ACT OR OMISSION CONTRARY TO MORALS

ADA ABELLERA

ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ and JOSE V. HERRERA, in their behalf and as minority stockholders of
the Allied Technologists, Inc.,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, COL. NICOLAS JIMENEZ, Head of the Engineer
Group, Office of the Secretary of National Defense, THE FINANCE OFFICER of the
Department of National Defense, THE AUDITOR of the Dept. of National Defense, PABLO D.
PANLILIO and ALLIED TECHNOLOGISTS, INC.,defendants-appellees.

Facts:

A contract was executed between the defendant Allied Technologists, Inc. and the Republic of the
Philippines, for the construction of the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Ruiz and Herrera were
stockholders and officers of the corporation. Civil Cases were filed by same plaintiffs, making as
parties-defendants in both cases, the same defendants. Both cases were dismissed. On appeal, this
Court reversed the order of dismissal, under the impression that the real controversy was confined
merely between defendant Panlilio and plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera over the 15% of the contract
price, which was retained by the Department of National Defense. The retention of the 15% of the
contract price in the sum of P34,740.00 was made to answer for any claim or lien that might arise, in
the course of the construction. Panlilio and the corporation filed their amended answers, stating that
the amount retained by the Department of National Defense was already paid to defendant
corporation, as sought for by the plaintiffs in their complaint. The plaintiffs sought the declaration
and recognition of plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera, as two of the three architects of the hospital.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, for being already academic and moot.

Plaintiffs-appellants contend that the only ground relied upon by the lower court to dismiss the case
without any trial is the allegation contained in pars. 4 and (e) of the answers of the appellees Panlilio
and Allied Technologists, Inc., respectively; that the amount retained by the Department of National
Defense had already been paid; that except for this bare allegation of the appellees, no evidence
was adduced to prove the truth of the same; that even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
same is true, nevertheless the first part of the first cause of action still remains, for which they had
insisted upon a hearing in order to establish their right to be recognized as two of the three architects
of the hospital. Appellants further argue in their brief that they base their cause of action on article
21, New Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the failure or refusal to extend the recognition was an act contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy

Held: NO

By discarding the Secretary and other officials of the Department of National Defense, as parties-
defendants, appellants could not expect the trial court to order them to recognize and declare
appellants as co-architects in the construction of the hospital. And this must be so, because the
construction agreement expressly provides that the architect being contracted by the Government
was appellee Pablo Panlilio. The said agreement states that the same was entered into by the
government, party of the first part and "Allied Technologists, Inc. . . . and Mr. Pablo D. Panlilio,
architect, hereinafter called the party of the second part" and "The Allied Technologists, Inc. for
rendering engineering services and Mr. Pablo D. Panlilio, architect, for rendering architectural
services". And the contract was signed for the Government by "Ramon Magsaysay, Secretary of
National Defense.

Appellants maintain that their claim for recognition is divisible and separable from their allegations
regarding the non-payment by the government of a portion of the architectural fees; thereby
concluding that what the lower court should have done, should have been merely to order the
striking out of the moot portion of appellants' cause of action, and should have proceeded with
hearing their claim for recognition. There is an indivisible and single cause of action which is
primarily to prevent payment exclusively to defendant Panlilio of the amount of P34,740.00, which
said appellants contend should be paid to appellee Allied Technologists, Inc.; the matter recognizing
them together with Pablo Panlilio as architects of the hospital, being merely incidental thereto. In this
case, the grounds for quo warranto are separable from the grounds for election irregularities which
are distinct and separate causes of action, entitling the petitioner to separate and unrelated reliefs. In
the case at bar, in one paragraph as first cause of action, the claim for recognition is inseparably
linked with their allegations regarding alleged threatened payment of P34,740.00 to Panlilio alone,
because "they will not only be deprived of the monetary value of the services legally due them, but
that their professional prestige and standing will be seriously impaired". When the very defendant
Allied Technologists, Inc. itself asserted in its answer the amended complaint, that the amount was
paid to it, an assertion which was not at all denied, plaintiffs-appellants' cause of action under said
par. 19 dissipated entirely.

There is a veiled insinuation that appellants, thesis would fall under the provisions of the Rules on
declaratory relief, because appellants wanted merely a declaration of their rights in a contract in
which they were interested. The trial court, however, was correct in refusing to make such
declaration, because it was not necessary and proper under the circumstances. Appellants were not
parties to the construction agreement. The sole object the appeal is only to secure for them a
recognition, that they were allegedly the co-architects of Panlilio, in the construction of the hospital,
so as to enhance their professional prestige and not to impair their standing. If this is the goal of
appellants, a judicial declaration to the effect would seem unnecessary. Let us ponder over the
thought that a brilliant professional enjoys the respect and esteem of his fellowmen, even without
any court declaration of such fact, and that an incompetent one may summon all the tribunals in the
world, to proclaim his genius in vain.

But appellants invoke Article 21 of the Civil Code, which states

Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.

contending that the word "injury" in the said article, refers not only to any indeterminate right
or property, but also to honor or credit. It may be added, however, that this article also envisions
a situation where a person has a legal right, and such right is violated by another in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; it presupposes losses or injuries, material or
otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of said violation. The pleadings do not show that
damages were ever asked or alleged, in connection with this case, predicated upon the article
aforecited. And under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, one cannot
plausibly sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to extend the recognition was an
act contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Missing her late afternoon classes in the USC, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second
year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows
with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock,
without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares.

An elopement was planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not,
however, materialize because when Vicenta went back to her classes after the marriage, her
mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta
was taken home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena
Escao were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicenta, and were disgusted
because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke.

To cut the long story short, the newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta had gone to Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She
did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-
appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").

Vicenta left for the United States. She filed a verified complaint for divorce against her husband in
the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. A decree of divorce, "final and absolute",
was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's
marriage to Pastor. Thereafter, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage.

Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California,
and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship.

Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and
against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.

ISSUE:WON a recognition of a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens

could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state. YES

HELD:

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of
the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father
Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original
action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to
plaintiff was valid and binding.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery
of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public
policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect,
give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of
those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-
resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95
Phil. 579).

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for
her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion
of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled
to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from
defendant Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim
for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather
than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.

Digest from the internet (might be of help lisod sabton ang case or bugo ra jud ko. Haha)

Tenchavez V Escano

Facts:

Tenchavez and Escao contracted a valid marriage. A few months after, they became
estranged. The latter left for the US and obtained a final and absolute decree of divorce in
Nevada, acquired American citizenship, and married an American.

The decision of the Court, promulgated on 29 November 1965, in the same case, is being
assailed by Vicenta Escao as to the award of moral damages against her.

She argues that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial
of consortium anddesertion of her husband are not included in the enumeration of cases
where moral damages may lie.

ISSUE
Whether the desertion by a spouse is an actionable wrong within the contemplation of
Article 21 of the NCC?

RULING
Yes. The desertion by a spouse is an actionable wrong within the contemplation of Article
21 of the NCC.

The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our
law, which was hers at the time) constitute a willful infliction of injury upon plaintiffs feelings
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for
which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.