SC Decisions

Crim II PreMid Cases

1. People vs Tulin
On Denial of Due Process and Right to Counsel
The extrajudicial confessions made without assistance of counsel are inadmissible in
evidence. There was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial,
considering that it was unequivocally, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of
a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made.

On Conspiracy
Acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be
present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task
in view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.
If there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and
not as principal.

On Piracy
Under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy
embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any
person is covered by the law. Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the
provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between
the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or
interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law,
in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from
crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned
by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as
amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as
separate laws.
Piracy is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. Piracy falls under
Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case,
were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a
special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters.
Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v.
Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law
penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world.
On Obedience to an Order
An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a
superior, if such order is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.

2. People vs Catantan
On Piracy under PD 532
While it may be true that the Pilapils were compelled to go elsewhere other than their
place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of seizing their boat. The
Court said that to sustain the defense and convert the case of piracy to grave coercion
would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by
the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, the very act punished
by PD 532. The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually
seized the vessel through force and intimidation.
It is on these small fishermen that the townspeople depend for the daily bread. To
impede their livelihood would be to deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of
the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social,
educational and community progress of the people."
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils
permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the
truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke
down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back to
their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they were
apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in
evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again,
that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the
pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.

3. Chavez vs Gonzales
On Abstraction of Freedom of Speech
There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent
liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.
Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be subjected to
some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not
be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society.
Restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a
combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits
limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech
restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a
standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and
requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a
given situation of type of situation; and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests
on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the
speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires
that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, "extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high.
It is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of
restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a
content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one
that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; or (2) a
content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter
of the utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the
challenged act is assayed with. A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule.
The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and
the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.
Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be
subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions. The
acts of respondents focused solely on but one object a specific content fixed as these
were on the alleged taped conversations between the President and a COMELEC official.
Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the time, place or manner of the
dissemination of speech or expression.
There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more,
cannot support suppression of free speech and free press.
In this case, for this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear
and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech
and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the antiwiretapping law
clearly endangers the national security of the State.

4. Soriano vs Laguardia
On Freedom of Expression
The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is,
however, not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public
interests, some forms of speech not being protected. As has been held, the limits of the
freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon matters of essentially
private concern.
It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value
expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading
advertisement, insulting or "fighting words", i.e., those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security.
The problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV program
that is rated "G" or for general viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach even
the eyes and ears of children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be
treated as unprotected speech. The State is also mandated to recognize and support the vital
role of the youth in nation building as laid down in Sec. 13, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.
To be sure, the clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been
applied by the courts. Generally, said doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow
of the government and even other evils which do not clearly undermine national security.
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation
results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to
determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under
the particular circumstances presented.

5. People vs Aranas
On Identity of the Offender
Where eyewitnesses contradict themselves on a vital question, such as the identity
of the offender, the element of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be lightly
disregarded. The identity of the offender, like the crime itself must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. In the case at bench, there is no positive identification of the
appellant inasmuch as prosecution eyewitnesses Uy and Magalona contradicted
themselves on the identity of the alleged offender.

On Alibi
Although alibi can be fabricated, it is not always false and without merit, and
when coupled with the improbabilities and uncertainties of the prosecution evidence,
the defense of alibi deserves merit. Besides, the prosecution has the burden of proof in
establishing the guilt of the accused. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. In every criminal prosecution, the
identity of the offender or offenders must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
There must be moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who
committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean exoneration
for accused-appellant.

6. Martinez vs People
On Unreasonable Searches
Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person's right against unwarranted intrusions by
the government. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable.
Clearly, a perusal of the foregoing testimony negates the presence of probable
cause when the police officers conducted their warrantless arrest of Ramon. To
elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly-populated place, with
many people conversing with each other on the street, would constitute any of the acts
punishable under Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance as above-quoted. Ramon
was not making or assisting in any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace;
he was not assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon another; and, the words he
allegedly shouted "Putang ina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" are not slanderous,
threatening or abusive, and thus, could not have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot
considering that at the time of the incident, Balingkit Street was still teeming with people
and alive with activity.
Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested, the
warrantless search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu
purportedly seized from Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree as mandated by the above-discussed constitutional
provisions.

7. Galvante vs Casimiro
On Warrantless Searches
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of
a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law.

On Arbitrary Detention
To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be shown that (a) the
offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender detained the complainant, and (c)
the detention is without legal grounds. The second element was not alleged by petitioner
in his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out by private respondent Conde in his Comment
and Memorandum, petitioner himself identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that it was
Police Chief Rocacorba who caused his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did
petitioner allege that private respondents effected his detention, or were in any other
way involved in it. There was, therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the
criminal charge for arbitrary detention against private respondents.

8. People vs Flores
On Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
Accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime of Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal Detention, since the first element of the said crime is that the offender
must be a private individual. In the case at bar, accused-appellants were members of the
local CAFGU at the time the alleged crime was committed.

On Arbitrary Detention
Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal
grounds, detains a person. Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers, the
question that remains to be resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial
court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accused-appellants.
Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in any
manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty. A careful review of the records of the
instant case shows no evidence sufficient to prove that Samson Sayam was detained
arbitrarily by accused-appellants. While the prosecution witnesses testified that
accusedappellants were seen walking with Samson Sayam toward the direction of the
detachment headquarters, there is no shred of evidence that he was actually confined
there or anywhere else. The fact that Samson Sayam has not been seen or heard from
since he was last seen with accused-appellants does not prove that he was detained
and deprived of his liberty. The prosecution, however, argues that Samson Sayam was
deprived of his liberty when accused-appellants forced him to go with them when they left
the store of Jerry Cabrillos and brought him to the detachment headquarters.
This Court finds the evidence of the prosecution grossly insufficient to sustain a
conviction. Again, the fact of detention, whether illegal or arbitrary, was not clearly
established by credible evidence. There was no showing that Samson Sayam was
locked up, restrained of his freedom, or prevented from communicating with anyone.
Likewise, there was no proof that there was actual intent on the part of accused-appellants
to arbitrarily deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. It is necessary that there must be a
purposeful or knowing action by accused-appellants to restrain the victim by or with force,
because taking coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or arbitrary detention.

9. Fortun vs Arroyo
On Declaring Martial Law and Suspending Habeas Corpus
The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it
becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Here, President Arroyo withdrew
Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could
act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court
has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy.

Carpios Dissenting Opinion

1. The term "rebellion" in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution must be
understood as having the same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" that is defined in Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. For a person to be judicially charged for
rebellion, there must necessarily be a statute defining rebellion. There is no statute defining
rebellion other than the Revised Penal Code. Hence, "one can be 'judicially charged' with
rebellion only if one is suspected of having committed acts defined as rebellion in Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code."
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which explicitly state: The suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. During the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
2. The Revised Penal Code definition of rebellion is the only legal definition of rebellion
known and understood by the Filipino people when they ratified the 1987Constitution.
Indisputably, the Filipino people recognize and are familiar with only one meaning of
rebellion, that is, the definition provided in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. One of the Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1959 expressly cites the Revised
Penal Code definition of rebellion, belying the government's claim that the Revised Penal
Code definition of rebellion merely guided the President in issuing Proclamation No. 1959.
In issuing Proclamation No. 427, President Arroyo relied on the Revised Penal Code
definition of rebellion in declaring a state of rebellion. In other words, President Arroyo
understood that, for purposes of declaring a state of rebellion, the term "rebellion" found in
the Constitution refers to the crime of rebellion defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code.
I am of the view that probable cause of the existence of either invasion or rebellion suffices
and satisfies the standard of proof for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of
the writ.

On Warrantless Arrest and Searches

The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through
the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

10. Kapunan vs CA
On Killings Absorbed in Rebellion
We can take judicial notice that there was no public uprising or taking up of arms
against the Aquino government that took place in November of 1986, and no serious coup
attempt until 28 August 1987. At the very least, that circumstance dissuades us from
concluding with certainty that the killings were inherent to or absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. Such a matter can be addressed instead through a full-dress trial on the merits.
The Court is satisfied that there is prima facie evidence for the prosecution of the
petitioners for the murders of Rolando Olalia and Leonor Alay-ay. The arguments that
petitioners are exempt from prosecution on account of the grants of amnesty they had
received are ultimately without merit, on account of the specified limitations in the said
grant of amnesty.
The Panel refused to consider petitioners' defense of amnesty on the ground that
documents pertaining to the amnesty failed to show that the Olalia-Alay-ay murder
case was one of the crimes for which the amnesty was applied for. Moreover, the Panel
pointed out that the criminal liability of therein respondents (herein petitioners) was not
obliterated by the amnesty granted to them. It was held that the killings were not
committed in furtherance of a political belief because at that time, there was no
rebellion yet launched against the Cory Aquino government.
11. Zalameda vs People
On Warrantless Arrest
We stress at the outset that the petitioner failed to question the legality of his
warrantless arrest. The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing
the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information
against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the
procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must
be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
After carefully evaluating the evidence in its totality, we hold that the prosecution
successfully established that the petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto. We
emphasize that the series of events that led the police to the petitioner's house and to his
arrest were triggered by a "tip" from a concerned citizen that a "pot session" was in
progress at the petitioner's house located on D. Gomez Street. Under the circumstances,
the police did not have enough time to secure a search warrant considering the "time
element" involved in the process.
There was therefore sufficient probable cause for the police officers to believe that the
petitioner and Villaflor were then and there committing a crime. As it turned out, the
petitioner indeed possessed a prohibited drug and, together with Villaflor, was even using a
prohibited drug and likewise illegally possessed drug paraphernalia, contrary to law. When
an accused is caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers are not only authorized
but are duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
The seizure of the various drug paraphernalia is likewise beyond question. Under the
plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. This doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
The search of the petitioner incident to his arrest yielded the confiscated crystalline
substance which later proved to be shabu. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they
inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia scattered on the bed. As these items
were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them.

12. Diamante vs People

On Legality of Arrest
On the legality of petitioners' arrest, the Court finds that, indeed, they are barred from
assailing the same for failure to take issue thereon before their arraignment.
Objections to the legality of an arrest must be made prior to the entry of plea at
arraignment; otherwise, they are considered waived. An accused may also be estopped
from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashal of the
Information against him before his arraignment.
 To be sure, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the accused, hence, any defect therein may be deemed cured when, as
here, the accused voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. An illegal
arrest is thus not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

On Admissability of Evidence
Regarding the admissibility of physical evidence obtained as a result of petitioners'
arrest, the Court need not belabor this question as it is not even a material
consideration in petitioners' conviction. It suffices to state that physical evidence
would be merely corroborative because, as will be discussed later, there are credible
witnesses who testified on the complicity of petitioners in the crimes charged.

13. Dolera vs People

On Chain of Custody
From the foregoing testimony of prosecution witness PO2 Pealosa which was
essentially echoed by prosecution witness PO2 Labon, there is no showing how the flow
of the custody of the drugs went from the time of the arrest of petitioner and alleged
confiscation of the sachets up to the turnover thereof at the police station to the
investigator according to PO2 Pealosa, to the desk officer according to PO2 Labon.
Neither is there a showing that the items were inventoried or photographed and
marked in the presence of petitioner in accordance with statutory requirements. In
fact, where in the police station and at what stage of the investigation was the
supposed marking of evidence done were not even indicated.
There is thus a reasonable likelihood of substitution along the chain in that the two
plastic sachets that tested positive for shabu were different from the items allegedly
seized from petitioner. The Court has long considered such possibility of substitution
as fatal for the prosecution.
Worse, the two marked plastic sachets were not even presented, hence, not
identified in open court by the police officers-witnesses and there is no explanation
extant in the record of what happened to them after their laboratory examination.
That the prosecution offered in evidence the request for laboratory examination, the
chemistry report and the certification from the forensic analyst has no bearing on the
question of whether the specimens submitted for chemical analysis were the same
allegedly seized from petitioner. All that these exhibits proved were the existence and
authenticity of the request for laboratory examination and the results of said
examination, but not the required chain of custody from the time of seizure of the
evidence until its presentation in court.
While there is no need to present all persons who came into contact with the seized
drugs to testify in court, the prosecution still has to convincingly establish that the chain
of custody remained unbroken throughout, and the seized items specifically identified.
This the prosecution failed to discharge.
 Although petitioner's defense is denial which, standing alone, is inherently weak, the
Court has repeatedly stressed that the conviction of an accused must rest on the strength of
the prosecution's evidence and not on the weakness of his defense.

14. People vs Kamlon

On Murder Absorbed in Sedition
The rule obtaining in this jurisdiction allows for the treatment of the common offenses
of murder etc. as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition. The common
crimes involving acts of violence were specifically charged in the information for rebellion,
but in the case at bar the information makes no allegation of political motivation and,
on the contrary, the proof adduced shows that the killing was purely motivated by
personal vengeance.
There is neither law nor jurisprudence which can allow this Court to uphold the
defendant's claim that acts of violence like murder and kidnapping are absorbed by
sedition. The aforecited cases of Hernandez and Geronimo, supra, cannot properly be
invoked as authority for that legal proposition since those two cases involved the crime of
rebellion and not sedition.
When We held in those two cases that murder and other acts of violence were
absorbed by "rebellion," the common crimes alleged to have been committed in
furtherance of the rebellion were specifically charged in the information and, for that
reason, were consequently necessarily alleged to have been committed for political
ends. In the prosecution at bar, however, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, "the
information makes no allegation of political motivation, and the evidence is totally
devoid of any such motivation, for on the contrary, the proof adduced shows that the
killing had no political or social color, but purely motivated by personal vengeance."

On who was telling the truth

This case has resolved itself into a question of who among the witnesses at the trial
were telling the truth. We can hardly hold ourselves in a better position to answer that than
the trial judge who had his five physical senses to aid him reach the fair, correct and
just conclusion.

On the delay of prosecution

We cannot sustain the view of the defendant on the last point raised. Although it is true
that undue delay in the prosecution of criminal actions speaks of the suspicious veracity of
the state's claim, the same observation cannot be made where the delay or inaction, long
though it may be, was imposed on the government by causes over which it has no control.
In the premises and as explained by the Solicitor General's Office, "the incident took place
15 days before the last military operations against Kamlon. People in the area affected
were in the grip of fear and felt no other concern than for their personal safety. The
witnesses could have preferred to remain in silence of what they knew against Kamlon
in the hope, however, that with the military operations about to be set afoot, retributive
justice would catch up with Kamlon and his henchmen that they might perish in the battle."
15. Martinez vs Morfe
On Immunity from Arrest
In the language of Art. XVI, Sec. 2 of the Constitution, that portion of Art. 145
penalizing a public official or employee who shall while the Congress is in regular or
special session arrest or search any member thereof except in case he has committed a
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor is
declared inoperative. Nor does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue.
Such a provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the Constitution became
operative on November 15, 1935.
As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution, the immunity from
arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace.

16. Alberto vs de la Cruz

On Amending Information
From the facts of the case, We are convinced that the respondent Judge committed an
error in ordering the fiscal to amend the information so as to include Armando Cledera and
Jose Esmeralda as defendants in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur. It is the rule that a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion
to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to
support the allegations thereof.

On Delivering Prisoners from Jail

The offense may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined in any
jail or penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to escape. To remove means to
take away a person from the place of his confinement, with or without the active
cooperation of the person released. To help in the escape of a person confined in any jail or
penal institution means to furnish that person with the material means such as a file, ladder,
rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape. The offense under this article is usually
committed by an outsider who removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him
escape. If the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is
liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalized under Article 223 of
the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera, as governor, is the jailer of the province, 16
and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the
escape of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be guilty under the aforequoted provisions (Art 223) of the Penal Code, it is
necessary that the public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner
under his custody or charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the
person in charge is an essential condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in
the custody of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does
not connive with the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime.
For sure, no connivance in the escape of Pablo Denaque from the custody of the accused
Eligio Orbita can be deduced from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for
five men to work in the guest house, it appearing that the notes does not mention the names
of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was the accused Eligio Orbita
himself who picked the men to compose the work party.

17. People vs Ama

On Plea of Guilty
The main error assigned by counsel is that the lower court erred in allowing appellant to
change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty without informing him that his plea cannot
offset the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism alleged in the information as to
obviate the imposition of death penalty. According to defense counsel, had the trial court
informed appellant that despite his plea of guilty he would still be sentenced to death, he
would have chosen to go to trial no matter how slim might be his chance of being acquitted.
Counsel further avers that the attorney who assisted appellant in the lower court committed
an oversight in advising him to plead guilty overlooking the provisions of Article 160 of the
Revised Penal Code on quasi-recidivism, while the lower court erred in sentencing him to
death relying merely on his plea of guilty.
There is no merit in this appeal. When an accused is arraigned in connection with a
criminal charge the only duty of the court is to inform him of its nature and cause so that he
may be able to comprehend it, as well as the circumstances attendant thereto. And when the
charge is of a serious nature it becomes the imperative duty of his counsel not only to assist
him during the reading of the information but also to explain to him the real import of the
charge so that he may fully realize the gravity and consequences of his plea. But there is
nothing in the law that imposes upon the court the duty to apprise him of what the nature of
the penalty to be meted out to him might be if he would plead guilty to the charge, its duty
being limited to have him informed of the nature and cause thereof. In the instant case, the
lower court did just that. In fact, it did even more. Considering the gravity of the charge it
asked the fiscal to produce the evidence in his possession relative to the aggravating
circumstance alleged in the information so that appellant's counsel may peruse it, and this
was done without any objection on his part, and thereafter, the court rendered its decision.
The error that counsel now imputes to the lower court is, therefore, untenable. Indeed, if
appellant expressed his desire to plead guilty it is for no other reason than that his
conscience persuaded him to do so, and so he has to suffer its consequences.
It was held that a plea of guilty is an admission of all the material facts alleged in the
complaint or information. In subsequent cases, we ruled that a plea of guilty when formally
entered in arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense charged in the
information, without the necessity of requiring additional evidence, since by so pleading,
the defendant himself has supplied the necessary proof (People vs. Valencia, 59 Phil., 42;
People vs. Palupe, 69 Phil., 702.) It matters not even if the offense is capital, for the
admission (plea of guilty), covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances.
18. Southern Hemisphere vs Anti-Terrorism Council
On Constitutionality of Human Security Act
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the
United States of America 17 (US) and the European Union 18 (EU) have both classified the
CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of
the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the
CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. 19 Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to
be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as
domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in
effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have
conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual,
prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For one,
those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this
Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor
does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements not
having been altered. Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no
relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three
years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners' obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged
as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these
allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function.
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief,
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of
the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
prohibited acts.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth
doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. As distinguished
from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even
though some of it is protected. The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations
by which a criminal statute may be challenged" and "underscored that an
'on-its-face' invalidation of penal statutes may not be allowed." The rule established in
our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal
statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation
of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding,
however, that there was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its entirety." It
stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant."
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism
must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free
speech clause. The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is
conduct, not speech. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there
must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key
qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first
element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of
the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.