Page |1
ISLAND OF LAS PALMAS (US v. NETHERLANDS)
Citation. Perm. Ct. of Arbitration, 2 U.N. Rep. Intl Arb.
Awards 829 (1928).
Brief Fact Summary. Both the United States (P) laid
claim to the ownership of the Island of Palmas. While
the U.S. (P) maintained that it was part of the
Philippines, the Netherlands (D) claimed it as their own.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A title that is inchoate cannot
prevail over a definite title found on the continuous and
peaceful display of sovereignty.
FACTS. Both the United States (P) laid claim to the
ownership of the Island of Palmas. While the U.S. (P)
maintained that it was part of the Philippines, the
Netherlands (D) claimed it as their own. The claim of the
U.S. (P) was back up with the fact that the islands had
been ceded by Spain by the Treaty of Paris in 1898, and
as successor to the rights of Spain over the Philippines,
it based its claim of title in the first place on discovery.
On the part of the Netherlands (D), they claimed to
have possessed and exercised rights of sovereignty over
the island from 1677 or earlier to the present.
ISSUE. Can a title which is inchoate prevail over a
definite title found on the continuous and peaceful
display of sovereignty?
HELD. (Huber, Arb.). No. A title that is inchoate cannot
prevail over a definite title found on the continuous and
peaceful display of sovereignty. The peaceful and
continuous display of territorial sovereignty is as good
as title. However, discovery alone without subsequent
act cannot suffice to prove sovereignty over the island.
The territorial sovereignty of the Netherlands (D) was
not contested by anyone from 1700 to 1906. The title of
discovery at best an inchoate title does not therefore
prevail over the Netherlands (D) claims of sovereignty.
DISCUSSION. Evidence of contracts made by the East
India Company and the Netherlands (D) was examined
by the arbitrator. The claims made by the Netherlands
(D) were also based on the premise of the convention it
had with the princes and native chieftains of the islands.
Hence, at the time of the Treaty of Paris in 1898, Spain
was found not to have dominion over the island.
y 4,700 private U.S. claims, ordered payment by Iran (D)
to U.S. nationals amounting to over $2.5 billion.
---------------------------XXX------------------------------
EASTERN GREENLAND (NORWAY V. DENMARK)
Citation. Court of Intl Justice, 1993 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
53 at 71
Brief Fact Summary. The statement made by the
Norwegian Minister was claimed to be binding on his
country by Denmark (P).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A country is bound by the
reply given on its behalf by its Minister of Foreign
Affairs.
FACTS. The agreement not to obstruct Danish (P) plans
with regard to Greenland was what Denmark wanted to
obtain from Norway (D). To this request, a declaration
on behalf of the Norwegian government (D) was made
by its Minister for Foreign Affairs that Norway (D) would
not make any difficulty in the settlement of the
question.
ISSUE. Is a country bound by the reply given on its
behalf by its Minister of Foreign Affairs?
HELD. Yes. A country is bound by the reply given on its
behalf by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. Therefore in this
case, the response by the diplomatic representative of a
foreign power is binding upon the country the Minister
represents.
DISCUSSION. The main source of international law on
treaties is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
The Convention was ratified by 35 countries but not by
the United States. Unilateral statements may also be
binding on states.

-----------------------XXX------------------------
S.S. LOTUS CASE (FRANCE V. TURKEY)
Citation. Permanent Court of Intl Justice, P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 10 (1927)
Brief Fact Summary. Turkeys (D) assertion of
jurisdiction over a French citizen who had been the first
officer of a ship that collided with a Turkish ship on the
high seas was challenged by France (P) as a violation of
international law.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A rule of international law,
which prohibits a state from exercising criminal
jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts
outside of the states national jurisdiction, does not
exist.
FACTS. A collision occurred shortly before midnight on
the 2nd of August 1926 between the French (P) mail
steamer Lotus and the Turkish (D) collier Boz-Kourt. The
French mail steamer was captained by a French citizen
by the name Demons while the Turkish collier Boz-Kourt
was captained by Hassan Bey. The Turks lost eight men
after their ship cut into two and sank as a result of the
collision.
Although the Lotus did all it could do within its power to
help the ship wrecked persons, it continued on its
course to Constantinople, where it arrived on August 3.
On the 5th of August, Lieutenant Demons was asked by
the Turkish (D) authority to go ashore to give evidence.
After Demons was examined, he was placed under
arrest without informing the French (P) Consul-General
and Hassan Bey. Demons were convicted by the Turkish
(D) courts for negligence conduct in allowing the
accident to occur.
This basis was contended by Demons on the ground
that the court lacked jurisdiction over him. With this,
both countries agreed to submit to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, the question of whether
the exercise of Turkish (D) criminal jurisdiction over
Demons for an incident that occurred on the high seas
contravened international law.
Page |2
ISSUE. Does a rule of international law which prohibits a
state from exercising criminal jurisdiction over a foreign
national who commits acts outside of the states
national jurisdiction exist?
HELD. (Per curiam) No. A rule of international law, which
prohibits a state from exercising criminal jurisdiction
over a foreign national who commits acts outside of the
states national jurisdiction, does not exist. Failing the
existence of a permissive rule to the contrary is the first
and foremost restriction imposed by international law
on a state and it may not exercise its power in any form
in the territory of another state.
This does not imply that international law prohibits a
state from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in
respect of any case that relates to acts that have taken
place abroad which it cannot rely on some permissive
rule of international law. In this situation, it is impossible
to hold that there is a rule of international law that
prohibits Turkey (D) from prosecuting Demons because
he was aboard a French ship. This stems from the fact
that the effects of the alleged offense occurred on a
Turkish vessel.
Hence, both states here may exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over this matter because there is no rule of
international law in regards to collision cases to the
effect that criminal proceedings are exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the state whose flag is flown.
DISCUSSION. In 1975, France enacted a law regarding
its criminal jurisdiction over aliens because of this the
situation surrounding this case. The law stipulates that
aliens who commit a crime outside the territory of the
Republic may be prosecuted and judged pursuant to
French law, when the victim is of French nationality. This
is contained in 102 Journal Du Droit International 962
(Clunet 1975). Several eminent scholars have criticized
the holding in this case for seeming to imply that
international law permits all that it does not forbid.
------------------------------XXX-------------------------------
ERITREA-YEMEN ARBITRATION
Brief Summary. The Hanish Islands conflict,[a] was a
dispute between Yemen and Eritrea over the island of

Greater Hanish in the Red Sea, one of the largest in the
then disputed Zukur-Hanish archipelago. Fighting took
place over three days from 15 December to 17
December 1995. In 1998 the Permanent Court of
Arbitration determined that most of the archipelago
belonged to Yemen.
FACTS. The archipelago is on the southern side of the
Red Sea near Bab-el-Mandeb (Mouth of the Red Sea).
The Red Sea is about 60 miles (100 km) wide at this
point. Since the British occupation of Aden, the islands
had generally been regarded as part of Yemen.
After being granted independence and membership of
the United Nations, the new Eritrean government
started negotiations with Yemen over the status of the
archipelago. Two rounds of talks had taken place before
the invasion:
Gutmann [French mediator] produced an Agreement on
Principles, which Eritrea and Yemen signed on 21 May.
The two sides agreed to resort to arbitration, to refrain
from using force and to abide by the verdict of an
arbitration tribunal. The French mediation effort almost
collapsed when on 10 August, Eritrean forces occupied
Hanish al-Saghir. With Yemen threatening to take
military action, the UN Security Council ordered Eritrean
troops off the island. Asmara withdrew its forces on 27
August. The renewed threat of conflict prompted
Eritrea, at the end of August, to begin deploying along
its coastline Russian-made SAM missiles acquired from
Ethiopia.
Lefebvre.[4]
On 22 November 1995, Yemen's Foreign Minister Adb
al-Karim al-Iryani met in San'a' with three Eritrean
officials to discuss the problem. Iryani, heading a Yemeni
delegation, then attended a meeting in Eritrea on 7
December. There, both sides agreed to resolve their
dispute over maritime borders through negotiations,
which they scheduled for February 1996. If those
negotiations failed, both sides agreed to take the case to
the ICJ at The Hague.
Page |3
Lefebvre.[5]
Greater Hanish (or Hanish al-Kabir) is one of three main
islands in an archipelago, and until 1995, it was
inhabited only by a handful of Yemeni fishermen. In
1995, a German company, under Yemeni auspices,
began building a hotel and scuba diving centre on the
Island. The Yemenis then sent a force of 200 men to
guard the construction site. Eritrean officials thought
that the construction work on Greater Hanish was an
attempt to establish facts on the ground before the
negotiations scheduled for February started. "Prompted
by concern over the Yemeni construction project on
Hanish al-Kabir, Eritrea's Foreign Minister Petros
Solomon delivered, on 11 November 1995, an
ultimatum giving San'a one month to withdraw Yemeni
military forces and civilians from Hanish al-Kabir".
ARMED CONFLICT. When the Eritrean ultimatum ran
out and the Yemeni military forces and civilians had not
withdrawn, Eritrea launched an operation to take the
island by force. The Eritreans used all seaworthy vessels
that they had to land ground forces on the islands.
Some Eritrean troops landed in fishing vessels and a
commandeered Egyptian ferry. The Eritreans also used
aircraft to ferry troops to the island. Eritrean forces
attacked the Yemeni contingent and overran the entire
island within three days of combat.
During the fighting, a Russian merchant ship was
damaged by Eritrean gunfire after it was mistaken for a
Yemeni naval vessel.
ALLEGED FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT AND OTHER
MOTIVES FOR THE ATTACK. The Eritrean attack on the
Hanish islands was said by Yemenis to be supported by
Israel.[8] According to Yemeni sources, the Eritrean
operation may have been directed by Israeli officers.[9]
Sources close to the office of Yemeni President Ali
Abdullah Saleh claimed that "several Israelis" had
directed the operation, including a lieutenant-colonel
named as Michael Duma. This claim was based on
several coded messages in Hebrew allegedly intercepted
by Yemeni intelligence.[7] Despite this, Yemen made no
formal complaint to Israel.[10]

According to Steven Carol, in light of Yemeni military
humiliation in the battle for Great Hanish island, the
proposed allegation of Israeli involvement may have
been nothing more than an attempt of Yemen to "save
some face".[10]
In 1996, Brian Whitaker (1996) and Carol (2012) suggest
that apart from the overt casus belli (that the war was
initiated to establish facts on the ground), three other
reasons had been proposed for the attack by the
Eritreans on the island. The Yemeni opposition sources
claimed that during 1994, Yemen received clandestine
military assistance from Israel via the Eritreans, and the
Eritreans took Hanish when Yemen failed to deliver the
promised payments. Yemen's military claim, that it had
intercepted radio messages in Hebrew and that "several
Israelis" had helped to direct the Eritrean operation, led
the Arab League to suggest that the real motive for the
attack was that Israel intended to set up a base on the
island. The third reason put forward was that there may
be oil in the Red Sea and that the territorial rights to the
seabed were the underlying reason for the war.
ARBITRATION. As no resolution to the problem could be
reached in bilateral talks, the status of the archipelago
was placed in front of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in The Hague in the Netherlands.[11] The
Permanent Court of Arbitration determined that most of
the archipelago belonged to Yemen, while Eritrea was to
retain the right to fish the waters around all the islands
and sovereignty over some small islands close to Eritrea.
[1][10]
The islands, islet, rocks, and low-tide elevations of the
Zuqar-Hanish group, including, but not limited to, Three
Foot Rock, Parkin Rock, Rocky Islets, Pin Rock, Suyul
Hanish, Mid Islet, Double Peak Island, Round Island,
North Round Island, Quoin Island (1343'N, 4248'E),
Chor Rock, Greater Hanish, Peaky Islet, Mushajirah,
Addar Ail Islets, Haycock Island (1347'N, 4247'E; not to
be confused with the Haycock Islands to the southwest
of Greater Hanish), Low Island (1352'N, 4249'E)
including the unnamed islets and rocks close north, east
and south, Lesser Hanish including the unnamed islets
and rocks close north east, Tongue Island and the
unnamed islet close south, Near Island and the
Page |4
unnamed islet close south east, Shark Island, Jabal
Zuquar Island, High Island, and the Abu Ali Islands
(including Quoin Island (1405'N, 4249'E) and Pile
Island) are subject to the territorial sovereignty of
Yemen;
CHAPTER XI Disposition.[12]
On 1 November 1998 "Yemeni Defence Minister
Mohammad Diefallah Mohammad raised his country's
flag over the island of Greater Hanish as Yemeni army
and navy troops took up positions on it. At the same
time, Eritrean troops departed on board a helicopter
and a naval vessel".
-------------------------XXX---------------------
PREAH VIHEAR TEMPLE CASE
Introduction. The Preah Vihear Temple more than being
a unique architectural masterpiece at the Thai-
Cambodian border is also a source of an endless dispute
between both countries. The issue concern the
sovereignty over the Temple and its surrounding area.
The International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ or the
Court) released a first judgment in 1962 and an
interpretation of this ruling in 2013. Nevertheless, some
questions and concerns have still remained
unanswered. A situation which could eventually lead to
future border incidents among both countries.
On 11 November 2013, the ICJ released its
interpretation on its 1962 ruling on the case of the
Preah Vihear Temple. As it did in 1962, the ICJ ruled in
favour of Cambodia: The Court therefore concludes
that the first operative paragraph of the 1962 Judgment
determined that Cambodia had sovereignty over the
whole territory of the promontory of Preah Vihear, []
and that, in consequence, the second operative
paragraph required Thailand to withdraw from that
territory the Thai military or police forces, or other
guards or keepers, that were stationed there.[1.
Request of Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June
1962 in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand), 2013 I.C.J. 36 (November 11).]
Historical Background the 1962 Judgment. The Preah
Vihear Temple is an ancient Hindu temple, situated in

the Dangrek Mountains at the border between the
Kingdom of Cambodia and the Kingdom of Thailand. The
Temple, built between the 9th and 11th century, is
dedicated to the Hindu deity Shiva and beholds great
cultural and religious value. It is also a famous tourist
attraction. For these reasons, the United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
(UNESCO) inscribed the Preah Vihear Temple on the
World Heritage List following a request from Cambodia
in 2008.
This sanctuary has been since the mid-twentieth
century a source of conflict precisely because of its
unique and controversial location between both
countries.
It all started in 1954 when Cambodian soldiers
encountered Thai military personnel stationed on the
Temple immediately after Cambodia regained its
independence from France. Cambodia protested and
notified Thai authorities that the Temple was on the
Cambodian territory but Thailand refused to withdraw
its troops. So Cambodia brought on the grounds of the
violation of its territorial sovereignty over the Preah
Vihear Temple and its vicinity the case before the
International Court of Justice in 1959. The mandate of
this judicial organ of the United Nations (UN) located in
The Hague, Netherlands is to settle on the grounds of
international law legal disputes submitted to it by a
state.
The Court after confirming its jurisdiction on the case in
a first judgment released on 26 May 1961, released a
judgement on the merits on 15 June 1962. It concluded
that [T]he Court, by nine votes to three, find that the
Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under the
sovereignty of Cambodia; finds in consequences, by
nine vote to three, that Thailand is under an obligation
to withdraw any military or police forces, or other
guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in
its vicinity on Cambodian territory.
The Heart of the Dispute. The core issue in this dispute
is the sovereignty over the region of the Preah Vihear
Temple. The origin of this controversy can be found in
Page |5
the Convention of 13 February 1904 and the Treaty of
23 March 1907 between France and Siam (what was
formerly known as Thailand) concerning the Return of
Battambang and Angkor to Cambodia. The Convention
of 1904 set up a first Franco-Siamese Mixed Commission
which was in charge to delimit the frontier. However a
further boundary settlement under the Treaty of 23
March 1907 brought various districts within Cambodia
which became the new frontier region.
In its article 4, the 23 March 1907 Treaty indicated that
a second Franco-Siamese Mixed Commission composed
of French and Siamese officers appointed by both
countries would be created. Its duty would be to
demarcate the shared border, especially needed for the
Dangrek sector which had not been done by the first
Mixed Commission.
Once the border was demarcated by this second Mixed
Commission, the Siamese government requested from
the French officers to first draw and then map the
border as the final stage of the delimitation process. The
resulting maps from these French officers, showing
Preah Vihear Temple on the Cambodian side, were
completed at the end of 1907 and communicated to
Siam in 1908. Though never officially accepted by the
first Franco-Siamese Mixed Commission and the
Siamese government, during decades these maps were
used by Siamese officials and were given wide publicity
by being communicated to the leading geographical
societies in important countries, and to other circles
regionally interested; to the Siamese legations
accredited to the British, German, Russian and United
States Governments.
In 1961 when the case was brought before the ICJ,
Thailand argued that those maps were not legally
binding because they had not been accepted by the first
French-Siamese Mixed Commission (which was
dissolved when maps were released) and also because
Thailand had never officially accepted them. Thailand
claimed that if it had done so, this was only because of a
mistaken belief that the frontier indicated [in the
maps] corresponded with the watershed line. Based on
Thailands passive attitude for years the Court
concluded of its tacit acceptance of the maps. The
judges affirmed that in public international law a
 Page |6

mistake is not admissible as an argument if the party ruling of the ICJ. The UN called for a permanent
that challenges it contributed to it by its own conduct or ceasefire and expressed its support for the Association
if that same party could have avoided the mistake. of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) to find a solution. As
the ASEAN was unable to mediate the conflict,
Cambodia ultimately decided to file a request at the ICJ
The Court in its 1962 judgment therefore concluded in for the interpretation of its 1962 ruling.
favour of Cambodia, taking into account the frontier
demarcated by the second French-Siamese Mixed
Commissions and the resulting maps produced by the The Judgment of 11 November 2013. On 11 November
French officers. It thus became unnecessary in the view 2013 more than 50 years after the first ICJ ruling, the
of the judges to consider whether the mapped border Court released its interpretation of the 1962 judgment.
did in fact correspond to the true watershed line or not.
The Court accepted jurisdiction because of the ongoing
disputes between Cambodia and Thailand on the
meaning and scope of the 1962 ruling.
The Request for Interpretation. In its 1962 decision the
Court failed to clearly identify the concept of vicinity or
surrounding area of the Temple. This lack of precision in
First of all, that a dispute did indeed exist over the
the term vicinity left the door open for tensions in the
territorial sovereignty on the area in which the Temple
surrounding area of the Temple.
was located, and that the Court was not engaged at that
time in delimiting the frontier. Maps were used by the
Court to settle the dispute about the sovereignty over
In 2008 Cambodia applied for the inscription of the
the region of the Temple in 1962 rather than
Preah Vihear Temple in the World heritage list drawn up
determining a boundary settlement.
by the UNESCO. But Thailand who first approved this
application then strongly contested it in the light of
nationalist feelings raising among the Thai opposition.
Secondly, the Court adds that the question was also to
know if both parties had adopted the maps, that is why
the Court had observed the behaviour of the parties
Once added to the World Heritage List, tensions
with regard to these maps and others practices,
increased and a number of armed incidents took place
including the tacit recognition of them by Siam officials.
within the disputed area. The outbreaks of violence
The Court in 1962 had considered that maps were
between Thai and Cambodian armies focused on the
accepted from both sides due to their passive attitude.
territorial sovereignty of the area surrounding the
This silent acceptance of the maps produced by the
Temple but not about the Temple itself as the ICJ had
treaty settlement in 1904 therefore lead the Court to
clearly already ruled on this matter. The crux of the
pronounce as a matter of treaty interpretation in favour
dispute was concerning the vicinity of the Temple as
of the line mapped at the beginning of the 20th century.
the 1962 ruling referred to it. Within this disputed zone
the surrounding area of the Temple of 4.6 square
kilometers, armed incidents at this Cambodian-Thai
Thirdly, the Court explains that the case concerned only
border between 2008 and 2011 caused the death of 20
the sovereignty in the region of the Temple of Preah
soldiers and 3 civilians on the Cambodian side, and 16
Vihear the vicinity and not on the whole disputed
soldiers and 2 civilians on the Thai side, as well as
border region.
numerous wounded civilians and soldiers.

The Court in 2013 affirmed its first ruling and

Under this situation, Cambodia formally complained on
[D]eclares, by way of interpretation, that the Judgment
February 2011 with a letter to the UN Security Council.
of 15 June 1962 decided that Cambodia had sovereignty
The letter claimed that the fighting violated the 1991
over the whole territory of the promontory of Preah
Paris Peace Agreement, the U.N charter, and the 1962

Vihear [] and that, in consequence, Thailand was
under an obligation to withdraw from that territory the
Thai military or police forces, or other guards or
keepers, that were stationed there.
The International Court of Justice here slightly clarified
the situation. The 2013 interpretation confirmed
Cambodias sovereignty over the Temple but also and
this is a new consideration defined the disputed area
and thus the expression vicinity of the Temple as the
whole territory of the promontory. The Court said that
back in 1962 it did not address the issue of sovereignty
of any other area beyond the limits of the promontory
of Preah Vihear.
As the Court has however not ultimately ruled on the
entire disputed area between Cambodia and Thailand,
questions arise as to see if both countries will finally
resolve the border issue over the rest of the disputed
area.
Implications for the Future. The 2013 decision clarified
the expression vicinity used in the 1962 judgment and
defined it as the whole the promontory in which the
Temple is situated. However the 4.6 square kilometers
disputed area is still contested because the promontory
is just a small part of it.
The Court did not pronounce on the border itself or
regarding the larger area, mostly because in
international public law and interstate border disputes,
judges estimated it not to be their prerogative and thus
leaving this delicate process to the concerned states.
International Courts are most of the time prone to
interpret an existing treaty in the light of the actual
situation because the treaty as to a boundary is an
interstate agreement which is generally dispositive for
the court. And this is what the ICJ has done here when
considering that both Thailand and Cambodia
consented to the treaties on the boundaries established
between 1904-1907 and that the maps drawn after
due to the passive attitude of the parties had entered
the treaties. The Court therefore interpreted them and
brought some clarifications on the current situation but
Page |7
not enough to solve the controversy related to the
whole disputed area.
Even if the ICJ 2013 interpretation is definitely a step
forward in resolving Cambodia and Thailands border
dispute, a legal vacuum over the remaining surrounding
area of the Preah Vihear Temple still exists. And while
Cambodia and Thailand have agreed to respect the
latest ICJ ruling urging their respective armed forces to
keep calm, the recent crisis in Thailand raised a few
questions over the temporary stability initiated by the
Court. Namely, a few days after the Thai military coup
on 22 May 2014, Thai forces erected a 130 meters long
fence within the disputed area. The situation at the
border will therefore continue to be an issue between
Cambodia and Thailand as long as there is not a new
and definitive consensus among both countries.
-----------------------XXX----------------------
FRONTIER DISPUTE CASE (BURKINA FASO/MALI)
Citation. I.C.J. 1986 I.C.J. 554.
Brief Fact Summary. A question pertaining to a border
dispute was tabled before the International Court of
Justice by Burkina Faso and Mali.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An obligation exists to respect
pre-existing international frontiers in the event of a
state succession.
FACTS. Burkina Faso (previously the Republic of Upper
Volta) and the Republic of Mali each obtained
independence in 1960 following decolonization. Later,
the Organization of African Unity, comprised of African
Heads of State, was formed. In 1964, the Organization of
African Unity met in Cairo, Egypt and issued a resolution
declaring that all member States of the Organization of
African Unity solemnlypledge themselves to respect
the frontiers existing on their achievement of national
independence. This resolution codified into law the
age-old international principle of uti possidetis. In 1975,
the Head of State of Mali made a statement indicating a
lack of respect for the existing boundaries between Mali
and Burkina Faso. Mali and Burkina Faso later submitted
to a Chamber of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
the question of the proper demarcation of boundary

lines between the two States. In considering the case,
the ICJ discussed the principle of uti possidetis.
ISSUE. Does an obligation exist to respect pre-existing
international frontiers in the event of a state
succession?
HELD. Yes. An obligation exists to respect pre-existing
international frontiers in the event of a state succession,
whether or not the rule is the rule is expressed in the
form of uti possidetis. The fact that the principle did not
exist when the states declared such independence in
1960 does not foreclose its present application.
Discussion. Yes. An obligation exists to respect pre-
existing international frontiers in the event of a state
succession, whether or not the rule is the rule is
expressed in the form of uti possidetis. The fact that the
principle did not exist when the states declared such
independence in 1960 does not foreclose its present
application.
-----------------------XXX------------------------
LIBYA VS. CHAD (SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE AOUZOU
STRIP)
FACTS. The Aouzou Strip is a barren piece of land
located on the border of Chad and Libya. Libya had
begun to stage troops on the strip in order to assist with
the defense of its citizens who lived in the area. Despite
the land having no strategic or functional value to Chad,
the government saw the Aouzou Strip as part of their
sovereign territory. Due to the inability of both
countries to internally establish a line of demarcation,
the case was referred to the International Court of
Justice for adjudication in 1990.
ISSUES. Each country has a differing basis from which it
is deriving its claims of the Aouzou Strip. Libyas claim is
on the basis of a coalescence of rights and titles of the
indigenous inhabitants, the Senoussi Order, the
Ottoman Empire, and through an agreement that its
government made with Italy. However, Chad has
argued that the border was established through the
Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness which
was concluded between France and Libya in 1955. From
Libyas perspective, there is not enough evidence to
show that a boundary was ever established and that
Page |8
they have adequately lay claim to the Aouzou Strip
through administrative control. Chads use of the Treaty
of Friendship and Good Neighborliness as basis of its
claim has also been challenged due to the treaty being
in effect for only 20 years (1955-1975).
DECISION. The International Court of Justice ruled that
the boundary between Chad and Libya is defined by the
Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness which
was concluded between France and Libya in 1955.
Conversely, this gives Chad territorial sovereignty over
the Aouzou Strip.
OPINIONS
Judge Ago concluded that 10 August 1955 was the
critical date in considering evidence of the dispute. This
was also the date that Libya concluded the Treaty of
Friendship and Good Neighborliness with France. He
acknowledges that by ratifying the treaty, the Libyan
government recognized the boundaries outlined within
as permanent.
Judge Abijola supported the courts decision on the
grounds uti possidetis as the borders claimed by Chad
had been determined following its establishment as an
independent state.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sette-Camara writes
that the territory in question was never considered to
be terra nullius (unclaimed in the eyes of international
law). He posits that the territory had belonged to the
Ottoman Empire who laxly exercised authority over
the indigenous groups living on the land. After the
Ottoman Empires collapse following World War 1,
territorial sovereignty was transferred to Italy. He
believes that the line of demarcation should be based
off the 1935 Laval-Mussolini Treaty completed by Italy
and France and not the Treaty of Friendship and Good
Neighborliness. He goes onto support Libyas claim of
sovereignty to the Aouzou Strip.
ANALYSIS. The decision of this case affirms that borders
which are established by international agreements

remain permanent even if the treaty expires or the
governments change. The only way to create a new
border is to ratify a new treaty in which all the states
affected acknowledge the adjustment. The key to the
Courts decision in this case was the establishment of the
critical date as being 10 August 1955. This then
dismisses the claim by Judge Sette-Camara that the
boundaries should be based off the 1935 Laval-
Mussolini Treaty. By establishing a critical date, the ICJ
set a benchmark for future litigation on this specific
matter. I agree with the Courts ruling as I see Libyas
ratifying of the Treaty of Friendship and Good
Neighborliness as implicit acknowledgement of the
boundaries stated within. Had Libya opted to revert
back to the old boundaries, there should have been a
treaty made in 1975 which acknowledges the prior
arrangement or new boundaries should have been
established immediately after Chad became a state.
--------------------------XXX--------------------------
THE ANGLO-NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE
Since 1911 British trawlers had been seized and
condemned for violating measures taken by the
Norwegian government specifying the limits within
which fishing was prohibited to foreigners. In 1935, a
decree was adopted establishing the lines of
delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone.
On 24th September 1949 the government of the United
Kingdom filed the registry of the international court of
justice an application instituting proceedings against
Norway. The subject of the proceeding was the validity,
under international law, of the lines of delimitation of
the Norwegian fisheries zone as set forth in a Decree of
12th July 1935.
The application referred to the declaration by which the
united Kingdom and Norway had accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in accordance with article 36 (2) of its statute.
The parties involved in this case were Norway and the
United Kingdom, of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
The implementation of the Royal Norwegian Decree of
the 1935 was met with resistance from the United
Page |9
Kingdom. The decree covers the drawing of straight
lines, called baselines 4 miles deep into the sea. This 4
miles area is reserved fishing exclusive for Norwegian
nationals. Under article 36(2) both UK and Norway were
willing to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ on this case
and with no appeal. The issues that constitute the case
were submitted to the court and the arguments
presented by both countries. The issues claims the court
to: declare the principles of international law applicable
in defining the baselines by reference to which
Norwegian government was entitled to delimit a
fisheries zone and exclusively reserved to its nationals;
and to define the said base lines in the light of the
arguments of the parties in order to avoid further legal
difference; and secondly to award damages to the
government of the United Kingdom in respect of all
interferences by the Norwegian authorities with British
fishing vessels outside the fisheries zone, which in
accordance with ICJ's decision, the Norwegian
government may be entitled to reserve for its nationals.
The United Kingdom argued that;
Norway could only draw straight lines across
bays
The length of lines drawn on the formations of
the Skaergaard fjord must not exceed 10
nautical miles( the 10 Mile rule)
That certain lines did not follow the general
direction of the coast or did not follow it
sufficiently , or they did not respect certain
connection of sea and land separating them
That the Norwegian system of delimitation was
unknown to the British and lack the notoriety to
provide the basis of historic title enforcement
upon opposable to by the United Kingdom
The Kingdom of Norway argued;
That the base lines had to be drawn in such a
way as to respect the general direction of the
coast and in a reasonable manner.
The case was submitted to the International Court of
Justice by the government of the United Kingdom. The
government of United Kingdom wants the ICJ to declare
the validity of the base lines under international law and
receive compensation for damages caused by
Norwegian authorities as to the seizures of British
Fishing vessels.

The judgment of the court first examines the
applicability of the principles put forward by the
government of the UK, then the Norwegian system, and
finally the conformity of that system with international
law. The first principle put forward by the UK is that the
baselines must be low water mark, this indeed is the
criterion generally adopted my most states and but
differ as to its application. (Johnson 154). The court
considered the methods of drawing the lines but, the
court rejected the trace Parallele which consists of
drawing the outer limits of the belt following the coast
and all its sinuosity. The court also rejected the courbe
tangent (arcs of a circle) and it is not obligatory under
international law to use these methods of drawing the
lines. The court also paid particular attention to the
geographical aspect of the case. The geographical
realities and historic control of the Norwegian coast
inevitably contributed to the final decision by the ICJ.
The coast of Norway is too indented and is an exception
under international law from the 3 miles territorial
waters rule. The fjords, Sunds along the coastline which
have the characteristic of a bay or legal straits should be
considered Norwegian for historical reasons that the
territorial sea should be measured from the line of low
water mark. So it was agreed on the outset of both
parties and the court that Norway had the right to claim
a 4 mile belt of territorial sea. The court concluded that
it was the outer line of the Skaergaard that must be
taken into account in admitting the belt of the
Norwegian territorial waters. (Johnson 154- 158).
There is one consideration not to be overlooked, the
scope of which extends beyond geographical factors.
That of certain economic interests peculiar to a region,
the reality and importance of which are clearly
evidenced by a long usage (Johnson 160)
The law relied upon mainly international Law of the sea;
how far a state can modify its territorial waters and its
control over it, exclusively reserving fishing for its
nationals. In this case, rules that are practiced for
instance how long a baseline should be. Only a 10 mile
long straight line is allowed and this has been the
practice by most states however it is different in the
case of Norway because of Norway's geographic
indentation, islands and islets.
P a g e | 10
The international customary law has been a law of
reference in the court arguments. Judge Read from
Canada asserts that Customary international law does
not recognize the rule according to which belts of
territorial waters of coastal states is to be measured.
More so public international law has been relied upon in
this case. It regulates relation between states; the
United Kingdom and Norway.
Maritime Law
Coastline Rule
The judgment was rendered in favor of Norway on the
18th December 1951. By 10 votes to 2 the court held
that the method employed in the delimitation of the
fisheries zone by the Royal Norwegian decree of the
12th July 1935 is not contrary to international law. By 8
votes to 4 votes the court also held that the base lines
fixed by this decree in application are not contrary to
international law. However there are separate opinions
and dissenting opinions from the judges in the court.
Judge Hackworth declared that he concurred with the
operative part of the judgment because he considered
that the Norwegian government had proved the
existence of historic title of the disputed areas of water.
Judge Alvarez from Chile relied on the evolving
principles of the law of nations applicable to the law of
the sea.
States have the right to modify the extent of the
of their territorial sea
Any state directly concerned may object to
another state's decision as to the extent of its
territorial sea
International status of bays and straits must be
determined by the coastal state directly
concerned with due regard to the general
interest and
Historic rights and concept of prescription in
international law.
Judge Hsu Mo from china opinions diverge from the
court's with regards to conformity with principles of

international law to the straight lines drawn by the
Decree of 1935. He allowed possibility in certain
circumstances, for instance, belt measured at low tide,
Norway's geographic and historic conditions. But
drawing the straight lines as of the 1935 degree is a
moving away from the practice of the general rule.
(Johnson 171)
The dissenting opinions from judge McNair rested upon
few rules of law of international waters. Though there
are exceptions, in case of bays, the normal procedure to
calculate territorial waters in from the land, a line which
follows the coastline. Judge McNair rejected the
argument upon which Norway based its decree
including:
Protecting Norway's economic and other social
interests
The UK should not be precluded from objecting
the Norwegian system embodied in the Decree
because previous acquiescence in the system
and
An historic title allowing the state to acquire
waters that would otherwise have the status of
deep sea. Judge McNair concluded that the
1935 decree is not compatible with
international law.(Johnson173)
Furthermore, Judge Read from Canada was unable to
concur with parts of the judgment. Read rejected
justification by Norway for enlarging her maritime
domain and seizing and condemning foreign ships
(Johnson 173);
Sovereignty of the coastal state is not the basis
for Norway to claim 4 mile belt from straight
base lines
Customary international law does not recognize
the rule according to which belts of territorial
waters of coastal states is to be measured.
Norwegian system cannot be compatible with
international law.
------------------------xxx----------------------
WESTERN SAHARA CASE
CASE SUMMARY:
P a g e | 11
Facts: On December 17, 1974, the UN General Assembly
by Resolution 3292 requested the ICJ to give an advisory
opinion on the following questions:
1. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet el
Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory
belonging to no one? (terra nullius)
If the answer to the first question is in the negative,
2. What were the legal ties between this territory
and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritian entity?
This request took place in the context of decolonization
of Western Sahara, formerly a protectorate of Spain.
Morocco and Mauritania are rival claimants, both
arguing that portions of the disputed area formed part
of their pre-colonial territories and seeking to have the
former colony re-integrated to their respective national
territories.
Held: 1. Western Sahara at the time of colonization by
Spain was not terra nullius.
2. [There are] legal ties of allegiance between the
Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the
territory of Western Sahara. [There are also] legal ties
between the Mauritanian entity and the territory of
Western Sahara. [However, such] do not establish any
tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of
Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the
Mauritanian entity.
CASE ESCERPTS:
Turning to Question I, the Court observes that the
request specifically locates the question in the context
of the time of colonization by Spain, and it therefore
seems clear that the [question has] to be interpreted by
reference to the law in force at that period. According
to State practice of that period, territories inhabited by
tribes or peoples having a social and political
organization were not regarded as terrae nullius. [I]n
the case of such territories the acquisition of
sovereignty was not generally considered as effected
unilaterally through "occupation" of terra nullius by
original title but through agreements concluded with
local rulers.
In the present instance, the information furnished to
the Court shows that at the time of colonization
Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if
nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes

and under chiefs competent to represent them. It also
shows that, in colonizing Western Sahara, Spain did not
proceed on the basis that it was establishing its
sovereignty over terrae nullius.
The Court's answer to Question 1 is, therefore, in the
negative and, in accordance with the terms of the
request, it will now turn to Question II.
Question II asks the Court to state what were the legal
ties between this territorythat is, Western Sahara
and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian
entity. The scope of this question depends upon the
meaning to be attached to the expression legal ties in
the context of the time of the colonization of the
territory by Spain It appears to the Court that in
Question II the words legal ties must be understood
as referring to such legal ties as may affect the policy to
be followed in the decolonization of Western Sahara.
Morocco's claim to legal ties with Western Sahara
has been put to the Court as a claim to ties of
sovereignty on the ground of an alleged immemorial
possession of the territory. This immemorial possession,
it maintains, was based not on an isolated act of
occupation but on the public display of sovereignty,
uninterrupted and uncontested, for centuries In
support of this claim Morocco refers to a series of
events stretching back to the Arab conquest of North
Africa in the seventh century A.D [It invokes] inter alia
the decision of the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case
(P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53), [maintaining] that the
historical material suffices to establish Morocco's claim
to a title based upon continued display of authority.
In the view of the Court, however, what must be of
decisive importance in determining its answer to
Question II is not indirect inferences drawn from events
in past history but evidence directly relating to effective
display of authority in Western Sahara at the time of its
colonization by Spain and in the period immediately
preceding that time (cf. Minquiers and Ecrehos,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 57). (emphasis
supplied)
In appreciating the evidence presented by Morocco, the
Court took into account the special structure of the
Sherifian State, saying that where sovereignty over
territory is claimed, the particular structure of a State
may be a relevant element in appreciating the reality or
P a g e | 12
otherwise of a display of State activity adduced as
evidence of that sovereignty.
[T]he Sherifian State at the time of the Spanish
colonization of Western Sahara was a State of a special
character... Its special character consisted in the fact
that it was founded on the common religious bond of
Islam existing among the peoples and on the allegiance
of various tribes to the Sultan, through their caids or
sheikhs, rather than on the notion of territory.
As evidence of its display of sovereignty in Western
Sahara, Morocco has invoked alleged acts of internal
display of Moroccan authority and also certain
international acts said to constitute recognition by other
states of its sovereignty over the whole or part of the
territory. The principal indications of internal display
of authority invoked by Morocco consists of evidence
alleged to show the allegiance of Saharan caids to the
Sultan, the alleged imposition of Koranic and other
taxes, and what were referred to as military decisions
said to constitute acts of resistance to foreign
penetration of the territories Emphasis is also placed
by Morocco on two visits of Sultan Hassan I in person to
the southern area of the Souss in 1882 and 1886 to
maintain and strengthen his authority in the Southern
part of the realm, and on the dispatch of arms by the
Sultan to the south to reinforce their resistance to
foreign penetration.
Having considered this evidence and the observations of
the other States which took part in the proceedings, the
Court finds that neither the internal nor the
international acts relied upon by Morocco indicate the
existence at the relevant period of either the existence
or the international recognition of legal ties of territorial
sovereignty between Western Sahara and the Moroccan
State. Even taking account of the specific structure of
the Sherifian State, the material so far examined does
not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between
Western Sahara and that State. It does not show that
Morocco displayed effective and exclusive State activity
in Western Sahara. It does however provide indications
that a legal tie of allegiance had existed at the relevant
period between the Sultan and some, but only some, of
the nomadic peoples of the territory. (emphasis
supplied)
As to the various international agreements presented by
Morocco claiming external recognition of the Sultans
alleged territorial sovereignty in Western Sahara, the

Court ruled that [the] agreements are of limited
value in this regard; for it was not their purpose either
to recognize an existing sovereignty over a territory or
to deny its existence. Their purpose, in their different
contexts, was rather to recognize or reserve for one or
both parties a sphere of influence as understood in the
practice of that time.
The Court thereafter took up the question of what were
the legal ties which existed between Western Sahara, at
the time of its colonization by Spain, and the
Mauritanian entity. The term Mauritanian entity was
first defined as a term used by the General Assembly to
denote the cultural, geographical and social entity
which existed at the time in the region of Western
Sahara and within which the Islamic Republic of
Mauritania was later to be created. According to
Mauritania, that entity, at the relevant period, was the
Bilad Shinguitti or Shinguitti country, a distinct human
unit, characterized by a common language, way of life,
religion and system of laws, featuring two types of
political authority: emirates and tribal groups.
Recognizing that this entity did not constitute a State,
Mauritania nevertheless claims that the Bilad Shinguitti
was a community having its own cohesion, its own
special characteristics, and a common Saharan law
concerning the use of water-holes, grazing lands and
agricultural lands, the regulation of inter-tribal
hostilities and the settlement of disputes. Mauritania
suggests the concept of nation and of people to
explain the position of the Shinguitti people at the time
of colonization.
As to the legal ties between Western Sahara and [this
entity] the views of Mauritania are as follows: At the
time of Spanish colonization, the Mauritanian entity
extended from the Senegal River to the Wad Sakiet El
Hamra. That being so, the part of the territories now
under Spanish administration which lie to the south of
the Wad Sakiet El Hamra was an integral part of the
Mauritanian entity. The legal relation between the part
under Spanish administration and the Mauritanian
entity was, therefore, the simple one of inclusion...
That part and the present territory of the Islamic
Republic of Mauritania together constitute "the
indissociable parts of the Mauritanian entity".
In the present case, the information before the Court
discloses that, at the time of the Spanish colonization,
there existed many ties of a racial, linguistic, religious,
cultural and economic nature between various tribes
P a g e | 13
and emirates whose peoples dwelt in the Saharan
region which today is comprised within the Territory of
Western Sahara and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.
It also discloses, however, the independence of the
emirates and many of the tribes in relation to one
another and, despite some forms of common activity,
the absence among them of any common institutions or
organs, even of a quite minimal character. Accordingly,
the Court is unable to find that the information before it
provides any basis for considering the emirates and
tribes which existed in the region to have constituted, in
another phrase used by the Court in the Reparation
case, "an entity capable of availing itself of obligations
incumbent upon its Members" (ibid.). Whether the
Mauritanian entity is described as the Bilad Shinguitti,
or as the Shinguitti "nation", as Mauritania suggests
the difficulty remains that it did not have the character
of a personality or corporate entity distinct from the
several emirates and tribes which composed it. The
proposition, therefore, that the Bilad Shinguitti should
be considered as having been a Mauritanian "entity"
enjoying some form of sovereignty in Western Sahara is
not one that can be sustained. (emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, the General Assembly does not appear to
have so framed Question II as to confine the question
exclusively to those legal ties which imply territorial
sovereignty, which would be to disregard the possible
relevance of other legal ties to the decolonization
process. Accordingly, although the Bilad Shinguitti has
not been shown to have existed as a legal entity, the
nomadic peoples of the Shinguitti country should , in
the view of the Court, be considered as having in the
relevant period possessed rights, including some rights
relating to the lands through which they migrated.
These rights constituted legal ties between the
territory of Western Sahara and the Mauritanian
entity.
Thus the Court, being mindful of the purpose for which
the Advisory Opinion was sought, held in its
penultimate paragraph: The materials and information
presented to the Court show the existence, at the time
of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance
between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes
living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally
show the existence of rights, including some rights
relating to the land, which constituted legal ties
between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the
Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other
 P a g e | 14

hand, the Court's conclusion is that the materials and

information presented to it do not establish any tie of
territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western
Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian
entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a
nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514
(XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in
particular, of the principle of self-determination through
the free and genuine expression of the will of the
peoples of the Territory.