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Meijer 2015
Meijer 2015
Erik Meijer
To cite this article: Erik Meijer (2015) The Radical Left in Benelux, Socialism and Democracy,
29:3, 71-80, DOI: 10.1080/08854300.2015.1113743
Article views: 15
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Socialism and Democracy, 2015
Vol. 29, No. 3, 71 80, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08854300.2015.1113743
Erik Meijer
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General overview
Unlike in Germany, France, and many other European states,
social democracy was almost never in a dominant position at the
state level in Benelux. Even when they were the biggest party, social
democrats could only govern in coalition governments with right-
wing parties.1 This situation enforces many painful compromises
1. Thus, the Dutch 197277 government of Joop den Uyl in a bloc of the Partij van de
Arbeid (Labour Party [PvdA]) together with left-wing Christian Politieke Partij Radika-
len (Political Party of Radicals [PPR]) and the left-wing liberal D66, in order to get a
parliamentary majority, had to co-operate with the conservative Katholieke Volkspartij
(Catholic Peoples Party [KVP]) and the protestant Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Anti-
Revolutionary Party [ARP]). Similarly, Belgium between 1944 and 1947 had five
short-lived governments of the social democrat prime ministers Achille van Acker
and Kamiel Huysmans with participation of communists and liberals. Luxemburgs
current government is somewhat to the left of its Christian-democrat predecessors,
but contains the centrist Demokratesch Partei (Democratic Party [DP]) together with
the social democratic Letzebuerger Sozialistesch Aarbechterpartei (Luxemburg Socialist
Workers Party [LSAP]) and green Dei Greng.
inside those social democratic parties was that the right wing was
proud of the results earned by participation in government, whereas
the left wing was continuing to fight for those parts of the original
program that had not been enacted. This Left Labour tendency,
however, was expelled from the main left parties and therefore had
to create its own political organizations, namely, the Pacifistisch Socialis-
tische Partij (Pacifist Socialist Party [PSP]) in the Netherlands and the
Socialistische Arbeiders Partij (Socialist Workers Party [POS/SAP]) in
Belgium.2 Although the electoral challenge from this left compelled
the social democrat leadership to support a more activist agenda,3 it
did not change the partys main line. A long tradition of class compro-
mises prevented any offensive struggle from gaining a majority pos-
ition for the left.
The main reason for this permanent minority position and a
general lack of polarization was the central position of Christian demo-
crat parties. During a long period, those parties were supported by
very well organized parts of civil society like Christian trade unions:
in the Netherlands, the still existing Protestant Christelijk Nationaal Vak-
verbond (National Christian Trade Union [CNV]) and the former
Roman-Catholic Nederlands Katholiek Vakverbond (Dutch Catholic
Trade Union [NKV]) merged together with the original socialist Neder-
lands Verbond van Vakverenigingen (Dutch Association of Trade Unions
2. The left wing of Netherlands PvdA left the party in different stages: the Socialist
Union (SU) was a minority which did not accept the merger in 1946 between the
large social democrat Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij (Social Democratic
Workers Party [SDAP]) and the smaller left-wing liberal Vrijzinnig Democratische
Bond (Free-thinking Democratic League [VDB]); a big group of members left in
1947 as a result of the co-responsibility of social democrat leadership for the colonial
war against the liberation of Indonesia; an organized left-wing opposition, the Social
Democratic Center (SDC), was expelled at the 1959 PvdA congress. In Belgium, an
organized left wing and a Walloon separatist tendency were expelled at the Decem-
ber 1964 PSB/BSP congress.
3. For example, in the Netherland in the 1970s, social democrats got active in rent sub-
sidies for low-income individuals, investment in railways and tramways, widening
public health insurance, and introduction of a state bank.
Erik Meijer 73
4. In the Netherlands, the KVP, the ARP, and the Christelijk-Historische Unie (Christian
Historical Union [CHU]) which, in the 1970s, merged into Christen-Democratisch Appel
(Christian Democratic Appeal [CDA]); in Belgium, Christelijke Volkspartij (Christian
Peoples Party [CVP/PSC]), nowadays the Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams (Christian
Democratic and Flemish [CD&V]) and the Walloon Centre democrate humaniste
(Humanist Democratic Centre [cdH]); in Luxemburg, Chreschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei
(Christian Social Peoples Party [CSV]).
5. In the Netherlands national elections, Christian-based parties got 53% in 1956, 37% in
1986, and 14% in 2012. In Flanders, the CVP was the dominant party till 1999. In Lux-
emburg, the CSV, by far the biggest party, was always in power until it was defeated
at the end of 2013.
74 Socialism and Democracy
each in its own particular way. Probably, the collapse of the Soviet
Union and Titos socialist Yugoslavia in the same period played an
external role in this. But it also had to do with a changed economy
at home as coalmines closed down and many factories moved to
low-wage countries. Traditional occupations of industrial and agrarian
workers were replaced by expanding services, especially financial ser-
vices. The ideas of class struggle and socialist revolution lost their
popularity. They were replaced by new issues like the environment,
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The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the situation changed dramatically in 1989.
After gaining many radical leftist voters during a period of opposition,
the PvdA, entered a coalition government aiming to cut rising social
expenses. At the same time, four small parties to their left7 went
along with this move, for fear of not surviving further electoral
defeats. Their long-term project to merge was rapidly finalized, but
its aims changed significantly. The new combination GroenLinks
(Green Left) claimed not to be a traditional party of radical socialist
unity but something totally new. It preferred to be like the newly
6. In the Netherlands, parties to the left of the PvdA got 16 seats in 1972, six seats in
1977, three seats in 1986. In Belgium and Luxemburg, the decline started earlier
but the 1970s was still a period of stability.
7. The Communistische Partij Nederland (Communist Party of the Netherlands [CPN])
(1909) and the PSP (1957), which both had their origin in social democracy; the
PPR (1968), which was separated from the KVP; and the Evangelische Volks Partij
(Evangelical Peoples Party [EVP]) (1981), which was separated from the Protestant-
Christian Party (ARP).
Erik Meijer 75
very active Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party [SP]). The SP was already
created in 1972 as an initiative of Maoist-inspired former members of
the CPN and the PSP. Originally, it defended the sectarian idea that
only a pure new party, accompanied by new trade unions and new
organizations defending peoples health and housing, could create a
mass line and serve the people. Local grassroots campaigns,
mainly in the Roman Catholic southern regions, where the left had
been always very weak, were its main activities. So, it got 55 local coun-
cillors and became well known at the regional level, but it failed five
times to get any representation in national parliament (1977, 1981,
1982, 1986 and 1989).
However, after 1989, the SP suddenly became the only force of the
left interested in defending low-educated, low-waged, jobless, and dis-
abled people those most severely victimized by capitalism. It had the
capacity to use its new political monopoly position very creatively and
to overcome its traditional sectarianism and admiration for Mao. In
each social conflict with enterprises, local authorities, housing corpor-
ations, schools, or hospitals, the SP was visibly present on the streets
with its new symbol, the red tomato. It succeeded in mobilizing a
growing sector of disillusioned left-wing voters and non-voters. It
attracted new adherents in the western and northern regions, the tra-
ditional strongholds of the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP) and the Com-
munist Party (CPN). In 1994, the voters gave the SP its first two
members in national parliament, in 1998 five, in 2002 nine, and in
2006 25 (16.6%). The SP was the main force behind the defeat of a pro-
posed neoliberal and NATO-linked EU constitution. In a 2005 national
referendum, 62% of the voters rejected it.8
The SPs combination of optimism and experiments, without any
clear strategy for transition from capitalism to socialism, was
doomed to fail in the coming years. Big campaigns, especially in
2009 against raising the retirement age to over 65, got broad support
8. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/02/eu.politics3; http://www.
mehr-demokratie.de/fileadmin/pdf/nl2_eclr.pdf
76 Socialism and Democracy
erning PvdA, once at a level of 35% in the 1970s and 1980s, lost most of
its voters in different directions. Although the SP gets only a part of this
constituency, in recent nationwide elections (2014 European and 2015
provinces/senate), it is even the biggest remaining force of the left,
albeit with only 11.6%.
After the collapse of the PvdA in 2014 15,10 the question is whether
and how the SP will be able to take the leading role in the left and restore
its national impact. Till now, the SP has not presented any attractive
strategy for the future. It lacks any notion of a United Front (as advo-
cated by the former PSP) or Popular Front (as advocated by the former
CPN), in the international Marxist tradition, seen as roads to create both
electoral and non-parliamentary majorities for changing society. The
current biggest party, the conservative-liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid
en Democratie (Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy, VVD),
often invites one of the three leftist parties to participate in its national,
provincial or local coalitions, aiming to keep the left divided by con-
demning the two other parties to opposition. A lack of remaining
local and regional left-wing majorities forced the SP to coalesce at
local and regional levels with right-wing partners,11 as the PvdA had
done. In general, the broad left is weaker today than at any moment
since the introduction of universal suffrage, nearly a century ago.
Belgium
In Belgium, for a short period of time, the communists were a sig-
nificant force. In the first post-WWII elections, they got 23 seats in the
parliament, participated in the government, and dominated the
socialist trade union federation Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond (General
Federation of Belgian Labour [ABVV/FGTB]).12 During the cold war,
their parliamentary strength declined to five seats, with support remain-
ing only in the Walloon coal and steel-regions Borinage and Liege, and
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to some extent in the bilingual capital Brussels and the Flemish harbour-
city Antwerp. However, they lost all of that in the 1990s. The main
reason was the relatively left-wing position of the Walloon Parti
Socialiste (social democracy) even after they expelled their strong Trots-
kyist tendency in 1964. To this day, they dominate the south-eastern
sub-state Wallonia inside right-wing dominated Belgium.
The collapse of communist positions gave space to the Partij van de
Arbeid van Belgie (Workers Party of Belgium [PTB/PVDA]). Its origins
half a century ago are exactly like those of the Netherlands SP, and it is
involved in the same types of bottom-up struggle. However, the
further development of the two parties between 1990 and 2010 was
very different. The PTB/PVDA was not only a militant trade unionist
party, with strongholds among public transport workers, but was also
always seeking heroes and models abroad. It adored Maos China and
even North Korea. As a result of its sectarian positions, it made itself
hated not only by social democrats and greens, but also by the once-
strong Trotskyist movement (POS/SAP) and the remnants of the
former communist party, PCB/KPB. Its isolated positions guaranteed
a regular maximum electoral support of only 1%. A brief electoral
alignment with the Arab-European League, temporarily a remarkable
movement of self-conscious Moroccan migrant-children, led by Dyab
Abou Jahjah, did not change this hopeless situation.13
After those failures, the PTB/PVDA changed its traditional atti-
tude in favour of more practical positions. In a people, not profits
campaign, held mainly in 2014, it attracted support from the remaining
forces of the radical left (e.g. the PvdA-plus in Flanders). It intervenes
in clashes between the right-wing government and the trade unions. Its
12. In the first post-war national elections on February 17, 1946, the Parti Communiste de
Belgique (PCB/KPB) got 12.7% of the votes, most of them in French-speaking Wallo-
nia and for a lesser extent in Brussels. Only three of their 23 deputies were from
Flanders constituencies.
13. For an interview with Dyab Abou Jahjah see: https://www.opendemocracy.net/
faith-europe_islam/article_1908.jsp
78 Socialism and Democracy
Luxemburg
In Luxemburg, the communists regularly got five representatives in
the parliament, but lost all of them after the steelworks industry around
their stronghold Esch-sur-Alzette ceased to exist. A new combination
Dei Lenk (The Left) started as an electoral alliance between communists
and a range of other left-wing groups and individuals. Together, they
succeeded in entering parliament in 1999, but lost their only seat after
the communist minority decided to continue separately. In 2013, Dei
Lenk re-entered the parliament, winning two seats. It fights for the
environment as well as on trade union issues. Its current focus is a cam-
paign to get a referendum on their proposal for an alternative national
constitution, oriented toward social justice, more democracy, and a tran-
sition of the small grand-duchy14 into a republic.
14. International agreements, starting at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, which, after the
chaos of the Napoleonic era, decided on future European states, their borders,
and their dynasties, stipulated that this newly created state should be headed by
a hereditary Grand Duke, understood as a monarch of lower status. From 1815 to
1890, those Grand Dukes were always the same persons as the kings of the Nether-
lands, but those functions were separated as the Vienna Congress determined that
the Luxemburg constitution did not allow succession in the female line.
Erik Meijer 79
European Union. Only the SP has used a moderate kind of euro scepti-
cism, especially as an instrument in its electoral campaigns for 2009
and 2014. It accepts Netherlands EU membership but regrets the
early and imprudent introduction of the Euro single currency,
wishes for less Brussels, and claims to resist this Europe. Contrary
to expectations, this more critical position did not produce real elec-
toral gains in comparison with 2004. The SP got two seats in 2004,
2009, and 2014. In practice, voters disgust with the EU does not
result in voting for the SP but in abstention or voting in favour of the
far-right Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, PVV), which,
together with Frances Front National, is against EU membership
and the Euro single currency.
Dei Lenk, for the time being, is still far away from this kind of
dilemma. It mainly functions as a pressure group. As a small radical
electoral front to the left of the governing LSAP (social democrats)
and greens, it does not have wider potential in the short run. The
PTB/PVDA is more exclusively dependent on the development of
class struggle than are its counterparts in the Netherlands and Luxem-
burg. Its expansion is limited by the relatively left-wing positions of the
greens in Flanders and the large and powerful Parti Socialiste in
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