Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Climategate'' and The Scientific Ethos: Reiner Grundmann
Climategate'' and The Scientific Ethos: Reiner Grundmann
Reiner Grundmann1
Abstract
In late 2009, e-mails from a server at the Climate Research Unit at the
University of East Anglia were released that showed some climate scien-
tists in an unfavorable light. Soon this scandal was known as Climategate
and a highly charged debate started to rage on blogs and in the mass
media. Much of the debate has been about the question whether anthro-
pogenic global warming was undermined by the revelations. But ethical
issues, too, became part and parcel of the debate. This article aims to con-
tribute to this debate, assessing the e-mail affair in the light of two norma-
tive analyses of science, one proposed by Robert Merton (and developed
further by some of his followers), the second by a recent suggestion to use
the concept of honest brokering in science policy interactions. On the
basis of these analyses, different aspects of malpractice will be discussed
and possible solutions will be suggested.
Keywords
ethics, engagement, intervention, politics, power, governance
1
University of Nottingham, United Kingdom
Corresponding Author:
Reiner Grundmann, University of Nottingham, School of Sociology and Social Policy, Uni-
versity Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD.
Email: Reiner.Grundmann@nottingham.ac.uk
Climategate
The Case
In November 2009, e-mail correspondence from the CRU at the UEA was
uploaded to various Web sites posing the immediate question whether these
mails had been obtained by illegal hackers or by whistleblowers from
within. There was suspicion that this was a political maneuver to derail the
Copenhagen summit which was three weeks away. On a deeper level, com-
mentators posed the question whether the exposed behavior was within
of the peer reviewed literature while at the same time fast tracking papers
from within the circle of likeminded (Douglass and Christy 2009). The
same differential treatment has been suspected in the process of compil-
ing assessment reports for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report published in 2007 (AR4; see
McKitrick 2010). The IPCC had come under fire after several errors in
AR4 were publicized, among them the claim that Himalayan glaciers
would be gone by 2035. As a result of these developments several inves-
tigations were launched, on both sides of the Atlantic, examining the
practices of Michael Mann, CRU, and the IPCC (see timeline box).
The Aftermath
In the meantime, six investigations have been completed5; none put the
square blame on Jones (or any other climate researcher).6 Perhaps the
most important inquiries were the Muir Russell review in the United
Kingdom, which looked at CRUs practices, and the Inter Academy
Council (IAC) which looked at the procedures of the IPCC. The Muir
Russell review (published in July 2010) emphasized the changed nature
of science communication in the electronic age and points out that CRU
did not realize the role of public debate in which rhetoric and credibility
are crucial but instead relied on traditional ways of publishing research
results (Muir Russell 2010). What is more, CRU seems to have dismissed
critical enquiries all too quickly, which was problematic and counterpro-
ductive. The review states that the emergence of the blogosphere has
changed the nature of such scientific debates. Before, scientific debate
largely took place in journals and conferences that effectively excluded
the public from active engagement (Muir Russell 2010, 41-42). But this
has now changed and has led to an increased demand of openness on the
part of scientists:
Without such openness, the credibility of their work will suffer because it will
always be at risk of allegations of concealment and hence malpractice. . . .
Therefore, the Review would urge all scientists to learn to communicate their
work in ways that the public can access and understand; and to be open in
providing the information that will enable the debate, wherever it occurs,
to be conducted objectively. (Muir Russell 2010, 41-42)
In a similar way, the IAC found that the IPCC needs more transparency
and a better management structure: The IPCC should complete and
ethos [or an] affectively toned complex of values and norms which are held to
be binding on scientists. The norms are expressed in the form of prescriptions,
proscriptions, preferences, and permissions. They are legitimized in terms of
institutional values [ . . . ] and internalized by the scientist [ . . . ] Although the
ethos of science has not been codified, it can be inferred from the moral con-
sensus of scientists as expressed in use and wont, in countless writings on the
scientific spirit and in moral indignation toward contraventions of the ethos
(Merton 1942/1973, 268-9).
judgment and the allocation of rewards have shown, there is little doubt
[ . . . ] that scientists observe the rules of their professional ethic in the allo-
cation of rewards and punishment of fraud and other kinds of deviance.
Yet he admits that there are some empirical studies on scientists attitudes
that paint a different picture: The outcome of these is inconclusive:
answers to some questions show acceptance of norms, while others sug-
gest rejection.
He solves this divergence by indicating a special role for scientific con-
troversies. When scientists are embroiled in controversies, evidence may
seem to support the view that ethical norms are unimportant [ . . . ] In these
situations, scientists are indeed willing to transgress practically all the
norms enumerated by Merton [ . . . ]: they may withhold findings in order
to prevent advantage from competitors, they make judgments on the basis
of personal prejudice, interpret results arbitrarily in order to fit theories, and
so forth. However, Ben-David holds, scientific controversies are an excep-
tion: They deal with an entirely different situation [ . . . ]: the scientists at
this stage act like litigants concerned more with putting together a convin-
cing case than with ultimate truth. They are not, and are not expected to be,
dispassionate (Ben-David 1982/ 1991, 479-480). This indicates that the
e-mail scandal could be seen as within the scientific ethos, as defined by
Ben-David. In controversies, passionate scientists use various tactics to
further their goals, like litigants putting together a convincing case.
Intellectual property rights. Metlay (2006, 566) argues that since the
creation of national competitiveness policies in the early to mid-1970s,
the academic world has been experiencing a period of renormalization.
In particular, the norm of communism is being or has been replaced by the
norm of private intellectual property.
Metlay quotes Zuckerman to the effect that this is evidently a time of
exceedingly rapid and possibly fundamental change in the social organization
of scientific research and in the normative structure of science (Zuckerman
1988b, 11). Already in the early 1970s, it was observed (e.g. by Sklair 1973,
113) that much, if not most, contemporary science is carried out under con-
ditions of formal or informal secrecynecessitated by national security mat-
ters and matters of economic interest. And Etzkowitz and Webster (1994,
488) hold that science is being transformed from a relatively minor institu-
tion encapsulated from social influence to a major institution that influences
and is influenced by other social spheres. Other authors have added that sci-
ence since the 1960s has become more attuned to social concerns (mode 2 of
knowledge production, Gibbons et al. 1994) and is operating in a context
where decisions are urgent, facts are uncertain, and values under dispute (also
known as post-normal science, Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993).
Honest Brokers?
Let us look at a contemporary attempt to define the roles of scientists in
society, taking explicitly into account the existence of scientific controver-
sies and the politicization of science. As we have seen, Neo-Mertonians
have granted an exception from the scientific ethos under conditions of sci-
entific controversy. This seems to leave the door wide open to many ques-
tionable practices. It is in this context that the contribution of Roger Pielke
Jr. is relevant.8 It should be noted that Mertons norms focus on scientific
practice, while Pielkes Honest Broker focuses on the practice of science
in a political context, in a manner similar to the notion of post-normal
science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). Pielke Jr. has introduced a fourfold
distinction between different types of policy relevant research. He writes:
[S]cientists have choices in what roles they play. Pure Scientist, Science
Arbiter, Issue Advocate, or Honest Broker of Policy Alternatives? All four
roles are critically important and necessary in a functioning democracy. But
scientists do have to choose. Whether a scientist admits, accepts, or is aware
of it, a choice must be made on how they relate to the decision-making pro-
cess. (Pielke 2007, 7).
A passion for knowledge, idle curiosity, altruistic concern with the benefit of
humanity, and a host of other special motives have been attributed to the scien-
tist. The quest for distinctive motives appears to have been misdirected. It is
rather a distinctive pattern of institutional control of a wide range of motives
which characterizes the behavior of scientists. (Merton 1942/1973, 276)
Pielke (2007, 151) recognizes this problem when pointing out that such
Honest Brokers could be individuals, but more likely will be the result of
institutional commitments to expanding or clarifying the scope of choice
available to decision makers. Institutions can bring together people with
diverse perspectives to provide a spectrum of options for decision makers.
It will be much more difficult for any one individual to serve in such a role.
Stealth Advocacy
If scientists are driven by self-interest and guided by values, it seems to be
unrealistic to expect that they will spontaneously adopt the role of honest
brokers. As Pielke (2007, 7) points out, there is the temptation to act as pol-
icy advocate, albeit in a concealed manner:
So when a scientist claims to focus only on the science, in many cases the
scientist risks serving instead as a Stealth Issue Advocate. For some scientists
stealth issue advocacy is politically desirable because it allows for a simulta-
neous claim of being above the fray, invoking the historical authority of
science, while working to restrict the scope of choice. The stealth issue advo-
cate seeks to swim without getting wet.
Analyzing the roles of advocates and honest brokers through the lens of
individual and collective (institutional) action, one can distinguish between
individual and collective advocacy, and individual and collective honest bro-
kering. While there are many examples of individual advocacy (see F.S. Row-
land, Paul Crutzen in the CFC controversy, Jim Hansen in the climate change
debate, or E.O. Wilson advocating biodiversity) and collective brokering (see
many advisory committees), collective advocacy and individual brokering are
far less established. There are exceptional circumstances where scientific orga-
nizations have engaged in advocacy (such as the National Academies of
Sciences calling for action on climate change c. 2007, see Grundmann and
Stehr 2012, chap. 4). And individual scientists are less convincing in the role
of honest brokers as they are normally not bound by specific rules or policies.
They can switch from advocate to honest broker at any time.
From this it follows that honest brokering in Pielkes sense requires insti-
tutional arrangements that explicitly foster and encourage a diversity of
viewpoints and practical options for decision making. Only by confronting
the different viewpoints in an open manner can transparency for the deci-
sion maker emerge. If we grant one group too much power, it will dominate
the research process and the decision-making process. It will ultimately
define what science is and what a good policy decision is without our ability
to check and without an opportunity to revise decisions, should they turn out
to be flawed.
Definitions
The terms malpractice, fraud and misrepresentation are sometimes used
interchangeably. Scientific fraud seems the accepted term for identifying
the most unacceptable behavior. A common definition of fraud in science
distinguishes between forging (or data fabrication), trimming (editing or
suppressing data to eliminate inconsistent findings, through omitting out-
liers or data dropping), and cooking (adjusting data to match expected out-
come).9 The question arises if the core set climatologists are guilty of this
Here is why. First, the IPCC is not engaged in research. It apparently violated
its own terms of reference when it allowed scientists to re-process data from
the peer reviewed literature. So the IPCC clearly violated its own norms.
However, even in violating its own norms, because it is not a research orga-
nization, it is very hard to say that it engaged in scientific fraud. But even if
the IPCC was a research organization, the selective omission of data might be
a questionable practice but hardly rises to any level of misconduct, which
generally refers to fabrication, falsification or plagiarism. There is no evi-
dence of that here. Just cherrypicking, perhaps egregious leading ultimately
to misrepresentation, but nonetheless cherrypicking. It can appear unseemly
when revealed (which is why it is not a good idea to do so in the first place),
but misconduct? No.
Did it engage in any other kind of "fraud"? [ . . . ] [T]he authors of the IPCC
TAR chapter under discussion clearly wanted to present information that (a)
best positioned their work for inclusion in the SPM [Summary for Policy
Makers], and (b) avoided giving "skeptics" ammunition. So they stage man-
aged the process to present a picture that they thought best conveyed the
storyline that they wanted. Was this fraud? I see no evidence for such a claim.
Again, misrepresentation but not fraud.
Thernstrom (2009) took a different approach, making the point (against Mer-
ton) that scientists do not have special normative standards:
Central to this disaster has been scientists insistence that they are unsullied
providers of truth in an otherwise corrupt and indecipherable world. It was
never so. . . . [I]n practice, science is competitive, backbiting, venal, imper-
fect and, indeed, political. Science, in other words, is replete with the same
human failings that mark all other social activities.
The British Times Higher Education quoted Sarewitz as saying that the
e-mails showed normal science politics. He said It is on the extreme end,
but still within bounds (Times Higher Education, December 17, 2009, p. 4).
There has been initial reluctance on the part of most climatologists and other
observers of Climategate to condemn the exposed behavior. A Nature com-
mentary put it this way:
used for this aim should be as robust as possible and withstand any amount
of scrutiny. Sooner or later it will be put under the microscope.
The question of what exactly constitutes unethical behavior can be
illustrated by the following example. The coordinating lead authors for the
Fourth Assessment Report, Working Group 1, Chapter 3: Observations: Sur-
face and Atmospheric Climate Change arguably had a conflict of interest when
assessing research results during the review process. It appears that these lead
authors actively (Trenberth and Jones) sought to suppress other research find-
ings.9 And Trenberth gave the following advice to the director of CRU who
was the second coordinating lead author, of how to deal with the skeptics:
The response should try to somehow label these guys and [sic] lazy and
incompetent and unable to do the huge amount of work it takes to construct
such a database. . . . So my feeble suggestion is to indeed cast aspersions on
their motives and throw in some counter rhetoric. (Kevin Trenberth to Phil
Jones, 21 Apr 2007)
Recently rejected two papers (one for JGR and for GRL) from people saying
CRU has it wrong over Siberia. Went to town in both reviews, hopefully suc-
cessfully. If either appears I will be very surprised, but you never know with
GRL. (Jones to Mann, March 31, 2004)
One other thing about the Climatic Change paperjust found another
e-mailis that McKittrick [sic] says it is standard practice in Econometrics
journals to provide all the data and computer programs!! According to legal
advice, Intellectual Property Rights overrides this.
It has been claimed that the e-mails show attempts at influencing the
peer review process in order to prevent uncomfortable papers to be
accepted.10 Such attempts were not always successful. When they were
not, the team would ponder extreme tactics, such as calling for a boy-
cott of the publishing journals. This was considered for Climatic Research
and Geophysical Research Letters.14 When requests for data release under
the new Freedom of Information Act came in, Phil Jones convinced his
senior managers at East Anglia University to ignore them: I think Ive
managed to persuade the UEA to ignore all further Freedom of Informa-
tion Act requests if the people have anything to do with Climate Audit
(June 19, 2007). Commentators have interpreted Jones and his
universitys refusal as highly problematic, if not illegal under section 77
of the Freedom of Information Act (Pearce 2010: 147).
Most commentators have focused on Mikes trick of creating long-
term temperature records and redefining peer review in order to keep
unwelcome skeptics out of the discussion. In addition, data were some-
times not released to skeptical scientists who requested them. Have the
researchers been justified in denying access to their data? In their defense,
they raised issues about intellectual property rights (which required
permissions from many national weather services and their stations) and
the suspicious nature of those requesting data (people associated with
Climate Audit). But the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) concern was
no hindrance to pass data on to friendly scientists, as the following
e-mail reveals:
Just sent loads of station data to Scott. Make sure he documents everything
better this time! And dont leave stuff lying around on ftp sitesyou never
know who is trawling them.15
Conclusion
Do the practices highlighted by the e-mails exemplify any of the four
norms suggested by Merton? Recall his definition which stipulates (1) the
existence of a special scientific ethos (prescriptions, proscriptions, prefer-
ences, and permissions) which are (2) legitimized in terms of institutional
values and (3) internalized by individual scientists. (4) The ethos can be
inferred from (among other things) moral indignation toward contraven-
tions of the ethos.
The exposed climate scientists did not adhere to the norm of universal-
ism as they gave preferential treatment to close allies. They did not share
their data as would be required under the norm of communism. They did
not act in a disinterested way as the whole e-mail communication reveals.
On the contrary, they acted strategically, showing self-interest and zeal.16
Above all, they wanted to communicate the political message of their
research (that the Northern Hemisphere has never been as warm in the past
millennium as it is at present) and boost their own careers. Finally, they did
not foster organized skepticism but tried to stifle skeptical voices. It is inter-
esting that the Climategate investigations describe this as bunker mental-
ity but do not see unethical behavior.
However, sociologists close to Merton have suggested that scientists do
not conform to the Ethos when engaging in scientific controversies. Here,
different norms apply, above all the cognitive norm of adhering to technical
standards in data gathering and analysis. Still, the hockey-stick controversy
and the dealing with the divergence problem could be seen as an instance
of violating a cognitive norm. But only skeptical scientists and bloggers
seem to put forward such a case.
This leads to the conclusion that the Mertonian ethos of science is not
operating in practice, and that it has been irrelevant for defining proper
behavior in the CRU e-mail scandal. This may be due to the fact that today
there are many more scientific debates and controversies, and that they are
increasingly politicized. Neo-Mertonians were ready to grant an exemption
for the scientific ethos under these circumstances. What must have seemed
There are examples where powerful people in the review process have
not abused their position. But it would be problematic to rely on human vir-
tues alone. Honest brokering can only be achieved on a routine basis
through institutions, not through individuals. This does not deny the fact
that sometimes exceptional individuals will play a decisive role in politi-
cized science controversies. However, it would be naive to take such inter-
ventions for granted. One should rather design institutions of knowledge
provision and advisory systems that do not fall prey to such vagaries.
Moving from the individual level to the collective level brings the risk of
group think, nepotism, and deference to authority. To forestall these, one
needs to include viewpoints that go against the grain of the views of estab-
lished elites of expertise and policy making. As we have seen in the case of
the e-mail scandal, we cannot rely on individuals research ethos but need
institutions that foster such aims.
Acknowledgment
I would like to thank the editors of ST&HV and two anonymous reviewers for very
helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
Notes
1. This phrase, which from 1997 was used in a rather polemical manner by climate
change skeptics such as Fred Singer, has been famously embraced by Al Gore in
a statement to the US House Energy committee and the Senate Environment
committee in March 2007. Since then it was repeated many times by proponents
of anthropogenic global warming (AGW).
2. Back in 1995, Aant Elzinga already used the term orchestration of consensus.
3. The story presented here does not attempt to provide an in-depth account of the
climategate affair. It is based on a limited number of textual sources (such as
Montford 2010; Pearce 2010, blog content, commentary, reports from official
inquiries, and a subset of released climate emails). These limitations in the data
need to be noted. The paper raises the question of how to assess knowledge pro-
duction in a highly politicized context. Sources were selected on accessibility
criteria with a special emphasis on critical accounts. The aim of the paper is not
to adjudicate who was right and who was wrong about the science, but to dis-
cuss norms of scientific practice in the light of two theoretical frameworks.
4. The e-mails were put into searchable format at http://foia2011.org/.
5. Six committees investigated the allegations and published reports, finding
no evidence of fraud or scientific misconduct. However, the reports criticized
climate scientists for their disorganized methods, bunker mentality, and
lack of transparency. (Wikipedia entry on Climatic Research Unit E-mail
Controversy).
6. One of the skeptical protagonists thus puts little faith in these inquiries:
The Muir Russell inquiry was particularly frustrating in the way it kept
restating and shuffling the allegations until they were rendered into either
innocuous or irrelevant terms, at which point any findings they did offer were
largely beside the point. The world still awaits a proper inquiry into climate-
gate: one that is not stacked with global warming advocates, and one that is
prepared to cross-examine evidence, interview critics as well as supporters
of the CRU and other IPCC players, and follow the evidence where it leads
(McKitrick 2010, 50).
7. Various terms have been used by climate bloggers to describe Mann, Trenberth,
Jones et al.: clan, tribe, the Hockey Team (or simply the team);
clique; cabal; or gang. Sociologists of science in the past (e.g., Crane
1972; Price 1963) have used labels such as invisible college taking up a
notion which Robert Boyle had coined in the seventeenth century.
8. Collins and Evans (2002) and Jasanoff (1990) also write on science policy inter-
actions. However, in the context of this paper special emphasis is given to the
problem of advocacy and its institutional context.
9. Charles Babbage introduced these three elements of scientific misconduct. See
Kimmel (1996) for a more detailed exposition.
10. Commenting on some skeptical papers, CRU director Jones wrote, I cant
see either of these papers being in the next IPCC report. Kevin [Trenberth] and
I will keep them out somehoweven if we have to redefine what the peer-
review literature is! (e-mail Jones to Mann, July 8, 2004, marked HIGHLY
CONFIDENTIAL!).
11. See Pearce (2010) for a discussion of the question of how justified and success-
ful Jones and Trenberth were keeping out the dissenting papers.
12. Only a full investigation of all communication between researchers could assess
such a claim. This is, of course, what excites the skeptics around the globe, that
Global Warming Theory is based on the cooking of data by a small group of
scientists who abused their power and perpetrated the greatest hoax on man-
dkind, as US Republican Senator Inhofe famously puts it.
13. To be sure, FOI did not exist at the time of Mertons writing and it may be doubt-
ful to simply equate FOI with his norm communismFOI has introduced a
different dynamic into science by formalizing a moral norm into a legal norm.
14. Michael Mann wrote, Im not sure that [Geophysical Research Letters] can be
seen as an honest broker in these debates any more, and it is probably best to do
an end run around GRL now where possible. They have published far too
many deeply flawed contrarian papers in the past year or so. There is no possible
excuse for them publishing all three Douglass papers and the Soon and cowor-
kers paper. These were all pure crap (e-mail Jan 21, 2005).
15. Scott appears to be Scott Rutherford, a close associate of Michael Mann.
16. It is perhaps no coincidence that CRU scientists refused to share data and code
invoking proprietary arrangements between different weather stations. As we
have seen above, this re-normalization of science which led to the emphasis
of intellectual property rights has become so entrenched now that in this case it
became the first line of defence.
17. Note there is a tension between this emphasis on institutional control of
motives and the moral consensus and internalized institutional values
in the quotes above.
References
Agrawala, Shardul. 1998. Structural and Process History of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change Shardul Agrawala. Climatic Change 39: 621-42.
Arthur, Charles. 2010. Hacking into the Mind of the CRU Climate Change
Hacker. The Guardian, February 5.
Barnes, Barry, and R. G. A. Dolby. 1970. The Scientific Ethos: A Deviant View-
point. European Journal of Sociology 11: 3-25.
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Cambridge, England:
Polity.
Ben-David, J. 1991. Norms of Science and the Sociological Interpretation of Sci-
entific Behavior. In Scientific Growth. Essays on the Social Organization and
Ethos of Science, edited by Joseph Ben-David, 469-84. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1975. The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Condi-
tions of the Progress of Reason. Social Science Information 14 (6): 19-47.
Collins, Harry, and Richard Evans. 2002. The Third Wave of Science Studies:
Studies of Expertise and Experience. Social Studies of Science 32 (2): 235-96.
Collins, H. M. 1985. Changing Order. London, England: SAGE.
Crane, Diana. 1972. Invisible Colleges. Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific Com-
munities. Chaicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. 1986. Laboratory Life: The Construction of
Scientific Facts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mann, Michael E., R. S. Bradley, and M. K. Hughes. 1998. Global-Scale Temperature
Patterns and Climate Forcing over the Past Six Centuries. Nature 392: 779-87.
. 1999. Northern Hemisphere Temperatures during the Past Millennium:
Inferences, Uncertainties, and Limitations. Geophysical Research Letters
26(6): 759-62.
McKitrick, Ross. 2010. Understanding the Climategate Inquiries, accessed 26
June, 2011, http://rossmckitrick.weebly.com/uploads/4/8/0/8/4808045/rmck_
climategate.pdf.
Merton, Robert K. 1942/1973. The Normative Structure of Science. In The
Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations edited by Robert
K. Merton, 267-273. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Metlay, G. 2006. Reconsidering Renormalization: Stability and Change in
20th-Century Views on University Patents. Social Studies of Science
36(4): 565-97.
Montford, A. W. 2010. The Hockey Stick Illusion: Climategate and the Corruption
of Science. London: Stacey International.
Muir Russell, Alastair. 2010. The Independent Climate Change E-mails Review.
http://www.cce-review.org/index.php.
Nerlich, B. 2010. Climategate: Paradoxical Metaphors and Political Paralysis.
Environmental Values 19(4): 419-442.
Mulkay, Michael. 1976. Norms and Ideology in Science, Social Science Information
15: 637-56.
Oxburgh, Ron. 2010. Report by Lord Oxburghs Science Assessment Panel.
http://www.uea.ac.uk/mac/comm/media/press/CRUstatements/SAP.
Pearce, Fred. 2010. The Climate Files. The Battle for the Truth about Global Warm-
ing. London: Guardian Books.
Pielke, Roger Jr. 2007. The Honest Broker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pielke, R. A. J. 2009. The Trick in Context. Available at: http://rogerpielkejr.
blogspot.com/2009/12/trick-in-context.html.
Price, Derek de Solla, 1963. Little Science, Big Science . . . And Beyond. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Randerson, James. 2010. University in Hacked Climate Change Emails Row
Broke FOI Rules. The Guardian, January 27.
Sarewitz, Dan, and Samuel Thernstrom. 2009. Climate Change E-mail Scandal
Underscores Myth of Pure Science. Los Angeles Times, January 10, 2012, http://
articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/16/opinion/la-oe-sarewitzthernstrom16-2009dec16.
Schmaus, Warren. 1983. Fraud and the Norms of Science. Science, Technology &
Human Values 8: 12-22.
Author Biography
Reiner Grundmanns current recent research focuses on the discourse of climate
change, using a comparative approach across nations. He has published several
influential papers on the Kyoto Process and the IPCC. He is a co-author of The Hart-
well Paper. His book publications include Marxism and Ecology (Oxford University
Press, 1991), Transnational Environmental Policy (Routledge 2001), Experts: The
Knowledge and Power of Expertise (Routledge 2011, with Nico Stehr) and The
Power of Scientific Knowledge (with Nico Stehr, Cambridge University
Press, 2012).