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Middle Eastern Studies

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Creating Nations, Establishing States:

Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the
British Creation of Iraq in 191923
Guiditta Fontana
Published online: 12 Feb 2010.

To cite this article: Guiditta Fontana (2010) Creating Nations, Establishing States: Ethno-Religious
Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq in 191923, Middle Eastern Studies, 46:1, 1-16, DOI:
10.1080/00263200902760535

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 Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol. 46, No. 1, 116, January 2010

Creating Nations, Establishing States:

Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity
and the British Creation of Iraq
in 191923
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GUIDITTA FONTANA

A modern Iraqi state, constructed by the British out of the three Ottoman Vilayets of
Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, emerged in the 191923 period when a monarchy was
established and frontiers were dened.1 Whereas the inclusion of the Vilayet of
Mosul in Iraq was formally conrmed only in 1925 by the Council of the League of
Nations, by late 1923 the Baghdad government had already established the capillary
authority over the territory which ultimately motivated the League of Nations to rule
that Mosul was commercially and geographically part of Iraq.2 As the newly created
political system did not draw authority from local communities, and the states
frontiers did not respond to ethnic realities, Iraq largely appeared as an articial
creation, a country of minorities in which political power was distributed along
ethno-religious lines.
A considerable body of literature attributes the rationale for the creation of a
unitary state in the Vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul to international pressures
(foremost the rivalry with France),3 to British economic interests (in particular the
ambition to maintain control over potential oil deposits in the Mosul Vilayet),4 or to
the strategic importance of the three Vilayets for the protection of routes to India
and the Suez Canal. These interpretations largely portray the British as unaware of
or unconcerned with the ethno-religious heterogeneity of the population in the
territory: accordingly, British policy relied on, and simply reproduced, Ottoman
hierarchies.5 Contrasting such perspectives is Charles Tripps assertion that, in
interacting with the local population, the British reinforced particular hierarchies
presenting them as the natural order of society:6 conscious of the ethno-religious
heterogeneity of the local population, the British also recognized their power to
support or suppress dierent groups. Similarly, Saad Eskander shows that the
British, initially supportive of Kurdish nationalism, ultimately disregarded ethnic
factors and promoted Kurdish incorporation in Iraq.7
Undoubtedly, strategic and imperial interests motivated the British to establish a
permanent presence in Mesopotamia. Nonetheless, the denition of such interests
was complicated by several factors. The division of authority in respect to Middle
Eastern policy between the Colonial Oce (CO), Foreign Oce (FO), War Oce

ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/10/010001-16 2010 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/00263200902760535
 2 G. Fontana

(WO) and India Oce (IO) ensured that visions for the territorial and political
organization of the occupied areas became a source of bureaucratic inghting. At the
same time, the British public increasingly questioned the economic and strategic
benets of the retention of Mesopotamia in particular, and of overseas possessions in
general.
Moreover, a formal peace treaty between Turkey and the Entente was signed only
in 1923. The Entente, indicating at the time of the 1918 armistice France, Britain,
Italy and Greece among others, had faught against the Ottomans and their allies in
the First World War. Tension mounted as in 1920 the Turkish Kemalists refused to
accept the terms of the Treaty of Sevres and embarked on a war with Greece and its
Italian, French and British allies: as the Italians and French signed separate peace
agreements with Ankara, Great Britain was left isolated in the Middle East.
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Finally, the evolving ideological underpinnings of world order forced British

policymakers to increasingly involve local elites in the administration of occupied
territories. The correspondence between the High Commissioner in Cairo, Henry
McMahon, and Sharif Hussein of Mecca had eectively promised independence to
the Arabs whilst rearming British short-term control over Basra and Baghdad.8
The British endorsement of American President Woodrow Wilsons 14 Point Peace
Programme, envisaging that nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should
be assured an . . . opportunity of autonomous development,9 was reconrmed by
the Anglo-French Declaration of 8 November 1918 pledging to further and assist in
the establishment of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and
Mesopotamia.10 Such pledges assumed increasing signicance as, in the aftermath
of the war, conquest of territory by war was ruled illegal and the League of Nations
Mandates system was devised to encourage nations to progress towards indepen-
dence under the tutelage of a Mandatory Power. The principle of self-determination
had become the touchstone for the post-war territorial organization: to foster
international peace, nations were to be encouraged to achieve independence and
establish representative and democratic governments.
In the Middle East, the establishment of nation-states was complicated by the
existence of a variety of minorities and rival ethno-religious groups. In the occupied
territory of Mesopotamia, considerable Christian and Jewish minorities were present
in urban centres, while Shia Arabs, following the guidance of the Mujtahids
(religious leaders), formed the majority of the population in both the Baghdad and
Basra Vilayets. A sizeable Sunni population, occupying positions of authority in
Ottoman times and traditionally suspicious of the Shias, was present in the Baghdad
Vilayet. New elites, associated with individual ethno-religious groups, emerged
during the war. In the north of the predominantly Sunni Kurdish district of Mosul,
Shaikh Mahmud Barzanji (hereafter Shaikh Mahmud or Mahmud), the self-
appointed leader of an emerging Kurdish National movement was entrusted by the
British with the maintenance of order while throughout the Arab world appeared a
new Sunni Arab nationalist leadership, the Sharians, associated with the family of
Sharif Hussein of Mecca.
Ethno-religious heterogeneity, and the elites associated to each group, were of
primary interest to the British in Iraq. This article will show that, rather than
disregarding ethno-religious dierences and rivalries, British policymakers took
these factors into account in 191920 and, debating the potential relationships
 Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq 3

between state and minorities, they were inclined to establish ethnically homogeneous
states. Ethno-religious factors receded in importance as the nancial demands
associated with the maintenance of order in Mesopotamia increasingly troubled
London: the coronation of an Arab king was deemed to satisfy promises of self-
determination, while, thanks to the eorts of British ocials in Baghdad, strategic
rather than ethnic arguments prevailed in the denition of the new states frontiers.
By 1923, ethnic and religious heterogeneity had become irrelevant.

In 1919, in the context of spreading ideas of self-determination and widespread

public aversion to imperialism, British policymakers argued that the application of
self-determination would further British interests by providing local stability,
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gratitude towards the British occupier, and international legitimacy, ultimately

ensuring a permanent British presence in the territory. This eectively questions the
widespread assertion that the creation of articial states in the Middle East primarily
resulted from British policymakers perception of an inherent conict between
British imperial interests and the emerging principle of self-determination.11 At the
same time, delays in peace negotiations with Turkey ensured that debates about the
denition of the new states frontiers and future political organization, as Sir Percy
Cox put it in 1921, were of academic rather than of practical importance.12 Thus,
deep bureaucratic disagreements hindered the formulation of a coherent vision for
the future of the territory: in London, conict revolved around the FOs ambition to
establish an Arab state, contrasted by the IOs emphasis on the need for a British
protectorate.13 The most crucial dierence nonetheless appeared between ocials in
London and ocials in Baghdad over the viability and desirability of the application
of self-determination.
While the framing of a peace treaty with Turkey was repeatedly delayed in the
belief that the east could wait,14 the status and borders of occupied ex-Turkish
territory remained ambiguous and London directed ocials in Baghdad to most
scrupulously refrain from any action giving rise to impression in Mosul Vilayet or
elsewhere that future . . . status of Mesopotamia [had] already been decided upon.15
Nonetheless, British ocials eagerly debated the future frontiers of Mesopotamia
and whether future states would have to be ethnically homogeneous.
In his memoirs, Arnold T. Wilson, Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia,
highlights Londons opinion . . . that the frontiers of the future . . . State should,
as far as possible, be racial rather than economic or geographical.16 The occupied
territory would have to be partitioned between an Arab state in the former Baghdad
and Basra Vilayets and an independent Southern Kurdistan in the north of the
Mosul Vilayet. As economic pressure mounted, Winston S. Churchill, then War
Secretary, echoing the British publics demands, went as far as suggesting British
evacuation of Mosul and Baghdad where a Kurdish and a Sunni Arab state would be
created, and the establishment of a British Protectorate over the predominantly Shia
Basra Vilayet.17 Londons commitment to encouraging self-determination in the
occupied territory is conrmed by a WO Memorandum to the British Delegation at
the Paris Peace Conference encouraging the establishment of a Kurdish state and
arguing that a British presence in Southern Kurdistan and Iraq would ensure
security despite the strategically uncertain frontiers.18 This view was consistently
 4 G. Fontana

opposed in Baghdad, where British ocials asserted that The three Vilayets form an
indivisible whole19 in commercial and strategic terms and that the creation of a
Southern Kurdistan would provide the Arab state with indefensible frontiers.
British ocials in Baghdad also questioned Londons twofold assumption that a
distinctive Kurdish nationalism existed and that its aim was the creation of an
independent Kurdistan. Both Wilson and Gertrude Bell reported that demands for
Kurdish independence, rather than being due to genuine nationalism, were the
product of the personal ambitions of individual Kurdish leaders.20 Shaikh
Mahmuds declaration of independence of Southern Kurdistan in May 1919 and
the failure of the ensuing Kurdish rebellion conrmed to British ocials in Baghdad
that the majority of Kurds in the Mosul Vilayet were at best lukewarm towards the
nationalist cause. In this context, and fortied with the results of the 1919
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referendum highlighting the Arab desire for the retention of the whole of Mosul
Vilayet in Iraq,21 Wilson suggested that the grant of some form of autonomy to the
Kurds of Kurdistan had better be left to our initiative, and not laid down in the
Peace Conference.22 The mounting disorder in Kurdish areas and the intensication
of Turkish intrigue in late 1919 further persuaded Wilson that the creation of an
independent Southern Kurdistan would only result in an anarchic area between the
plains of Mesopotamia and the Persian frontier.23
Despite the opposition of ocials in Baghdad, London persisted in its
determination to create ethnically homogeneous states: the signature of the Treaty
of Sevres in August 1920 represented its culmination, with the formal establishment
of a Kurdish independent state. Rather than being inherently ambivalent about
Kurdistan,24 the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres were hampered by the Turkish
Grand National Assemblys refusal to ratify the treaty.
In spite of the failure of the treaty, London maintained that it was only through
the creation of an independent Kurdish enclave that security could be maintained in
the north of the Mosul Vilayet: as the IO tentatively suggested, Might it not in these
circumstances be better course to withdraw our Political Ocers, &c., and leave
Kurds to their own devices? . . . Last thing [the British Government] desire[s] is to
create a new North-West Frontier problem on the very doubtful border of Iraq.25
Once again Wilson remarked that it was only through the inclusion of Kurdish
districts in Iraq that stability could be achieved: Frontier problem will be created
only if Kurdistan is left to its own devices.26
The creation of a political system in Mesopotamia in 191920 was similarly
characterized by immobility. As early as January 1919, the British cabinets Eastern
Committee had indicated the intention to set up an Arab government in
Mesopotamia27 to full the pledges of the Anglo-French declaration of November
1918 and meet the expectations raised by the establishment of an independent Arab
state in Syria.28 Debates nonetheless emerged as to whether an Arab government
would accomplish genuine self-determination or rather result in the antithesis of a
representative government for an ethnically and religiously divided population.
Once again conict emerged between ocials in London and Wilson. The FO
(and, by 1920, the IO) saw the establishment of an Arab government, headed by an
Arab king with liberal religious views, possibly a son of Sharif Hussein,29 as the
fullment of British wartime pledges for liberation of the Arabs, national self-
determination and representative governments.30 In contrast, Wilson argued that
 Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq 5

Your statement that we are going to have an Arab State in Mesopotamia whether
Mesopotamia wants it or not, is the rst indication I have had as to the real
signicance of self-determination as applied to this country.31
According to Wilson, an Arab state headed by an Arab king would result in a
disproportionate concentration of power in the hands of the Sunni minority, by
virtue of their superior educational and professional standards:32 I believe that the
results would be the antithesis of a democratic Government.33 To dampen the FOs
enthusiasm for the creation of an Arab state headed by a member of Husseins
family, Wilson had promoted a referendum in the occupied territory in early 1919.
Thereafter he was able to point out that, rather than commanding universal
enthusiasm, the idea of an Arab Amir had scared the Jewish and Christian minorities
into demanding British permanence.34
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Not only did policymakers in London sideline such observations, assuming a

common identity among Muslim Arabs, they also overlooked the ShiaSunni divide.
Ignorance contributed to this: in Baghdad contact was rarely established with the
Shia religious leaders and Wilson reports that at the Versailles Peace Conference the
British delegation refused to believe in the existence of a Shia majority in Iraq.35
Avoiding the denition of the future political status of Mesopotamia and persisting
in military administration of the territory, the British eectively encouraged the
emergence of an Arab Iraqi nation.36 Thus, during the 1920 revolt against the British
occupation an extraordinary cooperation between secular Arab Nationalists and
Shia tribesmen, led by the Mujtahids, brought the British administration to its
knees. The demands of Mesopotamian Arabs for a Muslim ruler were still seen by the
British as anarchy plus fanaticism . . . little or no nationalism;37 unity was equally
minimized, as, according to British ocials, Muslim Government To the Shiah
[sic] Mujtahids . . . meant a theocratic state; . . . to the Sunnis and free-thinkers of
Baghdad . . . was an independent Arab State under the Amir Abdullah; to the tribes
it meant no government at all.38 Even during the revolt Wilson found conrmation
for his misgivings: meeting three Sunni Iraqi nationalists in July 1920, he wondered
about the future position of the Shias and Kurds and was informed that they were
ignorant peasants who could easily be kept in their place.39
Thus, in 191920, discussions as to the future political and territorial
arrangements for the occupied territory were largely theoretical as policy was not
to be implemented before the conclusion of peace with Turkey. Nonetheless, the
ethno-religious heterogeneity of the population preoccupied British policymakers
and the eects of potential policies upon dierent ethno-religious groups were amply
discussed. Important dierences emerged between ocials in London and Wilson in
Baghdad. In Wilsons view, a period of direct British rule was necessary to ensure
that ultimately the Shia would occupy their rightful place in the Arab administra-
tion.40 In his insistence on the benets of British permanence, Wilson was opposed
by the British government and public, who maintained that direct British
administration would only result in anti-foreign nationalism. The 1920 rebellion in
eect conrmed the governments conviction: the twin failure to dismantle the
military administration and to establish an independent Kurdish enclave encouraged
the emergence of nationalism respectively among the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet
and among the Arabs of the Basra and Baghdad Vilayets. Leading classes
materialized in the shape of Mahmuds movement in Southern Kurdistan and an
 6 G. Fontana

alliance of Mujtahids and Sunni Arab nationalists associated with the Sharians in
the Basra and Baghdad Vilayets.
Events in the summer of 1920 profoundly altered the context for British
policymaking in Mesopotamia in four respects. First, the Turkish repudiation of the
Treaty of Sevres and the Grand National Assemblys declaration of war against the
Allies who had imposed it eliminated the prospect of peace with Turkey. The ensuing
Greco-Turkish war and Lloyd Georges determination to support the Greeks
deepened British international isolation and led to Turkish propaganda and
incursions in the Mosul Vilayet. Second, the French occupation of Damascus,
marking the end of Faisals Syrian kingdom, hampered the ambitions of pan-Arab
nationalists while providing a credible aspirant to the Iraqi throne in the person of
Faisal himself. Third, Britains formal acceptance of the League of Nations Mandate
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for the territory of Mesopotamia sanctioned and provided legitimacy for British
exclusive inuence over the territory. Fourth, the Iraqi rebellion, which ended only in
November 1920, and the increasing cost of the occupation convinced London of
the necessity to dismantle the military administration and conciliate Arab
nationalism.
In January 1921, a Middle Eastern Department was established at the CO to
provide coherent and centralized guidance for British policy in the Middle East. A
detailed programme for future British policy in Mesopotamia was created during the
Cairo Conference (March 1921), when Middle East experts, under the guidance of
the new Colonial Secretary, Churchill, denitively adopted a policy of indirect rule in
the newly acquired territories.41 Indirect rule seemed to further the three overriding
concerns of British policymakers: the maintenance of economic and strategic
inuence, the reduction of the permanent military garrisons so as to reduce expenses,
and the need to ensure local stability.
Cox, the new British High Commissioner (HC) in Mesopotamia, being highly
regarded by Churchill, eectively had a free hand in implementing British policy.42
As soon as Cox succeeded Wilson in Baghdad, the military administration was
dismantled and a provisional Arab Council of State was created in November 1920.
Attention to ethno-religious factors diminished: while London persisted in its
ambition to create a Kurdish enclave in the north of the Mosul Vilayet, ocials in
Baghdad avoided implementing Londons directives. Meanwhile, the 1920 rebellion,
and the virulent anti-British stance of the Shia Mujtahids, persuaded British ocials
to rely on the more accommodating Sunni nationalists for the creation of the Iraqi
state.43
In 192122 British policy towards the Kurds in the Mosul Vilayet was still
characterized by the divergence between London and ocials in Baghdad. Despite
the failure of the Treaty of Sevres, London maintained that newly created states
should be ethnically homogeneous. Churchill saw the establishment of a Kurdish
state as the best guarantee against Arab oppression of the Kurdish minority and as
an eective buer against potential Turkish attacks.44 He was opposed by Cox and
Bell, who, during the Cairo Conference, argued against all available evidence that
incorporation of Southern Kurdistan in Iraq was desired by the Kurdish
population.45 The Conference argued that Kurdish incorporation would exacerbate
Kurdish nationalism and lead to a Kurdish alliance with Turkey:46 Kurdish districts
were therefore to be separately administered by the HC.
 Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq 7

Convinced that however ideal theoretically it would be extremely dicult in

practice to make ethnology [the] sole criterion of a frontier,47 in the following year
Cox preferred to let matters take their own course,48 eectively ignoring Londons
directives for Kurdish separation. Two considerations inuenced Cox. First, he saw
the encouragement of Arab imperialism over the Kurdish districts as osetting anti-
British propaganda.49 This explains the HCs support for the provisional Arab
governments assertion that incorporation would be accepted by the Kurds, given
their small numbers and their susceptibility to get amalgamated with the people of
Iraq.50 Second, Cox wanted to avoid creating a precedent for separation from the
newly created state. Since June 1921 Basra had advocated independence from
Baghdad,51 if Kurdish areas were to secede: Basrah [sic] and other communities
would want to follow suit and it would be dicult to argue with them.52
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As early as June 1921, Cox attempted to argue that in Cairo it had been decided to
include the Kurdish districts in Iraq;53 he was rebued by Churchills directive of
keeping the Kurdish districts apart from Iraq and . . . setting up a non-Arab buer
between the Arab state and its potential enemies.54 The HC however remained
determined to delay policy implementation. Kurds were encouraged to participate in
the referendum for the election of the Iraqi king but rather than accepting Faisal, as
hoped by Cox, Suleimani (as spelt in the sources used, nowadays Sulaimaniyya)
abstained and Kirkuk refused rudely to swear allegiance to Faisal.55 After his
election, Cox informed Faisal that the British Government would prefer that . . . [the
Kurdish] districts remained an integral part of Iraq rather than they should secede56
and only when the COs Hubert Young personally travelled to Baghdad was it made
clear to Faisal that Policy was encouragement of Arab nationalism not Arab
imperialism.57 By late 1921 Cox encouraged Faisal to assert that unless His
Majestys Government is prepared to accept full military responsibility . . . [Faisal]
must have a determining voice in the decision as to what . . . borders are to be.58
Tension was mounting in the Kurdish districts as Kurds agitated for
independence and the return of Shaikh Mahmud from exile. Thus in the summer
of 1922 the CO directly intervened with a perfectly damnable despatch . . . re-
commending that . . . we shall practically advise . . . all the Kurdish districts within
Iraq to . . . form a Kurdish independent state.59 Under explicit CO directives
Mahmud was also recalled from exile and appointed governor of Suleimani, an
entirely Kurdish area recently evacuated by British troops. Mahmuds presence in
Suleimani, while containing Turkish propaganda, also inspired numerous petitions
from Kurdish districts requesting separation from Iraq and union with Mahmuds
enclave. Rather than seeing them as manifestations of Kurdish nationalism, Cox
interpreted the petitions as signs of disorder and, in September 1922, advised
London that in the present situation it would be a mistake to create further
uncertainty by asking the remaining Kurdish areas whether they wish for
inclusion in Iraq or not . . . remaining areas will now join in the elections [for the
Iraq Constituent Assembly].60 Marr suggests that Kurdish independence was not
established because of the lack of prospective Kurdish rulers.61 In fact, the COs
policy was consciously sabotaged by Coxs attempts to promote rival leaders62
and by the HCs refusal to recognize the constituency of Shaikh Mahmud. On his
part, Mahmud abused his position by his repeated declaration that he was King
of the Kurds.
 8 G. Fontana

By late 1920, British policymakers had decided that Iraq was to have an Arab
government even in the absence of peace with Turkey. Thus it was decided to
provide Iraq with a king, while a treaty between the British and Iraqi governments
would substitute the League of Nations Mandate. British policymakers were now
determined to ensure that the nal authority must be in the hands of the Sunnis, in
spite of their numerical inferiority; otherwise you will have a Mujtahid-run,
theocratic state.63
Thus, since his arrival in Baghdad, Cox systematically refused to recognize the
political authority of the Shia Mujtahids and marginalized them in the negotiations
marking the end of the 1920 rebellion, hoping to clip their wings.64 Meanwhile the
HC insisted on a Shia secular presence in the Iraqi provisional State Council, in the
hope of encouraging the emergence of a Shia secular leadership associated with
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the British. In this he was hindered by the Iraqi Cabinet, which is mainly Sunni and
very determined to remain Sunni.65 The re-emerging ShiaSunni mistrust after the
failure of the 1920 rebellion was so pronounced as to lead to increasing Sunni
support for a Turkish ruler for Iraq, because They are afraid of being swamped by
the Shiahs [sic], against whom a Turk might be a better bulwark than a son of the
Sharif.66
This ran contrary to British designs. As early as August 1920 Bell had ironically
suggested: now [that] Faisal is in England Sir Percy should crown him King of
Mesopotamia in Westminster Abbey.67 In fact, under Wilsons suggestion,68 Cox
and the British Eastern Committee in London were exploring the possibility for
Faisals appointment as king in early August 192069 and at the Cairo Conference the
appointment of Faisal as King of Iraq appeared as the best and cheapest solution.70
His religious tolerance would have conciliated the Shia majority, while his nationalist
credentials would have united the population: local candidates, with inevitably
sectarian power-bases, would not be acceptable to Iraq at large.71 The application of
democratic methods to the election of the future king was ruled out and the British
coupon72 was decisive in securing the election of Faisal as king and his coronation
in August 1921. As the leaders of the major Euphrates tribes put it, We swear
allegiance to you as King of Iraq, since you are accepted by the British
Government.73
In the hope to maximize the HCs inuence, the British enhanced the kings
powers at the expense of the cabinet and future Constitutional Assembly.74
What London had not predicted was that Faisal, in posing as an independent
monarch and attempting to enlarge his power base, would court the Shia religious
leaders. Increasingly, Faisals appeals to an inevitably anti-British nationalism75 and
the Mujtahids calls for complete Muslim independence from Christian rule
converged into a common opposition to the British Mandate and the Anglo-Iraq
Treaty.
In the summer of 1922 the Shia dominated Watani and Nahda parties presented a
petition to the king asking for the dismissal of the pro-British cabinet, the
repudiation of Mandate and treaty and the expulsion of British advisors.76 Faisals
decision to conciliate the Mujtahids led to the resignation of the Sunni-dominated
cabinet while the kings association with the Mujtahids and anti-British elements in
Iraq prompted Cox to question the results of British policy. The HC reported to
London that, meeting Sunni moderates, he felt ashamed when asked why we
 Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq 9

inicted them with such a paltry character for their King77 and argued
that Faisal aspires with the help of his entourage to become an irresponsible
autocrat.78
As London was considering deposing the king,79 an opportunity presented itself
for the HC to intervene directly in Iraqi politics. On the anniversary of the kings
coronation, Cox interrupted a nationalist gathering inside the royal palace. The
following day the king fell sick with appendicitis and, in the absence of a cabinet,
Cox himself assumed the reins of power, determined to suppress anti-British
nationalism. While closing nationalist newspapers, Cox also arrested the leaders of
the Shia parties and targeted prominent Shia divines, encouraging them to leave to
Persia. As he recovered, King Faisal approved the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, issued a royal
decree promoting the elections for the rst Iraqi Constitutional Assembly, and fully
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endorsed Coxs actions.

Thus, in 192122 the Kurdish problem was marginalized as the HC, fortied with
the opinion of the Iraqi government, repeatedly delayed the implementation of
Londons directives for the creation of an independent Kurdish enclave in the Mosul
Vilayet. Coxs refusal to accept Mahmud as a legitimate interlocutor and his attempt
to promote rival Kurdish leaders conrms that British ocials in Baghdad, showing
considerable independence from London, consciously discriminated between elites.
Similarly, the HC refused to recognize the Mujtahids as political interlocutors and
directly targeted them in the summer of 1922. In this period, British attempts to
promote a Shia lay class associated with the Arab government failed because
of the twin pressure of Sunni mistrust and of the Shia Mujtahids opposition to
British inuence which persuaded the Shia majority to openly oppose Mandate and
treaty.
In late 1922 the fall of the Lloyd George government in Britain and its
replacement by the Conservative Bonar Law cabinet led to escalating debates over
the advantages of a British presence in Iraq. As early as December 1922 a new
cabinet committee on Iraq was created: whereas British presence in the territory was
still deemed necessary, it was to be reduced from the 20 years originally envisaged in
the Anglo-Iraq Treaty to only four years. The treaty was modied in this sense in
April 1923. The new Colonial Secretary, Victor Cavendish, Duke of Devonshire,
lacked previous knowledge of the Middle East: British policy was therefore
increasingly inuenced by ocials in Baghdad.80 Finally, as Bonar Law replaced the
profoundly anti-Turkish Lloyd George, the opening of the Lausanne Conference
with Turkey in late 1922 provided the occasion for a rapid conclusion of peace. King
Faisal, for his part, recognized that British support was essential if Mosul, still
claimed by Turkey as integral part of its territory, was to be retained by Iraq, and set
out to curtail anti-British movements.
British policy in Iraq in 1923 aimed to create a state, establishing exclusive
government control over the territory and population. In this context, ethnic and
religious dierences were superseded by the necessity to provide secure frontiers and
to strengthen the governments exclusive authority. Cox and his successor Henry
Dobbs were convinced that only the Armistice line could provide strategically
defensible borders in the north: this made Kurdish incorporation necessary. The Shia
problem similarly came to a head in 1923, with a nal showdown between the Arab
government and the Shia Mujtahids.
 10 G. Fontana

In 1923, British policy towards the Kurds increasingly mirrored that of the
Arab government in Baghdad in its emphasis upon the incorporation of the
Kurdish districts in Iraq. The reduction of the terms of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty to
four years did not leave enough time to establish a Kurdish independent enclave,
given that recommendations for the Kurdish separation from Iraq had never been
implemented as, according to Dobbs, the people did not press for them.81
Determined to rapidly achieve peace with Turkey, London also came to believe
that Kurdish incorporation would facilitate negotiations as Turkish determina-
tion to . . . Southern Kurdistan is based on belief in our intention to give
Autonomy to Kurdish areas included in Iraq82 and on the fear this would
encourage separatism among Turkish Kurds.
As early as January 1923 King Faisal and Cox published their intentions to
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provide autonomy to Kurdish provinces, qualifying it so: Iraq Government

recognised the rights of Kurds living within the boundaries of the Iraq to set up a
Kurdish Government within these boundaries;83 independence was not on the table.
The extension of Iraqs authority over the Kurdish districts in the Mosul Vilayet was
signalled by the decision of Faisals brother, Prince Zaid, to take up residence in
Mosul. British ocials, persuaded that disorders in Kurdish areas, not resulting
from nationalism, were due to the fact . . . that the Arab Govt [sic] has lacked
prestige, believed that if we only leave Zaid alone, he and the northern Kurds will
come to a very comfortable arrangement.84
Two factors motivated the Arab government to achieve a rapid incorporation of
the Kurdish districts in Iraq. First, as early as September 1921, Faisal had argued
that, given the Shia demographic majority, excision of a large slice of Sunni districts
of Iraq out of State and exclusion of their representatives from national assembly
would place Shiahs [sic] in a very strong position.85 Second, the British delegation in
Lausanne failed to persuade the Turks to give up their claims to the Mosul Vilayet:
as peace was signed, the question of Mosul was referred to the League of Nations
which, sidelining potential Kurdish independence, set out to determine whether the
disputed territory would be assigned to Turkey or Iraq. Faisal, seconded by his
British advisors, feared that Kurdish autonomy would exacerbate disorders so that
if [a] commission from [the] League of Nations came out in a years time there would
be grave danger that it would consign South Kurdistan to Turkey on the ground that
Iraq was unable to control it.86
The British abandonment of a policy of ethnic separation was expressed by Dobbs
in June 1923 in a report to London to the eect that It is expected that . . . Kurdish
districts will join in the elections automatically.87 The protest of William Ormsby-
Gore, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, that Something like a denite
policy was laid down at Cairo in 1921 . . . the action now proposed by Sir H. Dobbs
involves its direct reversal,88 was ignored: by 1923 strategic and economic arguments
had triumphed over the principle of self-determination. Thus in October 1923 Dobbs
was able to declare unopposed that our aim is to incorporate in Mesopotamia all
Kurdish areas which may fall on Mosul side of frontier as a result of the negotiations
[with Turkey].89
One problem remained: the existence of a Kurdish enclave in Suleimani under the
governorship of Shaikh Mahmud. In December 1923 Dobbs decided to bomb it,
eectively demonstrating that Kurdish separatism would not be tolerated. Suleimani
 Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq 11

was occupied by British and Iraqi troops in July 1924 and the Kurdish districts,
participating in the 1924 Iraqi Constitutional Assembly elections, were nally
incorporated into Iraq.
The kings decree for the Constitutional Assembly elections published in October
1922 was immediately followed by fatwas (religious rulings) by the major Shia
Mujtahids arming that Participation in the elections is Haram because they will
bring harm to Iraq.90 Election committees in predominantly Shia districts resigned
en masse while tribal leaders were hesitating between the Royal injunction to take
part in the elections and the whispered threats . . . that elections were heretical.91
The Mujtahids strenuous opposition to the British in 1920, and to the treaty in 1922,
had been primarily motivated by the refusal to place Muslims under the domination
of British Christians. By 1923, the religious leaders confrontational stance also
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reected a protest against Shia marginalization in the administration and Sunni

domination of the Iraqi cabinet92 and the Grand Mujtahid of Kadhimain Mahdi
al-Khalisi, in calling for a Muslim republic free from foreign interference, voiced
the concerns of the Shia majority and increasingly acted like a rival head of
state.93
A struggle ensued in 1923 between the Arab government, predominantly Sunni,
secular and headed by Faisal, and the religious leaders of the Shia majority in Iraq.
British ocials had long deprecated Faisals attempts to conciliate the Mujtahids: in
late 1922 Bell argued that the king and cabinet have made all the concessions they
honourably can and theres nothing now but to ght it out.94 Cox himself warned
London that there is nothing to be gained by delaying action against Ulema.95
In late December 1922, Faisal appointed a new cabinet, aiming to prevent illegal
interference in the elections. In view of the Shiah fatwahs [sic] this clause is of great
importance.96 Therefore the king, endorsing his British advisors recommendation,
set out to marginalize the Mujtahids. Their exclusion was accomplished by courting
the Shia tribal leaders: during the election campaign in the summer of 1923 the king
promised increasing numbers of seats in the Constituent Assembly and various tax
exemptions to Shia tribal leaders.97 Government propaganda also portrayed Shia
divines as agents of the Persian government by virtue of their Persian citizenship.
This, while apparently only reinforcing a generalized Sunni hostility to Shias, also
succeeded in creating a rift between the Persian Mujtahids and Arab tribesmen,98
eectively dividing the Shia community, facilitating the exclusion of the religious
leaders and allowing the Arab government to ignore their demands. Seconding the
repeated suggestion of British advisors that deportation of prominent Mujtahids was
necessary to separate them from their constituency,99 the Iraqi government also
promoted a new immigration law providing for the deportation of foreign citizens
engaged in anti-government activity.
The conict between Faisal and the Mujtahids came to a head in June 1923, when
a son of al-Khalisi was arrested while posting a fatwa on the door of the Kadhimain
Mosque, and al-Khalisi responded by calling for the Baghdad bazaar to close down
in protest. As British ocials reported, this incident . . . brought the authority of
Government into denite and open conict with the inuence of the Ulama and the
Government had no choice but to take up the challenge.100 Al-Khalisi and three
members of his family were thus arrested and deported to Persia where the most
prominent Mujtahids of Iraq followed them in protest.
 12 G. Fontana

The deportations marked the end of clerical inuence on Iraqi politics and, as
Marr notes, left the leadership of the nationalist movement in the hands of Arab
Sunni nationalists willing to cooperate with the British.101 They also encouraged
prominent Shias to align with the king and to accept Sunni domination of Iraqi
politics. As early as November 1923, a deputation of prominent Shias presented a
manifesto to the king stating that the Shiah [sic] community had seen the error of
their ways and were now going to back the treaty and the British connection.102
Despite voicing their hopes for a major Shia representation in the cabinet, they
armed that they were content with the proposed cabinet and would loyally
support it,103 eectively endorsing Shia marginalization in the Iraqi administration.
Similarly, the exiled Mujtahids withdrew their fatwas as the Iraqi government
promised that, on condition of their abstention from political activity, they would be
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allowed to return to Iraq after the elections.

The Constitutional Assembly elections, taking place in 1924, were based on an
Electoral Law so framed that the elections must be hopelessly gerrymandered in
favour of the Sunnis.104 Thereafter, Shia elites, mainly consisting of tribal leaders
associated with the government by virtue of their individual socioeconomic interests,
would be politically subservient to the Sunni minority.
Thus, by late 1923, the British occupiers had succeeded in creating a unitary state
in the three Vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. Hereafter, an Arab Sunni-
dominated central government based in Baghdad would attempt to suppress
periodical manifestations of Kurdish nationalism, while struggling for clerical
marginalization in politics and reinforcing Sunni political domination over the Shia
demographic majority.

The history of twentieth century Iraq is largely characterized by the persistence of

tensions between dierent ethno-religious groups and by the eorts of Sunni-
dominated central governments to impose their exclusive authority over the Kurds in
the north and to politically marginalize the Shias. Tensions can be largely traced
back to the articial political and geographical conguration of the State of Iraq as
created by the British between 1919 and 1923. British attention to, or disregard for,
the ethno-religious heterogeneity of the population in the occupied territory of
Mesopotamia assumes crucial signicance in this light.
In 191920 British policy in the occupied territory of Mesopotamia was
characterized by immobility while ocials debated the viability of an application
of self-determination to the Kurdish districts and the desirability of the creation of
an Arab government in the territory. It was only in 192122 that British policy-
makers resolved to create an Arab government headed by King Faisal and based in
Baghdad, and only by 1923 did London encourage the Arab government to extend
its capillary and exclusive authority over people and territory, eectively establishing
a state. British policy in Mesopotamia was largely reactive, reecting concerns with
the Turkish menace: immobility, the promotion of a Kurdish buer state and the
nal incorporation of Kurdish districts in Iraq are to be interpreted in this light.
The denition of Iraqs political system and frontiers was largely inuenced by the
relationship between government departments in London and British ocials in
Baghdad. Whereas tensions between Wilson and London led to intense debates in
 Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq 13

191920, Cox was later able to ignore Londons directions for Kurdish separation;
the predominance of ocials in Baghdad over policy formulation in 1923 ensured
that the project of ethnically homogeneous states was abandoned. Ocials in
Baghdad also recognized the need to provide Faisal with a wide power base by
creating a Shia leadership associated to the governments interests. They set out to
co-opt members of various ethno-religious groups to the cause of the Arab
government through individual socioeconomic incentives. Thus, British policy-
makers, in discriminating between local elites, eectively created their subjects: the
choice to crown Faisal, a foreigner, King of Iraq, reected the British decision to
accept the Sharians as Arab interlocutors. In most instances, discrimination, rather
than originating in London, was the product of the attitudes of British ocials in
Baghdad. Indeed, Cox, since his arrival in Baghdad, set out to marginalize the
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Mujtahids while also attempting to undermine the following of Shaikh Mahmud

among Kurds.
In fact, in 191920 London did not perceive the principles of self-determination
and representative government as necessarily conicting with British imperial
interests. The creation of ethnically homogeneous states appeared to further security
and stability in the newly occupied territories while fostering popular gratitude and
international legitimacy for the British occupation. Similarly, the creation of
representative governments in the occupied territories appeared to minimize overseas
expenses and military commitments while conciliating the emerging public hostility
to an expanding British empire. What was to be ensured was the native governments
recognition of the primacy of British interests.
Thus, although in late 1923 power relations between dierent ethno-religious
groups in Iraq mirrored the Ottoman Sunni-dominated order, the recreation of such
order was by no means linear. Only as economic pressure mounted, a British
evacuation was envisaged for the immediate future, and peace with Turkey had to be
facilitated, British policymakers, rather than encouraging nations, set out to
crystallize a state in the three former Vilayets. The states security would be provided
by geographically and strategically dened frontiers and its internal stability would
be entrusted to a central government commanding the populations exclusive loyalty.
In late 1922 the newly created state of Iraq appeared articial enough to encourage
the London Times to polemically assert that no common purpose yet animates these
heterogeneous communities . . . Mesopotamia, with its vague frontiers and mixed
population, was treated as a nation, as an embryo State, to be ranked with the
modern democracies included under the League of Nations.105

Notes
The author wishes to thank Professor Rory Miller for his guidance, help and support.

1. E. Kedourie, England and the Middle East, The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 19141921
(London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1987), p.213.
2. League of Nations, Question of the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq, Report Submitted to the Council
by the Commission instituted by the Council Resolution of September 30th, 1924, 20 August 1925.
3. E. Kedourie, Great Britain, the Other Powers, and the Middle East before and after World War I,
in U. Dann (ed.), The Great Powers in the Middle East, 19191939 (New York: Holmes & Meier,
1988), p.9.
 14 G. Fontana

4. P. Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, Contriving King and Country, 19141932 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2007), p.66.
5. P. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), p.25, Y. Nakash, The
Shiis of Iraq (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.75.
6. C. Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.30.
7. S. Eskander, Southern Kurdistan under Britains Mesopotamian Mandate: From Separation to
Incorporation, 192023, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.37, No.2 (April 2001), pp.15380.
8. For a discussion of the motivations for the HusseinMcMahon Correspondence, of its political
relevance and of the main historiographical debates, see E. Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
9. H.W.V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol.VI (London: Henry Frowde and
Hodder & Stoughton, 1924), p.24.
10. Quoted in A.T. Wilson, Mesopotamia 19171920, A Clash of Loyalties (London: Humphrey Milford,
1931), p.102.
11. C. Catherwood, Winstons Folly: Imperialism and the Creation of Modern Iraq (London: Constable,
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2004), p.66.
12. Cox to Churchill, 9 December 1921, FO141/446/2, Public Record Oce (PRO).
13. E. Monroe, Britains Moment in the Middle East, 19141971 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1981),
pp.523; B. Westrate, The Arab Bureau, British Policy in the Middle East, 19161920 (University
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), pp.1423.
14. Wilson, Mesopotamia, p.261.
15. IO to Wilson, 5 June 1919, FO608/97, PRO.
16. Wilson, Mesopotamia, p.144.
17. The Arab Problem, The Times, 8 Oct. 1919 and Catherwood, Winstons Folly, p.92.
18. Peace Conference: Memorandum Respecting Mesopotamia, Jan. 1919, FO608/96, PRO.
19. Wilson to Montagu, 13 Feb. 1920, FO882/23, PRO.
20. G.L. Bell, Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia (London: His Majestys Stationery
Oce, 1920), pp.62, 63, 73, 74.
21. Self-determination in Iraq, Copies and translations of declarations and other documents relating to
Self-Determination in Iraq, 20 Feb. 1919, FO608/96, PRO.
22. Wilson, Mesopotamia, p.114.
23. Wilson to Montagu, 25 March 1920, FO882/23, PRO.
24. Catherwood, Winstons Folly, p.116.
25. Wilson, Mesopotamia, p.142.
26. Ibid., p.142.
27. Peace Conference: Memorandum Respecting Mesopotamia, Jan. 1919, FO608/96, PRO.
28. G.L. Bell, Syria in October 1919, encl. to Wilson to Montagu, 15 Nov. 1919, FO608/275, PRO.
29. Balfour to Wingate, 23 Jan. 1919, FO 141/444/7, PRO.
30. H. Young, Memorandum on the future of Mesopotamia, 20 Feb. 1919, FO608/96, PRO.
31. Wilson to Hirtzel, 12 Sept. 1919, L/PS/10/757, India Oce Records (IOR).
32. Wilson to Montagu, 15 Nov. 1919, FO608/275, PRO.
33. Wilson, Mesopotamia, p.315.
34. Peace Conference: Memorandum Respecting Mesopotamia, January 1919, FO608/96, PRO.
35. Wilson, Mesopotamia, p.116.
36. J. Wallach, Desert Queen, The Extraordinary Life of Gertrude Bell (London: Phoenix, 1997), p.263.
37. Wilson, quoted in David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, Creating the Modern Middle East,
19141922 (London: A. Deutsch, 1989), p.453.
38. Bell, Review, p.143.
39. Wilson, Mesopotamia, p.269.
40. Wilson to Montagu, 9 June 1920, L/PS/10/756, IOR.
41. Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, p.41.
42. Churchill to Cox, 9 July 1921, CO730/3, PRO.
43. G.L. Bell, To Father, 14 Nov. 1920, The Gertrude Bell Project (GBP), http://www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk/.
44. Report on Middle Eastern Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem, March 12th to 30th, 1921, June
1921, CO935/1/1, PRO and Eskander, Southern Kurdistan, p.154.
45. Churchill to Lloyd George, received 16 March 1921, E 4211/533/65, FO141/456/7, PRO.
 Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq 15

46. Eskander, Southern Kurdistan, p.156.

47. Cox to Churchill, 4 July 1921, CO730/3, PRO.
48. P. Graves, The Life of Sir Percy Cox (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1941), p.283.
49. Eskander, Southern Kurdistan, p.157.
50. Letter from Ministry of National Defence to H.H. the President of the Council of State, encl. to
Iraq Intelligence Report (IIR), No.5, 15 Jan. 1921, CO730/1, PRO.
51. To H.E. Sir Percy Cox, H.C. for the Occupied Territories of Mesopotamia, Basrah, 13 June 1921,
CO730/3, PRO.
52. Cox to Churchill, 2 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
53. Ibid.
54. Draft Telegram Churchill to Cox, June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
55. Bell, To Father, 9 Nov. 1921, GBP.
56. Cox to Churchill, 20 Sept. 1921, CO730/5, PRO.
57. Cox to Churchill, 25 Oct. 1921, CO730/6, PRO.
58. News Summary, Baghdad, 11 Nov. 1921, CO730/7, PRO.
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59. Bell, To Father, 15 Aug. 1922, GBP.

60. Cox to Churchill, 14 Sept. 1922, CO730/24, PRO.
61. Marr, The Modern, p.29.
62. Eskander, Southern Kurdistan, p.169.
63. Bell, To Father, 3 Oct. 1920, GBP.
64. Bell, To Father, 29 Nov. 1920, GBP.
65. Bell, To Father, 7 Feb. 1921, GBP.
66. To H.B., 22 Jan. 1921, in G.L. Bell, The Letters of Gertrude Bell (London: Ernest Benn Limited,
1927), p.585.
67. Bell, To Father, 16 Aug. 1920, GBP.
68. Wilson to Montagu, 31 July 1920, FO141/444/7, PRO.
69. 25th Minutes of the Finance Committee, 3 Aug. 1920, WO32/5745, PRO, and H.St.J.B. Philby,
Arabian Days (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1948), p.186.
70. Churchill to Lloyd George, 13 March 1921, FO141/456/7, E4211/533/65, PRO.
71. Report on Middle Eastern Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem, March 12th to 30th, 1921, June
1921, CO935/1/1, PRO.
72. H.W. Young, The Independent Arab (London: John Murray, 1933), p.326.
73. IIR, No.18, 1 Aug. 1921, CO730/4; for further discussions of Faisals power base and the importance
of the British connection, see Temperley, A History, p.186; Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, p.43; L. Lukitz, A
Quest in the Middle East: Gertrude Bell and the Making of Modern Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004),
p.151.
74. Cox to Churchill, 4 Dec. 1921, CO730/8, PRO.
75. Bell, To Father, 12 June 1921, GBP.
76. P. Graves, The Life of Sir Percy Cox (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1941), p.316.
77. Cox to Churchill, 24 Aug. 1922, CO730/24, PRO.
78. Ibid.
79. Draft Telegram, Churchill to Cox, 25 Aug. 1922, CO730/24, PRO.
80. Eskander, Southern Kurdistan, pp.169, 172.
81. H. Dobbs, Report of the High Commissioner on the Development of Iraq, 19201925, Aug. 1925,
CO935/1/11, PRO.
82. Dobbs to Duke of Devonshire, 1 Oct. 1923, CO730/42, PRO.
83. IIR, No. 1, 1 Jan. 1923, CO730/37, PRO.
84. Bell, To Father, 1 March 1923, GBP.
85. Cox to Churchill, 20 Sept. 1921, CO730/5, PRO.
86. Dobbs to Duke of Devonshire, 7 June 1923, CO730/40, PRO.
87. Dobbs to Duke of Devonshire, 15 June 1923, FO730/40, PRO.
88. Minute by William Ormsby-Gore on Dobbs to Duke of Devonshire, 15 June 1923, FO730/40,
PRO.
89. Dobbs to Duke of Devonshire, 1 Oct. 1923, CO730/42, PRO.
90. IIR, No.22, 15 Nov. 1922, CO730/26, PRO.
91. King Feisal on Tour, The Times, 21 July 1923.
 16 G. Fontana

92. IIR, No.14, 5 July 1923, CO730/40, PRO; see also Tripp, A History, pp.52, 56; Wallach, Desert
Queen, p.286.
93. S. Zubaida, The Fragments Imagine the Nation: The Case of Iraq, International Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.2 (May 2002), pp.20515, at p.212.
94. Bell, To Father, 16 Dec. 1922, GBP.
95. Cox to Duke of Devonshire, 19 Dec. 1922, CO730/26, PRO.
96. IIR, No.23, 1 Dec. 1922, CO730/26, PRO.
97. Nakash, The Shiis, pp.88, 91; Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, p.63; Tripp, A History, p.56.
98. Tripp, A History, p.57.
99. Bell, To Father, 12 April 1923, GBP.
100. IIR, No.14, 5 July 1923, CO730/40, PRO.
101. Marr, The Modern, p.32.
102. Bell, To Father, 29 Nov. 1923, GBP.
103. IIR, No.23, 1 Dec. 1923, CO730/43, PRO.
104. IIR, No.14, 5 July 1923, CO730/40, PRO.
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105. An Articial Treaty, The Times, 13 Oct. 1922.