiongco v. Deguma, et a1.,[if
!supportFootnotes][46][endif] we dismissed as totally unfounded his

charge of fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal against

petitioner, Major Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the latter's
superior at the Public Attorney's Office, Atty. Napoleon G.
Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though entertaining, do not find a
ready audience in us, and he should be, as he is hereby, warned
accordingly: Homines qui gestant, quiqui auscultant crimina, si
meo arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat, gestores linguis, auditores
auribus.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif]
 Section 41 of the Administrative code of 1987 as amended by R.A.
Sanchez vs Tupas No. 6788 reads:

<[A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1687-P. March 1, 2004]
vs. TUPAS
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated MAR 1 2004.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1687-P (Rafael Sanchez vs. Rubie P. Tupas,
Clerk of Court, MCTC, Barotac, Viejo, Iloilo.)
For resolution is a verified complaint dated June 16, 2003 filed by
Rafael Sanchez charging Clerk of Court Rubie Tupas with
unauthorized practice of law.
Complainant alleges that a criminal complaint was filed against
him relative to the seizure of his fishing boat named "M/BCA
Connie 14" he allegedly lent to one Antonio Galla for violation of
section 90 (Use of Active Gear) of R.A. No. 8550 otherwise known
as the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998[1]cralaw; that said
complaint and its supporting affidavit were subscribed and
sworn to by the complaining witness and the affiants before the
respondent Clerk of Court Rubie Tupas who is not a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and therefore engaged
in unauthorized practice of law.
In her Comment, respondent Clerk of Court states that her
administration of oath to the persons who executed the criminal
complaint and its supporting affidavit filed before the court was
done "under the color of authority" attached to the to the position
of a Clerk of Court under Section 3, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal procedure.Respondent avers that under this rule, she
is considered a public officer charged with the enforcement of the
law, and as such, she can administer oaths and that her acts done
as a clerk of court, such as notarizing criminal complaints and its
supporting affidavit filed in court, are considered as among those
which are related in the exercise of her duties.
Section 41.Officers Authorized to Administer Oath. - The
following officers have general authority to administer oaths:
President; Vice President; Members and Secretaries of both
Houses of the Congress; Members of the Judiciary; Sectaries of
Departments; Provincial governors and lieutenant-governors;
city mayors; municipal mayors; bureau directors; regional
directors; clerk of courts, register of deeds; other civilian officers
in public service of the government of the Philippines whose
appointments are vested in the President and are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; all other
constitutional officers; and notaries public.(Emphasis supplied)
The term "clerk of courts" in the aforequoted provision is used as
a general term.No specification was made as to the Court to
which said clerks of court belong.The intention of the law is clear,
to remove the limitation, and, hence, to authorize all clerk of
courts regardless of whether they are clerks of the Metropolitan
Trial courts, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, to administer oaths on matter involving official
business.[2]cralaw Hence, as Clerk of Court of MCTC, respondent
has the authority to administer oath of affidavits of parties and
witnesses which are to be filed in court.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant complaint is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court

In his Reply, complainant insist that respondent Clerk of Court's

allegations are but her presumptuous and erroneous
interpretation of the law; that the complaint and joint affidavit
notarized by respondent Clerk of Court are pleadings filed in
court of law for the commencement of a criminal prosecution,
hence, only lawyers and members of the IBP and not a mere court
employee as the respondent Clerk of Court can notarize said
instruments; and that Section 3, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure cited by respondent Clerk of Court
enumerates the persons authorized by law to file the complaint
and not the persons who may notarize the complaint.

In a Memorandum dated January 9, 2004, the Office of the Court

Administrator recommends the dismissal of the complaint
against respondent.The Court approves the recommendation.The
complaint of Rafael Sanchez is bereft of merit.

Section 3(a) Rule 112 of the revised Rules of criminal Procedure

provides that affidavits of complainants and his witnesses as well
as other supporting documents shall be sworn to before, among
others, government officials authorized to administer oaths.
[A.C. No. 5379. May 9, 2003]
WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant, vs. CEASAR G. BATUEGAS,
MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN Q. SUSA,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified
Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G.
Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for
allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating
the lawyers oath.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-
187627 for Murder, entitled People of the Philippines versus
Crisanto Arana, Jr., pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 27. On December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas
and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with
Motion for Bail, alleging that the accused has voluntarily
surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under
detention.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] Upon personal verification with
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana
allegedly surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered
only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate of
Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the
Security Management Division of the NBI.
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila,
Branch 27, calendared the motion on December 15, 2000 despite
the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects, namely, the
lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of
the three-day notice rule, and the failure to attach the Certificate
of Detention which was referred to in the Motion as Annex 1.
Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on
December 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was
issued against their client, they filed the Manifestation with
Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they immediately
fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to
voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived
at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of
detention indicated that the accused surrendered on December
14, 2000. They argued that there was neither unethical conduct
nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has
voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI. As regards
the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as
private prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless,
they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the
motion with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a
motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of
the Rules of Court.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was
no longer in court when his co-respondents filed the
Manifestation with Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Pea, Clerk III,
received the said Motion and noticed that it was set for hearing
on December 15, 2000 and the Certificate of Detention was not
attached. However, the presiding judge instructed her to receive
the Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate of
Detention before the hearing. Thus, the inclusion of the Motion in
the courts calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized by the
presiding judge and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in
faithful performance of his ministerial duty.
In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001,[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] the
instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.
On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner, Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, submitted her report and recommendation as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is
respectfully recommended that Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty.
Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of
their profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six
(6) months from receipt hereof. The complaint against Atty.
Franklin Q. Susa, upon the other hand, is hereby recommended
dismissed for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
The foregoing Report and Recommendation was adopted and
approved by the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline in Resolution
No. XV-2002-400, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and in view of respondents
commission of deliberate falsehood, Atty. Batuegas and Atty.
Llantino are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months. The complaint against Atty. Susa is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the
Investigating Commissioner. Respondents Batuegas and Llantino
are guilty of deliberate falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] He
swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his
clients.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] He should bear in mind that as an
officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the
court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing
justice and arriving at correct conclusion.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before
them.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] While a lawyer has the solemn duty
to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost
zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at
the expense of truth.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him
to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and
responsibilities expected from them as members of the bar.
Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court
if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused
had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was
under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to
mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice. To
knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated
their oath when they resorted to deception.

Respondents contend that their allegation of the accuseds

detention was merely a statement of an ultimate fact which still
had to be proved by evidence at the hearing of the Motion. That
they were able to show that their client was already under the
custody of the NBI at the hearing held on December 15, 2000
does not exonerate them. The fact remains that the allegation that
the accused was in the custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000
was false.

In Comia vs. Antona, we held:

It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the

police authorities on the same date tentatively scheduled for the
hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening
event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve
respondent judge from administrative liability considering that
he should not have accorded recognition to the application for
bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of
personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the court.[if
!supportFootnotes][13][endif]

In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion,

reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the
prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his
recommendation.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]

In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of

hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled
date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice,
respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-
observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they
are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]

Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner

that respondent clerk of court should not be made
administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of
the trial court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding
judge. However, he is reminded that his administrative functions,
although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are
vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice.[if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif] Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the

judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers

which are contrary to the established rules of procedure.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys.

Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found
guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal

records of Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Miguelito Nazareno V.
Llantino in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6198 September 15, 2006
RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's
Service is before us on a charge of unethical conduct for having
uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case
No. Q-99-38778.1
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by
complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military
officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point
during the February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla
said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases
he [complainant Maligaya] filed before against the same
defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the
case against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with
that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving
pension.2 (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge
Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of clarificatory questions and
thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing
and "file the appropriate pleading."3 Weeks passed but Atty.
Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else to
substantiate his averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty.
Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline.4 The complaint, which charged
Atty. Doronilla with "misleading the court through
misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice,"5
was referred to a commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant
swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never
entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits.7 Atty.
Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present
evidence and explain his side, admitted several times that there
was, in fact, no such agreement.8 Later he explained in his
memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case
amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial"9 and
insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath.10 He pointed
out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his
"alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the
case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.11
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro
submitted a report and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla
guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10,
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility12 and
recommending that he be "suspended from the government
military service as legal officer for a period of three months."13
This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of
Governors on August 30, 2003.14
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers
who, as officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of
justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth
and honor.15 The common caricature that lawyers by and large do
not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should
not become a common reality.16 To this end, Canon 10 and Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had
agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these
peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated
the lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court," of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but
restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never
seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law."17
Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover,
by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of what
he had done. From the very beginning of this administrative case,
Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had
done nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778.
He persisted in doing so even after having admitted that he had,
in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist.
Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty.
Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade
responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant
for the information of Judge Daway but only as "a sort of
question" to complainant regarding a "pending proposal" to settle
the case.18
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only
for its speciousness,19 cannot absolve him. If anything, it leads us
to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain
facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There
is in his favor, though, a presumption of good faith20 which keeps
us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an
indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his
only aim was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in
arms without going to trial,"21 perhaps it is not unreasonable to
assume that what he really meant to say was that he had
intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed
agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it
would have been no justification for speaking falsely in court.
There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among
disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any
circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true.
A lawyer's duty to the court to employ only such means as are
consistent with truth and honor22 forbids recourse to such a
tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the
doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the
parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to account
for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.
Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, which in part declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice x x x.

The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only

suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we disagree
with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension
from the government military service. After all, the only purpose
of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's
liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a
legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper
for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the
lawyer's oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge
Advocate General's Service. Of course, suspension from
employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a
consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that
should not be reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his
professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose
of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the
IBP's recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of
law.

At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's

recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronilla's suspension.
We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his
liability somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough
candor to admit, during the investigation, the falsity of the
statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second, the
absence of material damage to complainant may also be
considered as a mitigating circumstance.23 And finally, since this
is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some measure of
forbearance.24

Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of

this administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is
definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away
from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge
himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise
justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct
shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record

and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP
Judge Advocate General's Service.

SO ORDERED.
Molina vs Magat that:

MENDOZA, J.:
This Commission finds it
hard to believe that respondent would
have mistakenly been under the
impression that a case for physical
Before the Court is the undated Resolution[if injuries was filed against his client when
of the Board of Governors of the Integrated
!supportFootnotes][1][endif]
there was no such case filed.
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Ceferino R. Magat (Atty. Respondent was either negligently
Magat) liable for unethical conduct and recommending that he be reckless or he had mischievous
reprimanded. intentions to deceive the trial court. In
any case, he committed a transgression
The Facts: for which he should be punished.
However, the graver sin of
The case stemmed from a complaint for disbarment[if respondent is, and this he admits, that
filed by Rodrigo A. Molina (complainant)
!supportFootnotes][2][endif] he appeared as counsel before a trial
against Atty. Magat before the Court on May 5, 1978. The court on at least two (2) occasions
complaint alleged, among others, that complainant filed cases of notwithstanding the fact that he had
Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority and Breach of the been suspended by the Supreme Court
Peace and Resisting Arrest against one Pascual de Leon (de Leon) from the practice of law. Despite
before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila; that the counsel professing his contrition in his Answer,
of record for accused de Leon in both cases was Atty. Magat; that this Commission is not convinced.
a case for slight physical injuries was filed against him (Molina) Otherwise, respondent should have had,
by de Leon as a counter-charge and Atty. Magat was also the at the onset of the proceedings,
private prosecutor; that Atty. Magat subsequently filed a motion admitted to his misdeeds and put his
to quash the information on Assault upon an Agent of a Person in fate squarely with the disciplinary body.
Authority on the sole ground of double jeopardy claiming that a Yet, he proceeded to fight the charges
similar case for slight physical injuries was filed in court by a against him.
certain Pat. Molina (Molina); that based on the record, no case of Moreover, if respondent
slight physical injuries was filed by Molina against de Leon; that was indeed moved by altruistic
Atty. Magat was very much aware of such fact as he was the intentions when he made those
counsel and private prosecutor on record of de Leon from the appearances before the trial court
very start of the case way back on May 24, 1974; that Atty. despite having been suspended, he
Magats act of filing the Motion to Quash was a malicious act done could have so informed the Presiding
in bad faith to mislead the court, thus, a betrayal of the Judge of his plight and explained why
confidence of the court of which he is an officer; and that Atty. the party he was representing could not
Magat likewise committed willful disobedience of the court order attend. Yet, what he proceeded to do
when he appeared as counsel for de Leon on two (2) occasions was to enter his appearance as counsel.
despite the fact that he was suspended from the practice of law. Indeed, it is beyond doubt he trifled
with the suspension order handed by
the Supreme Court.
In his Answer,[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Atty. Magat If there is one thing going
averred that in so far as the filing of the motion to quash was for respondent, it is that the passage of
concerned, he was really under the impression that a criminal time with which this case remains
case in lieu of the two (2) charges was indeed filed and that the pending makes it difficult to impose a
said motion was opposed by the other party and was denied by penalty of suspension on him. Under
the court. He admitted his appearances in court while under normal circumstances, this Commission
suspension. He explained that his appearance in the December would not have thought twice of
21, 1977 hearing was to inform the court that the accused was suspending respondent. However, the
sick and to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the acts committed by respondent occurred
accused. In the January 9, 1978 hearing, he appeared because the over TWENTY (20) YEARS ago. It would
accused had no money and pleaded that his testimony be not be fair to now impose a suspension
finished. Atty. Magat begged for the indulgence of the court and on respondent, more so considering that
conveyed his repentance and apology and promised that the he is, in all likelihood, in the twilight of
same would not happen again. his career.

The complaint was endorsed to the Office of the On the other hand, there is
Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and still a need to discipline respondent if
recommendation.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Thereafter, the OSG only to set an example to other lawyers
transmitted the records of the case to the IBP for proper that suspension orders of the Supreme
disposition. Court cannot simply be ignored. Thus, it
is the recommendation of the
Inhis Report and Recommendation[if undersigned that respondent be meted a
dated March 20, 2009, the IBP Commission
!supportFootnotes][5][endif] fine of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
on Bar Discipline found merit in the complaint and recommended (50,000.00) and that he be heavily
that Atty. Magat be reprimanded and fined P50,000.00. It stated reprimanded for his actions, the passage
 of time notwithstanding.[if agents or brokers, constitutes
!supportFootnotes][6][endif] malpractice. [Underlining supplied]

On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed
its Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] adopting the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner. It, however, deleted the imposition
of fine.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but not
with respect to the penalty.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those
who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at
all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform
their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and
their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
As stated, if Atty. Magat was truly moved by altruistic
intentions when he appeared before the trial court despite having
been suspended, he could have informed the Presiding Judge of
his plight and explained why the party he was representing could
not attend. On the contrary, Atty. Magat kept his silence and
proceeded to represent his client as counsel.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ceferino R. Magat is hereby
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar
offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the standards

set by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule
10.01, which provides:

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor

consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.

In this case, the Court agrees with the observation of

the IBP that there was a deliberate intent on the part of Atty.
Magat to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss
the criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat
should not make any false and untruthful statements in his
pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight
physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do was
to secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case was
filed.

Furthermore, Atty. Magat expressly admitted

appearing in court on two occasions despite having been
suspended from the practice of law by the Court. Under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court and/or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority
to do so. It provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or

suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid
PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or A.C. No. 6323
OLIVARES REALTY
CORPORATION,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-versus
ATTY. ARSENIO C.
VILLALON, JR.,
April 13, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] for disbarment and
suspension[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] against respondent Atty.
Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. by Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty
Corporation for violation of Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum shopping.
In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondents client, Sarah
Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly sued him for violations of
the lease contract which they executed over a commercial
apartment in Olivares Building in Paraaque.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] The case was
dismissed for improper venue.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an
action for breach of contract with damages in the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque, Branch 274. [if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0233, was dismissed for failure to
prosecute.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Al-Rasheed, through counsel
Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the order dismissing Civil Case
No. 99-0233 but the Court of Appeals did not give due course to
her appeal.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] The subsequent petition for
review on certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise
denied. [if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999
suit in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274 [if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif] where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-
04-009.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] It was dismissed on the grounds of
res judicata and prescription.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was
only performing his legal obligation as a lawyer to protect and
prosecute the interests of his client.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] He
denied that he was forum shopping as his client, in her certificate
of non-forum shopping,[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] disclosed the two
previous cases involving the same cause of action which had been
filed and dismissed.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] Respondent further
claims he could not refuse his clients request to file a new case
because Al-Rasheed was the oppressed party in the transaction.[if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif]
This Court referred the complaint, together with
respondents comment, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[if
!supportFootnotes][17][endif]
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP
found that respondent assisted Al-Rasheed in repeatedly suing
Olivares for the same cause of action and subject matter.[if
!supportFootnotes][18][endif] It opined that respondent should have noted
that the 1999 case was dismissed for lack of interest to
prosecute.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court, such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on
the merits.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] The CBD recommended the
suspension of respondent for six months with a warning that any
similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more
severely.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that
respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility as well as the proscription on forum
shopping. It, however, modified the recommended penalty to
reprimand.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
We adopt the findings of the IBP except its
recommendation as to the penalty.
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are
neither mere words nor an empty formality. When they take their
oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice.
They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. [if
!supportFootnotes][23][endif] As the first Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states, [a] lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] Moreover, according to the
lawyers oath they took, lawyers should not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give
aid nor consent to the same.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
With all this in mind, respondent should have
refrained from filing the second complaint against Olivares. He
ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with
prejudice since it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.
There was no excuse not to know this elementary principle of
procedural law.
The facts of this case reveal that Atty. Villalon
purposely filed the second complaint. Respondent appealed the
1999 case to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court.
Both actions were dismissed for lack of merit, not on mere
technicality. The certificate of non-forum shopping attached to
the 2004 complaint disclosed that Al-Rasheed previously sued
Olivares for violating their lease contract. As if such disclosure
was a sufficient justification, Atty. Villalon unapologetically
reproduced his 1999[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] arguments and
assertions in the 2004[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] complaint.
Respondent obviously knew the law and tried to go around it.
This Court therefore concludes that respondent willfully violated
Rule 12.02, Canon 12 which provides that:
A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from
the same cause.
Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.
A lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at
the expense of truth and justice.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] Lawyers
have the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice. Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the
Courts processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file multiple or
repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for
incompetence or willful violation of their duties as attorneys to
act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such
actions that appear to be just and consistent with truth and
honor.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]

Everything considered, this Court finds that a

reprimand is insufficient and rules instead that CBDs
recommendation for a six-month suspension from the practice of
law to be more commensurate to the violation committed.
However, in view of respondents death on September 27, 2006,[if
!supportFootnotes][30][endif] the penalty can no longer be imposed on

him. This development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary

case moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993.
CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L.
FRANCISCO, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL; VIOLATION OF
OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR MONEY OR MALICE;
SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR
GROSS ABUSE OF RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY
ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT MERIT.
The cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit.
The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted
to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief
that was consistently denied, as he should have expected . . . By
grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose
of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was
disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such
actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the
law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or
malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession
and has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by
law as an officer of the Court . . . For this serious transgression of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be
sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also
as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his
example. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR
from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights
and privileges appurtenant to membership of the Philippine bar.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM, p:
In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992,
Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L.
Francisco.
On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband
Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa and Magdalena
Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a
period of 25 years beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated
verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate after the
expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he had an option to
extend the lease for another 5 years and the right of pre-emption
over the property.
In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's
counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits before
different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property
and that all these proceedings were decided against Lee. The
proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and involved
the same issues and parties, thus violating the proscription
against forum-shopping.
Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of
his client's right only such remedies as were authorized by law.
The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is narrated as
follows:
1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a complaint
against Garcia and the other lessors for specific performance and
reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2118. On
June 9, 1989, Garcia filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, laches and
prescription. The case was dismissed by Judge Felimon Mendoza
on August 10, 1989.
2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer against Lee in the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1455.
Through Francisco, Lee filed an answer alleging as special and
affirmative defense the pendency of Civil Case no. Q-89-2118 in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 5, 1989,
Judge Marcelino Bautista issued a resolution rejecting this
allegation on the ground that the issues before the two courts
were separate and different.
3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista,
Garcia and the other lessors. This was docketed as civil Case No.
Q-89-3833. In filing this petition, Francisco knew or should have
known that it violated the Rule on Summary Procedure
prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court.
Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was the denial of his prayer for
dismissal of Civil Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case Q-89-
3833 was clearly a special civil action and not an appeal.
On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued an order
enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with the trial of the
unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant,
however, the injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-89-
3833 was dismissed on January 9, 1990. Lee did not appeal.
4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
with the Court of Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon,
Garcia and the other lessors. Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No. 20476,
the petition assailed the January 9, 1990 order of Judge Vera
dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-3833. On May 31, 1989, the
petition was denied.
5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. 1455 in
favor of complainant Garcia and the other lessors. Lee did not
appeal. Instead, on, June 21, 1990, through Francisco again, he
filed a petition against Judge Singzon and the other lessors for
certiorari and annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 1455
and damages with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction.
This was docketed as Civil case No. 90-5852 in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, presided by Judge Cesar C.
Paralejo.
In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that Civil Case No. Q-
90-5852 is an appeal from the unlawful detainer case. Again, he
lies. Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not
an appeal.
On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July 13, 1990, Judge Paralejo
issued an order enjoining Judge Singzon from enforcing the
decision in that case. Garcia attacked this order in a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction of the Philippines.
docketed as CA Sp. No. 22392. The petition was granted by the
Court of Appeals on September 19, 1991, on the ground that the SO ORDERED.
judgment in the unlawful detainer case had come final and
executory as June 30, 1990.

6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for execution in

the unlawful detainer case. On September 27, 1991, Lee, through
Francisco, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the
hearing of the motion. A writ of execution was nonetheless issued
by Judge Singzon on October 8, 1991.

7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals, Judge
Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. This Court denied the
petition on January 27, 1992, and reconsideration on April 8,
1992.

8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for

certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge Singzon,
Garcia and the other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City to set aside and declare the writs of execution in Civil Case
No. 1455. This was dismissed on August 4, 1992, and Lee,
through Francisco, filed a motion for reconsideration. According
to Francisco, he was relieved as counsel while this motion was
pending.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice.

The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit.

The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted
to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief
that was consistently denied, as he should have expected. He
thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the courts and
wasted their valuable time. He also caused much inconvenience
and expense to the complainant, who was obliged to defend
herself against his every move.

By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the

purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he
was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such
actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such
defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the
law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or
malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession
and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law
as an officer of the Court.

Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2,

1956. Considering his age and experience in the practice of the
laws, he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use
it as an instrument for harassment of the complainant and the
misuse of judicial processes. For this serious transgression of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned,
not only as punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning
to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example.

Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the

practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and
privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.

Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on the

respondent and circularized to all courts and the Integrated Bar
[A.C. No. 4947. February 14, 2005]
ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS,
respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this verified Petition[1] filed by Rosa Yap-Paras
praying for the disbarment of her estranged husband Atty. Justo
Paras on alleged acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct,
grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
On 18 January 1989, respondent filed his comment[2] to the
Petition.
In a Resolution dated 10 February 1999,[3] the Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The background facts are summarized in a Report and
Recommendation dated 13 January 2004[4] of Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, which
Report reads in part, as follows:
Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the children of
Ledesma de Jesus Paras-Sumabong namely Conegunda, Justo,
Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna all surnamed Paras executed a
Special Power of Attorney prepared by the respondent to sell
parcels of land located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental
giving authority to their mother to sell the subject real properties
previously registered in the name of the heirs of Vicente Paras
wherein respondent was one of the signatories therein.
Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said
Special Power of Attorney, Ledesma J. Paras-Sumabang executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Aurora Dy-Yap over the
subject real property located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros
Oriental which was with the respondents full knowledge since he
was residing at the house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and
from that time, the Yap family had been in possession of the
subject real property up to the present.
Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention
was called to the fact that a free patent title to the aforesaid
property was issued in respondents name and upon verification
with the DENR, Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City, complainant
was able to get copies of the documents for lot Nos. 660, 490 and
585 pertaining to the Notice of Application for Free Patent dated
April 2, 1985 signed by the respondent; over the aforesaid lots
previously sold by Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D. Yap;
Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property Rights and Interest Over
Real Property executed by Ledesma de Jesus dated May 28, 1985;
Letter of Application dated April 2, 1985 signed by respondent
under oath before Apolonio Tan authorized officer to administer
oath; Letter of Certification signed by Apolonio Tan dated June 4,
1985 and Order of Approval dated August 19, 1985 signed by
District Land Officer Teopisto L. Gallozo with a Free Patent No.
328 in the name of respondent Justo J. Paras.
Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was
made by the respondent without her knowledge and consent and
those acts of deceit, machinations and falsification of documents
were deliberately willfully, and maliciously committed by the
respondent in violation of Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of the
RPC; in betrayal of his oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously obtained a
free patent title over real properties which had been previously
sold by his own mother to Aurora D. Yap and now still under the
control and possession of complainants natural family, a fact
respondent allegedly withheld from the Bureau of Lands which
he had full knowledge in successfully causing the release of a free
patent in his name and unjustly and unlawfully deprived the
rightful owners of their legitimate title to the said property in
betrayal of the court to pervert the administration of justice in
gross violation of his oath of office.
xxx xxx xxx
In his Comment, respondent alleged that complainant was
obviously not the owner of the properties and considering that
the properties were applied for free patent titling during their
marital union prior to its breakage, complainant was likewise a
communal owner thereof and as such was also complaining
against herself.
Respondent alleged that later on, a great portion of the public
lands classified as forested zone in Matobato were declared and
reclassified into public agricultural lands, then publicly surveyed
and parcelized by lots identified in the survey map based on
actual or known occupants; then the Bureau of Lands allegedly
made a public announcement that the lands were available for
private ownership thru Free Patent Application available only to
native settlers or natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that none of the Yaps including complainant
being native or natural born Filipinos muchless Aurora D. Yap
who in 1985 was said to be already an American citizen;
complainant and her family; the Yaps prevailed upon him to
apply for free patent over said questioned properties for the
reason that respondent had already occupied the properties;
introduced improvements thereon; acted as owner thereof; and
could easily align his right to the property which had been
identified in the public survey as Heirs of Vicente Paras,
otherwise the questioned properties allegedly according to the
Yaps will be applied for and awarded to other qualified natural
born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that Free Patent Application was filed by him
over the communal property of him and the complainant as well
as those purchased by him including the portion whose
occupancy of a public land was purchased by Aurora D. Yap from
Ledesma Vda de Paras upon the prodding of the Yaps for all of
them were not qualified to apply for ownership of an agricultural
public land via free patent; none of them being a natural born
Filipino or native settler and were disqualified from a gratuitous
grant of public land from the government.
Respondent alleged that the whole idea of giving to him and the
complainant the properties was hatched and executed by the
Yaps, most particularly Atty. Francisco D. Yap to circumvent the
law and prevent the properties from being given by the
government to some other qualified persons. He allegedly applied
for issuance of free patent in good faith and thereafter took
dominion and control of the properties in the concept of a
legitimate owner under authority of a gratuitous grant of the
government.
Respondent alleged that complainant or any member of her
family much less American citizen Aurora Dy Yap had not made
any prior demand for the return of the questioned properties;
nor filed a complaint under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law;
nor filed an administrative remedy before the DENR for the
cancellation and reversion/transfer of the Free Patent and Title
to them; nor brought any action in any civil court for either
quieting of title, or cancellation of free patent title or recovery of
ownership or whatever.
Respondent alleged that even without such civil court
determination on whether or not complainant or her family were
qualified to become grantee of a government gratuitous grant of
public agricultural land, if the Honorable Supreme Court will
decide that complainant, her mother, brothers and sisters were
within the ambit of the term natural born citizen or native
citizens under the 1946 Constitution and to them rightfully
belong the ownership of the questioned titled public agricultural
lands; and that he can never be guilty of the Anti-Dummy Law
consequent to such cession, respondent alleged that he will gladly
deliver and transfer title to them.
Respondent alleged that he sought and prayed for recovery of
possession of all conjugal/communal properties including the
herein questioned properties for after he left the conjugal home
in 1988 possession of all these properties, real and personal were
until now with the complainant and her biological family.
Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition for
lack of merit.
Complainant subsequently filed a Reply[5] to respondents
Comment, therein refuting respondents claims that he was used
as a dummy since complainant and her siblings had previously
acquired Free Patents in their names. Complainant further
alleged that respondent is morally unfit to continue to be an
officer of the court because of his falsely declaring under oath
that he had been occupying the subject real property since 1985
when in fact he did not and was never in occupation/possession
thereof.
On 27 August 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued
an Order[6] noting the filing of the last pleading and setting the
instant case for hearing. Several hearings[7] were conducted
wherein complainant presented all her witnesses together with
their respective affidavits and supporting documents[8], which
were all subjected to cross-examination by the respondent.
Likewise, respondent presented his Counter-Affidavit[9] and
supporting documents.
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner
concluded her Report and made a recommendation, as follows:
From the facts obtaining respondent committed deceit and
falsehood in having applied for free patent over lands owned by
another over which he had no actual physical possession being
aware of the fact that the same was previously transferred in the
name of Aurora Yap; an act which adversely reflected on his
fitness to practice law in violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
It is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as
there was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which partakes the nature of proper disciplinary action pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys.
Wherefore in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully
recommends for the suspension of Atty. Justo Paras from the
practice of his law profession for a period of three (3) months
from receipt hereof.
It is also hereby recommended that the IBP Chapter wherein
respondent Paras is a registered member be furnished a copy of
the Order and notified of the said suspension for proper
enforcement.
Via Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated 27 February
2004,[10] the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report of the
Investigating Commissioner but modified the latters
recommended penalty by recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for
violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The case is now before us for confirmation.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be sanctioned. We find, however, that the
recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the
wrong perpetrated.
The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession[11]
as the bar should always maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing among its
members. By and large, a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to his clients.[12] To this end, nothing should
be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend
to lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession.[13]
In Marcelo v. Javier[14], we held:
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it
for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the
court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him.
Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an
attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding
to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit
to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of
an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of
suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those
charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish
the attorney.
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of
his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counsellor which
include the statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. These statutory grounds are so broad
as to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity. It is a settled rule that the
enumeration of the statutory grounds for disciplinary action is
not exclusive and a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds other
than those specifically provided in the law. Generally a lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or
an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage
the business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for
conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or
to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public.
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege
bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.[15] One of those requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor.
And in the recent case of Bergonia v. Merrera[16], we ruled:
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners
honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are
required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play
and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with
their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the
courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to
conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and
discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. x x x
In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent
violated his lawyers oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to
society and to the courts, the obligation to obey the laws of the
land and to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court. Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor
required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court
in his acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent over the
properties in issue despite his knowledge that the same had
already been sold by his mother to complainants sister. This fact,
respondent even admitted in the comment that he filed before
this Court when he alleged that the said properties were public
land under the Forestal Zone when the mother of the respondent
ceded to Aurora Yap some portions of entire occupancy of the
Parases[17]. Moreover, respondent committed deceit and
falsehood in his application for free patent over the said
properties when he manifested under oath that he had been in
the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite the
fact that these were continuously in the possession and
occupation of complainants family, as evidenced no less by
respondents own statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.
Anent his argument questioning the status of complainant and
her family as natural born citizens, this Court holds that the
instant case is not the proper forum to address such issue.
Furthermore, as correctly held by the Investigating
Commissioner, [i]t is immaterial as to who instituted the
complaint for as long as there was a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Likewise, any other action which the
parties may make against each other has no material bearing in
this case. For, it must be remembered that administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
In line herewith, this Court in In re Almacen,[18] held:
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings
like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. xxx
The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case indubitably
reveal respondents failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in
consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from
this Court.
At this juncture, we take note that on 18 October 2000, in our
Decision in A.C. No. 5333 formerly A.C. No. CBD-371, entitled
Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras, respondent was
previously meted with suspension from the practice of law for six
(6) months on the charge of falsifying his wifes signature in bank
documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1)
year from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and
abandonment of his own family.
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light
of respondents prior misdemeanors for which he was penalized
with a six (6) month and one (1) year suspension from the
practice of law, his deplorable behavior in the present case which
grossly degrades the legal profession warrants the imposition of
a much graver penalty.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras
guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath
and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved
to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year, with a WARNING that commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a
more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well
as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator
who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and
guidance and likewise be entered in the record of respondent as
attorney.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR.,
ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms.
ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by
RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.
Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.
Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining
Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the
Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the preventive
suspension of petitioners,
Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr.,
Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey Matias, Technical
Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III;
and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for
Mental Health. The petition also asks for an order directing the
Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator
Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from
participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges
against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to Petition, Rollo, pp.
19-21).
The questioned order was issued in connection with the
administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-
0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the
recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy
de Villa-Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to
controvert the charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought
to disqualify Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for
manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).
On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents'
Comment on the petition.
On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a
"Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-130); Annexes to
Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and an "Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo,
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifestation;
Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively, averring developments that
transpired after the filing of the petition and stressing the
urgency for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order.
On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE the
respondents to MAINTAIN in the meantime, the STATUS QUO
pending filing of comments by said respondents on the original
supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177).
On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct
respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the Resolution
dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-
203). In a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required
respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus
Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its
Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were the
motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to
disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the "Omnibus
Submission" as annexes were the orders and pleadings filed in
Administrative Case No. OBM-ADM-0-91-1051 against
petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480).
The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners
with:
(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their
clients petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy, ignore,
disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their
preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the
Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully interfering with and obstructing
the implementation of the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp.
50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and
unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious falsehood
and outrageous deception" and by committing subornation of
perjury, falsification and fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus
Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and
Supplement to 'Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health
to Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'" (Manifestation
attached to Rollo without pagination between pp. 613 and 614
thereof).
On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its
Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that: (a) "despite
the issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing
respondents to maintain the status quo, respondent Secretary
refuses to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners'
preventive suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension, the status
quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; (c)
respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension and in
tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC
appointed to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992; and
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply
with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 immediately, by
restoring the status quo ante contemplated by the aforesaid
resolution" (Comment attached to Rollo without paginations
between pp. 613-614 thereof).
In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required
respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo
order, stating inter alia, that:
It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last
peaceable uncontested status which preceded the present
controversy was the situation obtaining at the time of the filing of
the petition at bar on September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners
were then actually occupying their respective positions, the Court
hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties
of their respective positions and to receive such salaries and
benefits as they may be lawfully entitled to, and that respondents
and/or any and all persons acting under their authority desist
and refrain from performing any act in violation of the
aforementioned Resolution of September 22, 1992 until further
orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p. 615 thereof).
On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the
Petition, Supplemental Petition and Supplemental Manifestation,
stated that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only to
recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;"
and (b) "Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly
suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions
required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said
conditions have not been met in the instant case" (Attached to
Rollo without pagination).
In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the
position of the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman can only
suspend government officials or employees connected with his
office. Petitioners also refuted private respondents' motion to
disbar petitioners' counsel and to cite them for contempt
(Attached to Rollo without pagination).
The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the
power to suspend government officials and employees working
in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the
investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said
officials and employees.
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively
suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent Motion to Lift Status
Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy
may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of Ombudsman but not more than six
months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of
the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period
of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension
given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 was
contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise
such other power or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim
that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only
recommend to the heads of the departments and other agencies
the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing
administrative investigation conducted by his office. Hence, he
cannot order the preventive suspension himself.
They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia
the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a
public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.
The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the
Constitutions, the Ombudsman has three distinct powers,
namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against public officials or employees at fault; (2)
recommend their removal, suspension, demotion fine, censure, or
prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the
recommendation (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).
The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that
can easily mislead, unless one bears in mind that what the
Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but only
a preventive suspension.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to
recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees
(Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure.
All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said
provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g.
removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a
sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as
the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular
word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the company of
terms in which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim
Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v.
Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the
power to preventively suspend public officials and employees
facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a
penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after
compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the
investigation of the administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized
to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or
prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to
make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such
actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn,
in order for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious
and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several
causes, among them, the danger of tampering or destruction of
evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of
witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to
decide when the persons facing administrative charges should be
preventively suspended.
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes
are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory Construction,
Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil.
456 [1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is
whether a penalty is imposed for the punishment of a wrong to
the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59
Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-
497). A Code prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is not a
penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People v. Adler,
140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such
powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed
to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute,
particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be
given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and
objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will
hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the
Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of
the purposes and objectives for which it was created (Cf.
Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200
Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d) 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind.
522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]).
In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a
preventive suspension is not a penalty, said:
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is
the penalty.
To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively
suspend respondents in administrative cases who are employed
in his office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on the phrase
"suspend any officer or employee under his authority" in Section
24 of R.A. No. 6770.
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with preventive
suspension and which authorized the chief of a bureau or office
to "suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under
his authority pending an investigation . . . ."
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which
superseded Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code also
authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any
subordinate officer or employees, in his bureau or under his
authority."
However, when the power to discipline government officials and
employees was extended to the Civil Service Commission by the
Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently with the
President, the Department Secretaries and the heads of bureaus
and offices, the phrase "subordinate officer and employee in his
bureau" was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase "under his
authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that
the proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend "any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).
The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper
disciplining authority to "preventively suspend any subordinate
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation"
(Sec. 51).
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate"
and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to read "suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation .
. . ." The conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of the
word "subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau" after
"officer or employee" is that the Congress intended to empower
the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and
employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of
whether they are employed "in his office" or in other offices of
the government. The moment a criminal or administrative
complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent therein is
deemed to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to determine
whether said respondent should be placed under preventive
suspension.
In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without
affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges
against them during the preliminary conference and even after
petitioners had asked for the disqualification of Director Arnaw
and Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners, the
Solicitor General contends that assuming arguendo that the
Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend erring public
officials and employees who are working in other departments
and offices, the questioned order remains null and void for his
failure to comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the
Ombudsman Law (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19).
Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned
order of the Ombudsman was validly issued even without a full-
blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the
parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner therein also claimed that the
Secretary of Health could not preventively suspend him before he
could file his answer to the administrative complaint. The
contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily
by holding that the suspension meted out was merely preventive
and therefore, as held in Nera, there was "nothing improper in
suspending an officer pending his investigation and before tho
charges against him are heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia., supra).
There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the
Ombudsman cannot order the preventive suspension of a
respondent unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1) the
charts against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty; (2) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the
case filed against him.
The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively
suspend officials or employees under investigation were found in
Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members
is given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action.
strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which
expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo
Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. In the ordered to be maintained in the Resolution dated September 22,
case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order of preventive 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
suspension only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to
the administrative complaint and the "Motion for the Preventive
Suspension" of petitioners, which incorporated the charges in the SO ORDERED.
criminal complaint against them (Annex 3, Omnibus Submission,
Rollo, pp. 288-289; Annex 4, Rollo,

pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the

answer of petitioners, specifying 23 cases of harassment by
petitioners of the members of the private respondent (Annex 6,
Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a preliminary
conference wherein the complainant and the respondents in the
administrative case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and
documentary evidence.
Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of
exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 336-337)
while private respondents submitted their list of exhibits (Annex
9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-348).
Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul
Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted with manifest
partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of
petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted
with grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably on their
recommendation.
The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of
petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their
clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as
ordered by the Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health can not
prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The Motion should be filed, as in
fact such a motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate,
we find that the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were
legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question the
validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of their
clients.
On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate
language used by counsel for private respondents hurled against
petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on
Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private
Respondent's Comment and Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-5).
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's
cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be
respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren
in the profession (Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]).
The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing
counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of
the court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned language in
pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light.
Teodoro Chavez vs Atty. Escolastico Viola
196 SCRA 10 Legal Ethics A lawyer shall do no falsehood
In 1966, Atty. Viola assisted Felicidad Alvendia et al in filing a
petition against Teodoro Chavez where he sought to have the
Alvendias be declared as bona fide lessees in a land controversy.
Said petition was dismissed because of nonappearance by the
Alvendias.
In 1977, Atty. Viola assisted same clients in applying for an
original registration of title over the same land in controversy in
1966. In said application, Atty. Viola insisted that his clients were
the true owners of said land because they acquired it by sale from
Teresita Vistan way back in 1929.
Chavez then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Viola.
Chavez said that because of the conflicting claims that Viola
prepared in behalf of his clients, he had willingly aided in and
consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a false
and unlawful application for land registration, in violation of his
oath of office as a member of the Bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Viola is in violation of the Lawyers
Oath.
HELD: Yes. Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients
were merely lessees of the property involved. In his later
pleading, he stated that the very same clients were owners of the
same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it
matters not which one. Worse, he offered no explanation as
regards the discrepancy.
A lawyer owes honesty and candor to the courts. It cannot be
gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is
essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are
entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Atty. Viola was
suspended for 5 months.

The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the

instant special civil action, which is confined to questions of
jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving
persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial
ANTERO J. POBRE,
Complainant,
- versus -
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with
enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the
following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech
delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And
I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face
of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on
the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted
direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that
disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken
against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25,
2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making
the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those
statements were covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in
the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its
committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to
bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with
a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted
to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar
Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice,
would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices
of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that
the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-
sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered
for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted
primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House
of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof. Explaining the import of
the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr.
v. Pendatun,
A.C.
said:
No. 7399
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
which is aPresent:
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative
assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament,CHICO-NAZARIO,
its purpose J., is to enable and encourage a
representative
Acting ofChairperson,
the public to discharge his public trust with
firmness and
CARPIO
success
MORALES,
for it is
* indispensably necessary that he
should enjoy
VELASCO,
the fullest
JR., liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from
NACHURA,
resentment
and of every one, however, powerful, to
whom thePERALTA,
exercise JJ.of that liberty may occasion offense.[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Promulgated:
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative
privilege isAugust
founded
25,upon
2009long experience and arises as a means
of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative
department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective
debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their
private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would
be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon
a judges speculation as to the motives.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been
in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary
immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court
lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight
functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to
look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and
denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its
citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the
legislature or its members in the manner they perform their
functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any
claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of
the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not
destroy the privilege.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] The disciplinary
authority of the assembly[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] and the voters,
not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses
committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago
for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary
action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on
the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about
the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her
speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of
decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent
that her statements in question were intemperate and highly
improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating
that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the
Court a Supreme Court of idiots.
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[if
We draw her attention to the ensuing
!supportFootnotes][6][endif]
passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first
place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the
respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the peoples
faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated
Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A
lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to the
judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most
lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a
former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited
authority on constitutional and international law, an author of
numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land.
Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and
officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect
due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public
faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private
practice.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Senator Santiago should have
known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements
would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her
privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on
the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in
light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage
once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And
I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face
of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
(Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily
show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and
frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In
a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her
official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity
must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean,
and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor
as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed
that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege
accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress
for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of
the people and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to
her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive
personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst
was directly traceable to what she considered as an unjust act the
JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position
of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Courts
supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief
Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif] have no official duty to nominate candidates
for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus,
at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and
indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her
choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and
debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of
Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules
concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of
the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged.
(Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the
Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar
will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself
except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and
self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical
standards x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S.
Sorreda,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] we reiterated our pronouncement
in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] that the
duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the
Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces
that [i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance. That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust
criticism and clamor. And more. The attorneys oath solemnly
binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity x x x
to the courts.

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif] that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.
Thus has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court,
for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without
fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums
outside the congressional hall.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] It is
intended to protect members of Congress against government
pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-
making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on
Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from
using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language
against another Senator or against any public institution.[if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif] But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary

it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.[if
!supportFootnotes][13][endif]
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession
bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has
entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and
dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official
duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his/her oath as a lawyer.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct
committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct
reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif] a good character being an essential
remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to
order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics
Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules
dictates under such circumstance.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] The lady
senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is
unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing
their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in
filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be
undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with
her more. We cannot overstress that the senators use of
intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court
of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe
to the courts.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]

qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or
misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit
unrelated to the actual practice of their professionwould show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which their license and the law invest in them.[if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre
has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in
question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not
categorically denied making such statements, she has
unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech.
Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against
Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art.
VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the SO ORDERED.

peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has
consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who,
for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct
the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of
courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women
who compose them. We have done it in the case of former
Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in
Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v.
Ang[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] who repeatedly insulted and
threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of

disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what
otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on
her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal
circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing
so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let

the Senators offensive and disrespectful language that definitely
tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our
part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect
courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew
that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to
members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions
 EN BANC and conformity to the unjust claims of the Zuzuarreguis. We
cannot fathom how such a decision could have been arrived
at except through considerations other than the pure merits
ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, of the case. Every law student reading through the case can see
Petitioners, clearly how a brother lawyer in the profession had been so short-
changed by, ironically, the most sacred and highest institution in
- versus - the administration and dispensation of justice.

ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, xxxx

PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA,
ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES, JOSE This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the least.
REYES and ANTONIO REYES, x x x We cry out in disbelief that such an
Respondents. impossible decision could spring forth
x---------------------x from the Supreme Court, the ultimate
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, administrator and last bulwark of
PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, justice. As it stands, instead of being
ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES, JOSE an administrator of justice, the
REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Supreme Court is ironically a
Petitioners, dispenser of injustice.

Under the circumstances, we hope you will forgive

-versus- us in expressing our sentiment in this
manner as we are utterly frustrated and
dismayed by the elementary injustice
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, JOSE B. H. PEDROSA, being foisted upon us by the Supreme
ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Court, no less. Given the facts of the case,
Respondents.x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - we will never understand what
----------x moved the Honorable Justice to
decide as she did and what forces and
influences caused her to reason out
RESOLUTION her decision in such an unfair and
unjust manner as to compromise the
reputation, integrity and dignity itself
PER CURIAM: of the Supreme Court, as a venerable
institution of justice.
Self-approbation, pride and self-esteem should not
erode and dim the luster and dignity of this Court. Against As lawyers, we are officers of the Court so that, while
overweening bluster and superciliousness, nay, lordly claim, this we are being underservedly pained by
Court must stand steadfast, unmoved and uncompromising in the seething injustice of the decision, we
upholding what is right and proper. In such posture, the mandate will submit to the authority of Highest
of affording every man the equal protection of the law cannot Court of the Land, even as our reverence
dwindle. Strict adherence to ethical conduct and righteousness for it has been irreversibly eroded,
without veering away from responsibility will foster an thanks to your Honors Judgment.
impregnable respect, deference and even reverence to this Courts
decisions and pronouncements. xxxx

In a Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] dated 26
September 2006, the Court En Banc ordered Atty. Romeo G.
Roxas to explain in writing why he should not be held in
contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action when he,
in a letter[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] dated 13 September 2006
addressed to Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario with
copies thereof furnished the Chief Justice and all the other
Associate Justices, intimated that Justice Nazario decided G.R. No.
152072 and No. 152104 on considerations other than the pure
merits of the case, and called the Supreme Court a dispenser of
injustice.
The letter of Atty. Roxas reads in part:
As an officer of the court, I am shocked beyond my senses to
realize that such a wrongful and unjust decision has been
rendered with you no less as the ponente. This terrible decision
will go down in the annals of jurisprudence as an egregious
example of how the Supreme Court, supposedly the last vanguard
and bulwark of justice is itself made, wittingly or unwittingly, as a
party to the wrongdoing by giving official and judicial sanction
As for Your Honor, sleep well if you still can. In the end, those we
address as Honorable Justice in this earthly life will [be] judged
by the Supreme Dispenser of Justice where only the merits of
Your Honors life will be relevant and material and where
technicalities can shield no one from his or her wrongdoings.
Good day to you, Madame Justice!
The decision referred to in the letter is the Courts
decision[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] in these consolidated cases where
Attys. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor were ordered to return,
among others, to Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al. the amount of
P17,073,224.84.
Roxas and Pastor filed their Motion for Reconsideration[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif] on 8 March 2006 which they followed with an
Executive Summary[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] the day after. In a
resolution dated 22 March 2006, the Court noted the Executive
Summary and deferred action on the Motion for
Reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
 On 27 March 2006, the Court denied with finality the
Motion for Reconsideration as the basic issues have already been
passed upon and there being no substantial argument to warrant
the modification of the Courts decision.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
On 30 March 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed a Motion
for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,
together with the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]
The following day, they filed a Motion for Leave to
File Motion to Set the Case for Oral Argument, together with the
Motion to Set the Case for Oral Argument (on the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto).[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif] In a Manifestation dated 3 April 2006, Roxas
and Pastor asked that a typographical error appearing in the
affidavits of service attached to the motions be corrected and that
the Motion to Set Case for Oral Argument be granted.[if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif]
On 7 April 2006, Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al.,
filed a Motion for Leave to File Comment on/Opposition to
Motion for Reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
On 7 June 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed an Urgent and
Compelling Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion to Refer the
Case to the En Banc).[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
On 7 June 2006, the Office of then Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban received from Roxas a letter (with
enclosures)[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] dated 6 June 2006 which
contained, inter alia, the following:
This is an unjust and unfair
decision, to say the least. x x x We cry
out in disbelief that such an impossible
decision could spring forth from the
Supreme Court, the ultimate
administrator and last bulwark of
justice. As it stands, instead of being an
administrative of justice, the Supreme
Court will ironically be a dispenser of
injustice.
Under the circumstances,
we cannot avoid to suspect the bias and
partiality of the ponente of the case who
we surmise must have been moved by
considerations, other than noble.
In this regard, Mr. Chief
Justice, we implore Your Honor, as
steward of the Highest Court of the land,
to take appropriate steps to forthwith
correct this anomalous decision by first,
referring the case to the Supreme Court
En Banc, and then, after allowing us the
opportunity to be heard orally En Banc
and after judiciously considering our
Urgent and Compelling Motion for
Reconsideration, thereafter reversing
the decision of this Honorable Courts
First Division.
Finally, in order to cleanse
the Supreme Court of the blot caused by
this case, we most ardently implore
upon Your Honor to immediately direct
the conduct of an investigation of how
such an impossible decision was
rendered at all and to sanction the
perpetrators thereon.
As the Chief Justice, we
have faith in you, Sir, to rectify a
grievous wrong inflicted upon a member
of the Bar and to restore the good image
and reputation of the Court by causing
the High Court to reverse such an
inconceivable decision that is unfair,
unjust and illegal, being an [impairment]
of the obligation of contracts and against
the principle of estoppel.
Said letter was indorsed to the Clerk of Court of the
First Division for its inclusion in the agenda.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]
On 12 July 2006, the Court resolved to (a) Note Without Action
(1) the motion of petitioners Roxas and Pastor for leave to file
supplemental motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
January 31, 2006; (2) the aforesaid supplemental motion for
reconsideration; and (3) respondents Zuzuarreguis motion for
leave of court to file comment/opposition to motion for
reconsideration, said motion for reconsideration having been
denied with finality in the resolution of 27 March 2006; (b) Deny
for lack of merit said petitioners (1) motion for leave to file
motion to set case for oral argument; and (2) motion to set the
case for oral argument [on the motion for reconsideration and
the supplement thereto]; (c) Note petitioners manifestation
regarding the correction of typographical error in the affidavit of
service of their motion for leave to file motion to set case for oral
argument and said motion to set case for oral arguments; (d)
Deny the urgent and compelling second motion for
reconsideration of petitioners Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N.
Pastor of the decision dated 31 January 2006 [with motion to
refer the case to the Court En Banc], considering that a second
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Sec. 2,
Rule 52, in relation to Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended; (e) Deny said petitioners motion to refer
the cases to the Court En Banc, the latter not being an appellate
court to which decisions or resolutions of the Divisions may be
appealed, pursuant to SC Circular 2-89 dated 7 February 1989, as
amended by the resolution of 18 November 1993; and (f) Note
the First Indorsement dated 9 June 2006 of the Hon. Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban referring for inclusion in the agenda the
thereto attached letter [with enclosures] of Atty. Romeo G. Roxas,
relative to these cases.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
On 13 September 2006, on motion by the Zuzuarreguis for the
issuance of entry of judgment, the Court ordered that entry of
judgment in these cases be made in due course.[if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif]
On 14 September 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed an Urgent Motion
for Clarification of Judgment.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] On even date,
the letter subject of this contempt proceeding dated 13
September 2006 was received by Justice Nazario with copies
thereof furnished the Chief Justice and all the other Associate
Justices.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
On 18 September 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed a
Motion to Withdraw said motion and instead prayed that their
Urgent and Compelling Motion for Clarification of Judgment
dated 15 September 2006 be admitted.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
 On 20 September 2006, the Court, treating
petitioners Roxas and Pastors Urgent Motion for Clarification of
Judgment as a second motion for reconsideration, denied the
same for lack of merit. We also noted without action the motion
to withdraw said motion for clarification with intention to re-file
the same with the necessary corrections, and referred to the
Court En Banc the letter dated 13 September 2006.[if
!supportFootnotes][20][endif]
In a resolution dated 26 September 2006, this Court
ordered Atty. Roxas to explain in writing why he should not be
held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action on
account of the letter he sent to Justice Nazario with copies thereof
furnished the Chief Justice and all the other Associate Justices.
On 22 November 2006, the Court noted without
action petitioner Roxas and Pastors Urgent and Compelling
Motion for Clarification of Judgment in light of the denial of their
Urgent Motion for Clarification of Judgment on 20 September
2006 which the Court treated as a second motion for
reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
On 16 November 2006, by way of compliance with
the 26 September 2006 resolution, Atty. Roxas submitted his
written explanation. His letter stated:
With all due respect to this Honorable Court, and
beyond my personal grievances, I
submit that the ruling in the subject
consolidated cases may not have met
the standards or adhered to the basic
characteristics of fair and just decision,
such as objectivity, neutrality and
conformity to the laws and the
constitution. x x x
xxxx
Aside from the fact that the aforesaid ruling appears
to be seriously flawed, it also casts grave
aspersions on my personal and
professional integrity and honor as a
lawyer, officer of the court and advocate
of justice.
xxxx
These implications, Your Honors, which I find hard
to accept, have caused me severe
anxiety, distress and depredation and
have impelled me to exercise my right to
express a legitimate grievance or
articulate a bona fide and fair criticism
of this Honorable Courts ruling.
While certain statements, averments and/or
declarations in my 13 September 2006
letter may have been strongly-worded
and construed by this Honorable Court
as tending to ascribe aspersions on the
person of the Honorable Associate
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, may I
assure Your Honors that no such
ascription was ever intended by the
undersigned.
Quite notably, despite my aggrieved sentiments and
exasperated state, I chose to ventilate
my criticisms of the assailed ruling in a
very discreet and private manner.
Accordingly, instead of resorting to
public criticism through media
exposure, I chose to write a personal
letter confined to the hallowed halls of
the highest tribunal of the land and
within the bounds of decency and
propriety. This was done in good faith
with no intention whatsoever to offend
any member, much less tarnish the
image of this Honorable Court.
Nonetheless, it is with humble heart and a repentant
soul that I express my sincerest
apologies not only to the individual
members of this Honorable Court but
also to the Supreme Court as a revered
institution and ultimate dispenser of
justice.
As earlier explained, I was merely exercising my
right to express a legitimate grievance
or articulate a bona fide and fair
criticism of this Honorable Courts
ruling. If the nature of my
criticism/comment or the manner in
which it was carried out was perceived
to have transgressed the permissible
parameters of free speech and
expression, I am willing to submit
myself to the sound and judicious
discretion of this Honorable Court. x x x
After reviewing the records of these cases, We firmly stand by
our decision which Atty. Roxas described to be unjust, unfair and
impossible, and arrived at through considerations other than the
pure merits of the case. Atty. Roxass insistence that said decision
did not meet the standards or adhered to the basic characteristics
of fair and just decision, such as objectivity, neutrality and
conformity to the laws and the Constitution, is simply without
basis. The fact that the decision was not in his favor does not
mean that the same was contrary to our laws and was not
rendered in a fair and impartial manner.
In one case,[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] we had this to say when a
lawyer challenged the integrity not only of the Court of Appeals
but also of this Court by claiming that the courts knowingly
rendered an unjust judgment:
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of
respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law
and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but
tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of
justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked
his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his
contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both
abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal
concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that
what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of
others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be
right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint
of another. x x x.
It is to be noted that prior to his letter dated 13
September 2006, Atty. Roxas wrote then Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban asking for an immediate investigation of how such an
impossible decision was rendered at all and to sanction the
perpetrators thereon. It is to be stressed that then Chief Justice
Panganiban was a member of the Division who concurred in the
ponencia written by Justice Nazario. The former and the other
three members[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] of the Division did not find
anything illegal, unjust or unfair about the decision; otherwise,
they would have registered their dissents. There was none. The
decision was arrived at after a thorough deliberation of the
members of the Court.
Atty. Roxas faulted the Supreme Court when (o)ur
two Motions for Reconsiderations were unceremoniously denied
via Minute Resolutions without addressing at all the merits of our
very solid arguments. We cannot help but observe the High
Courts resort to technicalities (that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading) if only for it to avoid
meeting the merits and arguments directly.
It is settled that the Court is not duty-bound to render signed
Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate
Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is
given, depending on its evaluation of a case.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
In the case before us, after going over the motion for
reconsideration filed by Roxas and Pastor, we did not find any
substantial argument that would merit the modification of our
decision and that would require an extended resolution since the
basic issues had already been passed upon.
In his letter subject of this contempt proceeding, Atty. Roxas
accused Justice Nazario of deciding the case through
considerations other than the pure merits of the case. He averred
that we will never understand what moved the Honorable Justice
to decide as she did and what forces and influences caused her to
reason out her decision in such an unfair and unjust manner as to
compromise the reputation, integrity and dignity itself of the
Supreme Court, as a venerable institution of justice. He then
ended by mocking her when he said sleep well if you still can and
that her earthly life will [be] judged by the Supreme Dispenser of
Justice where only the merits of Your Honors life will be relevant
and material and where technicalities can shield no one from his
or her wrongdoings.
As to the Court, supposedly the last vanguard and
bulwark of justice, he likewise accuses it of making itself,
wittingly or unwittingly, a party to the wrongdoing by giving
official and judicial sanction and conformity to the unjust claims
of the adverse party. He added: This is an unjust and unfair
decision, to say the least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that such an
impossible decision could spring forth from the Supreme Court,
the ultimate administrator and last bulwark of justice. As it
stands, instead of being an administrator of justice, the Supreme
Court is ironically a dispenser of injustice.
In his letter of explanation, Atty. Roxas extended apologies to
Justice Nazario, to the other members of the High Court and to
the High Court itself as a revered institution and ultimate
dispenser of justice. He said he was merely exercising his right to
express a legitimate grievance or articulate a bona fide and fair
criticism of the Honorable Courts ruling. He explained that his
criticism of the assailed ruling was done in good faith with no
intention whatsoever to offend any member, much less tarnish
the image of the Court. Instead of resorting to public criticism
through media exposure, he chose to ventilate his criticism in a
very discreet and private manner by writing a personal letter
confined to the hallowed halls of the Court and within bounds of
decency and propriety.
We find the explanations of Atty. Roxas
unsatisfactory. The accusation against Justice Nazario is clearly
without basis. The attack on the person of Justice Nazario has
caused her pain and embarrassment. His letter is full of
contemptuous remarks tending to degrade the dignity of the
Court and erode public confidence that should be accorded it.
To prevent liability from attaching on account of his
letter, he invokes his rights to free speech and privacy of
communication. The invocation of these rights will not, however,
free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained
defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous
statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free
speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks
on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech,
for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor
and confidence therein.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] Free expression
must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession
to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its
magistrates.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
This Court does not curtail the right of a lawyer, or
any person for that matter, to be critical of courts and judges as
long as they are made in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels. This Court in In re: Almacen[if
!supportFootnotes][27][endif] said:
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and
criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority, or that is it articulated by a lawyer. Such right is
especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation, because then the courts actuation are thrown open to
public consumption. x x x
xxxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should
and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. For like the executive and
the legislative branches, the judiciary is
rooted in the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic appraisal of
the citizen whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer,
both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels
the acts of courts and judges. x x x
xxxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a
lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty
to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he
professionally answerable for a scrutiny
into the official conduct of the judges,
which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen.
xxxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
 that it shall be bona fide and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between
fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the
judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
In the case at bar, we find the statements made by Atty. Roxas to
have been made mala fides and exceeded the boundaries of
decency and propriety. By his unfair and unfounded accusation
against Justice Nazario, and his mocking of the Court for allegedly
being part of a wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice, he
abused his liberty of speech.
In In re: Wenceslao Laureta,[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] cited in United
BF Homeowners v. Sandoval-Gutierrez,[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] we
ruled:
To allow litigants to go beyond the Courts resolution and claim
that the members acted with deliberate bad faith and rendered
an unjust resolution in disregard or violation of the duty of their
high office to act upon their own independent consideration and
judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the
authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts
and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of
regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral
attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the
role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.
xxxx
In resume, we find that
respondent Ilustre has transcended the
permissible bounds of fair comment and
criticism to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice in her letters
addressed to the individual Justices
quoted in the show-cause Resolution of
this court en banc, particularly the
under lined portions thereof; in the
language of the charges she filed before
the Tanodbayan quoted and
underscored in the same Resolution; in
her statements, conduct, acts and
charges against the Supreme Court
and/or the official actions of the justices
concerned and her ascription of
improper motives to them; and in her
unjustified outburst that she can no
longer expect justice from this Court.
The fact that said letters are not
technically considered pleadings, nor
the fact that they were submitted after
the main petition had been finally
resolved does not detract from the
gravity of the contempt committed. The
constitutional right of freedom of speech
or right to privacy cannot be used as a
shield for contemptuous acts against the
Court.
Atty. Roxas likewise cannot hide under the mantle of the right to
privacy. It must be disclosed that prior to his letter addressed to
Justice Nazario, Atty. Roxas first wrote then Chief Justice
Panganiban asking for an investigation as to how the assailed
decision was rendered and to sanction the perpetrators. The
accusations contained therein are similar to those in his letter to
Justice Nazario. The fact that his letters were merely addressed to
the Justices of this Court and were not disseminated to the media
is of no moment. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in
connection with the performance of their judicial functions,
become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for
the entire court.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] As can be gathered from
the records, the letter to then Chief Justice Panganiban was
merely noted and no show-cause order was issued in the hope
that Atty. Roxas would stop his assault on the Court. However,
since Atty. Roxas persisted in attacking the Court via his second
letter, it behooved the Court to order him to explain why he
should not be held in contempt of court and subjected to
disciplinary action.
Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Romeo G.
Roxas guilty of indirect contempt of court under Section 3, Rule
71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Said section
reads:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard
by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
d. Any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice; x x x.
xxxx
Section 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, provides the penalty for indirect contempt as follows:
Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. If the respondent is
adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a
Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he
may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both. x x x.
The disrespect caused to the Court by Atty. Roxas merits a fine of
P30,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of a similar act will
warrant a more severe penalty.
With his contemptuous and defamatory statements,
Atty. Roxas likewise violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Canons 11.03 and 11.04. These
provisions read:
CANON 11 -- A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND
MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS
AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS
xxxx
Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive and
menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.
 Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall
not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.

It is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to uphold the

dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in
the fair administration of justice and in the Supreme Court as the
last bulwark of justice and democracy.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]
Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial
institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] When
confronted with actions and statements, from lawyers and non-
lawyers alike, that tend to promote distrust and undermine
public confidence in the judiciary, this Court will not hesitate to
wield its inherent power to cite any person in contempt. In so
doing, it preserves its honor and dignity and safeguards the
morals and ethics of the legal profession.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas is

found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court. He is hereby FINED
the amount of P30,000.00 to be paid within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Resolution and WARNED that a repetition of a
similar act will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Roxas personal

record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-91-660 June 30, 1994
NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Regional Trial Court, Br.
12, San Jose, Antique, respondent.
Napoleon A. Abiera for and in his own behalf.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA of the Regional Trial Court,
Br. 12, San Jose, Antique, is administratively charged by District
Public Attorney Napoleon A. Abiera with grave abuse of
discretion and misconduct relative to a civil case 1 pending before
respondent judge, and with gross dishonesty and inefficiency in
deliberately falsifying his certificates of service, and failing to
decide cases submitted for decision within the reglementary
period prescribed by the Constitution.
The charge of grave abuse of discretion and misconduct stemmed
from the Order of 20 December 1990 issued by respondent judge
suspending complainant from the practice of law.
It appears that both counsel of the parties previously agreed to
set Civil Case No. 2119 for hearing on 20 to 22 August 1990. On
20 August 1990, however, complainant requested the Court
Interpreter for a second call of the case because he would first
attend the trial of another case in Br. 11 of the same court. 2 At
11:15 that same morning, after waiting for complainant in vain,
Civil Case No. 2119 was called for the second time. However,
neither the complainant nor his clients appeared. As a result,
respondent judge declared in open court that plaintiffs were
deemed to have waived further presentation of their evidence.
On 21 August 1990, upon being informed of the Order of 20
August 1990, but before receiving a copy thereof, complainant
verbally explained to respondent judge that his non-appearance
at the hearing was due to the lengthy cross-examination of a
witness in Crim. Case No. 3839 then being heard before Br. 11. On
the basis thereof, he moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order. Respondent judge denied the motion. Subsequently,
complainant requested that the proceedings be suspended in
order that he could secure a copy of the Order of 20 August 1990,
but the same was also denied. Thus, the hearing of Civil Case No.
2119 proceeded with the presentation by defendants of their
evidence. Complainant participated fully in the proceedings by
raising objection and cross-examining defendants' witness.
On 23 August 1990, complainant received the Order of 20 August
1990. On 5 September 1990, he filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Order of 20 August 1990 praying that the proceedings of
21 August 1990 be canceled and that plaintiffs be allowed to
finish the presentation of their evidence. 3
On 7 December 1990, respondent judge not only denied the
motion for reconsideration of complainant but also ordered him
. . . to show cause in writing within five (5) days from today or not
later than the close of office on December 12, 1990 why he should
not be punished for contempt and/or otherwise disciplinar(ily)
dealt with for abusing the court in participating and agreeing in
the reception of evidence for the defendants on August 21, 1990
but only to ask maliciously later for its nullification and why no
other liability should attach to him by reason of the heretofore
described acts and/or omission of deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct. 4
On 17 December 1990, complainant filed his Compliance within
the extended period by registered mail posted in Manila.
However, respondent's court received the same only on 26
December 1990. Earlier, on 20 December 1990, respondent judge
already issued an order suspending complainant from the
practice of law.
Complainant questioned the validity of the Order of 20 August
1990 before this Court through a petition for certiorari. 5 On 26
August 1991, we vacated this order upon a finding that
complainant was not afforded procedural due process and
ordered the records of the case returned to the sala of
respondent judge, who may, if he was so minded, refile the
proceedings for the suspension of complainant by following the
procedure prescribed in Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 6
Upon receipt of our resolution, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint against respondent judge.
In his first cause of action, complainant claims that respondent
judge acted in bad faith in issuing his Order of 20 December
1990. He asserts that respondent's perception that he
(complainant) feigned ignorance of the Order of 20 August 1990
is disproved by the record of the proceedings. He further argues
that his participation in the trial of 21 August 1990 was not a
waiver of his objections to the Order of 20 August 1990; that he
could not file his written motion for reconsideration as
respondent judge declared him in contempt in another case and
ordered his detention; and, that the motion for reconsideration
was formalized during his detention and filed only on 5
September 1990.
He further posits that respondent's words "machination . . . made
via a clever use of the filthy instruments of a devil's advocate
wily submissions and a smiling fox's pleading . . . " used in the
Order of 7 December 1990 are indecent and unbecoming a
member of the judiciary. He concludes that the issuance of the
Order of 20 December 1990 was due to the intense dislike,
or even hatred, of respondent judge for complainant and his
relative,
Cong. Exequiel Javier of Antique.
With regard to his second cause of action, complainant claims
that respondent wilfully falsified his monthly certificates of
service covering the periods from February to September 1989,
February to April 1990, and June to October 1990. He contends
that respondent judge certified that he had no pending
unresolved civil and criminal cases when in fact he had eight (8)
civil cases and ten (10) criminal cases unresolved within ninety
(90) days from date of their submission for decision. He submits
that such falsification enabled respondent to receive his salaries
and allowances. 7
Respondent judge, in his answer, asserts that he has been fair and
impartial to complainant, as evidenced by a list of cases where
the latter received favorable action. He however maintains that
complainant's effort "to trifle with the judicial proceedings in
Civil Case No. 2119 must not be tolerated and should be
penalized to protect and uphold the integrity of the court."
Respondent also avers that the initial hearing of Civil Case No.
2119 was set on 20 February 1987; since that date until 7 March
1990, complainant had already obtained seventeen (17)
postponements; in one case, 8 respondent had advised
complainant to arrange his calendar to avoid any conflict in
schedules which already seemed to be his pattern; the hearing on
20 August 1990 was fixed by both counsel of the parties and
respondent merely adopted the same; while complainant had a
scheduled hearing on the same date in another sala, the conflict
in schedules was not the making of respondent but the fault of
complainant who undertook to appear in two (2) branches of the
court at the same time; complainant neither required Atty.
Rolando Vedeja, the PAO lawyer assigned to respondent judge, to
appear in his stead nor did he direct his clients to attend the
hearing; their absence was intentionally planned by complainant
to demean respondent and to make him wait for them; on 30
August 1990, complainant committed a contemptible "show-
boating" towards the court in another case 9 for which
respondent cited him for direct contempt and sentenced him to
ten (10) days imprisonment; in his written motion for
reconsideration of the Order of 20 August 1990, complainant
made the impression that he learned of the order only when he
received copy of the same on 23 August 1990 and the written
motion was formalized while he was under detention; such
impression showed complainant's bad faith; the motion for
reconsideration could not have been formalized during
complainant's detention because it is dated 24 August 1990, six
(6) days before his imprisonment; his motion for reconsideration
prayed for the nullification of the entire proceedings not of 20
August but of 21 August 1990 where he participated as fully as he
could until the Galera spouses completed the presentation of
their evidence; when the defendants were given time to submit a
written offer of their evidence, complainant offered no objection;
complainant purposely withheld the filing of his motion for
reconsideration until his receipt of a copy of the written Offer of
Exhibits by counsel for defendants; and, such actuations are wily,
dilatory and obstructive.
On the second cause of action, respondent judge states that most,
if not all, of the subject cases mentioned in the complaint were
inherited from his predecessor. He adds that on 14 January 1989,
during the 11th Judicial Conference in Libertad, Antique, then
Chief Justice Fernan granted him an extension to deal with all the
cases then pending decision in his sala. Respondent also points
out that on 30 August 1990 and 25 September 1990, this Court
granted him an extension to decide twenty-eight (28) cases. 10
Again, on 23 April 1991, he was granted an extension to decide a
set of thirteen (13) newly-filed cases. 11 Respondent claims that
all cases mentioned by complainant were part of the twenty-eight
(28) cases decided by him within the extended period granted
him.
Finally, respondent judge contends that the complainant filed this
case "not only out of resentment and hate against (him) but it is
(also) what your respondent has earlier branded as complainant
Abiera's wily submission and smiling fox's pleading." Respondent
judge further states that, in contrast, the greater sector of Antique
has favorably recognized his judicial actuations as shown by his
receipt of several plaques of appreciation. 12
On 4 June 1992, the Court En Banc referred the case to Associate
Justice Jaime N. Lantin of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation. 13
On 3 August 1993, the investigating justice submitted his report.
14 On the first cause of action, i.e., grave abuse of discretion and
misconduct, he states that he concurs with our resolution in G.R.
No. 96636 holding the suspension Order of 20 December 1990
null and void for non-observance of the prescribed procedure,
adding that
. . . there was nothing contumacious in complainant Abiera's
conduct as would warrant his suspension from the practice of
law. The participation by Abiera in the hearing of August 21,
1990 should not be taken against him. Under the circumstances,
where the verbal motion to suspend proceedings were denied,
the most that could be expected of complainant Abiera was to
participate and scrutinize the evidence presented by his
opponent as a measure to protect the interest of his clients, and
such participation did not bar him from subsequently
questioning the Order of August 20, 1990, considering that at that
time, he was not yet formally served a copy of the written order
of August 20, 1990. It is the right and duty of complainant to
exhaust all possible and available processes and/or remedies
provided by law to protect the interest of his clients. Moreover, it
would appear that the Order of August 20, 1990, constituted a
violation of plaintiffs' right to due process considering that
plaintiffs were deprived of their right to present further evidence.
Time and again, courts are reminded to use their contempt power
with restraint and only in case of a clearly contumacious conduct.
Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a
flaunting, or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court and it
is not clearly established in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
The suspension of complainant Abiera from the practice of law
through an improper and invalid exercise of the contempt power
of the court and in clear violation of the prescribed procedure for
suspension, is unjust and manifests a deliberate intent to do
injustice a grave misconduct for which he should be held
administratively accountable.
On the second cause of action, respondent judge is charged with
gross dishonesty and serious inefficiency predicated on various
certificates of service, particularly referring to those dated 6
February 1989 to 10 October 1990
(Exhs. "M" to "M-16") allegedly falsified by him, and for failure of
respondent Judge to decide the eighteen (18) cases, subject
matter of the action, within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution. Complainant claims that respondent Judge did not
decide the criminal and civil cases enumerated in the Resolution
of the Investigator dated 17 May 1993 within a period of 90 days
from their submission for decision and, despite such failure,
respondent prepared and submitted falsified certificates of
service so as he would be paid his salaries. But, as the
Investigating Justice found
. . . that respondent Judge upon his request was granted
extensions by the Hon. Supreme Court in its Resolutions of
August 30, 1990, September 25, 1990 and April 23, 1991, all
giving an additional period of 90 days from notice within which
respondent Judge shall decide the subject cases. And the facts
would show that respondent Judge resolved all the subject cases
within the 90-day extension period. It is the view of the
Investigator that the said resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court
had actually three effects. First, the resolutions gave respondent
Judge an additional period of 90 days from receipt of notice
thereof within which to decide subject cases. Second, the
resolutions constituted an implied retroactive extension from the
lapse of the original 90-day period. Third, the said resolutions
also constituted an implied condonation by Hon. Supreme Court
on the failure of respondent Judge to resolve subject cases within
and after he lapse of the original 90-day period. Necessarily, the
charge for gross dishonesty and serious inefficiency holds no
water and, therefore, the respondent Judge should be exonerated
therefrom.
On the basis of the foregoing findings, the Investigating Justice
recommends that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda be
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00 for grave misconduct in
unlawfully suspending from the practice of law District Public
Attorney Napoleon Abiera; and, that he be exonerated from the
charge of gross dishonesty and serious inefficiency for allegedly
failing to decide cases within the prescribed period.
We cannot agree fully with the aforecited recommendations of
the Investigating Justice.
Let it be stressed that the Court does not condone the manner by
which complainant was suspended from the practice of law. This
was made clear in our Resolution of 26 August 1991 in G.R. No.
96636 when we set aside the Order of 20 December 1990 for
being null and void as it failed to comply with Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Our disapproval however should not be
construed as an indication that respondent judge's erroneous
order merits administrative sanction, otherwise, we would have
imposed the sanction then and there if in every proceeding for
certiorari we punish a judge for grave abuse of discretion.
As a general rule, the acts done by a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action, even though erroneous. 15
These acts become subject to our disciplinary power only when
they are attended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. A
re-evaluation of the case at bar presents no occasion for us to
depart from the general rule.
The records show that Civil Case No. 2119 has long been pending
presentation of plaintiffs' evidence. Yet, respondent judge has
been very lenient in granting motions for postponements to both
counsel of the parties, more particularly to counsel for plaintiffs.
Of the twenty-seven (27) motions for postponement granted,
seventeen (17) of these were filed by complainant as counsel for
plaintiffs, four (4) by agreement of the parties, one (1) by reason
of the stenographic reporters' strike, and five (5) by motion of
defendants. 16 Finally, upon prior agreement of both counsel for
plaintiffs and defendants, respondent judge set the case for
hearing on 20 to 22 August 1990.
Given this factual backdrop, complainant's non-appearance at the
hearing despite his previous commitment and his personal
request for a second call of the case inevitably pushed the
patience of respondent judge to the limit. In his Order of 20
August 1990, respondent tersely declared that "(t)he complaint
in the case was filed on 18 June 1986 and plaintiffs have not even
rested their case due to repeated postponements asked by
plaintiffs. This Court cannot tolerate further delay in the
proceedings of this case." 17
A reading of the Order of 20 December 1990 18 discloses that
respondent judge was not without reason in imposing a
disciplinary sanction against complainant. The latter's proffered
excuse of a protracted cross-examination in Br. 11 was a mere
subterfuge. As we view it, the fault indeed lies in his failure keep a
systematic record of his cases set for hearing. As it happened,
complainant appears to have learned only on 19 August 1990
that on the following day, 20 August 1990, he had to attend
simultaneously to two (2) cases in different branches of the court.
19 Faced with a conflict in schedules, complainant made no move
to transfer the hearing of either case. Perhaps he thought he
could cope with the situation. 20 Unfortunately, he was wrong.
Obviously, complainant's predicament then was of his own doing.
Therefore, the hearing of another case in Br. 11 could not be
made a shield for his blunder.
A hard look at complainant's oversight also reveals that he was
unprepared for the trial on 20 August 1990. The plaintiffs who
were then his clients were not even present in court. As the
Investigating Justice correctly pointed out, readiness for trial is to
be prepared with his witness for that day. 21 In his testimony,
complainant stated that plaintiffs were with him and that he
advised them to await the second call of the case. 22 For their
part, plaintiffs claimed otherwise. They countered that "(they)
would have been in court on August 20, 1990 to present further
evidence had Atty. Abiera informed (them) of the hearing but he
did not." 23
We are more inclined to believe the submission of plaintiffs. For,
other than his testimony, complainant presented no
corroborating evidence. On the other hand, logic dictates that if
plaintiffs were indeed present, respondent judge would not have
issued the Order of 20 August 1990, otherwise, had he done so,
plaintiffs would have promptly protested against it, or
respondent judge could have asked them to call for their counsel
who was in Br. 11. The whole incident plainly underscores the
truth, which eludes some lawyers, that an orderly schedule, a
punctual appearance at court hearings, and preparedness for trial
highly contribute to the speedy disposal of cases.
We also note that since complainant personally requested a
second call, courtesy demands that he should have at least
informed respondent judge of his predicament. But he did not.
Complainant's reason that the matter slipped his mind 24 is flimsy
and clearly indicates a lack of respect not for the sake of the
incumbent judge but for the court owing to its importance. 25
In his order of 20 December 1990, respondent judge deplored the
strategy of complainant in withholding the filing of his motion for
reconsideration until defendants filed their Offer of Exhibits on 5
September 1990. He claims that he could not file his motion
earlier because on 30 August 1990 he was detained by
respondent judge for contempt in another case so that he had to
formalize his motion while in detention.
Again, we are not persuaded. He is less than candid to the court.
His argument is belied by his own motion for reconsideration
which is dated
24 August 1990. Evidently, it was prepared six (6) days before he
was detained. In this regard, respondent judge aptly observed
The filing of the subject motion for reconsideration on the same
day, September 5, 1990, adverse counsel filed his formal written
offer of exhibits for defendants may truly be coincidental. But,
holding on to the motion until September 5, 1990, or twelve (12)
days after its date of execution on August 24, 1990, is clearly a
coincidence purposely made to coincide. It should even become
anomalous if it is considered that
Atty. Abiera received the two separate orders dated August 20
and 21, 1990 at the same time at 3:00 P.M. on August 23, 1990
while adverse counsel received personally his copy of the order
dated August 20 the following day on August 21 and later his
copy of the August 21 order was received on August 22. 26
Moreover, respondent judge can hardly be blamed for taking
complainant to task for not being factual in his motion for
reconsideration when he
states 27
1. That the undersigned counsel received the order dated August
20, 1990 on August 23, 1990 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
declaring the plaintiffs to have waived presenting evidence in
their favor for failure of plaintiffs and counsel to appear in Court
on August 20, 1990;
2. That on August 20, 1990 counsel for the plaintiffs appeared
together with the counsel for the defendants in Criminal Case No.
3879 entitled, PP vs. Anselmo Pagunsan, et al., for Violation of RA
6455 before RTC, Branch 11 as counsels (sic) for the accused and
Capt. Zenaida Sinfuego of the PCCL, Camp Delgado, Iloilo City,
testified for the prosecution. The setting was earlier requested
for the prosecution. The setting was earlier requested by Capt.
Sinfuego herself, appearing in the Order of the Honorable
Presiding Judge given in chamber last June 18, 1990;
3. That before the start of the session of Branch 11, the
undersigned counsel informed the Court Interpreter of Branch
12, that he would request for a second call since he will (sic)
appear in Criminal Case No. 3839 before Branch 11;
4. That unfortunately due to the lengthy direct and cross-
examination of the witness on the stand in Criminal Case No.
3839, the second call requested for Civil Case No. 2119 was ahead
a few minutes than that of the termination of the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 3839 and the reason why counsel was not
around as well as the counsel for the defendants when the second
call for Civil Case No. 2119 was made . . .
Apparently, the aforesaid motion creates the impression that
complainant had no knowledge of the Order of 20 August 1990
nor of the proceedings of
21 August 1990 where he fully participated. The misleading
statement in complainant's motion led respondent to rule that
What stands out is an effort to trifle with judicial proceedings of
this court. Worse, the machination is made via a clever use of the
filthy instruments of a devil's advocate wily submissions and a
smiling fox's pleading executed with the use of legal
knowledge by an officer of the court, Atty. Napoleon Abiera, who
is sworn to protect and uphold the dignity and authority of the
court.
Thus, Atty. Abiera submits at least sub silencio that he was
unaware of the August 20, 1990 order (received by him on
August 23, 1990) declaring his clients, the plaintiffs herein to
have waived further presentation of their evidence when he
entered into trial on August 21, 1990. And, because of his lack of
knowledge of such order he did not object to the presentation of
defendants' evidence on August 21. Hence, the court should
cancel and nullify all the proceedings had on August 21, including
his own cross examination of Mrs. Floreta Pillo Galera and the
court should also set aside Exhibits "1" to "3" for the defendants
and Exhibits "C" to "E-3" for the Third Party Plaintiffs, inclusive,
even if such exhibits have all been previously identified in his
presence and without his objection.
xxx xxx xxx
Granting that Atty. Abiera never learned of the order of August 20
but his appearance on August 21 for the reception of evidence for
the defendants must have adequately apprised him that further
presentation of evidence for his client was summarily terminated
and shut because defendants were allowed to present their
evidence even before he could close and offer the evidence for his
clients.
Not only that, Atty. Abiera did not even raise a quibble when
adverse counsel asked in open court for time to file formal
written offer of exhibits for the defendants.
xxx xxx xxx
The intention to manipulate in a hidden fashion a coated image of
innocence in counsel's submission is all too clear as crystal to
escape notice. The conduct is not simply odd but exhibits an
effort to trifle with the court. Such conduct plainly makes a
mockery of judicial proceedings and makes a fool of this court." 28
Indeed, candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of a
practicing lawyer. 29 Complainant's aforequoted motion for
reconsideration could barely measure up to this criterion. The
concealment of the facts naturally did not earn sympathy for him.
In his Compliance with the Order of 7 December 1990,
complainant clarified his misleading statement. He mailed his
Compliance in Manila by registered mail on 17 December 1990.
However, the same was received by respondent court only on 26
December 1990. In the meantime, respondent judge had already
issued the order of 20 December 1990 suspending him from the
practice of law.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, we find no malice in the
actuations of respondent judge. We perceive from his Order of 20
December 1990 the zeal to uphold the dignity of the court and the
seriousness with which he takes his task as dispenser of justice.
His record at the Office of the Court Administrator attests to his
earnest efforts in reducing his heavy caseload and instilling
discipline in his court. As the aforesaid order reveals, he would
not tolerate any attempt at disrespect towards the court nor
permit the use of double talk from any member of the Bar. Such
attitude may be severe and inflexible at times but in the case at
bench, his actuations do not constitute grave abuse of discretion
and misconduct to justify the imposition of an administrative
sanction.
On the other hand, complainant should be reminded of his
primary duty to assist the court in the administration of justice. It
bears stressing that the relations between counsel and judge
should be based on mutual respect and on a deep appreciation by
one of the duties of the other. 30 It is upon their cordial
relationship and mutual cooperation that the hope of our people
for speedy and efficient justice rests.

As regards the charge of gross dishonesty and serious

inefficiency, we affirm the recommendation of the investigating
justice that the same should be dismissed for being baseless.

WHEREFORE, the complaint against JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ

MACEDA, Regional Trial Court, Br. 12, Antique, now detailed in
Naval, Biliran, Br. 16, for grave abuse of discretion and
misconduct, gross dishonesty and serious inefficiency, and failing
to decide cases within the reglementary period, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

JOHN SIY LIM, A.C. No. 5653
Complainant,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
ATTY. CARMELITO A. Promulgated:
MONTANO,
Respondent. February 27, 2006
x-------------------------------------------------
-x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged with
gross misconduct relative to his filing of Civil Case No. C-19928
entitled Spouses Tomas See Tuazon and Natividad See Deecho v.
John Siy Lim and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif]
It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was the
defendant in Civil Case No. C-14542 for reformation of contract,
quieting of title, with damages, then pending before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131.[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif] The subject of the dispute was a 650-square
meter conjugal lot along A. del Mundo Street, 7th Avenue,
Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
860. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of defendant (complainant
herein), and declared that the deed of sale the parties executed
on July 15, 1987 was an absolute and unconditional conveyance
of subject property by the plaintiff in favor of such defendant. On
motion for reconsideration, however, the trial court reversed
itself and declared that the sale was in fact an equitable mortgage.
It thus ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 152621 and the
reinstatement of the previous title on the subject property.
The complainant appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 40167. In its Decision dated
March 31, 1995, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the
RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated November 16, 1992, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the original Decision of
the trial court, dated December 2, 1991, hereby REINSTATED,
with the modification that plaintiff-appellee is ordered to pay
defendant-appellant the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos
a month as reasonable rental for the use and occupation of
Apartment No. 161 from July 15, 1988 until the premises shall
have been vacated and possession thereof peacefully turned over
to defendant-appellant.
The counterclaim for
attorneys fees of defendant-appellant
is DENIED. There is no clear showing
that the action taken by plaintiff-
appellee was done in bad faith. There
should be no penalty on the right to
litigate.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this
Court, and the petition was docketed as G.R. No. 119794. On
October 3, 2000, the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA and
denied the petition.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Entry of judgment was
made of record on October 3, 2000.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of
Appearance[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] as counsel of Tomas See Tuazon
(the losing party) in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 131 in Civil
Case No. C-14542. On January 7, 2002, he filed, in behalf of his
client, a Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ,[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif] worded as follows:
1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to the decision
of the court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, the decision on the present case had already
become final and executory.
2. In order to avoid undue
inconvenience on the part of herein
defendant, plaintiff shall voluntarily
settle the money judgment as stated in
the decision sought to be enforced.
3. The plaintiff will be
filing Eight Hundred Ten Thousand
(P810,000.00) Pesos, equivalent to
162 months of rent as per decision and
the same to be covered by supersedeas
bond issued by a reliable insurance
company to answer for said obligation.
4. Every month starting
February 15, 2002, plaintiff shall
deposit to the court the amount of
P5,000.00 as monthly rent.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]
On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients (the spouses
Tomas See Tuazon) filed the Complaint[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] for
nullity of TCT and other documents, reconveyance, maintenance of
physical possession before the RTC of Caloocan City, eventually
raffled to Branch 121 thereof (Civil Case No. C-19928).
Meantime, on February 19, 2002, Judge Luisito C.
Sardillo of Branch 126[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] issued an Order[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif] in Civil Case No. C-14542 granting the
Motion for Execution with Manifestation earlier filed by the
prevailing party (complainant herein), and denying for lack of
merit, the Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ filed
by respondent counsel.
This prompted the complainant to file the instant
complaint for disbarment against respondent. In his Complaint-
Affidavit[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] dated March 20, 2002,
complainant alleged that respondent filed the complaint in Civil
Case No. C-19928 out of malice, pointing out that it involves the
same parties, the same causes of action and relief prayed for as
that of Civil Case No. C-14542. Thus, the complainant prayed that
the respondent be disbarred and/or suspended from the practice
of law for his gross misconduct, on the following allegation:
6. Evidently, I have been
subjected to harassment by the antics
of the respondent in filing a recycled
case docketed as Civil Case No. C-
19928 on January 07, 2002.
Respondent is guilty in abetting the
conduct of his clients, Sps. Tuazon. He
 has clearly violated his lawyers oath
not to promote or sue groundless, false
or unlawful suits among others.
Instead of counseling his clients to
abide and obey the decision of our
Supreme Court, the final arbiter of all
controversies and disputes, he is
showing disrespect to a final and
executory decision of our court.[if
!supportFootnotes][13][endif]
In his Comment,[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] respondent
denied the allegations against him. While he admitted that he
filed Civil Case No. C-19928 as counsel for the plaintiff therein, he
claimed that it was not filed with malicious intent. Moreover,
while the new case involved the same party, it was for a different
cause of action and relief, and, as such, the principle of res
judicata did not apply. He further explained that the complaint in
Civil Case No. C-14542 was for declaratory relief or reformation
of instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928 was for annulment of
title. He accepted the case based on his professional appreciation
that his client had a good case.
In his Reply,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] the complainant
stressed that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping; Civil
Case No. C-19928 was nothing but a revival of the old complaint;
and the lame excuse of the respondent that the present case is an
action in rem while the other case is an action in personam did not
merit consideration.
On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved to refer
the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline assigned the case to Commissioner Salvador L. Pea.
Only the counsel for the respondent appeared at the mandatory
conference held on September 30, 2003. Finding that there were
no factual issues in the case, Commissioner Pea terminated the
mandatory conference and ordered the parties to submit their
respective verified Position Papers, and, thereafter, considered
the case submitted for resolution.
The case was re-assigned to Commissioner Doroteo
B. Aguila who submitted his Report and Recommendation dated
May 9, 2005, finding the respondent guilty of misconduct. It was
recommended that respondent be meted a two months
suspension from the practice of law.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, the
elements of res judicata are present in this case as to bar the filing
of Civil Case No. C-19928 since (a) the judgment in Civil Case No.
C-14542, upholding the validity of the absolute deed of sale, had
attained finality; (b) the court which rendered the decision had
the required jurisdiction; and (c) the disposition of the case was a
judgment on the merits.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-
108, adopting said Report and Recommendation with the
modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.
We agree that respondent is administratively liable.
In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of
forum shopping. By his own admission, he was aware that Civil
Case No. C-14542 was already final and executory when he filed
the second case (Civil Case No. C-19928). His allegation that he
was not the original counsel of his clients and that when he filed
the subsequent case for nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect
the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly
addressed in the prior case for reformation and quieting of title,
deserves scant consideration. As a responsible member of the
bar, he should have explained the effect of such final and
executory decision on his clients rights, instead of encouraging
them to file another case involving the same property and
asserting the same rights.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances
of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in
determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and
the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim
substantially the same reliefs.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present
or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in another.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] Thus, the following requisites
should concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions, (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts,
and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration. x x x[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
The fact that the parties in the first and second cases
are not identical will not prevent the application of the principle
of res judicata. Mere substantial identity of parties, or a
community of interests between a party in the first case and a
party in the subsequent case, even if the latter was not impleaded
in the first case, is sufficient.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Moreover, a
party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle
that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated
between the same parties or their privies.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
This was what respondent resorted to in order to give some
semblance of merit to the complaint for annulment of title. He
should have realized that[if
!supportLineBreakNewLine][endif]
the ruling of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals[if
!supportFootnotes][22][endif] effectively determined with finality the
rights and obligations of the parties under the questioned deed of
sale.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but
not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.[if
!supportFootnotes][23][endif] The filing of multiple petitions constitutes
abuse of the Courts processes and improper conduct that tends
to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice
and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the
lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which
obviously delays the execution of a final and executory
judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful
violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity
to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him
to be just and are consistent with truth and honor. [if
!supportFootnotes][24][endif]

The filing of another action concerning the same

subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs
contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 [if
!supportFootnotes][25][endif] and Rule 12.04[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] of the

Code, as well as a lawyers mandate to delay no man for money or

malice.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]

Lawyers should be reminded that their primary

duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any
conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty. Indeed,
the Court has time and again warned not to resort to forum
shopping for this practice clogs the court dockets.[if
!supportFootnotes][28][endif]

While we rule that the respondent should be

sanctioned for his actions, we also note that the power to disbar
should be exercised with great caution, to be imposed only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a
member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where
any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.[if
!supportFootnotes][29][endif]

WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, respondent Atty. Carmelito A. Montano is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months. He is STERNLY WARNED that any future violation of his
duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. This Decision
is immediately executory. Atty. Montano is DIRECTED to inform
the Court of the date of receipt of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

REDENTOR S. JARDIN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DEOGRACIAS
VILLAR, JR. respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Law is a profession and lawyers are professionals. Implicit in
professionalism is a certain level of competence and dedication.
Far from measuring up to the standards of a lawyers conduct set
in the Code of Professional Responsibility which are also the
hallmarks of professionalism, the lawyer charged in this case
virtually abandoned his clients cause.
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Redentor
S. Jardin against respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar, Jr., who was
his counsel in a case, for the latters failure to formally offer the
documentary exhibits, which failure resulted in the dismissal of
the case.
The complainant Redentor S. Jardin is the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 21480 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City. A
building contractor, he engaged the services of the respondent to
represent him in the case which is for the collection of the sum of
One Hundred Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Four and
80/100 Pesos (P105,744.80), representing the alleged unpaid
contract price for the repair of the house of the defendants in the
case.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] The case went its course, but later
despite several extensions of time given by the trial court, the
respondent failed to file his formal offer of exhibits.[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif] Consequently, on May 7, 2001, the trial court
issued an Order the full text of which reads as follows:
When this case was called for continuation of hearing, Atty.
Rodrigo C. Reyes, counsel for the defendants manifested that up
to this date, Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not
formally offer (sic) the documentary exhibits for the plaintiff in
writing as Order (sic) by the Court.
Records show that on February 26, 2001, Atty. Villar, Jr. was
given an extension period of TEN (10) days within which to
formally offer the documentary exhibits in writing copy furnished
Atty. Reyes, counsel for the defendants who was given a period of
Five (5) days within which to comment and/or oppose the
admissibility of the said exhibits and set the continuation of the
hearing of this case for the presentation of evidence for the
defendant on March 30, 2001.
On March 30, 2001, when this case was called for hearing records
show that Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not
complied yet with the formal offer of documentary exhibits for
the plaintiff and again, in the interest of justice, the Court give
(sic) Atty. Villar, Jr. another period of TEN (10) days within which
to formally offer the documentary exhibits in writing and set the
continuation of the hearing of this case for today for the
presentation of evidence for the defendant.
Records show however, that on this date, the said counsel for the
plaintiff have (sic) not complied with the submission of
documentary exhibits for the plaintiff. For lack of interest on the
part of the counsel for the plaintiff to further prosecute this case,
upon motion of Atty. Reyes the oral testimonial evidence
submitted by the plaintiff is hereby ordered WITHDRAWN from
the records and upon further motion of ordered WITHDRAWN
from the records and upon further motion of Atty. Reyes, this
case is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of interest on the part
of the plaintiff to further prosecute this case.
Upon motion of Atty. Reyes, set the continuation of the hearing of
this case for the presentation of evidence on the counter claim on
the part of the defendant on June 15, 2001 at 8:30 oclock in the
morning.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
The dismissal of the collection case prompted the complainant to
file a verified Affidavit-Complaint[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] dated July
4, 2001 for the disbarment of the respondent with this Court,
wherein he also alleged the developments which transpired after
the dismissal of the case, viz: that he already terminated the
services of the respondent as his counsel; that the respondent
failed to return the originals of the documentary exhibits
entrusted to him; and that the respondent finally handed over the
documents only as an aftermath of a heated argument he had
with the complainants wife.
In a Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] dated September 10, 2001,
this Court required the respondent to comment on the complaint
against him. However, the respondent failed to file his comment
despite two (2) extensions of time granted to him. Thus, the
Court resolved to dispense with the filing of the respondents
comment and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Similarly, the respondent failed to file his answer as required by
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Hence, the averments made, as well as the evidence submitted by
the complainant, are undisputed.
Investigating Commissioner Attorney Milagros V. San Juan, IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, found the respondent liable for
negligence and recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, with the warning that a similar
conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. The salient
portions of the Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2003
of the Investigating Commissioner are as follows:
Complainants contention that respondent Villar failed to file
plaintiffs Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence is substantiated
by the Orders dated 26 February 2001, 30 March 2001 and 7 May
2001 (Annexes 7, 9 and 10 respectively). The Order dated 7 May
2001 (Annex 10 of complainants Affidavit) reads:
....
It is clear from the above-quoted Order that it was the failure of
respondent Villar to file the Formal Offer of Documentary
Exhibits which led to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 21480 to the
prejudice of respondents client, herein complainant. Respondent
Villar has failed to offer any explanation for his failure to file the
Formal Offer of Exhibits within the several extensions of time
given him by the trial court to do so. There is no doubt that it was
part of respondents obligation to complainant as the latters
counsel of record in Civil Case No. 21480, to file said Formal Offer
of Documentary Exhibits, and respondents dereliction of this
duty has prejudiced the interests of respondents client. In
accepting Civil Case No. 21480, it was respondents obligation to
take all measures to protect the interests of his client in
accordance with Canon (sic) 18 & 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility but it was respondents negligence or omission
which has caused damage to such interests.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
In its Resolution dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved said Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
We are also in full accord with the findings and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner.
At the outset, we find particularly glaring the respondents
disregard of the resolution of this Court directing him to file his
comment on the complaint. He exhibited a similar attitude in
failing to file his answer when required by the Commission on
Bar Discipline. The repeated cavalier conduct belies impudence
and lack of respect for the authority of this Court.
The record clearly shows that the respondent has been languid in
the performance of his duties as counsel for the complainant. He
was given by the trial court several extensions of time: first, an
extension of ten (10) days from February 26, 2001 or until March
8, 2001, and; second, another extension of ten (10) days from
March 30, 2001, when the case was called for hearing and the
court noted that no such formal offer had been filed then, or until
April 9, 2001. It must also be emphasized that there was an
interim period of twenty two (22) days between March 8, 2001
and March 30, 2001, and another interval of twenty-seven (27)
days from April 9, 2001 until May 7, 2001 when the Order
dismissing the case was issued. Effectively, therefore, respondent
had three (3) months and nine (9) days within which to file the
formal offer of exhibits.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] The respondent did
not bother to give an explanation even in mitigation or
extenuation of his inaction.
Manifestly, the respondent has fallen short of the competence
and diligence required of every member of the Bar. The pertinent
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND
CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
....
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
....
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
....
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHAL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH
ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
It is indeed dismaying to note the respondents patent violation of
his duty as a lawyer. He committed a serious transgression when
he failed to exert his utmost learning and ability and to give
entire devotion to his clients cause. His client had relied on him to
file the formal offer of exhibits among other things. But he failed
him. Resulting as it did in the dismissal of the case, his failure
constitutes inexcusable default. It therefore behooves the Court
to take action on the respondents mortal infraction, which caused
undeserved and needless prejudice to his clients interest,
adversely affected the confidence of the community in the legal
profession and eroded the publics trust in the judicial system. As
an attorney, the respondent is sworn to do his level best and to
observe full fidelity to the courts and his clients.[if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif] This means that in relation to his duty to his
clients he should put his maximum skills and full commitment to
bear in representation of their causes.
We can only echo our pronouncements in Basas v. Icawat,[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif] to wit:
Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his
profession, in violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides:
"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
As we reiterated in Aromin, et al. v. Boncavil, A. C. No. 5135,
September 22, 1999:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he
owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any
and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of
the land he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and
to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves
the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession.[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif]
This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence
necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high
standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his
profession, the courts and the public.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Every
case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill
and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or free.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] Certainly, a
member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice
the profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyers lethargy from
the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and
unethical.
The IBP recommended the suspension of the respondent from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. We find the
recommended penalty commensurate with the offense
committed.
In Aromin v. Boncavil,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] this Court suspended
a lawyer for six (6) months for his failure to file a written offer of
evidence despite the trial courts directive.
The failure to file formal offer of evidence is in pari materia with
failure to file brief, which as this Court held in Perla Compania de
Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] constitutes
inexcusable negligence. In the Saquilabon case, the respondent
lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months. The Court likewise imposed the same penalty upon
the respondents in the cases of In Re: Atty. David Briones,[if
!supportFootnotes][17][endif] Spouses Galen v. Paguinigan,[if
!supportFootnotes][18][endif] Spouses Rabanal v. Rabanal[if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif] for their failure to file the briefs of their
respective clients.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Deogracias Villar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months effective upon finality hereof, with the WARNING that
the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more
severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal
records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 123698. August 5, 1998]
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA
SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, A.M., J.:
This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corporation has come to this Court assailing the
execution of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-9297.
Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner, considering that
the issues raised in this second petition for review are but mere
reiterations of previously settled issues which have already
attained finality. We now write finis to this controversy which
has dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as we ruled in
Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City:[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif]
x x x litigations must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, it being essential to the effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party
be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against any scheme
to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to put an
end to controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to
prolong it. Public policy and sound practice demand that at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final
and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interes rei
publicae ut finis sit litium.
The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-
spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint
against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing
for brevity) for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name
of said corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment,[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and
void.
Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as
to costs."
The aforesaid decision was affirmed[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June
25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-
101819 on November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on
March 5, 1992.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
The RTC decision, having become final and executory,
private respondents moved for execution which was granted by
the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision
was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by
herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation
contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial
court; that it is completely unaware of the suit between private
respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and registered
owner of the lot having bought the same from Central Dyeing;
and that it was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private
respondents motion. Another Order was issued on August 18,
1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on
petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of defendant Central
Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Revised Rules of
Court.
 Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for
certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which read:
We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling
reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from
Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case
No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein
by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee
pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name
in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit
may be continued for or against the original party or the
transferor and still be binding on the transferee[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]
The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the
Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
On further appeal to this Court, petitioners petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G. R. No. 109076, was denied in
a resolution dated August 2, 1993.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Upon
finality of said resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment
dated October 21, 1993.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for
the issuance of a second writ of execution before the trial court
which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration.
Petitioners motion was initially granted[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] on
August 29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero.
However, upon motion of private respondents, the said order was
reconsidered on December 19, 1994[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] by
Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge Romero.
Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for
the second time, filed a petition for certiorari[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif] with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter alia: that the judgment
cannot be executed against it because it was not a party to Civil
Case No. C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in said case
never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the
property to the private respondents; that certain facts and
circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment
will render the execution highly unjust, illegal and inequitable;
that the issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot
buyers freedom of religion and worship; and that private
respondents title is being questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered
judgment[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] dismissing the petition for
certiorari on the ground that the lower court's decision in Civil
Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. It ruled, thus:
"This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent
Court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and
executory. The respondent court's writs of execution and
possession could have been implemented a long time ago if not
for the series of legal maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. x
x x x Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop the
execution of a final judgment by raising issues which actually
have been ruled upon by this Court in its earlier case with Us
in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a
mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs,
although prevailing party, will not benefit at all from a final
judgment in their favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously,
frivolous and dilatory warranting the assessment of double costs
of this suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules
of Court).
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private
respondents, the instant petition has already become moot
and academic as the property in question was already turned
over by the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs of
execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully,
putting the legal battle of this case to rest." (Emphasis ours.)
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
January 30, 1996.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention
reiterating in essence the same line of arguments espoused in
their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final
judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it
are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any
matter related to the controversy litigated come to an end.
Petitioners argument that the trial court cannot order it
and the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to surrender
and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the
ground that they were never parties to the case between private
respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been resolved by
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it
ruled:
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from
Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case
No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein
by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee
pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name
in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit
may be continued for or against the original party or the
transferor and still be binding on the transferee.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R.
No. 109076 and attained finality on October 21, 1993. There is,
therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here.
Further, petitioners contention that a determination of
the issue of possession should first be resolved before the
issuance of a writ of possession is untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the land in
question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence of the
decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful
owners of the property. As correctly argued by the private
respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the
purpose of taking possession of the subject realty.
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and
circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment in Civil
Case No. C-9297 which will render the execution of the said
judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the pendency of Civil Case
No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed
by the Republic of the Philippines against private respondents for
nullification of 22 titles which include the title to the subject
property. Petitioner argues that the pendency of the said case
provides a reasonable justification why execution of the aforesaid
judgment and delivery of possession of the subject property
should be permanently stayed or at least held in abeyance until
after the final resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of
titles filed by the Republic against private respondents will not
justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioners title which
originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already
annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which
judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by
this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial court
will nullify the said private respondents title in Civil Case No. C-
11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision
cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the rightful
owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition was
instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment.
Finally, petitioners fear that the grave lots will be
disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once the execution of the
judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the
Orders of the trial court with regard to the execution of the
judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners have
been taken into account by the trial court when it took steps and
made suggestions as to how their rights could be amply
protected. In its Order dated February 13, 1995, the trial court,
through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated:
"The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not completely
without recourse or remedy because they can still go after the
original party-defendant or transferor of the property in question
which is Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation pursuant to
Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And should it be difficult
or nay impossible for plaintiff-respondents to be placed in
possession of the subject property, due to defendant-petitioners'
arguments that the same have already been sold to burial lot
buyers, then it should be incumbent for the defendant-petitioners
to negotiate with the plaintiff-respondents for payment in cash of
the property subject of their complaint to avoid demolition or
desecration since they benefited from the sale of the burial lots."[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif]
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following
directive was given, to wit:
"The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the
plaintiffs and as proposed by the plaintiffs, they are given
authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so that they can
have access to the property. But as to the demolition of the burial
lots, negotiation could be made by the defendant with the former
owner so that cash payment or cash settlement be made."[if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his
Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following limitation on
the writ of execution, as follows:
"Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within
the Eternal Gardens have been sold to so many persons who now
have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots adjoining the lot
in question, it is therefore, in the interest of justice and equity,
that the enforcement of the writ of possession and break open
order should be applied only to the gate of Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in
question where the factory of the defendant is located, in order to
avoid disturbing the peace of the resting souls over the graves
spread over the parcels of land within the said memorial park."[if
!supportFootnotes][17][endif]
From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the
issue as to the status of the burial lot owners has been properly
addressed.
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot
and academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of
Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of
Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been
implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the Sheriffs Return,[if
!supportFootnotes][18][endif] dated March 31, 1995, with the attached
Turn Over Premises[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] indicating therein that
private respondents took possession of the subject property.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the
execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the
prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that
petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot
has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally
terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled with
tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the real
owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice.
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the
interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's
right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court,
bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse
the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna, et.
al.,[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] we ruled:
"As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in
the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this
duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of
the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as
it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them
when a case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to
merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing
litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.