박사학위논문

태권도의 독일유입과 변천
(1960 ~ 2000)

Introduction and Transition of Taekwondo in Germany

(1960 ~ 2000)

한국체육대학교 대학원

체 육 학 과

토마스쿠클린스키-리

지도교수 하 웅 용

2010 년 2 월
 태권도의 독일유입과 변천
(1960 ~ 2000)
Introduction and Transition of Taekwondo in Germany

(1960 ~ 2000)

한국체육대학교 대학원

체 육 학 과

토마스쿠클린스키-리

이 논문을 박사학위 논문으로 제출함

지도교수 하 웅 용

2010 년 2 월
Abstract

Introduction and Transition of Taekwondo in Germany

(1960~2000)

Kuklinski-Rhee, Thomas

Department of Physical Education

Graduate School of Korea National Sport University

Ha, Woong-yong

Prior to the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the German competitiveness in TKD faced
dramatic changes. While ranking on second place after Korea at the beginning of
the 1980s (in terms of gained international medals), Germany plays just a marginal
role in competition TKD since the 1990s. Which factors could be made responsible
for Germany’s decline in Taekwondo competitiveness, and why was the German
TKD administration not able to compensate for the loss?

In this current study, these and related questions were pursued by means of
social historiography. For this, different time periods were examined, such as the
formative years of Taekwondo in Germany during the 1960s; the formation and
developments of the most important German TKD associations during the 1970s
and 1980s (e.g., Deutsche Taekwondo Union, DTU; International Taekwondo
Federation-Deutschland, ITF-D); and the effects of the German Reunification of
1990 on TKD, together with the prospects of TKD as an official Olympic event
during the 1990s. Furthermore, the current socio-cultural position of TKD in
Germany was tried to determine by comparisons with other Asian martial arts
(Jujutsu, Judo, Karate, Aikido) as well as various European combat sports (Boxing,
Fencing, Wrestling). Research objects and tools included magazine articles, books,
the internet and one-on-one interviews with acknowledged experts of TKD in
Germany.
 The study resulted in four conclusions and two recommendations. First, the
socio-cultural comparisons with related martial arts and combat sports revealed that
TKD had endured a radical image change in Germany. While TKD was regarded as
an extremely effective and spectacularly artistic fighting system in the 1970s, it
became a family-friendly entertaining Olympic event with a ratio of 70% underaged
members 30 years afterwards. It could be assumed that the modern TKD image is
attracting a different kind of athletes than the old one, which in return could explain
partly the decline of German TKD athlete’s competitiveness since the 1980s.

Second, the examination into the formative years of TKD in Germany

discovered two different sources: U.S. GIs stationed in Southern Germany and
Korean coal miners working in hard coal pits in North Rhine-Westphalia. Their
different living situations and motivations resulted in two different habits in German
TKD which determined the transition of TKD in Germanz in the 1980s and 1990s.

Third, the analysis of the athletic records in TKD in the 1980s showed that the
decline in competitiveness beared external factors, such as professionalization of
TKD in other countries, as well as internal factors, such as mismanagement of the
DTU’s directors. Both factors sustained and reinforced each other during the 1990s,
leading to particular disappointing athletic achievements. The ITF-D, on the other
side, was able to manage both kinds of factors during the 1990s and gained top
athletic results in return.

Fourth, the analysis of the latest developments revealed that the DTU has laid its
primary focus on the support of TKD as elite sports, while widely ignoring the
prospects of TKD as recreational and leisure sport. This stood not only in sharp
contradiction to the disappointing athletic results of German TKD competitors, but
also to the socio-cultural image of TKD in Germany as an activity for the whole
family.

This led to the first recommendation. German TKD should lay more emphasize
on the importance of TKD as a recreational activity, e.g. for the silver generation, as
well as on TKD as a joyful leisure time program, especially for children and the
youth. In that case, TKD would most probably experience a raise of members,
which would also have beneficial effects on elite sports TKD.

The second recommendation was based on the assumption that the two world
governing TKD bodies, the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) and the
International Taekwondo Federation (ITF), would probably approach each other
more closely in the future, eventually leading to unifying the different TKD styles
into one umbrella administration, similar to the situations in fencing or wrestling.
The German TKD associations could already gain a competitive edge by actively
seeking more cooperation, instead of regularly applying mutual ignorance.

Keywords : Taekwondo, German Taekwondo, German Sports History

 Table of Contents

Ⅰ. Introduction ··································································· 1

1. Purpose of the Study ······················································· 1

2. Objectives of the Study ··················································· 9

3. Limitations of the Study ················································· 11

4. Research Method ·························································· 14

4.1. Original Documents ························································· 14

4.2. Secondary Literature ······················································· 17

4.3. Interviews ······································································ 27

5. Research Plan ······························································ 28

II. Socio-cultural Background for Taekwondo in Germany ····· 29

1. Taekwondo and other Korean Martial Arts in Korea ········· 31

1.1. Origins of Taekwondo in Korea until 1965 ························· 33

1.2. Taekwondo in Korea since 1965 ······································· 39

1.3. Struggling for a modernized Taekwondo ···························· 42

2. Combat Sports and Martial Arts in Germany ···················· 46

2.1. Combat Sports ································································ 46

2.1.1. Wrestling ··········································································· 49

2.1.2. Boxing ··············································································· 52

2.1.3. Fencing ·············································································· 55

2.1.4. Resume ·············································································· 57

- i-
 2.2. Martial Arts ···································································· 60

2.2.1. Jujutsu ··············································································· 62

2.2.2. Judo ··················································································· 66

2.2.3. Karate ················································································ 72

2.2.4. Aikido ················································································ 76

2.2.5. Resume ·············································································· 78

3. Korean Migrant Workers in West Germany ······················ 86

3.1. Labor Migration in West Germany ····································· 86

3.2. Korean Migrant Workers ·················································· 91

III. How Taekwondo Entered Germany (1960~1965) ··········· 100

1. Korean Migrant Workers Teaching "Korean Karate" in their

Spare Time ································································ 101

2. The Official Introduction of Taekwondo in 1965 ············· 104

3. "Korean Karate" in Garmisch-Partenkirchen ·················· 106

4. The "Oh-Do-Kwan" in Munich ····································· 108

5. A Lonely Student's Efforts in 1960 ······························· 110

IV. Administrational Effort for Taekwondo in Germany

(1964~1990) ···························································· 113

1. The Struggle for a Proper German Taekwondo Administration

(1964~1971) ······························································ 114

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 1.1. Lack of Effort in the Center ············································ 114

1.2. Power Struggles in the South ·········································· 117

1.3. Unexpected Problems ···················································· 120

2. The Struggle for a Self-Governed German Taekwondo

Administration (1971~1981) ··········································124

2.1. Struggles for Dominance ················································ 124

2.2. Struggles for Independence ············································ 131

2.3. Unity vs. Disparity ························································· 135

3. Conflicts and Problems Within the German Taekwondo

Community ································································· 139

3.1. Problem I: Lack of Korean Taekwondo Masters ··············· 139

3.2. Problem II: Commercial Taekwondo Schools ···················· 144

3.3. Conflict Line I: North vs. South ······································· 144

3.4. Conflict Line II: Full-Contact vs. Semi-Contact vs. Zero-

Contact Competition System ············································· 148

3.5. Inner Conflicts Within the ITF-D ····································· 151

4. Taekwondo in East Germany ········································ 154

V. Taekwondo in Reunified Germany (since 1989) ·············· 155

1. German Sports Unification since 1990 ··························· 157

1.1. Political Reunification ···················································· 157

1.2. Unification in Sports ······················································ 159

- iii -
 1.3. Situation for Taekwondo and other East Asian Martial Arts 163

1.4. Athletic Taekwondo Achievements during the 1990s ········ 165

2. Taekwondo in Reunified Germany: from Unity to Disparity 167

2.1. The impact of the WTF on the DTU during the 1990s ······· 168

2.2. Taekwondo: elite sports vs. recreational activity ·············· 170

2.3. Internal Power Struggles in the DTU ······························· 174

VI. Conclusion & Recommendation ···································· 177

1. Conclusion ································································· 177

2. Recommendation ························································· 179

Bibliography ···································································· 182

Interviews ······································································· 192

국문요약 ·········································································· 194

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 Ⅰ Introduction

1. Purpose of the Study

Around the time of the 1988 Seoul Olympics where the Korean martial art
Taekwondo (태권도, hanja 跆拳道; from now on, TKD)1 was a demonstration sport for
the first time, the successes of the German TKD competition teams went through
dramatic changes, as was shown by Kuklinski-Rhee & Ha (2007). While Germany had
been the runner-up after Korea in terms of medals won at the top international
tournaments at the beginning of the 1980s, it plays only a marginal role at international
TKD competitions since the 1990s. Since TKD became an official event at the Olympics,
it is one of Germany’s less successful Olympic sports. Which factors could be detected
as being responsible for the sudden decline of German TKD competitiveness, and for the
fact that Germany was not able to recover afterwards?

According to Kuklinski-Rhee & Ha (2007), one factor was the stepping-back of the
successful head coach of the German TKD teams, Park Soo-nam, in 1985. But a closer
look reveals that the problems in the German TKD competition teams already began
when Park was still in charge.2 Moreover, the fact that Park was reinstalled as national
head coach just for the TKD event at the 1988 Seoul Olympics, a competition that went

1
This abbreviation has the benefit that it covers the various TKD styles promoted by different federations.
Modern Olympic TKD promoted by the World Taekwondo Federation, for example, is spelled Taekwondo,
while the more traditionally oriented International Taekwondo Federation prefers to type Taekwon-Do. In
spite of constantly deciding to spell this word with or without a hyphen, usage of the abbreviation “TKD”
seems more practicable. Exceptions will be made for headings and the names of federations and events.
2
This was pointed out in several interviews, including Wolfer (2007), Jung (2007), and Arndt (2009). For
more details about the interviews and interviewees, see the “Appendix Table: Interviews and other
Interrogations, 2006~2009” at the end of this study.

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largely disappointing for the Germans, reveals that it was not just his physical presence
that guaranteed Germany’s successes during his regular term from 1976~1985.3

Therefore, the purpose of this current study was to determine the remaining factors
enabling the explanation of the decline of German TKD competitiveness during the
1980s and the German’s failed attempts to recover afterwards. This whole situation
seems especially odd considered the fact that at the time TKD was officially introcuced
to Europe, in 1965, West Germany already hosted more Korean TKD instructors than
any other European country, perhaps more than all of them combined 4 . Since 1963,
South Korean migrant workers had come to West Germany working in coal mines,
which summed up to about eight thousand until 1980. Several TKD masters were among
these migrant workers, and many of them settled in West Germany to teach their martial
art after their three-year working contracts ran out. It would be natural to assume that
these men formed a network which would later evolve into one of the first German
governing TKD bodies; but surprisingly, the facts contradict this hypothesis. Instead, it
took several years with no major developments of administrative structures, such as

3
At the 1988 Seoul Olympics, eight German male and four female athletes competed in TKD, but not more
than one match was won by a German athlete (Markus Woznicki). That result was especially disappointing
for another athlete, Michael Arndt, who had won the WTF World Championships (heavyweight) in the
previous year.
4
Estimations about concrete figures must remain vague. But according to Kim Un-yong, a total of 721 TKD
instructors taught in 48 countries in 1975, “with more than two-thirds of the instructors teaching in the
United States, Canada, and West Germany” (Gillis, 2008: 128). Given an even ratio, one-third of 66.6% of
all instructors were supposed to teach in Germany, thus 22.2% of 721, which would be more than 160
instructors. Moreover, this figure would cover only the instructors affiliated to the World Taekwondo
Federation; but at that time, most Korean masters in Germany followed the competing world governing
TKD body, the International Taekwondo Federation. Overall, they could sum up to more than 300 Korean
TKD instructors in West Germany in the 1970s.

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conducting referee’s training courses, setting up a national competition team and
organizing national and international tournaments, until the first generation of native
German black belts was ready to take the lead in administrating this Korean sport in
Germany.

Moreover, while such a development could be regarded as sheer coincidence with no

major relevance, the process that German TKD enthusiasts took over the administration
in Germany before it worked efficiently happened, in a very similar fashion, at least
twice, within the German branches of the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) and the
International Taewondo Federation (ITF), respectively. This odd behavior that Korean
TKD masters refrain from ruling over local TKD enthusiasts could hardly be found in
other countries and demands an extra explanation in respect of the situation of Koreans
within the German society.5

A gross estimation about the current situation of TKD in Germany would sum up to a
maximum of 100,000 practitioners in about one thousand public sports clubs and private
sports schools. They are currently distributed over three different main, and about two
dozen more minor associations and association-like administrations. The hugest of them,
the German Taekwondo Union (Deutsche Taekwondo Union, DTU), which is affiliated
to the ruling world body, the WTF, covers about two thirds of all clubs, schools and
members. 6 Another major association, the German branch of the main ITF (ITF-

5
As holding the position of national TKD head coach from 1976~1985, Park Soo-nam could be seen as a
possible exception from this rule. Yet as a payed coach, Park was hired by the directors who were running
the administration, without being a director by himself. His rule was on the national competition teams only,
not on the direction German TKD should take. However, on a personal level, he was befriended with the
long-time president of the administration, Heinz Marx, which would probably have included some influence
on the administration.
6
According to the latest statistics, the DTU featured exactly 59,944 registered members in 877 clubs in

- 3-
Deutschland, ITF-D),7 sums up to about five to ten percent of the clubs, schools and
members. 8 And up to 15,000 members in about 66 TKD schools, mostly run as
commercial enterprises, are associated with the private international association of TKD
pioneer Kwon Jae-hwa, the Kwon Jae-hwa Black Belt Center; its headquarter is located
in Fort Lauderdale in Florida.9

2008 (DOSB, 2008: 7). To get a more realistic number, about 5-10% of unregistered participants should be
added, which are often omitted in official reports by public clubs in order to pay less fees to the
superardinate federation. However, this official ratio of 68 1/3 members per TKD club should be used as a
basis for further estimations.
7
Currently, there are at least three different ITF organizations: one headed by North Korean IOC member
Chang Ung, another one headed by Choi Hong-hi’s son, Choi Jung-hwa, and a third one headed by Tran
Trieu Quan. The main German ITF branch is affiliated to the third one of these organization, while the other
two have only two (Chang Ung) or about a dozen (Choi Jung-hwa) member clubs in Germany (interview
Weiler, 2007). For the sake of clarity, all further comments about the German ITF branch, ITF-D, is related
to the one affiliated to the Tran Trieu Quan-ITF. The other two ITF branches are widely ignored in this study;
they would contribute to another few hundreds TKD participants.
8
According to the minutes of the general meeting on 1 November 2008, the ITF-D covered 87 clubs and
schools with a sum of 3528 members, with three additional clubs which failed to give the exact number of
their members; this would be an average ratio of about 40.5 members per club or school. The minutes are
available on the official ITF-D website at www.itf-d.de; accessed on 18 December 2009.
9
Beyer (2005: 18) specifies the number of Kwon-affiliated clubs and schools as 60, with a total of about
15,000 members; this would be an average ratio of 250 participants per club and school, far more than in the
DTU and ITF-D, which makes this figure sound unrealistic. On the other side, Kwon-affiliated TKD schools
are usually commercial enterprises, which tend to register more people than the public DTU and ITF-D
TKD clubs, because public clubs have to pay fees for their registered members to the regional umbrella

organization (Landessportbund, LSB). However, a more recent online research reveals 66 schools in
Germany affiliated to the Kwon association, plus one in Austria and one in Switzerland; see the Kwon Jae-
hwa Taekwon-Do websites at www.kwonjaehwa-taekwondo.com and www.traditionelles-taekwondo.de;
both accessed on 18 December 2009. It should also be noted that over the years, several students of Kwon’s
had opened their own TKD schools and had left the Kwon association after a while, thus taking several

- 4-
 TKD in these three organizations is very different. According to the rules of their
superordinated international organizations, the DTU features Poomsae (품새, hanja 品勢)
and full-contact sparring with chest and head protectors, while the ITF-D features Tul
(틀) and semi-contact sparring with hand and feet protectors. Also, dobok style and the
Korean terminology for techniques, postures and movements are different. The Kwon
organization features a similar dobok style and terminology as the ITF-D; however, in
forms and sparring style, a less elaborate way is promoted. Within the Kwon association,
the first 20 Hyong (형, hanja 形) General Choi Hong-hi originally developed are
practiced; 10 also, sparring style with abandonment of substantial protective gear is
supposed to be more essential, resulting in athletic zero-contact matches which are often
criticized as unrealistic (Capener 1995).

The remaining amount of TKD practitioners, clubs and schools is divided across a
growing number of organizations and networks; their respected figures can be estimated
only vaguely. Many Korean TKD masters, grandmasters and instructors residing in
Germany, for example, are personally affiliated to the WTF or the ITF, without formal
registration to a German sports association, and thus without official counting of their
members, schools, and clubs. Sometimes, they are forming tiny networks across their
own TKD clubs and schools. One of the most prominent Korean TKD masters of this
kind is Lee Keun-tae, who runs a network of commercial schools in North-Western
Germany (and, since German reunification, also in Eastern Germany), called Dr. Lee
Academy, where TKD and several other martial arts can be trained.11 Another one would

hundreds of members with them. The sum of those TKD practitioners might sum up to about one thousand.
10
Usually, only the first 19 Hyong are actually performed. The final Hyong, Tong-il (통일, hanja 統),
remains reserved for the day South and North Korea get reunited.
11
See the Dr. Lee Academy website, www.sport-dr-lee.de, accessed on 19 December 2009. Actually, the Dr.

Lee Academy is mainly selling Haidong Gumdo (해동검도), but their affiliated schools are also offering

- 5-
be Son Jong-ho, who is operating several clubs in Southern Germany. 12 Although
concrete figures about membership can hardly be estimated, it would be a reasonable
guess that these and other groups cover a few dozen TKD clubs and schools; and given
an average membership ratio per school or club, this would sum up to one to five percent
of all German TKD practitioners.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, and with rising intensity since 2000, several native
German TKD masters and instructors dissented from further participation at the German
WTF-affiliated TKD body, the DTU, after severe disagreements about the direction
German TKD was taking. Many of these schools and clubs remain independent since
then, forming a loose connection to other so-called Independent Single Dojangs (ISD).
Many others established new organizations, which are sometimes affiliated to the ITF or
WTF independently, thanks to an associated Korean TKD master with useful personal
connections. Some examples of these new organizations are the European Taekwondo
Federation (ETF), the Federation of International Taekwondo in Germany, the
International Budo Organization, the International Budo Association, the Global
Taekwondo Federation Germany, the International Mu-do Federation, the International
Martial Arts Federation, the World Association of Martial Artistry, the International
Taekwon-do and Budosport Federation and many more, sometimes consisting of not
more than one single club or school.

Kung Fu, Kuksoolwon (국술원; a Hapkido style), and others. Originally, the Korean Lee Keun-tae started
with TKD.
12
See the International Son Jong Ho Classic Taekwondo Federation website, www.classic-taekwondo.de;
accessed on 19 December 2009. According to this website, there are 11 TKD clubs in Germany, 7 in Austria,
4 in Italy and 2 in Switzerland affiliated to the Son Jong-ho organization, with no concrete figures about
members.

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 And finally, an unidentified number of people are practicing TKD at public middle
and high schools and leisure-time University sports programs without formal association
to any sports organization. Estimations about the respected amounts of practitioners of
all these new groups are virtually impossible, but may also sum up to about one to five
percent of all active German TKD practitioners, clubs and schools.

Furthermore, other Korean martial arts with some connection to TKD also cover
several thousand practitioners, sometimes performing techniques and forms practically
identical to those in old-school TKD. Most of those participants could be found in the
different German Hapkido (합기도, hanja 合氣道) organizations;13 it is not unusual for a
Hapkido club or school also offering TKD lessons. Since 2002, a German Taekkyon (택
견) master who learned the native Korean martial art in Korea is offering Taekkyon
classes and training courses all over Germany.14 They are usually filled with TKD
practitioners, but also joined by practitioners of Brazilian Capoeira. And finally, roughly
since the 1980s, an unidentified number of practitioners of early predecessors of TKD,
like Tangsoodo (당수도, hanja 唐手道) and Korean Karate, are organized in several
associations in Germany.15 To be clear, these organizations do not formally offer TKD
lessons. But both instructors and participants often have a TKD background.

Such a confusing situation could not be found in other Olympic sports in Germany,
and thus could raise many questions. But it just mirrors the situations of other East Asian

13
See, for example, the German Hapkido Federation website, www.deutsche-hapkido-federation.de;
German Hapkido Association website, www.hapkido-germany.de; and the Jin Jung Kwan Hapkido
Federation Germany, http://germany.jinjungkwan.org; all websites accessed on 19 December 2009.
14
See the website of the German Taekkyon Circle, www.taekkyon.de; accessed on 19 December 2009.
15
See, for example, the websites of the German Tangsoodo Federation, www.dtsdv.de, and the German
Tang Soo Do Moo Duk Kwan association, www.tangsoodo.de; see also the Association for Traditional Budo
Sports, www.koreanischeskarate.de; all websites accessed on 19 December 2009.

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martial arts in Germany. Judo (柔道), Jujutsu (柔術), Karate (空手) and Aikido (合気道),
for instance, the four other East Asian martial arts officially acknowledged by the top
German sports umbrella, the German Olympic Sports Confederation (Deutscher
16
Olympischer Sportbund, shortly DOSB), are represented by one huge major
association with DOSB affiliation, and one to several minor associations which are
officially ignored. Others, like Muay Thai, Kickboxing and the several Chinese Kung Fu
styles, are even not represented by a dominating administration in Germany.

The first separation of individuals and groups from the main German TKD
administration happened during the establishing of a proper WTF-affiliated association,
the DTU, in 1981. Several Korean TKD masters did not want to be formally associated
to the WTF and left the DTU. Some remained independent; a few went abroad; but most
of them summed up into ITF-affiliated federations, like the ITF-D (mentioned above), or
the German TKD Federation (Deutscher TKD Bund, DTB). Therefore, the process of
establishment of the DTU and the immediate reactions it provoked, which can be
observed until today, also deserve careful examinations.

The current situation with about two dozen TKD organizations in Germany emerged
successively during the last ten to fifteen years. Before that, the DTU was the
universally present TKD representative, and the only competitor, the ITF-D, was nearly
down. What had happened since then? Which processes caused the explosive diversity
of TKD organizations in Germany since TKD got Olympic (in 1988) and Germany got
reunited (in 1990)?

16
The former German Sports Confederation (Deutscher Sportbund, DSB) was renamed in 2006 after
merger with the German National Olympic Committee; see the DOSB website, www.dosb.de; accessed on 1
December 2009. Therefore, whenever the DSB is mentioned in this study, it is a reference to today’s DOSB.

- 8-
2. Objectives of the Study

The study followed four objectives.

First, determination of the socio-cultural position of TKD in Germany. This step

included an examination about the actual socio-cultural position of other East Asian
martial arts and European combat sports for comparable issues, as well as an exploration
of the socio-political situation related to Korean migrant workers and other foreigners
living in Germany around the time of the official introduction of TKD in 1965. This was
required to provide a basis for understanding of subsequent processes.

Second, an examination about the formative years of TKD in Germany. This step
covered the years before and after the official introduction of TKD in Germany in 1965,
from the time Korean and American martial arts experts residing in Germany started to
teach TKD on their own efforts until the sustainable establishment of the main TKD
association led by native Germans.

Third, examinations of the crucial decisions and actions in the establishment and
further development of the ruling German TKD body, the DTU. While these processes
led to the development of an internationally highly competitive West German TKD
scene on one side, the same processes resulted in growing discontent by members,
schools and clubs about the direction the main organization was heading at on the other
side. This step included examinations of particular conflict lines within the German
TKD scene and the process of the formal establishment of the German ITF branch. It
closed with the final resurrection of DTU's competitiveness and the realization of the
need for structural reforms around the time of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, both for the
German WTF and ITF branches.

Fourth, the impact of the German reunification and the aftermath on TKD in Germany.
Contrary to most other sports, the German reunification proved to be a heavy burden for

- 9-
the main TKD organization, the DTU, where increasing pressure from outside and
existing as well as newly emerging inner conflict lines reinforced each other. Especially,
the divergence of TKD as leisure and recreational sport and TKD as elite sport started to
become a major issue. In some respects, the DTU’s responses to these challenges
harmed the further development of Olympic TKD in Germany, much to the benefit of
non-Olympic TKD styles, like the ITF’s and others.

The study closed with four conclusions about the examined subjects and two
recommendations for the future transition of TKD in Germany.

- 10 -
3. Limitations of the study

First, based on the justified assumption that West Germany was the first European
country where TKD was introduced, 17 this study was focused on the proceedings of
TKD in Germany, with only rare additional views beyond the border. Therefore, it might
be found some day that somewhere else in Europe, even earlier TKD practitioners could
be found. But since it was generally acknowledged that West Germany was the
spearhead of European TKD until the mid-1980s and that the evidences of earlier traces
of TKD in other European countries would not affect the main results of this study, such
odd possibilities need not furtherly be examined.

Second, many of the German TKD proponents of the early days (including the
majority of persons interviewed for this study) were still vivid and actually engaged in
several activities during the period of this study. Some of them did not want their actual
lifes getting interfered with old stories, old problems and old clashes from the past, so
they might have felt some reluctance to comment on several aspects relevant to the
proceeding of TKD in Germany. Contrary to them, others with less important first-hand
experiences, but with a stronger political habit of guiding others in the direction of their
own opinions, were sometimes more willing to share their views. Herein lays the
systematic danger that the results of the research about the past might be biased in one
respect or another. This danger could adequately be handled by trying to confirm or
refuse allegations by external validation efforts, thus, by means of identifying supportive

17
The rationale for this assumption was that officially, TKD was introduced to Europe in 1965; yet Korean
migrant workers as well as American GIs in Germany had taught Korean Karate, which was later called
TKD, even before this official introduction. But West Germany was the only European country both groups
were located at that time. However, the possibility remained that, for example, a Korean student at another
European country’s university started practicing Korean Karate even before this happened in Germany.

- 11 -
or contradictory facts and documents. Otherwise, odd allegations were not taken too
seriously.

Third, original documents about the formative years of TKD in Germany and later
periods were rare and usually not accessible in public museums or archives, but in the
hands of individual persons, private schools and public clubs and associations. Therefore,
successful research in this field meant access to those documents, and the amount of this
access was a function of time and energy devoted into appeasing those subjects, which
could be conducted much easier from within the country than from abroad.
Consequently, many personal visits to Germany had been necessary throughout a period
of three years, where as much data was collected and as many connections were
established as possible. Where the access to original documents could not be enabled,
secondary literature and interviews were used as compensations.

Fourth, there was just a very limited amount of academic literature about East Asian
martial arts and similar areas of sports, especially including comparable social data in
these fields. Thus, the comparative part in this study was based mainly on the basic
statistics provided by the official German sports body, the German Olympic Sports
Confederation. These data distinguished between age groups and sexes, but were
omitting several other social factors, such as nationalities, social positions, and family as
well as educational backgrounds of the participants, especially of the top athletes of the
national competition teams. Those factors would probably bear significant explanational
values, as could be illustrated by the fact that the top athletes of the first and second
generation of German TKD competitors were often native Germans situated on a higher
educational level and occupying a higher social position, while the top athletes of the

- 12 -
second and fourth generation were typically of foreign origin with a usually unspecified
level of education and on a probably average social position.18

However, besides rather anecdotal evidences, complete statistical coverages of this

kind were missing, and since it would have been far beyond the scope of this study to
gain that kind of information by extra social research, that trace could not be followed in
this study, although it would have been a topic of significant interest. Therefore, future
social research on this topic would strongly be admired, though it would most probably
add extra explanational value which could not be provided in this study, and might as
well interfere with some of its assumptions, statements and conclusions.

Moreover, given the small basis of previous studies in this field plus the limited access
to original documents for a researcher from abroad, some aspects of the situation and
development of TKD in Germany might have remained untouched on this level of
research and might be discovered in further examinations, which, in turn, could interfere
with some of the allegations raised in this study. Therefore, this current study could not
claim to reveal the complete truthful picture about all aspects of the historical processing,
but should be regarded as a first step in its congruent reconstruction.

18
For example, top athletes of the first generation (roughly, athletes competing in the 1970s) would include
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Dahmen, Rainer Müller, Dr. Dirk Jung; second-generation’s top athletes (roughly,
athletes of the 1980s) would include Reinhard Langer, CEO Michael Arndt, Georg Streif; top athletes of the
third generation (roughly, the 1990s) would include a rising amount of persons with a foreigner’s
background, such as Musa Cicek, Aziz Acharki, Faissal Ebnoutalib; and the fourth generation (roughly,
since 2000) was virtually dominated by athletes of a foreigner’s origin, such as Mohammed Ebnoutalib,
Levent Tuncat, and Pinar Budak. This social shift in the pool of top athletes, from native Germans to
Germans with a foreigner’s background and from higher-level educated athletes to athletes on a more
average level, was also stressed by Gilbert Kapkowski as a general tendency in German TKD (interview G.
Kapkowski, 2009).

- 13 -
4. Research Method

The research in this study was based on three pillars: First, original documents from
the respected time period about the central topic in question. Second, additional
commenting and analyzing literature on the subject, as well as summarizing literature
about related areas which were beyond the central topic, such as additional martial arts,
earlier time periods, or other regions than Germany. And third, one-on-one interviews
with proponents and critiques of the central topics of the respected time period.

4.1. Original Documents

Original documents included unintended documents like contracts, letters, member

lists, appearance sheets, kup (급) and dan (단, hanja 段) grade promotion certificates,
teaching and instructor's licenses, as well as intended ones, like statistical and
chronological data, particularly written explanations and overviews about aspects of
TKD, diaries about particular events, published interviews, articles, reports and books
and particular promotion items, such as pamphlets and advertisements, and, finally,
photographs of individuals and teams as well as photographic reproductions of original
documents.

In case of contemporary history, those documents were usually in the hands of their
original owners, or in the issues of the originally published media, respectively. But
fortunately, an increasing amount of them was actually reproduced and published on the
internet, thus making the internet an indispensable source for research. However, this
affected only a fraction of original documents. It could be assumed that this limited
collection usually results from a pre-selection which would guide research in an
awkward direction. Hence, core assumptions should have not been based on thereafter
gathered documents; nevertheless, they provided useful additional information.

- 14 -
 Published original documents from the time period in question included monographies
by proponents of the early TKD years, such as Carl Wiedmeier (1966) and Kwon Jae-
hwa (1971). A standard source for the official introduction of TKD in Germany in 1965
was Choi Hong-hi’s famous book Taekwon-Do, whose German translation was based on
the 1972 English edition (Choi, 1994).

In the 1960s and 1970s, articles about TKD in Germany were usually published in
monthly magazines about other East Asian martial arts, like Judo Magazin (since 1961)
and Karate Revue (since 1975).19 Articles, interviews, reports, announcements, letters to
the editor, and others about TKD in Germany published in these magazines date back
until the late 1960s.

In 1980, the leading German TKD organization, the DTU, launched its own monthly
magazine, Taekwondo Aktuell (shortly TA), where original documents were regularly
published ever since.20 For example, the decline of West German TKD during the 1980s
and the conflict lines in the 1980s and 1990s could be directly observed at that very
source. Moreover, as it could be shown by Kuklinski-Rhee & Ha (2007), this magazine
played a key role in Park Soo-nam’s crucial stepping back as national head coach of the
German TKD competition team in 1985.

19
The Karate magazine changed its name every few years, from Karate Revue (in the 1970s) to Karate
Journal (1980s) to Karate-Budo-Journal (1990s). In the new Millennium, the magazine merged with
another, Budo-International, to become Karate Budo International, which was its actual name at the time of
the study.
20
The Taekwondo Aktuell was originally published by DTU president Heinz Marx in cooperation with
publisher Rainer Kawan. At the end of 1984, they got separated after financial disagreements, and Heinz
Marx continued to publish the magazine on his own. In 1993, he sold the magazine to Park Soo-nam, who

was running the Taekwondo Aktuell, the leading German TKD periodical, since then (Stix 1993: 8; Kim
1993: 3).

- 15 -
 As the TA usually presented the official viewpoint of the DTU (i.e. Olympic TKD in
the nutshell, but often in disagreement with WTF politics), German TKD dissidents,
renegades, hypocrites or just alternative points of view appeared in competing East
Asian martial arts magazines of that time. During the 1980s, several more magazines
joined the above-mentioned, such as Budo-Welt (since 1982) and Budo-Magazin (since
1987).21 All the above-mentioned magazines were available in the library of the German
Sports University in Cologne.

Between 1988~2007, the biggest West German regional DTU branch released its own
bimonthly magazine, Taekwondo Spiegel (TS).22 Its articles documented first-hand the
numerous clashes between the official German DTU opinion and policy, having always
been led by Bavarians, and its main opposition, the biggest and (in terms of international
medals) most successful regional DTU branch, the North-Rhine Westphalian Taekwondo
Union (NWTU). This clash reflected the traditional line of conflicts between Northern
and Southern Germany, most visibly between the two biggest German states, North-
Rhine Westphalia with its protestant Hohenzollern-Prussian heritage, and Bavaria with

21
The magazine Budo-Welt was published by Rainer Kawan, then co-publisher of the Taekwondo Aktuell
(together with DTU president Heinz Marx). Probably, it was the predecessor of the Budo-Magazin, which
started in the same year Kawan’s Budo-Welt was terminated, in 1987, although both had different publishers.
22
The Federal Republic of Germany consists of 16 Federal States (West Germany until 1990: 11 Federal
States), with North Rhine-Westphalia (nearly 18 Million citizens) and Bavaria (about 12.5 Million) being
the biggest ones, and the City States Hamburg (about 1.8 Million) and Bremen (about 700,000 citizens)

being the smallest. The German Olympic Sports Confederation (DOSB) is administrating elite sports in all
Germany, while subordinated regional sports confederations (Landessportbund, LSB) are administrating
leisure and recreational sports, ideally one LSB in each Federal State. Likewise, all member associations of
the DOSB, including the DTU, are running subordinated regional branches in the different Federal States,
which are operated independently, and sometimes confront each other.

- 16 -
its catholic Wittelsbach heritage and close ties to Habsburg.23 This and other conflict
lines were regular subjects in the secondary literature.

4.2. Secondary Literature

The majority of the secondary literature was published in the two competing German
TKD magazines, TA and TS, usually written by officials of the DTU (and its affiliates)
and the NWTU, respectively, or other experts with inside knowledge. Other viewpoints,
like opinions of the German ITF branch or of minor associations like Kwon Jae-hwa’s or
Son Jong-ho’s, also appeared there sometimes.24 However, clearly dissenting viewpoints
and comments, for example, from renegades who left the DTU and joined another
organization or remained independent, were rarely published there; at best, they were
expressed in letters to the editor,25 or published in one of the competing martial arts
magazines. At the time of the study, dissenting viewpoints could most likely be found on
the internet.

23
This traditional conflict line was referred to once in the mid-1980s by the North Rhine-Westphalian TKD
president Dieter Jebramcik, when he refused an offer from the Bavarian DTU president Heinz Marx with the
following words: “I’d rather be the King of Prussia than the powerless Emperor of Germany” (interview
Jebramcik, 2009).
24
A critical review about these sources should note that articles with a critical intention about the actual
publishers did not appear in the TA or the TS; but this should not lead to the impression that there weren’t
any dissenting opinions. As noted above, from 1981~1993, the TA was published by Heinz Marx, and since
1993, by Park Soo-nam. The TS was published between 1988~2007 by the North Rhine-Westphalian
Taekwondo Union, headed most of the time by Dieter Jebramcik (NWTU president 1984~2001).
25
Another way would have been an enforced counter statement, after statements were published contrary to
the facts. But this happened only rarely; moreover, as Jebramcik once complained (Interview 22. 2009), this
judicial right of reply was ignored at least once, while DTU president Heinz Marx was in charge of the TA.

- 17 -
 Thus, the internet provided a reliable source of opinions, reports, overviews, analyses
with secondary-literature status. One of the most frequently visited independent
information websites for TKD in Germany was the Taekwondo Reference Book. 26 It
contained several kinds of information about TKD in Germany and in general, most
prominently explanations and analyses about TKD forms, both hyong and poomsae,
including pictures and videos. Furthermore, it provided internet links and postal
addresses of TKD clubs and organizations in Germany and world-wide.

Besides websites of associations, schools, clubs and a few individuals who care about
TKD in Germany, several discussion boards with TKD insiders regularly participating
provided relevant research information for the topics in question. One of them, the
internet discussion board Taekwondoforum, was devoted to TKD only and administered
by several enthusiasts from various TKD styles and associations. 27 Similar to the
distribution in real life, most discussion board activists argued in favor of Olympic-style
TKD, but viewpoints from the ITF and other styles were also expressed there. The
discussions on this board have been dominated by TKD experts, not newbies; sometimes,
even officials of the DTU or one of its subordinated Federal State member associations
engaged in discussions.

Two other German internet discussion boards have been visited by TKD enthusiasts
regularly, which were the Kampfkunst-Board and the Kampfkunstforum. 28 They were
administered by experts of various martial arts, including (WTF) TKD, and covered all
aspects of martial arts and combat sports, from all over the world. Both of them had

26
See Taekwondo/Taekwon-Do/Tae Kwon Do-Nachschlagewerk, www.taekwondo. de; accessed on 10
December 2009.
27
Taekwondoforum, www.taekwondoforum.info; accessed on 10 December 2009.
28
Kampfkunst-Board, www.kampfkunst-board.info; accessed on 10 December 2009.
Kampfkunstforum, www.kampfkunstforum.de; accessed on 10 December 2009.

- 18 -
special sections where topics about TKD and other Korean martial arts could be
discussed. Many participants regularly engaging in TKD-related discussions on these
boards were also regular visitors of the above-mentioned Taekwondoforum. Most
participants of TKD-related topics had a background of DTU experiences as well as of
other associations, and many also had experiences in related arts or sports, such as
Karate, Hapkido and Taekkyon. On the other side, a number of participants of TKD
discussions on these two boards originally practiced other martial arts, mostly from
Japan, China or Thailand, but often not from Eastern Asia, such as (Kick-)Boxing and
Mixed Martial Arts. Hence, postings on these boards often did not reach the quality level
of the Taekwondoforum, but provided viewponts from fresh new angles on TKD.29

Thus, internet portals like those discussion boards could be rated as precious sources
for minor or alternative opinions about general and particular aspects of TKD.
Furthermore, for many minor and private TKD organizations, the internet was the only
way to spread information. On the other side, this facilitated individuals and groups to
dissenting from established organizations and remaining independent, or opening
another organization and to stay in contact with other TKD practitioners and the main
important TKD information. Therefore, the internet could provide a huge margin of the
explanation about why most minor and dissenting TKD organizations appeared in the
New Millennium.30

29
For example, it turned out that TKD competition in general, no matter which style, were regularly the aim
of scorn and derision by practitioners from other martial arts with a different sparring system. The regular
point of critique was that all TKD sparring systems were unrealistic models for a real-life setting, thus TKD
training would badly prepare for real fights. However, the same argument would be valid for all sports
competitions with a fixed set of rules.
30
For example, Gilbert Kapkowski, head of the dissenting European Taekwondo Federation (ETF), once
stressed the importance of the internet for his small organization (interview G. Kapkowski, 2009).

- 19 -
 Monographies including historical overviews and analyses about TKD in Germany
emerged first around the time of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, usually written by
acknowledged or self-acclaimed martial arts experts, not necessarily with TKD expertise.
Before that, TKD books were focused on names and illustrated descriptions of
techniques and forms and reprinted promotion and competition regulations, together
with short passages about the alleged historical and philosophical background of Korea
and TKD. More thorough historical examinations about martial arts in general, and TKD
in particular, both in Germany and on global scale, started with the very critical, but not
very thoughtful, book by psychologist and Karate practitioner Colin Goldner about East
Asian martial arts in 1988 (second edition 1992).

Goldner’s main fault was his calculated intermingling of Japanese Karate, Korean
TKD, Bruce Lee’s Kung Fu and Western Kickboxing by intentionally ignoring the
differences (Goldner, 1992: 13). This was possible because at that time, the German
public knew little about those differences, and did not care at all. Goldner’s main
hypothesis was that the martial arts boom of the 1970s and 1980s in Germany was not
only a reflection of an increased aggressive attitude in the German society, but also one
of its causes (37). Goldner’s empirical research of about 350 martial arts practitioners in
the 1980s (49) gained some public attention, and particularly resulted in severe
criticisms by various martial arts practitioners.31

Since then, several experts tried to clarify particular aspects of different martial arts,
mostly about correct performances of the movements and a proper terminology, but also
in respect of an accurate historical context which separated the different arts and styles.

31
The first edition of Goldner’s book was released in the Olympic year of 1988 and caused some attention
in the public. One of the results was a television debate between the author and the president of the German
Taekwondo Union (DTU), Hans Siegel, in September 1990 – one of the very rare occasions a German TKD
official was on TV; see Goldner, 1992: XI.

- 20 -
Likewise, several TKD experts tried to clarify particular aspects of TKD history in
techniques-based TKD text books, for example, Knoll (1994), Lee (2000), and
Gatzweiler (2008).32 Generally, the older the TKD text book, the less historical accuracy
can be found.

Registering the need to explain the public what exactly TKD was (and what it was
not), fomer DTU media secretary Peter Knoll published a monography about the basics
of TKD two years after the 1992 Barcelona Olympics (where TKD had been a
demonstration sport for the second time). This little book, titled Comprehensible
Taekwondo, did not teach how the different TKD techniques and forms should be
performed correctly, like standard text books; instead, it explained which techniques and
movements could reasonably be expected from the different styles of TKD, so that the
reader could establish a proper concept of the possibilities and constraints of TKD.
Especially, Knoll pointed out that “Taekwondo does not elicit violence” (Knoll, 1994:
13).

For the first time in Germany, this text book contained a lengthy passage about the
history of TKD in general and in Germany in particular, informing the reader about the
past glory and recent decline of German TKD competitiveness, as well as about the two
competing world governing bodies.33 Together with the nice pictures, the reader could
get the impression that TKD was an exciting new sport with a democratic openness

32
Peter Knoll, DTU Secretary for Media in the 1980s; Lee Kyong-myong, TKD pioneer in Austria and
Poland in the 1970s, later WTF deputy secretary-general and vice president; Gerd Gatzweiler, German TKD
pioneer since 1964.
33
See Knoll, 1994: 74~103. That passage covered about one quarter of the whole book and included a
section about the German ITF branch, written by its head at that time, Paul Weiler (president ITF-D
1989~2007).

- 21 -
safely enough for the whole family to practice, far away from the brutal violence
Goldner’s book was promoting.

In celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Bavarian DTU branch, the Bavarian
Taekwondo Union (BTU), in 2008, the BTU officials Peter Bolz and Werner Schuldes
published a book completely dedicated to the history of TKD in Germany, with a clear
focus on the chronology of TKD events in Bavaria (by partly ignoring other regions).
Although such anniversary books are quite a tradition in Germany’s public clubs and
associations,34 other regional DTU branches did not follow the BTU’s example until the
end of the study. That BTU book was written by two outstanding experts about historical
aspects of TKD, not only in Germany.35 Such expertise would not easily be available for
other DTU branches, or for the DTU as a whole.36

The anniversary BTU book provides both descriptive and interpretive secondary-level
information as well as reprints of original documents, therefore also being a primary
source for information. However, it is not free from errors or omissions in its descriptive
part. For example, as was shown in Kuklinski-Rhee & Ha (2007), the decline of German
TKD was enforced in 1985 with an act of severe disloyalty by the DTU magazine,
Taekwondo Aktuell, followed by the quick replacement of the successful Korean national

34
See, for example, the publication for the 50th anniversary of the German Sports Confederation, DSB
(Mevert, 2000); however, the earliest possible date for a 50th anniversary of an existing German TKD
association would not be before 2017.
35
Peter Bolz, BTU media secretary since 2003, was the long-time official photographer for the DTU and
BTU with arguably the hugest collection of original German TKD photographs; Werner Schuldes was a
long-time BTU official since 1995.
36
For example, the inofficial TKD chronist of the biggest DTU branch of the German Federal State of
North Rhine-Westphalia, Norbert Wolfer, passed away after long disease in the same year the BTU
anniversary book was published. Wolfer had published significant articles about TKD in Germany (e.g.
Wolfer, 2001).

- 22 -
head coach, Park Soo-nam, with the former flagship athlete, Dirk Jung; three years later,
just for the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Jung was replaced by Park. This whole chain of
events was completely omitted in the anniversary BTU book (cf. Bolz & Schuldes, 2008:
63ff.).

However, the general tendency to deliver historically accurate information about TKD
in Germany and in general, as could be seen in the books by Knoll (1994) and Bolz &
Schuldes (2008), deserved full respect. Another step in this direction was the (also in its
technical parts ambitious) Handbook Taekwondo by German TKD pioneer Gerd
Gatzweiler (Gatzweiler, 2008). It started with a lengthy introductory part about the
historical and philosophical roots of TKD, which took about one third of the whole book.

Finally, a few words on academic research and diploma, master and doctoral theses
about the topic of East Asian martial arts in Germany. The first observation was that this
area is not covered by many academic gradual and resarch writings in Germany. For
example, the German Sport University of Cologne enlisted just three dissertations out of
537 with a martial arts-related topic, 37 one of them dealing with performance enhancing
in judo athletes (Jarmoluk, 1989), another one about games and sports at the Japanese
imperial court from the 7th to the 14th century (Möller, 1993), and, finally, some
biomechanical analyses of movements and strikes in Karate (Pfeifer, 2001).

Likewise, among the 13,846 graduation theses of the Cologne Sport University, less
than 1% covered the field of East Asian martial arts.38 The most interesting ones for this
current study have been Cremer (1985), Arend (1989), Nigro (1997), and Beyer (2005).
The diploma thesis of Leo Cremer sported the most similar topic to this current study; it

37
On 12 June 2008; see http://zb-sport.dshs-koeln.de/Hochschulschriften.html, accessed on 24 November
2009.
38
This figure covered all diploma and master theses until 20 November 2009; see http://zb-sport.dshs-
koeln.de/Hochschulschriften.html, accessed on 24 November 2009.

- 23 -
was titled “The History of Taekwon-Do” (Cremer, 1985). Written about 25 years ago, it
clearly featured the flaws of a misconducted TKD history which was promoted by both
WTF and ITF prior to the 1988 Seoul Olympics. For example, Taekkyon master Song
Duk-ki (송덕기) was mentioned as a main forerunner of TKD with a causal influence on
this martial art (Cremer, 1985: 42). Likewise, the passage about TKD in Germany
(82~94) contained so many factual errors that Cremer’s thesis could hardly be regarded
as a starting point for a modern, critical study of TKD in Germany. At best, it could be
used as a reference for individual aspects, since Cremer added several photographies and
photocopied documents to his study, thus delivering first-hand historical information.39

The diploma thesis of Hans-Peter Arend about the athletic and organizational
development of Karate and TKD in Germany and beyond suffered from a lack of details
concerning TKD history at all, but contained a rich collection of details concerning the
Karate history in Germany (Arend, 1989). Thus, Arend’s study provided a decent basis
for comparisons between the developments of Karate and TKD in Germany. However,
many crucial details about TKD in Germany remained untouched by Arend.

The diploma thesis of Raffaele Nunzio Nigro about TKD and Karate as competitors
for the acceptance as official Olympic events was focused on comparisons between the
main governing bodies of these two East Asian martial arts (Nigro, 1997). It featured
useful insights into the international Karate administration, but fell short in terms of
providing information about international TKD administrations.

Finally, the diploma thesis of Ulrich Beyer about opportunities and obstacles for
professional TKD instructors provided some insights into TKD as a business enterprise

39
For example, on page 68, there is a photocopied reprint of the list of the complete board of directors of

the first WTF term from 1973~75, which revealed that the Member of the German Parliament (Bundestag),
Dr. Leo Wagner, was one of the two initial vice presidents of the WTF (the other one being Dr. Roland de
Marco from the U.S.). Oddly, Dr. Wagner is not mentioned in overviews about German TKD any more.

- 24 -
in Germany (Beyer, 2005). Based on interviews with three TKD school owners from
different TKD styles, it could be used as a reference point for assessing the role of TKD
in the German culture and society.

An online research about the topics Kampfkunst and Kampfsport, the two common
German translations for “martial art”, among diploma and master theses at the leading
German diploma website, which covered 11,797 files at that time, delivered just three
hits,40 one of them already mentioned (Nigro, 1997). Another one was less interesting
for the topic of this current study, dealing with the benefits of Chinese martial art’s
principles in the realm of economy (Mack, 1998). And the third academic diploma thesis
was about TKD as school sport (Radtke, 2001). That thesis was just partly interesting for
the current study, for it touched this study’s topics only marginally.

The most important academic researches about TKD in Germany could be found in
the two academic publications and one preliminary paper of Prof. Dr. Gu Hyosong, who
had studied sport science in Hamburg in the 1990s.41 Mr. Gu started in 1992 spreading a
paper everywhere he went in Germany (interview Gatzweiler, 2007), titled “Who Fears
the Truth” (Gu, 1992)42. For the first time in Germany, a Korean expert openly revealed
the real origins of TKD from Japanese Karate, instead of Subak performed by the
hwarang in ancient Shilla, as it was usually portrayed (cf. Ferger & Shin, 1986a, 1986b,
1986c, 1986d). One year later, Gu completed his diploma thesis, titled “Aggression,

40
See www.diplom.de; accessed on 29 November 2009.
41
During the time of his studies in Germany, Mr. Gu sported a 6th dan degree in TKD (Kukkiwon) and was
an official dan promotion inspector in Germany. During the time of this study, Dr. Gu was professor at the
Youngsan University near Busan; see his website at www.sportstory.net/home/ghs/base/index.php, accessed
on 30 November 2009.
42
This paper can be found on several websites; see, for example, the Hessia Taekwondo Union,
www.hessen-tkd.de/Geschichte/wer hat angst vor der wahrheit.pdf, accessed on 30 November 2009.

- 25 -
Nationalism and Martial Arts in Eastern Asia” (Gu, 1993/94). At first, he published his
thesis on his own efforts with limited effects, but it got frequently spreaded around on
websites and martial arts discussion boards later on. This thesis included a more
thorough explanation about the question why the real TKD origins were kept hidden by
the ITF and WTF.

In 1999, Gu completed and published his dissertation thesis, titled “Combat and
Locomotion”, where he analyzed typical martial arts moves in a biomechanical and a
broader cultural context (Gu, 1999). This paper was also spreaded frequently on the
internet. These papers by Dr. Gu clearly have been the most influential writings in
Germany about TKD history and its origins. However, they did not contain much
material about the particular situation of TKD in Germany.

To summarize, there actually was some influential and particularly interesting

literature about TKD in Germany, which would be referred to in this study. However,
there was no satisfying ground-breaking research about the peculiarities of TKD in
Germany which could provide a starting basis for the current study, neither about the
situation when and how TKD was introduced to Germany (chapter III of this study), nor
the conditions and problems of its subsequent transition in Germany (chapter IV),
especially since the German reunification of 1990 (chapter V). Therefore, all crucial
research about these topics had to be started at the very beginning, and had to rely
heavily on usage of original data and literature.

Contrary to that, other topcs which did not represent the primary focus of this study
could have been accessed by way of summarizing and analyzing secondary literature,
such as the general history of TKD in Korea, the socio-cultural comparison between
East Asian martial arts and European combat sports, and the situation of Korean migrant
workers in West Germany. All three topics were dealt with in chapter II.

- 26 -
4.3. Interviews

To cope with the situation of a relative small basis of literature about a time period of
40 years, interviews had been mandatory. Such interviews included proponents and
participants of the formative years of TKD in Germany and other critical time periods,
as well as critical observers of the changes and transitions during the time period in
question. Interviews had preferably been conducted one-on-one, where the interrogator
designed specific questions which were freely answered by the interviewee. However,
this method was time and energy consuming; therefore, only a limited number of classic
interviews with key figures of German TKD could have been conducted. Those
interviews included early pioneers of Korean Karate in Germany; former and actual top
officials from the DTU, NWTU, BTU, the German ITF branch and the private Kwon
association; former top athletes (Olympic style) and head coaches; outstanding critiques
of the DTU and founders of separatist administrations (ETF) or independent TKD
schools; former and actual leading staff from the TA and TS magazines; and the leading
German Taekkyon expert.

For a complete list of interviewees, see the “Appendix Table: Interviews and other
Interrogations, 2006~2009” at the end of this study. That list also includes several
telephone and E-Mail communications with key figures of German TKD.

- 27 -
5. Research Plan

- 28 -
 II. Socio-cultural Background for Taekwondo in Germany

The family is gathered in front of the TV screen. It is the summer of 2008, and
everybody is following the Games of the 29th Olympiad in Beijing. Suddenly, a
Taekwondo match is broadcasted, a semifinal. The reporter speaks enthusiastically about
the competitor from the U.S., allegedly the most successful TKD athlete on the planet,
who is on his way for his third Olympic gold medal in a streak. The father looks up; he
remembers the first public TKD demonstrations in Germany, more than 40 years ago. It
was one of the most exciting athletic performances he had ever seen, with real self-
defense situations and stone-breaking knife-hand strikes which could kill a man – but
what he sees on TV now bears no resemblance to the furious action of his childhood.
The son, who likes Bruce Lee and K-1, is laughing about the uselessly swinging arms of
the competitors, while filling the acion-lacking boredom of the bout with bad jokes,
dubbing this “take-one-dough” coward dancing and phony fighting. His little sister likes
the artistic moves, which enable elegant quickness dominating over massive muscle
power in this sport; she wants to join Mr. Kim’s Sports Academy across the street next
week. In his gym, old Grandmaster Kim smiles in his favorite meditative position while
listening to the sports news on the radio; finally, he hopes, days might be numbered for
his traditional martial art getting sold-out for soft drinks and hamburgers, as he imagines
international protests erupting after the obvious match fixing …

Although a made-up story, this was a collection of actual reactions by German

spectators of an Olympic high-class TKD match, which could be found, for example, on
the various internet discussion boards on TKD and martial arts. Obviously, there are
several images of TKD in the German society, ranging from a fiercy “killing art” (cf.
Gillis, 2008) to a professionally organized Olympic entertainment event, from traditional
meditative exercises to recreational fitness programs.

- 29 -
 A careful analysis of the transition of TKD in Germany would require an
understanding of the historical situations of both TKD and Germany before they came
into touch. As long as such an exploration would only be a preliminary enterprise paving
the way for the core topics of the current study, research in this area might mainly be
based on secondary literature. For the sake of shortness, brief overviews of relevant
aspects should be sufficient, without deeper explorations of critical details.

This chapter deals with overviews about the integration of martial arts, combat sports
and related disciplines in general in the German culture and society, as well as an
exploration of the socio-political aspects related to Korean migrant workers and other
foreigners living in Germany, before the official introduction of TKD in 1965.
Furthermore, the introductory section of this chapter provides an overview about the
history of TKD and other Korean martial arts in general. While this was a field of some
controversy (cf. Gu, 1994), questionable details and analyses had not been examined
here. Instead, a rough sketch along the key events and decisions of the development of
TKD in and outside of Korea were seen as sufficient, which could be based on recent
English literature on this topic. Capener (1995) paved the ground,43 which was further
cemented by Burdick (1997) and Dohrenwend (c. 1997), and finally settled by Kang &
Lee (1999). Most recently, Gillis (2008) added much material by gaining information
through numerous interviews with key proponents of TKD, including big names such as
Choi Hong-hi and Jhoon Rhee. A final source of expert knowledge on this topic was the
Martial Arts History Project on the internet.44

43
Steven Capener (1995) based his arguments on the same source as Gu Hyosung in Germany (1992;
1993/94; 1999), namely, Kim Young-Ok’s book “Principles Governing the Construction of the Philosophy
of Taekwondo” (Kim, 1990).
44
The Martial Arts History Project was a section of a strictly critical, independent online discussion board;
see www.bullshido.net, accessed on 11 December 2009. This internet project covered all disciplines, styles

- 30 -
 1. Taekwondo and other Martial Arts in Korea

Contrary to official statements of the leading TKD organizations,45 it was growingly

believed that TKD did not originate in a 2000 year old Korean tradition of foot-fighting
excercises, or that prerunners of TKD had been practiced in several states of ancient
Korea by special elite fighting groups. Of course, some kinds of combat practice had
occurred in the areas of ancient Korea, as everywhere else in the world. They had been
assigned with different names, such as Soobak (수박, hanja 手搏) and Kwon Bop (권법,
hanja 拳法), Ssireum (씨름) and Taekkyon (택견). It was not the concern of this study to
explore the question if the famous Hwarang (화랑, hanja 花郞) of the ancient Silla
kingdom were engaged in anything similar like that, nor if Korean martial arts had a
greater impact on Japanese ones, or the other way around. On the contrary, it should be
expected that they influenced each other during more than one and a half millenniums of
coexistence.

It could further be expected that the crucial developments of Japanese Jujutsu (柔術),
Judo (柔道), Aikido (合気道) and Karate during the period of Korean occupation would
have had a significant impact on Korean martial arts as well. Consequently, evidences
were overwhelming that Korean TKD and Korean Hapkido (hanja: 合氣道; shortly,
HKD) developed from the Japanese martial arts of Karate and Jujutsu, respectively.
Other martial arts, even from more remote countries than Japan, might also have had an
influence on these developments; but explorations in that direction would have gone far
beyond the scope of this study.

and traditions of martial arts, and TKD history was a regularly appearing subject of hot debatings.
45
See, for example, the history sections of the Kukkiwon (www.kukkiwon.or.kr), the Korea Taekwondo
Association (www.koreataekwondo.org), the World Taekwondo Federation (www.wtf.org), the German
Taekwondo Union (www.dtu.de); all websites had been accessed on 11 December 2009.

- 31 -
 However, the most significant impacts on modern Korean martial arts stem from the
mentioned Japanese arts, as the simple fact revealed that the prominent pioneers of TKD
and HKD, Choi Hong-hi and Choi Yong-sul, originally have studied and mastered
Karate and Jujutsu, respectively, in Japan. 46 It should be mentioned that the regular
denial of Taekkyon experts about Taekkyon ever have been involved in the early
development of TKD was taken for granted here. In fact, proponents of early German
TKD also confirmed that at first, their art was more similar to Shotokan Karate than
anything else, and especially Taekkyon moves and principles, as they discovered
decades later, were totally different from anything they learned from Korean TKD
masters (interview Gatzweiler, 2009).

To understand the situation of Korean martial arts properly when TKD was officially
introduced to Germany in 1965, the historical roots of TKD prior to 1965 was examined
first. This examination led to a discussion about the proper usage of terms like
Taekwondo, Tangsoodo, and Korean Karate. Second, to understand the transition of
TKD in Germany, and especially the influence of the different world governing TKD
bodies – the International Taekwondo Federation (ITF) and the World Taekwondo
Federation (WTF) – on TKD in Germany, the progress of TKD in Korea since 1965 was
outlined.

46
Choi Yong-sul (최용술; 1904~1986) is believed to have lived by master Takeda Sokaku (武田 惣角;
1959~1943) since he was 11, and learned everything about Dayito-ryu Aiki-jujutsu (大東流合気柔術) in
that time. His student Ji Han-jae (지한재; born 1936) chosed the name Hapkido (合氣道) for the art, which
has the same hanja characters as original Japanese Aikido (合氣道; since 1945, a more simplified character is
applied: 合気道), but both are significantly different martial arts. Aikido was founded by Morihei Ueshiba
(植芝 盛平), who was also a student of Tadeka’s from 1915~37.

- 32 -
 1.1. Origins of Taekwondo in Korea until 1965

The origins of TKD could be traced down to five Korean martial arts masters. 47
During the period of Japanese occupation of Korea, all of them had learned some kind of
Japanese Karate in Japan or in Manchuria, which was also occupied by the Japanese at
that time. These master’s names were enlisted in the table 01 below, which also shows
the Karate style and other martial arts they had learned, and the name of the kwan (TKD
school) they founded in Korea, and therefore, which tradition (TKD style) they
established.

Table 01. Founding Fathers of TKD and their Traditions

Name Martial Arts Training Kwan/Tradition

Lee Won-kuk Shotokan Karate in Japan by Cheongdo-kwan (1944)

(1907~2003) Funakoshi Gichin (1868~1957) Tangsoodo/Kongsoodo

Ro Byung-jik Shotokan Karate in Japan by Seogmu-kwan (1946)

(1919~) Funakoshi Gichin (1868~1957) Tangsoodo/Kongsoodo

Hwang Ki Kwon Bop (hanja 拳法; Mudeuk-kwan (1945)

(1914~2002) chin. Quanfa, jap. Kempo) Tangsoodo/Soobakdo
& Karate in Manchuria

Chun Sang-sup Judo, Karate in Japan Yeonmu-kwan (1946)

(~1953)* Jido-kwan (1953)**
Judo & Kongsoodo

Yoon Byung-in Kwon Bop (拳法) in Manchuria; YMCA Changmu-kwan (1946)

*
(~1953) Shudokan Karate in Japan (5th dan) by Kwon Bop (Kempo Karate)
Toyama Kanken (1888~1966)

Sources: Burdick 1997; Kang, Lee 1999; The Free Encyclopedia48

*
Chun Sang-sup and Yoon Byung-in disappeared during the Korean War.
**
After Chun Sang-sup’s disappearance, his students changed the school’s name into Jido-kwan.

47
Much of the material in this chapter is gained from Burdick (1997); Kang & Lee (1999); Gillis (2008).
48
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 13 November 2009.

- 33 -
 Table 01 shows that two of the founding fathers of TKD actually had studied by the
founding father of Japanese karate, Funakoshi Gichin (船越 義珍, 1868~1957), and
one had studied by the founder of the Shudokan Karate style, Toyama Kanken (遠山寛賢,
1888~1966). Both Japanese masters were born and raised on the Ryukyu Islands,
where they had learned several styles of the traditional Okinawan martial art Tode (唐
手), meaning Chinese hand, because it is originated in much older Chinese martial arts
styles. In the 1920s, Tode was introduced to Japan by Funakoshi, Kanken, and others. At
first, Funakoshi adopted the traditional name of the art, which was pronounced in
Japanese as Karate (唐手). But during the time of Japanese Imperialism in the 1930s, the
Chinese roots had to be cut off, and Funakoshi changed the art’s name into Empty Hand
(空手), which is also pronounced as Karate in Japanese.

In Korean, these names, written with Chinese hanja characters, are pronounced
differently, as Tangsoo (唐手) and Kongsoo (空手), respectively. Consequently, the
founding fathers of TKD named their martial art Tangsoodo and Kongsoodo, while it
was introduced as Korean Karate to foreigners (Kang & Lee, 1999). Another term
sometimes used was Kwon Bob, which is the Korean pronounciation of the traditional
Chinese martial arts style Quanfa (拳法), known in Japan as Kempo or Kenpo.

Based on their various training backgrounds, the founding TKD fathers practiced and
taught different Karate styles, with Hwang Ki’s style being the most significant one
(interview Gatzweiler, 2009). He was also the first who applied a unique name for his
style by using the term of the legendary ancient Korean martial art, Soobak, after he had
rediscovered and translated the old Korean textbook about combat techniques from the
late 18th century, the Muye Dobo Tongji, in 1957 (Burdick, 1997). Before that, he also
used to call his martial art Tangsoodo, which remained the term he used in international
contexts. Later, after the term Taekwondo had been generally accepted, Hwang Ki stuck
to Tangsoodo, which grew into a martial arts style on its own.

- 34 -
 Since the 1950s, there had been efforts to unify the different styles under one umbrella
organization. Unfortunately, those efforts had been sabotaged first by the Korean War
(1950~53), later by interferences of the student revolution in 1960 (Kang & Lee, 1999).

To become a proper Korean martial art, at least two things were required: a unique
name, common for all proponents of Korean Karate, and a unique style in its
movements, shared by all kwans, and which had to be significantly different from any
Japanese or Okinawan Karate style. Furthermore, unique theoretical considerations
about the historical purpose or the function of the martial art could also have been useful
(Capener, 1995).

Ten years after Korean liberation, General Choi Hong-hi created the new term
Taekwondo (태권도, hanja 跆拳道), and on April 11, 1955, it was chosen to unify the
different styles under one label (Kang & Lee, 1999; Gillis, 2008: 64~51). Choi
(1918~2002) had studied Shotokan Karate in Japan in the early 1940s, had gained
experiences in the Japanese Imperial Army, and after Korean Liberation, he had started a
bright military career in Korea.49 All the time, he practiced and promoted Karate. After a
few years, he was a high-ranked member of the Korean army and influential enough to
emerge as the most powerful leader of the early Korean TKD pioneers. Supported by the
Rhee government, he made it mandatory for military training and installed his own
martial arts gym in a military base in Kangwon Province, one year after the end of the
Korean War. 50 Choi named his school Ohdo-kwan (“School of My Way”), and he
centered the military martial arts training there (Gillis, 2008: 43). Eventually, sooner or
later, nearly every young man came into contact with Choi’s martial arts style, including

49
For the following, see Burdick (1997), Kang & Lee (1999), Choi (2000), Gillis (2008), and The Free
Encyclpedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 1 December 2009.
50
Technically, the Korean War ended with an armistice between the U.N. and Communist forces on 27 July
1953; see Lee (2005: 380).

- 35 -
members of one of the original five kwans. Thanks to his raising influence, Choi got also
honorary president of the leading civilian Tangsoodo school, the Chungdo-kwan, in that
same year of 1954. Both kwans consistently applied the new term Taekwondo after its
establishment in 1955.

But outside of Choi’s realm of influence, the term Taekwondo was not yet accepted.
However, Choi’s influence was growing, not least because the military Ohdo-kwan
system accepted only dan certificates from their own students and the associated
Chungdo-kwan. Consequently, other kwans were pressed to get along with Choi. In
1959, the Korea Taekwondo Association (shortly, KTA) was established for the first time,
as a means to unify all kwans under one umbrella organization. Choi Hong-hi managed
to get the position as first KTA president.

But unfortunately for Choi, he got lost of all his power in the army quickly after the
coup d’état led by Park Chung-hee in 1961. For some reasons, army general Park
Chung-hee and army general Choi Hong-hi didn’t get along at all, and the less powerful
one had to subordinate under the orders of the new big man in Korea.51 And so, shortly
after Park Chung-hee took the charge, Choi Hong-hi was ordered out of duty and sent to
Malaysia as ambassador. One of the first actions of the new KTA directors was renaming
the KTA into Korea Taesoodo Association, a name which was made up both to get rid of
the Chinese and Japanese connotation, as well as of Choi’s invention. For the following
four years, Taekwondo/Taesoodo was carried on without the interference of Choi Hong-
hi in Korea.

51
Choi had been Park’s senior at the military academy, but Park was one year older than Choi. The main
reason for their bad relation was, according to an explanation presented by Choi, that he had once voted for
Park’s execution, who had been a former Japanese collaborateur, “for communist activities” (Gillis, 2008:
57).

- 36 -
 Yet Taesoodo was still not distinctively unique to regard it a proper martial art on its
own. In the gyms, the traditional Karate forms were still practiced, called kata; and there
was no generally accepted sparring style.52 It was still Karate practiced in Korea.53

But in his exile in Malaysia, Choi devoted all his energy on that problem. Supported
by several TKD masters such as his former right-hand Nam Tae-hi, who was actually
training soldiers in Vietnam in close combat techniques at that time (including Ohdo-
kwan TDK), Choi transformed an unsystematic collection of Karate kata into a system
of 20 TKD forms, called hyong. Furthermore, he strictly insisted on zero-contact
sparring, for TKD strikes and kicks were demanded to be powerful enough to instantly
kill the opponent.54 And finally, he added a unique theoretical contribution, by strictly
trying to root every technique in scientific reasoning, not tradition. For example, Choi
developed a theory of power using formulas of mechanical physics, such as P = ½ m v2
(Choi, 1994: 29).55

After his return to Korea, Choi published a voluminous book in 1965, titled
“Taekwon-Do”, and in the same year, Choi got president of the KTA. One of his first

52
It could be argued that at least, there had been some unique theoretical contributions, such as the alleged
historical roots of TKD Choi was promoting since 1960 – the Goguryeo tomb paintings near Pyongyang, the
Kumgang Yoksa guards in the Seokguram grotto of the Bulguksa temple complex in Gyeongju, and the

Muje Dobo Tongji (see Gillis, 2008: 50). Yet as these discoveries turned out to be inaccurate constructions
rather than historical evidences (Burdick, 1997), they could hardly be counted on the plus side of claims for
an ancient TKD heritage any more.
53
Sihak Henry Cho, for example, described in a famous book of 1968 the Korean martial art as “identical to
Japanese karate”; see Cho, 2000: 19.
54
For elaborations into this philosophy of “one blow, one death”, see Capener (1995).
55
This formula means that the power (P) of a strike equals half of the mass (m) multiplied with square
velocivy (v). Therefore, a light, but quick player could deliver more energy with a blow than a heavy, but
slow, player, because speed counts more than mass.

- 37 -
actions was to reverse the renaming of the KTA and change it back into Korea
Taekwondo Association. Thus, ten years after its creation, the term Taekwondo finally
became the official title for this martial art, which could be called a unique Korean
martial art from that year on, since it was provided with remodeled forms, a coherent
sparring style, and enriched with a unique theoretical background.

To sum up, in the military and in the Chungdo-kwan, the term Taekwondo was used
since 1955. Beyond Choi Hong-hi’s influence, however, the terms Tangsoodo,
Kongsoodo and Korean Karate were regularly applied, until Taekwondo was used by
every style, kwan and tradition that was administered by the KTA in 1965. Since 1965,
the term Tangsoodo (shortly, TSD) was referred to Hwang Ki’s Mudeuk-kwan style,
especially since he settled in America. In Korea, he had preferred to call it Soobak.
Therefore, it would be inappropriate to apply Taekwondo on all variations of this Korean
martial art.

However, it has not been the purpose of this study to fix this confusing situation. It
was just required here to establish a proper usage for the purpose of TKD in Germany.
Officially, TKD was introduced to Germany the same year the KTA was renamed as
Korea Taekwondo Association, which happened in 1965. Therefore, general usage of the
term Taekwondo for the martial art in Germany since 1965 seems justified. Before that
time, the martial art practiced and taught in Germany could be called Korean Karate, a
name which in fact was widely applied, even after 1965.56

Another term used was Tangsoodo, especially by U.S. soldiers in U.S. military camps
in Germany, who had learned Japanese Karate in Okinawa, and sometimes Korean

56
For application of the term Karate in TKD contexts in Germany after 1965, see the titles of the first TKD
books in Germany: “Karate – Die Welt des Taekwon-Do” (Wiedmeier, 1966); “Zen-Kunst der

Selbstverteidigung. Taekwon-Do – Karate” (Kwon, 1971). The usage of Korean Karate was also confirmed
by several TKD masters (interviews Gatzweiler, 2006; Jung, 2007; Gil, 2009).

- 38 -
Karate, or TSD, in Vietnam. For example, German TKD pioneer Hans-Ferdinand
Hunkel, who later became the chairman of the Kwon Jae-hwa TKD organization, started
with TSD in an American military camp in Hessia, which was significantly different
from the TKD he learned later57. Yet apparently, this tradition dryed out, except for one
military camp in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, which became one of the birth places of TKD
in Germany (see the next chapter). Many years later, TSD was again introduced to
Germany, but this time as an import from America. In that respect, TSD is applied in
Germany until today, and the term Tangsoodo could be reserved for the later imports
since the 1980s. Therefore, all Korean martial arts in Germany prior to 1965 could
justifiably be named Korean Karate.

1.2. Taekwondo in Korea since 1965

Before Choi Hong-hi became KTA president in 1965, he set up a TKD demonstration
team which included some of the best available TKD athletes of that time: Han Cha-kyo
(then sporting the 6th dan), Kim Jun-kun (5th dan), Kwon Jae-hwa (5th dan) and Park
Jong-soo (5th dan) (Choi, 1994: 501). Choi recruited the team members from the military,
except for Kwon Jae-hwa, who was a civilian and assigned as reporter (Seo, 1993: 34).
The purpose of the delegation was to introduce and promote TKD as a unique Korean
martial art, performing artistic (hyong), athletic (twisting and airborne kicks), powerful
(wood and rooftile breaking) and simply exciting (self-defense techniques, freestyle
sparring) moments of action never shown before. The demonstration team travelled
through the world, including several European countries, such as the Netherlands and
West Germany.

57
E-Mail from H.-F. Hunkel, 26 July 2006.

- 39 -
 Back in Korea, Choi Hong-hi got in heavy troubles with most of the other kwan
leaders, so much that the next year, they forced him to leave the KTA and to quit his
duties. On the other side, they supported him in establishing the first international TKD
organization, the International Taekwondo Federation (ITF), in the same year of 1966
(Kang & Lee, 1999).

Followed by the successes of the international TKD demonstrations, the Park

government discovered the power of sports diplomacy on behalf of TKD. A new KTA
leader was generated and set into office in 1971, former KCIA chief Kim Un-yong (see
Gillis, 2008). Constantly backed by the government, Kim opened the Kukkiwon and
took the charge of TKD in Korea, but Choi didn’t let international TKD getting out of
his grip. Suddenly, in 1972, Choi fled the country heading towards Toronto, Canada,
where Park Jong-soo, a member of the 1965 demonstration team mentioned above, was
running a successful TKD business enterprise. Thus, Choi moved the ITF to Toronto,
where it was located from 1972~1985.

In the same year of 1972, the World Taekwondo Head Quarter, the Kukkiwon, was
opened, where the first Taekwondo World Championships took place one year later.
After the tournament, in May 1973, another international TKD organization, the World
Taekwondo Federation (WTF), was formally established. During the following years,
the two international TKD bodies competed about the global TKD leadership, but
eventually, the WTF was victorious in all relevant areas. It would be safe to argue that
the influence of multiple top international sports official Kim Un-yong in the IOC, and
especially on the IOC president since 1980, Juan Antonio Samaranch, played a major
role in favor of the WTF.58

58
Two of the most important victories for the WTF had been at the 83rd general IOC assembly of the
International Olympic Committee in Baden-Baden in 1981, where WTF-TKD was selected as demonstration

- 40 -
 But the basis for TKD’s quick distribution all over the world was provided by heavy
financial and personal support of the authoritarian Park Chung-hee government (Kim,
1993: 18; see also Gillis, 2008). They sent TKD instructors around the world and
supported them with huge financial aids, which enabled them to purchase or rent
facilities for running TKD schools. Moreover, these TKD instructors had all been
selected and approved by the totalitarian military government, which would not have
allowed them to leave the country without approval of the secret service (interview
Ferger, 2008). It would have been in the very interest of the KCIA to make sure these
subjects would not betray their land by revealing information of the KCIA’s international
operations. Therefore, it seemed safe to assume that the Korean TKD instructors sent by
the KTA/WTF across the world during the 1970s and 80s stayed in contact with South
Korean authorities, including the military and the secret service, and might have been
activated by them to deliver reports about people and events in foreign countries or even
to do some service, both openly and in secret.

For example, several Korean TKD masters residing in West Germany were engaged as
inofficial security guards for the South Korean delegation during the IOC congress in
Baden-Baden in 1981, which held high stakes for WTF-TKD, to be ready against
possible interferences by North Korean agents (Park, 1994: 3; Gillis, 2008: 149). 59
Another example about secret-service missions involving Korean TKD masters in the

sport at the 1988 Seoul Olympics, and the 103rd general assembly in Paris in 1994, where WTF-TKD was
added as an official Olympic event for the 2000 Sydney Olympics.
59
Two TKD masters from Germany being present in Baden-Baden had been Park Soo-nam and Kim
Kwang-il. An anecdote often reported is Park Soo-nam arriving at the conference hotel with a trunk full of
Kimchi in his car, and the (German) security guards did not let him pass, suspecting bombs or other terrorist
material hidden in the spicy Korean dish (Park, 1994: 3).

- 41 -
US during the so-called Koreagate Scandal in the 1970s is reported by Gillis (2008:
107ff.).

1.3. Struggling for a modernized Taekwondo

TKD could be seen as a unique Korean martial art distinguished from Japanese Karate
since it featured at least two elements: a unique sparring style, and a unique forms style.
This would cover both, the martial aspect (sparring), and the art (forms).

At first, the different kwans applied several sparring rules and fostered various
interpretations of the traditional karate katas. Some schools, for example, regularly
practiced bare-knuckled full-contact sparring 60 . Others were seeking for ways of
establishing rules and a point system to enable athletic competitions. Hwang Ki, for
example, started national and international tournaments during the late 1950s to promote
his Mooduk-kwan TSD style (Kang & Lee, 1999).61

A first common sparring system could be traced down to the period of Taesoodo, for it
is reported that a Taesoodo competition was an official sport event during the 43th
National Sports Festival in October 1963 (Burdick, 1997; Kang & Lee, 1999).
According to Capener (1995), the sparring rules at that time were already similar to the
modern Olympic style TKD, with competitors wearing chest protectors and forbidden
head punches, thus enabling full contact matches.62

60
Reports about regular bare-knuckled full-contact sparring bouts in early TKD training prior to the
establishment of the ITF were published in several threads of the Martial Arts History Project at the
independent martial arts website Bullshido; see www.bullshido.net, “TKD discovers its roots”, accessed on
2 December 2009.
61
See also Dan Nolan’s Tang Soo Do Web Page, www.budget.net/~dnolan; accessed on 3 December 2009.
62
According to a photography reprinted in Kang and Lee (2002: 108), competitors in the early 1960s tried

also chest and head protectors similar to those used in Japanese Kendo (剣道) or Korean Kumdo (劍道),

- 42 -
 Around that time, U.S. TKD pioneer Jhoon Rhee established regular tournaments in
America, featuring bare-knuckled full-contact sparring.63 In theory, contacts should have
been tried to avoid, but in fact, competitors “sent each other to the hospital right and left”
(Gillis 2008: 93). Rhee later developed safety gear for hands and feet to prevent from
severe injuries, thus paved the way for the later development of Kickboxing.

Choi Hong-hi, on the other hand, strictly insisted on a zero-contact sparring system,
described in the chapter “freestyle sparring (ja yoo matsoki)” of his elementary book
Taekwon-Do (Choi, 1994). The reason was simply because TKD featured such
devastating techniques aimed at vital body parts that actual full-contact sparring would
be deadly; if not, power or targeting would have been inefficient, thus faulty. Later in the
1970s, however, Choi integrated Rhee’s safety equipment in the ITF sparring system,
enabling light-contact TKD matches very similar to semi-contact kickboxing.

After South Korean president Park Chung-hee declared TKD being Kukki, Korea’s
national sport, in March 1971, the Kukkiwon was erected and completed in the following
year. It was headed by the new KTA president, Kim Un-yong, who later also became
president of the WTF. In the same year of 1972, Choi Hong-hi left Korea for Toronto,
Canada. Thus, putting Hwang Ki’s TSD aside, all TKD in Korea was now unified under
one administration, which focused the further development of TKD in a direction that
made it applicable as an Olympic sport. While full-contact sparring was maintained,
safety quality of the chest protector had to be increased, and since 1986, a head protector
was also required.

respectively.
63
Jhoon Rhee, called the “Father of TKD in America”, had started teaching Korean Karate in 1958 in Texas,
and since 1962 in Washington, D.C. Originally in the U.S. for his university studies, he became one of the
first professional instructors for Korean Karate outside Korea. Rhee started in 1964 conducting National

Karate Championships, until he took over the term Taekwondo from Choi Hong-hi (Gillis 2008: 93).

- 43 -
 Therefore, an interesting lineage of sparring systems in the progressing of TKD could
be reconstructed. At first, in the experimental stage, bare-knuckled sparring without
restrictions could be found, promoting the martial prowess of the art. Because of the
many resulting injuries, ways to protect competitors were examined. Second, in the stage
of withdrawing, it was reduced to zero-contact sparring, resulting in practically the
abandonment of fighting. Shortly thereafter, in the third stage of institutionalization,
better adapted safety gear enabled light-contact sparring, and at the same time, newly
developed safety technology facilitated full-contact sparring, which met the
requirements of the Olympic Movement.

Concerning forms, the first unique set of TKD forms, hyong, was developed by Choi
Hong-hi and his aides during his Malaysian exile (Kang & Lee, 1999; Gillis, 2008).
Although the heritage of Japanese (Shotokan) Karate was still too obvious to be
overseen, Choi earned the credit of putting the rather loose collection of Karate forms
(kata) into a system of successively structured and increasingly complex TKD forms.
Yet the KTA refrained from using the new system, and Taesoodo still maintained the old
Karate kata. After Choi’s return and quick dismissal afterwards, the KTA developed
another forms system, the palgwe forms, since the mid-1960s, and the taeguk poomsae
forms since the early 1970s. Many years later, during the mid-1980s, Choi developed his
forms system further into a tul system, with a few additional forms and a complete
change in the basic movements by adding the so-called sino wave.

This beared several consequences for the study of TKD in Germany. First, any
research about TKD in Germany had to take into account that before the mid-1970s,
there had still been several interpretations of TKD at that time, some of them very close
to Japanese Karate (TSD), some two steps ahead (WTF TKD), and others somewhere in
between (ITF). Second, this could help understand the variety of TKD associations early
in Germany, which would be elaborated in a later chapter. Third, it could help explaining

- 44 -
the sudden switch of German TKD from ITF affiliation to that of the WTF. Fourth, it
should have made clear that TKD in Germany could truthfully be united only after the
TKD unity in Korea was on its way. And last, but not least, it helped understanding the
reluctance of traditionally oriented Korean TKD masters in Germany about TKD
reforms of the KTA/Kukkiwon/WTF.

- 45 -
 2. Combat Sports and Martial Arts in Germany

How were combat sports and martial arts positioned in the German society? Did
Germany have a tradition in East Asian martial arts? Did Germans engage in combat
sports and martial arts for the purpose of challenging athletic confrontations, or were
they looking for something else? How accurate did German people know about the
differences of the particular martial arts of China, Japan, and Korea? And did they
eagerly engage in establishing administrations for their sports? These and other
questions would be answered in this chapter. But first, a conceptual clarification was
needed.

Following Poliakoff (1989), the term combat sports included the heavy-athletic
disciplines of the ancient Greek sports festivals, such as the athletic festivals at Olympia,
Delphi, Nemea and Isthmus of Corinth: wrestling, boxing, and pankration. Yet at the
modern Olympic Games, pankration was not performed any more. It was substituted by
another combatting discipline which was performed widely in the ancient and medieval
world: fencing.

Contrary to that, the term (East Asian) martial arts should refer to the combatting
disciplines from the East Asian realm, in this study, Korea, Japan, and China –
Taekwondo, Hapkido, Kumdo, Kendo, Jujutsu, Judo, Karate, Quanfa, Kwonbop, Soobak,
Taekkyon, and the like.

2.1. Combat Sports

Germany had a rich history of combat sports, dating back to the ancient Germanic
tribes conquered by the Romans. According to Tacitus’ description in his Germania
(around 98 A.C.), the main task for a free Germanic was being ready to fight, while the
females and servants had to care about house and home and the children (Tacitus, 2005).

- 46 -
In the northern Germanic assemblies of the free people, the Thing, physical excercises
and wrestling competitions were regularly held (Barisch, 1971: 105f.). Fencing as
physical excercise was officially sanctioned by Christian authorities during the Middle
Ages (128). After the Thirty Years’ War (1618~1648), one of the fathers of modern
education, Johann Amos Comenius (1592~1670), described the situation of physical
education in his Orbis Pictus (“The Visible World in Pictures”), the first children’s
textbook which was published in 1658 in the German city of Nuremberg. Among
different ball and other games, swimming and bathing, hunting and hiking and circus
performances like trapez artistry, he enlisted three kinds of activities subsumized under
the label fencing school: stick and weapons fencing, wrestling, and fist fighting, which
he described, oddly, as performed with covered eyes (Barisch, 1971: 163). Germany’s
master poet, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749~1832), described in his aubiography
Poetry and Truth his experiences in riding and fencing training in his youth (169f.).

However, since the gymnastics movement of the German Turner under Friedrich
Ludwig Jahn (1778~1852) since 1807, fencing, wrestling, and boxig were not seen as
proper elements of a true physical education any more. One reason was that German
turnen, contrary to English sports, did not aim at struggling with, and defeating an
opponent. But German turnen was a reformist and somehow intellectual activity widely
performed at schools and universities. The conservative nobility, on the other side, still
stuck to activities like hunting, riding, and fencing. Until the 20th century, for example, it
was not uncommon for men of honor to engage in duels against personal rivals; as the
duels were not only conducted with pistols, but also with rapier, epee and saber, fencing
instructors never had troubles of finding new students (Umminger, 1992: 92).

In 1885, the carpenter Hans Abs (1851~1895) from Hamburg became inofficial World
Wrestling Champion by beating the American William Muldoon in New York, which
was the starting signal for wrestling’s popularity in Europe (Müller, 1999: 23). Like

- 47 -
horse riding, wrestling and bare-knuckled boxing became a spectator’s sports, eventually
turning into show events, providing the basis for professional prize-fighters among the
underprivileged. The nobility, gentlemen and university students discovered boxing with
boxing gloves as training in self defense (Umminger, 1992: 99). In the laborer’s sport
movements in Europe since the late 19th century, boxing and wrestling became popular
events. In 1932, for example, 121,000 wrestlers were organized in 860 clubs (Müller,
1999: 25).

Regarding the long history of combat sports in Germany, it could be said that at the
beginning of the 20th century, wrestling and boxing were popular among the working
class, while fencing (and to a lesser degree, boxing) was popular among educated people
and the nobility.

In the following, the further progressing of the three combat sports in Germany in the
20th century would be presented separately. For a better overview, and to make
comparisons easier, the key aspects of the administrations of these three combat sports
would be presented in tables. For the sake of brevity, the following overviews will be
limited to athletic achievements at the Olympic Games.

- 48 -
 2.1.1. Wrestling

Table 02: German Amateur* Wrestling Administration

(*originally including professional sports wrestling,
but excluding American show-wrestling)

Subject Content Date

Original Name Deutscher Athleten-Verband founded on 1891.07.8

(German Athletics Federation)

Current Name Deutscher Ringer-Bund established in May 1972

(German Wrestling Federation)

Associated International International Federation of Associated formation in 1912

Federation Wrestling Styles (FILA)

Members 68,612 members 2008

in 476 clubs
Olympic Medals, 8 x gold 1952~1988
Germany 26 x silver
(total) 15 x bronze

Olympic Medals, 2 x gold 1954~1988

East Germany 6 x silver
(included) 1 x bronze

Outstanding Athletes (1) Carl Schuhmann (1) 1869~1946

(2) Werner Seelenbinder (2) 1904~1944
(3) Wilfried Dietrich (3) 1933~1992

Sources: Umminger 1992: 179; The Free Encyclopedia;64 German Wrestling Federation website;65

Vereins-Informations-Dienst website66

64
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.
65
German Wrestling Federation website, www.ringen.de; accessed on 12 December 2009.
66
Vereins-Informations-Dienst website, http://vid.sid.de; accessed on 12 December 2009.

- 49 -
 Although wrestling has been of mayor interest in Germany at the beginning of the 20th
century, at the time of the study, it was rated as a fringe sport. The first German
wrestling organization was founded in 1881, which covered both amateur and
professional wrestling (without American show-wrestling), but also weight lifting. The
first National Wrestling Championships for individual athletes date back to 1893 and for
teams to 1922. In 1963, a top division for team wrestling, the Ringer-Bundesliga, was
started, which produced annual German Champions in a mixture of Greco-Roman and
Freestyle wrestling since. In the current season of 2009/2010, twenty club teams are
competing about the title in the top division. The events attain some media attention,
culminating in broadcasted TV reports about the finals. Typically for a fringe sport,67 the
centers of wrestling are focused on peripheral regions, such as Schifferstadt and
Luckenwalde with about 20,000 citizens, or Köllerbach with just 8,000 citizens.

German wrestlers had been successful at the modern Olympic Games from its start at
Athens in 1896. One of Germany’s gymnasts, Carl Schuhmann, who was also successful
in his primary disciplines and in weight lifting, won the wrestling competition in an
unlimited weight class, although Schuhmann was the shortest participant, measuring just
163 cm. Schuhmann is one of the three wrestlers in Germany’s Hall of Fame in Sports;
the other two are Werner Seelenbinder and Wilfried Dietrich.68

Werner Seelenbinder was a secret activist in the German Resistance against the Nazi
regime in the 1930s and 1940s. He had planned to refuse the Hitler salute after winning
a medal at the Berlin 1936 wrestling competition to embarrass the Nazis in front of the
spectating world, but unfortunately, he only reached the 4th place. He was executed by

67
One reason for this phenomenon might be that the local sponsors would prefer to support the fringe sport
with its huge media coverage than the local football team competing in a minor division and thus getting just
weak media attention. In bigger cities, sponsors usually support more popular sports.
68
See German Hall of Fame in Sports website, www.hall-of-fame-sport.de; accessed on 13 December 2009.

- 50 -
the Nazis on 24 October 1944. Wilfried Dietrich, Germany’s greatest wrestling talent
called the “Crane from Schifferstadt”, excelled in both wrestling styles winning several
Olympic medals, including the freestyle gold medal 1960 in Rome, together with the
Greco-roman silver medal at the same tournament.

Athletes like those mentioned had been the spearhead of a vivid tradition of wrestling
as a competition and spectator sport, both in East and West Germany, and until today.

- 51 -
 2.1.2. Boxing

Table 03: German Amateur Boxing Administration

Subject Content Date

Original Name Deutscher Reichsverband für founded on 1920.12.05

Amateurboxen
(German National Federation for Amateur
Boxing)

Current Name Deutscher Boxsport-Verband e.V. established at the end of

(German Boxing Federation) 1949

Associated International (1) Federation Internationale de Boxe (1) since 1920

Federation Amateure (FIBA)
(2) Association Internationale de Boxe (2) since 1946
Amateure (AIBA)
Members 62,461 members 2008
in 643 clubs

Olympic Medals, Germany 11 x gold 1952~2008

(total) 14 x silver
22 x bronze

Olympic Medals, East 5 x gold 1956~1988

Germany (included) 2 x silver
6 x bronze

Outstanding Athletes (1) Max Schmeling (1) 1905~2005

(2) Henry Maske (2) born 1964

Sources: Umminger (1992: 332; 406; 417); The Free Encyclopedia;69 German Boxing Federation

website;70 Vereins-Informations-Dienst website71

69
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.
70
German Boxing Federation website, www.boxverband.de; accessed on 12 December 2009.
71
Vereins-Informations-Dienst website, http://vid.sid.de; accessed on 12 December 2009.

- 52 -
 Although boxing was prohibited in Germany until 1918, early boxing clubs reach
back to 1912 (SV Astoria Berlin) and even 1906 (SC Colonia 06). The first national
championships date from 1920. For a long time, Max Schmeling (1905~2005) remained
Germany’s sole international top boxing athlete. Schmeling was national champion in
1927, 1928 and 1938, and heavyweight World Champion from 1930~32. He was most
famous for his two fights against Joe Luis, knocking him out in 1936 in a preliminary
bout (Luis’ only knock-out defeat in his career), but being defeated by him in the fight
for the World Champion’s trophy in 1938. After Schmeling, in terms of popularity,
comes Henry Maske, East German Olympic gold medalist of Seoul 1988 and light
heavyweight World Champion (IBF) from 1993~96. Maskes title-defending matches
became major TV events in Germany in the 1990s, thus spearheading a new wave of
boxing enthusiasm in Germany.

On Olympic scale, boxing was one of the sports East Germany was particular
successful in, gaining gold medals in its first and last Olympic participations (Huhn,
2006: 45).72 In Melbourne in 1956, bantamweight Wolfgang Behrendt gained the first
Olympic gold medal for East Germany by beating the Korean boxer Song Soon-chun in
the final, thus establishing a rich tradition of East German amateur boxers. And in its last
participation at the Olympic Games, at the 1988 Seoul Games, Henry Maske secured
one of the last gold medals for East Germany. However, the enthusiasm in Germany
about Maske’s later engagement in professional boxing (and that of other professional
boxers) gained no reflection in Olympic amateur boxing. Thus, boxing remains a
divided sport, with huge media interest in high-stake professional bouts, but low

72
East Germany was also present in international amateur boxing on administrational level, for East
German Karl-Heinz Wehr had been vice president of the International Amateur Boxing Association (AIBA)
during the 1980s-1990s.

- 53 -
spectator’s interest in amateur boxing, making it only a fringe sport with less
participants than wrestling.

- 54 -
 2.1.3. Fencing

Table 04: German Fencing Administration

Subject Content Date

Original Name Deutscher Fechter-Bund founded 1911.12.17

(German Fencing Federation)

Current Name Deutscher Fechter-Bund e.V. 1949.11.27

(German Fencing Federation)

Associated International Fédération Internatioale d’Escrime founded 1913.11.29

Federation (FIE)

Members 23,301 members 2008

in 472 clubs

Olympic Medals, 13 x Gold 1951~2008

Germany 16 x Silver
(total) 11 x Bronze

Olympic Medals, - 1956~1988

East Germany -
(included) 1 x Bronze

Outstanding Athletes (1) Helene Mayer (3) 1910~1953

(2) Thomas Bach (4) born 1953

Sources: Umminger (1992: 804); The Free Encyclopedia;73 German Fencing Federation website;74

Vereins-Informations-Dienst website75

Of all combat sports in Germany, although fencing was clearly the smallest one during
the time of the study, it has the longest unbroken tradition in history. Before fencing

73
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.
74
German Fencing Federation website, www.fechten.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.
75
Vereins-Informations-Dienst website, http://vid.sid.de; accessed on 12 December 2009.

- 55 -
became a sport, it was practiced as a means of self defense, and also performed in
serious life-and-death duelings until the 20th century. Since the 19th century, Germany’s
politically oriented University student’s clubs, called Burschenschaften, adopted fencing
duels for special ceremonies and rituals, something which several traditionally oriented
clubs still feature.

Outside of Universities, fencing clubs emerged since the 1860s, and the first national
Championships took place in the year of the first modern Olympics, in 1896. To unify
the several fencing groups, different weapons and various styles, the German Fencing
Federation as top umbrella organization was formally founded in December 1911. The
first Olympic gold medal had already been won in 1906 (male team, Sabre), and the last
ones in 2008 (female individuals, Épée, and male individuals, Foil). One of the most
remarkable events was at the 1988 Seoul Olympics, when the three German female Foil
competitors shared all three medals.

The most outstanding German fencers would include Helene Mayer and Thomas Bach.
Helene Mayer was gold medal winner of the 1928 London Olympics and got a 5th place
at the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics, and at the time of the 1936 Berlin Olympics, she was
still one of the best fencers in the word. But because of her Jewish heritage, the Nazis
tried to withdraw her from the team, which was reversed after interference of the
American public and the International Olympic Committee. After all, she was happy to
compete for the Germans and won the silver medal.

Dr. Thomas Bach was member of the gold-winning Foil team at the 1976 Montreal
Olympics. Already a politically minded athlete, he got into sports politics afterwards,
and currently holds several top positions as sports official, including president of the
German Olympic Sports Confederation (DOSB) and vice president of the International
Olympic Committee (IOC), both since 2006.

- 56 -
 Although fencing was just a minor fringe sport with about one third of the participants
of wrestling or boxing at the time of the study, the existence of as many sports clubs in
fencing as in wrestling might have been a hint for the stable fencing tradition in
Germany. Nevertheless, it lacked media attention and broad spectator’s interest, except
for the Olympics, where everybody regularly expected fencing medals for Germany.
One reason for Germany’s lasting international successes in fencing might have been
that in other countries, fencing is not much more popular than in Germany.

2.1.4. Résumé

At first it should have been noted that all European combat sports are administered by
one single association in Germany, which apparently is a result of the sports’ long
76
tradition in Germany. This situation kept the organization focused on the
administration and development of their sport, while sheltering them from external
power struggles with competing organizations. In East Asian martial arts, as would be
shown, the situation was completely different.

Second, all European combat sports have produced widely respected athletes with a
strong place in the German public and culture. They were regarded as idols for young
ambitious talents who would accept the inheritance and impersonate the next generation
of the sports’ athletes. East Asian martial arts, in contrast, didn’t have a tradition of
athletic idols of this kind, at least not in Germany.

For the further interpretation of the situation of traditional European combat sports in
Germany, a comparable overview among their participants in terms of age and gender
could be useful.

76
For the record, the German Fencing Federation does not cover fencing practices at traditional university
clubs. Those activities are not considered sports, but rather ceremonies.

- 57 -
 Chart 01: Member Distribution in 2008 (Age)

European Combat Sports

20000
18000
16000
14000
Members

12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
~6
7~14 15~18 19~26 27~40 41~60 60+
years
Boxing 740 8117 11758 13845 13264 10415 4322
Fencing 236 7494 4010 2739 3219 3793 1810
Wrestling 2441 11266 5718 7528 11161 18758 11740

Source: DOSB (2008: 6f.)

Thus, third, the untypical age distribution in boxing was mostly apparent, since in
most sports in Germany, children and the youth made for the majority of members.
Furthermore, on the second observation, also the high percentage of higher-aged
wrestlers was an unusual result. Both findings could at least partly be explained by the
combatting nature of the sports, which might prevent parents from encouraging their
children in engaging in those activities.77

77
Further explanations would go far beyond the scope of this current study and must remain untouched.

- 58 -
 Chart 02: Member Distribution in 2008 (Gender)

European Combat Sports

80000
70000
60000
50000
Members

40000
30000
20000
10000
0
Boxing Fencing Wrestling
females 11239 8156 12703
males 51222 15145 55909

Source: DOSB (2008: 7)

Finally, the gender distribution revealed that fencing fell into a different category than
boxing and wrestling. While both were featuring about five times more male boxers and,
respectively, wrestlers than female ones, in fencing, the ratio was about 2:1. Together
with the age distribution, it could be interpreted that wrestling, and much more boxing,
were considered as sports promoting “male” attributes, such as physical strength and
beating opponents, while fencing was considered a sport promoting “female” and child-
oriented attributes, such as physical elegance and game play.

- 59 -
 2.2. Martial Arts

To provide a better understanding of the situation when TKD entered Germany, the
development of East Asian martial arts in Germany prior to the official introduction of
TKD in 1965 should be outlined briefly. Before 1965, four Japanese martial arts already
had found their ways to Germany, which were Jujutsu (at first in 1906), Judo (officially
in 1933), Karate (1957) and Aikido (around 1960). Others, like Kendo, Muay Thai,
Kickboxing and the several Chinese martial arts, did not enter Germany before the 1970s,
and could therefore be neclected.

Thus, it should have been sufficient to summarize the main facts and developments of
the above-mentioned Japanese martial arts in Germany, without detailed extractions of
preceding conditions, underlying motives and resulting consequences of the events. As
long as the purpose of this current study did not include researching the history of all
East Asian martial arts in Germany, but only of TKD, it was fair to rely on already
accomplished research about these other martial arts, without critically examining the
findings of the previous research.

Concerning these Japanese martial arts, there was already a vast collection of
literature, revealing every aspect of the various interconnections about the different arts
and styles.78 But there was just little literature covering the topic of Japanese martial arts
entering and developing in Germany in the 20th century, and much less dealing with
Chinese and other Asian martial arts. One of the most informative papers on these topics
was an unpublished essay by the head of the German Tangsoodo Federation, Klaus
Trogemann. It was compiled in 1993 in preparation of the promotion for his 4th dan
degree, and its statements had been further reviewed in preparation for his 5th dan degree

78
The most prominent researchers about Japanese martial arts include Don Draeger, Diane Skoss, and, more
recently, Andreas Niehaus and Wolfram Manzereiter.

- 60 -
promotion in 2001 and 6th dan degree promotion in 2009.79 Furthermore, many of the
information of the following sections were gathered by various internet sources, such as
the relevant organization’s websites, The Free Encyclopedia, and multiple entries on the
two general German martial arts discussion boards.80

For a better comparison, the core information about the most important
administrations for the researched East Asian martial art in Germany would be presented
in a table form similar to the ones used for European combat sports at the end of every
section.

79
E-Mail by Trogemann on 11 December 2009.
80
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 13 December 2009.
The two general German martial arts discussion boards, www.kampfkunstforum.de and www.kampfkunst-
board.info, accesed on 13 December 2009.

- 61 -
 2.2.1. Jujutsu

More than one hundred years ago, in 1906, East Asian martial arts entered Germany
after a Japanese fleet visited the (far Northern) German port of Kiel. Its crew performed
a Judo (柔道) and Jujutsu (柔術) demonstration in front of a German audience, including
Emperor Wilhelm II (reigning from 1888~1918) who got the idea that this kind of close-
combat practice should be added to the young cadet’s curriculum. Later in the same year
of 1906, Japanese Judo and Jujutsu master Agitaro Ono from Tokyo started teaching the
military and the police of Berlin in Jujutsu (Trogemann, 1993: 3).

Also around that time, the first Jujutsu school was opened in Berlin by Erich Rahn
(1885~1973), a student of Japanese Jujutsu master Higashi Katsuguma. Rahn’s student
Alfred Rhode (1896~1978), later called the “father of Judo in Germany”, opened the
first public Jujutsu club after World War I (1914~18), followed by the first governing
body for Jujutsu and the first national Jujutsu Championships soon after. Before World
War II (1939~45), Jujutsu was going to become a popular new exercise, resulting in
about 44 German Jujutsu and Judo text books until 1939 (Trogemann 1993: 4).

During the War and the following governing of Germany by the different occupying
forces, the developments of East Asian martial arts in Germany came to a halt until the
1950s. In 1952, Alfred Rohde gathered the highest-ranked German Jujutsu and Judo dan
grade holders, and they formed the German Dan Board (Deutsches Dan-Kollegium;
shortly, DDK), by now the oldest German uninterrupted martial arts organization. Yet
the DDK’s main focus was on Judo, which could be compiled into matches and
championships, and at the beginning of he 1960s, Jujutsu was struggling.

A committee of German martial arts experts of different styles, including Jujutsu, Judo,
Aikido, and Karate gathered together at the DDK and created a new style, presented in

- 62 -
1968 as Ju-Jutsu.81 It was considered to include reformed training and modernized
defense techniques, such as defense against gun attacks. It was also designed to facilitate
Ju-Jutsu competitions, but failed to gain broad international recognition. In 1990, Ju-
Jutsu separated from the DDK and became a proper member of the top German sports
organization, the German Sports Confederation (since 2006, German Olympic Sports
Confederation), one year afterwards.

Besides reformed Ju-Jutsu, there were still several organizations promoting more
traditional Jujutsu. One was the successor of Erich Rahn’s original Jujutsu organization,
the German Jujutsu Ring Erich Rahn (Deutscher Jui-Jitsu-Ring Erich Rahn e.V.).82 Two
other major Jujutsu organizations were the German Jujutsu Union (Deutsche Jiu-Jitsu
Union, DJJU) and the German Jujutsu Federation (Deutscher Jiu-Jitsu Bund)83. The
different organizations separated successively from the German Judo Federation (DJB),
not the least because of internal power struggles which, unfortunately, could not be
examined further in this current study.84

81
In German, the new style was named Ju-Jutsu, to distinguish it from the traditional Japanese martial art,
which is usually spelled as Jiu-Jitsu in German, but Jujutsu in English. See the German Ju-Jutsu Federation
website, www.djjv.de; accessed on 14 December 2009.
82
See the website of the German Jujutsu Ring Erich Rahn, www.djjr.de, accessed on 14 December 2009.
83
See the website of the German Jujutsu Federation, www.djjb.de, and the website of the German Jujutsu
Union, www.djju.de; both accessed on 14 December 2009.
84
For the record, since 2004, the reformist German Ju-Jutsu Federation was also accepting traditional
Jujutsu clubs; yet for the sake of clarity, it was regarded here as the Federation for reformist Ju-Jutsu only.

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 Table 05: German Ju-Jutsu Federation

Subject Content Date

Original Name German Dan Board (1) DDK since

(Deutsches Dan-Kollegium) 1952.09.20
(2) Jujutsu since 1969

Current Name German Ju-Jutsu Federation. 1990.10.20

(Deutscher Ju-Jutsu Verband)

Associated National (1) German Judo Federation (DJB) (1) since 1969
Federation (2) German Olympic Sports Confederation (2) since 1991
(DOSB)

Associated International Ju-Jitsu International Federation founding member in

Federation (JJIF) 1987

Members 53,637 members 2008

in 914 clubs 85

Sources: German Ju-Jutsu Federation website;86 The Free Encyclopedia; 87 DOSB (2008: 9)

Table 06: German Jujutsu Ring Erich Rahn

Subject Content Date

Original Name National Jujutsu Federation 1923

(Reichsverband für Jui-Jitsu)

Current Name German Jujutsu Ring Erich Rahn e.V. c. 1966

(Deutscher Jiu-Jitsu Ring Erich Rahn e.V.)

Associated National Federation independent

Associated International Federation independent

Members 47 participating clubs, 2009

about 2,700 members (estimated)

85
This ratio of about 58.7 members per Ju-Jutsu club should be regarded as the basis for further estimations
concerning Jujutsu members.
86
See www.djjv.de, accessed on 14 December 2009.
87
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.

- 64 -
 88 89
Sources: German Ju-Jutsu Ring website; The Free Encyclopedia

Table 07: German Jujutsu Federation

Subject Content Date

Original Name German Jujutsu Federation. January 1975

(Deutscher Jiu-Jitsu Verband)

Current Name German Jujutsu Federation. January 1975

(Deutscher Jiu-Jitsu Verband)

Associated National Corporation of International Dan since January 1975

Federation Grade Holders
(Korporation Internationaler
Danträger)

Associated International United Nations of Ju-Jitsu founding member in

Federation (UNJJ) September 1991

Members 22 participating clubs, 2009

about 1,300 members (estimated)

Sources: German Jujutsu Federation website;90 The Free Encyclopedia 91

88
See www.djjr.de, accessed on 14 December 2009.
89
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.
90
See www.djjb.de, accessed on 14 December 2009.
91
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.

- 65 -
 Table 08: German Jujutsu Union

Subject Content Date

Original Name German Jujutsu Union. 1982

(Deutsche Jiu-Jitsu Union)

Current Name German Jujutsu Union. 1982

(Deutsche Jiu-Jitsu Union)

Associated National Federation independent -

Associated International Federation Jiu Jitsu International founding member 1984

Members c. 100 participating clubs, 2009
about 5,870 members (estimated)

Sources: German Ju-Jutsu Union website;92 The Free Encyclopedia93

2.2.2. Judo

Judo got officially introduced to Germany by a promotional tour of Japanese Judo

inventor, Prof. Kano Jigoro (嘉納治五郎), across Europe in 1933. The previous year,
Erich Rahn’s student Alfred Rhode had already founded the first German Judo
administration. The Nazis were quite fond of Kano’s martial art and quickly integrated it
into their sports system, conducting annual national championships until all sports came
to a halt due to the ongoing Second World War.

In 1953, the year after the German Dan Board (DDK) had been formed, the German
Judo Federation (Deutscher Judo-Bund, DJB) was established in Hamburg. Three years
afterwards, the DJB got officially recognized by the supreme West German sports body,
the German Sports Confederation (DSB, now DOSB), and the DDK was integrated into
the DJB.

92
See www.djju.de, accessed on 14 December 2009.
93
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.

- 66 -
 It should be noted that the DDK was always run by native Germans and was headed
by the universally respected senior martial arts grandmaster Alfred Rhode from 1952~67.
The DDK was considered as the informal superordinate organization for all martial arts
in Germany. It had been rewarded by the Kodokan Institute in Tokyo, Japan, to certify
Judo kyu (Korean: keup) and dan degrees from its start in 1952, before any other martial
arts organization was established after World War II. Thus, the DJB depended on the
DDK and its direct connection the the Kodokan, but formally, the DDK was
subordinated under the DJB, which was the official representative of martial arts in the
DSB. Likewise, the DJB could serve as the umbrella for other martial arts’
administrations. In 1961, the DJB launched its official periodical, the Judo Magazin,
which contained interviews, background information, news, and technical advises not
only for Judo training, but also for the other martial arts the Judo Federation was
administering.

Originally also responsible for Jujutsu, the Judo Federation established special
sections for the organized administration of other martial arts during the 1960s, such as
Karate (1965), Aikido (1966), TKD (1967), and Kendo (1970). In cooperation with the
DDK, the DJB was the top umbrella organization for Japanese martial arts, including
Korean Karate and its successor, until the DJB decided to focus on Judo only at the early
1980s. In 1990, the DJB and the DDK separated from each other due to financial
disagreements after they had worked closely together on the administration and further
development of Judo and other martial arts in Germany for about 35 years. Since then,
the DDK promoted Judo as mass sports, while the DJB remained responsible for Judo as
both recreational and elite sports.94

94
See the DDK website, hhtp://www.ddek-ev.de; accessed on 15 December 2009. Meanwhile, the DDK
also administered other popular martial arts, including Jujutsu, Aikido, Karate, TKD, TSD, and Thai Boxing.

- 67 -
 At the time of the study, Germany ranked on 7th place in the all-time medal ranking
for Judo at the Olympic Games,95 which was the second-best rank for a European
country. The best European Judo nation would be France, ranking on 3rd place overall;
France has collected the same amount of Judo medals in total than Germany (31), but
with 9 gold medals nearly doubling the figure of Germany, which got 5 overall.
Considering its further successes in World and European Championships, Germany was
one of the top Judo nations in Europe, and always a strong candidate for gold medals at
international competitions. Germany had been successful in Judo competitions from the
start.

In expectation of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics where Judo was a demonstration sport,
Judo had become increasingly popular in Germany; while in 1957, the DJB counted just
about 10,000 members, it had been more than 30,000 members by 1965 (Trogemann,
1993: 6). The German Judo team won one silver and one bronze medal and was the
third-most successful Judo nation, after Japan with 3 gold and 1 silver, and the
Netherlands with 1 gold medal. In preparation for this first Olympic Judo event, the
German Judo team was supported by Korean Judo expert Han Ho-san who was living in
Hanover in that time to study architecture.96 Later, Han became national Judo head
coach at the DJB, and remained in this position for about 35 years, which could serve as
an explanation for Germany’s constant competitiveness in Judo.

One Olympic gold medal was won by a Judoka from East Germany in Moscow 1980;
furthermore, East German Judoka collected one silver and seven bronze medals at
several Olympic Summer Games. Judo was not East Germany’s flagship sport, but it

95
See the website of the International Olympic Committee, http://www.olympic.org; accessed on 15
December 2009.
96
See the report about Han Ho-san on the website of the North Rhine-Westphalian Judo Federation,
www.nwjv.de; accessed on 22 December 2009.

- 68 -
was the only Asian martial art being open for the public and officially supported by the
East German sports machinery, until the very end of the East-West German split.97
However, as East Germany’s sport administration did no longer exist since the German
reunification of 1990, East Germany’s administration of Judo would not be further
examined here.

Summing up the brief overview, there were currently two organizations administrating
Judo in Germany: the German Judo Federation (Deutscher Judo-Bund, DJB), and the
German Dan Board (Deutsches Dan-Kollegium, DDK), while only the DOSB-affiliated
DJB remains responsible for competitive Judo.

97
For example, Karate and even Yoga had been explicitly abandoned from any support in terms of facilities
and instructors; see Austermühle 1998.

- 69 -
 Table 09: German Judo Federation (Deutscher Judo-Bund, DJB)

Event Content Date

Original Name German Judo Federation 1953

(Deutscher Judo-Bund e.V.)

Current Name German Judo Federation 1953

(Deutscher Judo-Bund e.V.)

Associated National Federation German Olympic Sports Confederation since 1956

(DOSB)

Associated International Federation European Judo union (EJU) no data

International Judo Federation (IJF)

Members 184,765 members 2008

in 2,672 clubs

Olympic Medals, 5 x Gold 1964~2008

Germany 8 x Silver
(total) 19 x Bronze

Olympic Medals, 1 x Gold 1964~1988

East Germany 1 x Silver
(included) 7 x Bronze
Outstanding Athletes (1) Frank Wieneke (1) 1984~88
(1 x Olympic Gold,
1 x Olympic Silver)
(2) Udo Quellmalz (2) 1991~96
(1 x Olympic Gold,
2 x World Champion)

Sources: The Free Encyclopedia;98 German Judo Federation website;99 DOSB (2008: 7)

98
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.
99
German Judo Federation website, www.judobund.de; accessed on 14 December 2009.

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 Table 10: German Dan Board (Deutsches Dan-Kollegium, DDK)

Event Content Date

Original Name German Dan Board 1952

(Deutsches Dan-Kollegium)

Current Name German Dan Board 1952

(Deutsches Dan-Kollegium)

Associated National Federation German Olympic Sports Confederation since 1956

(DOSB)

Associated International Federation independent

Members no data available 2006

Outstanding Presidents Alfred Rhode 1952~67

Sources: The Free Encyclopedia100; German Dan Board website101;

100
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.
101
German Dan Board website, http://www.ddk-ev.de; accessed on 15 December 2009.

- 71 -
 2.2.3. Karate

Around 1957, Japanese Karate was introduced to West Germany via France, where it
was practiced since 1954; one of the first German Karate masters who got their black
belts in France was Judo master Jürgen Seydel. He opened the first German Karate
school in Bad Homburg, near Frankfurt, in 1957. From 1958~60, the famous “King of
Rock ’n’ Roll”, Elvis Aaron Presley, did his military service in Friedberg, near Frankfurt,
and he started practicing Karate in 1959 at Jürgen Seydels Karate school. Because of the
famous Elvis Presley, Karate got a huge media attention in West Germany, and many
young people tried to follow their idol, which created a huge demand for Karate training
facilities.

The first Karate organization was formed in 1961, the German Karate Confederation
(Deutscher Karate Bund, DKB). In 1965, the DKB already counted more than 1,000
members in 45 Karate schools and clubs. Because some schools focused more on the
commercial than the athletic aspect, the DSB refused to acknowledge this new sports
organization (Arend, 1989: 56).

The same year Choi Hog-hi’s TKD demonstration team toured across Europe and
Germany, in 1965, a delegation from the Japan Karate Association (JKA) visited
Germany, promoting Karate by performing several show demonstrations, leading a one-
week training course and certifying several dan degrees to German Karate students.102
Afterwards, German Karate got officially acknowledged by the JKA, yet the DJB
refused to accept the DKB and opened its own Karate section instead. Around the same
time, more other Karate organizations were created in some regions, including the
German-Japanese Karate Federation (Deutsch-Japanischer Karate-Verband, DJKV) in

102
According to Arend (1989: 55), the members of that delegation had been Japanese Karate masters Kase,
Kanazawa, Enoeda and Shirai.

- 72 -
Northern Germany, and the Goju Ryu Federation (Goju Ryu Bund, later Goju-Kai
Deutschland, GKD) in Southwestern Germany.

To maintain its leading position, the DKB hired Japanese Karate expert Kanazawa as
head coach, who was succeeded by Hideo Ochi in 1970. Ochi was the leading Karate
expert in the DKB until he opened his own association, the German JKA-Karate
Federation (Deutscher JKA-Karate Bund, DJKB), in 1993. The DJKB fostersed
traditional Karate and relinquished sports competitions.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Karate boomed in Germany. More Karate organizations were
established, such as the Wado-Kai Germany (Wado-Kai Deutschland, WKD), and the
German Karate Union (Deutsche Karate Union, DKU). At least two different national
Karate teams competed at different international tournaments: while the DKB team
participated at the Championships of the European Amateur Karate Federation (EAKF)
and the International Amateur Karate Federation (IAKF), the team of the Karate section
at the DJB participated at the Championships of the European Karate Union (EKU) and
the World Union of Karate Do Organizations (WUKO). For both sides, this was not a
satisfying situation, and after difficult negotiations, all the above-mentioned Karate
organizations merged together into the German Karate Federation (Deutscher Karate
Verband, DKV) in 1976. One year later, the DJB dissolved its Karate section and agreed
its members to joining the DKV, and the DKV was finally acknowledged by the DSB,
the highest German sports umbrella.

Despite numerous discrepancies (cf. Arend, 1989), the different factions of the DKV
managed to stick together, so that the current situation of Karate at the time of the study
resembled the situation in Judo: one association was affiliated to the DOSB and
responsible for high-level international competitions (and sports several subordinated
sections taking care for remote Karate styles), and the other one was remaining

- 73 -
independent, thus not officially engaging on the international stage as representative for
Germany.

Table 11: German Karate Federation

Subject Content Date

Original Name German Karate Confederation 1961

(Deutscher Karate Bund)

Current Name German Karate Federation 1976

(Deutscher Karate Verband)

Associated National Federation German Olympic Sports Confederation since 1977

(DOSB)

Associated International Federation European Karate Federation (EKF), no data

World Karate Federation (WKF)

Members 106,677 members 2008

in 2,051 clubs
103
Sources: Arend 1989; German Karate Federation website; The Free Encyclopedia;104 DOSB (2008: 9)

103
German Karate Federation website, http://www.karate.de; accessed on 15 December 2009.
104
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.

- 74 -
 Table 12: German JKA-Karate Federation

Subject Content Date

Original Name JKA-Karate Federation 1993

(Deutscher JKA-Karate Bund)

Current Name JKA-Karate Federation 1993

(Deutscher JKA-Karate Bund)

Associated National Federation independent

Associated International Federation Japan Karate Association (JKA) 1993

World Karate Confederation (WKC)

Members about 20,000 members 2009

Sources: German JKA-Karate Federation website;105 The Free Encyclopedia106

105
German JKA-Karate website, http://www.deutscher-jka-karate-bund.de; accessed on 15 December 2009.
106
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.

- 75 -
 2.2.4. Aikido

At the early 1960s, Aikido entered Germany, and very similarly to Karate, also via
France. In 1966, the DJB set up a section for Aikido, but one year later, another
organization was formed, the Aikikai Germany. It was led by Asai Katsuaki, a student of
Ueshiba Kisshomaru, the son of Aikido founder Ueshiba Morihei, who was officially
sent in 1965 by the Aikikai Honbu Dojo in Tokyo, Japan, to teach Aikido in Germany.

Under the guidance of Rolf Brand and Erhard Altenbrandt, another proper Aikido
organization, the German Aikido Federation (Deutscher Aikido-Bund, DAB), was
formed in 1977. It was acknowledged in the 1980s by the DSB as the official German
Aikido administration.107 Rolf Brand chaired the German Aikido Federation from 1977
to 1999, but in 2003, he set up another organization, the Aikido Union Germany, after
internal disagreements which can not be examined further in this study.

Thus, Aikido was at the time of the study diversified into various administrations in
Germany, characterized more by competing against each other instead of mutual
cooperation.

107
To be clear, the DAB was not accepted by the DSB as a proper elite sports association as usual, since
Aikido did not feature high-level sports competitions; but it was accepted as an association “with a special
purpose”, just as the German Sports Teacher Federation, or the German Association for Sports Science; see
the DOSB website, www.dosb.de; accessed on 12 December 2009.

- 76 -
 Table 13: German Aikido Federation

Subject Content Date

Original Name German Aikido Federation 1977.04.10

(Deutscher Aikido Bund)

Current Name German Aikido Federation 1977.04.10

(Deutscher Aikido Bund)

Associated National Federation German Olympic Sports Confederation (DOSB) 1980s

Associated International Federation International Aikido Federation unknown

Members 7,890 members 2008
in 162 clubs
108
Sources: German Aikido Federation website; The Free Encyclopedia; 109 DOSB (2008: 10)

Table 14: Aikikai Germany

Subject Content Date

Original Name Aikikai Germany 1967

(Aikikai Deutschland)

Current Name Aikikai Germany 1967

(Aikikai Deutschland)

Associated National Federation independent

Associated International Federation European Aikido Federation (EAF) 1967

International Aikido Federation (IAF)
Aikikai Honbu Dojo Tokyo

Members about 6,000 members 2009

in c. 180 clubs

Sources: Aikikai Germany website;110 The Free Encyclopedia 111

108
German Aikido Federation website, http://www.aikido-bund.de; accessed on 15 December 2009.
109
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.
110
Aikikai Germany website, http://www.aikikai.de; accessed on 15 December 2009.
111
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.

- 77 -
 Table 15: Aikido Union Germany

Subject Content Date

Original Name Aikido Union Germany 2002.04.27

(Aikido Union Deutschland)

Current Name Aikido Union Germany 2002.04.27

(Aikido Union Deutschland)

Associated National Federation Federal Association for Aikido in Germany 2002

Associated International Federation - -

Members 85 Aikido dan grade holders 2009

Sources: Aikido Union Germany website;112 The Free Encyclopedia 113

2.2.5. Résumé

Contrary to the European combat sports, it was far too obvious that East Asian martial
arts were administered by at least two (Judo and Karate), but usually a multitude of
associations. At first, this might just seemed like the result of the freshness of East Asian
martial arts in the German culture. But just the martial art with the longest history in
Germany – Jujutsu – featured the greatest variation of associations, while much younger
Karate (in Germany) reduced its administrations to just a pair.

The main difference between Karate and Judo on the one hand, and Jujutsu and
Aikido on the other was the existence vs. non-existence of international top-level
competitions. Obviously, the need to focus on competitive successes forced leaders of
martial arts to get along with each other, and thus, to establish strong and unanimously
leading national administrations. Then, fragmentations would occur only in fields where
such needs do not exist, such as in Aikido, or recreational Judo and Karate. While
recreational fencing, apparently, was covered by the German Fencing Federation, and

112
Aikido Union Germany website, http://www.aikido-union.de/start; accessed on 15 December 2009.
113
The Free Encyclopedia, www.wikipedia.org; accessed on 12 December 2009.

- 78 -
similarly, recreational wrestling covered by the German Wrestling Federation, things
were different for Judo and Karate. That might be explainable by recourse to the young
history of East Asian martial arts in Germany.

Second, there was no history of outstanding, universally respected athletes of East

Asian martial arts in Germany. Even Olympic gold medalists, like Judoka Frank
Wieneke (Los Angeles 1984) or Udo Quellmalz (Atlanta 1996), were practically
unknown outside of Judo circles. On the contrary, the most well-known (and thus,
respected) martial arts figures in Germany were usually the founders of associations, no
matter how tiny they might be; and it was much easier for an experienced martial artist
in Germany to open a new association than to win an international high-level
competition. Therefore, there was a lack of athletic idols for young talented ambitious
athletes in martial arts, contrary to European combat sports. More results could be
gained by taking additional statistical data into account.114

114
Unfortunately, due to its status as a member with a special purpose, data of this kind are not available for
Aikido.

- 79 -
 Chart 03: Member Distribution in 2008 (Age)

East Asian Martial Arts

120000
100000
80000
Members

60000
40000
20000
0
~6
7~14 15~18 19~26 27~40 41~60 60+
years
Judo 9986 109262 23560 14432 12287 13195 2043
Ju-Jutsu 984 20193 7748 7153 9348 7534 677
Karate 1985 52309 13502 4612 20950 12651 668
Taekwondo 3137 29612 9178 6454 6420 4894 249

Source: DOSB (2008: 6~9)

Thus, a third finding would be that the membership structure of the researched East
Asian martial arts resembled most the structure of European fencing, although each
martial art counted more practitioners than the German Fencing Federation. This
resemblance was also apparent in respect of the gender distribution, which showed a
figure for male participants twice as much as that for female participants in the
researched East Asian martial arts:115

115
The ratio for males to females in fencing was also about 2:1; see the section above.

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 Chart 04: Member Distribution in 2008 (Gender)

East Asian Martial Arts

200000
180000
160000
140000
120000
Members

100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
Judo Ju-Jutsu Karate Taekwondo
females 56119 17492 37197 22451
males 128646 36145 69480 37493

Source: DOSB (2008: 7~9)

Therefore, the best European combat sports comparable for East Asian martial arts
would be fencing, not boxing nor wrestling. Now in fencing, Germany was quite
successful in international competitions, although it featured fewer members than in any
East Asian martial art. The reasons for this might have been multitudinous; but one
precondition for Germany’s success in this area was clearly that other countrie’s athletes
were not doing better. It would be reasonable to assume that they would do so, if they
would be provided with the appropriate incentives to devote more time and energy in
better preparations, such as top national prestige, and amounts of money.

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 For example, in Judo, it was not known that other countrie’s athletes would be
regarded as national heroes, or be awarded with unimaginable amounts of money; the
situation was similar in Karate.116

In TKD, however, the situation was just as described above. Ignoring, for the sake of
argument, the situation in Korea, there were still several countries where TKD
competitors train and compete as professional athletes, earning nation-wide fame and
huge bonuses for top places at international tournaments. While a German athlete gains
just about 20,000 Euros for an Olympic gold medal, no matter in which sports she or he
participated, athletes from Turkey, for example, can get a life-long pension enabling
them the life of a rich person for an Olympic gold medal in TKD. 117 Similarly,
professional TKD athletes were competing regularly in premier divisions in Iran, where
they could gain much more experiences in high-level TKD competition than any
German amateur TKD athlete ever (interview Arndt, 2009). Other countries with
professional TKD athletes would include Spain, Greece, Mexico and several former
USSR countries. It would be an interesting enterprise to examine the origins of such a
huge interest and those huge amounts of money in these countries. But that would not be
the concern of this current study; here, it was only to state that German TKD athletes
have some clear disadvantages compared to some other countries.

Based on the previous reasoning, one could be wondering why such structures of
professional TKD did not develop in Germany. But as long as there were no professional
athletes in any East Asian martial art or European combat sport in Germany at all, the

116
By ignoring Japan, for the sake of the argument; it would go far beyod of the scope of this study to
examine the question if Japan would qualify for such a country or not, and in which respects.
117
These figures were taken from the website of the German Olympic Sports Confederation, www.dosb.de;
and from multiple entries in the German TKD-related internet discussion boards, www.kampfkunstforum.de;
www.kampfkunst-board.info; www.taekwondoforum.info; all accessed on 22 December 2009.

- 82 -
answer would be too obvious: there was just not enough money in these kinds of sport,
because there was not enough public attention, and thus media coverage, for fighting
sports.

The situation of East Asian martial arts in general, and TKD in particular, in Germany
could be summed up like this. Although combat sports were deeply rooted in the
German culture, and thus get some regular media attention around the time of high-
profile competitions, especially at the Olympics, East Asian martial arts were not
followed with a similar public interest. One reason might be that they were considered
more a healthy and safe physical activity, just like fencing (and, probably, Yoga), where
parents could assign their children to without worries; but that people would not regard
them as serious fighting sports with thrilling bouts, just as boxing, or that physically
challenging matches would be a regular part of that sport, just as in case of wrestling.118

Despite their quite long tradition in Germany – now over 100 years –, East Asian
martial arts were still seen as exotic activities where people assign in for some
unconventional fitness training for sometimes unconventional students, and sometimes
even for spiritual reasons, not comparable to serious European fighting sports which
require tough guys being ready to beat up unknown opponents. Thus, grossly spoken,
the current situation reflects the distinction between European combat sports as elite
sports for ambitious athletic heroes on the one hand, and East Asian martial arts as a

118
It was a generally observed tendency reflected in the postings at the German internet martial arts
discussion boards that many parents would assign their children to martial arts when they feel their children
were physically weak or underdeveloped, while young people assigning in wrestling or boxing often want to
showcase their physical prowess; see www.kampfkunstforum.de, and www.kampfkunst-board.info; both
accessed on 22 December 2009.

- 83 -
rather recreational activity including meditation, traditional forms and exotic
philosophical concepts on the other.119

Considering this, it would be interesting to examine how the German Taekwondo

Union, which promotes physically challenging full-contact bouts more resembling
European combat sports than Zen Buddhist meditation practices, tried to get along with
that situation. It would require the clear distinction between TKD as elite combat sport
promising Olympic metal for highly specialized athletes, and TKD as a safe and fun
activity for the whole family. And that would require a self-confident administration
capable of communicating that very distinction to the possible audience and pool of
participants, and successfully managing that distinction. The following examination of
TKD in Germany in the remaining three chapters would be guided by this question.

An important aspect would be the image switch of TKD throughout the decades. At
the time of the study, according to the analysis above, although TKD was a challenging
Olympic sport, it was also widely seen as a family-friendly activity. One reason for this
might be the missing media coverage of TKD competitions. In 1984, TKD once got a
huge media attention, after TKD master Kwon Jae-hwa demonstrated his famous
boulder-breaking knife-hand strikes at the BMW laboratory in Munich, Bavaria. It was
revealed that master Kwon managed to accelerate his hand so vigorously that he hit the
stone with a force of up to 10,000 Newton, which would be equal to a weight of 1,000
kg (Gatzweiler, 2008: 61). Since then, the most media attention was generated on local

119
Most probably, East Asian martial arts were usually seen as enriched with desired philosophical values,
while European combat sports were usually seen as activities without such disturbing constraints; thus, both
fields of activities would most probably be separated in different cognitive categories. Naturally, this would
have a great impact on the pre-selection of participating members. But regrettably, this trace could not be
followed within this study, for it would reach far beyond its scope.

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levels when Korean competition teams travelled (mostly) through Southern Germany,
usually on invitation by the fomer Korean head coach, Ko Eun-min, since the 1980s.

In the 1970s, TKD benefitted from the huge media hype around the famous Bruce
Lee-movies. Since Bruce Lee had adapted several TKD techniques (he collected
everything he seemed to be useful) and had performed them in front of the spectating
world, fans discovered several of his kicks and movements in TKD and engaged in that
sport. Thus, during the martial arts boom of the 1970s, many physically strong and
ambitious young men joined TKD, thanks to its image as containing the exciting
fighting elements of the movies (interview Arndt, 2009).

TKD in Germany had also benefitted from an increased demand for East Asian martial
arts in the 1960s, which was based on three pillars: the long tradition of Jujutsu and Judo
in Germany; Elvis Presley’s Karate exercises during his military service in Germany;
and the preparations for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics with Judo as a demonstration sport.
Despite that, there remained a lack of facilities where martial arts (besides Judo and
Jujutsu) could be learned appropriately, due to a shortage of qualified instructors.
Therefore, any opportunity to get access to a genuine East Asian martial arts instructor
was regarded as a huge value, with nobody questioning the qualifications of the
instructor for teaching a particular martial art. In fact, several Judo instructors, like
Germany’s national Judo head coach from 1965~2000, Han Ho-san, turned out to be
actual Korean citizens, and later additionally offered TKD in their schools.

To provide a basis for the examination of subsequent transitions of TKD in Germany,

the first reception of TKD in Germany should be examined properly. But before that, the
situation of the earliest Koreans entering Germany should be taken into account. This
would be the task of the following section.

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3. Korean Migrant Workers in West Germany

As mentioned, the first Korean TKD masters entered Germany for other purposes than
teaching TKD. Most of them worked as migrant workers in West German hard coal
mines. They remained the only Korean workers in Europe (Lee, 1991: 27), and the
second-largest Korean migrant group after those who settled in the U.S. (183). This
group originally resided in the West German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia
with its huge coal mining companies, resulting in an unusual development of TKD in
that area, unusual to all other German, even European regions, probably all over the
world. As this special North-Western German TKD region crucially affected the
development of TKD in all Germany later, it requires a closer observation of the
processes in that region.

First, the political background that enabled labor migration to West Germany would
be sketched shortly. Second, the situation of the German-Koreans and their impact on
TKD in Germany would be analyzed.

3.1. Labor Migration in West Germany

After Nazi Germany was defeated by the allies of the US, England, France and Russia
in 1945, the country was in a devastating situation; everything seemed ruined. But some
areas were less demolited than others. For example, production facilities of industry
companies had been destroyed by air bombings to a much lesser degree than residential
areas. This was at least partially because during the war, industrial production capacities
had been enhanced to a larger degree than other areas; and industrial facilities had been
updated and still were on a qualitative high level after the war (Herbert, 2003: 192).

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Therefore, the basis for ignition of the later economic miracle in West Germany was
already set.

But there was a lack of qualified workers, and proper accomodation. Through the
following years, millions of fugitives from the former Eastern territories of Germany in
Poland and Russia and escapees from East Germany spread into the land, around 10
million people by 1960 (Herbert, 2003: 194). Nevertheless, the unemployment rate,
which was above 12% in 1950 (Knortz, 2008: 59), shrinked dramatically, to less than
one percent in 1960 (40). But then, the flow of fresh workers came to a halt after the
Berlin Wall was erected in August 1961.

But West Germany was still in a need for more workers, especially for dull and dirty
jobs, since the so-called “economic miracle” during the 1950s and 1960s guaranteed a
constant economic growth. Some scholars even argue that the flexible reservoir of
workers in early West Germany (unemployed Germans, displaced people, GDR escapees,
refugees from the former far eastern German regions, then foreigners of different
nationalities) was one, if not the most important factor for West Germany’s explosive
economic growth (cf. Knortz, 2008: 54). Especially the refugees from East Germany had
usually been highly mobile and well-educated young laborers, with an above-average
amount of engineers, technicians, doctors, professors and professionals from other
highly qualified fields. According to Knortz, some scholars estimate that their
contribution, overall, was worth more than 30 Billion German Marks, i.e. more than the
U.S. loans which are officially regarded as helping West Germany’s economy getting
ignited after World War II.

The West German economic miracle was a result of the so-called “Korea boom”, a
period of global economic prowess during and after the Korean war of 1950~53, caused
by increased armament and private treasuring-up (Knortz, 2008: 53). In West Germany,

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exports of heavy-industry products, especially armament technology, were raised
dramatically, which, in return, ignited consuming rates within Germany. Since 1953, so-
called “guest workers” were hired from abroad to work on West German construction
and agricultural fields, the areas with dramatic seasonal variations in work amounts
(Herbert, 2003: 203).

However, as Knortz (2008) pointed out, the real incentive for the first official contract
for work migration, which was signed between West Germany and Italy in December 20,
1955 (Knortz, 2008: 83), came from the area of foreign politics. West Germany had such
a huge trade surplus over Italy, that unconventional measures were needed to get the
relationship with this European ally back into some kind of balance. Once the first
migrant workers proved to make a good job, and problems like different culture and the
language barrier could be overcome, the industry started getting interested in foreign
work craft. Through the following years, similar contracts were signed with Portugal,
Spain, Greece, and Turkey. In the long run, the Turkey contract appeared to be the most
significant, becaue since the early 1970s, Turkish descendants make the hugest amount
of foreigners in Germany.

The Turkey contract was also significant because it paved the way for contracts with
other non-European countries. Quickly afterwards, several non-European countries
approached West Germany, seeking for ways of sending their (often unemployed)
workers to the once again rich country.120

120
The reprint of an unpublished, internal summary in Knortz (2003: 116-120) enlists requests of the
following non-European countries: Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China (both), India, Iran,
Jamaica, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Tunis, United
Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and the central-African federation. Additionally, requests have been made by
Syria, Afghanistan, the Lebanon, Egypt, Japan, the Dominican Republic, and unofficially even from the U.S.
(113). According to this summary, the South Korean government has asked in May 1962 for two issues: (a)

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 Although most migrant workers were working in production and construction
industries, our special field of interest is mining. Hard coal mining was one of
Germany’s main important industries, which traditionally attracted foreign workers,
especially from Eastern Europe, since the late 19th century. The hugest mining pits were
located in the Ruhr and Saar areas in Western Germany, employing several hundred
thousand miners. However, from 1958 on, West Germany registered a dramatic reduce
of hard coal consumption, from 96 million tons to 88 million tons, due to increased
usage of the much cheaper mineral oil (Knortz, 2008: 43). The consequence was a
dramatic reduction of jobs in the coal mining industry, from 607,000 employees in 1957
to 287,000 ten years later. Between 1958 and 1960, about 100,000 jobs got lost in that
industry (193). However, as the average per-capita income was raised dramatically
during that time period (see the table below), people tried to raise their living conditions,
and less workers, including migrant workers, were ready to accept the dirty, difficult and
low-paied jobs in the coal pit. Therefore, although there was a huge reduction of coal-
mining jobs, the necessary amount of coal mining laborers was maintained only by
employing new foreigners (195).

Table 16: per-capita income in West Germany 1913-1975

(German Marks, in prices from 1913)

1913 1945/46 1950 1960 1975

720 500 850 1,480 2,300

Source: Knortz (2008: 40)

sending 60 young engineers for further education during 1962-66, and (b) sending about 1,000 industrial
laborers for several years, including further education. Therefore, until mid-1962, there was no mentioning
of Korean coal miners. The West German industry, on the other hand, requested 10,000 coal miners from
Pakistan in 1960 (118).

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 To fill that need, one major West German coal mining company, together with two
smaller pits, pushed forward an agreement with Morocco, whose government signed a
contract to sent about 9,000 pit workers on May 21, 1963. After all, this project was
finally cancelled by the German Interior Ministry because of the high illiteracy rate in
Morocco, presumably also beneath its laborers, which was seen as too dangerous for
working in the pits (Knortz, 2008: 133)121. Therefore, there was a sudden, immediate
need for coal miners.

On the other hand, West German coal mining companies have had quite good
experiences with East Asian coal miners. In 1957, Japan had sent 500 employed coal
miners for three years for educational purposes to West Germany. They were on
vacations during that time and returned to their companies afterwards (113). Obviously,
this program was seen as successful, for on January 30, 1962, both sides agreed to
enlarge the contract for more 1,500 coal miners, this time currently unemployed persons.
But the project was cancelled soon, after a severe mine disaster happened in the
Japanese Mitsui pit, which caused death for 455 miners and injured more 947 persons
(114) The Japanese migrant workers stayed at home to compensate for the losses. Thus,
again, German coal mining companies suddenly, and most unexpectedly, had a need for

121
Also, the experiences with the about 7,000 non-European migrant workers in West Germany in mid-
1962 was disillusioning, because of the massive problems concerning travel fees, language, food, climate,
traditions, and the complete culture of working and living. Therefore, the general policy was that no laborers
from non-European countries should be assigned again, with exceptions in single cases only, e.g. for
especially skilled workers, which resulted in negative answers to the requests of about 20 countries (Knortz
2008: 121).
Finally, in June 1965, a decision was made by ministers of the federal states that non-European countries
should not be granted sending workers, except for Tunis, Morocco, the US, Canada, Israel, Australia, New
Zealand, and some Eastern Bloc countries (140).

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fresh workers. Moreover, they were already ready for migrant laborers from remote
countries. In this situation, the Koreans came like a heaven-sent opportunity.

3.2. Korean Migrant Workers

In South Korea, the effect of the Korean War was anything else but a “Korea boom”.
There were war-related destructions of a far bigger scale than they had been in Germany,
and the economic situation was disastrous. Both Koreas could not help themselves out of
this mess. The North was supported by other communist countries, and the South
depended on aids by the US and other western states.

Now the US was interested in a democratic South Korea, and the new Kennedy
administration was especially concerned about the direction South Korea would take
after the military coup d’état by Park Chung-hee in 1961. One immediate reaction was
the freezing of gratuitous financial aids South Korean economy needed desperately. In
this situation, the Park Chung-hee government turned desperately to West Germany,
which promised a loan of about 150 Million German Marks if the Koreans would send
Korean coal pit workers (Kim, 2006). The Germans, as was shown above, were also in
desperate need of additional coal miners, 122 therefore it was the perfect win-win
agreement.123

122
According to Yoon & Kim (1996), the companies had been the Ruhrkohle AG in Herne, deep in the heart
of the Ruhr region, being the hugest German coal mining company, and the much smaller Eschweiler
Bergwerksverein in Eschweiler, close to Aachen, all of them located in North Rhine-Westphalia.
123
The German literature about guest workers keeps mysteriously silent about Korean migrant workers and
the respected contracts between the South Korean and the West German governments, although all relevant
documents until 1973 are already accessible (Knortz 2008: 7). But the fact that this agreement was not
mentioned in a summary about possible agreements from May 1962 (see one of the footnotes above), is a

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 According to Lee (1991: 26), the new South Korean government quickly installed a
law about ‘emigration to abroad’ in 1962, and about one year later, the first South
Korean migrant workers arrived in West Germany.124 In the end, more than 7,600
Korean migrant workers entered West Germany (see the following table):

strong indicator that this decision was a very urgent one, on both sides.
124
Sources differ on the exact date the first group of South Korean migrant workers set their feet on West
German soil: November 23 (Yoon, Kim 1996), December 16 (de.wikipedia.org), or December 22 (Kim
2006). According to Kim (2006), it was a group of 123 Korea laborers.
South Korean nurses have entered Germany before, even in the mid-1950s. However, this was a small
number based on private efforts conduted by religious interest groups. The first official contract between the
two states about migrant nurses was in 1965; see Lee (1991: 28).

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 Table 17: Korean migrant laborers in West Germany, 1965~1977

Year Trained nurses* Practical nurses** Coal miners

~1965 128 2,233

1966 723 297 286

1967 216 191 -

1968 9 - -

1969 450 62 -

1970 832 875 1,279

1971 360 988 893

1972 624 815 -

1973 763 419 2,140

1974 962 255

1975 331 55

1976 - - -

1977 - - 799

Total 5,270 3,959 7,630

Source: Lee (1991: 28), based on several other sources

*
trained nurses: requires College degree
**
practical nurses: high school degree sufficient

According to Lee (1991), these figures reveal several major migration periods for
Korean coal miners: before 1965, 1970/71, 1973/74, and, finally, 1977. Since the Korean
migration workers usually signed three-year contracts, a pattern like that one above
could be expected. It should be noted that in 1973, followed by the global oil crisis, the
constant economic growth came to a halt, and West Germany’s economy got in a severe
crisis, with the immediate consequence that the unemployment rate grew suddenly, and
Germans began to return to uncomfortable jobs (Knortz, 2008: 41). As a reaction,
recruitments of foreign workers were completely stopped first, officially on November

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23, 1973 (Herbert, 2003: 203). Yet quickly afterwards, it was again allowed for several
branches, including coal miners and nurses (Knortz, 2008: 41); but after the last team of
Korean miners had arrived on October 25 in 1977, recruitment of new migrant workers
got finally prohibited in 1978. Nevertheless, the total number of Koreans living in
Germany was constantly rising since, thanks to family reunions for those who stayed in
Germany; see the following table. According to Yoon & Kim (1996), the expiration of
Korean worker’s status of sojourn in Germany was changed in June 1978, and
completely abandoned in November 1980. This had been a reaction to severe
demonstrations from Koreans in 1980, because many Korean nurses had been forced to
return to their home country (Park & Fehling, 2003: 84).

Table 18: total number of Koreans living in Germany

1972 1973 1975 1976 1979 1981 1983 1984 2007*

8,824 11,518 14,460 13,231 12,705 14,733 15,960 15,853 29,800

Source: Lee (1991: 30), based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany;
*
Figure of 2007: according to The Free Encyclopedia

As mentioned, the Koreans weren’t divided equally over the Federal Republic of
Germany. On the contrary, they were originally gathered in a few areas around the coal
mining companies which had hired them, all of them located in West Germany’s hugest
federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia. However, according to Lee (1991: 29), in
September 1972, only 2171 Koreans were still working in the pit; he assumed that a
large portion of those original Korean migrant workers went further to America. Also,
many of those Koreans who originally came as pit workers switched to different jobs as
soon as their three-year contracts ran out. To enable this, many Koreans married Korean
nurses to be able to further stay in West Germany. As a consequence, the pure territorial

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concentration of Korean workers was dissolved, and they started spreading all over the
country. However, by far the biggest cluster still remained in North Rhine-Westphalia, as
the following table shows:

Table 19: total and relative numbers of Koreans divided across German Federal States (in 1984)

Federal state Koreans All foreigners (in 1000) Citizens (in millions)

North Rhine-Westphalia 6,202 = 39.0% 1,324.2 16.8

Hesse 2,703 = 17.0% 506.3 5.5

Berlin 2,067 = 13.0% 240 1.8

Baden-Württemberg 1,253 = 7.9% 845.2 9.2

Hamburg 1,171 = 7.4% 168.6 1.6

Bavaria 866 = 5.4% 666.3 11.0

Lower Saxony 781 = 5.0% 273.7 7.2

Rheinland-Pfalz 475 = 3.0% 161.5 3.6

Schleswig-Holstein 179 = 1.2% 86.2 2.6

Saarland 109 = 0.7% 44.5 1.1

Bremen 47 = 0.3% 46.8 0.7

All FRG 15,853 = 100% 4,363.6 61.1

Source: Lee (1991: 31), based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany

This table also shows that on the large scale, the Koreans remained a minor group of
foreigners living in West Germany, people never being noticed by most Germans. Also,
it shows that by far most foreigners were residing in North Rhine-Westphalia, which
features the most densed region in Germany, the Ruhr Area with cities like Duisburg,
Essen, and Dortmund. This is a traditional center for migrant workers, sporting, together
with the neighboring Rhein Area that includes cities such as Cologne, Leverkusen,

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former West German capital Bonn and the North Rhine-Westfalian capital Düsseldorf,
more than 12 milion people. It is considered the fourth largest urban area in Europe,
after Moscow, London, and Paris. And finally, the table reveals an unusual low amount
of Koreans in the two Southern German states of Bavaria (Munich, Nuremberg,
Garmisch-Partenkirchen) and Baden-Württemberg (Stuttgart, Karlsruhe), where the
other main regions of TKD in Germany are located.

Despite the fact that the West German industry, based on their experiences with the
Japanese coal mining trainees, demanded experienced Korean coal miners, many of
them who actually entered the country had no experience in coal mining; there were
farmers, day laborers, bankrupt entrepreneurs and other unemployed persons, high
school and college graduates, and a few real miners, looking for an opportunity to make
a living, and maybe to escape from the hopeless situation in South Korea of that time.
According to Kim (2006), who analyzed Korean newspapers from that time period,
2,894 people applied for the first 375 available jobs in 1963; and the first list of people
who actually got the jobs was published in a daily newspaper. Also, these newspapers
reported about the alleged 150 Million German Marks loan ‘in return ro Park’s making a
“heroic” gesture of sending workers to West Germany’.

After their arrival, they received one month of intensive German-language training
and then were sent to their work places below earth, where they earned minimum wages
due to their inferior working performances; plus, they often kept just about 250 German
Marks for themselves and sent the rest to their families in South Korea.

Korean migrant workers in West Germany lived under horrible conditions – low
wages, extremely uncomfortable work, bad accommodations, and no contacts to their
German colleagues (for an overview, see the following table). According to Yoon & Kim

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(1996), this was a result of the failure of the Korean government to negotiate better
working conditions for their people.

Table 20: Korean migrant worker’s situation in West Germany:

Sitution Description
Working About 1000 m below ground, with floors of 1,50 m height and up to temperatures of 40°
conditions C , the air filled with stone and coal dust

Working Unfair working contracts favored employers: in case of accidents or deaths, there were
contracts no compensations for workers or their families

Accomodation Of varying quality, often just 4-7 pyeong shared by four laborers; three showers, one
kitchen and one toilet for 120 persons, fostering conflicts between Korean colleagues
Wages Minimum wages of 800~1100 DM after a three-months training program, including
bonuses for efficiency; many of them kept about 250 DM for accommodation and food
and sent the rest to their families in Korea

Language One month of German language training after arrival

aquisition

Social contacts Usually just between Koreans, excluding German colleagues

Official support Official translators by Korean embassy were suspected to have other functions, such as
spying out and controlling Korean laborers, therefore they were often renounced, which
reinforced isolation of Koreans

Source: Yoon & Kim, 1996

After serious demonstrations by Koreans in November 1980, and under the

impression of the Gwangju massacre in May 1980, Germany rewarded Korean workers
standard working and living conditions equal to other nation’s migrant workers. This
resulted in further re-orientation of many Korean workers, and most of them ceased to

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work in the coal mines. By 2002, for example, there was just one Korean miner left
actually working at a coal mine in the Ruhr Area, Jeong Yong-Gi (Park & Fehling, 2003:
79).

Unfortunately, it is not known how many of the Korean workers were also TKD
masters, willing and capable of teaching students, and switching to this profession after
their contracts ran out. But there had been several, because many reports about the early
practice of something like “Korean Karate” unter Korean instructors who worked
officially as coal miners can be found on the internet, in discussion boards and in
historical overviews in different TKD and other martial arts magazines. For example,
German TKD pioneer Gerd Gatzweiler, who started learning “Korean Karate” as early
as in 1964, recalled “many Koreans” among the coal miners being responsible for the
quick spreading of Korean Karate in Germany, especially in Judo schools (Gatzweiler,
2008: 59). During the early times, such reports were not published openly, because the
Korean instructors usually taught at Japanese martial arts schools or locations where
they had to pay a fee for, such as wine cellars or backyards of rstaurants, and they were
paied by their German students for the lessons. This was strictly forbidden, for their
working contract did not allow any other engagement than the work they officially
signed for, and they could have been sent out of the land if it was discovered by the
authorities.

One of the earliest examples of a coal miner-turned TKD instructor was Kim Byung-
wook, then 3rd dan TSD instructor of the Mooduk-kwan tradition, who began teaching
the Korean martial art in 1964 in Essen, until he went on to the Cologne Sports
University after two years. Another one was his successor, Kim Woo-kang, also a first-
generation Korean coal miner, who returned back to Korea after his contract had run out
in 1966, but quickly came back to Germany to become the so-called “father of TKD in
Noth Rhine-Westphalia” (Gatzweiler, interview 2006). Another example would be Pak

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In Shyuk (1938~1995), who worked between 1965~68 in a German coal mine. Pak was
a 2nd dan degree hapkido master and tought German students together with Kim Sou
Bong. But both of them left Germany for America after their working permits ended
after three years. Finally, Lee Bum-i, who left Korea in 1966 to spread TKD around the
world. Lee worked first as a coal miner in Germany for 1 year, went to Zurich in
Switzerland as TKD instructor for 2 years, but came back to West Germany to teach
TKD and, later, to study sports science in 1974~76.

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III. How Taekwondo Entered Germany (1960~1965)

On a nice Saturday morning on May 1st in 1971, the German Taekwondo enthusiasts
gathered together for the first nation-wide assembly in order to revitalize the Taekwondo
section of the German Judo Federation. The new strong chairman of the section, Heinz
Marx, had called them up from all over the Federal Republic to join him in his
hometown in Munich, the hot spot of Taekwondo in Bavaria, where the big stars like
Kwon Jae-hwa and Kim Kwang-il were teaching masses of students in huge martial arts
schools. To ignite the movement, Marx had organized the first dan graduation event for
Germans, and he had promised to award them with official inspector’s licenses for future
dan grade aspirants. Down in Bavaria, Taekwondo had just emerged from Korean Karate
a few years ago, and the black belt applicants knew each other well. They considered
themselves the center of the German Taekwondo movement. But what a surprise, when
suddenly two guys from North-Western Germany appeared, waving their already earned
dan grade certificates around – the very first two dan grade certificates in Germany,
signed by the General already three years ago! Everybody was wondering all the time
why the earliest certificate in Bavaria started with the number 3, and where the first two
certificates had been going. This was mostly unbelievable! That meant that there was
another vivid Taekwondo scene somewhere else in the Republic, completely
independently from the Bavarian Taekwondo boom. It was as if the inventor of the
wheel suddenly detected the existence of complete cars somewhere else …

How could it happen that TKD emerged at two remote locations in Germany
independently from each other, and even before the official introduction of the Korean
martial art in Europe? In what respects was TKD developed similarly in these areas, in
what respects differently from each other? And which one of the two TKD scenes would

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emerge as the dominating one, imposing its regulations and claims of leadership onto the
other?

Those have been the guiding questions of this chapter. It covered the period of the
introduction of TKD in Germany, which was officially recorded as having happened in
1965. But, as was already shown, many Korean TKD masters had entered West
Germany occasionally as coal miners, and have started to teach TKD to Germans clearly
before 1965125. Moreover, there are several reports of a TKD-related martial art entering
West Germany independently of the appearance of Korean migrant workers, even before
1963, as early as in 1960.

But first, the Korean migrant workers in North Rhine-Westphalia.

1. Korean Migrant Workers Teaching “Korean Karate” in their Spare

Time

As already mentioned, among the Korean migrant workers who entered West
Germany from 1963 on were several martial arts masters, including Kim Byung-wook
and Kim Woo-kang. Kim Byung-wook was an offspring of Hwang Ki’s Mooduk-Kwan
in Korea, thus teaching TSD, and his first students in Germany included Heinz
Wiesemann and Gerd Gatzweiler, later the two very first official TKD dan grade holders
in Germany, probably in all Europe (interview Gatzweiler, 2006).126 After two years,
Kim Byung-wook followed an offer by the German Sports University in Cologne, and
Wiesemann, Gatzweiler and the other students found a successor in Kim Woo-kang, who

125
More precisely, they were masters of a martial art which would later become TKD, and started teaching
this pre-TKD before it became officially known as TKD.
126
During the time of this study, both Heinz Wiesemann and Gerd Gatzweiler have received their honorary
7th dan degree.

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had been in Germany as a coal miner and returned in 1966 to teach Chungdo-kwan TKD
(Gatzweiler, 2008: 60). Kim was later called the “father of TKD in North Rhine-
Westphalia” (interview Gatzweiler, 2006; interview Weiler, 2007).

It was at least in 1964 when these two martial arts masters and others started teaching
something closely related to TKD to German students. One of their motivations for these
activities could reasonably have been to get away from their uncomfortable existence for
a while, and get in contact with the locals instead. It might also have been an opportunity
to improve the language learning.

But another motivation was clearly that they got paid for their lessons. There was just
the problem that activities of this kind had to be conducted unofficially, because as
foreign laborers with a signed contract as their only basis for sojourn, they were strictly
not allowed to engage in any extra work and earn some extra money. Therefore, they did
not run their own martial arts school and taught as many students as possible, but they
were usually hired as unofficial assistants by established martial arts schools or clubs.
Many Korean martial arts experts did not only know TKD, TSD or Taesoodo, but also
Hapkido, which could be sold as something like a Jujutsu or Aikido style, or, moreover,
truly Japanese martial arts, like Kendo and Judo. In fact, Germany’s first national Judo
head coach was a Korean, Han Ho-san127. Like him, several Koreans could start teaching
officially Judo, Karate, Jujutsu or Kendo, while inofficially introcucing their TKD-style
to the audience.

127
In 1962, Han Ho-san came to Germany to study architecture in Hanover. Having gained 5th place at the
Judo World Championships in Paris in 1961, the Germans trusted his expertise in their Judo team’s
preparations for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, with the result of one silver and one bronze medal. The
following year, they made him national coach, a position which he upheld for 35 years, until he retired in
2000. Currently, he is a 9th dan degree Judo grandmaster; in 2004, he was awarded with Germany’s National
Order of Merit.

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 Following the development of Karate in Germany since the late 1950s, several young
people were interested in learning this fascinating new kind of physical education. All
they knew was it came fro East Asia, but whether it was Japan, China or Korea or
anywhere else, nobody really bothered back then. Therefore, at this early stage, nobody
insisted on using a Korean term, like “Taekwondo” or “Tangsoodo”, it was often called
“Korean Karate” instead. Some clever students started to wonder, after a while, why the
commands and countings during practice weren’t in Japanese, but in Korean, but serious
complaints about this issue weren’t recorded anywhere (interview Gatzweiler, 2006;
interview Jung, 2007). Eventually, since the re-naming of the KTA into “Korea
Taekwondo Association” in 1965 (Kang & Lee, 1999), Korean instructors got
increasingly confident in using this term for naming their art, but the description as
“Korean Karate” could be found even in the 1970s (interview Jung, 2007).

Therefore, the Korean migrant workers did not teach a coherent TKD system initially,
but applied a variation of techniques, styles, and interpretations. The first coherent
system came with Choi Hong-hi’s demonstration team in 1965.

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 2. The Official Introduction of Taekwondo in 1965

The official story line of how and when TKD entered (West) Germany remained
continuously repeated and spread by the leading German TKD body, the DTU128. Based
on this, many TKD clubs, schools and private websites copied this foundation mythos,
and usually, TKD practitioners believed that this story contains the whole process. But a
closer look reveals some odd aspects.

According to the official story line, TKD was introduced into (West) Germany by a
trip of a TKD demonstration team across Europe, including West Germany, in 1965.
That team was led by Choi Hong-hi, former and future KTA president, and further
included TKD masters Han Cha-kyo (who later went to the US), Park Jong-soo
(according to Choi Hong-hi, his best student; later went to Canada), Kim Jun-kun and
Kwon Jae-hwa (Choi, 1994: 501, 517: see also Gillis, 2008)129. That team conducted
performances in four West German cities: in Frankfurt (in the federal state of Hesse),
West Berlin, Munich (capital of Bavaria) and Garmisch-Partenkirchen (host city of the
1936 Winter Olympics in Bavaria). This could already seem a little odd, for as far as we
already know, Korean TKD masters belonging to the migrant workers group were
located neither in Berlin, not in Hesse, nor in Bavaria, but more North-Western, in North
Rhine-Westphalia. However, there was no single hint about Choi Hong-hi’s
demonstration team performing in a more North-Western region than Frankfurt.

Thus, the question arised about the reason for Choi’s team to choose only West Berlin
and southern cities as performance locations for a new martial art, while the presumably

128
See the DTU website, www.dtu.de; accessed on 3 December 2009.
129
According to Seo Yoon-Nam (1993: 34), the team was, mainly, a military team, with Kwon Jae-hwa
being the only civilian member. Officially, Kwon joined the team as sports journalist, which earned him the
allowance to travel abroad with the demonstration team.

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interested audience with some background knowledge about the performance could be
found more North-Western?

One first guess would be that Choi’s team visited Germany on the invitation of
someone connected with the Korean embassy. And in fact, Gillis (2008: 71) presents
photography where the Korean ambassador to West Germany, Choi Duk-shin, joined the
demonstration team on stage. But again, the South Korean embassy was located in Bonn
(not Berlin), the West German capital from 1949~90, a quiet city just southern of
Cologne, one of the most famous cities in North Rhine-Westphalia. If Choi Hong-hi’s
TKD demonstration team visited West Germany on the official invitation of the South
Korean embassy, why would they not have performed in Bonn or somewhere more
closely to the embassy than Frankfurt, which is about 170 km away?

There was only an anecdote about Choi having visited Bonn, on behalf of a dinner
invitation during his trip through Germany. But it wasn’t by invitation of the Korean
embassy, as one could expect, but on a private basis (interview Weiler, 2007). After his
drive back to Frankfurt, Choi forgot his hotel’s name, and the only thing he remembered
was that it was located just next to a pharmacy. Thus, it took his driver quite a while to
find the hotel again. This anecdote illustrated that the Korean embassy officially did not
know (or did not care) about Choi’s visit to West Germany.130

But then, who invited the team to Germany and organized performances for them at
different locations? Clearly, it could hardly have been the case that the team just
travelled into a city, changed their clothes in their hotel rooms and went on the street to
do their performance. On the contrary, someone had been there before, had to place
advertisements, to rent a decent location with comfortable seats for the audience (and

130
The answer might be found in the facts that the Korean ambassador, Choi Duk-shi, was an old friend and
supporter of Choi’s, who could probably had invited Choi privately when he was in town.

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one entrance to charge fees), and to organize accommodations, meals and transfers for
the team members. Especially for a rather tiny town like Garmisch-Partenkirchen (about
26,000 citizens) where only a limited audience interested in the new martial art could be
expected, proper organization of the event was mandatory. That had been the task of the
village’s traditional sports club. But how did they get assigned to the first official Korean
TKD demonstration team in Germany?

3. “Korean Karate” in Garmisch-Partenkirchen

Garmisch-Partenkirchen was located right in front of the Alps, closely to the Southern
border of Germany, roughly as far from North Rhine-Westphalia with its Korean migrant
workers and “Korean Karate” masters away as possible. However, this tiny Olympic
town was one of the hot springs of TKD in Germany, independently from Korean
migrant workers.

After their victory over Nazi Germany, the Americans erected their German head
quarter at the Sheridan military camp in the revitalizing region of Garmisch-
Partenkirchen, using as a retreatment location for their stressed soldiers. In that very
camp, the young U.S. American military police officer Mike H. Anderson was
responsible for close combat training since 1963. Back then, he held the 1st keup of a
new kind of East Asian martial art, sporting a brown belt. Anderson had learned this art
in America by Allen Steen,131 who had been one of the most talented students of Jhoon
Rhee, the so-called “father of American TKD” (Kang & Lee, 1999; Gillis, 2008). Rhee
had left Korea at the end of the 1950s to study engineering in America, but quickly

131
In 1962, Allen Steen was the first non-Korean receiving the black belt in a TKD-related martial art (Bolz
& Schuldes, 2008: 11f.).

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started teaching something very much related to TKD there,132 and he got so successful
that he never formally completed his studies.

After a while, Anderson started teaching German friends in this new martial art which
was somehow similar to the already known Karate. This was not unusual, as we already
saw the American GI Elvis Presley studying Karate in a German Karate school a few
years before.133 It was not undoubtedly clear which year Anderson started his training,
but it was in 1964 that he opened the very first TKD department at the traditional local
gymnastics club, TV Garmisch 1868, together with German fellow Hans Vierthaler. Not
surprisingly, they called it “Korean Karate” (Bolz & Schuldes, 2008: 13). As a
photography picture reveals, this department was something like a franchise of the J.
Rhee Institute in Washington, D.C. (13).

In the same year of 1964, Anderson and Vierthaler founded the first official Korean
martial arts association in Germany, the German-Korean Karate Federation (Deutsch-
Koreanischer Karate-Verband e.V.). They started conducting the very first German as
well as European Championships (although on a quite local scale), featuring a very
offensive combat style with no protection whatsoever. The European Championships
were conducted as part of a visit by Jhoon Rhee, who already had established quite good
relations with Choi Hong-hi. Thus, the Korean Karate department of the TV Garmisch

132
Jhoon Rhee had been a student of Hwang Ki’s Moodeuk-kwan, therefore his style originally was TSD,
thus much closer to modern Olympic-style TKD than Choi Hong-hi’s TKD at that time (interview
Gatzweiler, 2009). However, Rhee quickly joined Choi’s international ITF movement after it was
established. In the 1970s, Rhee was instrumental in the development of Kickboxing, for it was he who had
invented the safety gear first used at full-contact Kickboxing bouts.
133
Also, Hans-Ferdinand Hunkel had originally started with TSD at an American military camp near
Frankfurt (E-mail Hunkel, 26 July 2006).

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1868 eventually got in contact with Choi Hong-hi, who was to get president of the KTA
the following year.

Also in 1964, the friends of “Japanese Karate” in West Germany organized their first
instructor course, where they realized their lack of competence. Therefore, in the
following year, the Japanese Karate Association (JKA) sent four of their best Karate
instructors (Kase, Kanazawa, Enoeda, and Shirai) to a one-week seminar to Germany,
which was completed with a national championship, covered by several media,
including TV news and shows, and the official promotion of four German black belts
(Arend, 1989: 55).

It was in this very same year of 1965, in late October, when Choi Hong-hi conducted
the TKD demonstration team’s journey to West Germany. It seemed safe to argue that at
least one of his purposes by this trip was to promote “Korean Karate” as a unique
Korean martial art on its own, named “Taekwondo”. For this, he not only established
close ties with Germany’s first Korean Karate department in little Garmisch, but he was
also invited to West Berlin by one of Germany’s largest Karate schools, owned by
German Karate pioneer Georg Brückner. And he associated with probably the hugest
martial arts school in Southern Germany, Carl Wiedmeier’s Jujutsu school in the
Bavarian capital of Munich.

4. The “Oh-Do-Kwan” in Munich

Carl Wiedmeier had been an eager student of the “Father of Judo in West Germany”,
Alfred Rhode. In his hometown of Munich, he ran one of the biggest commercial martial
arts schools in the whole Federal Republic of Germany, serving about 5,000 students

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(about 10,000 in 1968)134 in different martial arts. As a young man, he had learned Judo,
Jujutsu and Kendo, and to complete his studies, he took a lengthy trip to East Asia at the
beginning of the 1960s, which took him to Japan and, for several weeks, South Korea.
There, he grabbed the opportunity of learning a formerly unknown martial art, somehow
related to, but also different from Japanese Karate. For some reasons, he got in contact
with Choi Hong-hi, who later rewarded him with the honor of using the name of his
famous Korean TKD school, “Oh-Do-Kwan”, for his own school in Munich – a name
that was in use until the period of this study.

Wiedmeier was instrumental in Choi Hong-hi’s visit to Germany, and he was

responsible to get his team for a demonstration show in Munich. Afterwards, he engaged
Choi’s team member Kwon Jae-hwa as the first professional TKD instructor in Germany,
if not Europe. Later, in 1966, Wiedmeier founded the first German association with the
proper name of the Korean martial arts in its title, the German Taekwondo Federation
(Deutscher Taekwondo Verband) in Munich. Despite its name, it remained a local
institution.

According to his own records, Wiedmeier had learned TKD first in 1961, probably on
one of his trips to Korea, which could make him the first German ever to learn TKD
(Wiedmeier, 1966). Yet as a martial arts teacher, he preferred a unified approach, i.e. he
didn’t teach just one particular martial art in its pure state, but he combined elements
from different areas to get better results. Therefore, although he might have been the first
German TKD student, he did not offer proper TKD in his own martial arts school in
Munich, until he engaged a professional TKD instructor, master Kwon Jae-hwa.

134
For this and the following information, see Carl Wiedmeier’s website: http://zsd-
international.com/odk/historie.htm, accessed in September 2009.

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 5. A Lonely Student’s Efforts in 1960

Despite the fact that the wife of South Korea’s first president, Francesca Rhee (born as
Franziska Donner), was from Austria, only few Korenas had found their way to
Germany or a German-speaking country before Korean coal miners came to Germany in
1963. Among them had been nurses, industrial trainees, and university students. One of
them was Han Ho-san, who started studying architecture in Hanover in Northern
Germany in 1962, and became Germany’s national Judo head coach after the 1964
Tokyo Olympics for 35 years.

Another one was Kim Kwang-il, who arrived in Germany in late 1959 to study
brewery at the Technical University of Munich. According to his self-report, he started
teaching small student’s groups in the new Korean Karate-like martial art in Freising, a
small city north of Munich, during his spare time in 1960 (Kim, 1993: 18f.).

This would make him the very first instructor of a TKD-related Korean martial art in
Germany, and his students the very first German practitioners of that art. However,
Kim’s efforts did not seem to have a lasting effect on his students. No one of them is
known as having practiced this new martial art continuously until it officially became
Korean TKD; therefore, Kim’s early trials could not be seen as sustainable.

However, Kim Kwang-il earned some more credits in the introduction and transition
of TKD in Germany. When South Korean president Park Chung-hee visited Germany in
1963, Kim put on his TKD dobok and cheered at the Munich airport. This was registered
by the president with some interest, and Kim was granted an audience at the president’s
hotel suite the next day. There, he explained that he used the Korean martial art as a kind
of tool for sports diplomacy. The president promised to support Kim, and shortly
afterwards, he sent 2,000 doboks from Korea (Kim, 1993: 18).

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 According to Kim, it was President Park who had sent Choi and his demonstration
team to Germany. But if this was correct, then there should certainly have been some
connections between the Choi-team and the South Korean embassy in Bonn. It is also
reasonable to assume that in case of an official issue, the Choi demonstration team
would have made a performance, probably including a cheerful get-together, in the
region of their hard-working country pals in North Rhine-Westphalia. But none of this
happened. Therefore, it is much safer to conclude that Kim just fostered a wrong
assumption in this case, 135 and President Park Chung-hee was not involved in the
mission of Choi Hong-hi.136

After the visit of Choi’s demonstration team, the owner of the hugest martial arts
school in Southern Germany, Carl Wiedmeier, engaged team member Kwon Jae-hwa as
TKD instructor, as already mentioned. Likewise, German Karate pioneer Georg
Brückner hired team member Park Jong-soo to teach Korean Karate in his Karate school
in West Berlin.137 Following these events, Kim Kwang-il also started teaching TKD on
a professional basis (until then, it was just his hobby) after he had completed his
university studies in 1966. He opened his own TKD school in Stuttgart, “Kim’s
Taekwondo School”, which became one of the most famous and athletically successful

135
This would not be Kim’s only mistake. He sometimes seemed to have mixed up dates in his recollection
of events; for example, he stated that the Choi demonstration team visited Germany in 1964, which, in fact,
was one year later.
136
This statement of Kim’s would also contradict the well-known fact that former army general Park
Chung-hee and former army general Choi Hong-hi fostered an exceptional bad relationship, which would
have make an official admission of Choi from Park very unlikely.
137
Georg Brückner (1930~1992) later turned back to Karate and, starting in 1974 together with Mike
Anderson, became one of the “fathers” of kickboxing, by organizing some of the first international
Kickboxing events and, in 1977, establishing one of the leading international Kickboxing organizations, the

World All-Style Karate Association (WAKO).

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TKD schools in Germany. But eventually, in 1979, after he felt too much disappointed
about the directions TKD was heading to, he surrendered and sold his school to Park
Soo-nam.

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 IV. Administrational Effort for Taekwondo in Germany
(1964~1990)

Finally, the athlete was at the Olympics! He never dared dreaming of this once-in-a-
lifetime opportunity. And things went pretty good for him: The previous year, he had
won the gold medal in the heavyweight class at the WTF World Championships. The
year before, he got European Champion. He beat the biggest names in Taekwondo, he
had nobody to fear for. If only this one thing had not happened … Just six weeks before
the tournament, the new head coach, his good friend who had always provided him with
the right tactics before a match and had guided him with sophisticated tips durig the bout,
saw no other choice than to step back for several reasons, and the old head coach was
reinstalled, just for this tournament. The directors ignored the protests of the athletes
who have managed three years ago to get him out of the position, because his old-school
training style completely contradicted modern training concepts the athletes were used to
work with. After severe power struggles, they agreed to cooperate with him, because
directors said they could make use of his positive influence on referees during the
tournament. But they ignored him; they conducted their preparations on their own and
did not allow him interfering the athlete’s matches with his useless comments. His
presence at the Olympics was a pure show event. Now the athlete is under stress. He
knows he could win the final against the Korean-American, his old foe whom he learned
to dominate. But in this actual semifinal, he acts totally unprepared against the Korean
opponent. He’s missing his old friend’s advises and encouragements so much, but he
dares not to look at the coache’s corner where the one person sits, completely
uninterestedly, whom he dislikes so much. Thanks to a free ticket, this was his only fight
at the Olympics; but the world can observe an actual World Champion cluelessly losing
against someone he otherwise could have beaten up.

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 Clearly, that situation described above is just the situation each athlete, coach and
administration should desperately avoid; but it actually happened, indicating the end of a
formerly glory tradition of TKD triumphs. Unfortunate events, bad luck and, arguably,
mismanagement of the administration produced a downward spiral nobody was able to
provide the rescue parachute for.

How could it come to a situation like this? To answer this and related questions, the
study for this chapter examined the crucial steps in the establishment and further
transition of the major TKD administration. The answer could partly be found in several
elaborations of particular conflict lines within the German TKD scene. Finally, this led
to an understanding why West German TKD was never united under one common
administrative body.

1. The Struggle for a Proper German Taekwondo Administration

(1964~71)

1.1. Lack of Effort in the Center

In the mid-1960s, after Choi Hong-hi’s first public presentation of the new Korean
martial art TKD, arguably the majority of Korean TKD masters in Germany were
located in North Rhine-Westphalia, the German Federal State of the huge coal mining
companies and thousands of migrant coal mining workers. Although these Korean TKD
masters automatically created something like a community or network with several
interrelations, there were no major efforts of establishing a governing administrative
body for this new sport, which would lead to official acknowledgement and
governmental support. The situation was different for other martial arts. As was already

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shown, Judo and Jujutsu were formally administered since 1952 through the German
Dan Board (DDK),138 and Judo got its own federation one year later, the German Judo
Federation (Deutscher Judo-Bund, DJB), which was reckognized by the top West
German sports body, the German Sports Confederation (Deutscher Sportbund, DSB), in
1956.

Japanese Karate, on the other side, got its very own administration first, with the
creation of the German Karate Federation (Deutscher Karate-Bund, DKB) in 1961
(Arend, 1989: 52). However, in 1965, the DJB also created a section for Karate, which,
in return, led to the creations of a variety of more Karate associations afterwards (Arend,
1989: 56f.)139.

A possible explanation for the lack of administrative efforts in the presence of the
majority of TKD training locations could be the nature of these facilities. For the
Koreans, teaching TKD as extra work in their spare time was illegal because this
situation was not covered in their working contracts. Therefore, they could hardly apply
for the usage of public training facilities, like German karate masters did140. So, they
depended upon the cooperation with friendly German martial arts masters sharing their
own private training facilities without any official notification, in other words, with
commercial school owners.

138
More exactly, Judo and Jujutsu had been formally administered even before World War II, but after Nazi
Germany’s surrender, these and most other administrative structures were dissolved and had to be rebuilt
again.
139
Including the German-Japanese Karate Association (Deutsch-Japanischer Karate-Verband, DJKV) and
the Goju Ryu Federation (Goju Ryu Bund, later renamed in Goju Kai Deutschland, GJK).
140
Since Karate was introduced to West Germany about seven years before the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, there
were already several German Karate dan grade holders, and more enthusiasts with instructing licences, when
“Korean Karate” entered the scene.

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 By West German civil law, formal non-profit administrations could only be
established on the basis of public clubs, called “Verein”; commercial schools were not
allowed to step in, because governmental recognition means public tangible and
intangible support, including money. Commercial schools, on the contrary, were
supposed to pay taxes. Thus, clever martial arts school owners could offer their students
“original” Karate instructors for a special price (as long as nobody bothered about the
differences between Japanese and Korean Karate), while at the same time paying lower
salaries to Korean instructors than Japanese ones, keeping the difference as something
like a silencing guarantee.

Another explanation would simply start with the language barrier. Among the Korean
migrant workers, no one was known with affluent German language skills; on the
contrary, they constantly needed the help of translators. On the other side, the Korean
TKD instructors already formed an informal network, news spread around quickly in the
community, and they might not have felt the need for more formal commitments.
Moreover, they might already have been organized more or less in the Korea Taekwondo
Association (KTA), and, since 1966, also in the International Taekwondo Federation
(ITF). For Korean TKD masters in Germany, it was probably less problematic to
establish relations to the KTA and ITF on a private basis, so that their students could get
officially approved promotion certificates, than to establish an official organization for
the same purpose which would have to fulfil the requirements of the German civil law.
For example, the official way would have had the disadvantage that dan and other grade
promotion fees would have to be made transparent, to prevent the organization from
adding a profit to the fees. But according to a description by Kim Kwang-il, this was
exactly the habit of the Korean TKD masters; it was one main source of their income,
and they didn’t agree to cooperate with an official German TKD administration since
they would have to abandon a portion of their share (Kim, 1993: 19).

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 To summarize, in the region of the earliest TKD activities in Germany, there weren’t
any registered efforts of administrative purposes, which could be seen as quite odd,
compared to the situation of other East Asian martial arts. The final explanation of this
situation remains to be confirmed.

1.2. Power Struggles in the South

Contrary to the situation in North Rhine-Westphalia, the early TKD pioneers in

Bavaria did not hesitate in terms of building formal structures. The very first Korean
Karate association was formed, as was already mentioned, in 1964 by Mike Anderson
and Hans Vierthaler in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, the German-Korean Karate Federation
(Deutsch-Koreanischer Karate-Verband). Despite its ambitious name, it consisted of
nothing more than the Korean Karate department at the Garmisch gymnastics club.

About one year after the visit of Choi’s demonstration team, on May 1, 1966, the
owner of Southern Germany’s largest martial arts school, Carl Wiedmeier, formed the
very first German TKD association, called the German TKD Federation (Deutscher TK-
D Verband).141 The motivation for this step remains unclear. One possible reason could
be Carl Wiedmeier’s appointment as director of the newly formed International
Taekwon-Do Federation in the same year.142 The creation of a German association might
have been a requirement for this prestigious position. Another possible reason could
have been his effort to hire the first professional TKD instructor, Kwon Jae-hwa. For
some reason, it could be possible that he was only allowed to work on something like a

141
Interestingly, Wiedmeier did not occupy the president’s position in this federation. Instead, he became
vice president, with the functions of a secretary-general.
142
See Wiedmeier’s website, http://zsd-international.com/zsd/odk/historie.html, accessed on 23 September
2009.

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volunteering basis for a public sports club, but not as a professional instructor at a
registered commercial sport school.

A third reason might have been resulted from the at least hidden rivalry between
Japanese and Korean martial arts at that time, 143 especially between both kinds of
“Karate”.144 As mentioned above, proponents of Japanese Karate were already in a state
of internal struggles, which resulted in the formations of various unrelated Karate
associations, several of them claiming to feature the only true kind of (Japanese) Karate.

From this perspective, Wiedmeier might have had the impression that TKD should be
organized under one unifying umbrella administration from the start, as the already
existing German-Korean Karate Federation of Anderson and Vierthaler sported the
wrong term. The ambitious name of “German TK-D Federation” could be seen as a hint
in this direction, and also as strong evidence that Wiedmeier’s further plan was a close
relationship with Choi Hong-hi’s ITF.

It could be interesting, at least as a side note, that Mike Anderson left Bavaria that
same year of 1966 for Berlin and joined forces with German Karate pioneer Jürgen
Seydel, former coach of Elvis Presley, by forming the German Karate Union (Deutsche
Karate Union, DKU) in Berlin. From that time on, Anderson, one of the few who
brought Korean Karate first to Germany, followed the Japanese Karate way.

After all, Wiedmeier’s ambitious plans got corrupted, after it turned out that all of his
hired Korean TKD instructors, who were believed to be coming from the military, were

143
For example, Wiedmeier mentions the “competition” between TKD and the several “dissenting”
Japanese Karate federations on his website; see http://zsd-international.com/zsd/odk/historie.html, accessed
on 24 September 2009.
144
For this usage, see Goldner (1992), who explicitly includes TKD in his constant usage of the term
“Karate” throughout his book.

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in fact secret KCIA agents. That was revealed after the so-called East Berlin spy incident
(dongbaekniim) of 1967 happened, where South Korean citizens were captured by KCIA
agents in West Germany and forcefully transported to Korea, facing severe punishments,
torture and even death sentences. It is an open secret in the German TKD community
that several KCIA agents residing in Germany and instrumental in the captures were
disguised as TKD instructors. For example, the above-mentioned Kim Kwang-il is
usually suspected to be one of the agents (interview Ferger, 2008), but there is also
evidence that he was cleared of all charges afterwards (interview Gatzweiler, 2006).145

Taking a closer look on this case, one important distinction could be made, the
distinction between Korean TKD masters who came to Germany first as migrant
workers, and those from the military who arrived as pure TKD instructors later on. It
seems safe to assume that most of the Korean coal miners-became TKD instructors in
North Rhine-Westphalia did not have much business with the KCIA, nor the military.
But they established quite close relationships with Choi Hong-hi’s ITF, for they needed
the international connection for promotion certifications. Now Choi, as it is known, had
to face increasing troubles in his homeland, which is sometimes explained as results of
growing conflicts between Choi and South Korean president, Park Chung-hee, both of
them former army generals, who cultivated their enmity since their common days at the
South Korean army (Kang & Lee, 1999).

But then, Choi had to face another opponent within the TKD community. According
to the report on Carl Wiedmeier’s website,146 a young, ambitious KCIA man named Kim

145
Gillis (2008: 79-85) presents many new aspects of the East Berlin Incident, partly based on interviews
with proponents and victims of that time. According to Gillis, Kim Kwang-il had been instrumental in the
kidnapping of several Koreans in Germany. But Kim got arrested by the German police afterwards, and he
showed exceptional cooperation with the German authorities. Soon after, he was released (84).
146
See http://zsd-international.com/zsd/odk/historie.html; accessed on 23 September 2009.

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Un-yong, with an instinct for the importance of sports diplomacy, had followed the
interactions between Wiedmeier and ITF president Choi Hong-hi carefully. As Kim got
increasingly powerful in the secret service, Choi’s influence on TKD in Korea was
dramatically shrinking, to the point that finally, he was forced to leave his country, and
Kim took over the charge of TKD in Korea, by becoming president of the KTA, the
Kukkiwon, and later the WTF. While all of Wiedmeier’s hired TKD instructors turned
out to be KCIA agents, thus not trustful ITF members, but in truth Kim Un-yong’s men,
Wiedmeier was forced to fire them all, which was the temporary end of the TKD branch
at his schools.

During this troublesome time, some former members of Wiedmeier’s schools grabbed
the opportunity, and together with some of the freshly fired Korean TKD instructors,
they founded a new administrative body, the South-Western TKD Federation
(Südwestdeutscher Taekwondo-Verband, SWTV) in February of 1968 (Bolz & Schuldes,
2008: 20).

1.3. Unexpected problems

Contrary to the story above, the official report of the German Judo Federation (DJB)
explained that the DTV got separated and split up because of unspecified “internal
reasons” (Brand, 1968: 21). A former student of Kwon Jae-hwa at Wiedmeier’s school,
Wilhelm Weingarth, took the charge and collected Wiedmeier’s former elite students as
well as the freshly released, specialized TKD instructors, including Kim Kwang-il and
chief instructor Kwon Jae-hwa as unofficial ITF representative, formed a new
association and got quickly recognized both by the ITF and the DJB. Later that same
year, Weingarth arranged the integration of the new TKD administration into the well-
established DJB as a section on its own, and got himself the position of the officer in

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charge of TKD (Weingarth, 1968: 2). He argued that this decision was the only and
quickest way to get official acknowledgement for this new amateur sport, which would
result in immediate governmental support for every participating public TKD club in the
whole republic.

The intermediate name of “South Western-German TKD Federation” was immediately

abandoned, to enable participation of more Northern TKD clubs. After all, one of the
main goals was still unification of all TKD clubs under a common administration,
together with a structural guarantee that TKD will be different to, and remain separated
from, Japanese Karate. After everything was settled, Kwon Jae-hwa travelled to Koea to
get the approval of Choi Hong-hi’s ITF (Brand, 1968: 21).

This whole process was also approved by the South Korean embassy (Lee, 1968: 4).
There, Kim Kwang-il summed up all Korean TKD masters of the republic to explain the
latest developments and to convince them to support the Germans in building up the
necessary structures, while offering technical support as TKD instructors. To his surprise,
many Korean TKD masters challenged his proposal. He did not know that they had
already established a system where they allowed Germans to practice on their own,
sometimes in their own clubs, while the Koreans remained in charge of all graduation
promotions at their commercial TKD schools, which turned out to be one major source
of income. They simply feared that this system would be lost if they allowed Germans to
create a newly structured system. The result was a general refusal of participation of
Korean TKD masters at the new, ambitious federation; the Koreans simply did not need
it, for they already had established connections to the ITF on private bases (Kim, 1993:
18).147 So, for the moment, the alleged all-German TKD administration did only cover

147
That might be an explanation about why Korean TKD masters in North Rhine-Westphalia remained
apparently disinterested in building up formal structures for the amateur sport of Korean TKD: from their
viewpoint, it was more a commercial enterprise than an amateur sport in need for public support.

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regional TKD clubs of Southern Germany, with the exclusion of commercial TKD
schools like Wiedmeier’s.

The following year, officer in charge for the section TKD in the DJB, Wilhelm
Weingarth, was replaced by Herrmann Oppermann (Judo Magazin 1969: 25), and Kim
Kwang-il was announced as Germany’s first national head coach for the first national
TKD team. Also, Choi Hong-hi made a visit to Germany to approve the new
developments concerning a proper TKD administration which he felt were quite
satisfying, adding that he wasn’t quite content with the situation before (Brand 1969:
8).148

As a side note, it is interesting to mention that Choi expressed his wish that TKD
could be presented to the sports enthusiasts of the world at the coming Munich Olympics
of 1972 (Brand, 1969: 8). However, the initial idea about this might stem from Carl
Wiedmeier, who presents several photographs and one advertisement about a TKD
demonstration at a pre-Olympic sports event in Munich in 1967 on his webside. 149
Moreover, according to Wiedmeier’s description of the events, these efforts had been the
initial idea for Kim Un-yong’s mission to get TKD as an official Olympic sport.

At the time of the proper implement of the alleged all-German governing TKD
administration into the DJB, there were just 14 German (1st and 2nd daegree) and five

148
It could be guessed that in this passage of the interview, he was addressing either to the commercial
character of Wiedmeier’s schools or the fact that his alleged ITF TKD instructors had been KCIA agents in
truth, or both. According to his own report, this was Choi’s third visit to Germany. Given that his first trip
was the demonstration tour with his team in 1965, it could be assumed that he visited Germany around 1966
or 1967, to settle his cooperation with Wiedmeier. Alternatively, it might also be possible that he turned to
the Korean embassy for the first time, where ITF director Lee San ku (6th dan) served as cultural attaché.
Unfortunately, neither of them could be confirmed or refuted until now.
149
See http://zsd-international.com/zsd/odk/historie.html; accessed on 25 September 2009.

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Korean dan grade holders (4th to 6th degree) participating (Weingarth, 1968: 2). 150
Presumably all of these Korean TKD instructors originally came from Carl Wiedmeier’s
TKD school, definitely all of them were from Bavaria, mostly Munich region. As
already mentioned, Kim Kwang-il wasn’t successful in exciting his fellow Korean TKD
masters from the north. This was the situation of German TKD when it got properly
approved as an amateur sport by integration into the already established DJB. This
situation remained constant on this rather low level for several years, until finally, in
1971, dramatic developments were ignited. The change started with the take-over of
Heinz Marx as new head of the TKD section of the DJB.

150
During Choi Hong-hi’s third visit to Germany, it was recorded that he spoke in front of “the six
participating high-leveled Korean TKD masters” (Brand, 1969: 8), which could assumedly consist of the 5
above mentioned, plus ITF director and cultural attaché Lee Sang ku (6th dan) from the South Korean
embassy.

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 2. The Struggle for a Self-Governed German Taekwondo
Administration (1971~1981)

2.1. Struggles for Dominance

Heinz Marx started TKD as a student of Kwon Jae-hwa’s in 1966, when Marx was
already 46 years old. In this community of young and mostly not fully educated people,
Marx could quickly raise in status and power, thanks to his appearance with a huge
natural authority (interview Jebramcik, 2006). In 1967, for example, the year after he
started with TKD, he was already appointed member of the referees at the first official
German TKD championships in Munich.151 Two years later, with 49, he passed the 1st
dan promotion test, and another two years later, on April 1, 1971, he was selected by the
DJB as new head of their TKD section (Stix, 1993: 12). At that time, organized TKD
officially included only 485 members in just 11 clubs. Six months later, the figures were
nearly doubled, to 800 members and 23 clubs (Wolfer, 2001: 4).

What had happened? Marx had invited all German TKD clubs to a re-vitalization of
the TKD section of the DJB, including a special 2-day seminar, with the opportunity to
get official, ITF-approved examination licenses afterwards (interview Gatzweiler, 2006;

151
At these championships, which featured a zero-contact competition style, the huge martial arts school of
Carl Wiedmeier in Munich ranked first, followed by another big one, the karate school of Georg Brückner in
Berlin, while the third rank went to the TKD department of the TV Garmisch 1868 (Bolz & Schuldes, 2008:
19). According to an anecdote noted by Wolfer (2001: 4), school-owner Georg Brückner was forced by
referees to compete against his own student, which he tried to refuse. Angry about this incident, he went
back to Berlin after the championships and said good-bye to TKD, becoming one of the instrumental figures
of Karate, later Kickboxing, in Germany and on international levels.

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see also Ferger & Shin, 1986d: 12).152 For the first time, TKD practitioners from the
whole Federal Republic came together and learned to know each other153.

There was a remarkable incident which made clear the authoritative power of the new
chieftain, Heinz Marx. As mentioned, Kim Kwang-il was the appointed national head
coach (he had allegedly been in this position for two years, but apparently with not much
to do so far), and it was his task now to sign the fresh examination licenses. This was
conducted in something like a small ceremony at the end of the examination seminar in a
sports center in Munich. But Kim refused to sign the documents, mentioning something
like true TKD principles would not permit minor dan grade holders conducting and
assessing dan grade promotions (interview Gatzweiler, 2006).154

Obviously, this was pretty much what Heinz Marx had expected. To the great surprise
of the participants, especially Kim Kwang-il, Marx stepped in, thanked Kim for his
service and explained him that from that very moment, he would no longer be national
head coach. Behind Marx, a relaxed Kwon Jae-hwa had placed himself comfortably on a
seat. Marx turned around, pointed at Kwon and asked him in front of the participants if
he would be willing to take over the vacant post as head coach, and if he would sign the

152
To make sure that there were enough candidates, there also had been a dan grade promotion a few weeks
before. Considering the above-mentioned importance of conducting dan grade promotions for Korean TKD
masters, this move had the side effect of destroying the basis for commercial TKD structures in North
Rhine-Westphalia.
153
Which included a big surprise, as the proud TKDin from Bavaria, especially Munich, disappointedly
discovered that the very first two ITF dan grade certificates in Germany, probably in all Europe, were
received by practitioners from North Rhine-Westphalia, namely Heinz Wiesemann (no. 1) and Gerd
Gatzweiler (no. 2) (interview Gatzweiler, 2006).
154
As we already know, Kim knew from his meeting with fellow Korean TKD masters in the Korean
embassy in 1968 about the importance of their dan grade examination monopoly. Now, there are no strong
reasons against the conclusion that this knowledge in Kims mind played its part in his refusal.

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licenses as his first duty. Smiling, as it is told, Kwon agreed to the offer from his former
student. Kim was stunned. Never ever before had a German official demonstrated his
dominance over a respected Korean TKD master so directly, even, as some could say,
aggressively, that Kim Kwang-il completely resigned from any further cooperation with
the Germans.155

And that is pretty much the point why this story was more than just another anecdote.
Every Korean TKD master who heard that story (and it is safe to assume that the ratio
quickly rose up to 100%) must have had bad feelings against the new German TKD
leader, lacking any incentive of further cooperation with the German TKD
administration at all. Thus, while Heinz Marx made a unanimous example in revealing
himself as the administrative boss in German TKD, he lost the readiness of the many
Korean TKD masters in Germany for fruitful contributions to the development of TKD
in Germany.156

The following year, Marx stated another example. Choi Hong-hi had already settled in
Toronto and tried to rebuild his international TKD Empire. Meanwhile, in South Korea,
his successor Kim Un-yong, who got in charge about TKD in Korea the same year Marx

155
Following Kim’s own records about that time, he just couldn’t get along with Marx, which was the
reason he actively resigned from his position (instead of getting fired); see Kim, 1993: 18. It should be noted
that this self-acclaimed authority of a German patriarchic figure in East Asian martial arts followed quite a
tradition which was established by Erich Rahn and further transported by his student Alfred Rhode. Carl
Wiedmeier was a student of Rhode’s, and Marx had trained under Kwon, who was the TKD head instructor
at Wiedmeier’s school.
156
However, it could be argued that Marx did not worsen the situation with his behavior, for there was
extremely little readiness by Korean TKD masters living in Germany for participation in the administrative
TKD affairs in the first place. For example, according to a Gatzweiler interview in 2006, besides the two
Korean masters involved in the head coach affair, no other Korean followed Marx’ call and participated in
the meeting.

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did about TKD in Germany – the two divided countries, by the way –, was building the
Kukkiwon, and, as rumors had it, he planned to open a new world-wide TKD body
which would be backed massively by the authoritative South Korean government. For
anyone with an instinct for political issues, this was a promising playing field where
power and honor (and money) awaited the clever ones.

But technically, the German TKD section in the DJB still had an agreement with
Choi’s ITF about “friendly cooperation”, stemming from 1968, the year the TKD section
was founded. Moreover, Choi Hong-hi planned to visit Germany in February of 1972, to
remind the Germans about this agreement, and to renew it. But he met a very self-
confident German TKD leader who refused any further cooperation with the then only
international TKD organization (Gil, 1985). Instead, Marx waited until the foundation of
Kim Un-yong’s World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) at the end of the first World TKD
Championships in the Kukkiwon in Seoul, South Korea, in May 1973. West Germany is
a founding member of that federation, and Heinz Marx was selected as WTF Executive
Member from the start.

The World TKD Championships in the Kukkiwon, both in 1973 and 1975, revealed
that German TKD still missed something important, and that was Korean expertise in
modern full-contact competition training and practice. Kwon Jae-hwa, national head
coach since 1971, favoured zero-contact competitions, and although he left the country
closely before the World Championships and headed to the U.S., the German team under
his successor Shin Boo-young, a follower of Kwon Jae-hwa, was largely unprepared for
this special kind of competitions.157

157
Nevertheless, German TKD athletes gained some medals: one silver and one bronze in 1973, and two
silver medals in 1975. However, only the bronze winner of 1973, Georg Karrenberg, who later became the
chief women’s coach, had some training experiences with a chest protector and full-contact sparring in
preparation for the Championships.

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 For obvious reasons, very little help from Korean TKD masters in Germany could be
expected on this issue. Consequently, after the 2nd World TKD Championships in Korea
in 1975, a gifted competition instructor with international experience was hired directly
in Korea, named Park Soo-nam.158

Park turned out to be highly efficient as national coach; he was the materialized
success factor for the Germans. His tricks, tactics and training practices were “state of
the art” (interview Arndt, 2009), also his detailed knowledge about Korean WTF
competition referees (interview Gatzweiler, 2006). Under Park Soo-nam, the German
national team won the European Championships five times in a row, and they produced
two World Champions until the early 1980s, thus making Germany the second-most
successful TKD nation after South Korea, in terms of internationally gained medals.159
With the help of Park Soo-nam, Germany quickly dominated European TKD
competitions, both their male and female teams.

But what happened to the schools of the Korean TKD masters, mostly in North Rhine-
Westphalia, which didn’t bother about participation in the TKD section under Heinz
Marx’s leadership? They remained largely independent. Until erection of the Kukkiwon,
which marked an end to the separational tendencies of the many Korean TKD kwans,
TKD schools usually belonged to the kwan of their Korean grandmaster, and it was they
who awarded their followers in Germany the right to conduct and to set quality
standards for dan grading promotions.

158
According to the self-presentation on his website, he was Korean Champion in 1969, ran “Park’s Gym”
in Seoul from 1971~76 and was referee at the 2nd World TKD Championships in Korea in 1975; see his
profile at www.taekwondo-aktuell.de, accessed on 12 October 2009.
159
For a more detailed overview of the successes of Park and the aftermath, see the study of Kuklinski-Rhee
& Ha (2007). For detailed information about past TKD competitions in general, see the Taekwondo Data
website, www.taekwondodata.com; accessed on 15 October 2009.

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 There was at least one trial of gaining new members for the TKD section of the DJB
among the independent TKD schools in North Rhine-Westphalia. The National TKD
Championships 1976 were conducted in the North Rhine-Westphalian city of Mühlheim,
a traditional laborer’s region where many independent Korean TKD enthusiasts could be
expected to be interested in watching, or even participating. Therefore, the TKD
directors tried something new; they abandoned the strict formal participation
requirements, which were, being one of the best 10 in a region, plus, of course, being a
formal member of the Judo federation, DJB (see Marx, 1977a).

Marx reorganized this event in something like an unconventional talent search. For the
German Championships of 1976 were the first ones featuring full-contact competition
style (Marx, 1977a: 7). This was quite new in Germany, as already seen, and the national
cadre members had the advantage of having trained this style under their new coach,
Park Soo-nam, for about one year. Thus, it was possible that new talents for full-contact
competitions could be spotted, which might have had some troubles with zero-contact
competitions and, therefore, did not belong to the 10 best competitors in their region so
far, while at the same time, there was little danger for the favorites to be beaten up by
unknown athletes from outside of the federation.160

Finally, the TKD section of the DJB gained dominance over Japanese karate in terms
of unity of the movement. While Karate had beaten TKD at first both in the competitions
of unity and of national recognition – the first Karate federation was founded in 1961
and remained the only one for several years, until in 1965, Karate got its own section in
the DJB – it was divided in five or more competing associations ten years later (Arend,
1989: 52; 56f.). Much worse, there was no line of karate unification on the horizon;
karate officials were obviously more interested in maintaining their own position
160
As the results show (Marx, 1977a: 8), nearly all weight classes were expectedly won by the favorites
from the national team.

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(including advantages these positions bring along, such as power, honor, and money)
than in the overall development of karate. This negative example might have convinced
Marx that a strong zero tolerance-policy was the only solution to prevent his TKD
movement to fall apart, which was, in his opinion, a clear and present danger (Marx,
1977b: 68)

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 2.2. Struggles for Independence

Another major agenda, besides struggles for dominance, was struggles for
independence. Several such struggles could be detected. First and foremost, as we
already saw, Marx tried to lead German TKD independently from Korean influences.
The only big exception from this line was the position of national team coach. Every
other position had to be occupied by native Germans, a phenomenon which was
exceptional in Europe, probably in the whole world.

Second, more specially, Marx tried to develop his German TKD independent from
influences of the mighty WTF. His motivation in this case might have stem from the fact
that the German TKD section of the DJB was, historically, older than the WTF, and
Marx participated at the WTF inauguration meeting in person, functioning as president
of German TKD. Thus, initially, German TKD had been independent from the WTF, and,
from Marx’ perspective, there was no reason why it should suddenly play a subordinated
role.

One outstanding example of this was the foundation of a unified European TKD
administration, which happened twice, first without, and second with the approval of the
WTF. The first foundation of the European Taekwondo Federation (ETU) took place on
May 26, 1975. Heinz Marx was elected as president, but the whole issue was not
approved by Kim Un-yong and the associations he controlled, like the Kukkiwon or the
WTF (see Gil 1985, 1985b; Marx, 1986). They were not quite amused, and their
response was delivered the following year, when the WTF conducted the very same
procedure again, this time in Barcelona, Spain: foundation of the ETU (with the identical
name), with a totally new staff of directors, all of them selected, presumably, by the
mighty Dr. Kim. In the view of Marx and his merry men, this was an illegal act, because
none of the new ETU directors were proper delegates of the alleged participating

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European countries, i.e. had not been formally elected. But they decided not to intervene,
for they understood this maneuver as a sheer power demonstration by Kim (Gil, 1985b).

Instead, the original ETU executives believed in the incompetence of the new
directors. For one year, the first directors had organized the first European TKD
Championships, which were held directly after the new formation of the ETU’s directors.
As already mentioned, the German national team was the most successful one, with
three gold and five bronze medals (Marx 1986). Now, organization of the following
ETU Championships would be the task for the new ETU directors. Based on their
experiences in organizing the first ETU Championships, the old ETU directors were
confident that this task would be one too big to be mastered by the new, totally
inexperienced directors. Fortunately, everybody was aware of their incompetence,
including the new directors themselves, and they turned to the original ETU directors for
help in this matter. Help was granted, the 2nd ETU European Championships were
successfully conducted in 1978, and while Marx and his merry men kept silenced about
this issue, which could be interpreted as a sign of devotion to Kim Un-yong and the
WTF, everybody was satisfied, and in 1978, the actual ETU directors were just replaced
by the original board members from 1975, this time with the approval from the WTF
(Gil, 1985b). Thus, although Kim Un-yong and the WTF demonstrated that every crucial
decision in the TKD world was theirs and could not be considered without their approval,
Marx and his men also demonstrated that Kim and the WTF could not realize everything
as they liked; at least in Europe, they needed the cooperation of Marx and his friends.
Therefore, from this perspective, Marx demonstrated Kim and the WTF some degree of
independence in return. In the end, Marx managed to get the ETU directors he intended,
with the approval of the WTF, and he gained trustworthiness after demonstrating loyalty,
which was awarded by hosting the 4th WTF World Championships of 1979 in
Sindelfingen in West Germany, close to Stuttgart.

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 On the pure administrational level, independence from the covering Judo organization
was quickly growing in importance. At the end of the 1970s and the beginning 1980s, as
already mentioned, German TKD was the most successful branch of the DJB, in terms
of medals at international competitions. However, the Judo federation was also
increasingly reluctant in supporting this success financially – coach’s salaries,
preparatory training seminars, travel costs, accommodations for athletes, coaches and
officials etc. While the international TKD community grew and sports contacts and
competitions became more frequent, bigger and, therefore, more expensive, Judo
executives tried to reduce their support for TKD, which, after all, wasn’t even a Japanese
martial art. The official reason, by the way, was that TKD wasn’t an Olympic sport
(Kuklinski-Rhee & Ha, 2007).

The first recorded activity in this direction was an open letter by TKD president Heinz
Marx in January of 1977. Its background was the latest developments in Karate. As
already mentioned, Karate had a DJB section, too, which did not prevent other Karate
organizations to be founded. By the mid-1970s, there were about 5 Karate associations
covering between 1,000 and 20,000 members each, with the DJB section ranging just in
the middle with about 10,000 members (Arend, 1989: 65). Thus, in principle, Marx
started to argue, membership to the DJB does not automatically prevent the TKD
community from splitting up (Marx, 1977b: 9). Therefore, he concluded, the status of
TKD and its future development should better be reconsidered (Marx 1977b: 68).

One reason why the DJB would foster departings was their strict member policy
which allowed only public clubs being accepted as formal members of the federation,
but not commercial schools161. As we already know, commercial schools were popular
among Korean TKD masters in North Rhine-Westphalia, with the consequence that their
161
This, of course, was not the DJB’s sole decision, but a requirement for all formal members of the top
German sports umbrella, the DSB.

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schools could not become members of the DJB-TKD, even if they wanted to. But there
were also many commercial schools ran by Germans, like Carl Wiedmeier’s Oh-Do-
Kwan, for example. As it was not possible for them to be formally accepted members of
the TKD community – they were not allowed to compete in national and international
TKD tournaments, for example -, they changed their direction and joined one of the
emerging Karate associations. Several of them were also instrumental in developing and
promoting Kickboxing (Velte, 2006). Overall, many highly talented and motivated TKD
enthusiasts could not participate in the official TKD community, including competitions
and national teams, because their school they belonged to wasn’t allowed to. Not
surprising, then, that TKD directors thought loudly about ways to get access to this
hidden potential.

Moreover, Marx mentioned even a case of a public TKD club which wasn’t accepted
by the regional branch of the DJB (Marx, 1977b: 68). If such cases would sum up, that
could lead to the foundation of a separatist TKD federation, in which case the DJB could
no longer claim to represent all German TKD officially, which would cause problems in
the formal recognition of any future TKD administration by the top German sports body,
the DSB (69). Marx’ solution to this dilemma was a quick independent German TKD
federation, which should follow the policy of enrolling all clubs, departments and
schools as members, without any exceptions, and each such member should be granted
an equal voting right at the annual assemblies.162

162
Marx could not know that this last demand, equal voting rights to every single member – no matter if it
was a tiny TKD club with a handful of members and little annual fees, or a big one with hundreds of active
participants and huge annual contributions to the federation -, would cause immense troubles about ten years
thereafter and since then, until it was finally replaced by a more restricted voting system in 2003; see Bolz &
Schuldes (2008).

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 The more the decade approached the 1980s, the more frequently occurred criticisms
on the DJB and plans for an independent TKD federation; see Kuklinski-Rhee & Ha
(2007) for more details on this matter.

Finally, at the beginning of the 1980s, even the DJB was ready to release its TKD
section soon, even by maintaining a good relationship. On April 20, 1981, the German
TKD Union (Deutsche Taekwondo Union, DTU) was founded in Frankfurt, and the
enduring struggle for independence finally got to an end. Around that time, Germany’s
TKD successes on international levels were on its peak. Thus, Marx and his cheering
TKD family had reached both of their two long-term goals: dominance about rival sports
– the situation in Karate was still troublesome, and TKD was the most successful martial
art in Germany -, dominance in this sport in Europe, and independence both from other
martial arts, especially Judo (totally), and from international federations; for the ETU
was, so to speak, in the hands of the Germans, and the WTF was bound to cooperate
with the Germans, not just dominating them.

In this light, the 1980s promised to be the decade of a strong, self-confident,

successful and united German TKD federation. But the 1980s was also the (first) decade
of major desperations of the German TKD community. This should be examined in the
next section.

2.3. Unity vs. Disparity

The year of 1980 produced a very positive headline for TKD, with the official
recognition as an Olympic sport (administered by the WTF) at the 83rd session of the
International Olympic Committee on July 17, prior to the Olympic Games in Moscow.
But around the same time, something unexpected happened that went across the

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direction of unity German TKD was heading at. Choi Hong-hi had been back in
Germany, and he was looking for ways to establish a German ITF branch.163

After Marx severed ties with Choi in 1972, the ITF remained silent in Germany.
However, many of the Korean TKD masters in North Rhine-Westphalia established a
loose connection to the ITF over the years, especially if they didn’t like to cooperate
with Kim Un-yong’s WTF. Also, several German TKD school owners were assigned to
the ITF, usually because their own German-Korean grandmaster was or had been.
However, the real motivations for individual choices often remain undiscovered. For
many, the ITF just seemed to be the better choice than the WTF.164

Now, as TKD was officially accepted as an Olympic sport – something which Choi
Hong-hi dreamed about one decade ago (see e.g. his interview in Brand, 1969) -, Choi
tried harder than ever to enhance the influence of his federation. In Germany, he found a
situation which was not helpful in this context: many Korean TKD masters running their
schools without formal affiliation to any major federation, and something like an ITF
organization, the North Rhine-Westphalian TKD Federation (Nordrhein-Westfälischer
Taekwon-Do-Verband e.V., NWTV) that consisted of only Germans (Karate revue 1980
(9/10): 23). So Choi made some efforts: The head of the NWTV, Max Geburt, was
awarded the 5th dan, his organization was officially affiliated to the ITF and re-named
into ITF-GER, and Kim Woo-Kang, later called the “father of TKD in North Rhine-
Westphalia” (interview Weiler, 2007), was appointed with the task of building up the
organization among his fellow Koreans.

163
See Weiler, 2005: 33; Karate revue 1980 (9/10): 23.
164
In fact, many established Korean TKD masters also preferred the hyong forms about the newly created
taeguk poomsae forms of the WTF. But this alone could not be a reason for the choice of ITF, because until
the 1990s, many WTF-affiliated German TKD clubs still fostered the hyong forms their grand masters had
taught them before formation of the WTF.

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 In that same year of 1980, another temporarily forgotten TKD grandmaster appeared
again: Kwon Jae-hwa, who had left Germany in 1973 and was running a huge TKD
school in Florida since 1974 (Karate revue 1980 (9/10): 22f.). He gave a few special
training seminars to his followers, who were still numerous, and officially opened the
first franchise of his own private (commercial) organization, the International Taekwon-
Do Black Belt Center, in Munich. Later on, more such centers were opened, mainly in
the Munich region and in far northern Germany, in Hamburg and beyond.

But this was not a real split from the main TKD line then. Commercial TKD schools
couldn’t become members of public federations anyway, but they could additionally
create a public club associated with their school. If the school then belonged to some
further organization, that was none of the federation’s businesses. For example, leading
members of the Black Belt Centers in Germany, like its current head, Hans-Ferdinand
Hunkel, or Kwon Jae-hwa’s successor as national team coach from 1973~75, Shin Boo-
young, attended the inauguration meeting of the German Taekwondo Union after its
separation from the DJB in 1981 (TA 1981 (9): 24).165 Also, Sabine Hunkel, wife of
Hans-Ferdinand Hunkel, was one of the leading female TKD athletes during the 1980s.
And finally, in 1989, husband Hans-Ferdinand received the golden needle of honor from
the Union, a strong indicator of not unfriendly relationships. But eventually, the split
happened during the 1990s, and today, the Kwon Jae-hwa’s Black Belt Centers
constitute a rivaling, private federation with practically no connections to Olympic-style
TKD.

A further split happened the following year, the departure of several high-leveled
Korean members of the ITF-GER, apparently more from southern Germany (Stuttgart,
Karlsruhe), and formation of the German TKD Association (Deutscher Taekwondo Bund,
165
In that issue, there is a reprint of the original attendance list of the inauguration meeting, which enlists
Shin as No. 73 and Hunkel as No. 81 of the attendees.

- 137 -
DTB) in March of 1981 (Karate revue 1981 (6): 36f.). This move was a serious blow to
the just re-established German ITF branch, the ITF-GER (Weiler, 2005: 33), while it
didn’t affect the DJB-TKD. On the contrary, several leading members of the new DTB
also attended the foundation meeting of the DTU just three months afterwards (TA 1981
(9): 24).166

Finally, after all these separations had happened, the German TKD Union (Deutsche
TKD Union, DTU) was founded in Frankfurt on June 20, 1981 (Siegel, 1981), and got
formally approved by the top German sport body, the DSB, on December 4, 1982
(Siegel, 1982: 4; Linden, 1983: 4; for more details on this topic, see Kuklinski-Rhee &
Ha, 2007). That was something the main proponents of the German TKD community
were waiting for quite a long time, and on a background of excitement, they moved
ahead and navigated their new vessel through a few prosperous years.

Yet several internal conflicts and other problems already existed from the start, were
fostered and got stronger, until they got the German TKD movement in serious troubles.
That should be examined in the next section.

166
In details: Song Chan-ho, no. 68; Jang Kwang-myung, no. 71; and Kwak Kum-shik, no. 86. However, it
remains unclear if the DTB was dissolved thereafter, of if these persons, together with their clubs or schools,
respectively, choosed to serve two different federations.

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 3. Conflicts and Problems within the German Taekwondo Community

For a more chronological examination about the events in the period between
1980~1989, see Kuklinski-Rhee & Ha (2007). Because that article should not be
repeated here, a more systematical description for this period should be applied. The best
way seems to select crucial problems and conflict lines within the TKD movement.
Repetitions from the article will just be mentioned here, not examined again in length; it
is not advisable to make the same discoveries twice. Only cases which were not
examined in detail in the article will be treated with all sincere academic respect.

3.1. Problem I: Lack of Korean Taekwondo Masters

It might sound odd, but although West Germany hosted the biggest community of
Koreans, including TKD masters, in Europe since the early 1960s, the leading West
German TKD organization contained probably less Korean TKD masters than any other
of the big TKD countries in and outside of Europe. As was examined above, this was at
least partly a homemade problem. 167 At some point it was realized that this was a
situation which could be advantageous to change, and occasionally, special offers were
made to Korean TKD masters living in Germany. For example, shortly after the DTU
foundation in June 1981, the secretary for international affairs, Joachim Hey, sent an
open letter to all Korean TKD instructors in the Federal Republic of Germany (Hey,
1981: 22). Arguing that in the past ten years the Germans had gained quite a lot without

167
Remember Heinz Marx’ humiliation of the first national team coach, Kim Kwang-il, in 1971. But Kim
had tried unsuccessfully in 1968 to convince his fellow Koreans to cooperate with the Germans in building
up strong, functioning administrative structures; for details, see the two sections before.

- 139 -
much contribution of many Korean TKD masters, he expressed his opinion that with
their cooperation, things would have been conducted not only quicker, but also more
harmonically. Then he collects wrongdoings in the past, such as arguments about
opinions, misunderstandings, refusals, and even boycotts. But, he argues, the issues were
too complex to determine the responsibilities, therefore, he recommends, each party
should just forget about it.

On private levels, this call for a new cooperation might have been fruitful. But
considering official positions in the federation with decisive power, it pops in the eye
that the only possible position in the federation for a native Korean was that of a coach,
and that never was a director’s position; see the tables below.

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 TABLE 21: The board of directors of section TKD (DJB) and DTU

Position Prior to 1981 (DJB) 1981~1985 (DTU)

President Heinz Marx Heinz Marx

Dr. Wolfgang Schütz *

Manfred Kloweit **
Vice President Dr. Wolfgang Schütz
Werner Paties ***

Peter Mauser

Technical Director Hans Siegel -

Secretary-General - Hans Siegel

Treasurer Norbert Hahn Norbert Hahn

Secretary for Referee's Affairs Dieter Kuckel Dieter Kuckel

Special Secretary Kurt Nauth -

Secretary for Promotional Affairs - Kurt Nauth

Secretary for International Affairs Joachim Hey Joachim Hey

Media Secretary Alfred Kayser Wolfgang Ganser

Secretary for Women's Affairs Mathias Schütz Winfried Anders

Secretary for Youth's Affairs Werner Paties Werner Paties

Park Soo-nam (head), Park Soo-nam (head),

hired Team Coach (no Director)
Shin In-shik (assistant) Georg Karrenberg (assistant)
*
Dr. Wolfgang Schütz stepped back after less than one year in office and was replaced by Manfred Kloweit.
**
Manfred Kloweit retired in 1984 and was replaced by Werner Paties,
***
Werner Paties passed away at the end of 1984 and was replaced by Peter Mauser.

Sources: TA, 1981: 38; Siegel, 1981: 7

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 TABLE 22: The DTU's board of directors, 1985~1989

Position 1985~1989 1989

President Heinz Marx Hans Siegel

Peter Mauser *
Vice President Peter Mauser
Joachim C. Hey

Technical Director - Joachim Kessler

Secretary-General Hans Siegel Dieter Jebramcik

Treasurer Norbert Hahn Ferdinand Hillen

Secretary for Referee's Affairs Dieter Kuckel Dieter Kuckel

Georg Dorff **
Secretary for Promotional Affairs Kurt Nauth
Kurt Nauth

Secretary for International Affairs Joachim Hey Edwin Ferger

Media Secretary Konstantin Gil Josef Ragotzki

Secretary for Women's Affairs Dorothea Kapkowski Ute Güster

Secretary for Youth's Affairs Wolfgang Pattberg Wolfgang Pattberg

Dr. Dirk Jung (head)***,

Helmut Gärtner
Georg Karrenberg (females),
(head),
hired Team Coach (no Director) Shin In-shik (youth)
Josef Wagner
Park Soo-nam (head),
(females)
Josef Wagner (females)
*
Peter Mauser stepped back as vice president and was replaced by Joachim C. Hey.
**
Georg Dorff was fired after one and a half year due to incompetence and replaced by Kurt Nauth.
***
Dirk Jung (and his team) stepped back in 1988 and was replaced by Park Soo-nam.

Sources: TA, 1985b: 30; Gil, 1989: 12; interview Jebramcik, 2007

In these tables, it can also be seen that the Korean head coach got replaced twice. As
was examined in Kuklinski-Rhee & Ha (2007), these had been very crucial steps
affecting the competitiveness of the national teams dramatically. It can also be seen that
the pattern of coach’s replacements shows a striking covariance with the pattern of

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replacements at the vice president’s position, especially with the persons Joachim Hey
and Peter Mauser involved. Now, as stated, Hey was responsible for the open letter to
the Korean TKD masters in 1981. Joachim Hey was working at the German embassy in
South Korea during the two first World Championships, and he remained quite fond of
Korea thereafter. It was he who discovered Park Soo-nam as gifted coach in Seoul and
who was instrumental in getting Park in the position of national team coach; moreover,
he was quite befriended with Park (interview Gatzweiler, 2006; interview Jebramcik,
2006). So, this fits perfectly with the fact that (nearly) whenever Hey held a responsible
position within the DTU’s board, the position as national team coach was occupied by
Park Soo-nam. Peter Mauser, on the contrary, shows the opposite pattern: whenever he
was in a responsible DTU position, Park Soo-nam was gone.168

Apart from that, the question could arise if there really weren’t any competent Korean
TKD masters willing and able to participate in the DTU. Well, there definitely were, at
least two of them: Ko Eui-min, dubbed the “head coach of the world”,169 the two-times
Korean national team coach at the World Championships of 1975 and 1977, who entered
Germany in 1978 and settled there since.170 Or Kim Chul-hwan, member of the Korean
World Champion team of 1973, Korea’s sports man of the year in 1974, World Games
gold medalist of 1978, father and coach of two-times World Champion Kim Yeon-ji;
Kim Chul-hwan lives in Germany since 1980. There is no evidence that any of both was
ever considered for the position as national team coach, or anything comparable.171

168
To be clear, this is just a covariance, this alone does not reveal relations of causes and effects. But it
leads to a hypothesis which should be tested. Unfortunately, for some reasons, Peter Mauser could not be
questioned in person about this topic until now.
169
According to his website, www.masterko.de; accessed on 11 November 2009.
170
Currently, Ko Eui-min is chairman of the technical committee of the WTF (since 2005).
171
It was not before this current year of 2009 that Kim Chul-hwan was finally appointed as additional coach

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 3.2. Problem II: Commercial Taekwondo Schools

According to German civil law, sports federations seeking governmental support are
required to accept only public sports clubs as members, not commercial sports schools.
Yet many Korean TKD masters living and teaching in Germany were running
commercial sports schools, simply because they had to make a living with their martial
art. Thus, while Germans were starting one TKD federation after another, Koreans were
largely left out.

Therefore, most public sport clubs were operated by native Germans with a regular
job, plus income, in a different field. And that’s why sports federations, like the DTU,
enlist nearly exclusively native German sports friends, while Korean TKD masters were
usually left out, their schools not operating under the official DTU banner, but were
associated directly with the WTF or ITF (or another, like Kwon Jae-hwa’s private
association), respectively.

3.3. Conflict Line I. North vs. South

One of the most traditional conflict lines in the history of Germany is North vs. South,
more exactly, the northern part of Germany, which is historically connected to the
protestant Prussian Empire, and southern Germany, traditional catholic regions

with special functions for the DTU; see www.dtu.de, accessed on 1 December 2009. In a telephone
communication with Park Soo-nam, the question if any of them was ever considered for an official position
in the DTU, such as national team coach, was simply answered with the expression that neither of them was
ever considered as an able coach (Park, 2007). Of course, it could be suspected that other aspects played
also a role. Both Ko and Kim came as TKD superstars to Germany, and it was their task to make a living
there out of their martial art. It is clear that with a network of flourishing martial arts schools, money could
be made easier than with the stressful job as national head coach, which apparently was not enough to
prevent Dirk Jung during his term in 1985~1988 from engaging in a side job.

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historically related to the Wittelsbach and Habsburg dynasties. In modern Germany, this
conflict line often occurs between Germany’s two biggest federal states, North Rhine-
Westphalia in the north-west, and Bavaria in the south-east. North Rhine-Westphalia
contains Germany’s most populated region, the Ruhr area, featuring cities like Dortmund
and Essen with about 5.5 million citizens overall, together with the Rhein area around
Cologne about 10 million. Thanks to the huge coal mining companies and the heavy
industry, the Ruhr area is a traditional worker’s region where Germany’s labor party, the
Social-Democratics, has its traditionally strongest backyard. Contrary to that, Bavaria is
a more urban region, traditionally fostering agriculture, nowadays high technology, and
the most catholic region in Germany; Bavaria features a unique party, the Christian-
Socialists, traditionally the most popular party in Bavaria, which is often more radical
than its sister party in the other German states, the conservative Christian-Democratics.
The diversity between these two outstanding German states can further be demonstrated
with the fierce rivalry between the two football clubs of FC Bayern München on the one,
and VFB Borussia Dortmund on the other side.

Coincidentally, it was exactly these two regions where TKD entered Germany first,
but on quite contrary ways, as was already shown. Plus, the development of TKD in
these states also was divergent. The following table should provide an overview.

- 145 -
 TABLE 23: Different ways of TKD in North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria (1960~present)
North Rhine-Westphalia
First TKD masters Coal miners
Kind of early TKD practice In spare time; in disguise;
illegal payments
Organizations Loose ITF connection; NWTV,
ITF-GER, ITF-D
(all ITF)
TKD (DJB) chairmen none
DTU presidents none
WTF World Champions Rainer Müller (Iserlohn), 1979
Dirk Jung (Essen), 1982
Michael Arndt (Neuss), 1987
Aziz Acharki (Bonn), 1995
ITF World Champions Natalija Kapulica (Lünen),
(sparring) 1999
Andreas Hampel (Lünen), 1999
Birgid Sasse, 2001
Hosted TKD World 14th ITF World Championships,
Championships Dortmund 2005
- 146 -
Bavaria
Students; American GIs
Professional schools, professional
coaches
DKKV, DTV, SWTV, TKD (DJB),
KWON, DTU
(ITF, WTF, Kwon)
Wilhelm Weingarth, 1968~69
Herrmann Oppermann, 1969~71
Heinz Marx, 1971~1981
Heinz Marx, 1981~1989
Hans Siegel, 1989~1992
Stefan Klawiter, 1992~1998
Walter Schwarz, 1998~2002
Heinz Gruber, 2002~present
none
none
4th WTF World Championships,
Sindelfingen 1979;
16th WTF World Championships,
Garmisch-Partenkirchen 2003
 This table shows that until today, the leaders of the main German TKD body, the DTU,
always came from Bavaria; as a result, the DTU office was always located in Bavaria.
Moreover, most DTU executives also came from southern Germany. Two DTU
presidents, Stefan Klawiter and Walter Schwarz, had also been presidents of the
Bavarian TKD Union (BTU) at the time of their service; the curret DTU president has a
position in the BTU director’s board. On the other side, only one president of the North
Rhine-Westphalian TKD Union (NWTU), Dieter Jebramcik, had a leading position in
the DTU; he served as secretary-general from 1989~1991, and again from 1996~1998.
This indicates that the Bavarian influence on the development of German TKD was far
more apparent than the influence of the NWTU, although the NWTU provided the
majority of successful TKD athletes. Therefore, it was a constant topic that NWTU
athletes were missing thorough support by DTU authorities.

One apparent example was the re-installment of Park Soo-nam as head coach just
before the 1988 Seoul Olympics (the following is based on an interview with Michael
Arndt, 2009). In 1985, Park had been replaced by a former athlet, Dirk Jung, TKD
World Champion of 1982. Jung, who had just completed his medical school studies, had
changed training style to a more systematic, scientifically based approach. But due to
lack of successes and raising criticisms, he quit the job just before the Seoul Olympics,
and the DTU directors asked Park Soo-nam to take care of the team. However, the
athletes did not want Park being in charge again, for he fostered an unsystematic,
unscientific training style which was out of fashion, and the athletes had the impression
that his training methods would not enlarge, but inhibit their performances. Thus, the
athletes, under leadership of their captain Michael Arndt, tried to boycott Park’s
coaching, but the NWTU athlete Arndt, heavy-weight World Champion of 1987 (without
Park’s assistance), had to subordinate under the Southern-German decision. Yet in the
end, Park’s coaching at the Olympics had no effect. He was just physically present,

- 147 -
without interfering in athlete’s performances, which, in return, had to compete without
the backing of a proper coach. Thus, moral and tactical support lacking, just one match
(by an athlete from the NWTU) was won during the whole tournament.

3.4. Conflict Line II: Full-Contact vs. Semi-Contact vs. Zero-Contact

Competition System

One of the core elements of TKD is its sparring style and the resulting competition
system, which are especially distinctive from Japanese Karate. Stemming from combat
practices developed in Okinawa against Japanese oppressors, the self-concept of a
Karate practitioner was getting ready to kill an opponent with just one strike. As the
founding fathers of TKD, including Choi Hong-hi, had learned Karate on Japanese soil,
they originally adopted this philosophy of “one blow, one death” (Capener, 1995). Due
to the obvious danger of this practice to sparring participants, it was not possible to
conduct competitions within this system. Korean TSD and TKD masters, like Hwang Ki
and Choi Hong-hi, were much quicker than Japanese Karate masters to break through
this tradition and to develop competition rules which would enable sparring matches
without severe danger to life and health of the participants.

The first way to enable competitions was applying a zero-contact sparring system,
which could be done without any major changes in technics and supplementary
equipment, like safety gear. It was only required to stop a strike just before it touched the
target. However, for the audience, a zero-contact competition style somehow looks more
like dancing than real fighting, for strikes and blows and kicks, no matter how deadly
they would be in a real situation, show no effect on the opponent. Therefore, the idea of
contact competitions never wore off.

- 148 -
 Although there are several reports about bare-knuckled full-contact sparring in the old
days of TSD and TKD, this could hardly be conducted as a proper competition
system.172 Therefore, supplementary equipment, like a chest protector, was needed, and
in fact, Koreans tested different materials as proper protection gear since the 1960s.
While light protection enabled semi-contact sparring style without evere injuries, better
protection, and therefore further developed equipment, was needed for full-contact
sparring style. Therefore, a full-contact competition system was not established before
the 1970s, after new chest protectors were developed, which were safe enough to
prevent severe injuries, but handy enough to enable quick and powerful movements.

Therefore, it seems like a logical consequence that a semi-contact competition style

was developed and applied by the ITF, while the WTF, established seven years later,
featured a full-contact competition style, which requires much more sophisticated
protection equipment. Moreover, some traditionalist TKD grandmasters like Kwon Jae-
hwa, who started teaching TKD in Germany before foundation of the ITF, still feature
zero-contact competitions instead, to stress their legacy as the historically earliest, from
their point of view: most original, kind of TKD.

Similar to the developments in TKD, the history of Karate competition styles also
shows the pattern of zero-contact (original Shotokan Karate), semi-contact (modern
sports Karate), and full contact sparring (Kickboxing). This pattern could be described

172
Moreover, the Kyokushinkai Karate style already applied bare-knucled full-contact combat matches
since the late 1950s. It should be noted that the founder of Kyokushinkai Karate, Oyama Masutatsu (大山 倍

達; 1923~1994), was born in Korea as Choi Hyung Yee (崔永宜/최영의), known also as Choi Bae-dal
(崔倍達/최배달). Interestingly, during the 1960s, Oyama/Choi was approached by Choi Hong-hi who tried
to persuade him joining his TKD movement, together with the whole Kyokushinkai Karate style (see
Burdick, 1997). However, it is beyond our knowledge if Choi Hong-hi planned to adopt the competition
style as well.

- 149 -
as the less contact, the more original, the more pure; but the more contact, the less moral,
the less art.

Especially in Germany, the notation of something as “original” has its benefits, for
many Germans would prefer choosing the original than a mere copy. No wonder, than,
that many German TKD (and also Karate) clubs promote their style as more pure, more
true, more original than others, with the general tendency to feature as few contacts
within sparring as possible. Also, many traditional DTU TKD clubs in Germany are
older than the WTF, and they originally featured semi- or zero-contact style sparring
before the WTF introduced its chest protector-based full-contact sparring system.

Therefore, it was not uncommon for DTU TKD clubs all over the Federal Republic to
feature other styles than full-contact sparring. More traditional-oriented German TKD
friends tend to prefer semi- or even zero-contact competition styles, while WTF-
affiliated DTU increasingly disallowed it during the 1990s, promoting full-contact style
only.

In general, there is a variety of DTU TKD clubs: some are focusing on forms
(poomsae), while others have their focus on competition (Olympic style), and even
others focus on the more meditative aspects of East Asian martial arts, the “do”,
understanding practicing martial arts as a way of a universal, harmonic life. Many DTU
TKD clubs which weren’t interested in preparing for (international) competitions didn’t
bother enduring the pains of full-contact sparring, they practiced semi- or even zero-
contact sparring instead. Even for official dan grade promotions, full-contact sparring
was not always mandatory.

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 3.5. Inner Conflicts Within the ITF-D

During the process the German WTF branch, the DTU, was released into
independence from the German Judo Federation, there also emerged a formal German
ITF branch for the first time. Not everybody was fond of the new forms and sparring
style the WTF was promoting, especially high-ranked Korean TKD masters who have
been in the country prior to the formation of the WTF. And while it was much easier to
perform old-school TKD under the judo cover, it seemed to be getting more difficult
once the DTU was established. So, they formed their own organization, the ITF-
Germany, shortly ITF-GER, in 1980 or 1981 in Witten, close to Dortmund (interview
Weiler, 2007). Unlike in every other TKD organization in Germany, the key positions
were divided between Korean TKD masters, who also held the personal contacts to Choi
Hong-hi and his ITF.

However, while the early 1980s had been the high time for the DTU, it was the
opposide for the ITF-GER, because at the beginning of the 1980s, Choi Hong-hi
approached North Korea for that kind of support he was neglected from the south
(Burdick, 1997; interview Weiler, 2007).173 As an immediate reaction to this act, which
was strictly illegal according to the South Korean National Security Law, most of the
Korean TKD masters of the ITF-GER severed ties with Choi and formed an independent
non-WTF TKD organization, the German TKD Association (Deutscher TKD Bund,
DTB), taking with them most clubs and schools, including about 5,000 TKD
practitioners overall, which was a hard blow against the young organization (Weiler
2005: 33; interview Weiler, 2007).

173
According to recently conducted interviews with TKD experts in the U.S. and in Canady by Alex Gillis,
including Choi’s son, Choi Jung-hwa, Choi Hong-hi already started to contact North Korean agents in the
1970s, which remained top secret until his death (Gillis, 2008).

- 151 -
 Closely thereafter, in 1982, Lee Ki-young from Kassel in Hesse (next to North Rhine-
Westphalia) rescued the young organization, reorganized and renamed it into ITF-D (D
for “Deutschland”). Lee was also secretary-general of the ITF at that time, and as the
only remaining Korean TKD master sticking to his connection to Choi’s organization, he
was the most powerful ITF-TKD master in Germany. Due to the language barrier, he let
native Germans take the director’s positions of first and second chairmen as well as
treasurer, but Lee took the charge at the disciplinary committee. Throughout the
following decade, he used his position and power in the ITF to be the mighty ruler of the
ITF-D, for anything which went against his wishes could be enforced by applying
disciplinary methods (interview Weiler, 2007).174

Thanks to those demotivating measures, after less than one decade, the ITF-D was on
the verge of dissolution, with just 150 members left. In this situation, Lee agreed to
allow a team around Paul Weiler being elected for the new director’s positions in 1989,
which immediately pushed through constitutional and regulative modifications, plus a
switch of the office back to North-Rhine Westphalia (this time, Cologne). The same year,
the ITF-D competition team was surprisingly successful during the 1989 World Games
for Youth and Students in Pyongyang, when their team of 6 athletes won one gold, two
silver and three bronze medals. After a report about that trip was published in one of the
mayor German martial arts magazines, the Karate Budo Journal, by Paul Weiler, many
former ITF friends remembered their old interest, including renegades from the nearly-

174
According to Paul Weiler (interview 2007), Lee Ki-young increasingly abused his ITF position so much
that eventually in the 1990s, Choi Hong-hi had to kick him out personally. Weiler reported, for example, that
ITF secretary-general Lee Ki-young regularly delayed sending information material to member nations
which he didn’t like, deliberately by two weeks. At the time of the interview, Lee was still living in Kassel,
Germany, as an old man no longer engaged in TKD at all.

- 152 -
vanished DTB, and about 1,200 people instantly rejoined the ITF-D (interview Weiler,
2007).

Thus, the following year, a strongly improved competition team could be sent to the
1990 World Championships in Canada, winning the vice champion title, losing only to
the North Koreans. 175 And the next year, the ITF-D of West Germany was clearly
dominating the 1991 European Championships in Reading, England, gaining 11 gold 4
silver and 3 bronze medals. Since then, the ITF-D remained on a European and global
top position, winning, for example, at least one World Champion title at every World
Championships since 1994 (interview Weiler, 2007).

Thus, the development of the ITF-D could be summarized as follows: while the DTU
remained successful, the ITF-D struggled; and since the DTU is struggling, the ITF-D
performs uncomparably successful.

175
While Paul Weiler still remains convinced that there was some cheating to let the North Koreans become
the World Champion.

- 153 -
 4. Taekwondo in East Germany

In East Germany, there was nearly no TKD, except for one or two known small TKD
training groups on a private basis, which practiced ITF-style TKD with North Korean
TKD masters. One of these groups was located at the University of Rostock, the other
somewhere near Berlin (interview Jebramcik, 2009).

As none of their practitioners set up any East German TKD organization which lasted
until the German reunification of 1990, all regional DTU administrations had to be built
up from scratch after German sports unification, which consumed much energy from
DTU officials with a sense for responsibility.

- 154 -
 V. Taekwondo in Reunified Germany
(since 1989)

That was another one of those fruitless trips deep into the countryside of former East
Germany. The president of a huge regional DTU branch conducted this five-hour drive
into the far East of Germany together with his treasurer, to help one of those new
regional DTU branches getting ignited. But, again, without major success; nobody
seemed interested in this sport. Although the new regional DTU branches for the five
new Federal German States had formally been established already a few years ago, they
did not gain many members, thus could not collect many fees, and therefore could not do
a decent job. What would be needed was heavy promotion in favor of this Olympic sport,
something the poor East German DTU branches need the enduring support, expertise
and, not the least, money of the big West German DTU branches for. Today the president
and his treasurer just delivered another cheque containing a huge number and negotiated
further exchange programs with experienced Taekwondo instructors – unbelievable, but
they still didn’t have instructors for each big city! Don’t forget, the treasurer calmed his
president down, Taekwondo was widely unknown in East Germany, since most martial
arts had been banned by the Socialists. Now that the East German people were provided
with real free choice, they prefer more exciting activities, such as Thai Boxing, Brazilian
Jiu-Jitsu and Shaolin Kung Fu. None of them existed when Taekwondo was the hot issue
in West Germany in the 1970s, the president remembered bitterly. He sighted. Next
week, he would have to take the same journey again. Another wasted day in his life. But
he had no choice. He desperately needed the votes of this regional DTU branch for the
next general assembly to push through the reforms his athletes back at home demanded
to gain back the lost ground in the international tournaments …

- 155 -
 As illustrated in this story, the German reunification happened to be a major
disadvantage for German TKD, especially for the DTU which was expected to spread
TKD throughout the five new Federal German States. How could the DTU
administration manage that situation? Especially in light of the coming Sydney
Olympics in 2000 where TKD was an official event for the first time?

These and related questions were the guidelines for this final chapter, which covers
the transition of German TKD in reunified Germany. Although German reunification
formally happened in 1990, the Berlin Wall fell down one year before, and that year of
1989 is usually seen as the real turning point in German history. The same is true for
German TKD, both for the WTF-affiliated DTU and for the ITF-D, because both
federations registered major changes in leadership. For the DTU, it it usually said that in
1989, an era came to its end after Heinz Marx was replaced as ETU and DTU presidents.
Similarly, it could be said that for the ITF-D, a new era began after Paul Weiler took the
charge, replacing Lee Ki-young as president in 1989.

For a neutral observer, it could be expected that a major impact of the German
reunification in 1990 was the unification of East and West German TKD associations.
However, as was shown before, despite a few training groups on a private basis, there
was no TKD in East Germany, at least not of a formally organized nature. However, that
caused immense problems for the DTU, for in their race against commercial martial arts
schools, they had to built up DTUstructures from scratch in all East Germany, which
consumed much time and energy and other resources of the federation. Given now that
most work in a German sports association is done on a volunteering basis, the DTU was
in desperate need for those precious resources to regain the competitive prowess they
lost during the last decade, both on athletic and administrative levels. Moreover,
increasing pressure by the WTF had to be endured, which were added to the still existing
conflicts between the North-West and the South, resulting eventually in a crash landing

- 156 -
of the administration in front of the courts. As a consequence, more clubs left the DTU
and went into independence or formed new minor TKD associations on their own.

The ITF-D, on the other hand, didn’t have to bother much about building up structures
in formerly East Germany; they continued to focus on their main regions, with
prospering results in competitiveness. To fully understand the situation of TKD in
reunified Germany, the key aspects of German sports unification should be considered.

1. German Sports Unification since 1990

Unification in sports basically means the merger of two associations of one sport. As
this is a political process, the model for the several German sports unifications was set
by the German political reunification of 1990. To gain a better understanding of the
situation of German sports after 1990, the key aspects of the process of the German
political reunification should therefore be taken into consideration.

1.1. Political Reunification

The German Reunification was the result of changes in politics of Eastern European
communist states since the mid-1980s, together with peaceful protests of the East
German people in 1989. One of the demands of the protesters was free travel to the West,
especially West Germany, which, in fact, was actually enabled by travelling through
allied Eastern European countries, like Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

In November of 1989, authorities of the German Democratic Republic (shortly, GDR)

debated about changes of travelling regulations, which should be adapted to the actual
situation. Yet a final decision was not reached when politburo member Günter
Schabowski was scheduled to inform international press and media correspondents

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about the procedure on the evening of November 9, 1989. The slightly confused
Schabowski, who had not been present at the debates about the regulations, surprised the
auditorium with the unexpected declaration that the borders to all West Germany and
West Berlin would be opened from that very moment on.

That news was broadcasted quickly by East and West European television and radio
stations, and during that night, thousands of GDR citizens in East Berlin approached the
Wall, trying to confirm the declaration right away. Lacking any official order in that
direction, the heavily armed East German and Russian border guards hesitated, but
eventually let the people pass the checkpoints to West Berlin. During that night, tens of
thousands of peoples crossed the border, a figure that reached about one million until
1990. On Christmas 1989, GDR authorities started allowing West German citizens enter
the GDR without any visa. From June 1990 on, the Berlin Wall was gradually torn off,
but the night from 9th to 10th November in 1989, when the border lost its function, is
seen as the official date the Berlin Wall fell.

In March 1990, the GDR conducted their first (and last) free elections. The new
government quickly signed a treaty about financial and economical unity with the
Federal Republic of Germany (shortly, FRG), and they got into further negotiations
about a unification treaty. This unification treaty was approved by the legislative
chambers of both states on 20 September, and officially realized on 3 October 1990,
which became the official unity celebration day afterwards.

This unification treaty had been designed according to the philosophy of “rescheduled
modernization”, which assumes that one of the parties is more advanced in
modernization, and thus should impose its superior structures on the minor party
(Rummelt, 2001). In terms of economic prowess and political democracy, the FRG of

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West Germany clearly was superior to the GDR of East Germany, which basically went
down because of this divergence.

According to the unification treaty, the area of former East Germany had to be divided
into 5 regions, which were to become the five new federal states of the Federal Republic
of Germany (see Einigungsvertrag, 1990).176 East Berlin was integrated into West Berlin,
and the German constitution was enlarged to cover the five new federal states as well.

1.2. Unification in Sports

Following the economical and political reunification, the task of structural unification
was faced by the different areas of society: science, education, the media, criminal and
civil law, literature, culture, art etc. – and sports. For all areas, the paradigm for
unification efforts was the political reunification based on the principle of rescheduled
modernization. West Germany had been so advanced over its Eastern brother state that
there were no debates about alternative ways of getting unified.

However, in the case of sports, it was the GDR that featured the more superior
structures in most respects. For example, at the 1988 Seoul Olympics, East Germany
ranked on the 2nd place after the Soviet Union, with 102 medals (including 37 gold
medals) overall, while West Germany just gained 40 medals (11 gold medals) and was
ranked on the 5th place (for more details, see Kuklinski-Rhee & Ha, 2009).

176
The five new federal states were Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-
Anhalt, and Thuringia, which were added to the eleven existing federal states, consisting of the eight area-
states of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-
Palatinate, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein, together with the two city-states Bremen and Hamburg, and
West Berlin. West Berlin was not formally a city-state, but had a peculiar legal status; however, technically,
it was treated like an associated federal city-state on its own.

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 The only area in sports where West Germany could be seen as unambiguously
constantly more advanced to East Germany had been some professional sports, like
football, tennis, golf, and car racing (Formula 1). This kind of professional sport was
hardly possible within the East German sport system, which was based on state-
subsidized amateurs. Thus, adopting elements of the East German sports system would
endanger West Germany’s edge in professional sports, something no one in a key
position in German sports could risk.177 Therefore, imposing the West German sports
system on East Germany never really got in question. Despite the public expecting that
approved elements, like the German Sports University in Leipzig and the 25 Sports
Schools for Children and the Youth, would be preserved and West German sports leaders
openly claiming a fair procedure, East German sports structures quickly got abandoned
without thorough discussions.

Formally, sports unification was performed in several steps; see for details Kuklinski-
Rhee & Ha (2009). In the end, East German sports structures were destroyed, and former
East German athletes and coaches were largely welcomed in the unified German sports
system. Exceptions were made for subjects with a proven connection to the East German
secret police, the so-called “Stasi” (Staatssicherheit). Estimations claim figures of about
10% of all persons involved in East German elite sports having co-worked with the Stasi.

Another main issue was illegal medication. It is an open secret that East Germany was
one of the leading countries researching and applying performance-enhancing drugs,
having been about 15 years ahead of Western states in this area. However, East German
sports authorities had also been extremely cautious with drug detection, so that after all,
only one case of illegal mediation was detected until the end of the GDR. Therefore,

177
To get an impression about the amount of money ruling the sports world, see Simson & Jennings, 1992;
Jennings, 1996; 2000; 2006; Smit, 2005.

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officially, all East German athletes were technically clean, and the DSB officially
applied an amnesty on all former GDR athletes until 1990.

Thus, despite a few cases of additional drug detection and past Stasi collaboration
discovered by researchers, most top GDR athletes and coaches were integrated into the
West German sports system, where they regularly played a central role. During the
following Olympics, for example, most German medals were gained by athletes of the
former GDR (for details, see Kuklinski-Rhee & Ha, 2009).

Based on this fact, it seems safe to claim that reunified Germany’s sports successes
were a function of successful integration of East Germany’s top athletes (and, for the
sake or argument, top coaches) into German sports teams.

It could be said that the integration of East German sports elements worked best with
top athletes, coaches, and facilities. But for the majorit of average sports people, and the
whole branch of mass sports, the import of an alien spoart system based on a capitalistic
society brought massive problems, amongst which only the divergence between public
sport clubs and commercial sport schools can be addressed here.

The GDR mainly encouraged, supported and promoted Olympic sports where the
GDR had a fair chance to win medals, dubbed “Sport I”. All the others, “Sport II”, like
basketball, tennis, water polo, alpine skiing, and also chess, could be found only at a few
sport clubs, and did not receive the support which would enable participants visiting
international or even national competitions, not even regular training sometimes. For
example, tennis balls and oversized basketball shoes were expensive import products
and could simply not be afforded by the clubs.178 Some sports, especially most martial

178
According to the GDR’s sport system, it was the sport clubs, not private individuals, which were
responsible for providing facilities and equipments.

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arts (except Boxing and Judo), were even forbidden for the sports clubs of the masses;
they were regarded as subversive.

Under the new capitalistic sport system, commercial sport schools and fitness centers
popped up everywhere in the new five states, offering kinds of sports and physical
excercises the East German people never had access to before, from general fitness
training to body building, from yoga to East Asian martial arts (interview Jebramcik,
2009). With increasing frequency of commercial school openings, the instructor’s
quality was shrinking. Nevertheless, in a region of growing unemployment rates,
instructors often preferred working there than engaging in pubic sport clubs on a
volunteering basis. Moreover, West German sports federatios have developed a system
of educating their instructors, to guarantee decent quality levels of instructors. But in the
East German region, qualified instructors could earn more money in commercial sport
schools, and instructors without proper training could only work there.

Contrary to the East Germany’s sport system, mass sports in West Germany is, and
ever was, based on leisure-time efforts by volunteers, except for school and professional
sports, and commercial sport schools. Thus, large areas of former East Germany faced
massive lack of capable people ready to engage in volunteering jobs, instead of getting
paid for their work, with the result that many sports federations had troubles in offering
their sport in all regions.

To summarize, professional and elite sports found ways to get the advantage of the
sport unification of east and West Germany. But for mass sports and sports for all in the
five new federal states, the import of the capitalist West German system resulted in
unexpected extra difficulties.

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 1.3. Situation for Taekwondo and other East Asian Martial Arts

Except for Judo and amateur Boxing, there had not been any structures for the
different martial arts in East Germany, so everything had to be built up from scratch.
Building up sports structures from scratch requires a plan, engaged people, and financial
resources. The plan was just the foundation of franchises of a federation
(Landesverbände) in each of the five new states, which should be responsible for
opening and managing of the new clubs on their own. The clubs then create the financial
basis for the federation, mainly by means of annual membership fees. But in cases when
the federation is organized prior to the opening of most of its member sports clubs, the
organization must be supported by other state’s federations. The same is true for the
work force; people from other state’s federations must fill the organization’s positions
before capable people from member sports clubs can be found and activated.

In TKD, for example, the biggest DTU franchises from the hugest federal states, like
North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, and Baden-Württemberg, started organizing the new
franchises in Germany’s new Eastern states, like Saxony and Thuringia. For example,
the Bavarian BTU president also got president of the DTU franchise in Saxony, and the
North-Rhine Westphalian NWTU president also got president of the DTU franchise in
Thuringia (interview Jebramcik, 2009). To bridge the vast lack of capable TKD
instructors in the East, weekend seminars were conducted regularly by leading West
German and Korean TKD masters residing in the West. TDK demonstration teams
performed in the most important urban regions to promote TKD and get the people
joining the newly established TKD clubs.

TKD and other public East Asian martial arts clubs had to face the rising competition
with commercial sport schools. Following the changes in the communist world, China
increasingly promoted its traditional martial arts of wushu, sending selected Shaolin
monks around the world for demonstrations and as instructors of shaolin wushu classes.

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It should be noticed that Chinese martial arts schools in Germany are mainly commercial
enterprises which could rarely be found in public sports clubs. Additionally, the shaolin
monks did not come to stay forever, but for a limited period only, and frequently
travelled around to perform and teach courses elsewhere. As the people in East Germany
were discovering their interest in East Asian martial arts, increasingly more commercial
sport schools offered wushu classes, successfully promoting them as the original, thus
most fundamental, martial art of all East Asia.

The biggest problem for public German sports clubs in this competition was that they
are conservative in structure, while commercial sport schools can act and react more
flexible. Usually applying short-termed working and membership contracts, they can
adept better to the current situations in their region, like increasing or decreasing
demands for East Asian martial arts. Since East German people had lacked first-hand
experience with East Asian martial arts, they still had to test their real interest and talent
in this kind of activity, thus they behaved rather unstable in joining and abandoning
martial arts classes. This was a big advantage for commercial sport schools, since that
behavior pattern fitted much better to their system than to the long-termed agreements of
public sport clubs. And that forced public sport clubs to stick to low membership fees,
their biggest advantage over commercial sport schools. But low fees combined with a
low number of clubs in the first place do not lead to a stable financial basis for the
federation. Therefore, they had to be constantly supported financially by the DTU or
other state’s federations.

As the official representative for the Olympic sport of TKD, the DTU had no choice
but to engage in this manner and to try as hard as possible. The claim that the DTU
represented TKD all over the Federal Republic of Germany was, after all, the basis for
the DTU being supported by the DSB. If the East German regional branches of the DTU

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were not in charge of TKD, it could lead to massive problems, up to a separation from
the DSB.

The ITF-D and the private Kwon Jae-hwa organization, on the other hand, did not
have to bother about the five new German states. They could continue focusing on their
main regions, and prosper. Adding to these kinds of problems was the increasing
pressure the WTF pushed on the DTU. To understand that situation in full scale, an
overview about the athletic achievements during the 1990s would be needed.

1.4. Athletic Taekwondo achievements during the 1990s

As was shown, the only surplus of the German sports unification was the integration
of former East German coaches and athletes into the reunified German sports system.
From this perspective, German sport unification was a straight disadvantage for TKD,
because there hadn’t been a pool of competitive East German TKD athletes and
experienced coaches. The unified German TKD teams still had to consist of pure West
German members (including West Berlin), exactly as before.

Now, as was shown, the situation of athletic TKD in West Germany had been coming
down just before the German reunification, both for the DTU and the ITF-D. In case of
the DTU, there had been a few athletic successes during the 1990s, but the level of
European superiority of the early 1980s could not be regained again (see table below). In
case of the ITF-D, athletic successes grew and put the German teams into international
top positions (see table below).

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 Table 24: Athletic Achievements of the DTU and the ITF-D since 1989

Tournament DTU athletes ITF-D athletes

Olympic Games 1 x Silver -
(1992~2004)

World Championships 1 x Gold 4 x Gold

(1989~2005) 4 x Silver 5 x Silver
9 x Bronze 13 x Gold

European Championships 19 x Gold 20 x Gold

(1990~2006) 6 x Silver 11 x Silver
29 x Bronze 10 x Bronze

Sources: Taekwondo Data website; 179 Weiler (2005)

This discrepancy clearly indicates diverging processes on the administrative levels of

both federations. While the DTU administration faltered in the 1990s (compared to the
glory 1980s), the ITF-D administration prospered (compared to the problematic 1980s).

179
Taekwondo Data website, www.taekwondodata.com; accessed on 23 December 2009.

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 2. Taekwondo in Reunified Germany: from Unity to Disparity

The DTU administration faced two main tasks after German reunification. On the
athletic level, the former level of successes should be regained. And on the
administrative level, DTU franchises had to be built up in the five new German federal
states. Both tasks turned out to face more obstacles than initially expected.

While the old conflicts and problems from the 1980s were still not solved, three more
problem fields emerged. One was caused by the intensed focus on TKD as elite sports,
especially since TKD officially became an Olympic event in the mid-1990s. As a
reaction, growing anger occurred, stressing the benefits of TKD as a recreational activity.
Another problem was the raising power struggles inside the DTU organization,
culminating in a legal battle between the presidents of the NWTU and the BTU at the
end of the 1990s. And on top of this, the world governing TKD body, the WTF,
increased its pressure on the DTU to a point that made many TKD clubs and participants
feeling hurt. Together these problems caused many TKD practitioners and clubs to leave
the DTU and establish separational TKD organizations or stay independent (interview
Sobota, 2008).

Of these problems, other TKD organizations, such as the ITF-D and the Kwon Jae-
hwa Black Belt Centers, only faced the lurking danger of internal power struggles.
Therefore, the decade after the German reunification had a very different process for
them.

In the following, the problems within the DTU should be examined first, starting with
the external pressure from the WTF. This pressure further increased the tension between
TKD as elite sports and TKD as a recreational activity, and both dramatically stimulated
the internal power struggles within the DTU. As a contrast, the developments of the ITF-

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D and the Kwon Jae-hwa Black Belt Centers in the same decade of the 1990s should be
presented briefly.

2.1. The impact of the WTF on the DTU during the 1990s

During the 103rd general assembly of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in
Paris, France, on Sunday, 4 September 1994, at 6.00 p.m., WTF-TKD was
acknowledged as an official Olympic Event during the 2000 Sydney Games (TA 1994b:
20). While the global TKD community registered this news eagerly, either to celebrate
(WTF affiliates) or to get angry about it (other TKD practitioners), another decision of
the WTF on the same day did not receive that much attention first. The WTF announced
that from now on, only full-contact sparring and Poomsae forms would be allowed
(26).180

At that time, Hyong forms and semi-contact sparring was widely applied in DTU
clubs, and many DTU members preferred performing them (interview Sobota, 2008).
Semi-contact sparing Championships were conducted especially in North Rhine-
Westphalia (Knoll, 1994: 41), and the Hyong forms had been officially integrated into
European TKD forms Championships until 1993 (42). Germany was one of the
last countries to abandon the Hyong as a substitute for Poomsae in
competitions and grading promotions by the WTF-affiliated organization
(68; interview G. Kapkowski, 2009).

180
It should be noted that during a short trip of WTF president Kim Un-yong to visit his daughter’s concert
in Cologne six months before the Paris decision, he was very careful not to comment on the possible
outcome of the IOC decision about TKD at the 2000 Sydney Games. Likewise, he did not announce that the
WTF would prohibit the further practice of Hyong forms and semi-contact sparring after a positive decision
(TA 1994a: 7). Thus, many DTU clubs and members were quite surprised about the top-down decision of
the WTF in Paris, and felt unfairly suppressed afterwards.

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 Now with the pressure of the WTF that only Poomsae and full-contact sparring were
officially allowed in TKD competitions and graduation promotions, not few German
TKD practitioners looked for ways of sticking to their familiar Hyong and semi-contact
sparring practice. This was the perfect opportunity for other, smaller TKD
administrations to emerge, offering members the parallel practice of Hyong and
Poomsae, and semi-contact and full-contact sparring style. It is estimated that in the
aftermath, about 5,000 TKD practitioners left the DTU and joined other organizations or
remained independent (interview Sobota, 2007).

The next attack on the DTU by the WTF came in July 2000, about two months before
the start of the Olympic Games in Sydney. The WTF had demanded for ten years that
the DTU should get their acknowledged dan grades be approved by the Kukkiwon. Now
the WTF offered the last opportunity: the Kukkiwon approval of each single DTU dan
grade would cost between 130 DM (for 1st dan) to 2,000 DM (for 7th dan) (Bolz &
Schuldes, 2008: 145). That meant, a 7th dan grade holder had also to approve the 6th dan,
the 5th dan and so on, and every single grade would cost several hundreds to thousands
German Marks. Otherwise, they would no longer be accepted on international WTF
tournaments, including the Olympics, and German TKD players would only be allowed
to compete if the whole DTU would obey to this demand.

As a result, many DTU members chosed to “buy” their dan grades, to not get in
troubles later on. But on the other hand, this was an invitation for many more to finally
leave the DTU. Especially TKD practitioners who weren’t interested in participating in
official WTF events at all did not accept this new WTF precondition and started thinking
about just leaving the WTF, without joining any of the other federations, like the ITF-D
or the Kwon Jae-hwa Black Belt Center.

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 2.2. Taekwondo: elite sports vs. recreational activity

The approval of TKD as an official Olympic event in Paris in 1994 had another
consequence for the DTU; it finally cemented the focus of the DTU on promoting TKD
as elite sports (Klawiter, 1994: 5).

During the 1980s, after the overwhelming successes of German TKD teams had faded
away, the later BTU vice president Wilfried Harloff, together with his wife Angelika,
started organizing recreational TKD training courses during the public holidays at
Pentecost, with a highly increasing number of participants: more than 500 participants in
1987, more than 1000 in the year of the Seoul Olympics, and more than 2000 in the
following year and ever since (Knoll, 1994: 98). This training course was a copy of
similarly popular events of Judo and Karate in Germany and other European countries,
where ordinary practitioners summed together to learn new, sometimes newly developed
or advanced aspects of their martial art, or the differences from and similarities to related
martial arts, and learned to know each other from all over the Federal Republic of
Germany, including guests from abroad. Since the 1980s, this Pentecost training course
was established as a fixed annual institution for recreational TKD, and similar training
courses throughout the year, also in neighboring countries, were frequently visited by
ordinary DTU and other TKD enthusiasts.

Thus, the decline of elite TKD performance in the second half of the 1980s was
compensated, in some respects, by the raise of recreational TKD. This must not be
regarded as a causal relation; very likely, it was just a coincidence.181 For example, the
amount of underaged TKD practitioners in the DTU, both the absolute number and the
relative ratio to grown-ups, was increasing steadily since the 1980s, from about 40% at

181
There is no known fact which would back such a causal relation hypothesis. However, it is not
impossible that some day, those facts could be found. Until then, the causal relation hypothesis should not
further be maintained.

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the early 1980s to more than the half of all DTU members in the 1990s, with a still
growing tendency (Knoll, 1994: 22).

It could be argued that this was the result of TKD being promoted as an Olympic sport
since the 1980s, and the young people could be aiming at excelling in TKD to
participate at the Olympics some day. Therefore, as this line of reasoning would
conclude, the growing number of underaged in the DTU should rather be seen as an
indicator for a stronger elite TKD attitude there.

But this line of reasoning would fail to acknowledge the fact that the vast majority of
underaged TKD practitioners do not eagerly engage in sparring, and that just the
smallest fraction is investing enough concentration and energy in tough competition
preparations.182 Moreover, even those children and youngsters who engage in sparring
training and excel in competitions, thus printing their names in the medal ranks of youth
tournaments, are usually not the same who would excel in this sport as seniors.183 The
reason for this odd finding remains yet to be discovered; but it is such a common
knowledge in TKD that people are regularly questioning the DTU’s engagement in
youth training and competitions.

And finally, an observation shared by many German TKD pioneers with decades of
experience is that the social structure of the people engaging in TKD fundamentally

182
Unfortunately, there is no statistical data available backing this statement. But this is the unanimous
impression of experienced TKD instructors regularly visiting one of the internet discussion boards relevant
for TKD in Germany. Moreover, this seems to be a more universal observation which is also reported by
instructors outside of Germany.
183
Comparisons of the medal rank lists of youth tournaments with the medal rank lists of senior’s
tournaments a few years later show no significant name matches; cf. the Taekwondo Data website,
www.taekwondodata.com; accessed on 17 December 2009.

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changed since the 1970s.184 Back then, decades before the emergence of UFC and K-1
matches and shortly before the invention of Kickboxing, TKD was regarded as a kind of
athletically enhanced Karate, allowing opponents exchanging full-contact kicks and
blows, including spectacular flying and twisting kicks widely admired in Bruce Lee
movies. This image attracted athletic young adults seekig and flourishing in adventurous
challenges, while it disgusted caring parents looking for nonhazardous physical activities
for their children. Unique individuals such as the first three German World Champions,
Rainer Müller, Dirk Jung and Michael Arndt, together with other TKD athletes who
competed on equal levels with them during the late 1970s and early 1980s, would not
find their way any more into a WTF TKD gym today.185 There are no Top Circles any
longer in Germany.

Since the early 1970s, WTF TKD competitions changed dramatically. Before 1986,
head protectors were not in use. And until the early 1980s, weaker body protectors
resulted in more usage of punches and in a more attacking sparring style than today,
which is dominated by two opponents mainly observing each other and waiting for an
opportunity to counterattack. Today’s WTF sparring style might be much safer and
equally challenging for the athletes, but all experts agree that in the past, TKD matches
looked more dynamic, more spectacular, more unique. Therefore, the change in the
social structure of TKD practitioners would just reflect the changes in athletic TKD. And
to become an official Olympic event, TKD had to become more family-friendly than in
the old days of the Bruce Lee movies, dominated by violence, vengeance and vendettas.

184
The following is the summary of statements and stories from the interviews of German TKD pioneers
Gert Gatzweiler (2006, 2009), Norbert Wolfer (2007), Dorothea Kapkowski (2009), Gilbert Kapkowski
(2009), Dieter Jebramcik (2009), Hans-Jürgen Sobota (2008), Michael Arndt (2009).
185
This is a special analysis of Michael Arndt, WTF heavyweight World Champion of 1987 (interview
Arndt, 6 August 2009).

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 The TKD athletes of the 1970s and early 1980s were not only ready to invest their
time and physical energy into their hobby; they also invested their money. Before TKD
became an Olympic event, the DTU did not receive much financial support for their
teams, so large amounts paid the athletes by themselves, especially all the costs for the
Top Circle project. Since Seoul 1988, and much more since Paris 1994, huge amounts of
money were put into WTF TKD in Germany to ensure Olympic medals, and therefore,
to enhance national prestige. Clearly this money was invested in sports structures for
elite TKD, as it was supposed to, and just a margin in recreational TKD.

Between 1994 and 2000, professional sports structures for TKD were established,
including Olympic Bases, National Performance Centers, and Elite Schools of Sports.
Also, two positions for TKD athletes were established at the German military sports unit
in Sonthofen in the 1990s, where athletes can devote nearly all their time for training
and competitions by getting full salary.

For some reasons, the available money ready for investments in elite TKD never was
enough186. Therefore, although the DTU was continuously supported by governmental
facilities, the DTU and its regiolan branches could not help but enhance the annual fees
for clubs and members several times during the 1990s. Oddly, most of this money was to
support elite TKD, not recreational TKD, which was not easy to be communicated to
ordinary DTU members. Clearly, this led to raising debates about the direction the DTU
should navigate at – more elite TKD for the price of less support for recreational TKD,
of vice versa?

186
It could be guessed that some sorts of self-service happened, which is not uncommon in sports; see
Simson & Jennings, 1992; Jennings, 1996; 2000; 2006. However, as there is no evidence in this direction,
such allegations would not be raised here. Yet Jebramcik (interview 2009) made some remarks which could
lead into this direction.

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 In the end, this seems to be the core conflict within German TKD. The DTU tries to
define TKD as a sport, similar to Judo, and, consequently, swimming and track and field.
But in the public attention in Germany, TKD is still a martial art, similar to Karate, with
the emphasis on the art. This conflict is still not solved.

2.3. Internal Power Struggles in the DTU

After the Marx era had ended, North Rhine-Westphalian and Bavarian TKD
authorities were in an unusual state of cooperation at first. According to the NWTU
president of the 1980s and 1990s, Dieter Jebramcik, there was a plot against the election
of Marx’s protégé, Stefan Klawiter, to be the next DTU president (interview Jebramcik,
2006). Klawiter had been BTU president since 1983, and as Heinz Marx’s right hand,
together they had ruled the German DTU and the European ETU. But Jebramcik joined
forces with the Bavarian secretary-general of the DTU, Hans Siegel; days before the
election, they organized the votes in their direction, and on election day, Siegel got DTU
president and Jebramcik DTU secretary-general.187

Two years later, in 1991, Jebramcik led the DTU team at the World Championships in
Athens, Greece, together with NWTU comrade and DTU secretary for international
188
affairs, Edwin Ferger. During the tournament, they successively witnessed
disadvantageous treatment of their team, but their in-game protest was not accepted. As
a sign of protest, they led the team moving out of the tournament during the final
celebration, a move that was inofficially approved by other nation’s coaches and team

187
According to an interview wich D. Jebramcik in 2006; supporting this was Knoll, 1994: 100.
188
Coincidentally, the two coaches of the male’s team, Helmut Gärtner, and the women’s team, Josef
Wagner, were from North Rhine-Westphalia as well. Thus, there was the unique situation that all responsible
persons at an international tournament came from the NWTU.

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managers. But six weeks thereafter, Ferger and Jebramcik got punished by the WTF’s
sanction committee. They were forbidden to visit WTF events for the next two years.189

This was the first open disagreement between the DTU and the WTF, and it was
regarded as a failure of the delegates from the NWTU. One year thereafter, Jebramcik
stepped back as secretary-general, and Siegel ordered early re-elections of the whole
DTU directors later the same year, which originally had been scheduled for 1993. Under
the impression of the events in and after Athens, the actual BTU president, Stefan
Klawiter, got elected as DTU president, and the old order was reset gain, i.e. Bavaria
was again in charge of German TKD.

However, as the most successful athletes still came from the NWTU, NWTU
president Jebramcik still tried to get a grip on German TKD. In 1998, most TKD clubs
had enough of Klawiter and demanded early reelections. Again, Jebramcik joined forces
with a Bavarian, this time Walter Schwarz, BTU president since 1995. They were
successful, and Schwarz got DTU president, while Jebramcik was again secretary-
general. And again, this relation did not last long. Schwarz and Jebramcik, the two
presidents of the main German TKD branches, quickly confronted each other. Their
relationship broke apart just nine months after election, when the directors ordered
reelections again in 1999. This time, Jebramcik joined forces with the president of the
TKD Union of Baden-Württemberg, Harry Weber. But Schwarz beat them, and
continued as the sole ruler of both Bavarian and German TKD for the next three years.

However, there had been some legal constraints with these elections, and the
following years, Jebramcik initiated a legal battle, trying to force Schwarz out of office;

189
According to the report of these events by Dieter Jebramcik (interview Jebramcik, 2006), they got
punished for something which was even not their own idea. The idea for the protest was the athlete’s, and
the decision was reached by the athlete’s votes. But the two officials had been the persons in charge. Thus,
officially, they were seen as the bad guys, while they just had tried to support the athlete’s wishes.

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yet unsuccessfully. But that battle had consumed much of the precious resources of
German TKD. Finally, in 2002, Schwarz surprisingly stepped back, referring to his weak
condition. In 2008, he suddenly passed away. One year later, his old nemesis Jebramcik,
also suffering from bad condition, followed him.

What had been the basis for the enmity between the BTU and the NWTU leaders? For
some reasons, NWTU was something like the bad guy in the DTU. Many NWTU TKD
schools and clubs, for example, refused to follow the latest WTF developments: they
featured hyong instead of poomsae, semi-contact instead of full-contact competition
style, and old-style Korean commands and (sometimes) cloths instead of the latest
fashion from Korea. Furthermore, many TKD clubs still remained in contact to their
original TKD grandmaster who often was running a TKD school in NRW which was not
affiliated to the DTU. Therefore, it often happened that TKD practitioners preferred
getting their dan degrees from their old grandmasters (who had direct contact to the ITF
or the WTF, respectively) instead of taking the formally correct DTU way. In a further
step, that led to more money (and influence) for independent Korean TKD masters, and
less fees and influence for the DTU in NRW.

While the DTU disregarded this situation, the NWTU recognized that they couldn’t
change it, so they made efforts to appease the renegades, an appease which went
contrary to the WTF’s way, like featuring hyong and semi-contact sparring style. But the
DTU’s leaders, mostly from southern Germany and straight WTF friends, tried to
repress NWTU’s influence, especially of the NWTU president, Dieter Jebramcik.

Another price was the huge loss of international credibility and influence, which made
the DTU a prey for WTF’s powerful demands, as was shown above.

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 VI. Conclusion & Recommendation

1. Conclusion

First, the study of the socio-cultural situation for European combat sports and East
Asian martial arts in Germany revealed that TKD has endured a radical image change
during the past four decades. Originally introduced to Germany as a tough martial
exercise featuring the most spectacular fighting moves, including jumping-twisting kicks
and stone-breaking knife-hand strikes (and actually being used in physical
confrontations in secret-service missions during the late 1960s and for guarding
purposes against North Korean threads in the early 1980s), TKD attracted particular
fighting talents until the early 1980s. After TKD became a family-friendly Olympic
event with obligatory head protectors in order to minimize health risks at competitions,
more females entered the sport, and the ratio of children grew dramatically, from about
40% at the early 1980s to about 70% in 2008. In Germany of today, Olympic TKD is
regarded a rather beneficial method of physical exercise suitable for the whole family
than a potentially dangerous combat sport similar to boxing. Therefore, it is concluded
that the image change of TKD from the 1970s to the 1990s resulted in a significant shift
from more competitive to less competitive participants engaging in TKD, which could
help explaining the decline of German TKD competitiveness during the mid-1980s.
However, further socio-cultural as well as psychological data should be gained on this
subject to confirm the hypothesis, or to refute it.

Second, the study of the formative years of TKD in Germany revealed that the roots
for the peculiar development of TKD in Germany were seeded at the very beginning. In
Southern Germany, TKD was introduced by American GIs and continuously controlled
by German martial arts school and club owners who hired famous Korean instructors.
These Germans had been the moving forces behind regulating TKD administrations. In

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North-Western Germany, on the other hand, TKD was brought along as an extra of
Koreans who happened to stay in Germany, and who were primarily interested in
making a living with their art. They established direct connections to international TKD
organizations bypassing controlling German administrations, while in Southern
Germany, Germans opened several formal organizations built up by public TKD clubs
run by Germans to establish similar international connections. With a sense for the
politically feasible, they were quick in switching to another connection if this promised
to be more useful, while most of the Korean TKD masters in Germany were increasingly
reluctant against ongoing reforms by the new TKD rulers in Korea and started to value
their traditional connections.

Third, the study of the circumstances of the rise and decline of Germany’s TKD
successes in the 1970s and 1980s showed that amongst others, two factors being a
prerequisite for international high-level athletic competitiveness of any kind had been
fulfilled in German TKD at first: state-of-the-art training conditions and instructors, and
a stable, task-oriented administration taking care of these conditions on athlete’s behalf.
Moreover, the study also showed that the more these factors got corrupted, the more
apparent became the decline of German TKD. However, the available data did not
unanimously support the elevation of this coincidence into a causal relation. Only future
research could clarify this case.

Fourth, the analysis of the situation of German TKD after the German reunification
showed the widening gap between TKD as elite sports and TKD as recreational activity,
whereas the main German TKD administration, the Deutsche Taekwondo Union (DTU),
lays the clear focus on high-level athletic competitions. The concept of TKD for all, or
TKD as mass sports, is only marginally supported. This DTU strategy is contradictory to
the general tendency of the German people to assess TKD mainly as a recreational
activity, as was shown before. The clear majority of people interested in TKD in

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Germany are not looking for a stone-breaking combat sport rewarding aggressive
fighting skills, as it might have been 20 or 30 years ago (cf. Goldner 1992). These days,
they most probably look for other qualities, such as fitness, fun, artistic moves, aesthetic
forms, self-defense, wood-breaking strikes and kicks, and at best risk-free, i.e. light- or
even zero-contact sparring.

2. Recommendation

This leads to the first recommendation for the further transition of TKD in Germany.
The leading TKD administrations, most of all, the DTU, should emphasize more the role
of TKD as a recreational tool, especially for silver sports, and as a joyful leisure time
activity, especially for the many participating children and the youth. This would mean
more financial engagement in TKD for the masses and less focus on TKD as elite sports,
which should result in lesser annual fees for ordinary members, or at least less frequent
hikes. It could also be used for events with an educational purpose for ordinary members,
such as special Taekkyon courses to teach German TKD enthusiasts the difference
between the two Korean martial arts, or enhanced website appearances revealing the
revisionist history of TKD and the true purposes behind its concealment. Surely this
would result in an increase in the number of members, first of all because many of the
latest separatist TKD organizations would lose their ground. And a rise in members
would also be beneficial for the elite sports section.

The German TKD administrations cannot change the situation of highly specialized
TKD athletes training on professional levels in other countries which have surpassed
Germany on the international medal ranks. Also, times are changing, and TKD in
Germany is not attracting the outstanding fighting talents as during the Bruce Lee-boom
of the 1970s any longer. But it could reasonably be expected that during the coming few

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decades, TKD will undergo further developments on the global scale, and one of them
might be the merger of the main international TKD governing bodies, since sports-
political constraints are no longer prohibiting such possibilities.

That would enable the integration of all forms and sparring styles of TKD into one
administration, similar to the integration of different fighting styles in wrestling and
fencing. From a pure athletic viewpoint, there is no reason why the different TKD styles
should remain separated. The main obstacle against a merger seem to be power games
between the world TKD bodies acting as lobby groups in the interest of their directors.
Thus, it could be predicted that from that very moment on when such power political
restraints fall apart, hyong and poomsae, and semi- and full-contact sparring styles
quickly get reunited.

Therefore, the second recommendation for German TKD would be that its
administrations ought to show greater willingness for mutual cooperation, to get an
advantageous edge in case of a future merger of WTF and ITF TKD. Both the DTU and
the ITF-D could remember their history of proud independence towards the international
governing TKD bodies – rejection of Choi Hong-hi’s offers in the 1970s and partly
successful trial to beat Kim Un-yong’s power grip on European TKD in the 1970s and
80s – and start working together more closely, instead of trying to ignore each other. It
would be nothing than advantageous for the greater benefit of TKD in Germany, and
probably a signal world-wide.

It would also be beneficial from the perspective of the athletes. Many fighting talents
competing for one of the administration’s competition teams could be interested in
getting closer experience with the “wrong” fighting style. It could turn out that some
would do better with the one style they currently never experienced deeply. And that
would clearly lead to better competition results.

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 Finally, this would also have a beneficial effect on new member recruitment. A
reunified TKD featuring a variety of forms and sparring styles would much better fit to
people’s expectations about East Asian martial arts in Germany. The most apparent
disadvantage for such a move would be the probable lacking of qualified hyong or zero-
and semi-contact sparring expertise in many DTU TKD clubs, similar, in some respects,
to the lacking of TKD in former East Germany at all. But the DTU already proofed that
they can handle such a situation, so, why don’t give it a try a second time?

- 181 -
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 Interviews

Appendix Table: Interviews and other Interrogations, 2006~2009

(in alphabetical order)

Interviewee Description Date (Location)

Arndt, Germany’s third WTF World Champion of 1987 (heavyweight), later 6 August 2009
Michael in charge of adidas’ engagement in TKD in Germany (Nuremberg)

Bolz, long-time official photographer for Taekwondo Aktuell and the DTU, 6 August 2009
Peter responsible for media affairs in the DTU in 1993 and since 2003; (Munich)

owner and operator of the TKD information website Taekwondo

Data190

Ferger, former DTU and NWTU official, an expert in Korean-German 21 August 2008
Edwin relations (Cologne)

Gatzweiler, German TKD pioneer since 1964 and famous DTU club coach, one 10 August 2006,
Gerd of the first two official German TKD dan grade holders 22 January 2009
(both in Essen)

Gil, Bavaria-based TKD pioneer since 1967; long-time official 6 August 2009
Konstantin Taekwondo Aktuell correspondent and critical observer of German (Munich)
TKD

Hunkel, 26 July 2006

Hans- (E-Mail)
Ferdinand

Jebramcik, Long-time president of NWTU (1984~2002); former secetary- 19 February 2007,

Dieter general of DTU (1989~1992, 1998~1999); 22 January 2009
passed away in 2009 (both in
Dortmund)

Dr. Jung, Germany’s second WTF World Champion of 1982 (heavyweight); 31 July 2007
Dirk successor of Park Soo-nam as national head coach (1985~1988) (Berlin)

190
See www.taekwondodata.com, accessed on 10 December 2009.

- 192 -
Kapkowski, Most succesful female German TKD competitor of the 1970s and 20 January 2009
Dorothea 1980s, three-time European Champion191 (Iserlohn)

Kapkowski, former successful DTU club coach, later DTU dissident and 20 January 2009
Gilbert outstanding critic, currently president of an alternative German TKD (Iserlohn)
192
association

Maier, chief editor of the Taekwondo Aktuell (since the 1990s) Summer 2006
Sibylle (Stuttgart)

Mönig, Former Bavarian TKD athlete of the 1980s; Summer 2007

Udo Professor for TKD at Youngsan University (Busan)
(since 2004)

Park, Most successful German national head coach of the 1970s and 1980s Summer 2007
Soo-nam (1976~1985; 1988); (telephone

owner of the Taekwondo Aktuell (since 1993); communication)

DTU vice president (since 2009)

Streif, Germany’s national head coach (1992~2006) 1 May 2006

Georg (E-Mail)

Rubbeling, former DTU athlete; switched discipline to become Germany’s 27 February 2008
Hendrik leading Taekkyon expert (Schwerte)

Sobota, former student of G. Kapkowski; gifted instructor, now eloquent and 27 February 2008
Hans-Jürgen careful DTU dissident (since 1995) and critic (Schwerte)

Weiler, long-time president of the ITF-D (1989~2007) 24 February 2007

Paul (Cologne)

Wiedmeier, Absolute German TKD pioneer (he started in 1961); established 02 August 2009
Carl contact to Choi Hong-hi; hired Kwon Jae-hwa and Kim Kwang-il (E-Mail)

Wolfer, long-time NWTU official and reknown TKD chronologist; 15 February 2007
Norbert passed away in 2008 (Altena)

191
She also won the gold medal at the WTF World Tournament 1983 in Kopenhagen, the inofficial female’s
World Championships before 1987; see www.taekwondodata.com, accessed on 10 december 2009.
192
This association is the European Taekwondo Federation (ETF); see www.etf.de.com, accessd on 10
December 2009.

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[국문요약]

태권도의 독일 유입과 변천

(1960년부터 2000년까지)

쿠클린스키-리 토마스

한국체육대학교 대학원

체육학과

독일 태권도의 경기스포츠로서의 위상은 1988년 서울 올림픽을 앞두고 극

적으로 변모하였다. 국제태권도시합에서 획득한 메달 집계를 볼 때, 1980년대
초 독일은 종주국인 한국에 바로 뒤이어 2 위의 위상에 있었다. 이에 반해,
1990년대 이후로는 국제랭킹에서 부수적인 역할에 그치고 있다. 독일이 태권
도에 있어서 위상을 상실하고 다시 되찾지 못하고 있는 데에는 어떤 요인에
기인하는 것인가?

본 연구로부터 다음과 같은 네 개의 결론과 이에 따르는 두 개의 제안에

도달하였다.

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 첫째, 타 격투스포츠와의 사회-문화적 비교연구를 통하여, 독일에서 태권도
는 그 이미지에 있어서 근본적인 변화가 있었다는 것이 밝혀졌다. 태권도는
1970년대의 극도로 격렬하고 현란한 격투술이란 인식에서 출발하여, 30년이
지난 2000년대에는 회원의 70%가 미성년자로 이루어진 가족친화적인 올림픽
경기종목이라는 이미지에로의 인식의 전환을 이루어내었다. 과거의 이미지보
다는 오늘날의 이미지가 더 많은 스포츠인들을 태권도로 유인하는 것으로 보
여지는데, 이는 80년대 이래 독일 태권도의 경기력약화현상을 부분적으로 설
명해 주기도 한다.

둘째, 독일 초창기 태권도의 연구를 통해 두 개의 상이한 역사적 근원에

도달하였다: 남부독일 주둔의 미합중국의 군인과 노르트라인-베스트팔렌주의
한국인 광부가 그들이다. 이들의 상이한 삶의 조건과 상이한 동기의식으로부
터 독일 태권도의 두 개의 상이한 태권도 전통이 형성되어갔으며, 이는 현재
까지도 그 영향을 미치고 있다.

셋째, 1980년대 경기스포츠 분야에서의 태권도의 성과에 관한 연구 결과,

경기성과의 저하는 외적인 요인(다른 나라의 태권도경기력의 전문화) 외에도
내적인 요인(DTU 지도부의 부실운영)이 있었음을 보여 주었으며, 이 현상은
1990년대를 통해 더욱 심화되어 경기스포츠 차원에서의 명백한 실패로 그 결
과가 드러나게 되었다. 이에 반해 ITF-D는 두 가지 요인 모두에서 해결책을
획득하였고, 이후로는 경기스포츠 분야에서 뛰어난 성과를 나타내었다.

넷째, 최근 동향을 분석한 결과 DTU는 태권도를 전문경기스포츠의 측면에

치중하여 지원하고 있으며 이에 따라 일반인을 대상으로 하는 저변이 넓은
대중스포츠로서의 측면을 상대적으로 소홀히 하고 있는 것으로 판명되었다.
이는 독일 태권도선수들의 취약한 경기성과와도 부합되지 않으며, 또한 태권
도는 대중스포츠라는 독일사회에 뿌리내린 사회-문화적 인식에도 부응하고
있지 못하고 있는 실상이다.

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 이로부터 독일 태권도를 위한 첫 번째 제안이 나온다: 독일에서 태권도는
건강증진활동 및 여가활동으로서의 가치를 더욱더 뚜렷하게 부각시켜야 할
것이다. 이렇게 한다면 태권도로 분명히 더 많은 신규 회원들의 유입이 일어
날 것이며 이는 결과적으로 경기스포츠적인 차원에서도 강화를 가져올 것이
다.

두 번째 제안은 세계태권도연맹 (WTF: World Taekwondo Federation)과 국제태

권도연맹(ITF: International Taekwondo Federation)이 장차에는 펜싱과 레슬링이
그러하였던 것처럼 서로서로 접근하여 서로 상이한 스타일을 하나의 스포츠
로 통합할 수도 있다는 가정을 전제로 제시해 보는 것이다: 독일의 태권도
단체들은 서로를 견원시하는 대신, 상호 협조적으로 교환하고 공동작업을 강
화해 나감으로써 유익함을 창출해 나갈 수 있을 것이다.

주요어 : 태권도, 독일태권도, 독일체육사, 세계태권도연맹

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