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GTM Research: Suniva Trade Case Executive Summary
GTM Research: Suniva Trade Case Executive Summary
June 2017
Contents
CONTENTS
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 4
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 6
1.1. Origins of a Solar Trade Dispute 6
1.2. Uncertainties Abound in Assessing Section 201 Impacts 6
1.3. The Petitions Effect on System Pricing Error! Bookmark not defined.
2. Impact Analysis by Segment ...................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1. Residential Solar Outlook Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.2. Non-Residential Solar Outlook Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.3. Utility Solar Outlook Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.4. Conclusion: National Level Takeaways 8
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Sunivas Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 petition to the International Trade Commission
(hereafter referred to as Section 201) could send shockwaves through the U.S. solar industry. In
this report, GTM Research quantifies the impacts of two simple scenarios that might unfold:
If Sunivas suggested remedy of a $0.78/Wdc minimum crystalline silicon PV module price is
accepted, U.S. solar demand would be reduced by 50% cumulatively over the next five years.
If the minimum price is added to Sunivas proposed $0.40/Wdc tariff on imported crystalline
PV cells, U.S. demand would be reduced by 66% cumulatively over the next five years.
In this brief, we explore the drivers behind each segments forecasted downturns below our base-
case projections. These forecast scenarios analyze impacts on residential solar economics vs. grid
prices, as well as the sensitivity of specific procurement types for commercial, industrial and utility-
scale solar to increased module prices.
8.0 Most Senstive Markets Most Sensitive Markets Most Sensitive Markets
7.0 6.5 GW
Installations (GWdc)
6.0
5.0
4.0
2.9 GW
3.0
2.0 1.7 GW
1.0
0.0
Figure 1.2 U.S. PV Installation Forecast: Base-Case Outlook vs. Tariff Scenarios
20.0
18.0 17.3
16.2
Annual Total PV Installations (GWdc)
14.0 13.1
12.6
12.0 11.1 -43%
9.8
10.0 -54%
7.5 -43% -53% -55% 7.5
8.0 6.7
6.2 6.3 6.1
6.0 4.8 -61%
3.4 6.7
4.0 -57% -70%
-69% -70%
4.8 4.9
2.0 4.1 4.4
0.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Base Case Minimum Module Price Minimum Module Price + Cell Tariff
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Origins of a Solar Trade Dispute
Uncertainty looms over the U.S. solar outlook due to a new trade dispute targeting global
manufacturers of crystalline silicon PV modules and cells. On the morning of April 26, 2017,
domestic module and cell manufacturer Suniva filed a petition to the U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC) under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. One month later, the U.S. ITC
announced that it would consider Sunivas petition, which could result in remedies to safeguard
against foreign-manufactured crystalline silicon photovoltaic products.
The U.S. ITC will make a determination of injury by Sept. 22, 2017, and if it finds injury (or threat of
injury), it will recommend remedies by Nov. 13, 2017. President Trump could then accept, modify
or choose not to implement the ITCs recommended relief measures.
Requests include, but are not limited to, a minimum price on crystalline silicon PV modules (initially
$0.78/Wdc) and a tariff on cells (initially $0.40/Wdc).
These requirements would step down annually for three additional years. The tariff on imported cells
would step down to $0.37/Wdc, $0.34/Wdc and then $0.33/Wdc, while the minimum module price
would step down to $0.72/Wdc, $0.69/Wdc and then $0.68/Wdc.
similarly consider or discard. And ultimately, the Trump White House decides if and what
remedies are levied, adding further uncertainty to an already hazy determination process.
Sunivas suggested remedies could imply an initial floor price of $1.18/Wdc, not $0.78/Wdc.
Trade lawyers are divided on whether Sunivas request would imply a minimum price for
imported modules of $0.78/Wdc, inclusive or exclusive of the $0.40/Wdc tariffs on imported
cells. If the tariffs and minimum prices are additive, imported tariffs would come in at
$1.18/Wdc in year 1, $1.09/Wdc in year 2, $1.08/Wdc in year 3 and $1.02/Wdc in year 4.
A negotiation and subsequent withdrawal of the petition is still possible. While SolarWorlds
entrance as a co-petitioner muddies the waters for negotiation or buyout of Suniva, the
parties could still come to an agreement that satisfies all parties ahead of potential
implementation of safeguards.
The U.S. International Trade Commission could propose or President Trump could decide to
extend the tariffs beyond four years. By default, remedies imposed under a Section 201
petition last four years. But if the tariffs are approved, the World Trade Organization could
rule that they are in violation of international commitments and law. In turn, if other
countries threaten to or actually impose new tariffs or other retaliatory measures on the U.S.,
its possible that the tariffs are withdrawn ahead of schedule.
In our scenario-based forecasts, however, we assume the tariffs last four years, but are
not extended in 2022. On one hand, 2022 would benefit from pent-up demand and an
abrupt uptick in the number of economically attractive states for distributed and utility
PV. However, we also expect substantial attrition of developers and installers serving the
market between 2018 and 2021, plus a much smaller base for the market to build upon
thereafter. In turn, our scenario-based forecasts account for a less mature market and
customer base in 2022, resulting in reductions to that years base-case forecast as well.
Top-tier module suppliers are sold out through the end of the year, as developers and
installers contract imported modules ahead of a potential November ruling. Two-thirds of this
supply (approximately 1.3 GWdc) will go to utility PV buyers that have better pipeline visibility,
larger volumes and tighter project economics.
In the utility PV segment, the 2018 base-case outlook is primarily based on capacity that
has already secured a PPA. But more than 50% of that pipeline comes from projects that
landed PPAs in H2 2016 onward, after module prices had already crashed. Given that,
the majority of the 2018 utility PV base-case outlook is at risk of cancelation, unless PPA
prices are renegotiated.
If tariffs are approved, its possible (but unlikely) that multiple Tier 1 cell manufacturers enter
the U.S. market to support downstream demand. If any Tier 1 cell suppliers set up gigawatt-
level facilities in the U.S., it would increase the floor on domestic, tariff-free supply to
support the market outlook. However, it can take anywhere between 12 and 18 months to
secure permits to set up a new facility. On top of that, there are only a handful of
manufacturers that have the brand and sales channel in the U.S. to justify setting up a
gigawatt-level facility, let alone manufacture in the U.S. with minimum margins. Realistically,
we would not see any Tier 1 module suppliers set up shop in the U.S. market before 2019.
More importantly, we do not expect global module players to set up sufficient U.S.-based
volume amid the global oversupply environment.
Over the next several years, residential PV can still rely on California and the other major Northeast
state markets to remain above the tipping point under both tariff scenarios. Meanwhile, the non-
residential PV segment is likely to be more sensitive to new tariffs than residential PV, given that
40% to 50% of the base-case outlook depends on large C&I customers with challenging rate
structures, plus the nascent community solar segment that is riddled with project development
and financing risks.
Meanwhile, longer development cycles and tighter project economics are expected to result in
utility PV procuring twice as much capacity from tariff-free module imports than from distributed
PV procurers in H2 2017.
However, the next four years of utility PV procurement is expected to remain primarily driven by
demand outside RPS obligations. In fact, 74% of the current pipeline is already driven by
procurement outside RPS obligations, most of which comes from PURPA and voluntary
procurement. Those drivers are either exclusively (e.g., PURPA) or primarily (e.g., voluntary)
enabled by solars cost-competitiveness with natural-gas alternatives. Given that, a larger number
of state markets for utility PV than for distributed PV are at risk of seeing deployment erased
altogether under either tariff scenario.
Figure 1.1 2018-2022: Base-Case Capacity Additions and Downward Revisions by Tariff Scenario
80,000 72,543
60,000
43,107
40,000
Capacity (MWdc)
18,609
20,000
10,826