State Defendants, Segovia v. United States (7th Circuit)

Case: 16-4240 Document: 42 RESTRICTED Filed: 06/09/2017 Pages: 53
No. 16-4240
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
LUIS SEGOVIA, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
Case No. 15-cv-10196
The Honorable Joan B. Gottschall, District Judge
JOINT BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES BOARD OF ELECTION

COMMISSIONERS FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO, MARISEL HERNANDEZ,
AND KAREN KINNEY, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ROCK ISLAND
COUNTY CLERK
James M. Scanlon Patricia Castro

James M. Scanlon & Assistant States Attorney
Associates, P.C. Rock Island States Attorney
27 North Wacker Drive #502 1504 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor
Chicago, IL 60606 Rock Island, IL 61201
(312) 782-8163 (309) 558-3202
Email: Email: castrop@co.rock-
james.scanlon@jmsalaw.com island.il.us
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees

Case: 16-4240
Case: 16-4240
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Case: 16-4240
Case: 16-4240
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APPEARANCE & CIRCUIT RULE 26.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

16-4240
Appellate Court No:
Short Caption: Luis Segovia, et al v. USA, et al
To enable the judges to determine whether recusal is necessary or appropriate, an attorney for a non-governmental party or
amicus curiae, or a private attorney representing a government party, must furnish a disclosure statement providing the
following information in compliance with Circuit Rule 26.1 and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1.
The Court prefers that the disclosure statement be filed immediately following docketing; but, the disclosure statement must
be filed within 21 days of docketing or upon the filing of a motion, response, petition, or answer in this court, whichever occurs
first. Attorneys are required to file an amended statement to reflect any material changes in the required information. The text
of the statement must also be included in front of the table of contents of the party's main brief. Counsel is required to
complete the entire statement and to use N/A for any information that is not applicable if this form is used.
[ ] PLEASE CHECK HERE IF ANY INFORMATION ON THIS FORM IS NEW OR REVISED
AND INDICATE WHICH INFORMATION IS NEW OR REVISED.
(1) The full name of every party that the attorney represents in the case (if the party is a corporation, you must provide the
corporate disclosure information required by Fed. R. App. P 26.1 by completing item #3):
Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago; Marisel A. Hernandez, Chairman of the Board
of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago
(2) The names of all law firms whose partners or associates have appeared for the party in the case (including proceedings
in the district court or before an administrative agency) or are expected to appear for the party in this court:
James M. Scanlon & Associates, P.C.
(3) If the party or amicus is a corporation:
i) Identify all its parent corporations, if any; and

N/A
ii) list any publicly held company that owns 10% or more of the partys or amicus stock:
N/A
Attorney's Signature:
s/ James M. Scanlon Date:
1/25/17
James M. Scanlon
Attorney's Printed Name:
Please indicate if you are Counsel of Record for the above listed parties pursuant to Circuit Rule 3(d). Yes No
27 N. Wacker Drive #502

Address:
Chicago Illinois 60606
312-782-8163
Phone Number: Fax Number: 312-264-4571
james.scanlon@jmsalaw.com
E-Mail Address:
rev. 01/15 GA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ....................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES.................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................. 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 7
STANDARD OF REVIEW................................................................................... 10
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................ 10
I. Illinois Statute Excluding Former Illinois Residents Now Living in Guam,

Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands from Casting an Absentee Ballot in
Illinois for Federal Elections is not a Denial of Equal Protection ................. 10
A. Illinois Law is Rationally Related to a Legitimate State Interest and
Passes Scrutiny Under the Rational Basis Test ......................................... 10
1. The Illinois Statute was Intended to Mirror Federal Law ................. 12
2. Illinois Failure to Keep Up with Changes in Federal Law Does Not

Render the Statute Irrational .................................................................. 17
3. Illinois Has a Legitimate State Interest in Restricting the Ballot to

Bona Fide Residents ................................................................................. 20
4. Plaintiffs Requested Relief Would Discriminate in Favor of U.S.

Citizens Residing in Certain U.S. Territories Who Formerly Resided in a
State and Against U.S. Citizens in Those Territories Who Did Not ...... 22
II. The District Court Did Not Err in Rejecting Plaintiffs Request to Apply
Heightened Scrutiny ........................................................................................ 23
A. UOCAVA and the Illinois Statute Do Not Interfere with the Exercise
of a Fundamental Right Requiring Strict or Heightened Scrutiny ........... 24
B. There is No Suspect Class ..................................................................... 31
III. Illinois Statute Excluding Former Illinois Residents Now Living in

Guam, Puerto Rico And U.S. Virgin Islands from Casting an Absentee Ballot
in Illinois for Federal Elections Does Not Infringe the Right to Travel ....... 37
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 41
i
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 32(g)(1)

.............................................................................................................................. 43
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE............................................................................. 44
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367, 121 S.Ct. 955
(2001) ................................................................................................................ 26
Broyles v. Texas, 618 F. Supp. 2d 661, 68586 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd, 381 Fed.
Appx. 370 (5th Cir. 2010)................................................................................. 31
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (1992) ......................... 27
Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 906 (1978) .............................. 43
City of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 118586 (10th Cir. 2010).................. 31
Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 96263, 102 S.Ct. 2836 (1982).................. 26
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181, 128 S.Ct. 1610
(2008) ................................................................................................................ 23
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-337 (1972) ............................................. 31
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096 (1993)
............................................................................................................... 17, 25, 34
Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) .................................................. 23
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) ............................................ 35
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) ...................................................... 37
Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 (7th Cir. 2004) ..................................... 24
Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651 (1980) ....................................................... 40
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993) .............................. 16, 26
Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297, 95 S.Ct. 1637 (1975)....................................... 31
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 6869, 99 S.Ct. 383 (1978)
..................................................................................................................... 29, 30
Igartua de La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994) ............. 27, 32, 34
iii
Igartua v. U.S., 86 F.Supp.3d 50, 55-56 (D. Puerto Rico 2015)......................... 39
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966) .............................................. 19
McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 89

S.Ct. 1404 (1969) .............................................................................................. 19
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)........................................ 25, 28
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35, 13 S.Ct. 3 (1892) ................................... 29
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 27, 112 S.Ct. 2326 (1992) ............................... 26
One Wisconsin Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, 198 F.Supp.3d 896, 961, (W.D. Wis.
2016) ................................................................................................................. 16
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ....................................................................... 37
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) .................................................. 27
Romeu v. Cohen, 121 F.Supp.2d 264 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) ................................ 22, 40
Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2001) .................... 23, 32, 34, 39, 44
San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)............... 37
Snead v. City of Albuquerque, 663 F.Supp. 1084, 1088 (D.N.M.1987) . 28, 30, 31
Srail v. Village of Lisle, Ill., 588 F. 3d 940, 946-47 (7th Cir. 2009) ................... 17
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359, 117 S.Ct. 1364
(1997) ................................................................................................................ 27
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 841842, 115 S.Ct. 1842
(1995) ................................................................................................................ 28
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ................. 36, 37
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976) ................................. 41

Statutes
10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-1 .................................................................................... 2
10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/21-1(1) ............................................................................... 4
iv
10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-1(4) ................................................................................ 14
52 U.S.C 20302(a)(1) ........................................................................................... 3
52 U.S.C. 20302................................................................................................. 33
52 U.S.C. 20310........................................................................................... 19, 33
52 U.S.C. 20310(5)(C) ......................................................................................... 3
52 U.S.C. 20310(8) .............................................................................................. 3
89 Stat. 1142 2 .................................................................................................. 13
89 Stat. 1142 3(2) .............................................................................................. 13
Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act (OCVRA), 89 Stat. 1142 ............... passim
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. 20310

.................................................................................................................... passim
Other Authorities
H. R. Rep. No. 99-765, at 19, 1986 WL 31901, at *19 ........................................ 21
H.R. Rep. No. 94-649, *3, at 2 (1975).................................................................. 12
Pub. L. 99-410, title I, 107, Aug. 28, 29186, 100 Stat. 927 .............................. 15
Public Act 81-953 (SB 1146), effective 9/22/1979 ............................................... 14
Treatises
Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux, Note, A Most Insular Minority: Reconsidering

Judicial Deference to Unequal Treatment in Light of Puerto Ricos Political
Process Failure, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 797, 828 (2010) ..................................... 34
Constitutional Provisions
Ill. Const. 1970, Art. III, 1 .......................................................................... 22, 29
U.S. Const. Art. I, 4, cl. 1 .................................................................................. 29
U.S. Const. Art. II, 1, cl. 2 ................................................................................ 28
v
U.S. Const., Amend XIV, 1 ............................................................................... 25
vi
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellees Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago, Marisel
Hernandez, Chairwoman, and Karen Kinney, Rock Island County Clerk, agree
that the jurisdictional statement in Appellants re-submitted Brief is complete
and correct. These Appellees also agree with the Appellants statements in
their Brief, at 54-56, that the district courts October 28, 2016 Memorandum
Opinion and Order disposed of all of Plaintiffs claims against all defendants,
thereby constituting a final decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1291 and
providing this Court with jurisdiction to decide this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
Whether the district court was correct in holding that certain federal and
Illinois laws extending the right to vote by absentee ballot to former Illinois
residents who move overseas, but not to certain territories considered by
Congress to be part of the United States, are rationally related to legitimate
government interests and are thus not a denial of equal protection.
II.
Whether the district court was correct in holding that former Illinois
residents who move to certain territories considered by Congress to be part of
the United States are not denied a fundamental right to vote in Illinois
elections for federal office nor are they members of a suspect class subjected to
invidious discrimination.
1
III.
Whether the district court was correct in holding that certain federal and
Illinois laws not extending the right to vote by absentee ballot to former
Illinois residents who move to certain territories considered by Congress to be
part of the United States do not infringe on the their right to travel.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The individual Plaintiffs are former residents of Chicago, Illinois, and Rock
Island County, Illinois, now living in Guam, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands. (R. Dkt # 49, 5-6) Plaintiffs contend that certain provisions of
federal law the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52
U.S.C. 20310 (UOCAVA) and Illinois law 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-1
(referred to by Plaintiffs as the MOVE Act1) prevent them from voting in
federal elections in Illinois. Brief, at 1-3.
Plaintiffs Iraq Afghanistan and Persian Gulf Veterans of the Pacific
(IAPGVP) and League of Women Voters of the Virgin Islands (LWV-VI) are
1 In October 2009, Congress enacted, and the President signed, the Military and
Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (the MOVE Act). This act amended the federal
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) to require that
States and local election jurisdictions provide procedures that would allow military
and overseas voters to receive and transmit voter registration and absentee ballot
application materials by electronic means. In response to the federal MOVE Act,
Illinois adopted Public Act 96,1004, effective Jan. 1, 2011, that amended Article 20 of
the Illinois Election Code regarding voting by military and overseas citizens to bring
Illinois law into compliance with Federal law by requiring each election authority to
establish procedures that allow individuals who are entitled to vote absentee under
Article 20 to request voter registration applications and absentee ballot applications
by mail or electronically for each election. Although Plaintiffs reference to the Illinois
statutes applicable to voting by military and overseas civilians as the Illinois MOVE
Act is not technically accurate, this brief may refer to MOVE for sake of simplicity
and consistency in the briefs.
2
organizations that count residents of Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands who
formerly resided in Illinois among their members. (R. Dkt # 49, 8)
UOCAVA provides in part, [E]ach State shall permit *** overseas voters to
use absentee registration procedures and to vote by absentee ballot in general,
special, primary, and runoff elections for Federal office. 52 U.S.C
20302(a)(1). The Act defines an overseas voter in part as a person who
resides outside the United States and (but for such residents) would be
qualified to vote in the last place in which the person was domiciled before
leaving the United States. 52 U.S.C. 20310(5)(C). The Act further defines
the United States to mean, where used in the territorial sense, the several
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the
Virgin Islands, and American Samoa. 52 U.S.C. 20310(8). Thus, persons
who reside in Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands and American Samoa are
deemed to be residents of the United States and not overseas voters for
purposes of UOCAVA.
The Secretary of Defense, the Federal Voting Assistance Program, and its
Director (the Federal Defendants) are charged with administration of the
federal duties under UOCAVA. (R. Dkt # 49, 12-14) They are sued in their
official capacities. (Id.)
Illinois law provides that civilian citizens and former Illinois residents who
now reside outside the territorial limits of the United States may vote in
Federal elections by absentee ballot. 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-2.2. Illinois law
3
defines the [T]erritorial limits of the United States as meaning each of the
several States of the United States and includes the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands, but does not
include American Samoa, the Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands or any other territory or possession of the United States. 10 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 5/21-1(1). Thus, persons who reside in Puerto Rico, Guam and the U.S.
Virgin Islands (but not including American Samoa) are deemed to be residents
within the territorial limits of the United States and not overseas voters;
therefore, such persons are not eligible to vote by absentee ballot under Illinois
law.
The Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago (the Board)
is the election authority charged with administering elections in the City of
Chicago, where some of the Plaintiffs formerly resided. (R. Dkt. # 49, 9) The
Boards Chairwoman, Marisel Hernandez, has been sued in her official
capacity. (R. Dkt. # 49, 10) Karen Kinney is the County Clerk for Rock Island
County, where Plaintiff Anthony Bunten formerly resided, and is the election
authority for Rock Island County responsible for conducting elections there.
(R. Dkt # 49, 11). Kinney is sued in her official capacity. (Id.) The Board,
Hernandez and Kinney are referred throughout this brief as the Illinois
Defendants.
Plaintiffs contend that the challenged federal and Illinois statutes violate
Plaintiffs right to equal protection under the 14th Amendment of the United
4
States Constitution because Plaintiffs are denied the right to vote in federal
elections in Illinois, a right that is afforded to all other former Illinois
residents residing overseas. (R. Dkt. # 1, 2-3, 48-54) Although not raised
in their complaint, Plaintiffs first contended in their second motion for
summary judgment (and now on appeal) that they are being denied due
process on the grounds that both federal and Illinois statutes violate Plaintiffs
fundamental right to interstate travel.
Plaintiffs and the Federal Defendants filed cross motions for summary
judgment. (R. Dkt # 42; R. Dkt # 47; R. Dkt # 50) On August 23, 2016, the
district court granted summary judgment for the Federal Defendants and
denied Plaintiffs summary judgment motion. (Short Appendix, at 1-42) After
finding that the Court had jurisdiction and that the individual Plaintiffs had
standing to sue, the district court found that the Plaintiffs do not have a
fundamental right to vote via Illinois absentee ballot in federal elections, and
the plaintiffs have not alleged that the UOCAVA discriminates due to their
membership in a suspect class. (Short Appendix, at 31) The district court also
found that Plaintiffs equal protection claims do not trigger strict scrutiny and
that such claims would be reviewed under the less rigorous rational basis
standard of analysis. (Short Appendix, at 32) The district court concluded that
the UOCAVAs challenged provisions survive rational basis review. (Short
Appendix, at 42) However, the district court noted that the Plaintiffs due
process claim was not briefed and survived the courts rulings on the equal
5
protection claims. (Short Appendix, at 42-43) The district court also noted that
the parties briefs did not resolve Plaintiffs claims regarding the Illinois
statute. Therefore, both these issues remained unresolved, according to the
district court. (Id.)
In response, Plaintiffs filed a second motion for summary judgment on their
equal protection claims against the Illinois Defendants and on their new due
process claims against both the Federal and Illinois Defendants on the theory
that both the federal and Illinois statutes violated Plaintiffs right to interstate
travel. (R. Dkt. # 70). On October 28, 2016, the district court denied Plaintiffs
second summary judgment motion and granted the Federal Defendants cross-
motion for summary judgment. (Short Appendix, at 44-63) The district court
accepted the Illinois Defendants explanation that Illinois attempted in 1979 to
mirror the original federal statute requiring that states permit overseas voters
to vote by absentee ballot the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act
(OCVRA), 89 Stat. 1142 and that this language simple remained in place
even after the OCVRA was repealed and replaced by UOCAVA in 1986. (Short
Appendix, at 55) The district court found that Illinois had a legitimate state
interest in staying abreast of federal voting rights laws and the adoption of
language into the Illinois statute that mirrored federal statutes such as
OCVRA legitimately achieved this purpose. (Id.) The district court also found
that Illinois had, at least until 1986, a legitimate state interest in treating
American Samoa differently from Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin
6
Islands. (Short Appendix, at 56) The fact that the Illinois statute was
predicated on the historical context of the 1970s and does not reflect the
current treatment of American Samoa under UOCAVA was not, in the district
courts view, fatal as the practical effect of the statutes outdatedness is that
it provides more generous voting rights to former Illinois residents than would
exist if Illinois had updated its laws to mirror the more recent (1986) UOCAVA.
(Short Appendix, at 57) The district court found no unconstitutionality with
the Illinois statute on equal protection grounds. (Short Appendix, at 58) The
district court also rejected Plaintiffs argument that both UOCAVA and the
Illinois statute violated Plaintiffs fundamental right to interstate travel.
(Short Appendix, at 61-62) The court found that the Plaintiffs inability to vote
by absentee ballot in their respective territories stems not from a violation of
their right to travel, but rather from the constitutional status of Puerto Rico,
Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands. (Id.)
On October 28, 2016, the district court entered judgment in favor of all
defendants and against the Plaintiffs. (Short Appendix, at 63)
Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The United States Constitution reserved to the States the right to vote for
electors for the President of the United States and States have certain powers
over the time, places and manner of federal elections.
The State of Illinois limits the right to vote in Illinois to permanent
7
residents of the State. However, Illinois amended its laws after Congress
enacted the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act (OCVRA) in 1975 to
conform to OCVRAs requirement that each State allow any former resident of
that State who moved overseas to vote by absentee ballot in federal elections.
Puerto Rico, Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands were considered to be within
the territorial limits of the United States. As a result, Illinois, like other States
was not required by OCVRA to extend absentee voting privileges to former
residents who moved to those territories. At the time, American Samoa was
not considered a part of the territorial limits of the United States. Later, when
Congress enacted the Uniformed and Overseas Civilian Absentee Voting Act
(UOCAVA) in 1986, American Samoa was included within the definition of
the territorial limits of the United States. Thus, States were no longer
required to permit their former residents who moved to American Samoa to
vote by absentee ballot. Illinois has never amended its law to reflect the
change Congress made in 1986. However, a statute is not invalid under the
Constitution because it did not go as far as it could have as a legislature need
not strike at every conceivable evil or problem that could have been addressed.
Illinois change in its laws in 1979 was in recognition that, under the
Constitution of the United States, Congress has plenary authority to create
and define the relationship between the United States and its territories and
possessions.
Former residents of the State of Illinois do not, however, have a
8
fundamental right under the Constitution to take their voting rights and
privileges with them no matter where they go when they move away from
Illinois. Former Illinois residents cannot, for example, take their Illinois voting
rights and privileges with them when they move to another State like
Wisconsin or Indiana. Rather, they inherit only those voting rights and
privileges conferred upon them by their new State. Similarly, former Illinois
residents who move to U.S. territories like Puerto Rico, Guam and the U.S.
Virgin Islands which are considered by UOCAVA and Illinois law to be part
of the United States do not take with them their right to participate in
Illinois elections. Instead, they possess only those voting rights as enjoyed by
other residents of their new home State and are presumably treated like any
other resident of their new community.
Residents of Illinois who move out of the State do not suddenly become
members of a suspect class who become targets and victims of invidious
discrimination simply because of where they move. Their alleged
mistreatment surely does not trigger strict or heightened scrutiny requiring
that the government demonstrate a compelling interest justifying any
difference in treatment.
Finally, former residents of Illinois are free to travel wherever they wish.
But their choices have consequences. If they choose to move to another State
like Wisconsin or Indiana or even to Puerto Rico, Guam or the U.S. Virgin
Islands, they surrender their right to vote in Illinois and inherit the same right
9
to vote as enjoyed by their new neighbors in their new home. The right to
travel guarantees only that they will be free of invidious discrimination in
their new home; it does not guarantee that they will be able to take the right
to vote they enjoyed in their former home with them when they move to a new
home.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellees Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago, Marisel
Hernandez, Chairwoman, and Karen Kinney, Rock Island County Clerk, agree
with Appellants that the appropriate standard of review of a grant of summary
judgment is de novo.
ARGUMENT
I. Illinois Statute Excluding Former Illinois Residents Now Living

in Guam, Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands from Casting an
Absentee Ballot in Illinois for Federal Elections is not a Denial of
Equal Protection
A. Illinois Law is Rationally Related to a Legitimate State Interest and

Passes Scrutiny Under the Rational Basis Test
Plaintiffs argue that regardless of the level of scrutiny to be employed in
this case, both the federal law and the Illinois statute must be invalidated on
equal protection grounds because there is no identifiable government interest
that is advanced by the alleged discriminatory treatment imposed by the
statutes. Brief, at 16.
Plaintiffs first attack UOCAVA, arguing that its provisions do not in any
way advance the federal governments unique relationship with the Northern
10
Mariana Islands (NMI). Brief, 17-18. Pursuant to this Courts March 6, 2017
Order (Doc. #17) encouraging counsel for appellees to avoid unnecessary
duplication by filing a joint brief or by adopting parts of co-appellees brief, the
Illinois Defendants adopt that part of the brief of co-appellees Federal
Defendants addressing this issue and the issue generally of Congress power
over all of the territories and UOCAVAs role in those relationships.
Regarding the Illinois statute, Plaintiffs contend that the district courts
grounds for upholding Illinois interests in treating former Illinois residents
now residing in American Samoa differently than former Illinois residents in
NMI are unavailing because Illinois justifications do not identify a
legitimate government interest that is advanced by the laws provisions.
Brief, at 22.
Plaintiffs contend that the Illinois legislature has offered no justification
for its classification in favor of former Illinois residents living in American
Samoa, the NMI, or a foreign country. Brief, at 9.
Plaintiffs then attack the Illinois statute on two grounds. First, they
contend that modeling a discriminatory federal law does not advance a
legitimate state interest because the federal government cannot authorize
States to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Brief, at 23. Of course, as a
proposition of law, they are right. However, the federal law, as argued by the
Federal Defendants and as held by the district court, is not discriminatory.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs contend that the Illinois statute no longer models the
11
federal law because of the 1986 changes in the federal law, which, Plaintiffs
argue, undermines the States legitimate interests. Id.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that because the federal government no longer
treats American Samoa differently than Guam, Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands under UOCAVA, Illinois has no state-specific reason of its own
to accord American Samoa unique status. Brief, at 23-24.
None of these arguments have merit.
1. The Illinois Statute was Intended to Mirror Federal Law
In 1975, Congress adopted the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975,
89 Stat. 1142 (OCVRA). In enacting the OCVRA, Congress recognized that
[V]irtually all States have statutes expressly allowing military personnel, and
often other U.S. Government employees, and their dependents, to register and
vote absentee from outside the country. See, H.R. Rep. No. 94-649, *3, at 2
(1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N 2358, 2360. The primary purpose of the
OCVRA was to assure the right of otherwise qualified private U.S. citizens
residing outside the United States to vote in Federal elections. Id., at *1, at 1.
One of the conditions of voting under OCVRA was that the voter does not
maintain a domicile, is not registered to vote, and is not voting in any other
State or election district of a State or territory or in any territory or possession
of the United States. 89 Stat. 1142 3(2).
According to the OCVRA, the United States includes the several States,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam and the
12
Virgin Islands, but not include American Samoa, the Canal Zone, the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, or any other territory or possession of the
United States. 89 Stat. 1142 2. OCVRA also defined State to mean each
of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. Id.
The State of Illinois amended its laws in 1979 to provide that any non-
resident civilian citizen, otherwise qualified to vote, may make application to
the election authority having jurisdiction over his precinct of former residence
for an absentee ballot containing the Federal offices only not less than 10 days
before a Federal election. See, 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-2.2, as amended by
Public Act 81-953 (SB 1146), effective 9/22/1979. Non-resident civilian citizen
was defined as a civilian citizen of the United States who (i) resided outside
the territorial limits of the United States, (ii) had maintained a precinct
residence in a county in Illinois immediately prior to their departure from the
United States, (iii) did not maintain a residence and is not registered to vote in
any other State, and (iv) whose intent to return to Illinois may be uncertain.
See, 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-1(4).
The 1979 Illinois law defined the territorial limits of the United States to
mean each of the several States of the United States and includes the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands;
but does not include American Samoa, the Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands or any other territory or possession of the United States.
13
See, 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-1, as amended by Public Act 81-953 (SB 1146),
effective 9/22/1979.
Thus, Illinois adopted legislation that tracked exactly the language of the
OCVRA when it came to defining what constituted the United States and the
territory it encompassed. As the district court properly noted, the OCVRA
differentiated between (1) the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands, (2) the Canal Zone ***, American Samoa ***, and the
now-former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (which included the NMI);
and (3) other United States Trust Territories or possessions. (Short Appendix,
at 37) Illinois simply followed suit.
When Congress enacted UOCAVA in 1986, American Samoa became
included (instead of being excluded, as was previously the case) in the
definition of State and United States, joining the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands as territories within the territorial
sense of the United States where States were not required to extend absentee
voting privileges. See Pub. L. 99-410, title I, 107, Aug. 28, 29186, 100 Stat.
927.
Illinois, however, never subsequently amended its statutory definition of
territorial limits of the United States. Now, nearly forty years later, its
definition remains the same as originally enacted in 1979. Thus, American
Samoa (along with the Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
(including NMI) and any other territory or possession of the United States)
14
continue to remain, by definition, outside the territorial limits of the United
States. As a result, former Illinois residents taking up residence in American
Samoa (or in the Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or any
other territory or possession of the United States) are eligible to receive an
absentee ballot from Illinois.
It is evident just from the face of both the OCVRA and the Illinois statute
that the State of Illinois sought merely to comply with the federal law, but the
State failed to keep up with the federal law when, in 1986, UOCAVA added
American Samoa to the list of territories considered to be within the territory
of the United States.
[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding
along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity. Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993). As the district court observed, [T]o
support the rationality of a challenged statute, a defendant is not limited to
the justifications that the legislature had in mind at the time that it passed
the challenged provisions any rational justification for the laws will
overcome an equal protection challenge, citing One Wisconsin Inst., Inc. v.
Thomsen, 198 F.Supp.3d 896, 961, (W.D. Wis. 2016), appeal pending. (Short
Appendix, at 35)
This Court has held that a legislature need not actually articulate the
legitimate purpose or rationale that supports the classification at issue.
Instead, a statute must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there
15
is any reasonable conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification. City of Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir.
1999), quoting Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993),
in turn quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113
S.Ct. 2096 (1993). A classification does not fail rational-basis review because
it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality. Id.
In Srail v. Village of Lisle, Ill., 588 F. 3d 940, 946-47 (7th Cir. 2009), this
Court, quoting Shalala, supra, held that even as regards to a state statute, if
there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some
legitimate government purpose, the statute survives rational basis scrutiny.
In denying Plaintiffs second motion for summary judgment, the district
court correctly concluded that the Illinois statute does not violate the Plaintiffs
equal protection rights because the statutes different treatment of former
Illinois residents living in various U.S. territories is rationally related to
legitimate state interests, which interests include the synchronization of
Illinois MOVE with applicable federal overseas and absentee voting laws such
as the UOCAVAs predecessor statute, the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights
Act (OCVRA). (Short Appendix, at 46)
The district court accepted the Illinois Defendants explanation that in 1979
the State of Illinois amended its election laws to define the territorial limits of
the United States in such a way as to track precisely the language and
16
provisions of the earlier OCVRA as a way of staying abreast of federal law,
even though the State of Illinois did not similarly amend its election laws
following the OCVRAs repeal and the UOCAVAs enactment. (Short Appendix,
at 55) The district court found that Illinois had (and has) a legitimate state
interest in staying abreast of federal voting rights laws and that the adoption
of language into Illinois statute that mirrored federal statutes such as the
OCVRA legitimately achieved this purpose. (Id.)
2. Illinois Failure to Keep Up with Changes in Federal Law Does Not Render
the Statute Irrational
Plaintiffs criticize Illinois, arguing that even if it attempted to track the
1975 OCVRA while it was in effect, Illinois cannot provide a plausible rational
explanation for the statutes classification three decades after the 1975 Acts
repeal. Brief, at 23.
Illinois is not alone, however, when it comes to keeping up with world
events and falling prey to historical timing. It should be noted that at the
time of UOCAVAs enactment in 1986, the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI),
the treatment of which Plaintiffs have spent considerable time arguing, was
not yet a United States Territory because the covenant creating this
framework did not become fully effective until three months after Congress
passed UOCAVA. (Short Appendix, at 34) Indeed, Congress, three decades
later, has never amended UOCAVA to reflect the new post-1986 relationship
with NMI and NMI is still not considered a part of the United States where
used in the territorial sense. See, 52 U.S.C. 20310.
17
The failure to amend the Illinois statute is, much like Congress failure to
include the NMI within the definition of territory of the United States when it
adopted UOCAVA in 1986, a product of historical timing. (Short Appendix, at
35) This does not mean, however, that Illinois statute lacked a rational basis
when enacted or that the statute is irrational today.
[A] statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have
gone farther than it did as a legislature need not strike at all evils at the
same time. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966). [A] legislature
need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial scheme simply because it
failed, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might
conceivably have been attacked. McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners
of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404 (1969). Reform may be taken one step
at a time without creating an equal protection violation, even if those steps
are taken slowly over the course of decades as has occurred here with both
Congress and the Illinois legislature. Congress, three decades later, still has
not amended UOCAVA to reflect NMIs relationship to the United States.
Accordingly, the different treatment of American Samoa and NMI versus
Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands, under the Illinois statute is not
irrational simply because Illinois has not gone as far as it might have (or
quickly enough) in denying absentee voting rights to former Illinois residents
who now reside in American Samoa.
The district court also observed that a basic understanding of the history of
18
American Samoawhich illustrates that American Samoa has not followed
the same path as Puerto Rico, Guam, and the USVI as concerns incorporation,
citizenship, and cultural practiceslead the court to conclude that a rational
basis supported Illinois decision to track the language of the OCVRA and to
exclude American Samoa from its definition of [T]erritorial limits of the
United States. (Short Appendix, at 57) The district court noted that at the
time of the OCVRAs enactment, the federal government viewed American
Samoa more like a foreign country than as part of the United States territorial
limits. (Id.)
Regarding Plaintiffs point that Illinois has neglected to update its statute
to reflect the federal law changes in 1986, the district court noted that while it
is true that the Illinois statute remains predicated on the 1975 federal
statutes approach to American Samoa that was informed by the historical
context of the 1970s and does not reflect the current treatment of American
Samoa under the 1986 UOCAVA, the practical effect of the Illinois statutes
outdatedness is that it provides more generous voting rights to former
Illinois residents than would exist had the State updated its laws to mirror the
UOCAVA. (Short Appendix, at 57) The district court observed that, critically,
this state-based electoral generousness is clearly permitted under the
UOCAVA. (Id.) An examination of the legislative history of the UOCAVA
indicates a clear intention to preserve the ability of states to extend voting
rights to individuals disenfranchised by the UOCAVA, citing H. R. Rep. No.
19
99-765, at 19, 1986 WL 31901, at *19 (deeming unnecessary for inclusion in
the UOCAVA any language contained in the OCVRA stating that this Act will
not be deemed to require registration in any State in which registration is not
required as a precondition to voting in a Federal election nor will it prevent
any State from adopting any voting practice which is less restrictive than the
practices prescribed by this Act because the UOCAVA would not impinge on
either activity) (emphasis added). (Short Appendix, at 57-58)
The UOCAVA, as explained by the district court, provides the voting
practices floor upon which Illinois must stand, while at the same time
granting States the right to expand upon these practices. (Short Appendix, at
58) In the words of the district court, The UOCAVA essentially provides a
built-in rational basis explanation for states that failed to implement any
narrowing of voting rights engendered by the UOCAVA. (Id.)
3. Illinois Has a Legitimate State Interest in Restricting the Ballot to Bona

Fide Residents
Next, Illinois, just like any other State, has a legitimate interest in
restricting the ballot to bona fide residents and ensuring that someone who
wishes to vote in the State does not maintain a place of abode or domicile, is
not registered to vote and is not voting in any other election district, state,
territory or possession of the United States. Romeu v. Cohen, 121 F.Supp.2d
264, 284. (S.D. N.Y. 2000). The State of Illinois Constitution requires that to
have the right to vote in the State, a person must be a permanent resident of
the State. Ill. Const. 1970, Art. III, 1. When a citizen decides to abandon his
20
or her Illinois residence and move to another State, he or she loses the right to
vote in Illinois. But, such a citizen inherits such voting rights as the citizens
new State allows. However, subject to the United States Constitution, the
Supremacy Clause and UOCAVA, Illinois, like every State, is obligated to
extend absentee voting privileges to former residents living outside the
territory of the United States. Illinois did so, as reflected in the 1979
amendments to its election laws, adopting a definition of territorial limits of
the United States that paralleled the OCVRA. It so happens, however, that
these Plaintiffs decided to take up new residence in certain U.S. territories
that are considered part of the United States under the OCVRA and UOCAVA.
Much like former Illinois residents who move to States like Indiana and
Wisconsin (both of which, it should be noted, require voter ID when voting
see, Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, U.S. ,
135 S.Ct. 1551 (2015), and Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S.
181, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008) while Illinois does not), Plaintiffs surrendered
their right to vote in Illinois and now must vote according to the laws of their
new home State or territory. Former Illinois residents who move outside
Illinois have no Constitutional right to bring with them their Illinois voting
rights and privileges, except as may be required by Congress under the
Supremacy Clause.
21
4. Plaintiffs Requested Relief Would Discriminate in Favor of U.S. Citizens

Residing in Certain U.S. Territories Who Formerly Resided in a State and
Against U.S. Citizens in Those Territories Who Did Not
Finally, the district court noted that if Plaintiffs were granted the
opportunity to vote in federal elections using an Illinois absentee ballot, it
would not result in a universally applicable rule that permits all United States
citizens in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands to vote in federal
elections, citing Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2001). (Short
Appendix, at 41) Instead, the court would be creating a distinction of
questionable fairness by permitting former Illinois residents now living in
Puerto Rico, Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands to vote for President, while
residents of those territories who have not previously resided in Illinois will
not enjoy that right. (Id.) This is exactly the concern the district court sought
to avoid when ruling on Plaintiffs first summary judgment motion when the
court found that, with respect to UOCAVA, [I]t is rational *** to enact a law
that does not differentiate between residents living in a particular United
States Territory based on whether they could previously vote in a federal
election administered by a state. (Short Appendix, at 42) The same rationale
applies to the Illinois statute.
As this Court observed in rejecting a claim by a class comprised of working
women seeking the right to vote by absentee ballot in Illinois, [T]he
Constitution does not in so many words confer a right to vote, though it has
been held to do so implicitly. Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 (7th Cir.
2004). Rather, it confers on the states broad authority to regulate the conduct
22
of elections, including federal ones. Id. This Court noted, [B]ecause of this
grant of authority and because balancing the competing interests involved in
the regulation of elections is difficult and an unregulated election system
would be chaos, state legislatures may impose extensive restrictions on
voting that may exclude some people from voting. [T]he constitutional
question is, this Court continued, whether the restriction and resulting
exclusion are reasonable given the interest the restriction serves. Id. No
greater precision in the articulation of the governing standard seems possible.
Id.
A statute must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113
S.Ct. 2096 (1993).
Here, there is a rational justification for the Illinois statutes treatment of
former Illinois residents who later take up residency in other States or
territories that are considered a part of the United States, versus those who
later become residents in other countries and territories outside the United
States. The district courts finding that the Illinois statute provides such a
rational justification must be affirmed.
II. The District Court Did Not Err in Rejecting Plaintiffs

Request to Apply Heightened Scrutiny
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a
state from discriminating among different classes of persons arbitrarily.
23
Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: No
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws. U.S. Const., Amend XIV, 1. (Italics added) The Fourteenth
Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws that
affect some groups of citizens differently than others. See McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). A state law is not presumed to be
unconstitutional solely because it results in some inequality among groups of
citizens. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 96263, 102 S.Ct. 2836 (1982).
If a classification does not impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a
fundamental right or involve a suspect class, then judicial scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause demands only a conceivable rational basis for the
challenged state distinction. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 27, 112 S.Ct.
2326 (1992). If this rational basis standard applies, then the burden is upon
the challenging party to negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001), citing Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993)).
A. UOCAVA and the Illinois Statute Do Not Interfere with the Exercise of
a Fundamental Right Requiring Strict or Heightened Scrutiny
Plaintiffs argue that because the voting franchise is implicated, UOCAVA
and the Illinois statute are subject to heightened scrutiny. Brief, at 25-38.
They contend that a legislative classification is subject to strict scrutiny if it
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right and that
24
the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society,
citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). Brief, at 27. But the mere
fact that a statute concerns voting does not establish that the statute infringes
on a fundamental right. See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10
& n. 2 (1st Cir.1994) (per curiam).
When deciding whether a state election law violates ... Fourteenth
Amendment ... rights, the Court must weigh the character and magnitude of
the burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the
State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the
State's concerns make the burden necessary. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area
New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359, 117 S.Ct. 1364 (1997), citing Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (1992). If a regulation imposes
severe burdens on plaintiffs' rights[, it] must be narrowly tailored and
advance a compelling state interest. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 359. The lesser the
burden, the less strict review. Id. Under the minimum level of scrutiny, equal
protection is offended only if the statute's classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. Snead v. City of
Albuquerque, 663 F.Supp. 1084, 1088 (D.N.M.1987), citing McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. at 42526. [T]o implicate the higher standard of review
on the basis of a fundamental right requires that the right be guaranteed by
the Constitution. Snead, 663 F.Supp. at 1087.
Plaintiffs have no right to vote for President or for members of Congress
25
that is guaranteed by the Constitution just because they were at one time
residents of Illinois.
The Constitution grants States certain powers over the times, places,
and manner of federal elections (subject to congressional revision), Art. I, 4,
cl. 1 ..., and allows States to appoint electors for the President, Art. II, 1, cl.
2. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 841842, 115 S.Ct. 1842
(1995). The Constitution assigns to the States the primary responsibility for
determining the manner of selecting the Presidential electors. See U.S. Const.
Art. II, 1, cl. 2. Individual citizens have no federal constitutional right to vote
for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the State
legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power
to appoint members of the electoral college. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1,
35, 13 S.Ct. 3 (1892) (the state legislature's power to select the manner for
appointing electors is plenary; it may, if it so chooses, select the electors itself,
which indeed was the manner used by state legislatures in several States for
many years after the framing of our Constitution. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 28
33.
The Constitution also gave States the power to prescribe the Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives. U.S.
Const. Art. I, 4, cl. 1.
As noted previously herein at pages 20-21, the Illinois Constitution
requires permanent residency in Illinois in order to vote in the State. Ill. Const.
26
1970, Art. III, 1. It is well established that a government unit may
legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political processes to those
who reside within its borders and that such a restriction does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60,
6869, 99 S.Ct. 383 (1978). In Holt, the Supreme Court considered an equal
protection claim brought against a city by nonresidents who were not allowed
to vote in the city's elections but were subject to some of the city's regulations
and fees. The Court determined that only rational basis scrutiny was required
because the statute did not den[y] the franchise to individuals who were
physically resident within the geographic boundaries of the governmental
entity. The Court observed:
From [our earlier] voting qualifications cases a common

characteristic emerges: The challenged statute in each case
denied the franchise to individuals who were physically
resident within the geographic boundaries of the
governmental entity concerned. No decision of this Court
has extended the one man, one vote principle to
individuals residing beyond the geographic confines of the
governmental entity concerned, be it the State or its
political subdivisions. On the contrary, our cases have
uniformly recognized that a government unit may
legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political
processes to those who reside within its borders.
Id. at 6869, 99 S.Ct. at 38889.
The Supreme Court in Holt Civic Club held that the affected non-residents
were not denied equal protection where they were not permitted to vote in the
city's municipal election because one who resides outside of the governmental
unit has no fundamental right to vote in its election Accordingly, the Court
27
rejected the plaintiffs' contention there that the denial of the franchise to them
could be justified only by a compelling state interest. See Snead v. City of
Albuquerque, 663 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (D.N.M. 1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 1131
(10th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiffs, however, attack the district courts reliance on Snead and Holt
Civic Club (Brief, at 33-34) and argue instead that when a statute grants the
right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, the
government must establish that the exclusions are necessary to promote a
compelling interests, citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-337 (1972).
But other courts have noted that Holt was consistent with earlier cases
holding that states and municipalities have the power to require that voters
be bona fide residents of the relevant political subdivision. See Broyles v.
Texas, 618 F. Supp. 2d 661, 68586 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd, 381 Fed. Appx. 370
(5th Cir. 2010), citing, among other cases, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
343, 92 S.Ct. 995 (1972), the very case relied upon by Plaintiffs.
Because the Plaintiffs in this case, former residents of Illinois, have no
constitutionally protected fundamental right to vote in Illinois elections, the
mere fact that Illinois law extends the right to vote to some non-residents to
comply with UOCAVA does not implicate strict scrutiny by this Court. See
Snead v. City of Albuquerque, 663 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (D.N.M. 1987), aff'd,
841 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1987). Classifications on the basis of residency are
exempt from strict scrutiny. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297, 95 S.Ct. 1637
28
(1975); City of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 118586 (10th Cir. 2010).
In ruling on Plaintiffs first motion for summary judgment, the district
court held that while an Illinois citizen who is qualified to vote in a federal
election has a fundamental right to vote, United States citizens living in
territories do not have the same fundamental right to vote as United States
citizens residing in Illinois who are qualified to vote in federal elections.
(Short Appendix, at 27) Plaintiffs focused below on UOCAVAs distinction
between former residents of States now living in the Northern Mariana
Islands (NMI) which is a trust territory that is not included within
UOCAVAs definition of State or United States and whose residents are
permitted to vote in federal elections and residents of Guam, Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands, which are included within the UOCAVAs definition of
States or United States. (Short Appendix, at 31) The district court found
that neither this distinction, nor the distinction drawn in Igartua de La Rosa v.
United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (Igartua I), and Romeu v. Cohen, 265
F. 265 F.3d 118 (2nd Cir. 2001) (distinction between those who reside overseas
and those who take up residence in Puerto Rico [and, as relevant here, Guam
and the U.S. Virgin Islands], but between those who reside overseas and those
who move anywhere with in the United States), infringes upon a fundamental
right. (Id.) Accordingly, the district court held, the UOCAVAs differing
treatment of the NMI versus Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
does not trigger strict scrutiny. (Short Appendix, at 32) Instead, the district
29
court correctly analyzed Plaintiffs claims under the rational basis test.
Without a constitutional right, there can be no fundamental right. (Short
Appendix, at 25)
UOCAVA provides that United States citizens (including, e.g., residents of
Puerto Rico, see 52 U.S.C. 20310), who reside outside the United States
retain the right to vote via absentee ballot in their last place of residence in
the United States, as long as these citizens otherwise qualify to vote under
laws of the jurisdiction in which they last resided. See, 52 U.S.C. 20302. It
does not apply, however, to citizens who move from one jurisdiction to another
within the United States. See 52 U.S.C. 20310(5) (defining overseas voter as
a person who resides outside the United States).
Plaintiffs claim that the UOCAVA and the Illinois statute illegally
discriminate against citizens who have taken up residence in certain
territories (Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands and American Samoa)
rather than in foreign countries and certain territories outside the United
States, because the former are not entitled by the Act to vote in their prior
state of residence. Brief, at 32. This claim is identical to the claim made and
rejected in Igartua De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 1011 (1st Cir.
1994) (Iguarta I). In Iguarta I, the court held that UOCAVA does not
distinguish between those who reside overseas and those who take up
residence in Puerto Rico, but between those who reside overseas and those who
move anywhere within the United States. (Italics added) The court held
30
further that because such a distinction neither affects a suspect class nor
infringes a fundamental right, it need only have a rational basis to pass
constitutional muster, citing FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993) (equal protection). Id. The court reasoned
that:
Without the Act, voters who move overseas could lose

their right to vote in all federal elections. However, voters
who move to a new residence within the United States are
eligible to vote in a federal election in their new place of
residence. Hence, Congress had a rational basis for seeking
to protect the absentee voting rights only of the former.
While the Act does not guarantee that a citizen moving to
Puerto Rico will be eligible to vote in a presidential
election, this limitation is not a consequence of the Act but
of the constitutional requirements discussed above.
Igartua, 32 F.3d at 1011 (1st Cir. 1994).
In Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit
held that "the UOCAVA's distinction between former residents of States now
living outside the United States and former residents of States now living in
the U.S. territories is not subject to strict scrutiny.
Nothing establishes the existence of a fundamental right of former Illinois
residents to vote in territories that are considered part of the United States,
and Plaintiffs have failed to show that UOCAVA and the Illinois statute
infringes on a fundament right. Therefore, nothing justifies the application of
strict or heightened scrutiny.
B. There is No Suspect Class
Plaintiffs contend that the Illinois law should be subject to the heightened
31
strict scrutiny because historical experience has shown that Territorial
residents have been effectively locked out of the political process and thus
should be treated as a suspect class. Brief, at 38-47. Plaintiffs complaint in
this case never alleged that Plaintiffs are members of a suspect class; it was
an argument raised for the first time in Plaintiffs second motion for summary
judgment.
As the district court noted, classifications based on sex, race alienage, and
nationality are inherently suspect, citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
682 (1973). (Short Appendix, at 51) None of those conditions are present here.
The suspect class that Plaintiffs refer to consists of territorial residents
who, Plaintiffs claim, are excluded from the political process and therefore a
suspect class. Brief, at 38. It is not clear, however, whether Plaintiffs are
referring to all residents of the affected territories (Puerto Rico, Guam, U.S.
Virgin Islands, American Samoa), or just those who move to the affected
territories from other States (including Illinois). In other words, did the
Plaintiffs become members of the suspect class only after they moved from
Illinois to the territories in question? There is absolutely no legal authority
supporting the proposition that former residents of Illinois or any State who
move to certain territories considered part of the United States are members of
a suspect class. Plaintiffs acknowledge this lack of authority, but argue it is
only a reason to decide Plaintiffs suspect class argument based on first
principles, not to reject it out of hand. Brief, at 43.
32
Plaintiffs cite several cases where the United States Supreme Court has
found that in the disbursement of public, health and education services or
benefits, different treatment of aliens within a state may run afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause. For example, Plaintiffs cite United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) for the proposition that heightened
scrutiny applies to legislation which restricts those political processes which
can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation and
statutes rooted in prejudice against discrete and insular minorities that
tend seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities. Brief, at 38-39. In Carolene Products, the
question for decision was whether the Filled Milk Act of Congress of March 4,
1923, which prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk
compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so as to resemble milk or
cream, transcended the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce or
infringes the Fifth Amendment.
Plaintiffs also cite, among other cases, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982),
which considered a Texas law barring children who were not U.S. citizens or
legally admitted aliens from state educational fund eligibility; San Antonio
Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which was a class
action was brought on behalf of school children, who were said to be members
of poor families residing in school districts having low property tax base,
challenging reliance by Texas school-financing system on local property
33
taxation; and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), which considered
the constitutionality of state statutes that disqualified resident aliens from
participating in state-run welfare programs. Brief, at 39. These last three
cases, citing Carolene Products, noted that certain racial and ethnic groups
have frequently been recognized as discrete and insular minorities' who are
relatively powerless to protect their interests in the political process. See
Graham, 403 U.S., at 372. But none of these cases are even remotely
analogous to the present case.
If Plaintiffs were arguing that Puerto Rico, Guam and the U.S. Virgin
Islands were discriminating against former Illinois residents who moved there
(their version of aliens) by not allowing them to vote in the same manner as
other citizens of those territories, perhaps these cases would be of assistance.
But Plaintiffs have not cited any authority suggesting that they are aliens in
Illinois seeking benefits. Rather, Plaintiffs are seemingly entitled to all the
same benefits of citizenship and residency of their new homes (including the
right to vote) exercised by the citizens of those territories.
Plaintiffs also cite several law review articles commenting generally on the
perceived poor treatment received by U.S. territories and possessions and their
residents. One of those articles is that of Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux, Note, A
Most Insular Minority: Reconsidering Judicial Deference to Unequal Treatment
in Light of Puerto Ricos Political Process Failure, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 797, 828
(2010). Brief, at 41, n. 9. The article advances the proposition that modern
34
equal protection doctrine particularly its underlying concern for politically
powerless actors justifies heightened scrutiny of differential treatment
toward U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico. But this article argues that
federal courts have followed a misguided approach regarding challenges to
unequal congressional treatment of Puerto Rican residents (110 Colum. L.
Rev. at 801) and that [a] judicial approach towards equal protection
challenges brought by Puerto Rican U.S. citizens modeled on alienage cases
such as Plyler would reclaim a role for the courts in the U.S.-Puerto Rico
dynamic. 110 Colum. L. Rev. at 834. In other words, the articles authors
acknowledge that, thus far, federal courts have been misguided and have not
adopted the Plyler alienage case model.2
As the district court observed, Congress, and the States when
implementing federal law, may treat residents of the territories differently
than residents of the 50 states, citing Igartua v. U.S., 86 F.Supp.3d 50, 55-56
(D. Puerto Rico 2015) (U.S. territories cannot be defined as States for
purposes of Articles I and II of the Constitution); and Romeu v. Cohen, 265
F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (citizens living in territories possess more limited
voter rights than citizens living in a State). (Short Appendix, at 52) Congress
2 In its conclusion, the article states, This Note has argued that courts have
misguidedly relied on the judicially created territorial incorporation doctrine to limit
the ability of Puerto Rican residents to redress harms cause by unequal congressional
treatment. *** In light of the political insularity of U.S. citizens residing in Puerto
Rico, this Note contends greater judicial scrutiny of federal legislation discriminating
against Puerto Rico is both appropriated and normatively desirable. 110 Colum. L.
Rev. at 839.
3 Even then, the individual inherits only those voting rights enjoyed by the citizens
of the new State. For example, if a resident of Illinois who may be an ex-felon moves
35
has the right to treat U.S. territories differently, including the manner in
which residents of the territories are, or are not, enfranchised with the right to
vote in federal elections, citing U.S. Const. Art. IV, 3, cl. 2 (the Territory
Clause). (Id.)
Moreover, Congress power to make laws regarding the territories is subject
to rational basis review. See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651 (1980). (Short
Appendix, at 52)
As noted earlier, Plaintiffs have not cited a single case in support of their
argument that former residents of a State who become residents in one of the
U.S. territories deemed to be within the territory of the United State are
members of a suspect class worthy of a strict or heightened scrutiny analysis.
But one case has already rejected such a claim under facts very similar to the
instant case. In Romeu v. Cohen, 121 F.Supp.2d 264 (S.D. N.Y. 2000), affirmed,
265 F.3d 118 (2nd Cir. 2001), Romeu, a U.S. citizen who lived and voted in New
York from 1994 through 1999, became a resident of Puerto Rico in May 1999
and registered to vote there. Because he was unable to vote for President and
Vice President, Romeu requested an absentee ballot from New York. Having
been denied a New York absentee ballot, he sued, arguing, among other things,
that both UOCAVA and the New York statutes were subject to strict scrutiny
because they denied absentee ballots to residents of Puerto Rico on the basis of
their race, ethnicity, alienage or origin. Romeu argued that residents of Puerto
Rico are members of a suspect class. The district court, however, rejected the
36
notion that Puerto Ricans are a suspect class under the Equal Protection
Clause. 121 F.Supp.2d 264 at 282. But even assuming that Puerto Ricans are
a suspect class, the court observed, Romeu failed to proffer facts sufficient for
this Court to ascribe an invidious discriminatory purpose to either UOCAVA
or NYEL, citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976). Id.
The Romeu district court determined that there is no basis for concluding that
either UOCAVA or NYEL invidiously discriminates against Puerto Ricans on
the basis of race, alienage or national origin. Romeu, 121 F.Supp.2d at 283.
Romeu clearly puts to rest any notion that Plaintiffs here are members of
any protected or suspect class that is the victim of invidious discrimination
under either UOCAVA or Illinois law.
Because plaintiffs here cannot demonstrate the deprivation of any
fundamental right or the existence of any invidious discrimination toward a
suspect class, strict scrutiny is not triggered.
This Court should, therefore, affirm the district courts evaluation of
Plaintiffs claims using the rational basis test.
III. Illinois Statute Excluding Former Illinois Residents Now Living

in Guam, Puerto Rico And U.S. Virgin Islands from Casting an
Absentee Ballot in Illinois for Federal Elections Does Not Infringe the
Right to Travel
Plaintiffs argue that both UOCAVA and the Illinois statute infringe on
their substantive due process right to interstate travel by deterring and
punishing travel to specific disfavored territories. Brief, at 47.
The district court noted that the right to travel embraces at least three
37
different components: the right of a citizen of one State to enter and leave
another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an
unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those
travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like
other citizens of that State, citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500, (1999).
(Short Appendix, at 60)
But as the district court concluded, neither UOCAVA nor the Illinois
statute prevents Plaintiffs from leaving Illinois and traveling to a U.S.
territory. (Id.) They are free to come and go as they please, although their
decisions to relocate to Puerto Rico, Guam, or the USVI come at a cost. (Id.)
The district court also noted that neither UOCAVA nor the Illinois statute
infringe upon the plaintiffs right to be treated as welcome visitors in their
respective territories or infringe upon their right to be treated like other
citizens of their respective territories. (Short Appendix, at 61) Indeed, the
district court ironically noted, it is the very fact that the plaintiffs are treated
the same as the other citizens of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the USVI that the
plaintiffs find so unappealing. (Id.) The district court nailed it on the head
when it observed, In truth, it is the denial of special treatment the ability to
vote by absentee ballot in federal elections (because of their former nexus to
Illinois) despite the fact that citizens of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the USVI do
not have the right to vote in federal elections that the plaintiffs now try to
convert into a due process violation based upon their right to travel. (Id.)
38
In Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 906 (1978), the Court
addressed the receipt of Supplemental Security Income by individuals who had
resided in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey but who lost those
benefits when they moved to Puerto Rico. The plaintiffs argued that they
should retain the same benefits they enjoyed in their former place of residence
even if those benefits were superior to the benefits enjoyed by the citizens of
Puerto Rico. While noting that laws prohibiting newly arrived resident in a
State from receiving the same benefits as other residents of the State
unconstitutionally burdened the right of interstate travel, the Court refused
to extend the doctrine to require that a person who travels to Puerto Rico must
be given benefits superior to the other residents of Puerto Rico even if the
newcomer enjoyed those benefits in the State from which he came. Califano,
435 U.S. at 4. As the Court went on to explain, [s]uch a doctrine would apply
with equal force to any benefits a State might provide for its residents, and
would require a State to continue to pay those benefits indefinitely to any
person who had once resided there. Id. The Court noted that the broader
implications resulting from such a doctrine are that the States independent
ability to pass laws applicable to all of its residents would be destroyed. Id. at
5.
Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2001) should put Plaintiffs
right to travel argument to rest in short order. In Romeu, the Second Circuit
held that the right to travel was not violated by either UOCAVA or the New
39
York statute in question. Romeu expressly rejected the argument that Saenz
compelled a finding that the right to travel is violated, stating [E]ven
assuming for purposes of this opinion that Saenzs references to States were
intended to encompass also territories and that the reference to the right to
enter and leave a State included also the right to change ones residence from
one political subdivision of the United States to another, we find no violation of
any of the components of the right to travel listed in Saenz. 265 F.3d at 126.
The Romeu court observed that New York had not impaired the plaintiffs
right to travel to Puerto Rico, although the New York statute placed a cost on
his becoming a permanent resident of Puerto Rico, i.e., the loss of the right to
vote for President. Id. Had Romeu moved to another State, he could have voted
as a citizen of that State.3
His move to a U.S. territory, in contrast, required that he

give up voting for the office of President. However, neither
the NYEL nor the UOCAVA caused that loss. His loss of
the right to vote for President is the consequence of his
decision to become a citizen of a territory in a
constitutional scheme that allocates the right to appoint
electors to States but not to territories.
Id. Romeu concluded, [S]uch consequences of the citizens choice do not
constitute an unconstitutional interference with the right to travel. 265 F.3d
3 Even then, the individual inherits only those voting rights enjoyed by the citizens
of the new State. For example, if a resident of Illinois who may be an ex-felon moves
from Illinois, where he or she is allowed to vote, to another state that prohibits ex-
felons from voting (e.g., Florida (see Fla. Const. art. VI, 4; Fla. Stat. 944.292(1);
Virginia (see Va. Const. art. II, 1); Iowa (see Iowa Const. art. II, 5; Iowa Code
48A.30(d)); and Kentucky (see Ky. Const. 145(1)), such former Illinois resident may
not be permitted to vote in his or her new state, thus suffering a loss of rights. A
former Illinois resident cannot take his Illinois voting rights and privileges with him.
40
at 127.
This Court should follow Romeus teachings and reject Plaintiffs contention
here that the UOCAVA and the Illinois statute violate due process and the
right to travel.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the judgment of the
district court that the UOCAVA and the Illinois statute challenged here do not
impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right or involve a
suspect class, that such statutes are properly reviewed under the rational
basis test, that such statutes are rationally related to legitimate government
interests, and that they are not unconstitutional. Further, this Court should
affirm the judgment of the district court that the challenged statutes do not
infringe on the right to travel.
Respectfully submitted,
By: s/James M. Scanlon

One of the Attorneys for
Defendants-Appellees Board of
Election Commissioners for the
City of Chicago, Marisel
Hernandez, and Karen Kinney,
Rock Island County Clerk
James M. Scanlon
James M. Scanlon & Associates, P.C.
27 N. Wacker #502
Chicago, IL 60606
(312) 782-8163
Patricia Castro
Assistant States Attorney
41
Rock Island States Attorney

1504 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor
Rock Island, IL 61201
(309) 558-3202
42
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 32(g)(1)
The undersigned hereby certifies that this brief complies with the type-
volume limitation of Rule 32(a)(7)(B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and Circuit Rule 32 in that, excluding the parts of the document
exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f), it contains no more than 14,000 words.
According to the word count of the word processing program used to prepare
the brief (Microsoft Word for Mac 2011), the brief contains 10,631 words,
including footnotes.
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5), as modified by Circuit Rule 32(b), and the type-style requirements of
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this document has been prepared in a
proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word for Mac 2011 in 12-point
Century Schoolbook, with 11-point footnotes.
s/ James M. Scanlon
James M. Scanlon
One of the Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees Board of
Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago, Marisel
Hernandez, and Karen Kinney, Rock Island County
Clerk
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 9, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
Joint Appellees Brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by using the CM/ECF system. I certify that
all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will
be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.
s/ James M. Scanlon

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Case: 16-4240 Document: 42 RESTRICTED Filed: 06/09/2017 Pages: 53

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

LUIS SEGOVIA, et al.,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Appeal from the United States District Court

JOINT BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES BOARD OF ELECTION

James M. Scanlon Patricia Castro

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees

APPEARANCE & CIRCUIT RULE 26.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Short Caption: Luis Segovia, et al v. USA, et al

of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago

(3) If the party or amicus is a corporation:

i) Identify all its parent corporations, if any; and

27 N. Wacker Drive #502

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ....................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................. 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 7

I. Illinois Statute Excluding Former Illinois Residents Now Living in Guam,

2. Illinois Failure to Keep Up with Changes in Federal Law Does Not

3. Illinois Has a Legitimate State Interest in Restricting the Ballot to

4. Plaintiffs Requested Relief Would Discriminate in Favor of U.S.

III. Illinois Statute Excluding Former Illinois Residents Now Living in

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 32(g)(1)

Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 906 (1978) .............................. 43

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-337 (1972) ............................................. 31

Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) .................................................. 23

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) ............................................ 35

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) ...................................................... 37

Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651 (1980) ....................................................... 40

Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297, 95 S.Ct. 1637 (1975)....................................... 31

Igartua v. U.S., 86 F.Supp.3d 50, 55-56 (D. Puerto Rico 2015)......................... 39

Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966) .............................................. 19

McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 89

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)........................................ 25, 28

McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35, 13 S.Ct. 3 (1892) ................................... 29

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ....................................................................... 37

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) .................................................. 27

San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)............... 37

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976) ................................. 41

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-1 .................................................................................... 2

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/21-1(1) ............................................................................... 4

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-1(4) ................................................................................ 14

52 U.S.C 20302(a)(1) ........................................................................................... 3

52 U.S.C. 20310........................................................................................... 19, 33

52 U.S.C. 20310(5)(C) ......................................................................................... 3

52 U.S.C. 20310(8) .............................................................................................. 3

89 Stat. 1142 2 .................................................................................................. 13

89 Stat. 1142 3(2) .............................................................................................. 13

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. 20310

H. R. Rep. No. 99-765, at 19, 1986 WL 31901, at *19 ........................................ 21

H.R. Rep. No. 94-649, *3, at 2 (1975).................................................................. 12

Public Act 81-953 (SB 1146), effective 9/22/1979 ............................................... 14

Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux, Note, A Most Insular Minority: Reconsidering

Ill. Const. 1970, Art. III, 1 .......................................................................... 22, 29

U.S. Const. Art. I, 4, cl. 1 .................................................................................. 29

U.S. Const. Art. II, 1, cl. 2 ................................................................................ 28

U.S. Const., Amend XIV, 1 ............................................................................... 25

Appellees Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago, Marisel

that the jurisdictional statement in Appellants re-submitted Brief is complete