Robert Sokolowsht ——_________Babart Sokotowskt FICTION AND ILLUSION IN DAVID HUME'S PHILOSOPHY "he Rav Roost Salons ast profess of phioerhy ‘ite Cathe Unberaty of ana Ie rece ts MA af the Cech Omer, {fe has ren for the Revue posi de sa raps Seen 10 heme Rema ‘He has eso contributed ies testa sttlogs: Hussel and Kant, dhe two German philosophers most vvily ‘influenced by Dav Hume, both pay great attention to his doctrine (of "fictions" constituted by reason and imagination Hiss! berates ‘his fictonslism. Hume wansforms the entire lived worl, substances, the self, and all scientiic constructions into unreal atifces, 5372 ‘Husser, because he is blind to the objetivating,intentionl function ‘of consciousness “For this Positviem, things are reduced to em Direally regulated complexes of peychic daia and the ident, 23% well a5 their entre real sense, It turned into a pune ft This isnot only a false doctrine, totally blind to estenial phonon nological factors, but itis also contradictory since i dors not see ‘hat even fictions bave their own mode of being, ther mode of evidence ."* The results are disastrous in Mussel’ opinion: a ‘atasiropic skepticism and an unreal, “as if" philosophy "Hustle response fs to take Hume's fictions ax the starting. point of bis ‘own pilesophy. The meanings, objects, and ego that Hume discatds 48 philosophical isions are accepted by plsnosienology as ahem ‘ically constituted by consciousness, and the entire progam of phe omenology becomes the analysis of thet’ constitution ‘Kant’ reaction is quite diferent. Instead of rehabilating whst Hume discards, Kant justies the jection * Causal necessiy aed sbtantil identity are sald to be the result of categries imposed ‘on experientist date and to this extent constructed by coasciowencr ‘he ideas of God, soul, and word are purely regulative, and whch spptied constitutively ro experience, base transcendental lions ‘The formal components of experince are “artifice” of consciousness‘Only the critical philosophy makes us aware of their unrelity and saves us from the contiadistions that arise when we naively confuse ‘oumena and phenomene. Critical philosophy fe te rigorous scoDce Of the artfces and fetions of consciousness” In it, Kant ertblishes the absolute necessity of Hume's ftions What is the philosophy of arisce and Action chat influenced Kent and Huser! in such dierent ways? It ie found chicly in Hune's Treatise In his later writings the concept of illusion almost ‘Alsappesss, a0 ow stady will concentrate on his frst major wore * ot Tol pe See ws et a Skee: Ses See eee Rites See ceceate Weare SUES ES ae ee ‘him of Htee's Theory of Kacwledge, Unt Fema, OT Ret aS i Kan erly menions only ees" ume "dope che Serminology evn So dey dotmss greares amo’ at ee, th cones ‘Et tg ume ae Soe un the Prac ot SSI aR BETS a pats SP Siero ta at ame Maen Sa ee Shay Siena ot mre Sy a at a BE Spig: Cee eee ED aA gnc Se hi ae wins tot cn ande: S74 Oh aa I ioting oad. om asst piven, ford, My pp oy tbe comet ‘Hite Schengen’ Spaeth Sag St teh cee tp Secu She Sad Sa ies ot Hose "Bane ncomne Son ie ne ete bn 190 1. THE ScuBSc8 OF MAN AND TIE MENIO00LOGY FOR PISCOVERENG ILLUSIONS In the Introduction to his Treatise Hume outlines a twofold aim fox his philosopty. Fist be intends to provide a unifed explana tion forall sciences by sbowing thet orgs In a science of Butan Datire’ "In pretending therefore to explain the principles of hutnan rnaure, we in elect propose a complete system ofthe sciences, built fon a foundation almost entiely new and the enly one upon ‘which they can staad with any securiy"* “This selene, by dectly at tacking human nature as the "espltal or center of these selences’ Will dissipate the scandalous doubt, errors, and frites contto ‘arses that continue to mar human understandkng of the foundations ff science. Tt wil briag proce and agreement to fundamental scien tide speculation Tn this expectation Hume resembles both Hussei and Kant who felt that their own “sciences of man" would. be Figorous and scietifc enough to bring an ebd to philosophical “The second alm deals with another sort of peace and content ment. Hume will show the limits of human inquiry and thus allow 1s to rest satsied with what we cam attain instead of tying to Satisly vain hopes. "When we seo, that we have arsed at the Utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented: and though wwe be perfectly sated in the main of cur ignorance, and perceive that We can give no zeason fer our mont general and mort refined principles, beside our experienc: of their realty; which Is tbe reason Of the mete vulgar." Wheteas the frst aim is theoretically con: Seuetive, te second is cathartic The fist gol is to achieve seen {ife tatisfaction and completion where that ie posible, the second {is to show that i¢ Is impossible in certain respeets Philosophy will, put us at rest by showing that tbere is nothing to be looked for, ‘where previously reason or imagination snticipated finding some {hing "When this mutual contentment and satisfaction cin be ob- tained between the master and scholar, I know not what more We an requte of our pbilosophy"* His philosophy must unmask Ulusions and aifces and thus bring the mind to sest The contast between Hurne and Aristotle on this point i sie ng. For Avistotle the mind also ests when i reaches the Timits of scientific explanation Tt cannot “march to infinity” im its ex planation, but teaches certain principles where it must stop. These Principles ace unquestionable because they aie lucid they ate tin and Huson in David Hume's Palosopy‘solfevident propositions, needing no fuller explanation because they ‘carey thelr explanation within themselves." The mind docs ot ask for more because itis completely stisied Ta Hare, the mind rests in a vory dileeat spe of wnguestonability There are certain prlneples simply experienced ag facts hey cannot be explained, hor ate they selferplanatory. The mind can and does fabricate ‘questions about them, but this only leads to contradiction and fezor. Peace of mind comes only when we stop asking questions ‘sbout basic priaciples and morsfy our desire to know. We aro ‘content and satisied when "we perceive thas we cam ge mo reason for our most general and most relied principles, besides car ex petience of their realty” Not emineat intelligibility but unintel- Nigtble facticiy is all we can reach "The methodology thet will erable us both to erecta selene of Juan nature and put an end to vain desires is so explained in ‘the Introduction Abstruse metaphysical argument isto be avoided fad experience alone is acecpted as guide and cxteion of uth: © The oaly solid foundation we can_give to this science itself ‘must be lad on expetience and cbservation"* Whatever is rejected by this eiterion Is Ilusory and artical. Tn practice the appiction ff this Principle involves the distinction between impressions and 2 eater tts 1 0 2 ihe detivacon of ideas from i rena adn with ees fw Eire, Fe Bis Talons and Bee cat, may be Shine ter ong 192 ‘eas, which are the only two forms of “perceptions” Hume admis in the mind. Since overy idea is by definition a faint copy of an finpression, ie must he possible 19 refer each Idea tothe impression itis derived from * In this way we ean validate ideas by showing the basis they have in “expericace and observation” ‘Sometimes the application of thls principle invalidates certain purported “ideas " Ror insance ip atasking the notion of abstract ‘eas, lke that of a triangle which is neither isosceles nor selene, Hume sests his argument oa the desivation of ideas from lmpres sions: "But to destey this arte, we neod but reflect on that principle so oft insisted on, that all our ideas are copied from fn impressions” Since we find there is no cotrespanding i sion, we must discard the pretended idea tis important 1o see what is being discarded here. Te is not te case that we have certain ideas that pretend to be copies Of ‘impressions but really are not According’ to Hume, sf we cannot ‘Bnd am impresslon, then the idea itslt doesnot exist If we eannat find an impression, we were simply mistaken in believing we had sn idea at all. “Bt if you caonot point out any such impression, you may be certain you are mistaken, when you imagine you have Any ech dea" It is not the caso that such ideas tally east ‘bat are false How do mistakes arise then? We may rasly suppose fat we do have a certain ides, of our language may mislead us into thinking we lve one: "In all ofthese expressions, so applic, ‘we have really no distinct mesning, and make use only ef commen ‘wotds, without any cleat and determiaate ideas" Usually, Hue Adds, the Uouble i not that we have no ideas whatsoever behind four Words, but tat we misapply lepiimate words: "Dut as ts ‘more probable, chet these expressions eo here lose their true mean Ing by being wrongly applied, than that they never have any meam ing." A word belonging to one idea is applid to another, ed the supposed combination cannot exist as an tea That Home's cicism is divected against the very etence of certain ideas is confirmed by the second methodologial principle ho uses to discriminate between reaity snd illusion. Besides the technique of tracing ideas to their impressions, Hume uses another ‘citeion of truth tehich is not mentioned in the Intodaction t0 the Treatise but occurs frequenty in that work This second criterion ‘could be called aprion, since It can establish the valldty of an Idee withour actually traclag st to MS propor impression. The tion aud Iason i Dai Hume’ Ptosopty 193‘elit ofa ide is determined simply by inspecting the idea its I the Idea is not ia contradtion with itself, ad i i can, be clearly fonecived, then it isa vad and real ea "Hume says: “Whatever {S"clearly conceived, after any manner, may exist after the same fmanne!, This is & Priniple, which as been already acknow edged" Barlier, ia talking’ about space and time, Hume says ‘Sis an established mann fa metaphysics, That whatever the mind Clearly conceives incindes the idea of posible existence, of in other ‘words, that nothing we tmagine Is absolutely impossble"** If we ‘Gin biing any idea to a clear conception, then we cam infer that ‘shat the idea expreses must be eapable of existing. To use Hume's Dom exsimple, we enn elestiy conceive of a golden mountain, and Shen mountain most be capable of existing Te would be possible for us to have an impression of it However, we cannot form & Cea conception of 4 mountain without a valley, Because such = ‘Sompler idea would be contradicioy Hence this complex being ‘Soult not exist) we could never have an impression of a mountain ithout valley. Here we have a erlterion for judging the reality or avlifcality of our ideas without actually relating them to an Gmpression The idea felt can ell us whether It can be the Ue mage of an impresion or not The criterion is Intrinie to the ‘eas themsalves How ean Hume justify this criterion? Tt i based on the mins passivity. It we Teally have an idea, it must have come from 3 GSrrespeading impression "For suppese I form at present an idee, ‘Sf which I have forgot the corresponding impression, Tam able to ‘Conclude thom this ea, that such an impression gid once exist" In speaking of causal necessity Hume says: “Upon this head 1 Zepedt what I have often had occasion to observe, that 9s we have rt nc ng ew Be Gone "eb, Care Eres SEO te esental of he iat ‘eos, ate encanto et {be existent "Cr ODannel, even, fa 8 mistaken way? Hanes reply Hames meee aaa Es Sots, We Sat i Sato SRE voe See re es SRGeMe RON, Hy es ws no idea, that i not detived from an impression, we must find some impression, that gives rise 10 this idea of necessity. If we assert Wwe have really such an dea"! No cleat and clsiinct idea can ‘hist in oar inde unless it has been ceived from some impression, ‘whether of sensation or rellecton Iheefore when we find itis possible to bring a given idea to. clear and distinct existence in {the mind, we have a sure sign that the idea has come from an Impression What the Idea expresses must be capable of real e« fstence "To form a clear Idea of any thing, s an undeniable axgu ‘ment for its possibility, and ie slone * relwiation of any pretended demonstration agaist it"™* The criterion works in @ negative way also. We ean dlsgualiy ‘certsin things that pretend to be ideas but really are not by showing that they are contradiciory.” We may think we have a certain idea 5 long as we leave it vagus or merely talk about it uncvitically, but when we ty to claify it we Gnd i is selfcontraditory. Thus ‘we never had am idea afterall, nd we know apriot® the impor sibility of ever bringing this supposed idea to its original impression ‘Contradiction “destroys the Mea” before we find its proper in pression Thos Hume has 600 0 son: tracing & supposed iden to ite impression, or inspecting the dea itself to see whether it-can be cleanly conceived, Now that Wwe have distinguished these two ctiteri, we Hust show that in practice they are very much dependent upon one another. “Hue fags thar in fact (eis almost impossible for us to make cur Ideas Clear (and hence to tast for contradiction) without nding the Impressions: "Tis impossible perfectly to understand any ides, ‘without tracing It up 0 its origin, and examining that primary Impression, from which it arises.” The examination of the impres- sion bestows a clearness on the Mea" In using both criteria in the Treatise Hume slips fiom ove to the other, now saying tht something is contradictory, now denying that it hax an impression ‘The two procedures reinforce one mnother But we caanst equate ‘hem clanifying ken is not the same thing ss finding their im pressions form he [tion ond Mason ta Dovid Hume's Phtosopty 1952, SrecuLanivE HLLUSIONE 1 BOOK TO HE “HERAUIS" Dok ot the Tri t He's alls of cogion a dest ens tnd sof an kw, be fxd (Situs sro tans pode by te maga 30 se GTI dw hela a ich ma oes tone Hope bo of nowy alhgh be comida th eon aoe tae fron oy, he soo eal seafarers inves, th tia cogutve ely” Why 1 sete be tuto to espn aay sping iB Sey hee yen, Bice foe unurtonale era i Rome’ toot $e tants fr seping sent nthe fl dard Sums fae sur nga. sr ecm eu nee crt ad at tay cant be guests" Tmressos do SOS Shel uf Abolce sckovdetpopotin wese ets ons al who anand tha. for Mane, te res ne et ses mero hn we a do Sots ‘ate our ene inprions"tiey we te being Peale tment for os cy on otras St Stara tne ely ting can op them, a oe 2 ae of as yond which om ot sei eguny! safe cao fart wheter oreo sor apie se Siete sgt tse we camo gan are nn oz Alpen Tt shag into beet pressions esa Re teste uly suo o sash tte tn w etan ae em he se alone ao settatpcrty hepa 9yhaman sewn *=. Te Pacing oan inte Teese wakes ts axel inpresons st ont any prea eis fn sexy el Ts ct raat tend pens, mst hei eter Stl nts tne net fr uni propane Ccuh Se ibnmily tan Ini wage, bur keh th de Peutee eat safes 1 epi ow sch ror oa be inary for Hage, we sop wth ipso bere WLS ee totlwnae and ee he st ems We orice sand ste ently Sent ie Ti hae ave pong pe 196 discover. There is nothing intinsic to impressions that justifies them 8 unquestionably true Thus Home can talk about illusions and ftions in the imagine tion and reason because he ean test Both of thew faculties against {he ctiterion of impressions to discover whether what they assert is tue. But sensibility itsett cannot be tested because we have ho tition more basic than impressions Therefore we cannot speak of any illusions ar Betions in sensibility everything ie presents aust be accepted as true We will classify the various types of speculative tluslons ais cussed by Hume in Book I into thee groups: (I) “objective” i sons, such as permanent physical substances, necessary casa rei tions, powers and qualities attibuted to things, and certain ther Sectional relationships the miad constructs for objects; 2) the “eub- jective” iusions of the self as a permanent cubstance; (2) the tions ‘Produced by the ancient philosophy, superstition, eduction, and ppoctty. Hume considers the frst two groups of fetions natural fnd necessary for human existence and action, but excep fr oetiy the fitions in the thd group ate unaatural and often malevolet (1) Hume describes all the “objective” illusions sesonding to similar pattern: the mind is given a multiplicity of impressions and fhe imagination simplifies this manifold by inclining us to assert 8 “sameness” among the impressions that really isnot give in there For example, when we perocive a physical object all we have given isa series of impressions following one another. Each impression {is distinct from every other and strictly speaking we have no warrant {or saying the we perceve the “same” thing throughout Uhere ls no single continuing imptession of the object's substance But in stead of leaving us with this kaleidoscope of diferent impression, the imagination has @ propensity to overlook slight diferences among ‘the impressions and simplifies the series Prompted by the imagine ton, we say that we are observing the “same” thing when, for Instance, we watch 8 bird fly across « Geld; but theve rally Is 20 “same thing” given to us besides the rapid flow of impressions, cach distinct from the other. Ihe sameness is the work of out Imagination, not something given 9s continuing impression “Even when the flow of Impressions i interrupted the imagination Incline ut to assert a permanence to them which eontinaes through eto and Husion in David Hue’ Pitosopy wr‘out the time ou attention te turned elsewhere. If we follow the path of a bind in ght, then turn aside from it, and then later ira back and see the bid at a more distant point, our imazins Smplies the interrupted sequence of impressions by asserting the Continued enstence of the bird dustag the interruption. this fc fiona continued existences then the Basis upon which we assert the existence of the objec as distint from ws ™ ‘Something similat happens when we claim to experience causal necessity betwect two objects All we have given in impressions are {he two objects and the relatonship of continuity, sucoession, and Constant conjunction. The concurreace is repeated. many tines, (rodally making vs expect the “cause” to be tovaiaby followed Sythe “elect But we never have an impression af the causal ‘bein as such We neves percelve the causal relation directly, and thus hover itecly experience the absolute necessity that this effet ‘howd follow that cause The imagination brings sbout tip iusion ‘fa necessary bond when i altnbutes its own expectancy t0 the ‘ings themselven nad ination bestows “powers” in things which Ste nupposd to be able to bring about the expected cause But in Si aus the tamgination merely objectivates is own expectations fand inclinations “The ides of necessity arses trom some impzession. There i= to impression conveyed by ut senses, which cas give rise fo that Mea. Ie must herefore, be detived from some internal Impression, ot impression of reflexion. There Is no internal Smpresslom which fis aay relation to the present business, Dat that property, which custom produces, to pass from an oject to the idea offs emul attendant. Ihis therefore fs the ‘esence of necessity." he idea of necessity docs exit a6 an dea, but jt i6 not derived om the extereal world; it an idea coming from reflsion on ae tg te nes OMS cece ina: bet Feel ous at “ies Sones ant See feo Gia Tera on. ") apis "mPa ee re ese Sha BES rates Manet wont Rea id, 1 Seeder he 198 four own propensity Thus the fiction favolved hore Is the misplace tment of & subjecive tendency into objective realty in 3 more general way, the imagination is prone to add many extra telationshipe to what is actualy glven in experience For ex Sipe, we realize that taste je not something spatial, and yet at. ‘ule spatisl prosence to it by saying, for example, that Tt ix "in this frit” The only relationships between taste and fruit that are sctully given are those of cause (for we customarily fad a certain {taste ia & gon piece of fruit) and contignty in time Bt to these wwe add the spatial zelatlonship in order to unify the two Lmpros: Sons more closely: For ‘tis a quality, which I shall often have occasion to remark {human atwe, and shall explain more fully in its proper place, tbat whea objects are united by any relation, we have {strong propensity to add some new relation to them, inorder to complete their union. But we shall not ind a more evident fect of it, thn in the presont instance, where trom the tle ‘dons of causation and contiguity im time betwist two objects, wwe fegn lkevrise that of a con}nction in place, i order Strengthen the conection * “The imagination tends to round out and simply sense experience by postulating a relationship or endurance which is not relly given {m the impressions we experience Also, because of this propensity fof the imagination, we fend to altbute to objects ll sorts of powers and qualities which we contider the sourecs of other im Pression which we customarily find associated with the objects = ‘We do this despite the foct that we never have any Impression of such powers of qualitles ‘Why does the imapintion constitute such fictions? In the be inning of the Treatie, Hume speaks about tho attraction that exists fmong ou simple ideas when they beara resemblance to one another ‘Ths attacton Ik compared to” gravitational force in nature, but Hue renounces any attempt to explain why or ow it occus: Bub as to ils causes, they aye oostly unknown, and must be resolved fio orginal qualities of human nature, which T pretend fot t0 explain» Thus the tendency of simlar ideas to come to ‘ether, “like to ike," is simply an obvious fact of experience whose ‘Sauses remain beyond cur gasp. However the work ofthe imagine. tion and Halon in David Hume's Posty 199‘ion is something move than the mere association of ideas 1 the constitution of a new relationship or endurance upon the se ‘ociaed ides, and by lmplioton at least Hane doce fry to explain this atone ays that the hnaginarion erates He Stony In fides to Keep usm state of ease and tangulliy The minis experience of impressions that are distinc frm se enoier ao yet sir Sete up a confit in out conciousess Similarities neine us 10. grup the and ene eget, wil the Tact that they are ‘distnet fm oe another compels us to keep them apart” In the case of aut perception cf an externa, physical thing for example, when we porceke Ie fos's while, then tea sway, and nally tan ack to we have the folowing station: "Now there being bere an opestion between the notion ‘of the Tdenity of esembling perepions, adhe intorrpti of their appeatace, the mind mist be uneasy in thet situation and will naturally sec relief fom the ocasines™ Flame has jst dbservd tht whenever we experience a eontadicon Sa fees mor tars VS Gas ae eee Sein i ‘tog io ‘secre Pareuterites ces Rca RASS 200 either to sentiments ot passions, we feel a "sensible uneasiness," “while things that agree with our natural inclinations give ws please. ‘Theast into this contadictory and wnessy state the wind wis (0 find reconciliation and repose by accerting. the contiauty of it imnpcessions duriog the time it tins any from the object it hid been contemplating Then it can say that the object "exists cot Hnuousiy” even when it is not seen, despite the fact that the Mind has 50 warrant to Say this "The relation faittates the fransition of the mind fom one object to ehother, and. renders [ts passage as smooth as if it contemplated one contioued object "= The purpose of this duplicity 1s to bring rest to the mind by removing the conttadicton It experiences. and buinglag about 2 ‘maximum of unity, continuity, and simplicity Tt is as though the mind wanted to recover the changeless simplicity of the present instant in alls observations and experiences." The entre explana tion ie based on the principle of the least expenditure of energy: "The faculties of the mind repose themselves in a manner, aod take no more exercise, than What is necessary 10 continue that lea, of which they were formeily posses, and which subsiss without variation ot intenrupsion "> Despite the mind's need to assert there relations or endurances, ‘Hume strongly insists that they are unteal He calls them fictions, fallacies, Musion,falsties, absurdities, artifers, fancies, errors, and obseusities; we felgn and contrive them, and the ilnd Is seduced by them Hume uses both criteria in decding that they ate illusory: ‘he often observes that we have no impressions of permanent Substances, objective causal necessities, or hidden. powers and ‘quallles Tn addition, be also uses the atgument that what the Imagination produces in these cases would be contradictory if taken 8 something derived from the objective world. For example, whea Wwe asvert the continued existence of objects, we are realy saying {hat our impressions continue to exist even when we ate n0t aware ‘of them. But it is a contradiction to “suppose a perception 10 fst without being present to the mind"2* Tn the ease where the Imagination produces new relationships, such as. the spatial rela tlonship of tastes, a contiadiction also results since a nonspail dea, taste, fs asset to be in a certain place “AI this absurdly proceeds from our endeavouring to bestow a place on what Is ftterly incapable of it} and that endesvour spain avises fom out Inclination to complete a union" ‘ction ond Muson tx David Hume's Phitosophy 2010 attacking the notion of necessary causality, Hume's primary ‘weapon is the claim that we have no. impression of any such Felation; because we have none, it i= not possible "for wt ever 20 form the most distant ide off considered se a quality in bodies-"™ The argument that such an iden is selfcontradting when applied to external bodies is only slightly mentioned, but Is present by ‘eoplicaton, since the conttlvance of ecesary causes lnvalves attibuting'to external bodies something that belongs exclsively {othe mind: the determination or inclination to go from one object to another. Hume goes on to say that all necessities, such as those in arithmetic and geometry, are likewise necessities of the ind and are not found im the things they ae usualy attdbuted to." + C1: “Bu when, instead of mean- the realty of abet, only our sblsty Ree eC Ae bet SaaS Sees Se Soe = in dowsing both cavsalty amd tropical See ween sealebper ane Omomtiet “PRIA ot 9, a8 whee Stich dame seer cet ace) ame Slee a “nalts eotaa EE af oe a ye eee ena ‘votes to icin, yy Nara mesely Re probion of te Sor ane Philotophy of Bast Uame, 9157 nin a0 th Pascale nnong mses 202 And since all necessities are mental inclinations the distinetion hetseen moral and physical necessity cannot be maintained > These faigameets imply that there is contradition in the idea of “objective necessity" since this cormplen idea combines & propery ofthe mind (accessty with objective realities given in impressions * ‘Not enly ate thee lateat contradictions in the very notions of objective casal necisity and permanent objective substances; if we submit fo both these tions, says Hume, they run into contradition ‘with one another This is tated in his treatment of “the medera Philosophy” If we admit the causeatfet relation between objects fd our impressions, then we must conclude that our impressions fate merely personal teations and do not exis independently oft ihen we reason from cause and elect, we conclude, that neither color, sound, tate, nor smell have a continued and Independeat fxstence”” But once we bave made this conclusion, we must deny the indopondent existence of all bodies: “When swe exclude thee sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe, which hss ich an existence’”™ Thus the idest of objective camel necessity fd the independent existence of bodies are eich contradictory 12 ‘hemsclves; But in addition, thee Js higher level of contradiction between the two idess, for they cannot be reconciled with one nother in our thinking (2) ‘he fiction of the self is constructed by the imagination Jn much the same way that objective illusions. are fabricated.” We have no continuing impression of the self as. ditinet trom Individual perceptions; all we have given is a series of perceptions following oe another in causal sequence Then Just asthe lmagins oa feigns a coatinuous ‘existence for what we. inormitenty ‘experience in the world, 50 it posits the existence of 4 permanent personal identity sustaining the vitied perceptions that oceut in ‘he mind". Identity is nothing veally Belonging to these ferent petoepéons, and uniting them together: but is merely a. quality, Which we ativbute to them, because of tho union of thelt Ideas In the Imagination, when we teleet upon them” This ilsion ‘of identity is based on the relations of resemblance and causation that we experience among out perceptions, the relation of contiguity plaving itie or no tole here. Asin the case of external objects, the purpose of this atifce is to bring about "an easy transition of ideas” when if operates upon intemnalexpedience * tion and Moon i David Hues Philosophy 20sBur there is one interesting difeence betwen our experience of the mind and out perception of external reality "The tlc ‘ort, though mote in Innit obstie Is ot perpesed ih ‘sich contaditon,as those we have dcovered Inthe nate. What is Known concening i agrees with ie, and. what known, we must be cootentad fo lve co"! Oar awareness ‘four own consciousness res of the "contradictions "tat beset fur Knowledge of the wotld. "Contractions aie In elexperence aly when plone stempt co cxpnin how we Koow ou eves Tei attenpt to explain what Js Sncpleale fa the lads done ‘at the hazard of Tuning us into contacto, from which the subject i of ie exempted = ‘What does Hume mean by ts? Why does sltknowge avid contradedons that arse in koowledge ot the world? The com ttaictins thet ais Inout kaowiedgeof tare coe about becase ‘we naturally combine ideas that Belong tthe mind with ess that ome tom objects Cassel aces i a sefcve impression, and yet we impose it om things: perceptions are postin ony in th ‘nds and yet we feign thet cote eistence eternal objects ‘ten when we ar not peceeing them, even the sre of seed Telasons, suchas ang spatial elas to fasts in things oar ‘wien th nates to interpret ia own seactons as Properties of tinge: "Ts a common ebrervstion, that the mind at get Dropeasity to spread itself on external objec and to casjin ‘ih them any itera impressions, which they econ, and wich aways make thie appenanee a se sane te tat Base object Giscoverthemacies fo the secs" Th ener, the cones {hat anise tout experience of nature oe the Foal of the mils Beton allows she dmeosion of Epil ecto cea Proregt con Sel Sain ee ope peat Sr ‘hat the audent to vie SE ener“ tly roast extinat elds atest carat a Shite fe duration ti gore Zaray=""Hat sas ee Ge Hane Phera othe Under- dtze ant candeson” ch be vented 208 propensity 10 impose its own qualities on things. When the mind Knows iteelf, however, ths ypectossing is no longer a danges teeause it Is not dealing with to segions. ‘No contradiction need be feored in a homogeneous domain When Hume rejects the idea ‘of the self ax an illusion, therefore, his entire attack is based om the fact thit we have no distinct impression for 2 continuows, avaiable selfs the theme of contradiclion Is not used“ ‘ihe to types of llusions we have discussed, that of che self tnd thore feigned for the objective world, arse spontaneously with yo artful contrivance or duplicity on our part They occur before ‘we doliborato. hey arise ftom the wnkuown springs of human hte and are ilslons that human nature needs Man is an frtifcer by nature, asserting the reality of what Is not the continued fxistence of object, the identity of the self, and eausal necessities hese natal illsions make Ife easier and more plessant for the vulgar. ‘Because of them, the mind nceds to expend less enigy {acting and orienating lel in the world.” Tiksions bring pleasant repose to the conscious life, even though they do so by Insintaining sheer contradictions The velgar overlook’ these con tadictions, however, forthe sale of rest and ease “The tre pilsopher isthe only one who unmasks these isons | ‘and points ot there contradictions He alone Keeps his mind only fo what is authentically given and asserts only what Is sticly Maranted Ihe result of this intellects scrupulosity is at abe Philosopher, who alone avoids tho natural coatradicions, appears fo be parsdowical and contradieory himsoll "Tam sensible, that fof all the parndones, which I have Bad or shall hevafter have ‘ccasion to advance in the course of this treatise, the preseat one {2 the most violent "In the face of "the invetoate prejudice ff mankind” the tue philosopher appears to be the dispenser of Contradictions aad illusions, and itis only "by dint of sold proof fnd reasoning” tht he ean ever hope fo sustain his positon ‘he philosopher suffers a fearful punishment for frustrating ‘and tnmlsking the natura illusions of humanity. He faces soci ‘cule and internal ansety” Ihe careful we of reason bas led him fo a sate of immobility, both im thowght and selon Having Stspended dhe contrivances of matte, e loses the exse and faclty fat they bring about and separates himselt from the common itusions that sustain social and politcal company He bas become ‘ome stange uscouth monsie!, who ot being able to mingle ‘ction and Mason in David Hume's Phllosopty 205,nd ute ts society, hap been expe all human commerce, ant lle uteywoandonad and acon" Thee iso eat ftom {hs Gilenms excepto ap back nto thowe sm sons of stare {the vocation to condom “Mont foreamatly happens at Sac toni Icpae a paling ten ct nae teat ‘ice that purpose and cate ie fii psp meachaly fe Geum, iter by lating the Went of mind oF by. some ‘voc and Unely impression of my sues, wich Strate all Shoe chineras"™ The tse hate whee Convenes he phar mma ses fou the sheck and dept ha Hs fdcioos lonely lash 10. Even inthe psc oe pal rope, man seems unable to bear ih falls ast ene 10h frig on wat wc Re a act ek ‘osld ny man underake plowphy Hit leds fo sich 4 anasto and fries end? Hi tions to senor se Suture te teens to inane Bin io ths endemer’ Pere ines of slice and tection when be Is “naaraly esc? to'aise such questions, fo gute ho the naar of knowles ‘oral, estes, and poles to ty to remedy pues oe instrct mankind "Thee stint sping up maar fo Piesat dipestin: and shuld 1 sndonout te teak Se, 8 ching nyoelt to anyother sine oF divasion, Tel Toons teva leer im point of pleases aad as he tga oy Pllsrpiy”= "Tye maate tat makes men ve by inci sa Esilce ems 10 all soe sen fo uncover these isons Se chee Stems oes EE bos were Beane e eee: Src oe oe Exptenle aces ule ogee ct Pyueae | Dales Soceing Matured Be Ponies! Garza Wak tg AN i Sale inde Bs Br Batis ants TES St K Sth Undaaints, 206 Sace the philosophical vocation then leads to an anxious, immobile, tnd colitry perplesty, this same nature almost mockingly rescues the philosopher from his melaachaly and dalitium. Not all men ‘ve Called to thist most live in the current of normal affals and Should “keep themselves in their prevent situation" But Hume does soem to aptlelpate a sort af community of philosophers who may share his hope of building up a science of man “which if ‘not tive (for that, perhaps, is 00 much to be hoped for) micht ft least be satisfactory to the human mind "=" He invites the feadors who should expesience in themselves the same incision ‘of nature, the “same exsy disposition” to philosophy, to follow im in his futher thinking” So some men turn to philosophy because fof 8 natural wosstion ‘But alter being saved from philosophical melancholy and deli- ‘ium by nature, is the philosopher who retains to natural existence fany better off than he was before? Does it help him to know ‘that what supports his fe and action is only illusion perpeteated Dy the imapnation? He must sill submit to illasion and astice, 4g he in any way happier than tho vulgar who also submit tut do not realize it? In bs Dialogue Hume docs say thatthe philosopher ‘who sinks back Joto the plebelan life is changed because of his experience: “ If'a man iss sceustomed himsall to seaptical cont siderations on the uncertainty aod natrow Tinits of reason, he wl hot entirely forget them when he turns ths reflocien on otber {ubjcts; Bat in all his philosophiea!prinetples snd reasouiog, V dare ‘ot say, in his common conduct, be will be found diferent from ‘hase, who either sever formed aay opinions im the ae, oF have fenterisined sentiments more favorable to human renson”® But Jn what way is be eiferent from the nonpbilosophical man? If any value is to be reached in the skeptical plilosophy, it ‘must be the "peace and cootentmeat” that Hume promises in the Tauoduction 10 the Treatise This is the peace that comes for knowing the Hits of explanation; we are not disqusted becanse ‘we Know that there are no farther explanations to be s0¥ght Ae justice brings peace to society when it lualts our greed by Lying down boundaries to what we can acquite, so the skeptical philosophy brings poace of mind By discovering the limite of human knowing That this Epicurean esve and contentment fx what Hume promises the philosopher is implied ia what he says during his ertigue of the ancient philosophy; he condemns the constructs of ancient phi ‘Hetion and Mason in David Huns Philosophy 207sophy a5 itsions, but as tnt these ftions do bring crn SSstction an test othe mind. = By tis means these paosope's shes a cand ie a tb a int ene inference, which the people sin by tok stupa, and ee flops bythe moderee cepacia" Viewing ‘he of hums unde standing bring aff anguish tothe philosopher, bat when he is reese from this by the taclton of rane he Tetum to the vl with asian andes tat ean be os tesed only by someone wo ht sadegone the sane ala Tne sys inte ot Inu, we muses ttl aie, i order fo eat ene eer ar ‘This fy the postive value Mann soes in slept In aiton there a sect seuon, bogs, cea ane wy some ren should ndcriake pilsopy. Te sees ab a coreg for ober spore dangeour isons, such as tose of sperstton ta prejudlen ot forthe welts fons of the ncn piteropy [te Mepis psy contls and vost sterateete (9) The tions and tons He Ss in the ancient por phy te sn: total by the ination onincy fe eacept that they ate mre exevegant The wage ination terely as flies and endranes to ipretics we acialy tei, and dct 3 by tang aut Mees and lpia thes But the philosophies! inngision gor fare nd figs etcly ew ceuses and principe, things nanowa and lave" soc "intone foe! mate, sata fon, seid calc, Sha ect aie, i faites ths things, las Hume, foi be contacto tht sem tosis ur mindy forts ite experience > gen bjt at intervals we are ingress oth considerable ferences snd sitet To econ isco tdi betwen scons std vert “ie Inala apt to fog someting uaktowa and ive, whieh supposes 1 Seay he Rope ns of eon Raa these 5 Sale’ eis pot ‘SalBnousycaccanine fanantic Lol east tetch a e Ee, sting» TET tet ok wy Capo, hal Toobin eines Shee SH Bey comb oy Eaatarae coer Grek Baye cnoe eae See vine esgugach'es 8 Be Sepia ooacrathie eS BYR i st tr ieee oie ae ses es Sa tes" ioe iat eee er i nmuecs Sieasuserca Sits ie eloate Piast ad a Se ieee ee aa acteurs Scat tt Bs py ne a crostini itor ot wih recast ner tahoe plea ere Sena acer ito ners Goamemss Seroted see wee ohare se rien magoce or eae faeces smite mace oe oe a erun bey emi i ry tea we eet Gri They thnk hat thay have answered probleme wen they SUD was ge eee isha eee ee Seaecmneee ee movie ay meee Se me Sonar Gain fend Saat i ton eo “his not the case fr the auties of sperstidon, with which one nena mee eee wegiecand Gtaete Arte te Kotha coat as ete riot as Sivae'ennch het Tene carecdaeie ce me ian ‘cies a"eqance amar ree ee eee ciciaes erway feta tion ad sion in David Hue’s PhitosopeyIe Slne of suprson mise tense the mind hes a2 Inmconbletnecy igo beyond what i i wattnte fo eer eit see impose far tan fo remain wi te thee he tu expen, the bot paste ta ke the nia eed 4s oor in wage tha te “fet and mut agente e I best done in pinot win ros, aye Hse are a wat nly scl, wile the of rl ste dangerous Wied elt wl elie ko any tt an Solon the oly way avld thie or sophical and rational religion. «* aan “ne Hons of edacaton sue sir to thse of sues, They te Se te eneean mot tec of ey pers sx iptenion, but buctase we hare accede hen ee Tey eine’ of peeades Tee ne ala pow fa feces greta Soe een ee te ee hs a Spt ee © se Sta he ae eae sie ct, Ss ie Se Sot ota sae See Spomn Caney cutie mp le Sines Saket! emt tn a Serie age etmek re wr Sool, ie cara oe ies Since ey Sn oe act alasnn Se ete fo cin ‘eas ofthe memory and thus develop into powerful eons ‘hsp aimee eat ange pr rn tie Sue cee st ed an ‘mentions * _ eh He ae Sir nem me tr wrt aon unter oun ei tts en ts msfesone ames ten ums ea ah acta ary Bova ee aS ey So ane body No philosophical citicism is needed to unmask then, Gee F iid.» 2; ct p28 tft op Sn Ino 210 even these fictions, if they are to be "entertaining to the imagina tion” inust bear the appearance of ruth. Therefore poets se certain Standard names and events, they build up a traditional system of things, and they doterweave tuth wilh their contrivances Both, the post and the stoner mist feign a bei if we axe to have Uue poetry” But since we are consciously feiuing the belief (and not Teigning something we believe ia), we remain always capeble of lecing ourselves from this counterfeit belie ‘But in all tions besides poetical one, philosopty must exce- ise a extical sole and make us assent only #0 what deserves our fassent Thus the plilosophleal vocation ean be Justified, according 1 Hume, by the corrective function it exercises over the aberrations fof human nature: those of the ancient philosophy, superstition, ae ‘eucation 4 In pce OF poox 11 nls concludes our study of speculative fictions as described by Hume in Book I of the Treatise Une concept of fiction is abun ddantly discussed ia Book I and sgain in Dook TIT It is almost ‘entucly absent in Book If, £0 we need not discuss that book st length’ We may however point cut a curious problem about the position of Book IT in the Treatise Its subject i the pessons pride and humility, love and hated, and the will, whieh for Hume 58 a simple Inclination to action and not a source of freedom 5, ‘Book I Hume hss concluded thatthe self fs 4 fction ofthe Imagina ‘lon: Book 1 sems to reinstate the sel as an agent so that Boot 117 wll be able to discuss the subject of mozala Book If constitutes the seit as ageat by beginning with the passions of pride and ‘humility, passous which ‘Hume sometimes tays are able to bring out the idea of the self About pride be says: “Ta this emotion She Coature] hes assigned a certain ides, vir that of sell, which {e pover fils to prodace”"«"| THume's terminology is loose of tle polnt; sometimes he says the idea of the sell the object of prid, ‘hus implying that the idea Is thete before the passion AL aay ‘ate, this passion at least constitutes the self as public agent with Status, and so Book IIT epends on Book I tor the idea of an gent with natural inclinations to action Hoowever, in one important respect Book IK depends on what ume does in Book II” Pride is an emotion of pleasure coming tion and Huson in David Hare's Phtosonhy Rater Sablon aunfiom a good quality in something that Belongs to me; humility is sn unpleasant emotion coming froin a bad quality in something that is mine Both these passions, which establish the sell as agent ‘Gepend on the concept of “belonging” oF property Bat this i only ‘escribed in Book IH, when Hume discusses the artical vttae of justice. Thus we have something of a vicious cifele: the set is constituted 26 agent Dy the passion of pride and thus can ente! Inco public action But it i thir very public scion (inthe torm ‘of justice and property rights, as we shall see) that 15 the bass for the passion of pride Moreover, this Velous cltele is not merely ‘2 question of ‘which book sbould come rst. Tt has implcations in determining the sef as a public egent> public tions of property and justice become fundamental for man’s abi %0 act in ae an wy 4 soos i: mows. 1H FOBMGAL SIROETURE OF ALL eRTUES, {Ie theme of fiction returns in Book IIT of the Treats, whe lume attempts to describe the satare of justice Justice, he claims, is an atticlal virtue, founded on the convention of men The Dioblem of justice dominates the entire Book, 20 the theme of ‘itiiee and Gction is as cental to thie part of the Troative ax ‘was to Book I, where Hume discusses maa understanding ‘Before distinguishing between natural and attiial vitues, we ‘must discuss the formal suture that Hume atibutes to all etues In all virtuous action, we must distinguish between the action st ood and the action ax = duty or moral obligation Hume insists that the motive of duty isel€ never grounds the goodness of an sction The fact that we do an action because it Is cur duty does fot make it a good action; It-must have been good priot to out recognition of it as our duty or moral obligation Actions. must Ihave a principle of goodness distinct from their morality Paternal cate of children is good because it stems ftom pateroal fection: {as ts what mater i good. The fact that ft a duly of moral cbiigation only follows upon the goodness of such an scion, ite rot the ground of gooess We have the obligation 10 cate {Ge SAA PS EMG oy ane on Hsien Dek Gee shake tle aS es Gawain weet sy tens a Nl tanta chilsen because this tion Ie antecedent recognineé as good and, stuous. "Thus Hume has introduced the concept of @ “natural” goodness for bodiness to actions But his anaysis docs not stop heie First, Of all, or moral evaluation is not directed towards the acts that § petson perform, but towards the mocive that prompts his asons The motive dn turn is considered good or bad only as i signs a permanent. personal quality ® Individual acts afe vot important ootlly for Hume; itis a petsou's Permanent disposition that is ‘applauded as good or condemned as evil This permanent dlspos ot is the ultimate prieiple of the goodness ot badness of action, land it serves as the motive for actions. For instance, the action ‘of parental care is good only because it expresses the permanent ‘qulltyof parental affection; almsgiving is good because it expresses the permanent disposition of manity. Thus Hume's analysis of virtue has led to a double reduction fhe morality of ations is reduced to that of motives, and motives sate good of bad only when considered as signs of permanent cuslties Tho inal basis of morality is found in permanent dispositions Now the problens becomes eplstemologcaly how are these dispasitions found to be good or bad? Hume replies with the moral sense Nature has instilled in maa a sensibility that approves certain per sonal qualities and condemns others: “To have the sense of vite, { nothing but to feel a saisfction of a particular kind from the Contemplation of a character” ‘The very fesling constittes out praise or admiration" ‘When we analyze virtues philosophically, therefore, we cannot sppeal to daty asthe ground of their goodness We must fd what Dpetmaneat disposition makes the action good io itell This must he done for both the natual and artical virtues The natural virtues preseat no problem: the stable qualitis We ppl in them are attbuter that we simply recognize as gro parental fection, humanity, generosity, gratitude, couage, and ml hess are all things that we spontaneously feel to bo good We fsteeot any actions motivated by these qualities These qualities moreover ate attibutes of human nature that arise without aay fontrivance or intervention of man: they avo as matural as man’s Physical or comitiwe powers Any obligation we ascibe to men fo foser sich qualities and to act in accordance with them stem from the prior admission dhat there qualies are naturally good "= ition amd Husk in David Hare's Pbitororhy bee Sobeowak 2135 mona anmrices: roses, covERDAEN, AND PRERCISES But what occurs in the ease of justice? When we pay taxes for obey laws, what motive do we have for these actions? Is there some natural, permanent quality of persons which serves 2 the ‘motive for Just actions? Hume replies in the negative: he goes Uhrough several possiblities of « natural basis for Justice, such as concern for tho Public interest, love of humanity, and benovolonce towards private individuals, and shows that none of thete cam be the glound of justice His conclusion ist "That the senso of justee and injustice is not derived fom nature, but arises arts ially, though necessarily fom education, and human conventions" = How does justice aise artiially? ‘Hume observes that man is not suficient at an individual; he has great needs coupled with great weaknesses Other animals all hnave the strength and resources to satify whatever Needs nature ‘nas given the, but man, when left to his own individual forces, is utterly unable to sustain himself He can remedy this sition only in society, whore corporate effort makes up for the weakness of individuals, ‘Dut once men aie thrown together in society, the danger of the selishness of individval members atises This natural. greed is dizected towards external material goods, whose possession is ‘ery precazious In sociely there is no problem, Hume say, with Internal goods of the mind because no one ean take these away; ‘not is there soy problem with external goods of one's Body, like ‘beauty ar physical strength, Because even though others ean take these aay it-does them no goed to do so; but there is great Aitiatty with the goods we have acqulted 36 our property, since these things are always capable of being coveted and taken for the tse of others "Once society is constitited, therefore, the problem of property becomes a constant threat to its existence soclety 15 always in danger of belng destroyed because of it, leaving man once agnin in the state of individual weakness and incapacity. To avold this calamity, which would be in the intererts of 29 fone, me conte to draw up rules for the possession and transfer ‘of property” Through this ardifice the norms of justice are estab saa: a Stun senavencer uncer ctl aod nig. 7h Time cbsres vat a NCE id SE seo ips cupid in check, so the folds pS au lished. “The remedy, then, is uot detived from nature, but from lardtee; or more properly speaking, nature provides remedy in the judgment snd understanding, for what i» iegular and incom fmodioas in the aflctions"" Thus the arte of juste arses because of man’s need to se and posers external, material objects {or his subsistence and weil being, together with the inevitable precatiousness these possessions are exposed to when man enters fociety-—whieh he i alto forced to do hy his natural weakness 25 ‘an individual. Two natural tendencies, the inclination to use roe feral goods and the inclination to society, thus collide, and thei ‘muteal annihilation can be avoided only by arice Judgmeat and ‘reason must intervene because nature has oot given mao any natal ‘quality tat could resolve the conflict ™ The fundarnental agtfices man devises in justice ate the rues governing how possession of property will be decided, how mote {Ean be neguired, and hovr its transfer can be estred out All these fl are contrivances; there Js nothing “natura” for instance, in laws determining inerltance And yet in his analysts ofthe modes fof soquiting and transferting property, Hume shows that the Laws ‘men devise usually do follow the inclinations of thought. For ex fample the rights of inheritance (which be calls succession) are foumulated in ordet to make men tore industriows snd frugal, aad Also because the mind tends to associate members of a faaiy at the proprietors of given goods." Nevertheless, such laws are the fabrication of reason anid do not arive from any natural propensity “luze's explanation of how justice becomes instittioalized ia ‘government develops further the theme of artifice and fetion. Once ‘ertain rules have been agteed upon for property, all problems have ‘ot been solved. Ie stil remains very dificult fr individual persons {o apply the rules objectively because personal, immediate interests sways entice oar passions We are poor judges im eases m which we ourselves take part The only way we cam hope to obtain ob- Jeculvity 1s to leave the Immediate, proximate view of things and look at thea from a distance: “When we consider any objects at 2 distance, all thels minute dlstinctions vanish, and we always give the preference to whatever is ia iloof preferable, without constdeting its situation and circumstances". As individals, however, we find it impossible to fake a distant and objective view of things when they aifect as) if Becomes necetsary to commission certain people ition and Hinson in David Hur Pitosoply 215,1 do this for us, whom we call judges and magistrates We make ft the personal Interest of these people 10 take a distant view of things "They cannot change their natures. All they can dois change their situation" Thar the execution of justice according 10 ‘objective laws Becomes the personal interest of these men, and in {his way objectity 1s assured Hume does not talk about illusion in this context, bat his cesplanation of the ofiee Of judges and magistrates implies that {hese men ate commissioned to be oficial astiicers for the body politic. The viewpoiat they take Is by profesion an illusory one; {hey do not experience objects in their concrete, fall immediacy ‘They lool at them only Hom distance, whese the details of concrete reality are blurred, where realty becomes iusory. Since they ace paid to do this, it i in their personal interest to maintain this, Evil viewpoint, but ie alo in the interest of socety For i Jr oniy by Iaving such professional avtifiers serving society thst the original arte of justice can be mainvained Thus quite com slstently, Hume says that the fiction of justice engenders a class ‘of ofa articers whose vocation i Isto preserve this fetion; and {in order to do so, they look at things ftom a vewpobat whieh makes Tealityilsory And looking at things im this wnreal way, thoy make Gecisions and impose theit judgments on the men who live in their society ‘The theme of Sctions i developed in still another direction when Hume examines the nature of promises We all admit that ‘We have an obligation fo honor oor promises; Hume asks if thre Js any natural iselination or feeling in us that serves as the Base (of this obligation Is Keoping promises a natural virtue? Ts the Sedon of promising an expression of some natural, permanent pe onal quality? Hume's answer again is negative. Like the ries ‘of justice promises are articss and contrivances of men A promise 5 simply & public act whereby 1 will an obligation for myseit The ‘Obligation des not sem from soy natural netination: It arses only from my contivance, fom my artifice of binding myself publicly to-do soothing * ‘The ar Beality of promises Is stressed in an acute remake Hume ‘makes about poople who fal to Keep promises. When a man com ‘its himselt publicly to do something, failure to carry out his pre- Ilse does not cause the man to be consideted defleat in any 2a pe win ais roars visu; rather his punishment i= nover tobe trusted to Keep. fis word in the future “When a man says he promises any thing, he. subjects himself to the penalty of never being trusted again fm ease of failure. {He] must never expect to be trusted any mote, fhe refuses 4 perform what he promised "= The man's Punishment is uot moral condemnation, but politcal exclusion. He Mil no longer be admitted 10 that society of men who, by the [ieliy of their words, allow the peacelul possesion and transfer of property to take place and hus make possible the ving to bother of men ‘But why are promises necessary at oll? Thiir need comes ‘tom the way propetty must be exchanged. Onoe justice bas Beet established and the stability of propesty bas been assure t becomes [posible for men to ive together in peace Then rules for the fraser Bf property must be devised, #0 that mon can become mutually Stivaniageous, But there is @ curious temporal condition attached fo this transier of property. Because we ean attend to only one thing ata time ie offen becomes necessary to put off lll the future Some reeiprocitions: "Now as {t froquently bappens, that these mutual performances cennot be finished at the same instant, "is Iecemary, that one party be contended «> remain in ncersinty, tnd depend upon the gratitude of the other for a return of kind: fess" Given the considerable solshness of men, a person coulé pot count oa stothers falling his part of some labor or exchange Unless thie could be certified publicly, and promises are the device land artifice that accomplish this Though artical, they sre neces Shry for the continsance of society because of the temporal disper- Sion of fuman existence. Only ape thing can be done at @ tine, fo the present must make some claims upon the furore Thur once the need for esposttion of external goods has ioe uoduved justice ab the fret arte In social existence, the other (two contrivances of magistrates and. promises arise as necessary Complements. Magistrates and. judges, with the slusory” view Soint of realty, operate im the demain where the individual eltizen Te incapable of judging objectively and mast submit his own judg ment to that of ther men: promises operate in the domain where Ihe individual citizen i capable of ir own public Judgment and Gecision and indeed where he must unake up his own mind and follow it through atthe tsk of Being expelled from the confidence ff men A promise isa law an individual makes for himself Magis ton end Musion bx David Hume's Paitosonty a7‘rates and judges help the individual because he i& unable to main. {ain objectivity in the present instant, when faced with the over ‘whelming sllurements of immediate goods; promises help the ii ‘vidual becasse of his Talib towarde the future, Bis tendency to forget a_preseot obligation, when it becomes. distant through the flow of time Citizens who disobey the mapstates and Judges fare considered criminal and dangerous to the social order becase they allow theit natural propensity to self interest to overule the artificial conventions of justice, which are the foundations of soley; Citizens who break promises’ are not considered dangeroas. bit merely irespoasible and unworthy of confidence in public exchange, $0 no one takes them seriously any longer" "inally, promises and public aces have undergone a carious reversal of dependencies "Ia the present tate of things we do ‘ot choose all our magistuates snd judges ‘They are determined by the laws and customs of the inetitutionalied. government ad. the individual citizen must submit himeel to then However at the very beginning of government, sastituions had not yet been ‘constituted and the entire socal order was on the level of promises [At that time the members of society chore thei magistrates then selves, whose offce then would be subject to the strength of the itizens’ promises Thus atthe present time promises sue a private ‘matter and bind only the man who makes thom, and our priate alsirs are dependent upon and subordinated to publie airs. "This ‘Separates the Boundaries of out publi and private des, and shows that the latter are more dependeat on the former, than the fosnet fn the latter" “But atthe beginning of human society promises were the very basis forall public authority. The public domain ‘was completely sustained by private promises" 6 NaruRut Avpnoeaston oF MORAL anctrtces “ustice, institutional goverment, and promises arise through the sutlice of mea aad net thieugh any direct inclination of nature However, once they have been constituted mature sets Its seal of approval'on them” Man has a tendency whereby he naturally ae ge samme of the dee so iit, p 595 PevBepin cast Bory Moray Sg Ge bo me sem we tretee 3 sie” Sto Sm 218 proves justice, government, and promises as morally gro therfore Ihe moral sia we hold for these arcs fo a atral thing “Ther that ineest io ove exalted 4nd acknowledged, te cease cf moray inthe cbsrvance of hese ran follows nasally and Sf ict" "The respect and allegiance we show to ule in Shrerament aso reccvee a aatual approbation, not ocrly an SPitcial approve" Tmatat, that Dough the ty of allen teat Best grated oa the ogni of promises, and be for some Sine reposted by tat cblgaton, Jet gui takes root of sel, i har tn oighal oblgnten aad aucorly, independent of al fontacis"™ Tt ie tue that our alogance and obedience to the See or government soften eacouaged by education and by the Sita cif of plidcians, both of whlch ate fictional and con tired procedures "Ia these caves we have one arc belng sum orto ‘and enotsagad by two farther arices However, sles TGlure had loved in ue 3 moral lnlizaion to respect poernnen, {he wes of pulicans ned evestore woud not move ws at all ‘hey canty out tlt wee only pon the bass of natal incl dion "Fay idly toot poses Js also approved as moral food guaiy, nod in tis way nature Isis in us sentinet and {Ecinton Zo suppoct the arces we mist fabcat t malnan ‘eal since Tune elaine this natiral moal approval of arte vires ty basing Wom sympally. Ln speaking st juste he sys, "Aer fis once exalted by these coaveanons, Hi naturally tended th a scng sentiment of mori; whieh can proceed fom nothing Int cur sympatiy with tbe inrens 9€ sosetys™ Sheth hav quay ct human nature whereby mon tend to respond ai rately to otber men, the degree of response elng greater th Ihave salar the persons ae. We have moe sympathy wth relates than wth sangre ose with comeymen than wid foreign, more with mn tha with animals This sympathetic response {Eady ot nly oveer perso theseher, ft also fo whatee Promotes tei wel ving Since the public virtues and iestiatns Tov only promote funn wel being but axe even necesary for Dots our sympathy wth the gut of Dumanity i the sauce Bru mots approbation of justi lleace, and eli. rough Shraihy are set approval on man’s ell oentivaness sion an isin in Dav Hare Posey 2197 Conpanssos oF cONIRAEPLALIVE AKD MORAL FICTIONS In both the contemplative and active domain nature forces man to make felons and artifice Ia thinking the rind constructs the fctions of permanent objects, the self, necessary causa relations fnd other unperceived relationships; in action man mus: fabricate the artifces of justice, government, and promises. ‘These wo types ‘af Betlo ate interrelated Through the tules of justice, the ftlons ff extetal objects ate distributed and controlled as the proportes ‘of individual citizens who are themselves, pllosophically speaking, ‘only luslons ofthe imagination These same citizens are the makers ‘of promises who must be presumed to be the same individuals at {Inter time, when the performance of what was promised is de- ‘mended; and yet speaklag philosophically the permanent identity (Of the sul is not given Iho promise enjoys’ an offical, public Permanence in time, since it is related to a future performance, ‘but the agent who mates the promise is not admitted philosophically a something endoring im time "But all these difcalies and Paradones arise only in philosophical speculation To the natural ‘man, or to the philosopher when he returns fo the nafusal attitude, the fictions of mature sppear real and no problem is scza i asserting someone to be the same person he was ears ago when he acquired property, was appointed & magistiate oF Judge, or made a promise ‘Bots group of fctons, the speculative and the socal, receive ‘an approbation from nature. Nature approves political fictions by appending a motal sestimeat to them. After they have been com Sivctod we consider the man stho respects them as good because ‘of our sympathy to what benefits humanity. Naluze approves specu fauve Getions by attaching an case and effectiveness in action to the man swho belloves in them. Only the man who believes in the petmanence of objects and his own self, as well as the reliability, Df cause, can be & man of succesful action The philosopher who { not duped by these fictions i reduced to immobility. Thus nature rewards those who follow her social fictions by the well being of visriinsertne arts mate pean = qeenienemes 2 ‘Ther htoa ont PotiaPitosoy of Bn ee moral uprightness, and she rewards those who are deluded by het Speculative ftions by ease and success ia hfe ‘in both cases the reason why nature provokes and approves fictions is to presetve man from seltdestruction If be did not arrange the contrivance of justice his conflicting passions of sel {interest and the noed for soclety would set im Into perpetual and final warlare with others If he did nat submit to the ilusions of the Imagination he would be reduced to a soipsism of the present instant, lost in the iaytiad changes of lmpxcssions, Incapable of planoing, acting, choosing, of using things. Rather than the sel onihilation of warfare, this Would lead to the self-destruction of fan absurd, motionless ‘peace The soclal felons save man fom ‘Sessive agession, the contemplative fetions save him from inactlan Tn the spoctlatve fictions man’s natural instines has to save ‘hie {rom the immobility of reason, but In the social sphere the Toles ate reversed: reason rewoues man from the lind forces oF {instinct which would destroy him by their greed However as long as man romeins in the natural atitude he docs not recognize these avtiices et Betions For the vulgar the donity of the ogo and the permanence of things are just as rel ‘bjective, and tatusal as human natore itself. Even Lings, for he Stance, have thougit that they were "divinely appointed” end: dhs Constituted as objectively ia thelr oflee as ereation i objectively fstablished by the divine will The vulgar consider both the speci= Tasive and the socal atiices to be real, mataral entities “Obedience for subjection becomes a0 familar that more men never make any Snguiry about fs origin oe cause, mote than about the principle of rarity, resistance, or most universal laws of nature™™ Only the Philosopher fe raised to that viewpoint from which these things fppeat a8 the tons that they are He alone Is the crtie of ue ions, the one who can distinguish tetween what is natural aad ‘what aitilal in uma existence. Only the philosopher discos {hat the substantaity of objects and of the Self is the result of faa act hidden inthe depts of human nature, and that the objectivity ‘of laws and governments is the result of a fabrication established i the hidden, forgotten beginnings of socery Taman ature needs sptifce to prevent it self-destruction. Why does it neo! pilosophy? Why should it call certain persons 10 discover the arGfeiallty of its tions? As regards the speculate fictions, philosophers ate needed to prevent the natural Retlons fom ction and tusion x David Hume's Phosoply mrunning wild Nature does not stop with the fabrication of fictions ecessary for action and case; It bas a propensity to continue in the fabucston of siperstcous Hetion, prejudins, nd the uw ranted fictions of ancient philosophy. ‘All these abuses disrupt the fase and propriety that the natural fictions allow. The valga, be suse they do no® have the gift of discerning eins fram realty, 420 uot know that natural peopensty has driven Beyond its proper Tmite thon it fabieates these things, so they are at the mercy ‘of superstition and prejudice Only the philosopher can protect them with hie moderate skepticism, slace be alone knows the Limits ‘of human ature [AS rogads the socal fctons philosophers are also able to pre- vent abones The vulgar are unaware of the arliciality of goveroe tent. They do not know that Inve and magitates are established ‘nly to preserve the slfinteest of men in sei community Whe, fants sbuse ihe laws and use them 19 destroy the interests of Cctiens, the vulgar ave no theoretical recourse They have 20 protection agninst the whimsical tyranzy of governments because they do not know the origin of government The tant may claim {o be divinely appointed or fo rule by natural righ, and his subjects Will be morally prevented from revolting lest they brea the divine fF natural laws But the philosopher, who kaows the arlieialiy ‘ot government and who sees ie tubotdiation as a means t0 the ‘fintorest of eldizens, can provide a theoretical justification for evolutions when governments bocome intolerable ® Thus as 16 fords both the intellectual and the soialfetions, philosophers can Serve ar the guardians of satura vights They can protect human ature aginst abuses because they aa disciminate between What 4 real and what is attic ‘Bat is this negative, critical, custodial funetlon the only value fof philosopliy? Does the philosophical vocation alford anything 10 the’ plosopher himself, not considered as a citizen but as phi on Hiei fall ase ae Ele Seen of erth aerial ts, South “ef ncrunrt ‘eet “ha oat Shara tated sok Gu Heer" Paras, abe ely ol h, MF sh eo Tre, Fa te wings, especially iio, Bod me ak aS te hd es m ‘osopher? Certainly hls vocation leads him to great anxiety and Selltude sine the Betions are needed for action and for mon Community, the discovery that they ate fcuons suddenly renders the philosopher unit for both chese dimensions Tn his moments Of philosophical elietion he cannot do anything with objects be- Cause they have become unreal, and be cannot deat with other men Deceuse thet substantialty bas Become Ulusory, and the basis of ‘his Interaction with them hae become an artifice Thus in the mo- iments of philouophiring his vocation leads him to immobility and Sotpsism "But after he bas returned to natural existence the mex (083 of what transpired in philosophy ts rewarding snd provides bien ‘with something no-one else can have. The philosopher has come {o see the Limits of bman mature and tis vsion lees him with, {sort of peace and satifection since he can now renounce the tinsetting propensity of human nature to go beyond its own limits be fe not subject tothe Testlessess of common men wbo ate look- ing fr information and explanations where none can be found "When this mutual contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwint the master and scholar, 1 Know ot whet more We eam require of out philsophy"™ 8. Howe's rretis wo erassieat roucK ‘there ate interesting similarities and diferenees in the concept of the vocation to piilosophy az understood by Hume and Plato If we take Plato's allegory of the cave as 2 central text we find the following likenesses: for both Hume aod Plto, the philosopher oust go apart fom the crowd to execise his activity. In. Plato the philosopher lemes the cave and stumbles towards the light, in Hume the vocation comes in. soltader "At the time, thevefor, that T ars tied with amusement and company, and have indulged ft reverie in my chamber, or in a solitary walk by a riverside, 1 feel my mind all clleced within itself." For both pik ‘sophers this contemplative actvity results in an alienation ftom ‘Sonntion men; Hume fects himself "some stage uncouth monster fot belug able to mingle und waite fa society,” ™ and Plato's retwrsing prisoner is set upon and perhaps kiled by his fellows. Both are Exposed to the ridicule of men, and both Sind it impossible t0 Sime thelr defense in words that the crowd understands, For tion aid asion x David Hue’ Philosophy Robert Soka msHiune the intricate seasonings of philosophy can be taken seriously only by one who spends the great efore needed 10 follow them, ‘hich the crowd will never do; for Plato the philosopher Is awkward Sd inefective in the le courts, iaeapable of using the aumonts ‘of the masses in his defense °" Both Hume snd Plato agree that ‘he ordinary life is beset with illusion and vafosnded.opiaion, ‘and thatthe sue philosopher isthe only dislmiaator of appearances He is the only one in the cave who knows that the echoes and shadows are not veal things but only phantoms, and he alone 3 Aware of the avtfies and fictions with which naire delides man These ate similarities. The dilferences are all the more striking in contrast: for Plato the moments of pilosophical releston are ‘he moments of triumph, happiness, and. protection for the phil ‘sopher Its in the sated speech of philosophy that e overcoes the mundane lawyer. But for Hume the moments of absorption ‘nwo philosophy are the cime of anxiety, exile, and helpleseness Plato considers the seturn to the cave nx m sort of downfall, an ‘Untergang that can go as far as death; ume thinks that the return to the crowd is atime of relief, ease, and vest Only a5 a memory in philosophy be comforsing For’ Plato the retuln 10 the city Js made out of loyalty and a sense of duty to fellow men; for Hume the 4 Repuoie. M1; Thee, 16; teppei him, Hees ide of eh Sie an goo wi St eb, 6; Thee, VS a Re Ses oeeiners moh CEs SEs os Exeecnoiarie BE Serceiae hos a Se 24 with them must submit knowingly to the iluslons of ordinary Te iis \woutd be the supecine degradation of the philosopher in Plato's eyes ® ‘Home’ differences with Plato, and his general doctrine of ftions, iigstrate many of the chatacteristies of modern thinking, of which Hume is cersialy one of the representative figures His concept ‘of autiice in both contemplation and social action is im keeping ‘with the present emphasis on mae 4s fabricator. Hume considers fan as at ariicer not only in technologieal and political matters but oven in costmplation, since the objects that are known by yan turn out 10 be fictions coauived by his imagination. Thus Contempletion, which in the classes! wow was contrasted to acting Gnd taking, becomes a apecies of production Philosophy, instead Of revealing the fundamental truth of being, is the nazration of ‘What man makes In this Hume anticipates the constructivist, Gpistemology of Kant andthe “constitutive” phenomenology of Hsserl = une's doctrine of fiction and sion also foreshsdows the alicoation between man and his workd so heavily stresed by modetn hinting, Descartes had already separated man as a thinking sub- ‘ance from matter a5 pare extension, but stil used the concept Of God ar abridge betwoon the two Hume omits God trom fany positive zoe in his philosophy and leaves man entitely aloe The world that man thinks be isbablts is a fiction of his own taking, aod the only knowdge which philosophy can ever hope fo acquire is a science of bamsn nature in which maa simply Knows himself” Faciog him is a world of whlch philosophy can ‘Sy nothing, @ world swhose only meaning lies in what man ean fo with ie Fito an aso in David Hues ieserhy ns